

**TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: THREATS, RESPONSES AND
THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY**

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ABSTRACT

TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: THREATS, RESPONSES AND THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY BY EJI EUGENE EJI (STUDENT NUMBER 1100534)

This phenomenological study, "Terrorism in Nigeria: Threats, Responses and the Question of Strategy" focuses on Nigeria and its current greatest security challenge - terrorism. Although it could be said that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, significant research on the subject was only recently stimulated particularly following the activities of the Boko Haram Islamic Sect. Many issues and gaps are therefore yet to be adequately researched and addressed. One of such issues is the sustainability and effectiveness of Nigeria's strategy for countering terrorism. The study, from a social constructivist perspective, takes a look at the threats of terrorism in Nigeria which have manifested in the form of religious extremism as exemplified in the Maitatsine uprisings, state terrorism under military rule and ethno-nationalistic clamour for change as witnessed in the Niger Delta Crisis. These threats preceded that of Boko Haram which is ongoing and has resulted in about 17,000 deaths as at mid-2015.

Adopting mainly qualitative methods, I juxtaposed the threats, in time and space, against government responses in an action/reaction process demonstrated across a series of case studies. In this way, the study presented a threat-response interplay between the terrorists and government. It revealed flaws in the responses adopted by the government noting that the counter-terrorism efforts of the Government of Nigeria were not guided by a documented national strategy until the release of the NACTEST in 2014. Even at this, the NACTEST is observed to be fraught with gaps that questions its suitability as a policy document for countering terrorism in Nigeria. The study surmised that of absolute necessity for countering terrorism in Nigeria is the emplacement of a people-centred strategy that employs whole-of-government and non-governmental approaches, and went on to make recommendations towards achieving this.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I give God all the glory for the grace to undertake and complete this study. Although the contents herein are my thoughts motivated by the desire to proffer solutions to a burning national security issue, the thesis would not have been possible without the support of others. I am inestimably indebted to the directors of the Buckingham University Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies, Professor Anthony Glees and Dr Julian Richards, for not only inspiring me into undertaking this study but also giving me the opportunity to embark on it under their tutelage. Dr Julian's feat of a professional who successfully ventured into the academics was particularly stirring, and this was bolstered by his acceptance to supervise the thesis. I thank him for the in-depth commitment and guidance he offered me throughout the study.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

- AFN - Armed Forces of Nigeria
- APC - All Progressives Congress (Party)
- APC - Arewa People's Congress
- AQIM - al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
- AU - African Union
- CJTF - Civilian Joint Task Force
- CONTEST - Counter Terrorism Strategy (United Kingdom)
- CTC - Counter Terrorism Centre
- DIA- Defence Intelligence Agency
- DSS - Department of State Service
- ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
- EU - European Union
- FTO - Foreign Terrorist Organisation
- GTI - Global Terrorism Index
- ICC - Intelligence Community Committee
- IED - Improvised Explosive Device
- IDP - Internally Displaced Person
- ING - Interim National Government
- JIB - Joint Intelligence Board
- JIC - Joint Intelligence Committee
- JTF - Joint Task Force
- MASSOB - Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
- MDAs - Ministries, Departments and Agencies

MEND - Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta

MNJTF - Multi-National Joint Task Force

MOSOP - Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

NACTEST- National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Nigeria)

NADECO - National Democratic Coalition

NALICON - National Liberation Council of Nigeria

NCNC - National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon, later known as the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens

NIA - National Intelligence Agency

NPC - Northern Peoples' Congress

NSA - National Security Adviser

NSCT - National Strategy for Counterterrorism (United States)

NPN - National Party of Nigeria

NPF - Nigeria Police Force

ONSA - Office of the National Security Adviser

OPC - Oduduwa People Congress

PDP - People's Democratic Party

PRP - Peoples Redemption Party

SSS - State Security Services

TPA - Terrorism Prevention Act

UN - United Nations (for United Nations Organization)

US - United States (for United States of America)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents	Page
Title Page.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgement.....	iii
Abbreviations and Acronyms... ..	iv
Table of Contents	vi
List of Tables.....	xi
List of Figures.....	xii
Appendices.....	xii
Declaration of Originality.....	xiii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study.....	1
Statement of the Problem.....	5
Research Questions	8
Objectives of the Study.....	9
Significance of the Study.....	9
Limitations of the Study	10
Research Methodology.....	10
Organization of the Study.....	15

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Preamble.....	17
Conceptual Discourse	17
Threats	35
Responses to Threats	44
Counter Terrorism Strategy	46
Selected Academic Works Relevant to the Study	52
Theoretical Framework.....	60

CHAPTER THREE
THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT, HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND
CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

Preamble	60
Nigeria: An Overview	67
Historical Overview of Terrorism in Nigeria.....	78
Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria.....	83

CHAPTER FOUR

RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF MAITATSINE

Preamble	100
Methodology.....	100
Religious Fundamentalism in Nigeria	102
The Maitatsine Terrorist Activities (1980-1985).....	106
Assessment of Government Responses.....	124
Lessons	129

CHAPTER FIVE

MILITARY RULE AND STATE TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE BABANGIDA AND ABACHA REGIMES

Preamble	131
Military Rule in Nigeria.....	131
The Notion of State Terrorism.....	133
Origin of State Terrorism in Nigeria.....	134
The Generals Babangida and Abacha Terror Era.....	136
Assessment of Government Responses.....	152
Lessons	156

CHAPTER SIX

MILITANCY AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

Preamble	159
Militancy and Terrorism.....	160
The Niger Delta Region.....	162
Terrorism in the Niger Delta.....	163
Assessment of Government Responses.....	182
Lessons.....	185

CHAPTER SEVEN

ISLAMIC JIHADISM AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OFBOKO HARAM

Preamble	186
Islamic Jihad and Terrorism.....	187
The Boko Haram Terrorist Group.....	189
Assessment of Government Responses.....	218

CHAPTER EIGHT

APPRAISAL OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE THREATS OF TERRORISM

Preamble.....	221
Methodology	224
Issue One: Policy and Legislation on Terrorism	225

Issue Two: Governance and Terrorism in Nigeria.....	230
Issue Three: Counter Terrorism Institutions.....	234
Issue Four: National Security and Intelligence Architecture.....	236
Issue Five: Border Management and Terrorism in Nigeria.....	240
Issue Six: Employment of Strategic Communications and Partnership.....	244
Future Trends of Terrorism in Nigeria	247

CHAPTER NINE

TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA

Preambles	260
Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Policy versus Practice	261
Counter Terrorism Techniques	266
A Sustainable and Effective Counter Terrorism Strategy for Nigeria	274

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Preambles	289
Highlights of the Study	289
Summary of Major Findings	292
Recommendations	295

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books.....	299
Official Publications	303
Newspapers, Periodicals/Journals.....	304
Internet and Electronic Media.....	310
Unpublished Materials	313

LIST OF TABLES

1.	Table 1.1	GTI Top 30 Most Terrorised Countries Ranking for 2015.
2.	Table 2.1	Definition of Terrorism by Selected Scholars.
3.	Table 2.2	Summary of Selected Theoretical Explanations of Conflict.
4.	Table 4.1	Maitatsine - Government of Nigeria.
5.	Table 5.1	Pro-Democracy - Military Regimes Interplay.
6.	Table 6.1	Niger Delta Militants - Nigerian Government Interplay.
7.	Table 7.1	Major Activities by Boko Haram and Government Responses from July 2009 to October 2015.
8.	Table 8.1	Length of Borders between Nigeria and Contiguous Neighbours.
9.	Table 9.1	Gaps in Nigeria's National Counter Terrorism Strategy.

LIST OF FIGURES

1.	Figure 3.1	Political Map of Nigeria.
2.	Figure 4.1	Graphical Representations of Maitatsine Activities and Government Concessions/Military Approaches.
3.	Figure 5.1	Graphical Representations of Pro-Democracy Activities and Military Regimes Concessions/Military Approaches.
4.	Figure 6.1	Map of Southern Part of Nigeria Showing the Nine Oil Producing States.

5. Figure 6.2 Graphical Representations of Niger Delta Militant Activities and Nigerian Government Concession/Military Approaches.
6. Figure 7.1 Map Showing Major Attacks by Boko Haram 2009 - 2013.
7. Figure 7.2 Graphical Representations of Boko Haram's Major Activities and the Government Concession/Military Approaches.

APPENDICES

1. Appendix One: National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (of Nigeria) 2014.

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Eji Eugene Eji (student number 1100534), hereby declare that my thesis entitled "Terrorism in Nigeria: Threats, Responses and the Question of Strategy" is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text, and is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Buckingham or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or is concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma, or other qualification at the University of Buckingham or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

Signature:

Date: December 2015

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Boko Haram is an example of small fires causing large fires. An eccentric and unorthodox preacher with a tiny following was given posthumous fame and following by his extra judicial murder at the hands of the police. Since then, through official bungling, negligence, complacency or collusion, Boko Haram became a terrifying force, taking tens of thousands of lives and capturing several towns and villages covering swathes of Nigerian sovereign territory.

President Muhammadu Buhari¹

Nigeria currently attracts significant global attention with headline news of a complex terrorism situation as described in the above statement by the country's president. The threats of terrorism have manifested in various forms over the years, and challenged the country's national integrity and the wellbeing of its citizens. Ironically, the Nigerian government seem not to have been adopting the appropriate strategy in countering terrorism and therefore often escalates and prolongs rather than promptly contain the threats. This study, from a social constructivist approach, reflects on these issues and the crafting of an effective national counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

It is the general consensus that terrorism is a subjective and multifaceted phenomenon that defies a universally accepted definition.² In broad terms, it is a tactic involving the use or threat of the use of violence by individual(s), groups, sub-state or state actors to register their grievances against existing political, economic or social situations perceived as not favourable to them. Terrorists carry out their acts mainly against civilian targets with the aim

¹ Muhammadu Buhari, Inaugural Speech during Swearing-in Ceremony as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at Abuja on 29 May, 2015.

² B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp 1-3. See also Jack P. Gibbs, "Conceptualization of Terrorism" in J. Hogan and K. Braddock eds., *Terrorism Studies: A Reader* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 63.

of intimidating or instilling fear, thereby influencing the government to take or not to take a particular course of action.³

The word “terrorism” originated from the Latin word *terrere* (meaning “to frighten”) and popularised by the French word *terrorisme* used to refer to the “reign of terror” witnessed during the French Revolution of 1789.⁴ Terrorism during the French Revolution supported regime security since it was employed as an instrument of governance by the revolutionary government against those considered enemies of the people. It has however changed both in meaning and nature from the French Revolution period assuming revolutionary, anti-monarchical and anti-anarchist forms to nationalist, separatist as well as ethno-religious and ideological (particularly anti-West) dimensions.⁵ The al-Qaeda attack against the United States (US) on 11 September 2001, in which a total of nearly three thousand people were killed is thought to mark the dawn of modern international terrorism.⁶ It could be said that terrorism and the fight against terrorism have now assumed such global dimensions that no part of the world can claim not to have been affected either directly or indirectly by it.

In Nigeria, the activities of some ethnic and religious groups as well as by the state that qualify to be categorised as terrorism, have been evident in the country’s political history. Terrorism in Nigeria, as this study will show, has manifested itself in various forms, and particularly as part of wider conflict situations. During the colonial period, the colonialists employed terrorist tactics of violence, intimidation and fear to coerce or persuade the local population into accepting regime policies.⁷ On the other hand, the same tactic of violence and

³ Terrorism can also take the form of sabotage or attacks on infrastructure, and equally be directed at military installations and formations in order to provoke an over-reactive target response or as a way to soften an otherwise hard target.

⁴ M. Williamson, *Terrorism, War and International Law: The Legality of the Use of Force against Afghanistan in 2001* (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), p. 43.

⁵ B. Hoffman, pp. 3-34.

⁶ *Ibid*, p.19.

⁷ A. B. Oyeniya, “Terrorism in Nigeria, Groups, Activities and Politics,” in *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1.1 Quarter I 2010, p. 3.

fear was used by some indigenous societies to resist colonial rule. Indeed some scholars believe that colonialism sowed the seed of terrorism in Nigeria and other post-colonial societies.⁸

The Maitatsine religious uprising led by Muhammed Marwa, an Islamic immigrant scholar from Marwa town area in Northern Cameroon, is often regarded as the first major incidence of terrorism in Nigeria.⁹ The uprising which started in Kano in December 1980 spread to Bauchi, Gombe, Maiduguri and Yola in North Central and North Eastern Nigeria resulting in the death of over 10 million persons.¹⁰ The military regime of General Muhammad Buhari contained the activities of Maitatsine in 1985 through the use of military force, which is the traditional and hard counter-terrorism approach. The later military regimes of Generals Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha and Abdulsalami Abubakar by their authoritarian style of government stifled groups whose activities would have probably resulted in terrorism related threats. Incidentally, Nigeria witnessed the first bomb attack under a military regime. This was in form of a letter bomb that killed the Newswatch Magazine Chief Executive Officer, Dele Giwa on 19 October 1986.¹¹ Subsequently, a series of bomb explosions occurred with both the military government and groups agitating for a return to democratic rule trading blames as to the responsibility for the bomb attacks.

The military handed over power to a civilian democratic government in 1999.¹² However, the return of democratic rule witnessed an upsurge of militant groups along ethnic, socio-

⁸ W. Okumu, *Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding its Impact on Human Security* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009), p. 1.

⁹ K. U. Danladi, *Maitatsine Violence: The Birth of Religious Fundamentalism in Nigeria* (Kano: Al Aku, 1992), p. 17.

¹⁰ Elizabeth Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited" *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XVII, 3 (Wellington: Victoria University, 1987), p. 194.

¹¹ Frank Sochukwu Osanugor, *Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience 1995 – 1998* (Lagos: Advent Communications Ltd, 2004), p.47.

¹² Sonnie B. E. Gberevbie, "Constitutional and Legal Framework for Military Involvement in the Management of Conflict" in Amos G. Adedeji and Istifanus Zabadi eds., *The Military and Management of Internal Conflict in Nigeria* (Abuja: ACSRT-National War College, 2005), p. 57

economic and religious lines.¹³ In the Niger Delta area, low level violent protests against environmental degradation and agitations for resource control as well as socio-economic development deteriorated into militancy that employed the tactics of terrorism. Hostage-taking, kidnapping, oil pipelines vandalism and armed assault on oil workers and security personnel heightened to such levels that warranted Nigeria been listed as a security risk country for international travellers.¹⁴ In the North-eastern part of Nigeria, religious fundamentalism assumed a greater level of violence. In December 2003 and January 2004, an Islamic sect known by the names Nigerian Taliban and Al-Sunna Wa'al Jamma launched an uprising with the aim of establishing an Afghanistan Taliban-styled Muslim state.¹⁵ From July 2009, the same sect now under the name Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram, launched an unprecedented armed assault on the local population and security forces across the North-eastern part of Nigeria.¹⁶

Terrorism in Nigeria now revolves primarily around the activities of the Boko Haram Islamic sect. The ideological mission of the group is to overthrow the Nigerian state, abolish all western values and impose strict Islamic Sharia law throughout the entire country.¹⁷ Beyond this is the sect's quest to turn Nigeria into a base for terrorist operations in West Africa.¹⁸ The

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Oronto Douglas, Von Kemedi, Ike Okonta, and Michael Watts, "Oil and Militancy in The Niger Delta: Terrorist Threat Or Another Colombia?" in *Niger Delta: Economies of Violence*, ISS Working Papers No.4 (California: ISS, 2004) p. 2.

¹⁵ Virginia Comolli. *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency* (London: Hurst & Co Ltd, 2015), pp. 45-47.

¹⁶ Onuoha C., "The 9/7 Boko Haram Attack on Bauchi Prison: A Case of Intelligence Failure", *Peace and Conflict Monitor*, 2 November 2010, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=754, accessed 2 June 2013.

¹⁷ Agbiboa Daniel Egiegba, "The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism of Boko Haram," in *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 13, No.1 (2013) p. 20.

¹⁸ Jonathan G. E., Presidential Address presented at the Regional Summit of Security in Nigeria at Paris, 12 May 2014. Also, Buhari M., "Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Africa", paper delivered at Chatham House London, 26 February 2015.

activities of the sect have been so devastating that as at mid-2015, it has led to the death of about 17,000 persons.¹⁹

1.2 Statement of the Problem

It could reasonably be said that terrorism in Nigeria has led to the loss of lives and property, dented Nigeria's image and conceivably raised doubts as to the continuous existence of the country as one political entity. What is perhaps more worrisome is the continuous deterioration of the terrorism situation with Nigeria ranking 3rd position on the 2015 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) of most terrorised countries in the world.²⁰ Table 1.1 depicts the top 30 most terrorised countries on the 2015 GTI ranking.

Table 1.1 GTI Top 30 Most Terrorised Countries Ranking for 2015

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
1	Iraq	10
2	Afghanistan	9.233
3	Nigeria	9.213
4	Pakistan	9.065
5	Syria	8.108
6	India	7.747
7	Yemen	7.642
8	Somalia	7.6
9	Libya	7.29
10	Thailand	7.279
11	Philippines	7.27
12	Ukraine	7.2
13	Egypt	6.813

¹⁹ Amnesty International, *Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands* (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2015) p. 4.

²⁰ See Global Terrorism Index Report, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, November 2015, p. 10.

14	Central African Republic	6.721
15	South Sudan	6.712
16	Sudan	6.686
17	Colombia	6.662
18	Kenya	6.66
19	Democratic Republic of Congo	6.487
20	Cameroon	6.466
21	Lebanon	6.376
22	China	6.294
23	Russia	6.207
24	Israel	6.034
25	Bangladesh	5.921
26	Mali	5.871
27	Turkey	5.737
28	United Kingdom	5.613
29	Greece	4.976
30	Uganda	4.894

Source: Adapted from <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>, accessed 30 November 2015.

This ranking is against Nigeria's position of 4th in 2014, 7th in 2012, 11th in 2010 and 16th in 2008. The trend is either an indication that other countries have shifted positions as a result of better counter-terrorism measures, or that the threat of terrorism in Nigeria has increased in proportion, or yet still that the counter- terrorism policies of the Nigerian government have not been effective. It could be said that all the three assumptions are probably true, but the third is pivotal. This is saying that ineffective counter-terrorism policies by a terrorist-affected state could escalate terrorist activities and worsening of the situation when compared with other equally affected countries. One could therefore hypothesise here that there is a

correlation between viable and sustainable strategies, and any effective counter-terrorism effort by government. In other words, effective counter-terrorism effort is to a large degree dependent on the strategies adopted by government. Therefore, the core hypothesis on which this study is based surmises that a major reason for the inability of the Nigerian government to counter terrorism so far is because of ineffective approach to the threat in terms of lacking or faulty counter-terrorism strategy. It is worth positing here that the trend, if allowed to continue, could render Nigeria ungovernable and a breeding ground for international terrorism.

The situation above is a concern not only for government and its security apparatus but for the academic community as well. Appropriate research by the academia is needed to assist government in the formulation and implementation of robust counter-terrorism policies. Scholars such as Abolurin, Comolli and Apata have attempted such research but as I will emphasize in the subsequent chapter on literature review, their works have been limited in this regards.²¹ There is therefore a compelling need to offer a uniquely detailed longitudinal study of terrorism in post-independence Nigeria in order to obtain a clearer picture to appropriately shape Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy. Herein, this study fits. The central problem of the study therefore revolves around the crafting of an effective and sustainable counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria through an inquiry into the interplay between terrorist activities (or threats) and successive governments counter-terrorism measures (or responses) over a period of time. The study consequently conducts a sort of inquiry or examination of what the responses of successive governments to the threat of terrorism has been thereby drawing both positive as well as negative lessons for effective counter-terrorism effort by the Government of Nigeria.

²¹ See details of the works of these scholars in section 2.3 of chapter two.

It is noted that the subject of terrorism has attracted the attention of a lot of scholars globally. However, scholarship and literature spread appears to have been uneven. In the case of Nigeria, there is an observed deficiency of literature on terrorism as awareness on the subject was low until the advent of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Boko Haram. Also, those that could have dealt with the subject of terrorism in Nigeria tend to evade specifics, preferring to treat it under the broad subject of national security or under other labels such as insurgency, militancy, ethno-religious or political violence.

Equally, a good number of the literature on the subject of terrorism are either written by Western scholars or from a Western perspective.²² Among the few written by Nigerians, some still fall victim to either the Western perspective or of the subjective nature of terrorism with geopolitical, religious and ethnic bias.²³ Furthermore, for the available literature on terrorism in Nigeria, and even those on general national security issues, linkage is hardly made between events. The works have mainly been episodic, without relating such to the previous cases or antecedents. As a result no lessons are learnt from previous events and experiences to shape current and emerging trends. When lessons are not learnt, mistakes are obviously made, and in this case the responses to, and strategies to contain threats remain ineffective. This study seeks to address these gaps.

1.3 Research Questions

The hypothesis that is central to this research is that the Nigerian government has failed to effectively counter terrorism because of the ineffectiveness of its strategy. This necessitates the need to reflect on what the responses of government to the threats posed by terrorism have been, and flowing from this, the suitable strategy that could be adopted for countering

²² Michael Smith's and Virginia Comolli's books on Boko Haram arguably fall into this category.

²³ See, for instance, the works of Hamzat and Ogundiya, Ade Abolurin and Odulami as detailed in chapter two.

terrorism in Nigeria. To address this, the study will be guided by the following specific questions:

- a. What are the origin, nature and causes of terrorism in Nigeria?
- b. How has the terrorism threat pattern evolved over the years in Nigeria?
- c. How have successive Nigerian governments responded to the threats of terrorism?
- d. What are the policy implications or shortcomings of the Nigerian government responses to the threats of terrorism?
- e. What policy options or sustainable national strategy can the Nigerian government adopt to effectively counter terrorism in the country?

This study, through a methodology that is later described, thus conducts a detailed longitudinal analysis of selected episodes of terrorism in Nigeria and the government's responses to them, by way of addressing the above research questions.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

This study is about the quest for effective and sustainable strategy for countering terrorism in Nigeria. It sets out with the broad objectives of addressing the questions posed in section 1.3. Specifically, it will examine the responses of successive Nigerian governments to the threats of terrorism with a view to recommending effective and sustainable counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study is of academic and policy significance as it is intended to fill some gaps in existing literature and address policy issues. The study will provide an insight into how successive governments of Nigeria have managed the threats of terrorism. It is therefore expected to

serve as a reference material to the managers and practitioners of counter-terrorism in Nigeria. The study aim to contribute to knowledge by deepening the understanding of terrorism in Nigeria, complementing the existing literature on the subject and stimulating further research from the gaps that would arise from it.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

As Andrew Silke contends, to research anything about terrorism is difficult as it is one subject that is characterised by a marked absence of conceptual agreement and a wide diversity of views on even basic issues.²⁴ The emotive and controversial nature of the subject was felt during the research, and posed the demand for a high sense of balanced judgement on the researcher. The inability to interview members of terrorist organisations presented additional limitations. I was equally unable to visit some of the affected areas due to ongoing violence.

These limitations were however overcome by my interview of victims, security personnel, civil society organisations, political figures, traditional rulers, religious leaders and counter-terrorism operation commanders. I also visited prisons, detention facilities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps. Statements and messages by terrorists, particularly those posted on the internet and to media houses, and by government through press releases and broadcasts were also analysed. All of these provided the data critical to the study. Equally, the author writes from a position of strength bringing to bear the advantage of not only been a Nigerian but also a witness to some of the events examined in the study.

1.7 Research Methodology

²⁴ Andrew Silke, ed., *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 2.

This is primarily a social constructivist study that utilizes the qualitative research approach to look at the interactions between the Nigerian Government and terrorists across a set of case studies. The choice of social constructivism is essentially as terrorism, and by extension counter-terrorism, are social phenomena and therefore best studied within a context that examines the development of a jointly constructed understanding of the world. As Charmaz opines, a social constructivist approach offers the opportunity for researchers to develop new understandings and novel theoretical interpretations of studied life, and in this case, of the actions and reactions of individuals.²⁵ This is the intention of this study, by putting forward over time and space an action/reaction model for understanding terrorism in Nigeria and how the country's counter-terrorism strategy could and should be shaped.

The study thus adopts a combination of historical-descriptive analysis and qualitative case study method of inquiry into the phenomena of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Nigeria. In doing this, particular attention was paid to the conflict studies of Collier and Hoeffler, Dusek's analysis of revolution and state response in Eastern Europe as well as Sandler and Todd's game theoretical analysis of terrorism among other works.²⁶ Daniel Byman's theory of proto-insurgency which explains for the rise of terrorist groups and escalation of violence provided the framework for the study.²⁷ All these enabled the researcher to look at the threats of terrorism in Nigeria from a historical context, make a comparative analysis of the responses by various Nigerian governments to the threats and in the process draw lesson for the crafting of a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy. Specifically, the research espouses a terrorism threat-response analysis framework, the outcomes of which brought to light the necessity of a national counter terrorism strategy that is both effective and sustainable.

²⁵ K. Charmaz, "Constructionism and the Grounded Theory" in J.A. Holstein and J.F. Gulbrium eds., *Handbook of Constructionist Research* (New York: The Guildford Press, 2008), p. 398.

²⁶ These works are outlined in detail in section 4.1 of chapter four.

²⁷ D. L. Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007).

Although rooted in a qualitative epistemological position, the study employs both qualitative and quantitative data collection tools. Field method was used to collect primary data through semi-structured interviews and questionnaires. The choice of this method was informed by the need to collect data from a representative sample of the population who are knowledgeable in the subject or involved in the subject as stakeholders or affected as victims. The specifics of the interview and questionnaire methods used is further discussed.

1.7.1 Interviews

Flick avers that interviews are entirely appropriate for phenomenological and symbolic-interactionist studies of this type.²⁸ To this, Patton adds the imperative of sampling of interviewees. He elucidates that purposeful sampling for qualitative interview datasets should aim to establish an “information-rich” sample.²⁹ In the case of a somewhat technical set of phenomena such as political violence and counter-terrorism policy, a set of “especially knowledgeable” respondents who can demonstrate sector-specific relevance to the topic at hand would seem entirely appropriate.³⁰ Set against this, I interviewed a total of 51 persons among whom were government officials involved in the counter-terrorism effort either in the form of policy-making or implementation. They include officials at the Office of the National Security Adviser, Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN), Nigerian Police, the intelligence and other security agencies. The others were academics, private security consultants, civil societies, religious heads and community leaders. I had the opportunity to also interview some victims who relocated out of areas of violence and others at IDPs camps. The focus of the interviews rested on three related pillars; the antecedents of terrorism threats and responses, substantive

²⁸ U. Flick, p. 11.

²⁹ M.Q. Patton, “Enhancing the Quality and Credibility of Qualitative Analysis.” *Health Services Research* Volume 34:5, Part II (December 1999), p. 1197.

³⁰ L.A. Palinkas, S.M. Horwitz, C.A. Green, J.P. Wisdom, N. Duan and K. Hoagwood, “Purposeful Sampling for Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method Implementation Research.” *Administration and Policy in Mental Health*, published online 6 November 2013, p. 2.

counter-terrorism issues and the way forward in terms of a national strategy to counter terrorism in Nigeria.

The semi-structured interview technique afforded me the opportunity to observe and sense the emotions, feelings and other personal matters regarding the interviewee and the subject that would have not been revealed in a structured interview. This is crucial in a research involving an intricate subject as terrorism. It also allows the interviewee the freedom to discuss issues broadly and in depth given the flexibility of semi-structured as opposed to the rigidity of structured interviews. I was equally able to clarify doubts and thereby comprehend issues that appeared complicated or controversial. There were however weaknesses with this approach as efforts had to be made to manage feelings and keep the respondents focussed on the topic of research interest which would not have been the case in a structured interview.

While a significant number of the personalities interviewed were based in Abuja and other major towns, and were therefore easily accessible to be interviewed verbally (face-to-face or telephonically), the same was difficult for those at locations where terrorism was on going due to safety concerns. Equally, the telecommunication facilities in most of these locations have been destroyed by terrorists for telephone interviews to be conducted. Thus, the questions of availability and accessibility of respondents was a factor in the research design here. The questionnaire method therefore complemented the interviews, and yielded good result in this regard.

1.7.2 Questionnaires

The study adopted the simple random sampling technique. This ensured that relevant characteristics like geographical spread, sex, religion and the degree of involvement of respondents in policy, operations or as victims were considered to provide robust data that meets the requirement for external validity. The main respondents were inhabitants of

communities where violence was ongoing and personnel of the security bodies as well as of other agencies in the theatre of counter-terrorism operations that could not be reached for face-to-face or telephone interview. Although only specific views and limited details could be obtained from the questionnaire method, it enabled the views of a larger number of people to be considered in spite of the ongoing violence. The questionnaires were administered with the help of research assistants and friends serving in the areas covered. The researcher also had the advantage of previous work experience in some of these areas.

1.7.3 Secondary Data

A broad and large amount of data from secondary sources complemented the primary sources of data obtained from the field method. The secondary sources of data were from books, official documents, journals, magazines, newspapers, seminars, dissertations, other published and unpublished materials as well as the Internet. The secondary data proved very useful in clarifying the basic concepts and other aspects of the study that the primary sources could not cover.

1.7.4 Data Analysis and Presentation

The data generated during the study were analyzed qualitatively. Cognizance was taken of the aim of analysis which, as Struwig and Stead stated, is the interpretation of data to make it understandable.³¹ This incorporates the ability to collect, interpret, criticize and provide a balanced argument on critical issues. The analyses were used to draw the conclusion and recommendations made in the study.

Validity and reliability are important in a research such as this. Validity refers to the credibility and trustworthiness in research while reliability has to do with consistency and dependability. Apart from intuition and inferences of study, the triangulation method was

³¹ Struwig and Stead, quoted in Rufus Khalidheen "Policing Mechanisms to Counter Terrorist Attacks in South Africa" thesis submitted at the University of South Africa, March 2008.

used to ensure the validity and reliability of this study. The method is often used to indicate that more than one technique is incorporated in order to cross-reference findings for the objective of credibility. For instance, more than one source was used to obtain an unbiased understanding of key concepts in the review of literature, and varied sources of primary and secondary data were exploited throughout the study. Another method employed to ensure validity and reliability was the cross-referencing of findings obtained from open sources such as books and from the interviews conducted.

Following the data generated and the nature of the study, the presentation of data was done in a descriptive analytical form. Tables, charts and graphs were used where appropriate. Further details on the methodology specific to the sections of this study are made in chapter four to cover the case studies, and in chapter eight on appraisal of government responses to the threats of terrorism.

1.8 Organisation of the Study

The study is organized into ten chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. It explains the background to the study, defines the problem and the research questions that the study seeks to answer. It also states the objectives, significance and limitations of the study as well as the research methodology employed. In chapter two, the key variables that guide and shape the research are conceptualised. These are terrorism, threats, responses and counter-terrorism strategy. It further reviews some scholarly works relevant to the study and fashions a theoretical framework that lays the foundation for better understanding of the study. Chapter three defines the threat environment in geographical, economic, historical and security settings. The possible causes of terrorism in Nigeria and the key actors involved are discussed.

The fourth chapter dwells on religious fundamentalism and terrorism in Nigeria. A case study of the threat posed by the Maitatsine religious sect between 1980 and 1985, and the response

to it by the then government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari and later, General Muhammadu Buhari are examined. Military rule and what the study describes as state terrorism are discussed in chapter five. The response of the military regimes of Generals Babangida and Abacha to pro-democracy groups was the main focus here. In chapter six, militancy and terrorism are discussed and a case study made of the threat posed by militant groups in the oil producing Niger Delta area and the response by government particularly the regimes of Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Yar'Adua to it. Chapter seven examines Islamic jihadists and terrorism focusing on the threat posed by the Boko Haram Islamic sect, and the responses to it by the Nigerian government under Presidents Obasanjo, Yar'Adua, Jonathan and Buhari.

The above dovetails into an assessment of the responses of the Nigerian government to the threat of terrorism made in chapter eight. A prognosis of the future trend of terrorism in Nigeria is equally covered in the chapter. Chapter nine focuses on a possible sustainable and effective counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria. It covers aspects such as the gaps in the current strategy and what the Nigerian Government could do to address them. Chapter ten concludes by drawing from the whole body of research highlights that will enable the government of Nigeria to better direct its counter-terrorism efforts through a sustainable and effective strategy.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Preamble

The subject of terrorism could be said to be replete with literature which often reflect its complex and subjective nature. According to the Quaker Council for European Affairs, terrorism occurs in many guises and locations with the acts justified by a plethora of different ideologies and grievances.¹ This therefore makes terrorism open to many varied interpretation. The import of this is the imperative of defining the perspective of any study on terrorism, including this one.

In this chapter therefore, the key concepts that guide and shape the study are examined. These are terrorism, threats, responses and counter-terrorism strategy. Thereafter, some selected relevant works on the subject of terrorism in Nigeria are highlighted. The chapter concludes with a theoretical framework on which the study is anchored.

2.2 Conceptual Discourse

2.2.1 Terrorism

A major issue associated with conceptualising terrorism is its definitional problems. An examination of this and subsequent narrow down to definitions relevant to this study is thus pertinent. This is what I will attempt to do, and thereafter bring to bear the Nigerian perspective of the term “terrorism.”

2.2.1.1 Definitional Problem

¹ Quaker Council for European Affairs, *Effective Counter-Terrorism: A Critical Assessment of European Union Responses* (Brussels: QCEA, 2007), p. 4.

Terrorism is a common term in political lexicon today much the same way as the act of it has become a daily threat in many countries of the world. In spite of its momentous and consequently significant placement in national and international security agenda, no universal definition of terrorism exists, be it in the academic, policy or legal circles.² In the light of this, Schmid and Jongman observed that researchers from various fields “have spilled almost as much ink as the actors of terrorism have spilled blood” and yet have reached no consensus on what terrorism is.³ They (Schmid and Jongman) counted 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional elements of the term.⁴ Similarly, Walter Laqueur counted over 100 definitions. He consequently surmised that the “only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence.”⁵ Even this submission by Laqueur does not resolve the controversy. In fact one could say that it further raises the contention bar. This is because the use or threat of violence is not restricted to terrorism. There are other forms of conflict that equally involve violence; war and coercive diplomacy being examples.

Various reasons have been proffered as to why there is no consensus definition of terrorism. Stepanova noted that the reasons are both subjective and objective.⁶ On the subjective side, she contended that terrorism is highly politicized, and this allows for different interpretations to suit the purpose of the interpreter and the political demands of the moment. She also pointed to the diversity and multiplicity of its forms, types and manifestations as the objective

² Alex P. Schmid, ed. "The Definition of Terrorism," *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 39. ISBN 0-203-82873-9. http://books.google.com/books?id=_PXpFxKRSHgC&pg=PA39. Also, Carlile A. (Lord of Berriew Q. C.), "The Definition of Terrorism," *Report by Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation*, presented to UK Parliament (London: HM Government, 2007), p.47.

³ Alex P. Schmid and A. Jongman, *Political Terrorism* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005), Introduction.

⁴ Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5-6.

⁵ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 6.

⁶ Stepanova Ekaterina, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and structural Aspects*, SPRI Research Report No. 23 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 5.

reasons for the disagreement.⁷ Hoffman on his part contends that the difficulties of a generally agreed definition arise from the fact that terrorism is characteristically stigmatizing, and the term politically and emotionally charged.⁸ That is to say it is a sensitive term and therefore the subjective and impassioned perspective of the term at individual, national and international levels. Hoffman elucidates further that:

...terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore. (...) Hence the decision to call someone or label some organization 'terrorist' becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the person/group/cause concerned. If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism.⁹

Hoffman's assertion holds true among scholars, professionals, security practitioners, states and governmental as well as non-governmental organisations. For instance, attempts by the United Nations (UN) to define the term have remained unsuccessful. Member states of the UN, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, were sharply divided on the use of violence in the context of conflicts centred on national liberation and self-determination. While the colonialists and imperialists regarded those who participated in liberation struggles as terrorists, the nationalists and their sympathisers saw them as freedom fighters. The situation is aptly captured by the "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" cliché that stresses the fact that the definition of terrorism depends on the perspective and world view of the one defining it.¹⁰ Today, the UN, regional organisations as well as individual states still battle with anti-West sentiments, religious bias and ethno-nationalist interests amidst other factors in their attempts to define terrorism.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Hoffman Bruce, p. 32.

⁹ Ibid. p.23.

¹⁰ Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?" *Police Practice and Research*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2002), p. 292. See also Bruce Hoffman, p 24 - 25.

The dynamism in the usage of the term and in the nature of the threat equally raises the bar of definitional problems. The word 'terrorism' was first recorded in the English-language dictionaries in 1798 as meaning "system or rule of terror."¹¹ This was in the wake of the French Revolution of 1789 when there was a systematic use of terror as a policy by the revolutionary French governments that tried to impose their radical new order on the citizenry. The meaning of terrorism has however since taken a radical shift. Myra Williamson notes this and contends that:

*The meaning of "terrorism" has (since) undergone a transformation. During the reign of terror, a regime or system of terrorism was used as an instrument of governance, wielded by a recently established revolutionary state against the enemies of the people. Now the term "terrorism" is commonly used to describe terrorist acts committed by non-state or subnational entities against a state.*¹²

The transformation in meaning of the term goes even beyond the above view by Williamson. This is because the perpetrators are not limited to non-state or sub national entities. Nation-states have continually been drawn into the act either at domestic or at international level. The targets have also continued to widen to include rival section of a state, ethnic group, religion or the electorate thereby drawing the whole state into the conflict. Emphasizing further on the transformation of the term, Hoffman after highlighting the various usage of the term from the French Revolution to the war on terror, and from the contemporary and 19th Century Marxist/classic meaning to the modern and revisionist meaning opines that "the meaning and usage of the word have changed over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era."¹³ In this respect, scholars and counter-terrorism practitioners have often based their definitions of terrorism on various perspectives such as the causes (motivation, reason or justification) of the conflict. Some argue that

¹¹ Klaus Dodds, *Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), p. 199.

¹² Myra Williamson, *Terrorism, war and international law: the legality of the use of force against Afghanistan in 2001* (Farnham-Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), p. 43. ISBN 978-0-7546-7403-0.
<http://books.google.com/books?id=ZuJIPP9HfRsC&pg=PA43>.

¹³ Bruce Hoffman, p. 20.

terrorism should not be defined by its causes or the identity of the perpetrators but by the nature of the act.¹⁴ A number of others tend to define the term by its combat characteristics, others by its criminal traits, and yet others emphasise that the means, ways and the objective (or ends) of the act of violence is what makes or does not make the act terrorism.¹⁵ A further argument is that it is the consequences of an action that matters and not the intent.¹⁶ Suffice it to say that the contentions are legion and unending.

Consequent on the above definitional controversies, Bassiouni contends that:

...to define 'terrorism' in a way that is both all-inclusive and unambiguous is very difficult, if not impossible ... (and) why the search for an internationally agreed upon definition may well be a futile and unnecessary effort.¹⁷

In spite of the arguments, the importance of charting a near-consensus definitional agreement of the term 'terrorism' cannot be overemphasized. One thus aligns with the postulation of Ganor that "an objective definition of terrorism is not only possible; it is also indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism."¹⁸ In Ganor's opinion, a common understanding of what constitutes terrorism, and by extension its definition is important for several reasons. Among the reasons are the development of common international strategies, effective results of the international mobilization against terrorism, enforcement of international agreements against terrorism and for effective extradition procedures.¹⁹ This view is shared by the

¹⁴ Jenkins, *The Study of Terrorism*, cited in Bruce Hoffman, p. 25.

¹⁵ EU Sixth Programme Workshop "Defining Terrorism," in *Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law*, WP3, Deliverable 4 (2008), pp. 15 - 24, available at www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/wp3..., accessed 22 November 2012. See also B. Hoffman and D. Claridge, "The RAND-St Andrew Chronology," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10: 2 (1998), p. 135-180.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ M. Cherif Bassiouni, "A Policy-oriented Inquiry of 'International Terrorism'" in: M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *Legal Responses to International Terrorism: U.S. Procedural Aspects*, (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), pp. xv - xvi.

¹⁸ Boaz Ganor, 288.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.288 - 290.

European Commission Sixth Framework Programme group on Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law that posits that:

Without understanding the exact meaning of the term, it is hardly possible to analyse what consequences there are to intra-national and international relations. Without a common agreement on the notion, there can hardly be any common steps to counter terrorism, whether at the domestic or the international level.²⁰

Crafting a definition of terrorism would therefore be essential for a study such as this. As an academic exercise, such a definition is necessary as a guide to what is to be researched, thus guiding the kind of data to collect, analyse and interpret. On the strategic focus of the research, it is pertinent to define its combat and criminal nature, and therefore the formulation as well as the implementation of appropriate counter-terrorism responses. A working definition of terrorism would also address the issues of legitimate or illegitimate use of force and of double standards. To these could be added the legal aspect of classifying those who could be punished (the perpetrators) and the degree as well as the manner punishments ought to be carried out. Drawing from the afore-highlighted positions, I will now examine a number of definitions relevant to this study.

2.2.1.2 Definitions of Terrorism Relevant to the Study

To arrive at a workable definition of terrorism for this study, I will examine definitions by some scholars spanning the last four decades. This will be followed by definitions espoused by some states in their national counter-terrorism strategies and other relevant documents. It would be observed that the point about the dynamism and complexity of the term is reflected in the various definition as are highlighted beginning with the scholarly definitions listed in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Definition of Terrorism by Selected Scholars

²⁰ See EU "Defining Terrorism," p. 5.

Year	Name	Definition
1978	Michael Jenkins	Political terrorism is the threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instil fear... ²¹
1987	Ali Khan	Terrorism sprouts from the existence of aggrieved groups. These aggrieved groups share two essential characteristics: they have specific political objectives, and they believe that violence is an inevitable means to achieve their political ends. The political dimension of terrorist violence is the key factor that distinguishes it from other crimes. ²²
1988	Schmid & Jongman	Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s), turning it into a

²¹ Michael Brian Jenkins, *The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems* (California: The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1980).

²² Ali Khan, *A Legal Theory of International Terrorism*, Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 19 (1987) p. 945.

		target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. ²³
1993	Ali Mazrui	The deliberate creation of specialized terror among civilians through the use of violence in order to promote political ends. ²⁴
1994	Martha Crenshaw	A tactic that uses violence or the threat of violence as a coercive strategy to cause fear and political intimidation. ²⁵
1997	Rosalyn Higgins	Terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals widely disapproved of and in which wither the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected or both. ²⁶
2002	Walter Laqueur	Terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targets. ²⁷
2005	Boaz Ganor	Terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian target in order to attain political aims. ²⁸
2008	Carsten Bockstette	Terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and

²³ Schmid, Jongman, *et al.*, 1988, p. 28.

²⁴ Ali A. Mazrui, "The Third World and International Terrorism: Preliminary Reflections" in Martha Crenshaw (ed), *Terrorism in Africa* (New York, G.K. Hall & Co., 1994), p. 26.

²⁵ Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Africa* (Boston: GK Hall & Co), 1994, p. 4.

²⁶ Rosalyn Higgins, "The General International Law of Terrorism" in Rosalyn Higgins and M. Flory, *International Law and Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 1997) p. 28.

²⁷ Walter Laqueur *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987) ISBN 0-316-51478-0.

²⁸ Boaz Ganor, p. 294.

		destruction of non-combatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). Such acts are meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organization. The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to reach short- and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states. ²⁹
2013	Lutz James & Lutz Brenda	Terrorism involves various aims and motives. It is violent or threatens violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence is conducted by an identifiable organization. The violence involves a non-state actor or actors as either the perpetrator, the victim of the violence, or both. Finally, the acts of violence are designed to create power in a situation in which power previously had been lacking. ³⁰

Source: Author's compilation, 2015.

Michael Jenkins and Ali Khan's definitions wrap up the two generally agreed features of terrorism, that is, violence and politics. Although some scholars emphasize such factors as ideology, race, ethno-nationalism and religion, it could be argued that these are all intrinsically linked to politics. This is more so when one considers the fact that terrorists seek to convey a message aimed at forcing or persuading their audience to accept their views and

²⁹ Carsten Bockstette, "Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques," *George Marshall ECSS Occasional Paper Series*, No. 20 (2009) ISSN 1863-6039.

³⁰ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 8-9.

beliefs, and in doing this, they strive to influence government's course of action and ultimately gain some political grounds. Khan's definition is however restrictive as it limits terrorism to grievances by groups. It is important to observe here that aside from groups, states also employ terrorism as a weapon particularly against domestic opposition. In the international sphere, states involvement in terrorism is arguably not only evident but evidently subjective. In its war against terror, the US had viewed some countries as an "axis of evil" while these countries view the US and its allies as the "real terrorists."³¹ The same applies to Israel and Palestine where each view the other as terrorists.

The fact that perpetrators of terrorism transcend groups was captured in the definition provided by Schmid and Jongman that included individual, group and state actors. Schmid and Jongman's definition is all embracing, capturing perhaps all essential features of terrorism. In doing this, however, their definition became more descriptive than definitive, that is, more of a description than definition of terrorism. Herein however fit Ali Mazrui's broad scope but terse definition that emphasize deliberate creation of specialized terror and civilians as victims of that terror. His definition implies that once terror is created amidst civilians, terrorism is also created, thus accounting for the various manifestations and forms of terrorism over time and across space (particularly Africa). In the same view as Ali Mazrui is Martha Crenshaw who emphasized coercive strategy and political intimidation in her work that dealt specifically on Africa. She thus indicated aspects of state terrorism associated with colonial and post-colonial African states. Rosalyn Higgins defined terrorism from a very legalistic and cautious perspective. She however captured emerging aspect of terrorism where the impact of violence is not immediately evident as exemplified in such modern forms as cyber-terrorism and narco-terrorism. The definition also connotes the fact that individuals as well as states are guilty of terrorism if they allude to the extent of aiding or abetting it.

³¹ Stephen Kaposi, *The Real Axis of Evil: The Invasion of Iraq, Western Imperialism, Lies and the Police State* (Lincoln: iUniverse Inc, 2004). ISBN: 0-595-32895-4.

In Walter Laqueur's definition, an important aspect of terrorism, which is the use of force was encapsulated. Laqueur's emphasis on force however portrays a military perspective on terrorism. This is not surprising as it came on the heels of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism. Equally noteworthy is his use of 'innocent citizens' implying the often indiscriminate nature of attacks, and a pointer that victims of terrorism such as passers-by, motorists, train commuters or passengers on a plane are most times distinct from the intended audience. Ganor, writing three years later, share much the same definitional view of terrorism as Laqueur exchanging however 'illegitimate use of force' with 'deliberate use of violence' and 'innocent citizens' with 'civilians'. The use of the words 'innocent citizens', 'civilians' and 'non-combatants' are helpful in this study as it assists in distinguishing terrorism from other forms of conflicts such as guerrilla warfare and insurgency where the primary target is the military apparatus of the affected state. An even more helpful definition is that offered by Carsten Bockstette. He introduced terms such as political violence, asymmetrical conflict, psychological fear and the media which are significant in today's study and understanding of terrorism, and will be explored further in this study. The Lutzs allude, among other things, to the psychological fear feature of terrorism. An important aspect of significance to this study is their contention that acts of violence inherent in terrorism are designed to create power in a situation in which power previously had been lacking. This points to ungovernable spaces as exists in the terrorism prevalent countries of Asia and Africa; with failing or failed states characteristics.

In terms of states' definition of terrorism, it could be said that states formulate counter-terrorism policies based on their threat perception or the nature of the terrorist threat that they are experiencing. The definition states give terrorism is therefore important as it has implications for policy-making. In this wise, we will consider a few of such definitions.

The UK's Terrorism Act 2000 defined terrorism as follows:

(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where:

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),

(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:

(a) involves serious violence against a person,

(b) involves serious damage to property,

(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public or

(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied".³²

Section 34 of the Terrorism Act 2006 amended sections 1(1) (b) and 113(1)(c) of Terrorism Act 2000 to include "international governmental organisations" in addition to "government."³³

The Terrorism Act definition criminalised terrorism and legitimised government actions against it. The definition includes not only violent offences against persons and physical damage to property, but equally acts that interfere with or disrupt electronic systems, that is, the use of the internet for terrorism (or cyber-terrorism). It emphasised human rights and the need for the state to protect them. These ideals are encapsulated in the UK's Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) which aims to reduce the risk to the UK and its interest overseas from terrorism in order to enable people go about their lives freely and with confidence.³⁴

³² HM Government, United Kingdom Terrorism Act 2000, Part 1.

³³ HM Government, United Kingdom Terrorism Act 2006.

³⁴ HM Government, United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism

In the US, various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions of terrorism according to their roles. Central to the various definitions and of relevance to this study however is the definition provided in Title 22, Chapter 38 of the US Code that "...the term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."³⁵

Equally, Title 18 of the Code that deals with criminal acts and criminal procedure defines international terrorism as:

*...activities that ...involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; [and] appear to be intended . . . to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; ...to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or ...to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and [which] occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.*³⁶

The US National Security Strategy of September 2002 defined terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents."³⁷ When it was realised some months later that the definition did not exclude actions by the US government, the word 'innocents' was replaced with 'non-combatant targets' and the definition broadened to "premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."³⁸

The US National Counterterrorism Centre in much the same way as the US Code defines a terrorist act as a "...premeditated; perpetrated by a sub-national or clandestine agent;

³⁵ 22 U.S.C. Section 2656f(d)

³⁶ 18 U.S.C. Section 2331(1)

³⁷ Edward P., Jones Andy and Kovacich Gerald L. *The Corporate Security Professional's Handbook on Terrorism* (California: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007).

³⁸ Tom Rockmore, Margolis Joseph and Marsoobian Armen, *The philosophical challenge of September 11* (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 2004)

politically motivated, potentially including religious, philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations; violent; and perpetrated against a non-combatant target.”³⁹

These US definitions support the realist school of thought which view terrorism essentially as an attack by clandestine groups on non-combatants or civilians for political objectives. The definitions of terrorism were silent on aspects of state-sponsored terrorism. They excluded, and indeed legitimised actions by the US in and/or against other states particularly in the “war against terror.” Boot and Dune while contending that terrorism is an act, not an ideology frowned at the silence by the US that terrorism can be committed by the state.⁴⁰ The definitions convey the US militaristic perspective of terrorism and by extension hard power counter-terrorism approach. It is perhaps no surprise therefore that states targeted by the US view actions by the US as terrorist acts. For instance, in response to the US raid on Abu Kamal on 20 October 2008, the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mualem, stated that “killing civilians in international law means a terrorist aggression.”⁴¹ In this wise, Sean concludes that while the powerful nations of the world view terrorism as a tactic of the powerless against the powerful, the powerless see terrorism as threat or violence unleashed on them by the powerful.⁴²

The central point here is that academics, statesmen and the international community are all yet to arrive at a universally acceptable and legally binding definition of the term ‘terrorism’. Nevertheless, there is an agreement related to several components of terrorism. These are that the nature of the act is unlawful, perpetrators could be individuals, groups or states; objectives are primarily political; intended outcomes include fear and frustration; the target

³⁹ See http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2010_report_on_terrorism.pdf.

⁴⁰ Booth and Dunne, *World in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.8.

⁴¹ The raid was carried out by the US around Abu Kamal in Syria aimed at targeting a network of foreign fighters alleged to have travelled through Syria to join the insurgency against the US-led coalition forces in Iraq.

⁴² See Sean, K. “Globalization, power and security.” *Security Dialogue* Vol. 35 No.1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)

audience often distinct from immediate victims and the methods range from assault, hijacking, hacking, hostage taking, kidnapping to suicide bombings and others. Summing up the definitions therefore, an act is presumed a terrorist act if:

- a. It involves violence or threat of violence.
- b. It has a political goal.
- c. Civilians are the direct target or immediate victims.
- d. It is asymmetrical – involving a ‘weaker’ and a ‘stronger’ force. This summation leads me to the view of terrorism from the prism of the Nigerian state.

2.2.1.3 Conceptualising Terrorism in Nigeria

Having explored some definitions of terrorism and arrived at what generally constitute terrorism, it is pertinent to investigate whether the above captures the situation in Nigeria. In other words, do (any of) the definitions and features examined above reflect the situation in Nigeria, or into which of the definitions does the Nigerian situation best fit into. This is pertinent as the starting block of any meaningful research as this would be to establish whether the situation in Nigeria is actually that of terrorism. It further reinforces the need to focus attention on what terrorism as a concept means in the context of Nigeria and in so doing establish a common platform for its study and understanding.

The point needs to first be made that the threat of, and vulnerability to terrorism differs from continent to continent, sub-region to sub-region and state to state implying that regions and countries will interpret and react differently based on their unique perception of the threat. This is not to side-line the effects of globalisation, particularly the Internet and such other factors that not only directly influence perception formation and radicalisation but as well transcends national and continental borders.

Undiandeye posits that the problem of conceptualising terrorism in Nigeria and indeed Africa and the third world is not in the definition but rather the characterisation of conflict as terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare and others.⁴³ On her part, Botha opines that terrorism is not a new threat or concept in Africa, but that what is worrying is the application of Western models to the situation in Africa which results in double standards and consequently impacts negatively on the understanding of terrorism in Africa.⁴⁴ Equally of note is the fact that domestic terrorism presents a more immediate challenge in Africa and indeed the third world than transnational terrorism, which is experienced more in the developed world.⁴⁵ Domestic terrorism in this sense comprises of terrorist acts usually conducted by local groups within the state for the purpose of overthrowing a government or achieving local political advantage.⁴⁶ It also takes the form of repressive regimes and brutal subjugation of opposition. The observed trend however is that when a group resorts to violence against a government or segment of society; it is regarded as terrorism, but when the government or security forces use the same (and even worse) methods; this is paradoxically done in the name of state security. In this context therefore, there is a need to regard as terrorism politically motivated acts of violence against a civilian population whether there are carried out by a state or a non-state actor. As Botha observes, governments will seldom agree that their actions should be included in a definition on terrorism.⁴⁷ However, as she further contends, it is essential that both to contextualise the concept and to enhance an understanding of the concept on the African continent, state actions need to be included.⁴⁸ According to Kushner, state terrorism has one goal in mind, the “strengthening of government control by the complete intimidation

⁴³ Interview with Colonel E.A.P Undiandeye, United Nations Headquarters, New York on 29 August 2012.

⁴⁴ Anneli Botha, "Challenges in Understanding Terrorism in Africa: A Human Security Perspective", *Africa Security Review* - 17: 2 (2008), p. 28.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 29.

⁴⁶ Wafula Okumu, Introductory Remarks in "Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding its Impact on Human Security", *Institute for Security Studies*, 2009. p. 1.

⁴⁷ Anneli Botha, p. 33.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

of a population.”⁴⁹ One therefore supports the view of the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Anan who stated that:

*...the deliberate use of weapons to kill innocent people must be condemned and eradicated, for it is as unworthy and inhuman as it is repulsive, like terrorism perpetrated in the past by oppressing states. But the right to resist cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians.*⁵⁰

Precisely not all acts of violence can be classified as terrorism. It is however necessary to encompass as terrorism a number of actions of insurgents, para-militaries and other groups who resorted to terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals. Often these groups advance ethnic and religious agenda as a cover for their wider political aims. They disrupt national stability and integrity, creating a state of fear and general insecurity. Collaborating this assertion, Boaz notes that “when a group or organisation choose terrorism as a means, the aim of their struggle cannot be used to justify their actions.”⁵¹ Thus, no matter the legitimacy of the cause of agitation, once terrorist tactic is employed, the perpetrators ought to be classified as terrorists.

Driving the above point home to Nigeria, deliberate acts of violence by government and its agencies (whether in the colonial period, military era or democratic dispensation) against the civilian population qualify to be termed state terrorism. Doing otherwise would be endorsing oppressive regimes who under the guise of fighting terrorism have meted even more acts of terror on opposing political groups that they label terrorist groups. In the same manner, the activities of groups in Nigeria particularly militants either championing ethnic agenda, agitating for control of resources or engaged in violent religious extremism that employ terrorism as a means to achieving their aims should be classified as terrorists.

⁴⁹ H. W. Kushner, *Encyclopaedia of Terrorism* (London: Sage Publications, 2003).

⁵⁰ K. Annan. *A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism*. International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid, 8–11 March, 2005. Keynote address to the closing plenary. Available at <http://english.safedemocracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html>.

⁵¹ Boaz Ganor, p. 293

One is content that the African Union (AU), perhaps in realisation of the need to promote an African perspective of terrorism, took on a wider although ambiguous definition of terrorism when in its Act, it defines terrorism as:

...any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any member or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

(i) intimidate, put in fear, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) create general insurrection in a State.⁵²

In article 3(1), the AU equally notes that:

(i) The struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces, and

(ii) Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act.⁵³

In a similar vein, the Nigerian government in its Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011 defines a terrorist as:

...anyone who [is] involved or who causes an attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death; kidnapping of a person; destruction to a government or public facility, transport system, an infrastructural facility including an information system, a fixed platform located on the intercontinental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss.⁵⁴

Conceptualized in this way, Oyeniyi posits that the AU and the Nigeria Government (in its TPA) are clear on activities that qualify one group or the other as terrorist group, and

⁵² African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combatting Terrorism Article 1 (3).

⁵³ Ibid, Article 3 (1).

⁵⁴ See the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011.

activities that qualify as terrorist activities.⁵⁵ It could however be said that the problem with the Nigerian government and indeed governments of African countries goes beyond the definition of terrorism. Interpretation, and following this, implementation could be said to be problematic. These issues are however for later discussion.

My submission here is that terrorism situations exist and are currently evident in Nigeria. For a clearer understanding of the situation therefore, the threat picture need to be viewed and assessed from a wider, all-inclusive and an African perspective. To this end, this study will approach the subject of terrorism in Nigeria from an idealist school of thought which stress the fact that every act that produces fear, terror, or death, whether legitimately carried out or not, by an individual group or state, is an act of terrorism.

From the discussion so far, it is indicative that terrorism is a threat to the safety of lives and property. Equally, and by extension, it is a threat to the peace and stability of a nation. In the next section therefore, the concept of threats in relation to terrorism is considered.

2.3 Threats

A peaceful and secure environment is a need, first for people who desire it to live and go about their normal daily activities freely and secondly, for the state whose responsibility it is to provide for such. Indeed, the primary function of the government of a state is security.⁵⁶ The attainment of this is however impaired by threats. The words "threats to security" or "security threats" is thus common in the lexicon of not only intelligence and security but of governance and policy-making.

Threat, as the *Webster's Dictionary* states, is "(1) a statement or expression of intention to hurt, destroy, punish, etc. in retaliation or intimidation", and "(2) an indication of imminent

⁵⁵ Adeyemi Bukola Oyeniya, "Terrorism in Nigeria: Groups, Activities, and Politics", *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, Vol 1 No. 1. 1 Quarter 1 (2010), p. 3. ISSN No. 0976 - 1195.

⁵⁶ David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: Hurst & Co Ltd, 2010), p. 7.

danger, harm, evil etc.; as, the threat of war.”⁵⁷ Similarly, in the *Compact Oxford English Dictionary*, threat is referred to as “(1) a stated intention to inflict injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone; (2) a person or thing likely to cause damage or danger; (3) the possibility of trouble or danger.”⁵⁸

Security on the other hand, is referred to in the *Oxford Dictionary of English*, as “the state of being free from danger or threat.”⁵⁹ It further states; “the safety of a state or organisation against criminal activities such as terrorism, theft, or espionage; procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the security of a state or organisation, and; the state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or anxiety.”⁶⁰ Nweze avers that security is a state of affairs where life, property and people in any given environment are free from fear, threat, danger, intimidation or coercion and are therefore in peace and harmony. He states further that a state of security guarantees the rights of persons to carry out their legitimate duties devoid of risks, abuse or molestation.⁶¹ Wolfers views the concept of security from both objective and subjective perspectives. From the objective sense, security “measures the absence of threats to acquired values” and from the subjective viewpoint, security refers to the absence of fear that such values (as refers to in a subjective sense) will be attacked.⁶² According to Hermann, security implies the reduction of danger or threat, while threat is understood to mean the anticipated obstruction of some values.⁶³ To this end, it could be said that security exists when threat is contained. It is said to be contained because it is impossible to have a society

⁵⁷ J. L. McKechnie and N. Webster, *Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary* (Chicago: Dorset and Baber, 1979), p. 1901.

⁵⁸ Soanes C., *Compact Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: OUP) 2003, p. 1199.

⁵⁹ See Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford: OUP, 2010)

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Cited in A. R. Adesoka, “Reflection on Regional Security options and Limitations before Nigeria” Research Project submitted to National War College of Nigeria, 1996, p. 9.

⁶² Arnold Wolfers, *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962) p. 9.

⁶³ Cited in A. R. Adesoka, p. 9.

completely free of threats, and therefore no such thing as absolute security is said to exist.⁶⁴ To this extent, it is argued that security is measured by the value and definition the society gives it. This aligns with Richards' constructivist contention that "security is, to a certain extent, a constructed concept for any given state at any given time."⁶⁵

It is perhaps pertinent to state that the concept of threats has mainly been thought of from the traditional perspective of security. Schwarz and Hadik, for instance, defines threat as "an assessment of a potential opponent's military capability."⁶⁶ Their position is understandable since they were writing during the Cold War period when security was perceived in terms of the amassment of military armaments and personnel, and threats perceived from the perspective of actions or inactions of states. Also, Buzan, a renowned scholar of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies whose works span through the Cold and post-Cold War period, pointed to force (capabilities) and ideas (ideology) as two basic threats to state institutions.⁶⁷ He, Waever and Wilde posits that the state's territory can be threatened by seizure or damage, and the threats can come from within and outside of the state.⁶⁸ They further distinguished between military threats (seizure of territory, invasion, occupation, change of government, manipulation of policy), economic threats (export practices, import restrictions, price manipulations, default on debt, currency controls etc., and those to domestic stability), and ecological threats (damaging the physical base of the state). These

⁶⁴ Arnold Wolfers, pp. 18-19.

⁶⁵ J. Richard, *A Guide to National Security: Threats, Responses and Strategies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 54.

⁶⁶ Hadik Schwarz, quoted in Hans Gunter Brauch, "Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerability and Risks" in *International Security, Peace, Development and Environment*, Vol.1. Online www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapter/C14/E1-39B-02.pdf, accessed 24 November 2013.

⁶⁷ Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Harvester Books, 1983).

⁶⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

threats, they argue define (the state's) insecurity, and set the agenda for national security as a security problem.⁶⁹

The end of the Cold-war ushered in a "broadening" of the concept of security from the traditional military and diplomatic perspective, to new economic, societal and environmental dimensions.⁷⁰ Consequent on this, the concept of threats equally broadened and is now been applied to a series of new threats not only to the state but global and particularly human security. It is in this light that Buzan notes that security is now an ambiguous and multi-dimensional concept in which the military factor attracts a disproportionate attention.⁷¹ By this, Buzan imply that academics should begin considering new and emerging threats to security, and rather than concentrate on military aspects. Robert McNamara, a one-time US Secretary of Defence supports this view as he asserts that:

*Any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortages, population explosions, low level of productivity and per capital income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities, and chronic problem of unemployment, has a false sense of security.*⁷²

Mathews and Myers points to the new security threats of the future to include population growth, resource scarcity, and environmental degradation.⁷³ Kaldor on her part notes the increase in asymmetric forms of warfare and of the increasing role of more sophisticated and brutal non-state actors (or terrorist networks).⁷⁴ Capturing the situation in third world countries, Edward and Moon identify domestic political structures, policy-making fragility, technological underdevelopments, ethnic, religious and social cleavages and the ever

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

⁷⁰ Klaus Dodds, *Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2005).

⁷¹ Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

⁷² R. Mc Namara: *The Essence of Security: Reflection in Office* (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968).

⁷³ Matthew Meyers, cited in Hans Gunter Brauch, *op.cit.*

⁷⁴ M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).

expanding populations as the immediate threats.⁷⁵ Thus, the concept of security, and by extension, threats to security envelops social, economic, cultural, technological and political considerations.

It is worth noting also that the concept of security is ambiguous. This is because the threat perception of people, and indeed states differ. As Adesokan argues, "security raises a fundamental contradiction because it means many things to many people, group, nations, regions and the entire world".⁷⁶ He states further that it is common to talk of personal or individual security, regional security, global security, economic security and so on.⁷⁷ His view reflects the popular post-Cold War constructivist approach to security which espouses a "no one-size fits all methodology" meaning that security issues and solutions to them differ in time and space. It could be surmised therefore that for a nation, its security is defined by the socio-political, economic and other factors peculiar to it. Equally, the nature and character of the state and many other strategic considerations determine its threat perception and consequently its security direction. This brings to the fore the need to briefly discuss national security, threats to Nigeria's national security and to buttresses the point mentioned earlier that terrorism is a threat to the national security of an affected state.

2.3.1 National Security

National security arguably revolves round the overall efforts of government and the people to detect, prevent, eliminate or minimize internal and external sources of danger and risk that threatens the collective interest of a nation-state.⁷⁸ The concept began with the emergence of

⁷⁵ E.A. Edward and C. Moon, *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1988), p. 3.

⁷⁶ A. R. Adesoka, "Reflection on Regional Security Options and Limitations before Nigeria" Research Project submitted to National War College of Nigeria, 1996, pp. 8-10.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ The concept of state, nation or nation-state are often used synonymously. While a state (also referred to a country) could be defined as a geo-political entity, a nation is composed of people with cultural, language,

state system, and gained prominence in the post-Second World War period following the growth of the activities of national governments and the involvement of states in international affairs. Emphasis then was on use of military, economic and diplomatic means in the defence of the state thereby equating national security with the defence of the nation-state. Traditionally therefore, national security has the nation-state as its major referent object as oppose to human security that is citizens or people-centred.

Ojo realizes the shortcomings associated with the popular conception of security in purely military-strategic terms by stating that national security is fundamentally the preservation of the safety, freedom, values and welfare of the people as individual and as groups, both state and non-state.⁷⁹ This is saying that national security is the ability to protect both the collective national interest and the legitimate interest of individual citizens and groups from internal and external threats, including threats posed by the state against individuals or groups. Supporting this, Imobighe opines that security refers to freedom from danger, or the threat to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself as a viable independent entity, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests including the wellbeing of its people.⁸⁰ For a country like Nigeria therefore, one could aver that national security has to do with freedom from, or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion, corporate identity of the nation and its capacity to sustain the essential structures for the realization of national core values and development. This implies freedom from danger to life and property and the presence of a conducive atmosphere for the people to pursue their legitimate interests within the society. A former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo captures this in the 2006 Grand Strategy for National Security where he defined Nigeria's national security as "the

religious or ethnic identity that may cut across a state. A nation-state is therefore a defined geographical area with political legitimacy of a sovereign state, that is, largely a coinciding of a state and a nation.

⁷⁹ Ojo O., "Economic Underpinnings of Security in Africa," *Centre for Advanced Social Science, Cass Monograph* No. 12, 1999, p.1.

⁸⁰ T. A. Imobighe, *Nigerian Defence and National Security Linkages: A Framework of Analysis* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1988), pp. 5- 18.

aggregation of the security interest of all individuals, communities, ethnic groups, political entities and institutions which inhabit the territory of Nigeria.”⁸¹

According to him:

...the primary objective of national security shall be to strengthen the Federal Republic of Nigeria; to advance her interest and objectives; to contain instability; control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, progress and growth; improve the welfare and well-being and quality of life of the citizenry.”⁸²

The attainment of these objectives are however being challenged as Nigeria is faced with security threats from both within and outside the country.

2.3.2 Threats to Nigeria's Security

Nigeria's security concerns and threat perceptions emanate from a myriad of sources. Externally, the country is surrounded by Francophone countries who maintain defence ties with France. The West African sub-region has over the years been, and continue to be a hotbed of political instability, religious extremism and poverty. Equally is the problem of illegal cross-border activities such as smuggling, arms proliferation, drug peddling and human trafficking. At regional levels, conflicts throughout Africa, shifts in the balance of power across northern Africa, and competition with countries such as South Africa for its leadership role in the continent are potent threats. Also Nigeria's dependence on the production and export of oil is not only threatened by global market conditions, but equally attracting foreign powers such as the US, UK, China, India and South Korea along its maritime transit routes in the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea.⁸³

⁸¹ Olusegun Obasanjo, *Grand Strategy for National Security* Abuja, 2006.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Eze O.C., Anigbo C.A., & Dokubo C.Q. eds. *Nigeria's Security Interest in Africa* (NIIA Lagos: PrintServe Ltd 2010), pp. 10 & 239.

More than the external threats are internal threats, although these are not always mutually exclusive as it is sometimes difficult to determine where internal threats end and where external threats begin and vice versa. Summing them up, Duniyan contends that the security problems of Nigeria are more endogenous than exogenous in character. He further opines that Nigeria suffers from the crisis of cultural and ethnic fragmentation as well as leadership. Imobighe adds that the country "suffers from fragmented societies, incomplete nation-buildings and rigid policy capacity".⁸⁴ Internally, the fragility of the political system, economic and infrastructural backwardness, prevailing poverty, foreign and local indebtedness, social unrest and ethno-religious crisis have remained endemic threats to national stability and integrity. Of greatest challenge to the country currently is terrorism.

2.3.3 Terrorism as a Threat to National Security

The subjectivity associated with terrorism transcend to arguments as to whether terrorism promotes or negates national values, security inclusive. To some, terrorism is "a means to an end" that has proved a positive instrument for nation building on whose pivot security revolves.⁸⁵ They point to antecedents, particularly in the colonial era where supposedly oppressed people have used terrorism as a means to attain societies based on values such as social justice, freedom and rights of citizenship. The armed wing of the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela that was responsible for transforming South Africa to a nation with democratic values is an oft-cited example.⁸⁶

Terrorism is also seen as a means to creating a better society; an alternatives to corrupt, brutal and autocratic regimes (in whose tenure worse human security threats such as poverty,

⁸⁴ T.A. Imobighe "Doctrines for and Threats to Internal Security," in A.E. Ekoko and M.A. Vogt, eds. *Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems* (Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1990), pp. 223-236.

⁸⁵ See Boaz Ganor, pp. 292 & 298

⁸⁶ Klaus Dodds, p. 51.

hunger, unemployment, diseases, ethnic tensions and electoral violence exist).⁸⁷ Those that espouse this view also argue that the insecurity resulting from terrorism is caused by the resistance of government or groups opposing the cause of the so called terrorists. That is arguing that the perpetrators of terrorism seek to change society for better, and the destruction of lives and property that occasion it is more the result of counter-terrorism operations than terrorist actions. Stepanova further posits that among the politico-ideological beliefs that terrorists tend to display is the idea that it is primarily the state that practises violence and terror (not the terrorists).⁸⁸ The moral argument for terrorism is further hinged on the belief that while violence may be unlawful in accordance with a victim's statutes, the cause served by those committing the acts may represent a good in the eyes of the terrorists' supporters and neutral observers.

However, even moral arguments hold against terrorists. One factor on this is that terrorists aim to achieve objectives through intimidation and fear. They have in some situations deliberately and indiscriminately kill people irrespective of nationality, faith or ethnic background.⁸⁹ The use of bombs (including suicide methods), assassination, hostage taking, hijacking and destruction of infrastructure undermine national security. The link between terrorism and criminality could be said to worsen any justification for terrorism. Furthermore, cyber-terrorism and the risks of the use of weapons of mass destruction have heightened the threat to security that terrorism poses not only at national but at global level.

The terrorist ideology hinges on the belief that only their cause or belief is the right one. They see those that do not support their ideology as 'outsiders' or 'infidels'.⁹⁰ This challenges national cohesion and integration. When people do not believe in national identity, or place it

⁸⁷ Bruce Hoffman, p. 4.

⁸⁸ Eketerina Stepanova, p. 30.

⁸⁹ Terrorist are also discriminate in their attacks by targeting certain section(s) of the population.

⁹⁰ Patrick Ryan, "Islam and Politics in a Religiously Pluralistic African Society" in *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol.26 (3)August 1996, pp.308-329.

behind group interest, the result is a fragmented society that breeds insecurity. Terrorism also undermines the authority of government and the political structure of the state and its institution.⁹¹ It seeks political change through force, fear and intimidation; all of which fan the embers of insecurity. It could thus be said that terrorism is an attack on values that define the nation-state because it negates peaceful co-existence of people, undermines societal stability and the prosperity of mankind. It is in consideration of the threat posed by terrorism that government justify their responses to terrorism.

2.4 Responses to Terrorism

It has been noted in this study that security is the primary responsibility of government. This includes the safeguarding of the lives and property of citizens and the protection of the state from internal and external threats. It has equally been established that terrorism, whether domestic or transnational, is a threat to national security. It is to this end that nations engage in a strategic vision to recognise the threat, prepare for, and as much as possible prevent or mitigate terrorist attack. This involves investing in primarily defensive measures to protect the society from terrorist acts (known as anti-terrorism) or primarily offensive measures intended to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism (known as counter-terrorism).⁹² In practice, it could be argued that the line between defensive and offensive measures is blurred. Offensive measures are thought to begin where defensive measures start, but as in the threat of war, the situation dictates, and policy would consequently either favour a preventive or proactive approach, or a counter-terrorism strategy combining both. A combination of both defensive and offensive approach is often the case given the argument that counter-terrorism policies not only include prevention and pursuit of terrorists, but equally measures aimed to protect and respond (or prepare).

⁹¹ As noted in section 2.2.1.2 of this chapter.

⁹² See US Department of Defense *Joint Publication 102 - Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, pdf.

2.4.1 Defensive versus Offensive Response

The choice of investing in defensive (passive), or offensive (active, proactive, pre-emption) responses is, among other factors, dependent on threat assessment.⁹³ A defensive response or strategy employs measures that are intended to make terrorists acts more difficult and include the fortification of potential targets, erection of technological barriers, and the securing of borders.⁹⁴ The strategy tends to equally lay emphasis on human security and the underlying factors that cause terrorism, that is, factors that drive individuals to resort to terrorism as a tactic. Since the protection of individuals and the community is prime to the defensive strategy, soft approaches are employed with increased roles for civil liberty and non-governmental organisations.

The offensive response and strategy on the other hand emphasises a 'hard power' approach that employ traditional methods, that is, military power as the means of delivery, and the protection of the state as the major objective. It involves proactive operations that take direct action against terrorists and their sponsors and include neutralisation of terrorist assets, assassination of suspected terrorists and curbing of civil freedom.⁹⁵ Offensive strategy may have the disadvantage of generating grievances in reaction to high handed tactics or unintended collateral damages. This could result in government loosing public support while empowering same for the terrorists. Herein lies the dilemma for the government in responding to the threat of terrorism. As Rosendorff and Sandler put it, a government that responds too little appears unable to protect her citizens and loses public confidence.⁹⁶ On the other hand, a government that responds too much appears tyrannical and encourages

⁹³ S.C. Ukpabi "Threat Assessment", a paper presented at the Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna-Nigeria, 1985.

⁹⁴ Daniel G. Arce M. and Todd Sandler, "Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 2, The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism, Sage Publications, Inc Apr., 2005, p. 184.

⁹⁵ *ibid.*

⁹⁶ Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing?: The Proactive Response Dilenma", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (London: Sage Publications Inc, 2004), p. 659.

opposition.⁹⁷ However, because the primary role of government is to safeguard lives and property of citizens, it is thought that the state in employing counter-terrorism strategies ought to ensure that the strategies so employed are such that they do not become a burden to the citizens. An equally important consideration in responding to the threat of terrorism is the question as to whether terrorism should be regarded as an act of war or a criminal act. This, Botha contends, is important as it determines whether the military or law enforcement should be the main driving force of the counter-terrorism effort of government and hence a determinant of the shape of the counter-terrorism strategy.⁹⁸

2.5 Counter Terrorism Strategy

It is observed that terrorism is a proof that we live in a dynamic security environment with emerging threats and risks.⁹⁹ This necessitates efforts to counter such threats and minimise risk. Counter-terrorism is defined by the US Army Field Manual as “operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to terrorism.”¹⁰⁰ The conduct of such operations are usually based on “strategy” which, simply put, is a product of skilful planning for the attainment of long term objectives. Strategy critically relates means to ends, capabilities to intentions and resources to objectives.¹⁰¹ It thus could be defined as the art and science of applying resources and aiming at the optimal attainment of stated policy objectives. A national counter terrorism strategy could therefore be described as a frame of reference that specifies how the state would provide for and guarantee itself and its citizens against the threat of terrorism. In this vein, it could be averred that a national counter-terrorism strategy strengthens the legitimacy of the state, establishes a national consensus on

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Anneli Botha, p. 28.

⁹⁹ HM Government, *The United Kingdom Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, p.10.

¹⁰⁰ See US Army Field Manual, 2006, p. 4.

¹⁰¹ David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: Hurst & Co Ltd, 2010).

terrorism issues, boosts the effectiveness of security services, and strengthens trust and cooperation at regional and international level.

Countries formulate and implement their national counter-terrorism strategies based on their peculiar threat experiences and available resources among other reasons.¹⁰² Wilkinson contends that for a liberal state, a counter terrorism strategy is a multipronged approach which does not undermine or seriously damage the democratic process and the rule of law, while providing sufficient flexibility to cope with a whole range of threats.¹⁰³ As a prelude to the focus of this study, which is a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria, I will highlight the basic tenets of the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT) and the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST).

2.5.1 US National Strategy for Counter Terrorism

The US NSCT articulates the government's approach to countering terrorism by setting out overarching goals and identifying the range of tools and steps critical to the success of the strategy. It includes specific areas of focus tailored to the regions, domains, and groups that are most important to achieving the goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda while protecting the American people.

The current version of the strategy, that is, the 2011 NSCT builds on groundwork laid by previous strategies.¹⁰⁴ In terms of threats, it recognizes that there are numerous nations and groups that support terrorism to oppose US interests. The nations and groups include Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas to which a full range of foreign policy tools are expected to be used to protect the US. However, the principal focus of the strategy is the network that poses

¹⁰² C. Lum, Kennedy LW, Sherley, AJ. "The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies." *Campbell Systematic Reviews* (Newark: Campbell Collaboration, 2009), p. 2.

¹⁰³ Wilkinson, P., *Terrorism vs. Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 6

¹⁰⁴ The National Strategy for Counterterrorism, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf, accessed 12 March 2014.

the most direct and significant threat to the US, that is, al-Qaeda, its affiliates and its adherents. In this vein, the ultimate objective of the NSCT is to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qaeda (particularly its leadership core in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region), its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of US citizens and interests. The strategic posture of the NSCT could be summed up as the US being at war against al-Qaeda and therefore waging a broad, sustained, integrated and relentless campaign that harnesses every element of American power to defeat al-Qaeda.

The US NSCT outlines seven overarching goals it seeks to achieve. First is the protection of US homeland by constantly reducing vulnerabilities, adapting and updating defences. Second is disrupting, degrading, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda wherever it takes root. The third is preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. Eliminating the safe havens al-Qaeda needs to train, plot and launch attacks forms the fourth goal. Following this is the fifth goal which is degrading links between al-Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents. The sixth goal focuses on countering al-Qaeda ideology and its attempts to justify violence while the emphasis of the seventh goal is on depriving al-Qaeda and its affiliates of their enabling means, including illicit financing, logistical support and online communications.

In the pursuit of the highlighted goals, the NSCT is guided by several key principles. Among the principles, as stated in the 2011 version of the strategy is upholding core American values, including rule of law and the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all Americans. Another principle is the harnessing of every tool including intelligence, military, homeland security and law enforcement, and maximizing cooperation between communities. Additionally is the building of partnerships with international institutions and partners so that nations can take the fight to al-Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents in their own countries. An equally key principle is applying tools appropriately, recognizing that different threats in

different regions demand different tools. Additionally, the NSCT is guided by the principle of building a culture of preparedness and resilience at home to prevent terrorist attacks and ensure quick recovery should an attack occur.

The Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism works with all appropriate elements of the US Government to ensure integrated and effective counter-terrorism efforts. The key element of US counter-terrorism operational approach is inter-agency operations which plan, conduct and structure operations, from the very outset, as part of an intimately connected whole-of-government approach.¹⁰⁵ At the heart of operations of the integrated approach are the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency and homeland security. They all interact through the Joint Terrorist Task Force and the Counter Terrorism Centre. The Joint Terrorist Task Force exists locally in all states in America and enhances the synergy amongst law enforcement agencies by coordinating the efforts of investigators, analysts, linguists, intelligence operatives, and reaction unit members. On the other hand, the Counter Terrorism Centre has a broader mandate and brings all disciplines relating to counter terrorism (operational officers, analysts, reporting officers, technical and other experts) together thereby increasing synergy among them.¹⁰⁶

2.5.2 UK Counter Terrorism Strategy

The UK CONTEST aims to reduce the risk to the UK and its interest overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.¹⁰⁷ It is premised on the fact that terrorism poses a serious threat not only to national security, but also to the fundamental democratic values of the British society. A strong element of CONTEST is its attempt at striking a delicate balance between ensuring the right to security of citizens and

¹⁰⁵ P.R. Pillar., "Intelligence" in Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes. (eds.) (2004): *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2004), p. 131.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ HM Government, *The United Kingdom Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, (London: TSO, 2011), sec 1.2, p.9.

respect for human rights. CONTEST is organised around four work streams. These are Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare.

Pursue is the strand of CONTEST that aims to stop terrorist attacks in the UK and against UK's interests overseas. It is based on detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage. The police, security and intelligence agencies work in collaboration to disrupt terrorist activity before they endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecute those responsible. The UK also work with other countries and multilateral organizations to enable the country better tackle the threats it faces at their source.

The Prevent strand of CONTEST aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. In June 2011, the Government published a review of Prevent to address radicalization to all forms of terrorism, including the extreme right wing.¹⁰⁸ It is dependent on a successful integration strategy. The strategy establishes a stronger sense of common ground and shared values, which enables participation and the empowerment of all communities. It works with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the Internet and health) where there are risks of radicalization that needs to be addressed. The purpose is to reach the much smaller number of people who are vulnerable to radicalization.

Protect is the work stream of CONTEST that aims to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against UK's interests overseas. Priorities are informed by an annual National Risk Assessment (of threats and vulnerabilities). Efforts are focused on border security by improving the technology for identifying who enters and leaves the UK and the coordination of law enforcement response. Protect generally strengthens UK border security, reduce the vulnerability of the transport network, increase the resilience of the UK's infrastructure and improve protective security for crowded places.

¹⁰⁸ HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, (London: TSO, 2011).

The Prepare work stream of CONTEST aims to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped. This includes work to bring a terrorist attack to an end and to increase resilience as to recover from its aftermath. It is based on a generic approach which makes best use of resources and avoids needless duplication. Efforts are equally geared at improving preparedness for the highest impact risks in the National Risk Assessment, the ability of the emergency services to work together during a terrorist attack and enhanced communication and information sharing for terrorist attacks.

The CONTEST structure is designed to ensure accountability, effective implementation and monitoring of its progress. The National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister has oversight of CONTEST and takes regular reports on its progress. The Home Secretary is the lead Minister for counter-terrorism within the UK. Departments, agencies and the police are expected to work closely together to a common set of objectives, with transparency and openness. Regular dialogue is maintained with the private sector, voluntary organizations, community groups and the general public. A report on counter-terrorism work is published annually.¹⁰⁹ All these provisions and practices could be said to have enhanced the efficacy of CONTEST and as James Kelly, the British Security Industry Association Chief Executive posits, "CONTEST is already a world class counter-terrorism strategy which has been developed and is currently being used as a model by other countries."¹¹⁰ This, however, is not to say that everyone agrees with the CONTEST strategy, and particularly with the Prevent part of it. Rachel Briggs and Arun Kundnani, for instance, notes the reservations of the Muslim community in the UK who perceive that the strategy is unfair to them.¹¹¹ It could be

¹⁰⁹ See *CONTEST Strategy pdf (Summary)* available at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism...>, accessed 2 September 2013.

¹¹⁰ See "BSIA welcomes revised counter-terror strategy", <http://www.bsia.co.uk/OXO9UJ864681?backlinktype=archives>, accessed 3 August 2014.

¹¹¹ See Rachael Briggs, "Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom" *International Affairs* 86: 4 (London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2010),

said generally that although the US and UK counter-terrorism strategies highlighted certainly have their flaws, they arguably provide a model for growing liberal democracies and particularly post-colonial states such as Nigeria.

2.6 Selected Academic Works Relevant to the Study

There are a number of works with themes that directly or indirectly have a bearing on this study. On the aspect of the origin of terrorism in Nigeria, it is generally contended that terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Writing specifically on Africa in her edited volume, *Terrorism in Africa*, Crenshaw traced the origin of terrorism in Africa to the colonial period.¹¹² According to her, terrorism was a feature within resistance movements, military coups, political assassinations, and various intra- and inter-state wars that affected most African states at some point during the continent's transition to independence and subsequent post-colonial period. Crenshaw's position however raises questions as to whether pre-colonial African societies, such as those in what is today called Nigeria, were free from terrorism.

Before the advent of colonialism, there were organised groups, societies and kingdoms in Nigeria that are thought to have employed terrorist tactics of fear, intimidation, violence and threat of violence against one another. In this wise, Oyeniya points to the existence of socio-cultural and political groups such as *Ndinche, Modewa, Aguren, Eso, Akoda* and *Ilari*.¹¹³ More so, pre-colonial empires such as Oyo, Benin and Jukun are believed to have carried out acts against neighbouring kingdoms and internal opposition that would today qualify as state terrorism. Comolli similarly notes in her book, *Boko Haram*, that the Sokoto Caliphate employed intimidation and fear in expanding its territorial hold and in propagating the

pp. 971-981, and Arun Kundnani, *Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism* (London: Institute of Race Relations, October 2009).

¹¹² Martha Crenshaw, p. 4.

¹¹³ A. B. Oyeniya, "Terrorism in Nigeria, Groups, Activities and Politics," *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1.1 Quarter I 2010, p. 3.

religion of Islam in what is now Northern Nigeria.¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, Crenshaw's colonialism start-point is significant. This is because colonialism bore unmistakable features and undoubted traits of terrorism. It could also be said that the history of Nigeria as a nation began with colonial rule. Additionally, it was only from the colonial period that written accounts of Nigeria's history could be obtained. Colonialism thus provides a marked point in the history of Nigeria with which to, perhaps unquestionably, embark on a discourse on terrorism in Nigeria. This study will adopt this colonial period start-point.

Abolurin in his book, *Terrorism: Nigeria and Global Dimensions*, approached terrorism during the colonial period from the perspective of an anti-colonialist act.¹¹⁵ He views terrorism as violence perpetrated by indigenous nationalists and anti-colonial organizations that arose throughout Asia, Africa and the Middle East in opposition to European occupation and rule. Abolurin, it could be said wrote from a purely Western perspective. He emphasised the terrorism carried out by the indigenous societies against colonial regimes and underplayed that perpetrated by the colonialists against the indigenes such as witnessed in the Oke-Ogun uprising of 1923 and the Aba Women riots of 1928 in Nigeria.¹¹⁶ In these two instances, the British colonial government allegedly used its army against civilians who opposed the colonial system of imposition of puppet rulers and taxes on the people.¹¹⁷ This, Ogundiya and Amzat in their article, *Nigeria and the Threat of Terrorism: Myth or Reality*, describe as a form of state terrorism.¹¹⁸ In a broader perspective, terrorism in Nigeria during the colonial era could perhaps be better viewed as two-sides of the same coin; that perpetrated by the

¹¹⁴ Virginia Comolli, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency* (London: Hurst & Co Ltd, 2015), pp. 15-16.

¹¹⁵ Ade Abolurin, *Terrorism: Nigeria and Global Dimensions* (Ibadan: Golden-Gems Unique Multiventures, 2011), pp. 18, 168.

¹¹⁶ Oyeniyi, p. 3.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ I. S Ogundiya and J Amzat, "Nigeria and the Threat of Terrorism: Myth or Reality," *African Journal for the Psychological Study of Social Issues*, Vol 9, No 2, 2006, pp. 186-200.

indigenous population against the colonial administration, and that by the colonial administration against the indigenous population.

The nature of post-colonial societies and their relationship with terrorism attracted the attention of Howard in his, *Failed States and the Spread of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa*.¹¹⁹ He contends that colonialism left Africa with nations that were really never states to begin with. Howard concludes that it is difficult for states that lacked a history of prior state development to establish strong and effective states today because the political and economic institutions necessary to promote state building were never cultivated in the past. In this circumstance, Forest and Giroux in their article, *Terrorism and Political Violence in Africa: Contemporary Trends in a Shifting Terrain*, support that opportunities for political participation that empower moderates and de-legitimize extremists' use of violence (as in stable democracies) are lacking.¹²⁰ Extremists therefore capitalize on political and security vacuums within Africa's fragile states to grow their support base and consolidate their strength. This assertion is plausible in the case of Nigeria that has remained highly polarised politically, economically and socially. Allegiance of citizens could be said to be more to ethnic affiliations, religion and geographical cleavages rather than the nation. Such a situation arguably provides the conditions for weak states and consequently space for terrorism to thrive. However, whether post-colonial theories still have relevance in explaining the failure of affected societies to develop strong institutions and promote peace and stability is debatable. This is given other factors such as regime or group interests, corruption and criminality that now bedevil such societies making them not only prone to terrorism but equally difficult to effectively counter the threat.

¹¹⁹ Tiffany Howard, "Failed States and the Spread of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.13, Issue 11, 2010, pp. 960-988.

¹²⁰ James Forest and Jennifer Giroux, "Terrorism and Political Violence in Africa: Contemporary Trends in a Shifting Terrain" *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol 5, No 3-4, 2011.

The causes of terrorism are an aspect on which many writers have varying opinions. Crenshaw in her work, *The Causes of Terrorism*, highlights the difficulty of finding general explanations for terrorism.¹²¹ She, an adherent of the rational approach to the study of terrorism, opines that terrorism is not the product of individual decision or personal development but a result of group process and its collective rational decision. On the other hand, Pape in his, *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, employed a psychological approach and refutes modern traditional thinking that modern suicide terrorism is religiously motivated.¹²² Other scholars like Hudson support the political or structural approach that points to environmental factors such as poverty, oppression and inequality as possible causes of terrorism.¹²³

The terrorism situation in Nigeria appears multi-causal. One is therefore supportive of the view of the Lutzs in their book, *Global Terrorism*, that “anyone who suggests that there is only one cause (of terrorism) should be regarded with great care and considerable scepticism.”¹²⁴ Emphasising the multi-causal approach, Wilkinson states in his book, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, that political violence including ethnic, religious and ideological conflict result in terrorism.¹²⁵ Furthermore, Odulami in his book, *Media in Nigeria's Security and Development Vision*, highlighted poverty, ethno-religious factors, unjust and inequitable distribution of national resources as well as a weak and poor economy marked by corruption as predisposing factors that have caused terrorism in Nigeria.¹²⁶ Alluding to the multi-causal nature of terrorism in Nigeria, Comolli views it as a

¹²¹ Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4, July 1981, pp. 379-399.

¹²² Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 August 2003, pp. 343-361.

¹²³ Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes A Terrorist and Why?” *Federal Research Division, Library of Congress*, Washington D.C., September 1999

¹²⁴ J Lutz and B Lutz, *Global Terrorism* (New York, Routledge, 2013) pp. 212 – 216.

¹²⁵ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (New York: Routledge), 2011

¹²⁶ Odulami, Idowu Samuel. *Media in Nigeria's Security and Development Vision* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd) 2001,

phenomenon rooted in cultural history and religious belief as well as political, economic, social marginalisation and the failure of governance.¹²⁷ It is perhaps pertinent to submit here that the failure of governance possibly flared embers of the conditions stated above, and the absence of a good judicial system, human rights practices and an effective security system created a vacuum of which terrorism took advantage.

Terrorism as a security threat in Nigeria has manifested in various forms. The US House of Representative Committee on Homeland Security Sub Committee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence focused on Boko Haram which it stated has transformed from its beginning as a religious study group to a violent insurgent movement bent on overthrowing the Nigerian government.¹²⁸ The group's link with al-Qaeda and its potential threat to the US Homeland was also stressed.¹²⁹ However, a number of other violent groups whose activities could be categorised as terrorism existed before Boko Haram. Adesoji in his work, *Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State*, points to the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 to 1985 as the first major local manifestations of Islamic terror in Nigeria.¹³⁰ He observes a link between Maitatsine and Boko Haram, arguing that the latter is a product of the former. He equally notes that apart from material and training assistance, growing global Islamic fundamentalism has provided ideological support and motivation to the local group(s).

The violence perpetrated by the state against its citizens is what captures the attention of Thomas Imobighe in his article, *Challenges in Categorising Domestic Terrorism*. He argues that the practice of visiting the sins of a target enemy on the latter's relations or associates is

¹²⁷ Virginia Comolli, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency* (London: Hurst & Co Ltd, 2015).

¹²⁸ L Ploch, "Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland", *US House of Representative Committee on Homeland Security Sub Committee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Report*, September 30, 2011

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Abimbola Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State," *Africa Today*, Vol 57, No 4, 2011 pp. 98-119.

what has made many innocent people the victim of terrorism.¹³¹ Pointing to both the state and non-state actors, he cites the killing of innocent civilians and the destruction of their habitation in the name of hunting down dissidents, 'rebels', or those guilty of perpetrating real crimes. Similarly, in the article, *Domestic Terrorism in Africa; Ontology of an Old War in New Trenches*, Oshita highlights the invasion of the town of Odi in the night of 20 November 1999 and Zaki Biam on 22 October 2001 by the Nigerian military as two cases of terrorism perpetrated by the state against its citizens.¹³² In the same vein, Frank Oshanugor in his book, *Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience (1995-1998)* posits that the era of military regimes in Nigeria was associated with the assassination, torture and imprisonment of political opponents as well as human right abuses and clampdown on media houses.¹³³ A related point to mention here is that incidences of state terrorism reduced since the ushering in of democratic rule in 1999. What evidently gained prominence from 1999 was the rise of militant groups principal of which were those in the Niger Delta oil-producing region. The militant groups, Sampson notes, carried out kidnappings, hostages-taking and killings.¹³⁴ At present, militancy in the Niger Delta has abated following a Federal Government of Nigeria Amnesty Programme in which the militants received government 'pardon' in exchange for laying down their arms and embracing peace. The threat now lies primarily with the activities of Boko Haram.

In terms of the responses of the government to the threats posed by terrorism, a number of works relate to the hypothesis that I am exploring in this thesis, which is that the response of the Nigerian Government to the threat of terrorism has been inappropriate and consequently

¹³¹ Thomas Imobighe, "Challenges in Categorising Domestic Terrorism" in Walula Okumu and Anneli Botha(ed), *Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding Its Impact on Human Security* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies) 2009, pp.14-20.

¹³² Oshiti O. Oshita, "Domestic Terrorism in Africa; Ontology of an Old War in New Trenches" in Walula Okumu and Anneli Botha(ed), Op. Cit. pp. 27-40.

¹³³ Frank Oshanugor, *Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience (1995 - 1998)*.

¹³⁴ Terwase Isaac Sampson, "Niger Delta Militancy and the Challenge of Criminalising Terrorism in Nigeria," *Africa Security Review*, Institute for Security Studies 18.2 (2009) pp. 28-41.

ineffective. The military that dominated twenty-nine years of Nigeria's post-independence period adopted the traditional 'hard power' response approach. Ogundiya and Amzat observe that the military regimes were repressive on any individual or association that tended to breach the security of Nigeria in any form.¹³⁵ Adesoji accounts how the regime of General Buhari brutally suppressed the Maitatsine religious sect.¹³⁶ An important point that many scholars have probably missed is the fact that the repressive stance of the military regimes on acts of terrorism against the state greatly kept in check the emergence of the type of terrorism that Nigeria is now witnessing. This is not to support military and undemocratic rule because looking at it from another perspective, and as will be seen later in this study, it could be argued that a lot of grievances of citizens were swept under the carpet only to resurface in violent forms during democratic rule.

Since the inception of democracy in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed both the soft and hard power counter-terrorism approach. The attack by the military on the people of Odi and Zaki Biam and the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf by security forces as analysed in Jamestown's *Boko Haram: A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report*, clearly illustrates the employment of the hard approach.¹³⁷ The Amnesty granted militants of the Niger Delta which Kingsley Kuku gave a detailed account of in his book, *Re-making the Niger Delta: Challenges and Opportunities*, is an instance of soft power approach.¹³⁸ On the Amnesty Programme, a soft policy approach which I will explore more fully later in chapter six, Ejovi and Ebie observes that only palpable measures such as exchange of arms for cash and an

¹³⁵ I. S Ogundiya and J Amzat, Nigeria and the Threat of Terrorism: Myth or Reality, *African Journal for the Psychological Study of Social Issues*, Vol 9, No 2, 2006, pp. 186-200.

¹³⁶ Abimbola Adesoji, pp. 98-119.

¹³⁷ "Boko Haram: A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report" Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, January 2012

¹³⁸ Kingsley Kuku, *Re-making the Niger Delta: Challenges and Opportunities* (Lagos: Mandigo Publishing) 2001.

uncoordinated skill acquisition training for ex-militants have been undertaken.¹³⁹ According to them, the supposed root causes of the Niger Delta problem such as environmental degradation and dearth of infrastructure are yet to be addressed. With reference to the continuing threat posed by Boko Haram, Omede in his article, *Nigeria: Analysing the Security Challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration*, contends that the government's counter-terrorism policies have not yielded the desired results.¹⁴⁰ He stress that Nigeria has not witnessed a significant reduction in occurrence of violence but instead a continuity of violence.¹⁴¹ The import of this argument is that the Government of Nigeria needs to better its counter terrorism efforts.

In summing up this review, it is worth emphasising that terrorism in Nigeria is woven in multi-dimensional issues. It is therefore thought that the measures to contain it would require the coordinated employment of holistic and multi-dimensional lines of effort. This would be contingent upon an understanding of the threat and the employment of a comprehensive approach and plan, while simultaneously learning and adapting to the emerging threat scenario. Herein lies the imperative of this study that draws from the lessons of the past in the form of threats-responses case study analysis with a view to shaping Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy. In the process of doing this, it is necessary to present the theoretical framework upon which this study is anchored.

2.7 Theoretical Framework

Terrorism, as has been defined earlier, is a form of conflict. There are different theoretical perspectives and explanations that have been used to account for why conflicts occur in

¹³⁹ Austine Ejevi and Sunday Ebie, "Niger Delta: A Critical Appraisal of the Amnesty Programme and the Social Political Development in Nigeria" in *Journal of Research on Humanities and Social Sciences* Vol. 3 Issue 22 (2013), pp. 130-137.

¹⁴⁰ A. J Omede, "Nigeria: Analysing the Security Challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration" *Canada Social Science Journal*, Vol 7 No 5 (2011), pp. 90-102.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

society. Many of these stem from the works of Karl Marx (1818-1883). A summary of the theoretical explanations is shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Summary of Selected Theoretical Explanations of Conflict

Type of Theory	Proponents	Explanation of Conflict
Structural Conflict Theory	Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, V. I. Lenin, John Garltung, Max Weber, Ralph Dahrendorf	The theory links the causes of conflict to the structure and organisation of societies and human reaction to it. For example, peoples response to injustice, marginalization, exploitation, poverty, etc.
Realist Theory	Donald Campbell, Muzafer Sherif, Kenneth Waltz	The theory attributes conflict to man's selfish nature which reflects in his personalized pursuit of power for selfish interests. It emphasizes conflicting goals and competition over limited resources.
Frustration-Aggression Theory	John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Berkowitz	It views conflict as the outcome of frustration triggered by the gap between needs expectation and needs attainment or what is referred to as the "want-get-ratio". People tend to be aggressive when what they get falls below expectation.
Physiological Theory	Erik Erikson	This emphasise that aggression is inherent in human nature, but this aggression only results in conflict if it is activated by man's environment and his response to failure, success or necessity.
Economic	Paul Collier,	It attributes conflict to resource scarcity and

Theory	Herschel Grossman, Jack Hirshleifer	competition and the commercialization of violence.
Psycho-Cultural Conflict Theory	Vamil Volkan, Marc Ross, Joseph Montville	The theory explains conflict as the outcome of ethnic identity and a culture of conflict
Human Needs Theory	Abraham Maslow, John Burton, Manfred Max-Neef, Marshall Rosenberg	The theory blames conflict on the competition to satisfy human needs
Systemic Theory	Ury, W.L., Brett, J.M., Goldberg S. B.	It explain how conflict lies in the social context within which it occurs, and is triggered by challenges to human comfort and existence such as unemployment, environmental degradation, domination, etc.
Relational Theory	Jean Baker Miller, Judith Jordan, Jennifer Nedelsky, Alan Fiske	This attributes conflict to the interdependence of sociological, political, economic and historical relationships among people. Examples include history of migration and stereotypes on inferiority - superiority relationships and past conflicts
Biological Theory	Thomas Hobbes, St. Augustine of Hippo	This postulates that conflict is inherent in man due to hormonal composition that is aggression-prone

Source: Adapted from A. S. Faleti, "Theories of Social Conflict", in Best G. S., (ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2006.

According to Ibaba, theories of conflict overlap.¹⁴² That is to say no one theory can independently explain conflict settings. The situation is even made more difficult in the case of terrorism, given its subjective nature. In the case of Nigeria, the heterogeneous nature of the country with different tribes, culture and history arguably makes the culture of conflict not only inevitable but also complex. According to Faleti, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination.¹⁴³ Added to these, factors such as poverty, unemployment, social inequality and the lack of forums to express perceived injustice could be said to worsen situations in a polarised society like Nigeria. It could therefore be reasoned that a mix of psycho-cultural, systemic, relational and structural conflict theories are relevant to the understanding of terrorism in Nigeria.

What is probably common and rooted in the Nigerian situations is the grievance factor fuelled by poor governance, deprivation, unemployment, poverty marginalisation and other development issues. The gap between the needs expectations of the people and needs attainment by the people is observed to be wide as what people get falls far below expectations.¹⁴⁴ The situation is heightened in a setting where the elite class controls the Nigeria's wealth at the expense of the masses, and where corruption has resulted in a deprived, frustrated and aggrieved populace that breeds aggressive tendencies.¹⁴⁵ Nnoli observes that in such situations, the frustrated populace turn to religious, ethnic and other

¹⁴² I. S. Ibaba, "Terrorism in Liberation Struggles: Interrogating the Engagement Tactics of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta," *Perspectives on Terrorism - Terrorism Research Initiative*, Vol. 5, No. 3-4 (2011).

¹⁴³ A. S. Faleti, "Theories of Social Conflict", in Best G. S., (ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2006.

¹⁴⁴ O. O. Akanji, "The Politics of Combatting Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria" Wafula, O. and Botha, A, (eds), *Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding its Impact on Human Security* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, Terrorism Studies and Research Program, 2007), pp. 55-64.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

cleavages rather than the state as sources of hope.¹⁴⁶ This establishes a link between the frustration - aggression and the structural conflict theories. It equally makes them appear to be the more plausible causal explanations for terrorism in Nigeria, and with indications that one is a follow-up to the other. For instance, in considering the preconditions (root causes) for terrorism, the structural conditions appear to be more of enabling (or permissive) factors that provide opportunities for terrorism to occur while frustration and aggression breeds on the situations that serve as direct motivations for terrorist campaigns.

The theories highlighted attempt to offer explanations as to the causes of terrorism in Nigeria. There is however the dimension of government response and issues of effectiveness of institutions responsible for conflict management. This is saying that why conflicts could arise owing to a number of reasons, equally important to conjecture are the measures taken to either arrest the conflict situation or prevent it from escalating. Here the theory of proto-insurgencies as propounded by Daniel Byman offers a possible recipe.¹⁴⁷ The theory is based on the assumption that small terrorist groups and insurrections usually seek to become full-blown insurgencies and terrorist organizations.¹⁴⁸ Byman opines that the groups are highly vulnerable in their early stages hence, the need to focus attention and identify capabilities for combating them before they become full-blown organizations.

He notes that terrorist groups take several steps to attain full-blown size and capabilities. The steps include the creation of an identity which is attached to a cause that has widespread appeal, locating a sanctuary from where to operate and seeking local and foreign support. The groups use violence as a propaganda weapon to aid recruitment, attract media attention and separate themselves from the moderates. According to the theory therefore, the success or

¹⁴⁶ Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978).

¹⁴⁷ Daniel L. Byman is a professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Programme, Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Science and Department of Government. His work, *Understanding Proto-insurgencies* was undertaken as part of RAND Corporation research project for the US Defence Department on how to improve US counter insurgency and counter terrorism strategy.

¹⁴⁸ D. L. Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007) p. 1.

failure of a proto-insurgent group depends only in part on its campaign as the reaction of the state is often the overriding factor. If the government cracks down too hard, it runs the risks of alienating the population and creating support for the proto-insurgents. However, failure to crack down can reduce confidence in the government and garner support for the groups. Equally, a weak crack-down may result in rival ethnic, religious and political groups acting on their own. In defeating proto-insurgencies therefore, Byman advises that the government could exploit the weaknesses of the groups and avoid an overreaction that may strengthen them.

The theory of proto-insurgency is adopted for this study based on its relevance to the Nigerian situation. For instance, the rise of the Boko Haram Islamic sect from a small religious study group to a full blown terrorist group could be said to have been a direct response to some inappropriate government measures. The theory enables the researcher to answer the questions as to what mistakes the Government of Nigeria made in allowing Boko Haram to transform to a terrorist group and to the extent of its designation by the US as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It therefore provides causal explanations, and an appropriate threat-response or strategic framework to counter- terrorism in Nigeria. It is on this setting that the study makes an overview of the threat environment, the history and causes of terrorism in Nigeria in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

OVERVIEW OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT, HISTORY AND CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

3.1 Preamble

This chapter presents some basic facts on Nigeria in relation to the subject of terrorism. I will first highlight the threat environment by outlining Nigeria's geography, economy, defence and security as well as political history. This is to provide an understanding of the physical and human terrain on which this research is based. A historical overview of terrorism in Nigeria is made in the second part of the chapter in an attempt to provide answers as to the origin and nature of terrorism in Nigeria as well as to how the threat pattern has evolved over the years. The answers here are however preliminary and therefore not comprehensive. This is because detailed and specific accounts would be made in the subsequent chapters.

Finally, the causes of terrorism in Nigeria will be discussed to provide a general picture of the expression of terrorism in Nigeria. The causes are examined from a "root and trigger causes" perspective including a consideration of external factors. In a nutshell, the discussion in this chapter is expected to serve as a prelude to the case studies that would be examined in chapters four, five, six and seven.

3.2 Nigeria: An Overview

Figure 3.1 Political Map of Nigeria



Source: www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/nigeria-map.html, accessed 4 September, 2014.

3.2.1 Geography

Nigeria is a federal constitutional republic comprising 36 states, 774 Local Government Areas and a Federal Capital Territory called Abuja.¹ The country is grouped into 6 geopolitical zones namely; North-West, North-Central, North-East, South-West, South-South and South-East. Nigeria is located on the eastern part of the West Coast of Africa, south of the Sahel region. It lies between latitudes 4 degrees and 14 degrees North, and longitudes 2

¹ The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999

degrees and 14 degrees East. The total land mass of Nigeria is 923,768 square kilometres, with land borders totalling 4,047 kilometres and an 853-kilometre stretch of coastline.² The country is bordered on the North by the Republic of Niger, to the Northeast by the Republic of Chad, on the East by the Republic of Cameroon, to the West by the Republic of Benin and to the South by the Atlantic Ocean. The socio-political and economic ties Nigeria have with each of its contiguous neighbours mentioned above predate colonial times.³ It also enjoys relatively friendly relations with them.⁴

Nigeria's total population, according to the CIA's 2014 estimate, is about 177 million.⁵ This makes her the most populous country in Africa and the black world, and the sixth most populous in the world after China, India, USA, Indonesia and Brazil.⁶ The population is also one of the most diverse in the world with about 250 ethnic groups that speaks more than 500 different dialects.⁷ The major ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani (29 per cent), Yoruba (21 per cent), Ibo (18 per cent), Ijaw (10 per cent), Kanuri (4 per cent), Ibibio (3.5 per cent) and Tiv (2.5 per cent).⁸ About 50 per cent of the population are Muslim, 40 per cent Christians and the remaining 10 per cent adherents of indigenous beliefs.⁹ The majority of the Muslim population are found in the North and parts of the Southwest of the country while the Christians are mainly in the South and parts of North Central Nigeria. It could be surmised from these data that Nigeria is large in terms of geographical size and population. It is equally

² The CIA World Factbook, available at <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>, accessed 28 February, 2015.

³ B. E. Ate and B. A. Akinterinwa, (eds), *Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s* (Lagos: NIIA & Pumark Nig Ltd, 1992).

⁴ "Nigeria Relations with Neighbouring States" *The Library of Congress Country Studies*, available at http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/government/nigeria_government_relations_with_neigh~10030.html, accessed 23 February 2014.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ See Nigeria National Population Commission website, <http://www.population.gov.ng/>, accessed 1 March 2015.

⁷ Onuorah J. Obodozie, "Diversity and Social Cohesion in Africa." In Kwandiwe Kondio, eds., *Perspective on Thought Leadership for Africa Renewal* (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2013), p. 564.

⁸ The CIA World Factbook.

⁹ Ibid

socio-culturally diverse with regional politics, religious and ethnic factors featuring prominently in conflict situations as would be seen later in the study.

3.2.2 Economy

Nigeria is the world's 12th largest producer of petroleum, 8th largest exporter of the product, and has the 10th largest proven reserves of oil and gas.¹⁰ Petroleum accounts for 40 per cent of Nigeria's GDP and 80 per cent of the Federal Government's revenue.¹¹ There are other mineral resources in the country such as natural iron ore, coal, tin, bauxite and many others that have remained largely unexploited. Agriculture used to be the main foreign exchange earner of Nigeria. The country had been the world's largest exporter of groundnut, cocoa and palm oil. Over-dependence on petroleum however led to the neglect of agriculture.¹² The agricultural sector still employs over 60 per cent of the country's working population. The manufacturing sector, science and technology are underdeveloped.¹³

About 70 per cent of Nigerians are said to live below the World Bank poverty line of \$1.25 income per day.¹⁴ The unemployment rate is estimated at 28.9 per cent.¹⁵ There is generally a low level of infrastructure associated with Third World economies. Nigeria's main trading partners are the US, UK, China, France, Germany, India, Brazil, South Korea, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Indonesia and Japan.¹⁶ Formal trade and investment with its contiguous neighbours, the West African Sub-region and African region is low.¹⁷ Generally, it could be stated that Nigeria is a developing economy that is highly dependent on

¹⁰ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10116945>, accessed 1 June 2014.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² "Nigeria: Overview of Economy" *Nations Encyclopaedia*, available at <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria-OVERVIEW-OF-ECONOMY.html>, accessed 12 February 2014.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ The CIA World Factbook.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ National Bureau of Statistics, <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/>, accessed 13 August 2014.

economically advanced nations. As would be discussed in detail later in the study, the dependency includes reliance on foreign countries for resources to fight terrorism.

3.2.3 Defence and Security

The Nigerian security and intelligence architecture, security policy decision-making process, procedure for military aid to civil authority and the national counter-terrorism structure are relevant to this study. They are discussed subsequently.

3.2.3.1 Security and Intelligence Architecture

Nigeria maintains an armed forces that consists of an army, a navy and an air force. Each of these is under the operational control of a Service Chief, and collectively under the Chief of Defence Staff as the professional head and the Minister of Defence as the political head.¹⁸ The roles of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) include the defence of Nigeria from external aggression and the suppression of insurrections in aid of civil authorities when called upon by the President to do so.¹⁹ The President of the country is also the Commander-in-Chief of the AFN and therefore the Chief Security Officer of the nation.

The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) is charged with the preservation of public order and the promotion of public safety. It is the primary entity responsible for ensuring citizen compliance with the nation's rules and regulations.²⁰ The NPF is headed by an Inspector General who is appointed by the President on the advice of the Police Council. There is a plethora of other security agencies such as the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps that provide measures against threats and disasters, the Nigerian Prison Service that takes into custody and rehabilitates detainees, as well as the Nigerian Custom Service and the Nigeria Immigration Service that are responsible for border security.

¹⁸ See the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

Nigeria has three secret intelligence agencies. These are the Department of State Service (DSS) also known as the State Security Services (SSS) responsible for intelligence of internal security value; the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) responsible for intelligence of non-military nature outside Nigeria and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) responsible for intelligence of military interest within and outside Nigeria.²¹ The overall responsibility and direction for all secret intelligence matters rests with the President. He appoints a National Security Adviser (NSA) who coordinates the intelligence activities of all the security and intelligence agencies in the country. The NSA also serves as the Chairman of the Intelligence Community Committee (ICC) and the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB). The ICC has as members, the heads of the three secret intelligence agencies and an Assistant Inspector General of Police in charge of criminal investigation. The other ICC members are the Directors of Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence and Air Intelligence. The JIB comprises all the members of ICC as well as the Comptrollers General of Custom Service, Immigration Service, Prison Service and the Chairman of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency.²² It functions along similar lines to the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). It could be argued that in terms of composition and structure, the Nigerian intelligence and security architecture is to a large extent a semblance of those of the Western world. Their performance, as this study will show, has however been below the demands of the Nigerian security situation and the expectation of citizens.

3.2.3.2 Security Policy Decision-Making Process

²¹ National Security Act (CAP 278) 1986, Archives of Office of the National Security Adviser Abuja.

²² Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, *National Security Strategy: Issues and Challenges*. Lecture presented by Nigeria's National Security Adviser at the National Defence College on 7 January, 2013.

In his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFN and the Chief Security Officer of the nation, the President exercises authority and oversight over all security policies regarding the safety of Nigeria and its citizens. He exercises this through two main organs, that is, the National Security Council and the National Defence Council.²³

According to Section 25 of the Third Schedule of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the National Security Council advises the President in matters relating to public security, including matters relating to any organization or agency established by law for ensuring the security of the country.²⁴ The Council is composed of the President of Nigeria, the Vice President, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Interior, the NSA, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Inspector General of Police and such other persons the President may in his discretion appoint.

Section 16 of the Third Schedule of the Constitution of the Federation states the function of the National Defence Council as to advise the President on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria.²⁵ The Council is composed of the President as the chairman, the Vice President, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff and the three Service Chiefs of the AFN.

It is perhaps pertinent to mention that aside from the two organs highlighted above, there is the Council of State forum which is primarily a policy advisory body with the president as chairman. The other members of the Council of State are the Vice President, all former Presidents or former Heads of State, all former Chief Justices, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, all state Governors and the Attorney-General of the Federation. Its significance here is that it among other functions advises the President

²³ Ojogbane Adegbe, Office of the President, State House Abuja, interviewed on 12 January 2015.

²⁴ See the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

²⁵ Ibid.

(whenever requested to do so) on the maintenance of security. Its advice is often given priority because of its broad membership that cuts across the executive, legislature and judiciary as well as former Presidents.²⁶ The whole decision making process ensures that wide consultations are made on matters affecting the national security of Nigeria.

3.2.3.3 Procedure for Military Aid to Civil Authority

The procedure for military intervention in internal security situations otherwise known as Military Aid to Civil Authority is important here as the military role in counter-terrorism will significantly feature in subsequent discussions in this study. Briefly, the AFN's intervention in internal security situation draws from the constitutional role assigned to it by virtue of Section 217 of the Nigerian Constitution. When a crisis situation develops beyond the capability of the police, the Governor of the affected state initiates a request to the President for the military to intervene in the crisis. Once this approval is given, the military deploys troops to the crisis area. The police then hands over operational control to the military, and subsequently operate alongside other security agencies in supporting roles to the military until law and order is restored. In some grave situations, the President may initiate the process of military intervention directly. The President may also declare a state of emergency over the affected areas of the country to enable effective containment of the situation by the military. Aside from this arrangement, there are a number of combined military, police and other security-cum-intelligence agencies operation groups known as Joint Task Force (JTF) established all over the country including that with the neighbouring countries of Niger and Chad known as Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). All these, as will be discussed in detail later, are military-led task groups that have come to play significant roles in the counter-terrorism effort of the Government of Nigeria.

²⁶ Ojogbane Adegbe, Abuja, interviewed 12 January 2015.

3.2.3.4 National Counter Terrorism Structure

The Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is the entity charged with the overall responsibility for coordinating the counter-terrorism programme of the government. The centre is responsible for strategic communication in collaboration with relevant ministries, departments and agencies, and collaboration with foreign partners for capacity building, while facilitating oversight of operations by security and intelligence agencies.²⁷ It is also responsible for the development, direction and implementation of the nation's counter-terrorism strategy.²⁸

A branch of the CTC known as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Bureau is officially responsible for the delivery of some aspects of the counter terrorism strategy such as analysis of intelligence from the security and intelligence agencies. It is proposed to function as the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. The three secret intelligence agencies (DSS, NIA and DIA), three services of the AFN (army, navy and air force), the Defence Headquarters as well as the Nigerian Police Force have counter-terrorism cells which, apart from their respective service functions, are expected to feed the overall counter-terrorism effort.

3.2.4 Highlights of Nigeria's Political History

During the European colonization of Africa in the 19th Century, the British established spheres of influence around the basins of River Niger and River Benue on the West Coast of Africa. On 1 January 1901, the area was formally declared a protectorate of the British Empire.²⁹ The area around and to the north of the confluence of the River Niger and River Benue was known and administered as the Northern Protectorate, while the southern areas including the coastal town of Lagos (that was then a colony and administrative capital) was

²⁷ Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, 7 January 2013.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ J. F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., *History of West Africa* (London: Longman, 1985), pp. 87-128.

known and administered as the Southern Protectorate. In 1914, the two protectorates were amalgamated into one; to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. The name 'Nigeria' derived from River Niger and coined by Flora Shaw (who was the fiancée of Lord Lugard, the then British colonial administrator) was adopted as the country's official name.³⁰

The British colonial government did not implement a uniform style of government in administering Nigeria after the amalgamation. The pre-1914 administrative structures of the Northern Protectorate, the Southern Protectorate and the Colony of Lagos were maintained. There were therefore different policies for the three political units. As posited by Akinwumi, "each of the groups that colonialism forcefully brought together...had had their own unique political and administrative structures that were best suited to their society."³¹ One probable reason why the British colonial government opted for a non-uniform administrative structure was for ease of governance as the Northern Protectorate was far from the colonial seat of government in Lagos. Another and perhaps more important reason was the stiff resistance posed by the Northern people and their rulers to Western influence which they perceived as anti-Islam. The British thus adopted an 'indirect rule' system of government in Northern Nigeria whereby the local chiefs and emirs were recognized and empowered to govern their localities subject however to their loyalty to the Crown.³² In the South, the British were directly involved in government, propagation of the Christian religion and Western culture. Therefore while the South imbibed Western culture and values such as education and consequently attained a certain level of socio-economic development early, it was the reverse in many parts of the North. This difference in the relationship with the colonial state between

³⁰ Helen Callaway and Dorothy Helly, "Crusader for Empire: Flora Shaw/Lady Lugard" in Nupur Chaudhun and Margaret Strobel, (eds), *Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 88.

³¹ Olayemi Akinwumi, *Crisis and Conflicts in Nigeria: A Political History Since 1960* (Munster: LIT Verlag, 2004), pp. 9-22.

³² J. F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder, pp.87-128.

the North and the South, it could be argued, impacted on contemporary national security issues.

As noted by Ekeh, the colonisation of Nigeria was by force.³³ Owing to this, opposition to colonial rule dominated Nigeria's political culture during the time. The result was the establishment and amendments of a series of constitutions by the British colonial government in an attempt to find a structure to meet the demands of Nigerians for political power. This became more evident after the Second World War. By 1951, the country has been divided into Northern, Eastern and Western Regions, each having its own House of Assembly. In 1954, Nigeria became a Federation. A Nigerian, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was appointed Federal Prime Minister in 1957. The Western and Eastern regions were granted internal self-government in the same year, and the Northern region in 1959. On 1 October 1960, Nigeria was granted full independence from British rule.

According to Falola and Heaton, political unrest dominated most of Nigeria's post-Independence history.³⁴ The unrest was triggered by regional politics, ethnic sentiments, religious extremism, and perceived political domination by the Hausa-Fulani.³⁵ The latter factor resulted in a coup led by Nigerian Army officers of Ibo extraction who assassinated Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and the Premiers of the Northern and Western regions. A large number of Ibos living in the North were massacred in the subsequent reprisal attacks. The attempt by the Ibos, led by Lieutenant Colonel Odumegu Ojukwu, to secede from Nigeria and form the state of Biafra resulted in a national civil war from 1967 to 1970.³⁶

Nigeria was ruled from 1966 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1999 by the military. The military regimes allegedly engaged in suppression of ethno-religious and political activism with

³³ P. P. Ekeh, *Colonialism and Social Structure* (Ibadan: OUP, 1983), p. 3.

³⁴ Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 158.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

attendant violations of human rights.³⁷ The attempt to restore democratic rule in 1993 was scuttled by the then military President, General Ibrahim Babangida when he annulled an already concluded election supposedly won by Chief Moshood Abiola. Also, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a political and environmental activist was hanged in 1995 by the General Sani Abacha military regime, an action that attracted international condemnation including Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations.³⁸

Civil democratic government was ushered in on 1 October 1999 with the election and swearing-in of a former military Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo as Executive President (in a US-styled presidential system of government). In May 2010, President Umaru Yar' Adua that succeeded President Obasanjo died while in office. He was succeeded by his deputy, Vice President Goodluck Jonathan. Goodluck Jonathan was subsequently elected President on 27 May 2011 for a four-year term. His bid for re-election for another 4-year term was unsuccessful following his loss to General Muhammadu Buhari in the presidential election held on 28 March 2015. Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in on 29 May 2015 and is the current Executive President of Nigeria. The period of civil rule, from 1999 to date has been however of immense security challenge for Nigeria owing principally to terrorist activities, the history and causes of which I now examine.

3.3 Historical Overview of Terrorism in Nigeria

It is difficult to tie the origin of terrorism in Nigeria to a specific period. As noted earlier in the study however, the colonial era significantly stands out as a period in which to begin a discourse on the origin of terrorism in Nigeria for several reasons. The period arguably gave birth to what is now Nigeria, in other words, Nigeria could be said to be a creation of

³⁷ Frank Sochukwu Osanugor, 2004.

³⁸ *BBC News*, 10 November 1995. See news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/November/10..., accessed 16 July 2014.

colonialism. It was also during this period that an elaborate and reliable documentation of Nigerian history was first made, and as a corollary to this, a period in which features of terrorism in Nigeria were first documented.³⁹ Therefore, beginning from colonialism to the present day, I will make a brief overview of terrorism in Nigeria in four phases, namely; the colonial era, the post-colonial era, the military era and the current democratic era.

3.3.1 Colonial Era (1900 – 1960)

Nigeria was colonised by the British. As a political process, Osterhammel views colonialism as an unequal relationship between the metropole (Britain) and the colony (Nigeria), and by extension, between the colonist (colonial administrators) and the indigenous (Nigerian) population.⁴⁰ In exercise of sovereignty, Aderibigbe observes that Britain re-defined and re-structured Nigeria's social system, government and economy to suit her colonial interests.⁴¹ This is as many policies that were fundamental to the lives of Nigerians were made and implemented by the colonial rulers with direction from Britain. It is conceivable that often, the policies were arbitrary, neglecting political and socio-cultural compromise and the wishes of the people.

Oyeniya avers that owing to its illegitimacy and non-acceptability, colonial rule in Nigeria depended on the use of force to implement policies, laws and orders.⁴² There was at this period therefore, the threat of, and use of violence by the colonial state against the civilian population in the bid to enforce policies, and on the other hand, the threat of and use of violence by resistance groups against the state in protest against its policies. The Oke-Ogun uprising of 1921, Aba Women Riot of 1928 and the *Ekumeku* Movement of the 1920s, the

³⁹ Toyin Falola and Saheed Aderinto, *Nigeria, Nationalism and Writing History* (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2010).

⁴⁰ J. Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Princeton: Markus Wien Publishers), pp. 15-16.

⁴¹ S. Aderibigbe, *Basic Approaches to Government* (Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd, 2006), p. 164.

⁴² B. A. Oyeniya, "A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria" in Wafulu., Op.Cit., p.43.

accounts of which are well documented by various scholars, aptly demonstrated this.⁴³ In the case of Oke-Ogun, the colonial government in an effort to enforce its policies engaged the people in a three-year violence that resulted in the death of about ten thousand persons.⁴⁴ One could perhaps espouse the argument here that it was these acts of repression by the colonial state against its citizens, and the citizens' violent reactions to political and socio-economic policies considered unacceptable that later manifested in post-colonial Nigeria.

3.3.2 Post-Colonial Era (1960 – 1983)

Post-colonial Nigeria witnessed manifestations of ethno-religious and other security issues particularly in the form of resistance to Christianity and Western culture. The divide between the adherents of Islam and the adherents of Christianity broadened. Somehow, the divide coincided with the geopolitical structure of Nigeria; the Muslims predominantly inhabiting the North and the Christians in the South of the country. According to Falola, a key development during this period was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.⁴⁵ The major Islamic sects in the 1970s and 1980s include the Shiite, Muslim brotherhood and *Izala*. As noted earlier in the study, what is agreed by many authors to be the first episode of religious violence in independent Nigeria that could be rightly classified as terrorism was the Maitatsine uprising between 1980 and 1985.⁴⁶ The violence which started in the town of

⁴³ Phillip Igbafe, "Western Ibo Society and its Resistance to British Rule: The Ekumeku Movement 1898-1911" *Journal of African History*, Vol. 12, Issue 03 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, July 1971), pp 441-449. Also, Paul E. Lovejoy and J. S. Hogendorn, "Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905-6" in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Cambridge University Press 1990), pp. 217-244. Article available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/182766>, accessed 12 June 2013.

⁴⁴ Adeyemi Bukola Oyeniya. "Terrorism in Nigeria: Groups, Activities, and Politics." In *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, Vol 1 No, 1. 1 Quarter 1 (2010), p. 18.

⁴⁵ Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies* (New York: University of Rochester, 1998), p. 17.

⁴⁶ See Elizabeth Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria, 1980 -1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited, in: *Journal of Religion in Africa*, xvii, 3 (1987), pp. 194-208. See also Ibrahim, Omar F. "Religion and Politics: A View from the North," in Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Green and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds. *Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida* (Ibadan: Vintage Publishers, 1997), pp. 509-534.

Kano spread to Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe and Yola, all in the areas of Northern Nigeria where Boko Haram subsequently took root.

3.3.3 The Military Era (1983 – 1999)

During the military regimes, acts of terrorism were perpetrated against political opponents. The acts, according to Albert, were carried out by the military under the cover of national security.⁴⁷ The regimes of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha were notorious in this respect. Dele Giwa, the founding Chief Executive and Editor-in-Chief of the *Newswatch* Magazine, was assassinated through a letter bomb on 19 October, 1986.⁴⁸ Also assassinated were Alfred Rewane, a 79 year-old democrat and Kudirat Abiola, the wife of Moshood Abiola, who supposedly won a presidential election held in 1993.⁴⁹ All these were believed to have been politically motivated killings by the then military regimes.

Incidences of transnational terrorism were also witnessed during the military regimes. In 1984, the Generals Buhari and Idiagbon military regime sponsored the kidnap of the country's former Finance Minister, Umaru Dikko in London. The plan was foiled by the C13 Anti-terrorist Special Patrol Group of Scotland Yard.⁵⁰ Also, in October 1993, some politically disaffected Nigerians under the aegis of Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) hijacked a Nigerian Airbus A310 from its Abuja destination to Niamey, Niger Republic.⁵¹ Their demands included the dissolution of the then Interim National

⁴⁷ Isaac Albert, "The Socio-cultural Politics of Ethnic and Religious Conflict" in Ernest Uwazie, Isaac Albert and Godfrey Uzoigwe (eds), *Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria* (Oxford: Lexington Books, 1999), p.116.

⁴⁸ Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy Under Military Rule 1966-1999* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), p. 151.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Akinsanya, Adeoye, "The Dikko Affair and Anglo-Nigerian Relations", *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol.34, No.3, July 1985, p.602.

⁵¹ Isaac Olawale Albert "Terror as a political weapon: reflections on the bomb explosions in Abacha's Nigeria" *Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan*, p. 37-56.

Government (set up by the military after the annulment of the 1993 Presidential Election result) and a return to democratic rule.

3.3.4 Current Democratic Era (1999 – Date)

The return of democratic rule in 1999 is often perceived to have opened up the space for the expression of myriads of security issues that had either been suppressed or ignored by autocratic military regimes.⁵² Freedom of speech and improved human rights under democracy are thought to have given citizens the opportunity to express their grievances without molestation. This 'new found freedom' however provided some people the opportunity to take agitations to the extreme. Religious extremism assumed a new dimension as many states in the northern part of the country began implementing the Sharia legal system.⁵³ It could be argued that this deepened the ethno-religious divide and escalated violence between the Christians who dominated the southern part of Nigeria and the Muslims who dominated the northern part.

Similarly, ethnic militant groups emerged across the country fostering ethnic nationalism and parochial interests.⁵⁴ In the South East of Nigeria, a group known as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) emerged, agitating for self-determination of the Igbo ethnic group. The Oduduwa People Congress (OPC) militant group was formed in the South West to promote and defend pan-Yoruba ethnic nationalism. In the Niger Delta South-South region, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and MEND were formed to champion the cause for economic and political control of the oil-rich region as well as end years of environmental degradation of the area. In the

⁵² A. J Omede, "Nigeria: Analysing the Security Challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration" *Canada Social Science Journal*, Vol 7 No 5 (2011), pp. 90-102.

⁵³ Lauren Ploch, "Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress" *Congressional Research Service (RL 33964)*, April 2011.

⁵⁴ A. A. Akanni, "History of Terrorism, Youth Psychology and Unemployment in Nigeria" in *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, Vol.7, No.3, September 2014, pp.67-68.

North, the Arewa People's Congress (APC) was established to protect the religious and political interest of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani people. Oyeniya notes that the above mentioned groups summarily usurped the role of the police as the state security apparatus were unable to cope with the emerging security challenges.⁵⁵ They purportedly unleashed terror on government institutions as well as individuals and groups that were outside their ethnic and religious cleavages.

An episode that could be said to have first brought Nigeria under the searchlight of international terrorism was the case involving one of its citizen, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. On Christmas Day of 2009, he attempted to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underpants while on board a Northwest Airlines Flight to the city of Detroit in the US.⁵⁶ The significance of this event was its highlighting of the potency of international terrorism in Nigeria and the attestation of the level to which young Nigerians have been recruited by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Prior to this, Al-Jazeera television reported that (the late) al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden had called for an uprising by Muslims against several national governments including Nigeria.⁵⁷ There was at this time clandestine recruitment of young Nigerian Muslims for terrorist training in Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. In December 2006, for instance, one Mohammed Ashafa was arrested in Kano, Nigeria and charged for receiving funds from two al-Qaeda operatives based in Lahore, Pakistan. The funds were meant to recruit young Muslims for terrorist training in Niger Republic, and to carry out terrorist attacks on American residences in Nigeria.⁵⁸ Also arrested was one Mohammed Bello Ilya

⁵⁵ A. B. Oyeniya, p.3.

⁵⁶ "Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab: One Boy's Journey to Jihad" *Sunday Times* (London), 3 January 2010. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world.....>, accessed 7 June 2013.

⁵⁷ See Stratfor, <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/alleged-bin-laden-tape-encourages-overthrow-muslim-oil-producers>, accessed 12 July 2013.

⁵⁸ "Country Reports on Terrorism, Africa Review", *Global Terrorism Organization Year Book*, (Washington D.C: International Business Publication, 2010), p. 83.

Damagun. He was charged with receiving 300,000 US Dollar from terrorists based in Sudan.⁵⁹

Terrorism in Nigeria now revolves primarily around the activities of the Boko Haram Islamic sect. Of particular interest, and disturbing too, is the alleged linkage of the sect to AQIM and other al-Qaeda affiliates as well as the ethno-religious, criminal and political dimensions to the sect's activities that is threatening Nigeria and sub-regional security. The possible factors that have brought about terrorism in Nigeria will next be discussed.

3.4 Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

This section covers the general perspective, root, trigger and underlying causes of terrorism in Nigeria.

3.4.1 General Perspectives

The subject of terrorism has inspired a voluminous literature in recent years. However, nowhere among the highly varied treatments does one find a general theoretical analysis of the causes of terrorism.

- Martha Crenshaw⁶⁰

As Crenshaw observes, there is a general difficulty regarding consensus explanations for the causes of terrorism, as is the case with the definition of it. The multifaceted nature of the subject of terrorism is one major reason believed to account for this. Theoretical thinking on the causes of terrorism spans the works of political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, economists, criminologists, historians and many other disciplines, each with either specific or interrelated approaches. From these arise four categories of approaches to terrorism analysis. These include the multi-causal approach which suggest that terrorism cannot be explained by

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4, New York Jul 1981, p. 379, available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421717>, accessed 1 June 2013.

a single cause and therefore considers the understanding of the causes of terrorism from a plethora of factors such as sociological, psychological, economic, political and religious.⁶¹ There is the rational or organizational approach which views terrorism as a product of rational strategic choice, arguing that organizations consciously make the decisions to use terrorism as the best option to attain certain political goals. Ross, an adherent of this approach adds that the cost benefit calculation is critical in the choices of the participant.⁶²

Another approach to terrorism analysis is the psychological approach as espoused by scholars such as Wardlaw, Clayton, Barlow and Ballif-Spanvill.⁶³ The approach takes into account the motivation of individuals, and concludes that the primary motivation to resort to terrorism lies on the personalities, beliefs, attitudes and disposition of the individual perpetrator or terrorist group rather than religious, economic or other factors.⁶⁴ A fourth approach is the political or structural approach. This approach hinges the causes of terrorism on environmental factors which takes into account the political, cultural, social and economic structure of societies. The adherents of this approach, such as Jeffrey Ross and Ted Gurr, opine that poverty, marginalisation, oppression and inequality are causes of terrorism.⁶⁵ Gurr further contends in his notion of relative deprivation that the inability to obtain what is felt to be justified triggers feelings of frustration that ultimately facilitates the emergence of collective violence.⁶⁶

⁶¹ See J. Lutz and B. Lutz, *Global Terrorism* (New York, Routledge, 2013) pp. 212 – 216.

⁶² Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model." *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 30, No. 3 (1993), pp. 317-329.

⁶³ See Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 49, No. 1 (Feb., 2005), pp. 3-42.

⁶⁴ The theories generally attempt to explain why individuals join terrorist organisations, terrorist group dynamics and how the terrorists, their victims as well as their audiences affect the commission of terrorist acts.

⁶⁵ J.I. Ross and T. R. Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1989) pp. 407-428

⁶⁶ The term Relative Deprivation is often used to describe feelings of political, economic, or social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute.

Crenshaw on her part postulates that terrorism is a product of rational political choice and differentiates between strategic, psychological and structural groups of variables. The structural variable is further categorised into preconditions or root causes, and precipitants or trigger causes. As defined by her, the preconditions are those factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run while the precipitants are specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism.⁶⁷ This means that the root causes do not in themselves result in violence but stay dormant until ignited by the trigger factors. A sub-division is further made of the root causes into permissive factors that provide opportunities for terrorism to occur and situations or reasons that serve as direct motivations for terrorist campaigns as earlier observed in chapter 2.⁶⁸ As discussed, this thesis examines the action/reaction interplay between terrorists and the government in Nigeria. As such, an adoption of the root and trigger causes categorisation would seem the most appropriate approach.

3.4.2 Root Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

According to Newman, the idea of 'root causes' of terrorism suggests that there is some form of causal relationship between underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions and terrorist activity.⁶⁹ Although some scholars are opposed to the idea of espousing root causes of terrorism for reasons including that it could mean giving some form of legitimacy to terrorists, one shares Newman's view that root causes have implications for counter-terrorism and further academic scholarship.⁷⁰ As noted earlier, a failure to understand the linkage between root causes and terrorism may result in inadequate counter-terrorism

⁶⁷ M. Crenshaw, p, 381.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Edward Newman, "Exploring the "Root Causes" of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:8 (2006), pp. 749-772.

⁷⁰ Ibid. pp.750, 752. Newman noted William John Bennett as scholars that have such contrary views. Bennett is an American Conservative Party pundit and political theorist who shared his views in his work *Why We Fight. Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc,2003) in response to US counterterrorism policy after 9/11 attack.

policies. Newman further opines that an approach to counter-terrorism that ignores this relationship may even exacerbate the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism and in turn intensify the terrorist threat.⁷¹

It is perhaps difficult, if not erroneous, to tie terrorism in Nigeria to specific root causes. The causes of terrorism in Nigeria could rather be said to be multi-faceted, complex and interdependent. Similarly, it is difficult to present a comprehensive and an all-inclusive catalogue of the causes as they seem undefined and subject to varying interpretations. It is more so that what drives any particular individual to commit an act of terrorism may not be the reason that appears apparent. In this study, I will subsume the root causes into economic, socio-cultural and political factors.

3.4.2.1 Economic Factors

Nigeria is richly endowed with natural resources. The country, as stated earlier in this chapter, is one of the world's largest oil and gas producers. Taking 2010 as a benchmark, Nigeria earns about 59 billion US Dollar annually from oil exports alone.⁷² The country's wealth has however not been translated to the wellbeing of the whole populace as economic opportunities are unevenly distributed between the rich and the poor. The UN Human Development Index of 2006 (the period Boko Haram was actively radicalising and recruiting) ranked Nigeria 159th position of 177 countries, with 70.8 per cent of the population living on less than one US Dollar a day and 92.4 per cent on less than two US Dollar a day.⁷³ There are indications that pervasive poverty to some degree increases vulnerability to radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. Experts allude to the fact that even though perpetration of the act of terrorism is not exclusive to the poor (or that terrorism ought not to be blamed on

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² http://www.bloomberg.com/.../nigeria_s_oil_revenue..., accessed 3 April, 2013.

⁷³ http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/Countries_1320.html, accessed 3 April, 2013.

poverty), the phenomenon thrives most in poverty stricken parts of the world.⁷⁴ This is evident in the northern part of Nigeria where Boko Haram operates.⁷⁵ The area has an average poverty rate of 70.1 per cent as compared to 34.9 per cent for the South.⁷⁶

The environment of widespread poverty in Northern Nigeria, Awofeso contends, contributes to the growing population of street children or child beggars known as *Almajiris*.⁷⁷ The term *Almajiri* in Nigerian refers to someone who leaves his home in search of knowledge in Islam. It is a system whereby children are sent to live and study under renowned Islamic teachers in the cities, similar to the *madrassah* system in Central Asia.⁷⁸ Although the phenomenon is a popular and old practice, the *Almajiris* usually live and study in appalling conditions as they are often cramped into shacks, left with little or no food and compelled to roam the streets as beggars.⁷⁹ A 2010 survey indicates that the population of *Almajiris* in Nigeria stood at 9.5 million.⁸⁰ Without parental care and social security therefore, it is plausible that they are easily radicalized and recruited as foot soldiers for terrorist operations.

Similarly, there is a large number of unemployed youth in Nigeria. Nigeria's youthful population (between 15 and 34 years) is estimated to be about 70 million, that is, nearly a half of the entire population.⁸¹ Official statistics show that more than 80 per cent of the youth are unemployed while about 10 per cent are under-employed. The estimated 10 per cent in gainful employment are stretched and over-burdened with the task of providing not only for

⁷⁴ See Chester Phyllis, "Empowering Jihad: The Deadly Myth of a 'Root Cause'" *The New York Post*, 26 February 2015, p. 1.

⁷⁵ M. Lukman, "The North and Poverty Phenomenon", *This Day Newspaper*, 6 February 2007.

⁷⁶ Data obtained from the Office of National Statistics, July 2013. The percentage is based on an estimated total of 100 million Nigerians living below the UN poverty base line.

⁷⁷ Niyi Awofeso, Jan Ritchie and Pieter Degeling, "The Almajiri Heritage and the Threat of Non-State Terrorism in Northern Nigeria--Lessons from Central Asia and Pakistan" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol. 26, Issue 4 (2003), pp.311-325.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ See "Almajiris 'Street Children' and Sectarian Conflicts in Northern Nigeria", *West Africa Insight*, Vol.1, No.3, March 2010, p.7.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Nigerian National Population Commission 2013 figures. See also "Nigeria's Unemployment Rate Rises to 23.9% - NPC" in *Punch Newspaper*, 13 October 2013.

the immediate family members but other relations given the extended family system practised in Nigeria.⁸² Consequently, growing frustration and disillusionment that accompany long-term unemployment and poverty possibly underpin their gravitation to crimes, making these individuals more vulnerable to recruitment by criminal cartels, extremist and terrorist groups. Environmental factors such as harsh climate and drought in the Sahel region of Northern Nigeria, and pollution in the Niger Delta region of Southern Nigeria have contributed to making land use difficult. Agriculture, which is the major occupation of the people, can hardly be practised in these areas. Thus, the frustration syndrome is aggravated as the people are dispirited by the absence of white collar jobs and disheartened by inability to engage themselves in traditional occupations such as crop farming, animal husbandry and fishing. The situation in the Niger Delta region is particularly grievous as excessive gas flaring and oil spillage on land and sea has made it difficult for plants to grow and for fish to survive. The extent of pollution is such that a UN Inspection Team estimated that it will cost 150 billion Naira (equivalent to approximately 600 million US Dollar), and take 30 years to revive the land degraded by years of oil and gas pollution.⁸³ In the North East of Nigeria where Boko Haram thrives, Lake Chad that is the main fishing location and source of water for livestock and crops has been shrinking with resultant economic hardship on the people and demographic shift.⁸⁴ A UN humanitarian official described the people of the area as “some of the poorest ... in the world” with increasing vulnerability to terrorism.⁸⁵

3.4.2.2 Socio-Cultural Factors

⁸² Onuoha C., Freedom, “Youth Unemployment and Poverty: Connections and Concern for National Development in Nigeria”, *International Journal of Modern Political Economy*, Vol.1, No. 1 (2010), pp.115-136.

⁸³ Idonor, Daniel, “It’ll Take N150 Billion, 30 Years to Clean Ogoni Oil Spill – UN, FG”, *Vanguard Newspaper*, 5 August 2011, available at <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201108050286.html>, accessed 30 August 2012.

⁸⁴ World Bank Report, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/03/27/restoring-a-disappearing-giant-lake-chad>, accessed 12 June 2014.

⁸⁵ “Crisis in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin ‘must not be forgotten’ – UN humanitarian chief” *UN News Centre*, 25 September 2015, Available online at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51974#.Vi6UEMtOckM>, accessed 26 October 2015.

It has earlier been explained in this study that socio-cultural factors such as ethnicity, religion and culture have over the years influenced events in Nigeria. With about 250 ethnic groups, a population nearly half divided between Muslims and Christians and a diverse culture influenced over the years by both Western and Arabic civilization, it could be said that Nigeria stand on structures that engender or are susceptible to conflict situations. This became more evident when the political parties that were formed during the colonial era maintained dominance only in their ethnic and geographic confines even after Nigeria's independence.⁸⁶ The Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) established by the Hausa-Fulani elites dominated politics in the northern part while the Action Group (AG) founded by Yoruba political elites dominated politics in the west. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon, later known as the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) formed by elites of the Ibo ethnic group, controlled politics mainly in the eastern region. This, according to Azeez, set the stage for the manipulation of religion and ethnicity by mischief-makers to achieve political and other objectives.⁸⁷ The situation, as will be further discussed in the study, is now being exploited by terrorists.

Colonialism brought with it Christianity, a contender to Islam which by this time had already dominated the northern and some western parts of Nigeria. It equally brought with it Western civilisation as opposed to Arabic civilisation. Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria has mainly been hinged on opposition to Christianity and Western ways of life.⁸⁸ The Boko Haram Islamic sect, for instance, is opposed to anything that Western civilisation represents. More to this, the sect's jihadist stance has made some scholars believe that the emergence of Boko

⁸⁶ Ademola Azeez, "Ethnicity, Party Politics and Democracy in Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as Agent of Consolidation" *Kamla-Raj Stud Tribes Tribals*, 7(1): 1-9 (2009), pp. 2-3.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Abimbola Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State," *Africa Today*, Vol 57, No 4, 2011 pp. 98-119.

Haram is rooted in the global upsurge of Islamist ideology.⁸⁹ It could be argued that although socio-cultural factors of ethnicity, religion and culture have over time provided fertile grounds for the breeding of the terrorism in Nigeria, what the country is now witnessing is largely rooted in the ideology of Islamization propagated by irredentist adherents of the religion worldwide.⁹⁰

3.4.2.3 Political Factors

I have discussed the political history of Nigeria earlier. The import of that discussion is that Nigeria is a heterogeneous state with a people whose values and interests tend to lie more with their ethnic, religious and cultural cleavages than with the Nigerian state. In this wise, national identity is undermined thereby impinging negatively on national cohesion and integrity. A country in such condition could be said to be fragile as the structures that bind it are weak. The result of this is the vulnerability of the country to threats such as terrorism at both domestic and transnational levels.

Yoroms observes that political agitations resulting from perceived marginalisation, oppression and deprivation have been characteristic of the Nigerian state.⁹¹ Uneven distribution and access to political offices are thought to breed electoral violence which in turn result in the formation of armed groups or the manipulation of the existing ones for mischievous purposes. Groups such as Boko Haram, OPC and MASSOB gained grounds partly because politicians at some points used their members as thugs to intimidate political opponents during elections. Further to this is a governance deficit as indexed by the poor

⁸⁹ Stephen Ulph, *Boko Haram- Investigating the Ideology Background to the Rise of Militant Organization*, Westminster Institute, 2011, p. 21.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Gani Yoroms, "Pluralism and the Challenges of Conflict Management in Nigeria" in Amos Adedeji and Istifanus Zabadi, eds., *The Military and the Management of Internal Conflicts in Nigeria* (Abuja: ACSRT-National War College, 2005), pp. 17-38.

capacity of public institutions to deliver critical public goods including security.⁹² Average Nigerians lack access to basic services important to live a healthy, satisfying, and productive life.⁹³ This potentially contributes to the emergence of a large number of frustrated population. The situation is not helped by the perceived poor response of government to the plight and agitations of the citizens which probably informs people's resort to violence as the only available or best option to express their grievances.

Additionally, the existence of ineffective national security systems contributes to Nigeria's vulnerability to terrorism.⁹⁴ The problem of a weak national security system heightens the threat of illegal cross-border migration and arms trafficking across the nation's land and maritime borders.⁹⁵ According to Abba Moro, a former Nigerian Minister for Interior, there are 1,497 illegal routes across the country's land borders.⁹⁶ The porosity of Nigeria's land borders, especially in the northern part, has serious security implications given the activities of transnational jihadists such as AQIM. The ease with which arms are proliferated through the land and maritime borders is equally fundamental. Nigeria is estimated to host over 70 per cent of about eight million illegal weapons in West Africa.⁹⁷ With this volume of small arms and light weapons circulating in an environment of poverty and porous borders, it is perhaps not surprising that the nation is witnessing the outbreak of crimes, violent extremism and terrorism.

3.4.3 Trigger Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

⁹² Thomas Imobighe, "Dimensions of Threats and National Development Challenges in Nigeria" in O Mbachu and U. Bature (eds), *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa, 2013) p. 546.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ C. Nna-Emeka Okereke, 'al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Question of Security in West Africa, *African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, Volume 1, Number 1, (June 2010), pp. 65-67

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Jacob Segun Olatunji, *FG uncovers 1,497 illegal border routes. Seeks US assistance*, Nigerian Tribune 24 May 2013, available online at <http://www.tribune.com.ng/.../12691...>, accessed 1 June 2013.

⁹⁷ Abdullahi Bello, "70% of illegal arms in West Africa are in Nigeria – NATFORCE boss", *Daily Trust*, 9 November 2010, p.29.

The multifaceted and diverse scope of terrorism makes distinguishing the root and trigger causes of terrorism an intricate task. Suffice it to say that the distinguishing line between the two is thin, if not blurred. Some scholars have resorted to couching “intermediary causes” between the root and trigger causes.

In their *Concept of Terrorism: Analysis of the Rise, Decline, Trends and Risks*, the Project team of the European Commission under the Sixth Programme, contend that the first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, and the second condition is the lack of opportunity for political participation.⁹⁸ They note a common pattern that highlights particular government actions as catalysts for terrorism, for instance, an unusual and unexpected use of force by the government that could prompt terrorist retaliations. Crenshaw adds that provocative events that call for revenge or action such as contested elections, police brutality and even peace talks may trigger terrorist action.⁹⁹

Bringing home the point to Nigeria, it could be argued that poor governance has resulted in the non-translation of the country’s wealth to meet development challenges and the expectations of citizens. This sparks grievances among the populace. In their state of grievance, citizens become susceptible to extreme ideology that engender terrorist situations as evidenced in the Maitatsine and Boko Haram cases, which will be discussed in detail later. The grievance factor is made worse when the government in exploiting the natural endowments for foreign exchange deprive the people of their basic source of livelihood. This was a principal trigger cause of terrorism in the oil-rich Niger Delta region as the people resorted to violence in protesting years of pollution of their farmlands and fishing areas by oil companies. Nwabueze affirms that “environmental degradation inform the threat to sack and

⁹⁸European Commission Sixth Programme, “*Concept of Terrorism: Analysis of the Rise, Decline, Trends and Risks*,” in *Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law*, December 2008, p. 18.

⁹⁹ M. Crenshaw, p.385.

ultimately liquidate the oil industry and explain the vulnerability of the region (Niger Delta) to the utilization of terrorism.”¹⁰⁰

A corollary to the above is the craze for wealth and corruption in Nigeria. The craze for “quick wealth” is believed to have driven many youths into acts of kidnapping, oil theft, drugs and arms trafficking which Collier contends in some ways feed into conflict situations such as the Niger Delta Crisis.¹⁰¹ Similarly, Nigeria ranks 136 out of 176 countries with a score of just 27 out of 100 on the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.¹⁰² The corruption factor arguably heightens grievances as it broadens the inequality gap between the rich and poor. Ordinary Nigerians see their leaders as having enriched themselves at the expense of the masses and foisting poverty to keep them (the masses) subjugated.¹⁰³ This perception seems evident across Northern Nigeria with simmering anger at the failure of their leaders to have used the long period when they controlled the central seat of government to eradicate poverty and hunger from the North.¹⁰⁴ The Boko Haram sect has repeatedly expressed that one reason for their campaign is to rid Nigeria of corrupt leaders.¹⁰⁵

The trigger cause of state terrorism in Nigeria during military rule could be attributed to the fact that military rule is undemocratic. It is generally agreed that the lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law can provide preconditions that could trigger many forms of

¹⁰⁰ G. Nwabueze, “Contextualising the Niger Delta Crisis,” *CASSA Newsletter*, Vol.6, No.2, p.2.

¹⁰¹ P. Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 3-16.

¹⁰² See “Nigeria’s Corruption Challenge” available at

http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/nigerias_corruption_challenge, accessed 15 September 2015.

¹⁰³ Ozy Orluwene, “Elitist Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria” in S.A. Abdullahi and Sabo Bello (eds), *The Global Financial Crisis and Africa’s Quest for Development* (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2010), pp. 342-354.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ This is contained in nearly all the teachings of Mohammed Yusuf and the video messages of Abu Shekaru posted in the Internet.

domestic terrorism.¹⁰⁶ As mentioned earlier, military rule in Nigeria particularly between 1984 and 1999 was characterised by a clampdown on civil liberties, human rights abuses and rule by decrees as opposed to the wishes and aspirations of citizens obtained in liberal democracies. This, among other factors, triggered off the emergence pro-democracy groups such as the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). In a bid to legitimize their regimes, restore law and order, and to perpetuate themselves in power, the military labelled the pro-democracy groups as terrorists.¹⁰⁷ Assassinations of political activists, arson and bombings at pro-democracy rallies were allegedly carried out by the military against civilians in what could qualify as state terrorism.¹⁰⁸

A paradox in the analysis of the trigger causes of terrorism in Nigeria is that while state terrorism existed during the military regimes, what could be termed as sub-national terrorism assumed greater diabolical dimensions under democratic rule. The adoption of the Sharia legal system in 12 states in the northern part of Nigeria provoked religious uprisings between the Muslims and Christians.¹⁰⁹ More than this, the politicisation of religion gave tacit approval and cover for radical Islamic sects to grow in the northern part of the country. In the South, ethnic militia groups began clamouring for ethnic and regional autonomy, employing violence as a weapon of protest. The explanation for this situation could be that Nigeria's democracy in 1999 stood on weak institutions and the Nigerian state at this period lacked the capacity and the will to exercise territorial control leaving a power vacuum that was taken over by sub-nationalities and terrorist groups. It could equally be said that the long years of military rule militarized a significant section of the Nigerian society hence, the continuance

¹⁰⁶ Ayo Olukotun, *Repressive State and Resurgent Media under Nigeria's Military Dictatorship 1988-98* (Goteborg: Nordiska Afrika Institute, 2004). P. 9.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 37-55.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁹ Henrik Angerbrandt, "Political Decentralisation and conflict: The Sharia crisis in Kaduna, Nigeria" in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* Volume 29. Issue 1 (2011), pp. 15-31.

of violence; the exercise of which transited from the state apparatus of violence to sub-state apparatus of violence.

It has been noted in chapter two that the existence of grievances alone could only be a precondition for terrorism and other forms of conflicts. Someone is needed to translate the grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle. This is more so when it is considered that a terrorist group may compose of a coalition of disparate forces united by a common cause. Thus, a leader that would not only steer a compromise and negotiation of their differences but equally has the charisma to hold the various forces together is considered indispensable for the evolution and sustenance of terrorist groups and organisations.¹¹⁰ The charisma of leaders such as Mohammed Marwa of Maitatsine, Mohammed Yusuf of Boko Haram, Asari Dokubo of Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force and Government Ekpemupolo (alias Tompolo) of MEND, it could be argued, are decisive in the emergence of the mentioned groups that perpetrated terrorism in Nigeria.

Terrorism in Nigeria could also have been leveraged by the North - South struggle for control of the central seat of government, which as earlier mentioned predates Nigeria's independence in 1960. In a bid to ensure that no one political zone of the country dominates the other, the ruling political party in Nigeria known as the People's Democratic Party (PDP) arranged a rotational power sharing formula between the North and the South.¹¹¹ In May 2010, when President Umaru Yar'Adua (a Northerner) died while in office, his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan became the President. Jonathan contested for the presidency in 2011 and won a four-year term to the displeasure of some core Northerners who felt that he reneged on the power rotation agreement under which the Muslim North should have assumed

¹¹⁰ David Hoffman and Lornel Dawson, "The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority in the Study of Terrorist Groups and Radicalization" in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol. 37 (2014), pp. 348-368.

¹¹¹ Ademola Azeez, pp. 2-3.

presidency to complete the tenure of Umaru Yar'Adua.¹¹² Thus, some analysts view Boko Haram as a front by northern politicians to make the country ungovernable for the regime of Goodluck Jonathan while he was in office.¹¹³ They point to the arguments made by a number of prominent Nigerians that the solution to Boko Haram terrorism was then for Goodluck Jonathan to concede the ruling party's presidential ticket in the 2015 elections to a Northerner.¹¹⁴ However, some view this as a mere conspiracy theory contending to the contrary that it was the ineptitude of the Jonathan's regime that was largely responsible for the level of threat posed by the Boko Haram sect during the period.¹¹⁵

The hypothesis under examination in this thesis, is that the responses by government could be considered to be the most critical of the trigger causes and growth of terrorism in Nigeria. As pointed out earlier, the institutions for conflict management in Nigeria are weak and consequently inefficient. Following this, issues that would have been promptly and amicably resolved are either left to degenerate into crisis situations or handled through the excessive use of force by the government and security forces.¹¹⁶ Instances such as this were the controversial circumstances leading to the hanging to death of the leader of MOSOP, Ken Saro-Wiwa on 10 November 1995.¹¹⁷ Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of Boko Haram was also extra-judicially killed by the police on 30 July 2009 while in their custody, still wearing hand cuffs.¹¹⁸ Al-Jazeera television in February 2010 aired footage of Nigerian security forces on a

¹¹² "Northern Nigerian Group Opposes Jonathan Candidacy" *Voice of America*, 10 August 2010. <http://www.voanews.com/content/northern-nigerian-group-opposes-jonathan-candidacy-100437669/155575.html>, accessed 12 July 2014.

¹¹³ "A President's Aspirations Threaten Nigeria's Feeble Democracy" *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 12 November 2014. <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/presidents-aspirations-threaten-nigerias-feeble-democracy>, accessed 12 July 2015.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ A. J., Omede, pp. 90-103.

¹¹⁶ Julie Sanda, "Institutional Processes of Conflict Management in Nigeria" in Amos Adedeji and Istifanus Zabadi, pp. 39-55.

¹¹⁷ Sanya Osha, "Birth of the Ogoni protest moment". *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Vol. 41, Issue 1-2 (2006), pp.13-38.

¹¹⁸ "Spiralling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Forces Abuses in Nigeria." *Human Right Watch*, 11 October, 2012.

house-to-house search for Boko Haram members. It was reported that some of the members arrested were later lined up and shot in the back.¹¹⁹ As Abeebe Salaam notes, the Boko Haram sect used these videos to radicalise and recruit frustrated, vulnerable youths and young adults to its fold.¹²⁰ The pertinent point to note here is that government ill reaction to insurrections at their early stages is considered largely responsible for their transformation to terrorist and terrorist-related groups in line with Byman's theory of proto-insurgencies discussed in the previous chapter.

3.3.4 External Considerations of Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

Beyond the root and trigger causes of terrorism in Nigeria discussed above, there are other issues, external in nature that underpin the threat. It could be argued that the war on terrorism waged by the West has to a significant degree succeeded in unlocking the centre of gravity of al-Qaeda and its affiliates thereby compelling them to seek safer (and softer) areas of operation. The result has been the emergence of radical Islamic sects in fragile states like Nigeria. The phenomenal of the threat becomes more potent when one considers the call by Late Osama Bin Laden for a jihad in Nigeria.¹²¹

The presence of AQIM and al-Shabaab in the Sahel and Central Africa areas respectively have been indicators of potential threat and resolve of al-Qaeda to extend its influence across all of sub-Saharan Africa particularly in what is considered as "ungoverned spaces."¹²² Nigeria's neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroun share border with Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Sudan which are all hotbeds of activities of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

¹¹⁹ "Video shows Nigeria 'executions'" *Al Jazeera*, 9 February 2012.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/02/2010298114949112.html>, accessed 23 February 2014.

¹²⁰ Abeebe Olufemi Salaam, "Boko Haram: beyond religious fanaticism," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* (Sydney: Routledge, 2011) p. 154.

¹²¹ Tony Karon, "Why Africa Has Become a Bush Priority" *Time Magazine*, 7 July 2003, available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,463304,00.html>, accessed 5 June 2013.

¹²² Angel Rabasa, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2007), p. 176.

The rebels and Islamic groups ousted from Libya and Mali are believed to have taken advantage of porous borders to infiltrate into Nigeria with sophisticated arms and ammunition. The US African Command (AFRICOM) Commander, Carter Ham affirmed that intelligence reports on Boko Haram have consistently indicated proof of the manpower and logistic support the sect enjoy from cross-border terrorist networks.¹²³

In 2006, the CIA allegedly predicted that Nigeria may break up in 2015.¹²⁴ The prediction was supposedly based on three issues. One was the crisis in the Niger Delta. Another issue was the crisis between the Muslim North and Christian South. A further issue was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria and the possible infiltration of al-Qaeda into Northern Nigeria. This prediction attracted a lot of condemnation by Nigerians who saw it as a ploy by the US to destabilize Nigeria in order to control the country's oil resources.¹²⁵ Certain elements of the prediction could be said to have unfolded given the Niger Delta Crisis and the ongoing activities of Boko Haram. An angle worth noting also is the probability that Nigeria is a target of terrorist attack because of its socio-economic and political affinity with the Western world. It could be reasonably argued that it is the values of this relationship that groups such as Boko Haram and AQIM are striving to eradicate and replace with those of Islam. Equally, the presence of the US, UK and other Western nationals and investments particularly in the oil and construction sectors in Nigeria could invite terrorist attacks, since the terrorists are increasingly unable to carry out these attacks against same targets in the West.

The possibility of other countries sponsoring terrorism in Nigeria cannot also be ruled out. Nigeria's oil wealth and political influence in Africa is envied by other countries that see her as a competitor rather than an ally. Muammar Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader, for

¹²³ See "US Army Chief links Boko Haram to al-Qaeda, Others" *The Guardian*, 18 August 2011.

¹²⁴ See "Nigeria and The 2015 Break-Up Prediction" *PM News Nigeria*, 10 February 2012.

¹²⁵ Jonathan Edeh, *The Mirage of Change in Nigeria* (Raleigh: Lulu.com, 2015), p.77.

instance, consistently campaigned for the splitting of Nigeria into two; the North and the South.¹²⁶ He is purported to have supported terrorist training camps in Nigeria's neighbouring countries of Niger and Chad in the pursuit of his agenda. On the contrary, his death is thought to have made Libya ungovernable, and consequently a sanctuary for terrorist groups and the spread of their activities to other areas in the Sahel region including Nigeria.¹²⁷

From the discussion above, it could be said that Nigeria has experienced terrorist activities from groups, non-state and state actors, and in different dimensions; religious, state-sponsored, ethnic and socio-economic. The religious dimension of terrorist threats included activities of the Maitatsine and Boko Haram, those that are state-sponsored were associated military rule while the activities of MEND fit into the ethnic and socio-economic category. I shall in the next four chapters examine these threats in detail beginning with the threat of religious fundamentalism, and taking the activities of the Maitatsine Islamic Sect as a case study.

¹²⁶ "Divide Nigeria in two, says Muammar Gaddafi" *BBC News*, 16 March 2010.

¹²⁷ Isiaka Wakili, "Buhari: Ghaddafi regime's collapse worsens terrorism in West Africa" *Daily Trust*, 28 November 2014.

CHAPTER FOUR

RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF MAITATSINE

4.1 Preamble

This chapter is the first of four case studies of the threat-response interplay between the terrorists and the Government of Nigeria. The object of study or 'case' that will be investigated is the terrorist nature of the activities of the Maitatsine sect. The chapter discusses religious fundamentalism, limiting it however to the post-independence period of 1960 - 1985. This time limitation is necessary because, as has been pointed out earlier, the religious factor is prevalent throughout Nigeria's history from colonialism to the present day. The time boundary also enable my comparison of the threat of religious fundamentalism (and the response there of) during the stated period to that of the current period. My emphasis here will be on Islamic fundamentalist movement because, as Falola aptly observe, violent religious fundamentalism in Nigerian history has been more associated with Islamic movements than with Christianity.¹

4.2 Methodology

In terms of methodological approach, this and the preceding three chapters will demonstrate what Davenport, Armstrong and Lichbach expressed as "incapacity" hypothesis as derived from the conflict studies of Collier and Hoeffler.² They stated that "large-scale conflagration emerges when political authorities are unable to apply significant levels of state repression."³

This is saying that when repressive behaviour is low, challengers take advantage of a perceived weakness in state coercive power to increase their rebellious (extremist and

¹ Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies* (New York: University of Rochester, 1998), p. 17.

² Christian Davenport, David A. Armstrong II and Mark I. Lichbach, "Conflict Escalation and the Origins of Civil War." Working Paper, University of Maryland, 2005. Available at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/dcawcp/paper/111605.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2015.

³ *Ibid*, p. 2.

terrorist) efforts. The consequence of this is often escalation of the conflict situation.⁴ Katrina Dusek's work on the political transitions in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, which presents some case studies on the relationship between revolutions in those countries and police action was a useful framework for this and the subsequent three chapters.⁵ Her timeline charting of rebel activity against police action was employed to explore the hypothesis put forward in this thesis that repressive state action has a causal relationship with the rise of terrorist activities. This thesis therefore attempts to take our understanding of these phenomena forwards by applying a model initially developed in a European context to an African environment.

The qualitative case study method is employed in these four chapter as it provides tools for researchers to study complex phenomena within their contexts. In couching a definition for case study, Baxter and Jack view it as "an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a (contemporary) phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources."⁶ Robert Yin who based his approach to case study on a constructivist paradigm opines that the method ensures that the topic of interest is well explored and the essence of the phenomenon is revealed.⁷ Additionally, the method is adopted here in that case studies are believed to provide hind-sight for insight. As Andrew Staniforth avers:

*To tackle new and emerging terrorist threats we need first to reflect upon previous terrorist attacks. Learning the lessons from history will assist in providing solutions to develop counter-terrorism measures for the future.*⁸

A further reason for adopting case study methodology in this and the ensuing three chapters is that it will enable explanations to be made as to how, as espoused by Sandler and Todd in

⁴ Davenport, et al noted this as derived from the "Greed" argument contained in the works of Collier and Hoeffler, 2002.

⁵ Katrina Nowak Dusek, *Negotiated or Stolen? Methods of Transition and Patterns of Opposition-Regime Interaction in Communist Eastern Europe* (Ann Arbor: Proquest, Umi Dissertation, 2012).

⁶ Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, "Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers," in *The Qualitative Report*, Volume 13 No. 4 (2008), pp. 544-559.

⁷ R. K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 4th ed. (London: Sage, 2009), p. 2.

⁸ Andrew Staniforth, *Blackstone's Counter-Terrorism Handbook*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 17.

their game-theoretic analyses of terrorism, terrorists' choices and actions are influenced by those of the government and vice versa.⁹ The aspect of government - terrorist interface is further buttressed in Fearon and Laitin. They opine that the likelihood of an insurgency and the determinants of the size of an insurgency are influenced by initial 'demand' for insurgency, by the government's response and by the level of available 'technology' such as terrain and financing for insurgency.¹⁰ This could be interpreted to mean that, among other factors, the manner of responses by the Government of Nigeria to the threat of terrorism could have had a direct influence on the actions of terrorists and by extension the state of terrorism in Nigeria. The chapter begins with an overview of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria and thereafter dwells on the threat posed by the Maitatsine Islamic sect and the response of government to it.

4.2 Religious Fundamentalism in Nigeria

Religion has played and continues to play a very significant role in Nigerian society. It could be argued that any discussion on the political development of the Nigerian state would be incomplete without the mention of religion. Falola contends that "religion and politics have been bedfellows throughout Nigerian history."¹¹ Unfortunately, one could say that they have been bad bedfellows. Danjibo supports this view by stating that:

*...religion in Nigeria, at different levels, is mostly mentioned in negative terms. Or rather, historical events linked to religion tilts more towards its negative than its positive contribution to the Nigerian state.*¹²

⁹ See Todd Sandler and Daniel Arce, "Terrorism and Game Theory," *Simulation and Gaming*, Sage Journals Vol. 34 3 (2003), pp. 319-337.

¹⁰ Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D., "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War" cited in Nicholas Sambanis, "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War." *Defence and Peace Economics* 13: 3 (2010), pp. 215-243.

¹¹ Toyin Falola, p. 1.

¹² N. D. Danjibo, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The "Maitatsine" and "Boko Haram" Crises in Northern Nigeria", *Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan*, 2009.

This negative connotation is perhaps the result of the politicisation of religion and the consequent institutionalisation of political Islam, and what Falola also calls political Christianity.¹³ Religious issues had at various times heated the polity and threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria. Instances of these were the debate over the inclusion of Sharia law in the Nigerian Constitution, the colouration of the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970 as a Christian-Muslim war, the adoption of Sharia law by 12 states in Northern Nigeria and the admission of Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), all of which resulted in violent religious crises in Nigeria.¹⁴

According to Falola's account, the religion of Islam was first introduced into the region that is now Northern Nigeria in the 8th Century by Arabic and Mauritanian traders.¹⁵ From a religion of commerce, Islam became a political tool used by the local chiefs and subsequently, it gained acceptance and ascendance to become a belief system shared by the people of the area. It co-existed side by side with the local traditional religions. Islam flourished greatly with the establishment of the Kanem-Borno Empire in the now North Eastern zone of Nigeria during the 13th Century and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate during the 19th Century. The Uthman Dan Fodio jihad that swept across the whole of present day Northern Nigeria transformed the lifestyle of the people, particularly among the *ulama* (Islamic scholars) and the *umma* (Islamic community), to one of Islamic solidarity resulting in the division of the society into Muslims and non-Muslims.¹⁶

The colonization of Nigeria brought another dimension to this as it ushered in Christianity and a modern (or Western) way of life which was parallel to Islam and Islamic lifestyle. There was thus not only the Muslim and non-Muslim divide but equally the fanatical Muslim and moderate Muslim divide similar to the situation in the late 19th Century India, when the

¹³ Toyin Falola, p. 3.

¹⁴ N. D. Danjibo, p. 3.

¹⁵ Toyin Falola, p. 24.

¹⁶ Virginia, Comolli. *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency* (London: Hurst & Co Ltd, 2015), pp. 13-16.

more fundamentalist Deobandi school of Islam was formed.¹⁷ The result was the emergence of Islamic sects canvassing for a return to pure Islam.

Inter-Islamic sect clashes and inter-religious (Muslim - Christian) clashes have particularly been prevalent in Northern Nigeria. Inter-Islamic sect clashes arguably arose owing to the multiplicity and variations in the doctrines or beliefs of the Islamic sects. Often times the sects placed great emphasis on purity and the need to defend the religion of Islam against the forces of modernism. Explaining this sectarian dimension in Islam, Danjibo opines that:

*To further understand the ambivalent character of sectarianism in Islam, there is a need to underscore the fact that whereas religion is all-embracing and all encompassing, sectarianism isolates group members with particular and peculiar identity from the larger body. In this regard, all Muslim faithful can profess Islam as their religion but not all can claim to be members of a sect, and there are many sects in Islam as there are variations in teachings and interpretations.*¹⁸

Thus, apart from the major Sunni and the Shi'a (Shiite) Islamic sects in Nigeria, there exist the *Derika*, the *Izala*, the *Kaulu (Kablu)*, the Muslim brothers, the *Tijjaniya* and the *Quaddiriya*, the Muslim Brotherhood and several other splinter groups.¹⁹ As we shall later see in the case of the Maitatsine and Boko Haram Islamic sects, the desire by some of these sects to exert authority and profess their brand of Islam (against perhaps popular Islamic beliefs) did not only bring them into contention with other sects but with the Nigerian state as well. The sects were simply labelled as extremists or fundamentalists by the government and others opposed to them.

The term "fundamentalism" has its roots in both the Christian and Muslim religion. Indicating this fact, the Oxford Dictionary of English gives the meaning of the word in two dimensions. First, it refers to it as, "a form of Protestant Christianity which upholds belief in the strict and literal interpretation of the Bible" and secondly as, "strict maintenance of the doctrines of any religion, notably Islam, according to a strict, literal interpretation of

¹⁷ India and Nigeria share similar colonial experience, both were colonised by Britain with values that now reflect in issues bordering on their national security as post-colonial states.

¹⁸ N. D. Danjibo, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 5.

scripture.”²⁰ Komonchak, Collins and Lane see it as an eclectic word that can be viewed from three perspectives. Firstly, from a cognitive understanding where the word is associated with a closed personality type that expresses exclusivity, particularity, literality and moral rigour. Secondly, from a cultural theological framework where the word expresses opposition to religious and cultural liberalism in defence of orthodoxy and religious traditions. Thirdly, from a social movement perspective where it denotes organizational and ideological uniqueness from other types of religious movements.²¹

In his couching of ‘fundamentalism’, Falola sees the term as often used negatively in the West to condemn and criticize Islamic groups, and to describe the religious views of all organizations referred to as terrorists.²² He went further to give his view of the term thus:

*The term “fundamentalism” can refer to three interrelated tendencies in religion: (a) a commitment to seek answers in religion to the crises that afflict the world and its peoples; (b) religious revivalism in a variety of forms such as aggressive proselytization, intense spiritualism and rigorous worship; and (c) increasing militancy, that is, aggressively using religion as a vehicle or a movement to reorder society, combat ills, reform religion, fight opposition and accomplish other goals.*²³

This study does not intend to dwell on the religious aspect or debates on fundamentalism, rather focuses on the security dimension of religious fundamentalism, yet recognising that the latter is consequent on the former. In this wise, Byung-Ock Chang states that radical Islamic fundamentalist groups are known to launch fierce wars against established authority through terrorist means such as kidnapping, assassination, and bombing.²⁴ His statement aligns with the popular Huntingtonian thesis which views Islamic fundamentalism as a new global threat and where the war between communism and the West has been replaced by a new war

²⁰ See *Oxford Dictionary of English*, 2nd Edition Revised, (Oxford: OUP, 2005), p. 701

²¹ Komonchak, Joseph A., Mary Collins and Dermot A. Lane, eds., *The New Dictionary of Theology*. (Collegeville-Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1993), p. 411.

²² Toyin Falola, p. 11.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Byung-Ock Chang, *Islamic Fundamentalism, Jihad, and Terrorism*, available at http://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/metadb/up/74007022/JIDC_11_01_4_Chang.pdf, accessed 20 June 2013.

between the West and Islamic fundamentalists (among other confrontations).²⁵ The interpretation of the above could be that Islamic fundamentalism in some ways breeds Islamic terrorism. In Nigeria, the attachment of people to ethnic, religious and other socio-cultural institutions rather than the state had combined with external influences (such as the 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini Revolution in Iran) to fuel Islamic fundamentalism.²⁶ While the threat or use of violence by a number of Islamic fundamentalist sects in the 1970s and 1980s were localised, the case of Maitatsine's spread from Kano to other parts of the North Central and North Eastern zones of Nigeria is particularly worthy of attention. The nature of violence and the fear that the Maitatsine sect perpetrated against the Nigerian state and its people fits its categorization as terrorism as will subsequently be discussed.

4.3 The Maitatsine Terrorist Activities (1980-1985)

I shall discuss the origin, immediate causes and the nature of the terrorist threat posed by the Maitatsine sect. Thereafter, the activities of the sect and corresponding responses by the Government of Nigeria, an assessment of the government responses and the lessons arising from them will be examined.

4.3.1 Origin

The Maitatsine sect was founded by Muhammed Marwa, an Islamic scholar who at various times was also known by other names such as Muhammadu Mai Tabsiri, Marwa Darka, Muhammadu Arab and Muhammadu Allah Tatsine.²⁷ It is posited that 'Maitatsine', the popular name and that by which Muhammad Marwa's followers were known, was coined from his oft-made statements "May Allah curse the one who disagrees with his version (of the Koran)" hence, the appellation *Mai Tatsine* meaning "the one who curses".²⁸ He is

²⁵ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011).

²⁶ Gunar Weimann, *Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria: Politics, Religion, Judicial Practice* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), p. 160.

²⁷ See *The New Nigerian*, 24 December 1980 quoted in Falola, p. 141.

²⁸ A. N. Aniagolu, "Report of Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances, 1981, para. 157

believed to have been born in the 1920s in the Marwa area of northern part of Cameroun where he grew up to become an Islamic scholar. Marwa migrated to the Nigerian city of Kano in 1945 where he declared himself a prophet and a liberator. His teachings on the Koran, which he claimed were to sanitize and purify Islam, turned out to be both controversial and provocative. This brought him into confrontation with the colonial government and the then Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi Lamido. According to the accounts of Isichei and Falola, Marwa was arrested and prosecuted in 1962.²⁹ He was jailed for three years and later deported from Kano to his native home at Marwa. Marwa returned to Kano in 1966 without permission. Although he was arrested again on 9 December 1966 and remanded in police custody for a month for preaching without permit, the Kano authority did not further enforce the deportation order. It is probable that the political tension at the time (that led to the Nigerian Civil War) and the death of Alhaji Sanusi might have been responsible for this laxity. Marwa was also arrested in 1973 and 1975 for his inciting preaching and confrontation with the police but released at each of these times after serving a short prison sentence. His followership increased through the 1970s. He had over 2000 followers by 1975. Some other accounts have it that before his death in 1980, his total number of followers was between 8,000 and 12,000 including those in towns other than Kano.³⁰

4.3.2 Immediate Causes of Maitatsine Terrorist Activities

The activities of Maitatsine has been labelled by some scholars as sheer religious fanaticism, others as politically motivated, yet others view it as caused by faceless aliens, and as the handwork of either the Israeli Mossad, Muammer Gaddafi of Libya or Ayotollah Khomeini of Iran with 'insiders support' provided by Nigerians.³¹ While these views, particularly the external influence dimension are difficult to support with empirical evidence, a significant

²⁹ Isichei Elizabeth, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited" *Journal of Religion in Africa* XVII, 3 (Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 1987), p. 194. See also, Toyin Falola, p. 155.

³⁰ A. N. Aniagolu, p. 272.

³¹ Adeleye Ojo, "The Maitatsine Revolution in Nigeria", *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1985, pp. 297-306.

point worth noting is that Nigeria was at this period (of the late 70s) undergoing economic decline.³² The region where Maitatsine operated was also plagued by desertification and drought.³³ Poverty, hunger, mass rural-urban drift and unemployment were therefore prevalent. What perhaps made matters worse was the socio-political and moral decadence occasioned by corruption which increased the inequality gap between the rich and the poor thereby marginalizing the populace. This led to the popular belief that Maitatsine was a protest by the poor (under the banner of religion) against exploitation and oppression by the rich in the society.³⁴

Marwa's teachings were allegedly inciting against the state, and his followers were purported to be reckless, violent and refused to obey the laws of the land.³⁵ Marwa took over lands and buildings around his 271 Kofar Wambai residence in the Yan Awaki-Fagge area of Kano and established in here what could be described as "a state within a state."³⁶ The sect held processions in public areas and along the streets intimidating members of the public especially Christians and fellow Muslims that were opposed to their brand of Islam. People lived in fear of attack by Marwa's followers, and the police seemed helpless as several attempts to arrest Marwa had been unsuccessful.³⁷ One of Marwa's sons named Tijani died during this period. Following this, Marwa was said to have murdered children in the feeling that every other father should share the same sorrow as he did.³⁸

What probably provided the immediate cause of violence was the manner in which the police responded to Marwa and his followers' acts of lawlessness. According to Falola, in a bid to stop further public processions and demonstrations by the Maitatsine sect, the police on 18

³² Paul Lubeck, "Islamic Protest under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: Yan Tatsine Explained" in *Journal of the International African Institute* Vol. 55, No. 4 (1985), pp. 369-389.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Adeleye Ojo, pp. 297-306.

³⁵ See A. N. Aniagolu, p.170.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Paul Lubeck, pp. 369-389.

³⁸ A. N. Aniagolu, p. 275.

December 1980 took over Shahuci praying ground, a regular meeting place for the sect located close to Kano Central Mosque and the Emir's Palace.³⁹ The Maitatsine members regrouped and engaged the police in an armed confrontation. The police numbering about 150 first discharged tear gas to scare off the advancing Maitatsine only to discover hundreds of other members of the sect charging at them from different directions with swords, knives, bows and arrows. The police opened fire but were completely overwhelmed with a strength ratio of about one policeman to twenty Maitatsine members.⁴⁰ Four policemen were killed and 13 badly injured.⁴¹ All the police vehicles deployed for the operation were destroyed, arms and ammunition seized and their uniforms stripped off them.⁴² Perhaps emboldened by this feat and the weapons captured from the police, the Maitatsine members seized the Fagge Central Mosque, police stations, schools and markets. Between 18 December and 30 December 1980, about 4,117 persons were killed and properties worth millions of Naira destroyed.⁴³ Quoting Neil Kastfelt, Falola stated:

*A psychology of fear descended upon the (Kano) city. The mere mention of an approaching Maitatsine was enough to cause chills in the bravest civilian. People would immediately flee to find refuge.*⁴⁴

With the police overpowered, the military was called in on 28 December 1980 and the situation brought under control two days later. Many of the sect members were killed while others escaped to other towns. Marwa sustained fatal bullet injuries and later died.⁴⁵ His corpse was hurriedly buried by his followers. It was later exhumed by the police and publicly

³⁹ Toyin Falola, p. 153.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Police testimony as contained in A. N. Aniagolu, para 44-45.

⁴³ Isichei Elizabeth, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited" *Journal of Religion in Africa* XVII, 3 (Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 1987), p. 194. See also, Falola, Op.Cit, p. 155.

⁴⁴ Neil Kastfelt, "Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria" *African Affairs* 88, No. 50 (1989): p. 83-90.

⁴⁵ Some accounts have it that Marwa died of heart attack but it is more likely that he died as a result of the gunshot wounds as many accounts state.

cremated so that his followers would not turn the burial site into a shrine that potentially could ignite further violence.⁴⁶

Marwa's death in December 1980 did not end activities of the sect. Isichei notes that after the 1980 violence in Kano, his followers that escaped regrouped and continued the campaign of terror in other cities across Northern Nigeria.⁴⁷ For instance, in October 1982, members of the sect staged an uprising at Bulumkutu, near Maiduguri. About 3,350 persons were killed.⁴⁸ There were also attacks at the same period in Rigasa village near Kaduna and subsequently in Kaduna town itself. In March, 1984 there was an outbreak of violence in Yola town resulting in the death of between 500 and 1,000 persons.⁴⁹ Similarly in April 1985, the sect members carried out an attack in Gombe and Bauchi with over a hundred persons killed.⁵⁰

4.3.3 Nature of the Threat

The nature of the threat posed by Maitatsine could ordinarily be described as that of fundamental Islamic ideology that ran counter to the political, economic and social establishment of the Nigerian state. The Maitatsine ideology centred on the purification of Islam. Marwa believed that Islam had been corrupted by Westernization and the formation of the modern state.⁵¹ His preaching was consequently very offensive, particularly against state symbols, the political class, and traditional institutions such as the emirate system which he felt had been tainted by modernization. He was thus in the concerted pursuit and desire to change the secular state order through a jihad or Iranian-styled revolution that would ultimately replace the supposedly corrupt, Western-styled secular state with an Islamic

⁴⁶ See Toyin Falola, p. 155.

⁴⁷ Elizabeth Isichei, p. 194.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Toyin Falola, p.144.

state.⁵² His ideology was therefore radical and revolutionary anti-*status quo* professing the total rejection of the existing state order.

What possibly made the Maitatsine ideology peculiar and vicious was that it did not only challenge the political authorities, but also the larger Muslim community. Isah observes that Marwa and his followers expressed perceptions that the dominant Muslim population had derailed from the tenets of the Koran and became increasingly materialistic and Westernised to the detriment of the lowly and poor segments of the society.⁵³ The members condemned materialism and rejected everything Western including education, schools and the possession of things like radios and wristwatches.⁵⁴ The *Maitastine* operated at variance with some established Islamic beliefs and injunctions. They rejected other Muslims for having gone astray while maintaining that their beliefs were the most realistic because they revolve around the 'Koran only'. Marwa's teachings included that any Muslim who reads any book beside the Koran was a pagan. He however rejected the *Hadith* and *Sunnah* of the Prophet Muhammad and other related sanctioned sources of Islamic law. At some points, Marwa's followers preached that he was their true prophet and urged all the sect members to desist from calling the name of Prophet Mohammed whom they referred to as an Arab.⁵⁵ There were reports that after his death, copies of the Koran found in his house had the name of the Prophet Mohammed replaced with his own.⁵⁶ The sect believed in divination and charms. Members shaved their heads, wore Arabic inscribed charms and amulets on their waists, tattooed their stomachs, and were also known to drink human blood, a practice normally forbidden in Islam.⁵⁷

⁵² M. K. Isah, "Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria" in Okumu, W and Ikelegbe, A eds, *Militia, Rebels Islamic Militants: Human Security and State Crisis in Africa*, (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2010) p. 314-340.

⁵³ *Ibid*

⁵⁴ Toyin Falola, p. 143.

⁵⁵ *The New Nigerian*, 29 October, 1982

⁵⁶ "Religious riots at Gombe." *West Africa*, 6th May 1985, p. 876

⁵⁷ *Sunday Sketch*, 18 March 1984, p. 8.

The members of the Maitatsine sect were said to regard anyone opposed to their belief as an infidel and an enemy.⁵⁸ Accounts further have it that those who refused to join the sect were abducted, taken to Yan Awaki quarters and killed.⁵⁹ As a result of this, many of Marwa's neighbours at Yan Awaki fled the area giving Marwa the chance to take over their lands and buildings. Marwa organised his Yan Awaki headquarters like a fort. It was separated from the nearby houses by a stream and situated on top of a high ground in new layout of the city where buildings were few and in their uncompleted stage.⁶⁰ The location made it difficult for the police to easily access while enabling the Maitatsine a good field for observation of any attacker. It was said that in the residence was a back house with a 'slaughter room' where those opposed to the sect were killed and their bodies thrown into a stream.⁶¹ Many of Marwa's followers lived with him at Yan Awaki where he inspired them and promised the true path to Allah and salvation. Members received combat and unarmed combat training from other members who had served in the military and the police force. They were always armed, either carrying their weapons openly or hidden under their clothing. The weapons used by members of the sect included swords, cutlasses, bows and arrows, Dane guns, single and double-barrel hunting rifles, clubs and spears.⁶²

There are compelling reasons to believe that Marwa seized the opportunity of governance failure, a declining economy and the absence of a social security system to provide psychological and material support to the poor and displaced, and in the process directed their anger at the Nigerian state. His message consequently found support among the poor and displaced who could be categorised into three groups. The first were the migrants into Kano city from other towns and neighbouring countries. The second set were those from the rural

⁵⁸ Paul Lubeck, pp. 369-389.

⁵⁹ Toyin Falola, p. 145

⁶⁰ Ibid,

⁶¹ A. N. Aniagolu, para 28 & 29.

⁶² "The Maitatsine" *National Concord*, 5 March 1984, p. 7.

areas who migrated to the cities to look for jobs particularly during the dry season when there was no farming activity in the countryside. The third set were the Almajiris (Koranic students) as discussed in chapter three. These three groups of people became easily recruited and formed the bulk of the 'army' of Maitatsine. Emphasising this point, Isichei described Maitatsine as a movement of the 'disinherited', in other words, a movement of those who were not part of the existing order by reason of migration, socio-political or economic exclusion.⁶³ This could account for the anger and deadly nature of attacks that Maitatsine inflicted on their victims and symbols of the state, as they had nothing to lose. Also, Marwa emboldened his followers to fight by making them believe that his prayers and charms would protect them. Further to this was the martyrdom belief that if they die fighting for Allah's cause or killed infidels, they would go to heaven. They carried pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini and Muammar Gaddafi whom they saw as *Mujaddid* (or reformers). It is worth mentioning that a sizeable number of the Maitatsine sect were from countries such as Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Sudan.⁶⁴

Summing up the nature of the Maitatsine threat, it could be argued that the group represented a threat to the Nigerian state, its citizens and institutions. The sect sought the overthrow of what it regarded as the 'Westernised' state of Nigeria, caused loss of lives and property as well as confronted the police and other state institutions. The sect in this manner exhibited the characteristics of a terrorist group. The motivation to change the status quo through jihad or revolutionary means is political. Equally, the civilian population was the immediate target of the sect as they tried to register their grievances against the state. The threat and use of violence was a dominant weapon employed by the sect. Furthermore, the forces involved were asymmetrical, the state being the stronger side and Maitatsine the weaker side plausibly accounting for the resort by Maitatsine to employ the weapons of terrorism. What made the

⁶³ Elizabeth Isichei, p. 201.

⁶⁴ Toyin Falola, p. 147.

terrorist threat potent even from its inception was that the city of Kano which was the centre of the violence was by then, and still to date, the most populous and significant town in terms of size and commerce in Northern Nigeria. This means that the effects of the Maitatsine activities in Kano cut across the lives of many Nigerians within and outside of it. Contending on this, Bello avers that Kano was to Maitatsine what Maiduguri is to Boko Haram today.⁶⁵ Comolli on her part views Maitatsine as arguably the most widely cited religiously motivated insurgency in Nigeria before the emergence of Boko Haram, and as a typical example of an Islamist network formation that precedes insurgency.⁶⁶ She added that the responses of government escalated its activities.⁶⁷ This is central to the investigation at hand, and it is this aspect of government response that is examined next.

4.3.6 Maitatsine Activities and Government Responses

From the foregone discussions, it is evident that the Maitatsine sect was a threat to public safety and to the stability of the Nigerian state. As in other terrorist situations, Maitatsine targeted innocent members of the public. Their attacks were also indiscriminate in that they attacked anyone that was not sympathetic to their cause, be they Muslims or non-Muslims, indigenes of Kano or migrants. The fact that Maitatsine stood against what the Nigerian state represented and sought the overthrow of its secular values and status quo made it a threat Nigeria's national security. To this end, it conceivably behoved on the government to respond by taking all measures necessary and appropriate to counter the threat.

The Nigerian government response to Maitatsine could therefore be said to have been predicated on the activities of the sect which threatened law and order, and the stability of Nigeria as a nation. The resort of Maitatsine to employ terrorist tactics and indeed the magnitude of terror which the sect unleashed on Nigerians living in the affected areas could

⁶⁵ Sadique Bello, Kano indigene and Businessman interviewed 15 April 2014.

⁶⁶ Virginia Comolli, p. 38.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 42.

on the other hand be said to have been influenced by the manner of government response. I attempt to explain this in Table 4.1, that is, examine the sect's activities and the corresponding government's responses and vice versa. While the table outlines the interplay between the sect and the government in general, Figure 4.1 utilises Dusek's model (explained earlier in section 4.1 of this chapter) to further show the corresponding impact on terrorist choices when government employed negotiation and other soft approaches as opposed to the military option. This was to determine the extent of causal relationship which negotiations or concessions by government on the one hand, and repressive state action on the other, had with the rise and growth of the sect. The data used in the compilation of the table and figure below, and in the subsequent case studies in the succeeding three chapters, were obtained from a combination of primary and secondary sources.⁶⁸

Table 4.1: Maitatsine - Government of Nigeria Interplay

Serial	Date	Maitatsine Actions and Reactions	Government Actions and Reactions	Remarks
1	1962	Muhammadu Marwa's teachings on Islam became increasingly provocative against other Islamic sects and the government.	The Kano Emirate Council and Provincial Government in an effort to end Muhammadu Marwa's provocative teachings on Islam arrested, prosecuted and jailed him for 3 years.	

⁶⁸ I made use of archival materials obtained mainly from the National Archives of Nigeria and Arewa House Kaduna. Printed documents (in the form of newspaper and magazine cuttings) were invaluable. A large chunk of data were obtained from interviews, books, journals and official reports. These were collated, analysed and presented in the mentioned tables and figures.

2	1962-1964	Marwa did not served the full 3-year jail sentence. He returned back to the streets with more ferocious attacks on government and gained more followers.	No significant action taken.	It is probable that little or nothing was done to de-radicalize him while in prison.
3	1965	Marwa continued to recruit and win more followership.	The Kano Emirate Council and Provincial government deported Marwa from Kano to his hometown in Marwa, Cameroon.	
4	1966	Marwa plot his return back to Kano and successfully achieved this presumably with the help of his followers.	Government did not respond to his violation of the deportation order.	
5	9 December 1966	Marwa continued his provocative teachings.	Marwa was arrested and remanded in police custody for preaching without permit. No charges were filed against him and was released after a month.	Marwa and his followers were emboldened by the release of their leader without charge and their membership continued to increase.

6	1967-1970	No much activity of the sect observed as Nigeria was at this period engulfed in a civil war sometimes regarded as a religious cum ethnic war between the Muslim Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria and the Christian Ibo of Eastern Nigeria.		Sect members perhaps merged with the larger Hausa-Fulani/Muslim effort of prosecuting the civil war against the Ibo/Christians - a case of a larger security issue absorbing a smaller one.
7	1971	Open street teachings by Maitatsine	Monitoring by police	
8	4 August 1972	Sect members threw stones at policemen sent to disperse their gathering.	The police engaged in open confrontation with sect members.	Sixty four Maitatsine members were arrested. Marwa escaped arrest.
9	1973	Marwa continued his provocative teachings and embarked on more street processions.	Marwa arrested and sent to prison in Makurdi. He was released after a short prison term.	Again no lasting action was taken to stop Marwa's inciting preaching or keep him away from Kano where he has large followership.

10	1973-1974	Marwa returned to his base in Kano.	Marwa arrested for illegal preaching, and subsequently released without charge.	Followership increased (as in serial 5).
11	1975-1978	Continued inciting preaching and recruitment.	Marwa arrested, detained and released several times without charge	Followership increased. More so, Marwa performed hajj to Mecca in the year thereby gaining more acceptability among Muslim faithfuls.
12	1979	The sect became more confrontational with the police	A large number of Maitatsine arrested for law and order offences.	The Iran revolution fuelled violent extremism mind-sets.
13	April 1980	Maitatsine sect harass and intimidate members of the public, clashed with other religious sects. 7 people injured.	Police attacked Maitatsine members who refused arrest. Two Maitatsine killed, 3 policemen injured	Killing of their members meant to Maitatsine the drawing of battle line between them and the police
14	30 May 1980	Killings by Maitatsine provoked confrontations with the police.	Police arrest 20 for public disturbances.	Government action continued to be reactionary, thereby giving the sect

				momentum.
15	May – September 1980	Maitatsine now more bold and on several occasions successfully resisted police attack on their Yan Awaki base.	Police pressed several charges against Maitatsine relating to assault and preaching without a permit.	Maitatsine had by this time fortified their Yan Awaki quarters making it a no go area for the public and security agencies.
16	23 October 1980	Maitatsine sect members mounted a road block near their Yan Awaki quarters.	Policemen from a nearby Police unit were sent to dismantle the road block but Maitatsine over-powered the police and stabbed one Special Constable to death. A squad of anti-riot police from Kano State Police Headquarters sent as reinforcement were also over-powered.	The Kano police as at this time were yet to be given orders to use force. Request to the National Police Headquarters for additional federal mobile police units to tackle Maitatsine was not granted.
17	November 1980	Maitatsine sect expanded and continued to fortify their Yan Awaki quarters as a sanctuary/operational base.	The Kano Police, Emirate Council and State Government at various times invited Marwa for meeting.	The sect had by now seized the initiative, became more daring and now exercises freedom of action.
18	26 November	Marwa turned down invitations for meetings	Kano Government gave Marwa a 2-week	

	1980	Kano State and continued his activities.	ultimatum to demolish all the illegal structures he has built to accommodate his members, and to vacate his compound and the lands and properties he seized in the Yan Awaki area.	
19	26 November – 7 December 1980	Rather than vacate, Marwa sent for all his followers across Nigeria to come to Kano city in order to defend their faith and leader. They fortified their base and acquired more arms in readiness for attack. Non-sympathisers were hunted down. Tijani, Marwa's eldest son was said to have been killed by unknown persons outside Yan Awaki causing Marwa to slaughter many children of non-members of his sect in revenge	Police continued confronting the sect with no definite operational strategy.	The influx of Maitatsine followers into Kano was not checked. Warning signals of impending Maitatsine attack were also not taken seriously by government.


20	7/8 December 1980	Attacks and killings of members of the public increased. A violent procession by the sect across Kano City starting from the Shahuci Playing ground was planned.	In response to information on the planned procession, the police decided to stop all public gatherings and processions by the sect. 150 policemen were stationed at the Shahuci Playing ground to prevent the sect's use of it.	
21	8 December 1980	Sect members attacked and over-powered the 150 policemen stationed at Shahuci Playing ground, burnt all their vehicles and seized the police arms, ammunition and uniforms		The police underestimated the strength of Maitatsine
22	8-28 December 1980	Maitatsine killed more policemen and civilians. Arson, looting, kidnapping, assassination, raping by sect members witnessed. Sect took control of almost the whole city and established	The police mustered all resources to contain the situation but were unsuccessful. Police morale was dampened, many policemen failed to report for duty, police stations were deserted	The police were no longer able to cope with the situation.

		more bases.	resulting in a state of anarchy in Kano city.	
23	28-30 December 1980		The Federal Government called in the military to contain the situation. The military shelled and destroyed the Maitatsine base and restored relative normalcy to Kano city.	4,117 deaths were recorded, including Muhammadu Marwa. Many other Maitatsine members fled Kano to other cities across Northern Nigeria.
24	January 1981	The sect members that escaped regrouped in small numbers in other cities.	The Federal government set up a Tribunal of Inquiry to investigate the causes of the Maitatsine terror.	No adequate follow-up was made to pick up sect members that escaped.
25	1 October 1982		The Federal Government released political prisoners including 900 detained Maitatsine members.	The release of Maitatsine members turned out to be a political blunder as some resume sect's activities.
26		Regrouping by Maitatsine gained momentum with the released of members from prison.		

27	October 1982 – April 1985	Maitatsine staged following attacks (1) Bulumkutu near Maiduguri in October 1982. About 3,350 persons were killed. (2) Rigassa village and Kaduna town in October 1982. Hundreds of lives were lost (3) Yola town in March 1984 resulting in the death of between 500 and 1,000 persons, and (4) Gombe and Bauchi in April 1985 with over a hundred persons killed.	Resurgence of security forces confrontation with Maitatsine	All these attacks were contained by the military sometimes with tanks and aerial bombardment. Many of the sect members were killed. It is probable that the remaining members of the sect either fled the country or ran underground.
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Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (See note 67).

Figure 4.1 Graphical Representations of Maitatsine Activities and Government Concessions/Military Approaches



Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (See note 67).

The unit of measurement (as represented in the x column) in Figure 4.1, and in subsequent similar graphical representation in the following three chapters on case studies, was based on the rate of incidents and casualty recorded. In this case study instance, there was steady increase in Maitatsine activities in the years before and after the Civil War with government employing soft approach and limiting police action to arrests. The turning point was in 1980 when the sect's activities went beyond police control and the military had to be drafted in as will be further highlighted in the assessment of government responses.

4.4 Assessment of Government Responses

Table and Figure 4.1 depicted the chain reaction of the Nigerian government to the activities of Maitatsine, and of Maitatsine as influenced by the manner of government's responses, and vice versa. It could be argued that the responses of government were from the outset relaxed and reactionary rather than proactive thereby giving Marwa the opportunity to not only settle

but to equally expand his foothold in Kano. Marwa was deported, but he returned to exercise greater influence as no significant attempt was made to respond to his violation of the deportation order.

As can be seen from the table, the attempts made to arrest Marwa often ended up in fatal confrontations with the police because at this time, Marwa had recruited a sizeable followership from the populace and even among public office holders who patronised him for consultations and to buy charms.⁶⁹ At occasions when Marwa was successfully arrested, he was quickly released and several times without charge. The consequence of this was a growing sympathy as a significant section of the public therefore believed that Marwa had committed no offence but was only being persecuted by the state which evidently could not press charges against him. The sympathy was more so for the reason that his sermons were against the state that has failed to deliver critical dividends of good governance. Marwa's arrests thus often ended with him gaining more sympathisers and a larger followership.⁷⁰

The police seemingly had no strategic plans for curbing Maitatsine's activities. They allowed themselves to be dragged into constant confrontation with the sect without a definite plan of action thereby emboldening the sect. Equally, the lack of clear directives to the police and particularly the initial refusal to authorise them the use of force (as highlighted in the table) only helped to give Maitatsine both tactical and operational advantage. Furthermore, the killing of Maitatsine members by the police often resulted in counter action by the sect. Apart from engaging in fierce confrontations with the police, the sect sought vengeance by killing members of the public and confronting other religious sects who they felt were collaborators of government and security forces. The event that sparked off greater reaction was perhaps the Kano State government order for Maitatsine to vacate their Yan Awaki base. Marwa's

⁶⁹ Toyin Falola, p. 164.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

invitation to his followers to mass in Kano in order to defend their leader and faith following the vacation notice inevitably produced a pressure-cooker situation that resulted in the offensive of 8-30 December 1980.

The events of 8-30 December, it could be argued depicted a resolve by Maitatsine to take over Kano city, and a demoralised police force attempting to carry out its constitutional roles. Probably alarmed by Maitatsine's exploits, the response of government saw a shift from that of apathy to doggedness in overcoming the terrorists' challenge, and this became the turning point in both government response and Maitatsine activities. The military that were called in to contain the situation did not apply restraint in the use of force. They shelled the Maitatsine bases killing many Maitatsine members including Marwa who later died presumably of gunshot wounds.⁷¹ Although the situation in Kano was contained, later events revealed that the high-handedness of the military and the death of Marwa could not end the activities of Maitatsine. This was because no proactive measures were taken by government to forestall possible outbreak of violence in other cities to where Maitatsine members had escaped. The consequence of this was that Maitatsine terror continued in a different form and various fronts for another five years, from 1980 to 1985.

The deportation of Marwa, his arrests and trials and the deployment of security agencies could possibly have served to curb Maitatsine activities. However, these measures seemed not well-articulated or effectively pursued by government and its security agencies. Falola observes that the government allowed inter-party rivalry to cloud its fundamental obligation of safeguarding the lives and properties of its citizens.⁷² According to his account, Kano State, from where the sect started manifesting terror, was controlled by a political party known as the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) while the Federal Government was controlled

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Toyin Falola, p. 140.

by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).⁷³ In an attempt to weaken and discredit the PRP in Kano State, the NPN-led federal government declined to respond promptly to the situation. Governor Abubakar Rimi of Kano State was alleged to have had secret dealings with Marwa in order to win his political support and secure the votes of his followers during elections. This is as a later report indicted Governor Rimi for dining with the “emissaries of a terrorist” and on two occasions donating money to Marwa.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the Kano State Commissioner of Police and the Emir of Kano were purported to be NPN members hence, supporting the federal against the state government.⁷⁵ In this state of affairs, concerted efforts or synergy between the federal and state government could not be achieved and consequently appropriate responses to counter the Maitasine threat could not be agreed upon. It is likely that Marwa seized the opportunity of the misunderstanding and confusion to defy constituted authorities. For instance, Marwa refused to honour court summons, invitations for an audience with Governor Abubakar Rimi and the order for him to stop all land developments and to vacate the Yan Awaki quarters which he allegedly occupied illegally.

The political feud between the state and federal levels of government affected security operations. In the attempt to make PRP appear incapable of handling the crisis, the national headquarters of Nigerian Police, controlled as it was by the NPN-led federal government, did not initiate appropriate orders for the arrest of Marwa or for the destruction of the sect. An indication of this was the refusal of the headquarters of the Nigerian Police to grant a request by the Kano State Police Commissioner for the use of force and for three additional mobile units to counter Maitatsine.⁷⁶ Therefore, being outmatched in strength by Maitatsine and receiving no clear directives on how to handle the situation, the police in Kano were said to have:

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ A. N. Aniagolu, para 114.

⁷⁵ Toyin Falola, p. 140.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 151.

*...totally succumbed to the permanent existence of the threat...believed to be beyond suppression. It was a case of total surrender to an overwhelming situation.*⁷⁷

Another issue that could be responsible for the ineffective response of government was its resolve not to interpret the Maitatsine terror as a religious issue. This was probably in view of the sensitive and volatile nature of religious issues in Nigeria. However, in the attempt not to “call a spade a spade”, solutions became difficult. In his 1981 New Year speech, President Shehu Shagari viewed the Maitatsine terror as the handiwork of external forces whom he described as enemies of the nation working in collaboration with opposition politicians to destabilise Nigeria.⁷⁸ He thus absolved his government and the NPN of any blame. The tribunal he set up a few days after his speech made a number of findings, several of which appear to contradict his views.⁷⁹ Significantly, and as lofty as the recommendations of the tribunal were, many of them were never implemented.⁸⁰

It could be concluded that the responses by government simply hardened Maitatsine, gave the sect freedom of action to operate and eventually turned it into a formidable terrorist threat that was beyond the control of the Nigerian security forces. The case study of Maitatsine indicated that negotiations or concessions are not an effective way of dealing with some terrorist groups as the measures do not achieve their intended purpose of appeasing the terrorist and persuading them to end their violence. The Maitatsine sect possibly took the concessions as signs of weakness on the part of government. On the other hand, the repressive response of government through the employment of military force seemed to have achieved only a short term solution as a resurgence of the violence was later witnessed in other parts of the country. Generally, the threat-response interface between Maitatsine and government offers some lessons for counter-terrorism policy as subsequently highlighted.

⁷⁷ A. N. Aniagolu, para 76.

⁷⁸ President Shehu Shagari, “New Year Message” *New Nigerian*, 2 January 1981, p. 1.

⁷⁹ The Justice A. N. Aniagolu-led tribunal is officially called Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances. It commenced sitting on 2 February 1981.

⁸⁰ Toyin Falola, p. 151.

4.5 Lessons

The Maitatsine threat and the Nigerian government responses to it demonstrate the importance of political will and direction on the effectiveness of countering terrorism, insurgency and such other conflict situations. It raises the imperative for an effective oversight function and the need to rid security and intelligence agencies of political interference.

Marwa, as noted earlier, was an immigrant from Cameroon. He crossed the Nigerian - Cameroun border into Nigeria on two occasions, the first being in 1945 when he initially moved into Kano, and the second in 1966 when he violated his deportation order. These movements were likely unchecked as there existed no record of any encounter he had with the border control agencies. Equally, a significant number of his followers were aliens. This illustrates the porosity of Nigeria's borders and the role of cross border activities (particularly movement of persons and goods) in conflict situations in Nigeria.

Marwa served several jail sentences in Nigerian prisons. Little or nothing appeared to have been done to de-radicalise him while in jail. Prisons are supposed to, among other things, serve as rehabilitation centres and de-radicalisation points in the case of extremists and such other detainees. When this is not done, the convicts could come out more hardened and in the mood for vengeance thereby escalating the conflict situation. They could in some cases recruit more followers while in custody.

The Nigerian Civil War, as noted earlier, absorbed Maitatsine as it is probable that it became part of a wider Hausa-Fulani-Muslim and Ibo-Christian conflict. Another possibility is that Maitatsine may have used this period to incubate (gaining more followership in the process) and emerge as a formidable force in the post-Nigeria Civil War years. There is therefore the

imperative during conflicts to monitor all security issues that may take the advantage to feed into or operate under the cover of wider security concerns.

The federal nature of the Nigerian police conceivably gives room for control and manipulation by the federal government and the ruling political party. Often therefore, the police become an instrument in the hands of the regime in power thereby serving regime rather than national interest. This raises the issue of decentralisation of police powers or consideration for a state or community policing system in Nigeria.

The Maitatsine crisis revealed the depth of Nigeria's economic crisis, political instability and the lack of capacity by security forces to handle threat situations. As stated earlier, Marwa cashed-in on the decline in the Nigerian economy and the attendant poverty, hunger and unemployment to win the support of some segments of the society against the Nigerian state that manifested inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens. The need for, and the delivery of the dividends of good governance are therefore of utmost importance in national security management. However, it could be said that government after government either failed to, or only paid lip service in addressing the socio-economic problems that birthed Maitatsine. The result has been that of re-occurrence of similar terrorist situations particularly the current wave of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram which I shall discuss in chapter 7. Following the historical sequence of threats, the next chapter will examine terrorism under military rule.

CHAPTER FIVE

MILITARY RULE AND STATE TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE BABANGIDA AND ABACHA REGIMES

5.1 Preamble

In chapter two, I argued that the definition of terrorism needs to be broadened beyond its limitation by some authorities to only actions of groups and non-state actors. It needs to be all inclusive, taking into account actions by states at domestic and international levels. In this chapter, the focus will be on acts considered to be terrorism perpetrated by the Nigerian state against its citizens. The military regimes of Generals Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida and Sani Abacha who were military heads of state of Nigeria from 27 August 1985 to 26 August 1993, and from November 1993 to 7 June 1998 respectively, will be considered.

The case study analysis methodology will again be adopted in this chapter. I will begin by making a historical overview of military rule in Nigeria and highlight the concept of state terrorism as it applies to Nigeria. This will lay the foundation for a detailed examination of the acts of terror committed by the Babangida and Abacha regimes in the course of their responses against Nigerians that they considered political enemies of the state.

5.2 Military Rule in Nigeria

Nigeria has had eight military regimes since her independence in 1960. The regimes could be conveniently divided into two periods of four regimes each. The first period spanning thirteen years began on January 15, 1966, when some Majors of the Nigerian Army led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu overthrew the then President, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Prime Minister,

Tafawa Balewa in a coup.¹ Olusoji, Olusanmi and Nelarine's account of military interventions in Nigeria detailed that General Aguiyi-Ironsi who became Head of State following the coup was himself killed six months later in another coup that brought the then Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon as Head of State.² Gowon held power until 29 July 1975 when he was overthrown in a bloodless coup. Brigadier Murtala Mohammed succeeded General Gowon. He was assassinated in a violent coup on 13 February 1976 and subsequently succeeded by General Olusegun Obasanjo. On 1 October 1979, Obasanjo handed over power to Shehu Shagari, who was democratically elected as the first Executive President of Nigeria.³

The second period of military regimes, which spanned approximately 16 years, started with the overthrow of President Shehu Shagari in a bloodless coup on 31 December 1983.⁴ General Muhammadu Buhari became the Head of State. On 27 August 1985, he was overthrown by General Ibrahim Babangida who took on the title of President. He ruled Nigeria until 26 August 1993 when he was compelled to hand over power to a transitional government headed by Ernest Shonekan. Shonekan was overthrown two months later by General Sani Abacha. Abacha died on 8 June 1998, and General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over power. On 29 May 1999, Abubakar handed over power to a democratically elected government headed by an Executive President, Olusegun Obasanjo.⁵ This ended 29 years of military rule, a significant part of which was arguably characterised by state sponsored violence that fitted into what could be, as I will discuss in detail later, described as state terrorism.

¹ Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 158-180.

² George Olusoji, Amujo Olusanmi and Cornelius Nelarine, "Military Intervention in Nigerian Politics and Its Impact on the Development of Managerial Elite: 1966-1979" *Canadian Social Sciences*. Vol. 8, No. 6 (2012), pp. 45-53.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

5.3 The Notion of State Terrorism

There is a much contested argument about whether the actions of governments could be considered as terrorism or that the term should be applied only to the actions of non-state actors.⁶ The opinion for those opposed to the use of the term 'state terrorism' is that actions by a legitimate government are not generally seen as illegitimate, and in circumstances where the term could have been applied, the actions by states seem to be justified through the prism of war or national defence.⁷ As I have argued earlier, toeing the line of these scholars would be narrowing the definition of terrorism to a traditional and Western perspective, and in the process ignoring the repressive actions of some states particularly in Third World countries. The consequence could be the justification of such acts and therefore a cover-up for such states to commit worse human rights abuse on their citizens. Max Weber asserts that the state is the only human community with the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.⁸ While one is unequivocally in agreement with this, it is equally worth stressing that such use of force ought to qualify as legitimate and on legitimate targets too. In this wise, the state's use of its instrument of violence such as its armies, intelligence services and the police against a harmless civilian population, I would say, negates such legitimacy. This is more so when one takes into account the social contract that should exist between the government and

⁶ Jack Gibbs, "Conceptualisation of terrorism" in John Hogan and Kurt Braddock (eds), *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*, (New York: Routledge, 2012) p.67. See also Ruth Blakeley (2009), *State Terrorism and neoliberalism*, Routledge, p. 27. ISBN 0-415-46240-1

⁷ Holsti K.J., *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, (New York: Prentice Hall Inc. 1995, p.200.

⁸ Max Weber, "The Profession and vocation of politics" in Peter Lassman and Ronald Spears, eds., *Weber: Political Writings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.311 – 315.

its people where the latter expects a guarantee of security in return for subjecting their rights to the former.⁹

As a term, state terrorism is also varyingly referred to as state-sponsored terrorism, establishment terrorism, terrorism from above, enforcement terrorism, preventive terrorism, repressive terrorism or structural terrorism. Generally, state terrorism refers to acts of terrorism conducted by government, and as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online* states, "it is employed by governments or more often by factions within governments against that government's citizens, factions within the government or foreign governments and groups."¹⁰

Similarly, Gus Martin defines it as terrorism "committed by governments and quasi-governmental agencies and personnel against perceived threats", which can be directed against both domestic and foreign targets.¹¹ In the same vein, Slogan notes that state terrorism could be applied externally by a government against other nation states or internally to repress various forms of domestic opposition or unrest to move the populace to comply with the programmes of the state.¹² Further to this is the 'establishment terrorism' definition by Shultz as "the threat and, or employment of extra-normal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, by an established political system, against both external and internal opposition."¹³

The views above distinguish between two broad types of state terrorism, that is, that committed by the state concerned against its local population and the one committed or directed against another country. The situation in Nigeria, as this chapter will show, was that

⁹ The social contract theory (also referred to as the political contract theory) originated during the Age of Enlightenment through political philosophers such as Hobbes and Rousseau, and centres on the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual.

¹⁰ Terrorism, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*

¹¹ Martin Gus, *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, SAGE Publishers, 2006. ISBN 1-4129-2722-6.

¹² See Juliet Lodge, ed., *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State* (London: Martin Robertson Press, 1981) p.5.

¹³ R. Shultz, "Conceptualising political terrorism: A typology," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 32 No. 1 (1978), pp.7-15

of government repression against internal opposition, that is, terrorism committed by the Nigerian state against its local population.

5.4 Origin of State Terrorism in Nigeria

State terrorism is as old as the word 'terrorism' which stemmed from the 1789 French Revolution *Reign of Terror*. There was at this period a systematic use of terror as a policy by the revolutionary French government to impose their radical new order on its citizens.¹⁴ In Nigeria, state terrorism was practised by the colonial government against the indigenous population. As pointed out in chapter three, the colonial army and police were the principal state instruments of terror. It is this character of colonial army and police that Nigeria is thought to have acquired at independence and maintained thereafter.¹⁵

Another important point to stress is that perhaps among the significant legacies colonialism bequeathed to post-colonial Nigeria and indeed most post-colonial societies, is the military instrument of national power. It is believed that the military was one of the most developed institution at the period the colonial states were granted independence, and also the only institutions that could challenge the ineptitude of the political class. It is not surprising therefore that when the political class failed in the task of governance in post-colonial states, the military easily usurped their roles on the grounds of stabilising the socio-political and economic structures of the nation.¹⁶ The concern in this study however is the resort of the military to repressive actions against citizens in ascendance to power. One reason for the prevalence of terror during military regimes is perhaps the fact that the military came to power not through the ballot box but coups. This practice is considered illegitimate and

¹⁴ Klaus Dodds, *Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), p. 199

¹⁵¹⁵ See E. E. Osaghae, *Crippled giant: Nigeria since independence*. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998). Also, Toyin Falola, *Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria*. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998).

¹⁶ A. J. Kposowa and J. C. Jenkins, "The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial Africa 1957-1984," *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 99, No. 1 (1993), pp. 126-163.

undemocratic.¹⁷ Constrained by legitimacy and acceptability therefore, Falola contends that military rule relied on the use of force to implement its policies, laws and orders.¹⁸ Such was the situation during the Babangida and Abacha military regimes to which Albert notes that Nigeria witnessed the most agonising moment in its political history.¹⁹

5.5 The Generals Babangida and Abacha Terrorism Era

In this case study analysis of state terrorism during the Babangida and Abacha regimes, I will discuss the immediate causes, nature of the threat and juxtapose pro-democracy group activities with government responses. An assessment of the government responses and the lessons that could be derived from the case study will also be highlighted.

5.5.1 Immediate Causes of State Terrorism during Babangida and Abacha Regimes

The military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida became unpopular when in the face of economic decline in 1986, Babangida introduced an International Monetary Fund and World Bank endorsed austerity measures programme.²⁰ The programme, which he christened Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) resulted in a decline of the real wages of workers thereby sparking up public discontent.²¹ Also, Babangida registered Nigeria as a fully-fledged member of the Organization of Islamic Countries to the dissatisfaction of the Christian population.²² The Babangida regime was equally accused of condoning corruption as this was evidently widespread and yet no member of his cabinet was prosecuted.²³ There were also

¹⁷ M. A. Adebisi, "The Military and Democratic Transition in Nigeria" in Rotimi Ajayi, ed., *Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives in Nigerian Studies* (Ilorin: Nathadex Publishers, 1998), pp. 142-143.

¹⁸ Toyin Falola, *Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria*. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998).

¹⁹ Isaac Olawale Albert, "Terror as a political weapon: reflections on the bomb explosions in Abacha's Nigeria" in *IFRA Special Research Issue Volume 1*, Ibadan: Institut française de recherche en Afrique, 2005, p. 37-56.

Available online at <http://booksopenedition.org/ifra/801>, accessed 11 August 2013.

²⁰ John Anyanwu, "President Babangida's Structural Adjustment Programme and Inflation in Nigeria" *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, Volume 7, Issue 1 (1992), pp. 5-24.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies* (BOYEG, 1998), pp. 93-102.

²³ Ibid.

allegations of human rights abuses which include the murder of Dele Giwa by a letter bomb.²⁴

What could account for the immediate cause of state terrorism under the Babangida and Abacha military regimes was the political problem which started with the annulment of a presidential election held on 12 June 1993.²⁵ The announcement of the results of the election was stopped half-way and the elections cancelled when it became apparent that Chief Moshood Abiola had won. The public outcry and riots that followed the annulment forced Babangida to hand over power to a hurriedly constituted Interim National Government (ING) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan. This however did not pacify pro-democracy activists who wanted a return to full democratic government.

Instead of a return to full democracy, General Sani Abacha, who was then the Chief of Army Staff, seized the opportunity to organise a coup that overthrew Shonekan. The expectations of many Nigerians when Abacha seized power were that he would 'heal the wounds' supposedly created by Babangida by de-annulling the presidential elections of 12 June 1993 and install Abiola as President.²⁶ It however became apparent to Nigerians that Abacha intended to perpetuate himself in power. This heightened pro-democracy and human rights activism on one hand, and on the other hand, the resolve of the military government to deal with such activism using the weapon of terror.

5.5.2 Nature of the Threat during Babangida and Abacha Regimes

State terrorism as perpetrated by the Babangida and Abacha military regimes took the form of covert and clandestine operations using security and intelligence agencies.²⁷ The operations usually involved a cover up since the state did not want to expose itself as the sponsor of the

²⁴ Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission of Nigeria (HRVIC) Report, Volume 4, May 2002.

²⁵ Isaac Olawale Albert, p.37.

²⁶ Toyin Falola, pp. 93-102.

²⁷ Isaac Olawale Albert, p. 37.

activity.²⁸ It was therefore the practice for the state to link the terrorist acts perpetrated by it to pro-democracy groups and in the process provide a rationale for dealing with political opponents.

They were various modes of attack on opposition. One was the assassination method. The assassination of Dele Giwa through a letter bomb and the shooting to death of Kudirat Abiola, the wife of Chief Abiola that have been mentioned earlier, were examples. Another method was the intimidation of political activists which forced many of them into exile. Prominent Nigerians such as Wole Soyinka, Bola Tinubu and Anthony Enahoro fled from Nigeria to the UK and the US for safety.²⁹ A number of those that chose to remain rather than flee the country were sent to jail where they were subjected to torture and other forms of human rights abuses.³⁰ Charges of treason were placed on politicians opposed to military rule all in a bid to eliminate them. Ken Saro-Wiwa, for instance, was charged with treason, jailed and later executed publicly alongside other eight of his Ogoni kinsmen.³¹ The charge of treason was equally placed on military personnel that were alleged to be disloyal to the regimes in power. Such serving and retired military officers were often implicated in phantom coup plots, which provided an excuse for them to be jailed. Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired former military head of state who later became civilian President of Nigeria suffered this fate.³²

²⁸ "Nigeria Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998" *U.S. Department of State*, 26 February 1999. Available at https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Nigeria%20Country%20Report%20on%20Human%20Rights%20Practices%20for%201998%20.pdf, accessed 23 August 2015.

²⁹ See Kunle Amuwo, "Introduction: Transition as Democratic Regression" in Kunle Amuwo, Daniel Bach and Yann Lebeau (eds), *Nigeria during the Abacha Years (1993-1998) The Domestic and International Politics of Democratisation* (Ibadan: IFRA Institute of African Studies, 2001).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Sanya Osha, "Birth of the Ogoni protest movement". *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Vol. 41, Issue 1-2 (2006), pp. 13-38.

³² Kunle Amuwo, p. 2.

Of all the methods of terrorist attacks that the Babangida and Abacha regimes employed against the country's citizens, bomb attacks were perhaps the most devastating particularly in terms of the psychological fear that they created among the citizenry. The bombs were hidden in public places, along VIPs routes or in the vehicle of targeted persons. Oshanugor chronicled a total of 18 bomb incidents which occurred between 31 May 1995 and 23 April 1998.³³ He notes that the military regime of Abacha blamed opposition groups for all the bomb attacks. Summing up this view, Albert asserts that:

*...the bombs were meant to incriminate, implicate and intimidate pro-democracy and human rights activists, who were usually blamed for the attack, the regime also used the explosions to validate its highhandedness against the opposition.*³⁴

The situation could best be explained in terms of the government labelling opposition groups as terrorists and in the same process using terrorism as a counter-terrorism weapon against the opposition. This interplay, I will now examine.

5.5.3 Pro-Democracy Groups Activities and Government Responses

Some of the factors that led to the emergence and subsequent activities of pro-democracy groups in Nigeria are as explained in section 5.5.1 of this chapter. Additional factors that accounted for the emergence of pro-democracy groups were the long period of military rule and the fact that most of the military heads of state came from a particular section of the country, that is, the North.³⁵ Therefore, when Abiola was denied the Presidency following the annulled 12 June 1993 elections, some Nigerians saw it as a ploy not only to keep the military but also the North perpetually in power at the expense of the South.³⁶ The activities of the pro-democracy groups were therefore principally aimed at ensuring the de-annulment of the

³³ Frank Sochukwu Osanugor, *Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience (1995 – 1998)*, Advent Communications Ltd, 2004, p.47.

³⁴ Isaac Albert, p.47.

³⁵ M. A. Adebisi, "Ethnic Relations and Politics in Nigeria" in U. A. Igun and A. A. Mordi, *Contemporary Social Problems in Nigeria* (Ijebu Ode: Shebiotimo Publications, 2005), pp. 20-38.

³⁶ Kunle Amuwo, p.3.

presidential elections of 12 June 1993 which by extension would take the military out of power and equally effect a shift of power to the South.

The military on the other hand appeared unwilling to relinquish power. Babangida attempted to appease the South by appointing Shonekan (who is of the same Egba stock of the Yoruba ethnic group as Abiola) to head the ING. This did not work and the new regime continued to face a legitimacy crisis. As mentioned earlier, the MAD group led by Jerry Yusuf high-jacked a Nigeria Airways Airbus A300 to Niamey, the capital city of Niger Republic in protest against the annulment of the election and the institution of an ING.³⁷ The most vocal of the pro-democracy groups however were the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and the National Liberation Coalition of Nigeria (NALICON).³⁸ Using passive resistance, these organisations resolutely opposed the Abacha regime that succeeded Shonekan. They organised demonstrations, industrial actions and campaigned for the imposition of international sanctions against the Nigerian military government. They were supported in the struggle by human rights organisations and trade unions in the country, as well as by the international community which condemned the annulment of the election and the continued military rule.³⁹

The response of government to the activities of pro-democracy groups was a clamp-down on public opinion and the detention without trial of journalists, human rights activists and anyone considered an opposition to military rule.⁴⁰ A number of political and human rights activists like Alfred Rewane and Kudirat Abiola died mysteriously while some like Wole Soyinka went into exile from where they organised themselves into various pressure groups as noted in chapter three. The scenario that played out was that of pro-democracy groups

³⁷ Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton, p. 228.

³⁸ Egsagha E. Osaghae, *Crippled giant: Nigeria since Independence* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 294.

³⁹ James O. Akpeninor, *Merger Politics of Nigeria and Surge of Sectarian Violence* (Bloomington: Author House, 2013), p. 356.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

employing mainly passive means to force the military out of power and the military on the other hand responding with repression on the pro-democracy groups whom they dubbed as terrorists. Thus, while the military government annulment of 12 June elections and continued stay in power sparked off pro-democracy activities, the pro-democracy activities on the other hand prompted government's violent response. This interplay between the pro-democracy groups and the military regimes is detailed in Table 5.1 and a graphical representation that includes the corresponding impact of concessions in Figure 5.1. In the table, I have deliberately chosen to start with the pro-democracy groups in the first column that is ordinarily assigned for the terrorist thereby placing them in the position where the government placed them (as terrorists). Who the real terrorists were will come out as we analyse the threat-response data in the table. I have also chosen to start from the date of the annulled presidential elections, that is, 12 June 1993. It is pertinent to note that the events were fluid, meaning that some activities involved spanned through the entire period and as such dates given are meant to reflect the commencement of such activities. Equally, the rate of incidents and casualty recorded was used as the unit of measurement in Figure 5.1 to show the differences between the military and soft response approaches causal effect on the rise of pro-democracy activities. The sources of data in the table and figure were also a combination of primary and secondary sources.⁴¹

Table 5.1: Pro-Democracy – Military Regimes Interplay

Serial	Date	Pro-Democracy Groups Actions and Reactions	Military Regimes Actions and Reactions	Remarks
1	12 June 1993	Campaigned and actively participated in	The Babangida regime announced the	International and local observers had

⁴¹ See note 67 of chapter four.

		Presidential Elections.	annulment of elections.	adjudged the elections free and fair.
2	June 1993	Urged government to de-annul the election.	Promised to undertake political reforms rather than de-annul the election.	
3	July 1993	Some members bought over/ succumb to government.	Issued threats to those yet to succumb.	
4	July–August 1993	Emergence of hardliner groups. Carried out sustained public awareness campaigns against the military.	No longer able to bear the pressure, Babangida handed over power on 26 August to an Interim National Government led by Ernest Shonekan.	
5	August 1993	Declared Interim National Government illegal and unfit.	Campaigns support for Interim National Government.	
6	October 1993	Movement for the Advancement of Democracy led by Jerry Yusuf hijack Nigerian Airways plane to Niamey, Niger	Arrested, tried and sentenced hijackers to prison sentence of eight years.	Hijackers released in 2002

		Republic demanding de-annulment of election.		
7	November 1993	Continued to protest against ING and for de-annulment of election.	Sani Abacha staged coup on the 17 th and overthrow ING. Announced the setting up of a constitutional committee to determine the future constitutional structure of Nigeria.	
8	December 1993	Stepped up campaign against return of the military.	Abacha began to consolidate himself in power. He promulgated decrees. One of them, Decree 107 conferred on him absolute power to make laws without reference to anybody.	
9	2 January 1994	Media Propaganda. <i>Tell Magazine</i> publishes defamatory report on Abacha "The Return of the Tyranny: Abacha Bares His Fangs."	Security forces invaded the Magazine's printing press and seized 55,000 copies of the edition. Clamp down on journalists began.	

10	January 1994	Increased activism. Ranks of pro-democracy groups swell. NADECO and NALICON gained local and international support.	Proscribed all pro-democracy groups in the country.	
11	February 1994	Mobilised workers for demonstrations and labour strikes particularly in the South West zone of Nigeria.	Security forces deployed to the streets to stop demonstrations.	
12	March 1994	Confrontation with security forces.	Ruthless with demonstrators. Killed a number of them and imposed curfew.	
13	April 1994	Groups remained undaunted in the face of attack by security forces.	Formed anti-terrorism outfit that became a "killer squad."	
14	June 1994	Abiola declared himself President of Nigeria.	Abiola arrested, charged for treason and jailed.	
15	June 1994	Pro-democracy riots	Intelligence and	

		broke out in parts of Nigeria.	security forces engaged in secret killings of political activists.	
16	1994 -1995	Some prominent members of pro-democracy groups went on exile, formed pressure groups.	Ignored calls by the international community for return to democratic rule. Shunned international engagements.	
17	31 May 1995	Bomb explosion at Illorin Township Stadium during launch of Government sponsored Family Support Programme.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	2 deaths. 50 injured
18	10 November 1995		Ken Saro Wiwa and 9 Ogoni tribe men killed by hanging.	Sanctions imposed on Nigeria by the international community.
19	18 January 1996	Bomb explosion at Durbar Hotel Kaduna. The bomber blown into pieces in one of the hotel's toilets.	Government blames pro-democracy groups. A journalist, James Bagaudu Kaltho was later alleged by security agents to be the bomber	1 confirmed death.

			blown into pieces.	
20	19 January 1995	Bomb blast at the toilet of the departure wing of Mallam Aminu International Airport, Kano.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	No loss of life recorded.
21	13 April 1996	Bomb explosion at Mammy Market of Ikeja Military Cantonment.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	
22	4 June 1994	Kudirat Abiola, wife of Abiola assassinated.	Government denies involvement.	The US impose more sanctions on Nigeria.
23	14 November 1996	Car bomb explosion along Murtala Mohammed International and Lagos Local Airport link road.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	The occupants of the car, Sola Omoshola who was the Chief Security Officer of the Airport, and one Nelson Kazim reported death.
24	15 November 1996	NADECO leader, Chief Michael Ajasin denies NADECO's involvement in bomb blasts.	Government continues to blame pro-democracy groups for the bomb blast and for attempts to destabilise the nation.	

25	16 December 1996	Bomb blast at Ikeja-Lagos targeted at convoy of Col Buba Marwa the Lagos State Military Administrator.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	Two aides of the Military Administrator and a passer-by were injured.
26	18 December 1996	Bus conveying security personnel (about 40 in number) to their duty post hit by explosion.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	
27	19-24 December 1996	The US warned Nigerians to expect more bomb blast and for her citizens in Nigeria to be on the alert.	Summoned the US Ambassador to Nigeria, Walter Carrington.	
28	7 January 1997	Bomb explosion at Ojuelegba bridge at Lagos hit military bus conveying about 50 soldiers from Ikeja Military Cantonment to Lagos Island.	Government blames NADECO and other pro-democracy groups.	Amnesty International condemn spate of bomb blasts.
29	12 February 1997	Bomb explosion hit a military bus conveying soldiers from Ikeja Military Cantonment to	Government blames pro-democracy groups. Sets up a special presidential task force	Eight persons wounded.

		Apapa-Lagos.	to investigate the blasts.	
30	7 May 1997	Bomb targeted at a military bus conveying soldiers exploded at Yaba-Lagos.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	
31	12 May 1997	Bomb targeted at a military truck conveying soldiers exploded at Ibadan.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	
32	16 May 1997	Twin bomb explosions at Onitsha bridge end.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	
33	30 July 1997	Pro-democracy groups urge the government to investigate itself and stop blaming them.	Declared international playwright Wole Soyinka, Elder Statesman Anthony Enahoro, retired General Alani Akinrinade and former Senator Bola Tinubu all members of NADECO and NALICON wanted for conspiracy and treason.	
34	6 August 1997	Bomb explosion at Port Harcourt.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	1 killed, 2 injured.


35	2 September 1997	Bomb targeting convoy of Ekiti State Military Administrator, Colonel Mohammed Bawa exploded at Ado Ekiti.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	6 injured.
36	13 December 1997	Bomb blast at Presidential Wing of Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport, Abuja when the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya was on his to board a plane.	Government blames pro-democracy groups.	1 security personnel killed and another injured.
37	21 December 1997	Condemned the deteriorating security situation in the country.	Arrested Diya and ten other senior military officers for allegedly plotting to overthrow Abacha.	
38	2-3 March 1998	Support for pro-democracy groups increase.	Organised Abacha-for-President campaigns and "Two-million man" Abacha support rally.	
39	9 March 1998	Pro-democracy coalition group called United Action for	Clamp down on rally injuring many.	

		Democracy organised "Five-million-man" counter-rally.		
40	22 April 1998	Bomb explosion at Evans Square-Lagos.	Government continues to blame pro- democracy groups.	3 killed.
41	23 April 1998	Bomb explosion at Ile- Ife, Osun State.	Government continues to blame pro- democracy groups.	5 killed, 14 injured.
42	8 June 1998		Abacha died of "cardiac arrest" in the State House. General Abdulsalami Abubakar became head of state.	
43	7 July 1998 – May 1999	Abiola (still in detention) died of cardiac arrest while in a meeting with Nigerian government and US officials at the State House. This sparked off violent protest across the South West and tension nationwide on suspicion that he may have been	Abubakar announced that he would hand over to a democratically elected civilian government on 29 May 1999. He requested that all those on exile declared wanted by the Abacha government were free to return to Nigeria.	Abubakar handed over power to a democratically elected government headed by Olusegun Obasanjo. Among other things, Obasanjo set up a panel to investigate activities of military governments from 1966 to 1999.

		poisoned.		
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Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

Figure 5.1 Graphical Representations of Pro-Democracy Activities and Military Regimes Concessions/Military Approaches



Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

In this case study, there was from 1993 to 1997, a sustained increase in military response to the activities of pro-democracy groups which consequently provoked a corresponding increase in the activities of the groups. Negotiations and other soft approaches by the government were low as it continued to employ military response to perpetuate itself in power. The turning point was in 1998 when General Abacha died and the new government of General Abubakar took on a liberal posture, ultimately handing over power to a democratically elected government in 1999. A detailed assessment of the responses of the government is made below.

5.6 Assessment of Government Responses

Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 depict the responses of the Nigerian military government of Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha to the activities of pro-democracy groups. As observed earlier, we can postulate that the emergence and activities of the pro-democracy groups were a consequence of the actions of the military regimes. Thus, it was a chain reaction of threats and counter-threats, responses and counter-responses; each party influenced by the other's actions in trying to get the better of the other. For the pro-democracy groups, their activities were aimed at ending military rule while for the military, their actions were to perpetuate themselves in power.

The annulment of the June 12 elections, as argued earlier, left many Nigerians in doubt as to the sincerity of the military to hand over power to a democratically elected government. This was more so as the elections were regarded by both local and international observers as the freest and fairest in Nigeria's political history, and also for the reason that Babangida did not give Nigerians a convincing reason as to why he annulled the elections.⁴² It is noted that even

⁴² M. A. Adebisi, pp. 20-38.

when he handed over power to the Shonekan-led ING, he still superintended over the affairs of the nation in an autocratic manner. This helped garner support for pro-democracy groups.

The pro-democracy groups employed mainly passive means in resisting military rule, as against the high-handed response of the military. The response of the Nigerian military, as pointed out earlier, was due to the reason that the military lacked legitimacy and could only hold on to power by force. As with all autocratic regimes, they had little or no regard for human rights or the reproof of the international community. From the details indicated in Table 5.1, it is observed that there was a gradual ascent in the response rhythm of the military government to the activities of pro-democracy groups. The response began with warnings and proscription of pro-democracy groups, then graduated to ruthless physical contact and thereafter assassinations and jailing of political and human rights activists which forced several of them into exile. Further to this was the wave of bomb blasts which created psychological fear in the minds of Nigerians particularly as it was uncertain who were responsible for the blasts and where or when the next blast would occur.

The position of the government was that the bombs were planted by agents of the pro-democracy groups that were bent on destabilising the government and the nation in general.⁴³ In the light of this, whenever there was a bomb blast, the government whipped up public sentiment to attract sympathy and support against the perceived 'terrorists' and 'enemies of the nation'⁴⁴. Along this line, Albert observes that:

Each bomb attack was followed the next day by pro-Abacha public demonstration during which banners, which appeared to have been printed in advance, were displayed condemning NALICON, NADECO and pro-democracy activists like Wole Soyinka and others.⁴⁵

⁴³ "Nigeria 'The Dawn of a New Dark Age': Human Rights Abuses Rampant as Nigerian Military Declares Absolute Power" *Human Rights Watch Report*. Vol. 6, No. 8 (October 1994)

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Isaac Albert, p.51.

Ordinarily, the bomb blast would appear to be the handwork of pro-democracy groups. This is considering the fact that many of the targets were military personnel and installations, thus giving the impression that the bombs were planted by civilians who wanted the military out of power. Later revelations however pointed to the contrary, and indications began to emerge that the military were the architect of the bombs blasts.⁴⁶ One pointer to this was that while it was common worldwide to find groups claiming responsibility for incidents of bomb blast, no group identified itself with the ones in Nigeria mentioned above. The NADECO, NALICON and other pro-democracy groups denied any involvement. It also became suspicious when in spite of government promises to restore security situation to normality, the bomb blasts continued with intelligence and security agencies exhibiting apathy and often contradicting themselves in their press releases.

Some members of the top hierarchy of the police and military later confirmed that the government was responsible for the bomb blasts, assassinations and other forms of assaults on political figures. For instance, Abubakar Tsav, the then Commissioner of Police for Lagos State where many of the blasts took place, later confirmed in an interview with *The Post Express* Newspaper that the Presidential Task Force on Terrorism Activities planted explosives in the office of Omoshola (the Lagos Airport security chief killed in a car bomb explosion as detailed in serial 22 of Table 5.1) to provide fabricated evidence that he was a NADECO terrorist.⁴⁷ In another interview with *Newswatch Magazine*, Tsav claimed that the Presidential Task Force on Terrorism Activities was composed of police officers who were handpicked by the Inspector General of Police and sent on counter-terrorism courses in Israel.

⁴⁶ Frank Sochukwu Osanugor, p. 52.

⁴⁷ *The Post Express*, 12 July 1999.

He concluded that “they were sent for those (counter-terrorism) courses just to come and perpetuate acts of terrorism in this country”⁴⁸

Things became more apparent when the military regime of Abacha turned against some of its senior officers who it regarded as “NADECO Officers” disloyal to the regime. The soldier that died during the bomb blast at Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport on 13 December 1997 (serial 35 of Table 5.1) was reported to have confessed before his death that he was sent by Abacha’s Chief Security Officer, Major Al-Mustapha to plant a bomb in the aircraft that General Diya was due to board.⁴⁹ When there was public outcry for investigations into the attempt on Diya’s life, the government implicated him (Diya) in an alleged coup and sentenced him to death by firing squad. Abacha however died before the sentence could be carried out.

The situation in Nigeria during the military regimes of Babangida and Abacha clearly illustrates Slogan’s and Schultz definition of state terrorism as cited earlier in this chapter. The regimes feasted on and sustained themselves through the employment of extra-normal forms of political violence against its citizens. All the features of terrorism were involved. This included (but was not limited to) the threat of, or use of violence; the civilian population being the target and political objectives (of regime sustenance) as the end. Unlike the situation with non-state terrorist actors, the balance of forces favoured the perpetrators, that is, the state. The dubbing of pro-democracy groups as terrorists provided the regimes the excuse for high-handedness against opposition (as it presented the pro-democracy groups as the ‘bad guys’ and the government as the ‘good guys’). Repressive political measures, as represented in government’s arbitrariness and political oppression, were explained as steps taken to protect the security of the Nigerian state. In a nutshell, it could be argued that the Babangida and Abacha regimes represented a dark era in Nigeria’s history where the

⁴⁸ *Newswatch Magazine*, 22 November 1999.

⁴⁹ *The News*, 28 December 1998, p.32

government turned against its citizens to preserve personal and regime rather than national interests. It is for this reason that scholars such as Metz and Osaghae considered the military regime of Babangida and Abacha as an aberration and symptomatic of a malfunctioning political system.⁵⁰ While their use of terrorism as a weapon to counter perceived terrorism is arguably condemnable, certain lessons could be drawn from the case study for counter-terrorism policy.

5.7 Lessons

Experiences worldwide have shown that non-state terrorist actors take advantage of weak governments and ungovernable spaces to operate. This means that where strong governments exist, whether democratic or not, opposition that results in sub-national or non-state terrorism is curbed. Attesting to this point, Crenshaw notes that generally, the most democratic and the most totalitarian societies have the lowest levels of oppositional violence. I would argue here that because of the high-handedness or heavy clampdown on opposition by military regimes, non-state actors found it difficult to have the space to pursue terrorist activities. This is saying that repression by the military regimes prevented non-state terrorism while ironically perpetrating state terrorism. The Maitatsine terror covered in the previous chapter could not find space to continue operations under the military regimes. Equally, terrorist and terrorist-related activities as manifested by militant groups such as OPC and Niger Delta militants as well as Islamic jihadists as exemplified by Boko Haram could not find expression during the military regimes. This is not to lose consciousness of the fact that some of these groups were only forced underground to resurface later in the ensuing democratic era. The lesson to draw from this is that repressive measures perhaps help to prevent non-state terrorism but is not a

⁵⁰ Helen C Metz, ed, *A Country Study* (Washington D, C.: Library of Congress, 1991). See also Eghosa E. Osaghae, p. 54.

strategic option because insurgent groups may be forced to go underground and resurface later in a more deadly form.

Similarly, repressive measures may only stifle opposition in the short run. In the long run, they could attract sympathy for the opposition. Opposition usually gain support from human right groups and the international community that are usually opposed to undemocratic practices associated with military regimes. There is the need for government to recognise that opposition very often represent the voice of 'silent majority' of ordinary people and, as a result can quickly garner widespread popular support in the face of intimidation by government. It is therefore important that government counter-terrorism approaches have a human face rather than attempt to countering terrorism, whether real or imagined, with the same psychological fear and violence that terrorism represents.

State terrorism under Babangida and Abacha regimes had serious socio-political and economic consequences for Nigeria. The spate of bomb blasts, for instance, created psychological fear in the country. Local and foreign investment, and other aspects of national development were retarded because in the absence of a conducive atmosphere, people could not go about their lives freely. Nigeria also became a pariah state as countries such as the UK and the US as well as the EU imposed sanctions on it.⁵¹ This brings to the fore the requirement for counter-terrorism policies that will not dislocate the socio-political and economic wellbeing of Nigeria and Nigerians, or attract the condemnation of the international community. However, some of these mistakes continue to feature even under civilian regimes as will be seen in the next chapter that dwells on terrorist threats occasioned by militancy in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria.

⁵¹ Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton, p. xix.

CHAPTER SIX

MILITANCY AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

6.1 Preamble

In the previous two chapters I examined respectively a religious violence-centred terrorist situation that occurred between 1980 and 1985, and a political or state violence-centred terrorist situation that occurred between 1986 and 1998. From 1999 to 2008, Nigeria's wellbeing as a nation was troubled by yet another terrorist situation, this time ethno-nationalistic and resource-based. The Niger Delta Crisis, as it is popularly called and as would be referred to in this study, was principally the machination of militant groups who resorted to terrorism ostensibly in pursuit of better socio-economic and political conditions for the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.¹ Sometimes however, personal and group interests override the pursuit of the interests of the region.² As will be analyzed later in the study, the situation fits into the conflict escalation 'inflammation' hypothesis elaborated by Davenport, Armstrong and Lichbach.³ The hypothesis suggests that repressive activity by the state enrages citizens who subsequently increase dissident behaviour, in this case militancy and associated terrorist activities.⁴ I will in this chapter first conceptualise militancy and explore the relationship between militancy and terrorism, and thereafter define the Niger Delta in geographical terms. This will set the tone for the core aspect of the chapter which is a case study analysis of terrorism in the Niger Delta illustrating how the threat of terrorism was shaped by government responses.

¹ L. A. Afinotan and V. Ojatorotu, "The Niger Delta crisis: Issues, challenges and prospects" *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 3, Issue No. 5 (May, 2009), pp. 191-198.

² Oluwatoyin Frederick Idowu, "Niger Delta Crises: Implications For Society And Organizational Effectiveness" *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences* ISSN: 2046-9578, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2012), pp. 112.

³ Christian Davenport, David A. Armstrong II and Mark I. Lichbach, "Conflict Escalation and the Origins of Civil War." Working Paper, University of Maryland, 2005. Available at

<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/dcawcp/paper/111605.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2015.

⁴ Davenport (et al) noted that this was derived from the "Grievance" proposition in the works of Robert Gurr, 1970 and Peterson, 2002.

6.2 Militancy and Terrorism

The word 'militancy' or 'militant' expresses an aggressive or combat posture by an individual or group. According to *The Collins English Dictionary*, militancy is "the quality or state of being aggressive or vigorous, especially in the support of a cause."⁵ *The Cambridge Dictionaries Online* refer to the word militant as "active, determined and often willing to use force".⁶ Similarly, the *Merriam-Webster* gives the meaning of militant as "engaged in warfare or combat" and "aggressively active (as in a cause)."⁷ In this wise, a militant group could be that which resort to confrontation or take an aggressive approach to achieve goals which could be social, economic or political.

The words militancy and terrorism have at times been used interchangeably to suit interests and perspectives as in the case of "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter".⁸ For instance, it is common to find the word militant being used for terrorist organisations to avoid the label 'terrorism' which, as stated earlier, indicates disapproval of the behaviour of the organization so labelled, regardless of the motivations for such behaviour.⁹ In this wise, the word 'militancy' could be said to have been used sometimes as a euphemism for 'terrorism' and in an attempt to give some modicum of legitimacy and acceptability, or yet still, to express neutrality.¹⁰

The above could be true for some ethno-nationalist movements that usually emerge in the context of larger political conflicts centred on the grievances of economic and political marginalization. Gurr (et al) mentions the Kosovar militants and Chechen rebels as belonging

⁵ See <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/militancy>, accessed 18 August 2013

⁶ See <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/militant>, accessed 18 August 2013.

⁷ See <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/militant>, accessed 19 August 2013.

⁸ See definition of terrorism in chapter two.

⁹ Paul Wilkinson, *Homeland security in the UK: future preparedness for terrorist attack since 9/11* (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2007), p. 55

¹⁰ Juergensmeyer, Mark, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Comparative studies in religion and society), (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 9.

to this category.¹¹ Crenshaw also observe a similar feature with the Hamas and Hezbollah militant groups.¹² Gurr and Crenshaw opines that such marginalised groups have few options other than terrorism. They add that for such groups, terrorism is a temporarily expedient means of pressuring a government, and a tactic in a larger campaign which is used and then discarded depending on opportunities and costs.¹³ Collier and Hoeffler add the greed factor to this. They opine that a motivation for some rebel groups is the income that can be achieved from criminal activities and the benefits of control of state revenues.¹⁴

The Niger Delta situation, as will be demonstrated, typified the above expressions. The use of terrorism as a weapon of violence seemed to have been the choice or option available to the people for expressing grievances particularly after negotiations, protests and other forms of normal militant postures had failed. The resort to terrorism could equally be seen as a means of getting recognition and attracting the attention of the multinational oil companies, the Nigerian government and the international community to the problems faced by the people of the Niger Delta.

In exploring the important question as to what circumstances prompt militant movements shift to terrorist strategies, Zimmermann postulates that:

*A general principle is that semi-repressive regimes contribute to the escalation of political conflicts to terrorism. Their repression is not consistent enough to destroy terrorist organizations, while their reforms are insufficient to persuade militants to give up strategies of violence.*¹⁵

¹¹ "Addressing the Causes of Terrorism" in *The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism*, Vol. 1 International Summit On Democracy, Terrorism And Security, Madrid 8-11 March 2005, p. 21. Available online at <http://media.clubmadrid.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf>, accessed 19 August 2013.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.14.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 13-28.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

This was apparently the situation in the Niger Delta from 1999 when the civilian government headed by Olusegun Obasanjo tried to adopt the repressive approach (associated with military regimes) in handling the Niger Delta militants. This however appeared not to have succeeded as the democratic structures that were in place following the return to democracy could not sustain the military-style repression. In the same vein, initial concessions and other non-military interventionist programmes of the government could not assuage the militants from the course of terrorism up till 2009. I will return to this issue in detail when examining the interplay between the Niger Delta militants and the government of Nigeria. Before this however, it is perhaps important to clarify the definition of the Niger Delta in geographical terms.

6.3 The Niger Delta Region

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria refers to an area occupied by nine oil-producing states, all in the southern part of the country. The states are Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States¹⁶. In 2006, the region accounted for about 31 million out of Nigeria's then over 140 million people.¹⁷ Of this figure, the Ijaw ethnic group, which is the largest in the region and fourth largest in the country, accounted for about 14 million.¹⁸ The region's oil and natural gas resources generate over 90 per cent of the Nigeria's export earnings and about 40 per cent of the gross domestic product thereby making Nigeria an important player in the international oil market.¹⁹ This is as the disruption of oil production by militant groups in the Niger Delta region can often affect the price of

¹⁶ Cross River State was recently de-listed owing to court judgment which ceded her oil wells to Akwa Ibom State. See, Mike Odiegwu, *Niger Delta: Elders' committee on oil wells yet to meet – Investigation*, <http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art20091216246110> (31 Mar 2010).


¹⁷ Federal Republic of Nigeria official Gazette No. 4, Vol 94 Government Notice No.3, *Legal Notice on Publication of the 2006 Census Report* (Lagos, Nigeria: 19 Jan 2013).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Erich Marquardt, *The Niger Delta Insurgency and its Threat to Energy Security*, Terrorism Monitor Vol. 4 No. 16, available from <http://www.jamestown.org/index.php?id=148> (01 Apr 2010). See also Paul M. Lubeck, Michael J. Watts and Ronnie Lipschutz, *Convergent Interest: US Energy Security and the Securing of Nigerian Democracy*, a Centre for International Policy Report (Washington D.C: February 2007), p. 1.

petroleum on the international market.²⁰ Of the nine states mentioned, the states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers are at the epicenter of what Ugiabe describes as “complex and systematic violence that characterized the region.”²¹

Figure 6.1: Map of the Southern Part of Nigeria Showing the Nine Oil-Producing States.



Source: Office of the Niger Delta Development Commission Abuja, 2015.

6.4 Terrorism in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta Crisis, as stated earlier, revolves around the activities of militant groups who resorted to the employment of terrorist tactics in pursuit of ethno-nationalist and group interests centred on the wellbeing of the Niger Delta area and its people. In this section of the chapter, I will examine the interplay between the militants and government, assess the

²⁰ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, pp. 13-28.

²¹ Ugiagbe Thompson Bobby, "Stretching The Limits of Legality: An Analysis Of The Amnesty For The Niger Delta Militants In Nigeria" MA thesis in International Law and Settlement of Disputes, University for Peace, Costa Rica, 2009.

responses by government and subsequently draw lessons for a counter-terrorism strategy. It is perhaps necessary to begin by exploring the origin of the crisis. This will determine when agitations in the area could have been considered legitimate and then when, how and why they became acts of terrorism.

6.4.1 Origin of the Crisis

The Niger Delta crisis predates Nigeria's independence. As noted in chapter three, colonial rule was repressive. In the Niger Delta area, the repression was such that traditional rulers such as King Jaja of Opobo, Nana Olomu of Itsekiri and William Dappa Pepple of Bonny kingdoms were dethroned because they opposed attempts by the British to subjugate their people.²² The colonial history of the area was also marred by popular agitations for internal self-determination. This followed the introduction of self-government and creation of three autonomous regions of Northern, Western and Eastern Nigeria between 1947 and 1954 by the colonial government in preparations for Nigeria's independence.²³ The people of the Niger Delta and other minority groups were apprehensive that when Nigeria became an independent country, they might be oppressed and marginalised by the three major ethnic groups, that is, the Hausa-Fulani in North, the Yoruba in the West and the Ibo in the East.²⁴ In 1957, a year before the production of oil in the Niger Delta began, the people of the area and several other minority ethnic groups in the country expressed their fears in a complaint to the Henry Willink Commission set up by the colonial government to inquire into minorities' apprehensions. The Niger Delta people complained that they were being neglected by the regional and central governments in the allocation of social amenities and political appointments. The people demanded their own autonomous region or a state that would

²² Olajide O. Akanji, "The Politics of Combatting Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria" in Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha, eds., p. 57.

²³ Fidelis Paki and Samuel Edoumiekumo, "Colonialism and Political Conflict in Contemporary Nigeria: The case of the Niger Delta" in *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* Vol. 1, No. 6 (June 2011), pp. 276-284.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

comprise only the minority ethnic groups of Niger Delta.²⁵ The Willink Commission declined to create a separate state for the ethnic minority groups in the Eastern Region as demanded.²⁶ Their protests were later to give birth to the Niger Delta Development Board, a special agency established by the colonial government in July 1959 to tackle the developmental needs of the area.²⁷

Another issue which stemmed from colonial rule and had a direct bearing to the Niger Delta Crisis was the issue of revenue sharing which turned out to be the central point for resource control agitations in the Niger Delta. The introduction of self-government and autonomous regions led to the introduction of revenue-sharing arrangements. The provisions of the 1951 McPherson Constitution and the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution allowed the regions to manage their own resources commencing therefore a fiscal federalism regime.²⁸ At independence, in 1960, the Nigerian state continued with the colonial federal fiscal policy, which was partly based on the principle of derivation. The 1963 Republican Constitution also gave content to the federal fiscal policy by codifying the revenue-sharing formula based on the principles of derivation, distributable pools and independent revenue.²⁹

The situation however changed when the military regime of Gowon enacted Decree 13 in 1969 which altered the fiscal policy of the country from that based on the principle of derivation to one of central control.³⁰ This, Egbulem posits, was conducted during the Nigerian Civil War ostensibly to deny the seceding Eastern Region (Biafra) the commercial

²⁵ An instance of this was the pressure mounted on the colonial government for the creation out of the then Eastern Nigeria of a Calabar – Ogoja – River state,

²⁶ The Henry Willink Commission Report, Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, July 1958), 96.

²⁷ Niger Delta Development Board, HANSARD 1803-2005 (London) Accessed on 05/07/2009, Available in <http://hansard.milbanksystems.com>

²⁸ Joseph Egbulem, "Federalism and the Politics of Resource Control in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of the Niger Delta Crisis" in *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* Vol. 1, No. 12 (September 2011), pp. 218-229.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Wilson Akpan, "Putting Oil First? Some Ethnographic Aspects of Petroleum-related Land Use Controversies in Nigeria" in *African Sociological Review* Vol. 9, Issue 2 (2005), pp. 134-152.

benefits of crude oil which at this time was assuming a major export product for the country.³¹ The fiscal policy was however not reversed after the civil war prompting the people of the Niger Delta region to perceive that the policy was directed against them by slowing down development in the area while using the resources derived from the region to develop others.³² The perceived injustice of the fiscal policy change was further exacerbated as the federal government side-lined the other two tiers of government, that is, the state and local governments, in revenue sharing.³³ This stifled the capacity of local administration to embark on development projects that addressed the needs of the communities and rural areas from where the crude oil was being extracted.

Summarising the above, Undiandeye notes that:

The military coups of 1966 and the civil war that followed in their wake put an end to whatever dreams and aspirations the Niger Delta Development Board creation had for positively impacting the lives of the impoverished people. Instead, there was ushered in a political and fiscal regime that not only transferred the bulk of the oil income to the victorious Federal Government, but also nationalized by decree, the land and mineral resources of the communities of the Niger Delta without consulting them. Niger Delta people have since then harboured resentment and grievances against a succession of governments that have failed to address their problems but rather resorted to broken promises and often ill-conceived and ad hoc programs that never went to the heart of the Delta crisis.³⁴

The demand for equity in the allocation of federal resources and ethnic minorities' rights took a new dimension on 23 February 1966 when Isaac Adaka Boro declared the southern part of the present Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states as "The Niger Delta Peoples Republic".³⁵ The revolt which lasted 12 days was quashed by the Nigerian military.³⁶ The revolt is significant in the study and analysis of the growth of domestic terrorism in the Niger Delta region for

³¹ Ibid.

³² Olajide O. Akanji, p. 57.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ E. P. A. Undiandeye, "Niger Delta Insurgency: Strategic Framework For Sustainable Resolution" Master Of Arts thesis in Strategic Security Studies Counterterrorism Concentration submitted to The College Of International Security Affairs National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., 2009.

³⁵ See *The Twelve – Day Revolution*, <http://www.adakaboro.org/> (1 Apr 2010).

³⁶ Ibid.

several reasons. It was the first attempt by any Nigerian after independence to lead a separatist group in an attempt to terminate the corporate existence of the Nigerian state. Equally, it occurred at a time when oil was beginning to play a significant role in the economy of the country. Furthermore, the decisive manner the Nigerian government clamped down on Boro postponed rather than checkmated future armed agitations as subsequent events revealed.

The situation in the Niger Delta was made worse by the issue of environmental degradation caused by oil exploration in the area. Appeals by the people for government and oil companies to address the problem of oil pollution did not receive a response that could be considered satisfactory.³⁷ Thus, opposition to the activities of oil companies and their Nigerian partners kept mounting all through the 1970s and on into the 1990s. It could be said that agitation by the people of the Niger Delta during this period was legitimate and a lawful reaction to environmental pollution by oil companies as well as neglect and marginalisation by government. Owing to the factors of neglect and marginalisation (which arguably occasioned underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty), movements and groups that took a cue from the 1966 Isaac Boro revolt began to emerge. The MOSOP, the Movement for the Survival of the Izon Ethnic Nationality and the Ijaw Youth Council were formed seeking the control of the resources in the Niger Delta.³⁸

6.4.2 Immediate Causes of Terrorism in the Niger Delta Region

The environmental concerns championed by MOSOP in the 1990s could be said to have precipitated the terrorist situation in the Niger Delta. The MOSOP, which was about 500,000-strong under the leadership of a playwright and environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa was the

³⁷ See Mary Kaldor et al, *Oil Wars*, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 57.

³⁸ G.A. Wahab, *Niger Delta Crisis: An unending Dilemma*, a dissertation submitted to King's College, London and the Royal College of Defence Studies in 2008.

most formidable of the militant groups in the Niger Delta at the time.³⁹ The group articulated its goals in the Ogoni Bill of Rights which demanded a restructuring of Nigeria based on equality of all ethnic-nationalities and a revenue formula based on the principle of derivation as provided for in the 1963 Nigerian Constitution.⁴⁰ However, events went out of hand when MOSOP was implicated in the death of perceived collaborators of the government. The response of the military government to this was a clamp down on the groups. The MOSOP as an organization was decimated, and some of its members fled into exile. The leader of MOSOP, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders were tried and publicly executed by hanging in November 1995 for suspected but unproven complicity in the murder of four of their Ogoni kinsmen.⁴¹ The execution of Wiwa drew widespread international condemnation and led to the institution of a civil case against Shell under the Alien Tort Claims Act in a New York Court. It was alleged that Shell colluded with the then Nigerian military government and was therefore complicit in the 1995 execution of Wiwa and eight others. The company eventually made an out of court settlement of about 15.5 million US Dollars.⁴²

The executions further aroused anger, raised passions across the Niger Delta and served as reminder of the Major Isaac Adaka Boro's ill-fated Niger Delta Republic of 1966 revolt that had been similarly quashed. The Ijaw Youth Council on 11 December 1998, at a meeting in Kaiama, Bayelsa State issued a communiqué known as the Kaiama declaration that condemned the underdevelopment and degradation of the environment of Ijaw land. The communiqué stressed that all lands and mineral resources within the Ijaw territory belong to the Ijaws and that the Ijaw Youth Council no longer recognizes Nigerian laws. It called for

³⁹ See MOSOP website <http://www.mosop.org/index.html> , accessed 20 August 2013.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ See Elizabeth Neuffer, *Big Oil and an Activist's Death*, Boston Globe, <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/0603-02.html>, and Donu Kogbara, *The Forgotten Ogoni Four*, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200906150592.html>, accessed 20 August 2013.

⁴² Ibid.

the withdrawal of all oil companies from Ijaw land by 30 December, 1998.⁴³ The ruling military government continued to respond to the agitations with repressive actions by the military troops which were conceivably occasioned with human right abuses. It is probable that it was this repressive action that ultimately drove the militant groups to resort to terrorism against the Nigerian state. Akanji notes that incidences of calculated and premeditated attacks on public institutions, oil installations and pipeline vandalism, bombings, kidnapping and hostage taking of foreign oil workers and relatives of government officials were rife.⁴⁴

6.4.3 The Nature of the Terrorist Threat in the Niger Delta from 1999

It has been noted earlier in this study that the quest for self-determination by some ethnic groups became increasingly militant in nature following the end of military rule and the ushering of democratic governance in 1999. This brought about the emergence of ethnic militia groups such as the pan-Yoruba OPC and the Pan-Ibo MASSOB groups. In the Niger Delta, there was a proliferation of armed militant groups with their training camps established all over the creeks of the Niger Delta.⁴⁵ The response of the civilian government to the threat posed by the militant groups was still that of repression.⁴⁶ An instance was an incident in Odi town that involved the abduction and brutal murder of six policemen by militants on 4 November 1999.⁴⁷ The Federal Government responded by deploying the military to the area ostensibly to restore peace. The military action heightened tension as reports of human rights abuses such as torture, rape, extra judicial killings and arson allegedly followed their

⁴³ AO Edokpayi, *The Niger Delta Crisis and National Security: Challenges for the Nigerian Armed Forces*, an Independent Study Paper submitted to the National Defence College, (Abuja Nigeria, Jun 2009), p. 35.

⁴⁴ Olajide O. Akanji, p.56.

⁴⁵ Aderoju Oyefusi, "Oil and the Probability of Rebel Participation Among Youths in the Niger Delta of Nigeria" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45 No 4 (Oslo, July 2008), p. 542.

⁴⁶ Olajide O. Akanji, p. 54.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

interventions.⁴⁸ Asuni observes that while the military sometimes succeeded in restoring relative calm, their excesses however created a hostile environment as they failed to win the hearts and minds of the local populace.⁴⁹ There were consequently increased calls by the inhabitants of the area for multi-national corporations, expatriates and soldiers to leave the region.⁵⁰

From 2003, civilians and soldiers alike were continually targeted by militant groups. The groups engaged government forces as well as each other on various fronts, and as Howden observe, terrorist acts were accentuated by the multiplicity of these groups that numbered about a hundred, all of them struggling for supremacy.⁵¹ The emergence in 2003 of two formidable militia groups, the Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force led by Asari Dokubo and the Niger Delta Vigilante led by Tom Ateke changed the dynamics of the crisis. These two groups subsumed other smaller groups, through being better organized and equipped.

The situation changed again in 2006 with the emergence of MEND led by Mr Government Ekpemupolo (alias Tompolo).⁵² The MEND group was different from the other groups in a number of ways. According to Hanson, MEND leaders seemed better educated and had learnt from insurgencies in other parts of the world.⁵³ They operated a decentralized system of leadership, made effective use of local and international media for propaganda and had modern weapons like shoulder-mounted rocket launchers.⁵⁴ The MEND therefore became more like the umbrella body of the militant groups, and the voice, face as well as strength of

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Judith Burdin Asuni, "Blood Oil in the Niger Delta," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 229 Washington D.C., 2009. p. 7.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Daniel Howden, *NIGERIA: Shell may pull out of Niger Delta after 17 die in boat raid*, CorpWatch publication <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13121>, accessed 23 March 2014.

⁵² Stephanie Hanson, *MEND: The Niger Delta's Umbrella Militant Group*, Council on Foreign Relations <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12920>, accessed 11 April 2014. There is dispute as to when MEND actually emerged on the national scene, as there are claims of earlier dates.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

terrorism in the Niger Delta. It maintained an effective propaganda machinery to discredit the Government of Nigeria and woo some members of the international community to its cause.

In June 2009, the Nigerian Government under the Late President Umaru Yar'Adua, announced the granting of Amnesty and unconditional pardon to militants in the Niger Delta region. This led to most of the militant groups laying down their arms in an arms buy back deal with the government. However, a faction of MEND led by Mr Henry Okah and the Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF) led by Late John Togo refused to accept the amnesty.⁵⁵ Their refusal was based on allegations that the Federal Government of Nigeria was only interested in the region's oil resources and not sincere about developing the Niger Delta.⁵⁶ It is perhaps worthy to observe here that the refusal of the Okah and Togo factions to accept the Federal Government's Amnesty programme did not significantly affect its implementation. This is as Togo died following injuries he sustained from an attack on his base by the JTF while Okah fled to South Africa where he was subsequently charged and tried for terrorism offences.

6.4.4 Activities of the Niger Delta Militants and Government Responses

I have so far attempted to trace the origin and examine the causes and nature of terrorist acts conducted by militants in the Niger Delta. The summation is that the Niger Delta crisis was militancy using terrorism as a method of action. It was characteristically a case of domestic terrorism, fulfilling the features required for such categorisation. The threat of, and use of violence was prevalent. The civilian population particularly oil workers, both local and expatriates, were the main targets of armed assault, kidnaping, hostage-taking and bombings conducted by the militants. More so, the situation was such that both the local population and

⁵⁵ Voice of America, (2011), "In Nigeria, Last Main Militant Group in Niger Delta Offers Truce in Exchange for Amnesty," <http://www.voanews.com/content/in-nigeria-last-main-militant-group-in-niger-delta-offers-truce-in-exchange-for-amnesty-121893144/158114.html>. accessed 14 July 2013.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

foreigners lived in fear. The militants' ends were political as their intentions were to coerce the government into negotiating a better political and socio-economic deal for the Niger Delta region. Furthermore, the forces involved were asymmetrical, the militants been the weaker and the government the stronger force.

However, as glaring as the acts of terrorism by the militants were, some Nigerians including relevant government bodies were shy of using the word "terrorism" to describe the situation in the Niger Delta.⁵⁷ This is even as Olusegun Obasanjo (the president of the country from 1999 to 2007) while in office referred to it as terrorism.⁵⁸ In 2000, the US Department of State in its annual encyclopaedia of global terrorism identified the Niger Delta as "a breeding ground for militant and 'impoverished ethnic groups' for whom terrorist acts (abduction, hostage taking, kidnapping and extrajudicial killings) were legion."⁵⁹

In 2006, the bill for a Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) was presented at the Nigerian National Assembly. This was not passed into law until 2011 primarily because of divergent views on what constitutes and what does not constitute terrorism in Nigeria.⁶⁰ There were thus, no enabling legislations to deal with the Niger Delta Crisis while it lasted. It is also apparent that political, economic, diplomatic and other non-military instruments of power that could resolve the crisis were not adequately exploited. The government's response was rather heavily dependent on the use of the military instrument which spurred violent reactions from

⁵⁷ Isaac Terwase Sampson and Freedom Onuoha, "'Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it Realise its Thirst'? Understanding the Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL)" in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol.5, Issues 3-4, September 2011, p.33-53.

⁵⁸ Josephine Lohor "Nigeria: Obasanjo Links Niger Delta Violence to Terrorism" in *This Day Newspaper*, 27 January 2006.

⁵⁹ See Oronto Douglas, Von Kemedi, Ike Okonta, and Michael Watts, "Oil And Militancy In The Niger Delta: Terrorist Threat Or Another Colombia?" in *Niger Delta: Economies of Violence*. ISS Working Papers No.4, California, 2004, p. 2, available online at <http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/4-DouglasVonOkonta.pdf>, accessed 24 August 2013.

⁶⁰ Terwase Sampson and Freedom Onuoha, "Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it Realise its Taste? Understanding the Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria" in *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol 5, No 3-4 (2011).

the militants and counter response by the Nigerian military. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrates this interface between the Niger Delta militants and the Nigerian government using data obtained from primary and secondary sources.⁶¹ Figure 6.1 specifically utilizes the rate of incidents and casualties recorded to form a picture of the causal effect of military responses on one hand, and soft approaches (such as negotiations and concessions) on the other hand, on the rise of the militant threat.

Table 6.1: Niger Delta Militants – Nigerian Government Interplay

Serial	Date	Militants' Actions and Reactions	Government's Actions and Reactions	Remarks
1	23 February 1966	Isaac Boro declared 'Niger Delta Republic' out of Nigeria in protest over alleged Federal Government marginalisation of the area.	Deployed military which quashed the revolt within 12 days.	
2	1966-1990	Inactive except for inter-ethnic/communities clashes and low level protests. A probable incubation period for the militant groups.	Normal policing to ensure law and order.	Events such as the Nigerian Civil War (1966-1970), the oil boom in the early 1970s and military rule prevented escalation of situation.

⁶¹ See note 67 of chapter four.

3	1990s	Formation of MOSOP, Movement for the Survival of the Izon Ethnic Nationality, Ijaw Youth Council, etc.	Monitoring of militant groups.	
4	1990-1995	Increased agitations for better political, cultural, economic and environmental conditions such as MOSOP's Ogoni Bill of Rights.	Government (military) viewed agitators as pro-democracy and anti-military regime activists. MOSOP leader, Kenule Saro-Wiwa and 8 others executed by hanging on 10 November 1995.	
5	November 1995	Public outcry and international condemnation over execution of Saro-Wiwa.	Government unrepentant of actions.	The US, UK, EU and others imposed political and economic sanctions on Nigeria for human rights abuses.
6	11 December 1998	Ijaw Youth Council declares it no longer recognizes Nigerian laws and called for the withdrawal of all oil companies from	Set up a military Joint Task Force (JTF) codenamed Operation RESTORE HOPE to neutralise activities of militants.	

		<p>Ijaw land by 30 December, 1998.</p> <p>Launched Operation CLIMATE CHANGE to enforce the declaration. About 40% of Nigeria's crude oil production facilities closed down.</p>		
7	4 November 1999	<p>Militants at Odi town abducted and murdered 6 policemen.</p>	<p>Deployed military to the area. Human rights abuses such as heavy-handedness, rape, extra judicial killings and arson by the military reported.</p>	
8	1999-2003	<p>Proliferation of militant groups.</p>	<p>Newly instituted democratic government too weak to handle the rising wave of militancy.</p>	
9	2003	<p>Emergence of 2 formidable groups - the Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force and the Niger</p>	<p>Restructures and strengthens JTF under new codename, operation FLUSH OUT 3 to meet the challenges</p>	

		Delta Vigilante led by Asari Dokubo and Tom Ateke respectively.	posed by Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force and Niger Delta Vigilante.	
10	2003- Onwards	Kidnapping, taking of hostages, attacks on oil facilities, systematic targeting of soldiers.	Security forces confronts acts of terrorism by the militants using conventional warfare methods. Provokes more hostile reactions from groups.	Public and international sympathy/support sways the side of militants.
11	2006	Emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Mr Government Ekpemupolo (alias Tompolo).	Intensifies military action. Acquires new crafts/vessels for land, air and sea patrol. Military operation spread all through the Niger Delta area.	
12	February 2006	MEND attack Italian petrol company Eni SpA, killed 9 workers and took hostages (expatriates). Declared in a	Security forces confronts MEND.	

		statement that "hostages are in good health and have adapted fairly well to the conditions under which the people of the Niger Delta have been kept.		
13	May-August 2006	Killed official of US-based oil company Baker Hughes. Attacked off-shore oil rig and kidnapped 16 Norwegian crew members. Took a Royal Dutch Shell expatriate hostage.	JTF killed 10 MEND members.	MEND vows to retaliate killing of members. Stated in an email to REUTERS, "Our response to Sunday's (10 August 2006) will come at our time, but for certain it will not go unpunished."
14	2 October 2006	MEND fired mortar shell at JTF patrol boat killing 10 soldiers.	Conducted reprisal attacks.	
15	October-November 2006	Increase confrontation with military. Continued hostage-taking/kidnappings.	Operations to rescue hostages and curb militancy results in casualties on both	

			military and militants.	
16	1 May 2007	MEND attacked Chevron's Oloibiri oil facility, killed 10 people, and took 6 expatriates hostage – four Italians, one American and a Croat. MEND published photographs of captives seated on white plastic chairs in a wooden shelter around the remains of a camp fire.	JTF continued offensive against militants.	
17	May 2007	Increased hostage-takings and pipelines vandalism.	President Yar'Adua in his inaugural address to the nation on 29 May 2007 calls for MEND to ceasefire promising solutions to Niger Delta problems.	
18	June 2007	MEND announced ceasefire.	JTF continues aggressive patrols of creeks and hinterlands.	

19	23 September 2007	MEND spokesperson Jomo Gbomo declares MEND commencement of "attacks on installations and abduction of expatriates" citing violation of ceasefire agreement by JTF troops.	Government continues to appeal to militants to stop attacks, meanwhile JTF - militants' confrontations increases.	
20	April- September 2008	MEND launched heavy and sustained attacks on off-shore and on-shore oil facilities resulting in 50% drop of Nigeria's oil production and rise in global oil prices.	Called for international support against militant activities.	Military support declined by UK, US and EU citing cases of human rights abuses by the Nigerian government.
21	September 2008	MEND announced ceasefire following intervention by traditional rulers and elders.	Government announced the creation of Ministry of Niger Delta to tackle the challenge of infrastructural development,	The Niger Delta people treated announcement of the ministry with caution following the failure of previous establishments/intervent


			environmental protection and youth empowerment.	ion schemes such as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC)
22	May 2009	MEND rejects offer of Amnesty by the Federal Government and launches offensive against JTF kidnapping some soldiers and foreigners.	Merged units of operation RESTORE HOPE and FLUSH OUT into an expanded operation RESTORE HOPE. Launched large scale offensive against MEND.	
23	18 June 2009	MEND claimed responsibility for attack on Royal Dutch Shell facilities saying it was a warning to potential foreign investors and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev who was visiting Nigeria the next day.	JTF continues offensive.	
24	June-July 2009	Attacked three Royal Dutch Shell facilities, Chevron Okan	Federal Government announced and finalised plans for grant of	

		manifold, and Atlas Cove Jetty (Lagos).	Amnesty to “repentant” militants. Releases one of MEND’s arrested leader Henry Okah.	
25	6 August - 4 October 2009	Militants surrendered arms in exchange for rehabilitation and skill acquisition training.	Amnesty and Disarmament Programme in progress.	Henry Okah and John Togo’s faction of MEND refuse to accept Amnesty.
26	October 2009 – 2011	Anti-Amnesty MEND faction conducted isolated attacks on oil installations, bombings in Warri (15 March 2010) and Abuja (1 October 2010).	JTF troops attack bases of ‘unrepentant’ militants. Operation RESTORE HOPE restructured and renamed Operation PAULO SHIELD.	Henry Okah arrested, tried and jailed in South Africa for terrorism offences relating to the bombings in Abuja on 1 October 2010.
27	2011-Date	Relative calm in the Niger Delta except for criminality and occasional restiveness by ex-militants protesting non-payment of Amnesty stipends.	Federal Government embarks on intervention programmes. Patrol and protection of oil installation, oil workers and other vulnerable/key points by JTF and a private firm Global West Vessels Specialist Limited.	Oil production restored as a result of relative calm in the Niger Delta. However it is felt that the root causes of the Niger Delta Crisis such as environmental degradation, underdevelopment, unemployment and

				poverty are yet to be addressed.
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Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

Figure 6.2 Graphical Representations of Niger Delta Militant's Activities and Nigerian Government Concessions/Military Approaches.



Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

In this case study, there was as in the previous cases, an increasing military response and corresponding increase of threat level between the mainly military regime periods of 1966 and 1999, and from 2000 to 2011 under democratic rule. In 2007, the new regime of President Yar'Adua stepped up a soft approach of negotiations and concessions. The turning

point was however in 2009 when the soft approach was stepped up above the military approach through Amnesty Programme. The development is further highlighted in the assessment of government responses to the threat posed by the militants.

6.5 Assessment of Government Responses

The table and figure presented indicate the terrorist threat and corresponding government responses, and vice versa, in the Niger Delta Crisis. As highlighted in the study, the Niger Delta Crisis was a product of multi-causal factors arising from socio-political and economic grievances occasioned by environmental degradation, poverty, infrastructural deficit, unemployment, corruption and poor governance. This resulted in a struggle by the Niger Delta people who felt that the suitable way out of their neglect by the government and multinational oil companies is for the political and economic control of the resources of their area.⁶² The method of struggle adopted was militancy that employed terrorism as a tactic.

There were however several factors that could be said to have made the Niger Delta Crisis complex. There were issues of ethnic nationalism particularly among the Ijaws and Ogonis, ethnic minority agitations which united the ethnic groups in the region and the question of federalism and national development.⁶³ Equally were individual and group interests among the leaders of the militant groups and highly placed Nigerians, some of whom were interested in enriching themselves or deriving benefits from oil companies.⁶⁴ Criminality in the form of oil theft, piracy, and armed banditry were likewise significant as were issues of corruption, human rights abuses and international oil politics which centred on the effect of the crisis on oil prices.⁶⁵ All these fed into the Niger Delta Crisis, and by extension influenced the responses of the Nigerian government. It could be said that while the Niger Delta Crisis

⁶² G. A. Wahab, RCDS London, Dissertation, 2008.

⁶³ E. A. P. Undiandeye, NDU Washington D. C., Dissertation, 2009.

⁶⁴ Isaac Olawale Albert, p. 57.

⁶⁵ E. A. P. Undiandeye, NDU Washington D. C., Dissertation, 2009.

perhaps needed a political and economic solution, the government initially emphasized the traditional military approach. There is thus a compelling case for arguing that the Nigerian government's response to the Niger Delta Crisis caused it to escalate and assume a terrorism dimension. For instance, the Isaac Boro revolt was repressed and the underlying causes of the revolt which largely hinged on structural issues of national development and the Nigerian society, as earlier discussed, were largely unaddressed. Successive governments arguably paid lip services to the problems in the Niger Delta and treated agitators as anti-regime activists. Such was the situation that resulted in the extra-judicial killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995. It is therefore not surprising that the period from the 1970s through to the 1990s became incubation periods for militancy and militancy in the Niger Delta as indicated in Table 6.1.

The response of the Government of Nigeria as could be seen from Table 6.1 was often more reactionary than pre-emptive. The repressive action of the military possibly hardened the minds of the militants, provoking them to commit more acts of terrorism including the targeting of military personnel. However, while the repressiveness of the military deployed to the Niger Delta had some adverse consequences, it on the other hand facilitated the militants' later acceptance of the Federal Government's Amnesty programme. This is as it is probable that despite the sophistication of MEND, it was only going to take time for the JTF to overwhelm the militants. The JTF had continued to restructure and fine-tune its operations from operation RESTORE HOPE to operation FLUSHOUT and later operation PAULO SHIELD.⁶⁶ All these operations had as their mandate the restoration of peace and protection of oil installations.

⁶⁶ M. A. Yekini, Sector Commander Op PAULO SHIELD, interviewed 17 March 2013.

The Amnesty programme has, according to government sources, succeeded in demobilising about 30,000 militants.⁶⁷ Although the root causes of militancy and terrorism in the Niger Delta are yet to be fully addressed, it could be maintained that the programme has led to relative peace in the Niger Delta and a restoration of normality in oil production. Incidences of armed assaults, kidnapping, hostage-taking, bombing and the destruction of oil facilities are evidently less common compared to the 2000s. The crisis and the terrorism as well as the government responses that arose from them offer lessons for counter-terrorism policy which I now examine.

6.6 Lessons

The Niger Delta Crisis offers significant lessons for a counter-terrorism policy and in particular the adoption of appropriate counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria. One of such lessons is that the starting point of any strategy or solution to a problem is the definition of the problem which should ultimately lead to a fashioning of the plan of action to counter or resolve it. While the Niger Delta problem lasted, the Nigerian National Assembly, as noted earlier, could not agree on what ought to constitute or not constitute terrorism offences in Nigeria. This complicated government and equally international efforts towards resolution of the crisis. It brings to fore the imperative of defining terrorism as it relates to Nigeria and in so doing provide the springboard for the country's counter-terrorism strategy.

The Niger Delta Crisis was a product of multi-causal factors. Crises such as these are expected to be complex and therefore require a comprehensive approach. The Government of

⁶⁷ "The Niger Delta Amnesty: Lessons Four Years On", *Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme Policy Brief*, No. 2 (2015). Online at <http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PolBrief-Niger-Delta-Amnesty.pdf>, accessed 23 August 2015.

Nigeria over-relied on the military instrument, the brutal nature of which provoked more acts of terrorism and pitched the government as well as the military against the people they ought to protect. It is therefore necessary that other instruments of national power such as political, economic, psychological and informational instruments are adequately and promptly brought to bear in counter-terrorism.

The relative success of the Federal Government Amnesty Programme is indicative of the fact that non-military measures, or military measures if well combined with non-military measures could produce positive results. The Amnesty programme has lowered the wave of militancy and associated terrorism in the Niger Delta thereby restoring normality in oil production. In the light of this, the Amnesty counter-terrorism response has now been canvassed as a possible solution for the ongoing terrorism by the Boko Haram Islamic sect. I will address this issue in detail in the next chapter which focuses on terrorism perpetrated by the Boko Haram sect.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ISLAMIC JIHADISM¹ AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM

7.1 Preamble

This chapter is the fourth and concluding case of terrorist threats examined in this study of terrorism in Nigeria. Here, I focused on aspects of Islamic jihad using the Boko Haram Islamic sect as a case study. Fearon and Laitin as well as Sambanis and Zinn's arguments regarding insurgency; that large-scale conflagration emerges when governments apply coercion are demonstrated in this case study.² As would be observed subsequently, terrorist activity by the Boko Haram sect was escalated when repression by government was high. This was particularly so when the terrorists perceived a weakness in state coercive power and in spite of their (the terrorists) sustaining costs.

The chapter begins by clarifying the concept of Islamic jihad, and relating it to other concepts by which the Boko Haram sect could be associated with. In doing this, I made a number of inferences to Islamic fundamentalism covered in chapter four, noting in the process the evolutionary trend of Islamic terrorism in Nigeria from the Maitatsine period to the current Boko Haram situation. This dovetails into the central focus of the chapter, which is, a case study of the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and the responses of the Nigerian government to it.

¹ The term is used to denote an aspect of Islam that promotes jihad.

² Fearon, James and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97:1 (2003), pp. 75–90. Also Sambanis, Nicholas and Annalisa Zinn. "From Protest to Violence: An Analysis of Conflict Escalation with an Application to Self-Determination Movements." Unpublished Manuscript: Yale University, 2005.

7.2 Islamic Jihad and Terrorism

In chapter four, I highlighted the early history of Islam in Nigeria and the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism, as stated earlier, is based on an ideology that advocates a return to the practice of pure Islam. Islamic jihadism flows from Islamic fundamentalism. As John Esposito contends, one of the most defining features of Islamic fundamentalism is belief in the ‘reopening’ of the gates of jihad.³ This portrays jihad as firstly, a subset of (or stemming from) Islamic fundamentalism and secondly, as a contemporary phenomenon. In the *Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, the term ‘jihad’ is viewed as a fight, battle or holy war against infidels or as a religious duty.⁴ It is also averred that the word is used by Muslims to describe three different kinds of struggle – firstly; “a believer's internal struggle to live out the Muslim faith as well as possible”, secondly, “the struggle to build a good Muslim society”, and thirdly, “holy war: the struggle to defend Islam, with force if necessary”.⁵ In this study, jihad will focus on the third kind of struggle noting that to defend Islam could also mean to attack or take the offensive, and that as in relation to terrorism, jihad is more often associated with force.

Apart from been regarded as a jihadist movement, it is worth highlighting two other related concepts relevant to this study with which the Boko Haram sect could be identified. These are Islamism and “new terrorism”. Islamism (often referred to as Political Islam) is based on the belief that Islam should guide socio-political as well as personal life, and therefore advocates a state system based on Sharia as opposed to Western-based systems.⁶ The Boko Haram ideology, as would be seen in details later, advocates a state based on the fundamentals of

³ Esposito, John, *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 4.

⁴ Milton J. Cowah, ed. *Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. 3rd ed. (Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1979), p. 142.

⁵ BBC, 3 August 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/jihad_1.shtml, accessed 26 August 2013.

⁶ Shepard, W. E. Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam. Leiden, New York: E.J. Brill., (1996). p. 40. Also, Berman, Sheri, "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society". *Perspectives on Politics* Vol.1, Issue 2 (2003), p. 258.

Islam where corrupt and selfish officials would be replaced with 'puritans'. It could be argued here that one thing that made Boko Haram complex is the political angle to it. This could be attributed to the feelings in some quarters that the group is a political movement shrouded in religion. President Goodluck Jonathan lent credence to this assertion when he painted a picture of a puppet group that was being used by aggrieved politicians from the northern part of Nigeria to undermine his government for the reason that he is of southern extraction.⁷

The concept of "new terrorism" dwells on the evolutionary trend associated with terrorism which stresses that contemporary terrorism represents a significant departure from the past.⁸ Scholars associated with the coining and development of the term include Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur and Christopher Harmon.⁹ According to Tucker, the distinguishing features of new terrorism as opposed to old terrorism are; (1) a new structure that is a network facilitated by information technology, (2) new personnel that are amateurs who often come together in ad hoc or transitory groupings, and (3) a new attitude with an increased willingness to cause mass casualties through the use of weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological.¹⁰ It is surmised that new terrorism is more dangerous and difficult to counter.¹¹ The lethality of Boko Haram, its real and perceived external connections, its ad hoc groupings and its use of technology all of which I will later examine, indicate a shift of terrorism from the form witnessed during the Maitatsine situation of the 1980s.

⁷ Andrew Walker, "What is Boko Haram" in *United States Institute of Peace Special Report 308*, June 2012, p. 7.

⁸ Matthew Morgan, "The Origin of New Terrorism" 2004, p. 31, Available online at <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/04spring/morgan.pdf>, accessed 27 August 2013.

⁹ David Tucker, "What's New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?" in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 1–14. Available online at <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CTIW/files/the%20new%20terrorism.pdf>, accessed 28 August 2014.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

7.3 The Boko Haram Terrorist Group

Boko Haram is a Nigerian-based Islamic jihad group.¹² It gained local and international prominence in 2009 when it transformed from being a relatively quiet local radical Salafist group to a Salafi-jihadist group that has carried out major terrorist operations, including suicide attacks in parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun.¹³ In this segment of the chapter, I explored the etymological meaning and philosophy of Boko Haram, the origin of the sect and the immediate causes of its terrorist activities. Thereafter, I examine the nature of the threat posed by Boko Haram and the response of the Nigerian government to it before concluding with an assessment of the threat-response interplay that brought to the fore implications for counter-terrorism policy in Nigeria.

7.3.1 'Boko Haram' – Meaning and Ideology

There have been arguments over the etymological meaning of 'Boko Haram'. Abimbola Adesoji states that "'Boko Haram' is derived from a combination of the Hausa word 'boko' meaning 'book' and the Arabic word 'haram' which is 'something forbidden, ungodly or sinful.'"¹⁴ He adds that this literally means "book is sinful", but that its deeper meaning is that western education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden.¹⁵

Adamu and several other scholars find fault in the above view of the name which somehow has become the common perception particularly among Western-based scholars. According to Adamu, this mistake is often made by scholars with poor understanding of the Hausa language.

¹² David Cook, "The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria" in Paul R. Pillar, *American Perceptions of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Decade*, CTC Sentinel, September 2011 . Vol. 4 . Issue 9, pp. 3-4. Available online <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss92.pdf>, accessed 27 August 2013.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ A. Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State." *Africa Today*, July 2012.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

He opines that:

*It is the persistent theme of condemning aspects of Western schooling that earned the group the sobriquet of 'boko haram' in the Nigerian media, an expression widely translated, very wrongly, as 'Western education is sin'. This is because it is assumed that 'boko' – a Hausa onomatopoeic of 'book' – means 'Western education based on Western books'. Strictly, it does not.*¹⁶

By tracing the word 'boko' to the lexicon of Hausa language, Adamu gave the original meaning of the word as 'deceptive knowledge' hence, technically “‘boko haram’ means ‘deceptive knowledge which is sinful’, not ‘western education is a sin.’”¹⁷ He added that Muhammad Yusuf’s lectures and writing were geared towards convincing his followers that knowledge inspired by Western ideas is false in some respects, but neither he nor his followers actually proclaimed that such knowledge is sinful. Adamu further explains that it was in the process of demonising the movement that the projected medieval personality of the group as condemning Western education arose. In this wise, the sect frowns at being called Boko Haram. One of the sect’s professed members, Mallam Sani Umaru further explains that what the sect termed forbidden is actually Western civilisation and culture as a whole; not education which is only a subset of civilisation and culture.¹⁸ This could be understood from the point that Islam abhors anything contrary to the way of life preached by Prophet Mohammed. Adherents of Boko Haram reject the use of some modern or purportedly Western items such as wrist watches and safety helmets. Ironically however, the sect patronise products of Western civilisation such as laptops, arms, explosives and even have full-blown Internet websites to proclaim their ideals.¹⁹

¹⁶ U.A. Adamu, “Insurgency in Nigeria: The Northern Nigerian Experience” (Paper delivered at the Seminar of Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting On Complex Insurgencies In Nigeria at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, 29 August 2012.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See *Vanguard* 14 August 2009, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-jihad/>, accessed 14 May 2014.

¹⁹ Examples of such websites is www.yusufislamicbrothers.blogspot.com.

It is perhaps necessary to note that the Boko Haram sect has equally been known at various times by other names such as the *Nigerian Taliban*, *Ahl ul sunna wal'jama'ah hijra* and the *Yusufiyyah* sect.²⁰ It however prefers to be addressed as the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, loosely translated from Arabic as 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'.²¹ This preferred name underlines the sect's ideology which is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam. The sect strongly opposes Western ways of life, democratic institutions, constitutional laws and institutions of the Nigerian state. Hazzad notes that "the mission of the group is to clean the (Nigerian) system, which they view as polluted by Western education, and to uphold Sharia all over the country."²² It thus could be described as a jihadist movement that strives to destroy democracy and establish a Sharia state of Nigeria.

Onapajo et al posits that the ideology of the sect is embedded in the tradition and workings of Islamism and anticipates a political system modelled after that of the Taliban in Afghanistan.²³ By this, he notes that the sect attempts to attain an independent state that comprises all the tenets of a modern state, including a government, population, territory and security base that runs in line with its ideology.²⁴ Thus, its overriding goal is to wrest control from the Nigerian state in order to implement the Sharia legal code across the entire country.²⁵ In this vein, Boko Haram sees the Nigerian state as the major obstacle to true Islamic reform and the main persecutor of true Muslims, thus fuelling its belief that representative of the government like the police, military and government officials as well as

²⁰ See Freedom Onuoha, "From Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra to Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awati wal Jihad: The Evolutionary Phases of the Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria" in *African Insight* Vol. 1 (2012).

²¹ Farourk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram?" BBC News (August 26, 2011), online at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>

²² A Hazzad, "Nigeria clashes kill over 50 in northeastern city", Reuters, 26 July 2009.

²³ Onapajo, Hakeem & Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", *Africa Security Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2012), p. 27.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 28.

²⁵ Agbiboa, Daniel Egiegba, "The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism of Boko Haram", *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 13, No.1 (2013), p. 20.

their collaborators should be killed.²⁶ The aforementioned resort to violence is also in line with the Salafist view of radical Islam.²⁷ It is this Salafism that the Boko Haram sect embraces.²⁸

There were growing indications that rather than attempt to capture and Islamise all of Nigeria (or establish a Sharia state of Nigeria), Boko Haram may want to establish its own caliphate in line with the historic Kanem-Borno Caliphate but based on *takfiri* ideology rather than Sufi traditions.²⁹ According to Zen, this is as the hierarchy of Boko Haram continues to be dominated by the Kanuri tribe and its foothold is largely within the confines of the former Caliphate.³⁰ In other words, Boko Haram's current area of operations corresponds almost precisely to the territory of the former Kanem-Borno Caliphate which covers parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.³¹ However, in 2015, there were indications of claims by the sect to be establishing links with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to the extent of renaming itself as the Islamic State's West African Province (ISWAP).³²

7.3.2 Origin of Boko Haram

The origin of Boko Haram could be linked to the history of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria as earlier highlighted. It is believed in some quarters that Boko Haram is a product of

²⁶ Danjibo, Nathaniel Dominic, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria." *Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series*, Vol.1, No.21 (2009), p. 7.

²⁷ Hafez Kal, *Islam in Liberal Europe: Freedom, Equality and Tolerance*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p.366.

²⁸ James J. F. Forest, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram," *Joint Special Operations University Report*, 2012, p. 94.

²⁹ The takfiri ideology hinges on the view that all non-practising Muslims are kafirs (infidels) and urge its adherents to abandon existing Muslim societies, settle in isolated communities and fight the infidels. It thus a more radical form of belief system compared to Sufism that emphasizes mainly purification.

³⁰ Jacob Zenn, "How Boko Haram recruits members and finances its operations", *Jamestown Foundation Publication*, December 2014.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State, *BBC News* 7 March 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31784538>, and Ludovica Iaccino, "Nigeria: Boko Haram changes name to Islamic State's West African Province after Isis alliance", <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-boko-haram-changes-name-islamic-states-west-african-province-after-isis-alliance-1498696>, accessed 15 March 2015.

the Maitatsine uprisings indicating that it was members of Maitatsine who went underground that resurfaced later.³³ Some others opine however that the founder of Boko Haram was simply inspired by Maitatsine's ideologies.³⁴

It is unclear as to the exact year Boko Haram emerged. A number of accounts have it that the sect has been in existence since 1995 under the name of *Sahaba*³⁵ and *Ahl ul sunna wal'jama'ah hijra*.³⁶ According to these accounts, the group was then led by Abubakar Lawan who later left Nigeria for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia.³⁷ Following this, the group's leadership was transferred to Mohammed Yusuf who was said to have abandoned Lawan's style of conservative teachings to more radical ones. Some other accounts link the beginning of Boko Haram to the activities of a violent religious militant group that was formed in 2003 known as *Al-Sunna Wal Jamma* (Followers of the Prophet). This group was sometimes called the Nigerian Taliban because of their claim to being inspired by the Islamic militants in Afghanistan.³⁸ On 24 December 2003, the Nigerian Taliban attacked police stations and public buildings in Geidam and Kanama towns of Yobe State. They seized weapons from the police stations and replaced the Nigerian flag with that of Afghanistan at a public building they seized.³⁹ They were subsequently dislodged by

³³ A. Adesoji, *Africa Today*, July 2012.

³⁴ See Sahara Reporters 2012, "Comments on Gunmen Killed 10 persons in Kaduna," <http://www.mobile.saharareporters.com/news-page/gunmen-kill-10-personskaduna>, accessed 28 August 2013.

³⁵ Isioma Madike, "Boko Haram: Rise of a deadly sect," *National Mirror*, 19 June, 2011. Online at: http://nationalmirroronline.net/sunday-mirror/big_read/14548.html. See also Emma Ujah, Emeka Mamah, Kingsley Omonobi, Chioma Obinna & Daniel Idonor, 'Yar'Adua Orders Probe of Boko Haram's Leaders' Killing', *Vanguard* (online edition), 4 August 2009. Online at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/yaradua-orders-probe-of-boko-haram-leaders-killing/>.

³⁶ Julian Taiwo and Micheal Olugbode, Boko Haram leader killed, *This Day*, 31 July 2009, 4.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman (ed.s), *Armed and Aimless; Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS region*, Geneva, 2005. Also, Bestman Wellington, "Nigeria and the Threat of Al-Qaeda Terrorism," (12 June 2008).

³⁹ "Nigerians 'crush' Islamic uprising," *BBC News*, 5 January 2004. Online at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3368627.stm>.

troops of the Nigerian military.⁴⁰ On 21 September 2004, members of the group attacked Bama and Gwoza police stations in Borno State, killed several policemen and stole away arms and ammunition. A counter-attack launched by the police a few weeks later resulted in the death of 28 members while others fled to Cameroon across the Nigerian - Cameroon border.⁴¹ The remnants of the Taliban group are considered by several observers as having been involved in founding what today is known as Boko Haram.⁴²

In spite of the conflicting accounts, it is agreed by many observers that Boko Haram became an organised and formidable radical Islamic sect under the leadership of a charismatic cleric, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. In 2002, Yusuf established in Maiduguri town a religious complex that housed a mosque, an Islamic boarding school and a headquarters for a prayer group which he called *Jama'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'wati Wal-Jihad*.⁴³ The school is said to have attracted many children from poor homes across Northern Nigeria and from neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon.⁴⁴ The school complex became a recruiting ground for future jihadists.⁴⁵ This is as it drew members from neighbouring countries while entrenching the sect's hold in the Northern Nigerian states of Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Adamawa and Yobe.

The radicalisation process and events that led to the emergence of Boko Haram took another dimension when in 2004, some students from the University of Maiduguri, Ramat Polytechnic in Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic in Damaturu and other tertiary institutions, all

⁴⁰ Tajudeen Suleiman, *Terrorism unsettles the North*, *Tell*, 26 February 2007, p. 25.

⁴¹ "Nigeria police kill 27 Taleban," BBC News (24 September 2004), online at:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3685280.stm>.

⁴² James J. F. Forest, *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, *JSOU Report 2012* (Florida: JSUO Press), p. 59.

⁴³ This became the name by which the Sect wishes to be identified.

⁴⁴ Farourk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?" BBC News, January 11, 2012. As of February 5,

2013: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

in Borno and Yobe states withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and took up full preaching ministry and Koranic lessons with Boko Haram.⁴⁶

The years 2007 and 2008 could be regarded as the recruitment and training phase of the group's activities. The sect was alleged to have received funds from outside Nigeria for recruitment and training. In 2007, Mohammed Yusuf, and Mohammed Bello Damagun (another Muslim cleric and purported member of the Nigerian Taliban) were tried for terrorism-related offences in a federal high court in Abuja.⁴⁷ As mentioned in chapter two, Mohammed Damagun was charged for receiving monies, recruiting and training Nigerians for terrorism. Mohammed Yusuf's charges included receipt of monies from al-Qaeda to recruit terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners, especially Americans living in Nigeria.⁴⁸ Yusuf was acquitted on these charges. He was however re-arrested and prosecuted in 2008 alongside some of his members. They were released on bail by an Abuja High Court on 20 January 2009.⁴⁹ Some other arrests made in this period included foreigners such as Bukar Shekau from the Niger Republic. The foreigners were either deported or handed over to the police for prosecution. "Unfortunately", as Onuoha put it "these disciples usually found their way back into Nigerian society."⁵⁰ Together with the foreign elements (particularly from neighbouring countries), the radicalised Islamic youths developed Boko Haram into a formidable terrorist group.

7.3.3 Immediate Causes of Boko Haram Terrorism

⁴⁶ Abdulrafiu Lawal, *Rage of the puritans*, *Tell*, 10 August 2009, p. 34.

⁴⁷ J Peter Pham, *Strategic interests*, *World Defense Review*, 1 February 2007, <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham020107.shtml> (accessed 6 August 2013).

⁴⁸ See "Country Reports on Terrorism, Africa Review", *Global Terrorism Organization Year Book*, (Washington D.C: International Business Publication, 2010), p.83. Also in, "Tajudeen Suleiman, Terrorism unsettles the North", *Tell*, 26 February 2007, p. 24.

⁴⁹ Julian Taiwo and Micheal Olugbode, *Boko Haram leader killed*, *Thisday*, 31 July 2009, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Freedom C Onuoha, "The Islamist challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis explained", *African Security Review*, 2010, 19:2, 54-67. Online at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2010.503061>, accessed 6 August 2013.

It was supposedly easy for the sect to recruit members given the fact that the sect professed Islam and its practices, which were already entrenched in the lifestyle and belief system of a majority of the people in Northern Nigeria. The sect was also able to exploit the socio-economic and political discontent in the country especially the high rate of poverty, unemployment, insecurity, electoral malpractices and political hooliganism to gain a foothold in Borno, Yobe and other states in northern Nigeria where it spread. Over time, members of the sect became more dissatisfied with the secular authorities. They continued to view them as representatives of a corrupt, illegitimate and Western-styled government. At local government levels, the situation worsened in the summer of 2009, when authorities of Bauchi town in Bauchi State refused to allow members of the sect to preach and recruit publicly for fear of public safety.⁵¹ On 11 June 2009, police stopped a funeral procession of Boko Haram members who were riding on motorcycles without the use of helmets, as mandated by a law then recently passed. In the ensuing confrontation, 17 members of Boko Haram were shot and badly wounded by the police.⁵² It is probable that the brutal manner in which the Nigerian security forces responded to the activities of the Boko Haram group turned out to be the immediate cause of the resort of the group to turn violent and subsequently embrace terrorism.

Angered by the response of the police, Boko Haram members on 26 July 2009 staged an armed uprising in Bauchi. They attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi as well as the Bauchi Prison where they freed about 700 of their jailed members.⁵³ The violence subsequently spread to the states of Borno, Yobe, and Kano. Within four days,

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Isioma Madike, "Boko Haram: Rise of a Deadly Sect," National Mirror (June 19, 2011). Online at: http://nationalmirroronline.net/sunday-mirror/big_read/14548.html; and Isa Umar Gusau, "Boko Haram: How it All Began," Sunday Trust, (August 2, 2009), online at: <http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index>.

⁵³ F. C. Onuoha, "The 9/7 Boko Haram Attack on Bauchi Prison: A Case of Intelligence Failure", *Peace and Conflict Monitor*, 2 November 2010, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=754, accessed 2 June 2013.

the sect members had attacked police stations, schools, churches and public buildings across the states mentioned. A combined military and police operation was launched resulting in the killing of many of the sect members, and the arrest of others including Mohammed Yusuf. After a few hours in police custody, Yusuf was reported death in what appeared to have been an extrajudicial killing, although police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape.⁵⁴

The death of Yusuf was only a temporary setback as the sect regrouped under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau. It could be argued that Yusuf's death transformed the sect as it retreated temporarily, re-strategized and redefined its tactics.⁵⁵ It possibly used the videos of the July 2009 encounter with security forces, alongside leaflets and audio tapes to radicalize, publicize its cause and issue threats of revenge mission and intention to wage war on secular authorities. Marc-Antoine sums up the situation by arguing that the actions of the Nigerian security forces were a significant determinant in the trajectory of the Boko Haram crisis.⁵⁶ He observed that the repression of the sect in July 2009 was followed by repeated massacres, extra-judicial killings and arrests without trial that widened the gap between communities and the security forces.⁵⁷

7.3.4 The Nature of Boko Haram Terrorism

Boko Haram could be said to have begun as a home grown terrorist group and the threat posed by it localised to some parts of north-eastern Nigeria particularly Yobe and Borno states. Its leadership centred on Mohammed Yusuf as the *Amir-al-Aam* or Commander-in-Chief, with deputies and commanders in charge of the states and local government areas

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Isioma Madike, Op.Cit.

⁵⁶ Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis" Research Paper Africa Programme, Chatham House, September 2014. Available online https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140901BokoHaramPerouseMontclos_0.pdf, accessed 10 November 2014.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

where the sect existed.⁵⁸ It was further organised according to various roles such as the police and soldiers. The group's method of attack at this period was mainly ambush or what could be termed as 'hit and run' tactics which avoided protracted confrontation.⁵⁹ All these however changed or were modified from 2010 when the sect began to embark on revenge mission and threat of war under Shekau.

The Boko Haram that resurfaced under Shekau in 2010 became more deadly. Shekau provided the overall spiritual guidance and command but organised Boko Haram along a loose operating structure with disconnected cells that made it difficult for the Nigerian intelligence and security forces to detect and defeat them.⁶⁰ The sect graduated from 'hit and run' armed assault tactics to open armed confrontation with security forces. Veronica, a victim of the sect's attack, observed that Boko Haram raiding parties were composed of three groups of "shooters, looters and recruiters."⁶¹ The task of the first group was to fight the Nigerian troops, the second to rob local banks and shops, and the third to kidnap new recruits.⁶²

The sect further embraced the use of improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide terrorism. It equally expanded its attacks from low to high profile targets such as the attack on the headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in Abuja in June 2012.⁶³ This attack turned out to be the first known incidence of suicide bombing in

⁵⁸ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature, eds. *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa, 2013), p. 409.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 415.

⁶⁰ Oliver Guitta and Robin Simcox, "Terrorism in Nigeria: The Threat from Boko Haram and Ansaru" *The Henry Jackson Society Briefing*, London, June 2014.

⁶¹ Colin Freeman, "Nigeria school girl tells House of Lords of brutal Boko Haram attack" *The Telegraph*, 13 October 2015. Online at


<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11927617/Nigeria-schoolgirl-tells-House-of-Lords-of-brutal-Boko-Haram-attack.html>, accessed 15 October 2015.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature, eds., p. 418.

Nigeria. On 26 August 2012, the sect carried out an attack on a UN building in Abuja.⁶⁴ The attack on an international institution that is a symbol of global peace and security was presumably aimed at drawing international attention and publicity to the sect while in the process portraying government security lapses. The sect further extended its geographical reach to other parts of Northern Nigeria, and conducted series of attacks as depicted in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1. Map Showing Major Attacks by Boko Haram 2009 - 2013



Source: F. C. Onuoha, "Porous Borders and Boko Haram Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria", *Aljazeera Center for Studies*, 8 Sep 2013.

In January 2012, a splinter group known as Ansaru broke off from mainstream Boko Haram owing to disagreements over issues that were later evident in the ideological and operational

⁶⁴ Ibid.

differences between the sects. The Ansaru did not believe in indiscriminate killings but concentrated more on foreign targets, particularly the kidnap of expatriates.⁶⁵ The sect claimed to be fighting for the dignity of Muslims and for the creation of a caliphate in the West African region, and was thus more closely aligned with AQIM.⁶⁶ The sect in a video said to be released by one of its leader, Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, averred to defend the interest of Muslims and Islam not only in Nigeria but in Africa in general.⁶⁷ This perhaps revealed its links with AQIM and the Movement for Oneness for Jihad in West Africa, based in Mali. The activities of the Ansaru group declined as several of its leaders later re-joined Boko Haram particularly following the defeat of the Islamic terrorists groups by the French-led intervention in Mali in 2013.⁶⁸ It is thought that the French-led military operation in Mali disrupted Boko Haram and Ansaru's lines of communication, supplies and command network making it difficult for Ansaru to continue existing as a separate body from mainstream Boko Haram.

The attacks by Boko Haram were so devastating that, as indicated earlier, Nigeria's ranking in the Global Terrorism Index of most terrorized countries in the world continually worsen. According to former President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria had by mid-2014 recorded over 12,000 deaths with many more people injured and others displaced from their localities owing to the activities of Boko Haram.⁶⁹ The situation was made worse with the sect's abduction of women including schoolgirls. For instance, on 14 April 2014, the sect abducted about 276 girls from Government Girls' School Chibok. Of this number, 57 girls escaped following a breakdown of one of the trucks conveying them to the terrorists' hideout while

⁶⁵ Jacob Zenn, "Nigerian al-Qaedaism" Jamestown Foundation, 2014. Available online <http://www.hudson.org/research/10172-nigerian-al-qaedaism->, accessed 4 January 2015.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Farouk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Ansaru Islamists?" *BBC Africa*, 11 March 2013. Available online <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21510767>, accessed 4 July 2013.

⁶⁸ Oliver Guitta and Robin Simcox, London, June 2014.

⁶⁹ G. E. Jonathan, Presidential Address at the Regional Summit on Security in Nigeria at Paris-France, 17 May 2014.

the remaining 219 are still held by their abductors in yet to be identified locations.⁷⁰ This incident brought terrorism in Nigeria to such prominence that notable persons such as UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon and the wife of US President, Michelle Obama have actively condemned it while Nobel Peace Prize winner, Malala Yousafzai, has paid a visit to Nigeria solely for reason of seeking the possible rescue of the Chibok girls. An equally worrying development was that the sect graduated from serial attacks in public places to sieges of towns and villages, thereby threatening the territorial integrity of Nigeria. The size of the area held by the terrorists as at January 2015 equalled the size of Belgium.⁷¹ Added to this development is the sect's embrace of the ISIS tactics of beheadings of victims and the use of females (including girls as young as 10 years) for suicide terrorism.⁷² The activities of the Boko Haram sect have to date continued to be a concern not only to the Nigerian government but to the international community as well. It is in the light of this that I now examine government responses to the Boko Haram threat.

7.3.5 The Response of Nigerian Government to Boko Haram Terrorism

The Nigerian government condemns terrorism. Nigeria is a signatory to International Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism, and has signed the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.⁷³ However, the country's commitment to the fight against this strand of terrorism remained mainly passive until the 2009 upsurge of Boko Haram terrorist activities, and the attempt by Farouk Umar Abdulmutallab to bomb a

⁷⁰ Nana Bemba Nti, "Silence on the Lambs: The Abducted Chibok Schoolgirls in Nigeria and the Challenge to UNSCR 1325" Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Policy Brief 3, November 2014. Online at <http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Policy-Briefs/Policy-Briefs/Nana-KAIPTC-Policy-Brief-3--The-Abducted-Chibok-S.aspx>, accessed 14 December 2014.

⁷¹ Virginia Comolli, p. 161.

⁷² Jay Akbar, "Like master, like servant: Nigerian terror group Boko Haram releases first beheading video since pledging allegiance to ISIS" *Daily Mail Online*, 10 July 2015, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3156551/Like-master-like-servant-Nigerian-terror-group-Boko-Haram-releases-beheading-video-pledging-allegiance-ISIS.html>. Accessed 30 July 2015.

⁷³ Mbanefo, A., "On Agenda Item 166: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism – United Nations General Assembly, 56th Session, NY., www.un.org/terrorism/statement/nigeriaE, accessed 4 July 2013.

Northwest Airliner on Christmas Day of the same year.⁷⁴ The Nigerian government could be said to have been compelled to deploy the military in a full-scale offensive against the Boko Haram sect following upsurge of the sect's violent activities. In July 2011, a Joint Military Task Force (popularly known by its acronym JTF) was established in Borno State, and subsequently in other terrorist affected states in Nigeria.⁷⁵ The JTF consists of personnel of the AFN, NPF and DSS, as was the case with the Niger Delta Crisis discussed earlier. Furthermore, an army division with the nomenclature 7 Division Nigerian Army, was formed with headquarters in Maiduguri to confront the terrorists.⁷⁶

In order to ensure effective military counter terrorism operations, the Nigerian Government declared states of emergencies in the affected areas. The first was declared on 31 December 2011 for a six-month period covering 14 Local Government Areas across Borno, Niger, Plateau and Yobe states.⁷⁷ The second was declared on 14 May 2013 and covered all areas of the three states most affected by Boko Haram terrorism, that is, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.⁷⁸ In terms of legislation, Nigeria's highest law making body, the National Assembly, in February 2011 passed an anti-terrorism bill aimed at preventing and combating terrorism. This was later reviewed in June 2013 in line with the government's counter-terrorism drive.⁷⁹ Equally, the government appointed a Presidential Adviser on Terrorism in January 2011 and established a Counter-Terrorism Centre at the Office of the National Security Adviser to

⁷⁴ Farouk Umar Abdulmutallab popularly known as the Underwear Bomber is a Nigerian who attempted to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear while on board the plane en route from Amsterdam to Detroit

⁷⁵ J. A. H. Ewansiha, Chief of Training and Operations Nigerian Army, Abuja. Interviewed 3 March 2014.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Virginia Comolli, p. 112.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 120.

⁷⁹ Chinedu S. Udeh, "Boko Haram and Counter Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria" in O. Mbachu and U. M. Bature, pp. 307-322.

facilitate the implementation of counter-terrorism strategy and overall coordination of government effort.⁸⁰

Also noteworthy are the bilateral and multilateral engagement efforts of the Government of Nigeria with organisations and partners such as the UN and the European Union (EU), with states such as the US, UK and France as well as with contiguous countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.⁸¹ All these efforts of government have been in response to the activities of Boko Haram, and which have in the process further generated reactions from the sect. Table 7.1 details the major activities carried out by Boko Haram and the responses by government to them from July 2009 to October 2015. As in the previous case studies, the data used was obtained from a combination of primary and secondary sources.⁸² In Figure 7.1, incidents and casualty rate was used as unit of measure to graphically show the causal effect on the rise of Boko Haram by military responses on one hand, and the use of soft approaches such as negotiations and concessions on the other.

Table 7.1: Major Activities by Boko Haram and Government Responses from July 2009 to October 2015.

Serial	Date	Major Action and Reactions by Boko Haram	Government Actions and Reactions	Remarks
1.	26-27 July 2009	Boko Haram members staged uprising in Bauchi, Bauchi State. Attacked police stations, schools, churches and public buildings across Borno, Yobe and Kano states.	The Nigerian police and military confronts Boko Haram.	
2.	28-30 July 2009	Boko Haram kills hundreds in Maiduguri town and attack	Nigerian Army captured and handed over Mohammed	Extra-judicial killing of Yusuf

⁸⁰ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature, pp. 407-434.

⁸¹ Chinedu S. Udeh, pp. 307-322.

⁸² See footnote 67 in chapter four for details.

		security forces.	Yusuf, leader of Boko Haram to police. He was later found dead. The police claims he was killed while trying to escape. Residents and human rights groups claim that he was assassinated.	possibly provoke revenge mission by sect.
3.	September 2010	Boko Haram members attack a prison in Bauchi and freed hundreds of prisoners, including about 100 members of the sect.	Governor of Bauchi State asked Boko Haram members to leave the state. Many Boko Haram members arrested.	
4.	December 2010	Borno State Governorship candidate of the All Nigeria Peoples Party and seven others shot dead by gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members.		There were speculations that they may have been hired by political opponents,
5	December 2010	Bombings in Jos and Maiduguri towns kill about 80 people.	Increased military efforts at containing Boko Haram.	
6	31 December 2010	Boko Haram attack Mogadishu Army barracks market in Abuja.	Beefed up defensive security measures in military and other security installations.	Provoked more clamp down by the military on the sect.
7	May 2011	Bomb attacks in Abuja, Bauchi and other states after inauguration ceremony of President Goodluck Jonathan.	Alleged that political opposition involved in bombings and sponsorship of Boko Haram.	
8	16 June 2011	Bombed Police Headquarters in Abuja.	Scale and nature of attack shocked the government. Inspector General of Police later sacked.	First incidence of suicide terrorism in Nigeria.
9	June 2011	A Muslim cleric critical of Boko Haram, Ibrahim Birkuti, is shot dead by two gunmen on a motorcycle.	Some state governments ban use of commercial motor cycles at night and in city centres.	
10	July 2011		Federal Government states that it will inaugurate a panel to initiate negotiations with Boko Haram.	Boko Haram possibly took this as a sign of weakening coercive power of government.

11	August 2011		Federal Government reneges on negotiations with Boko Haram.	Boko Haram alleges insincerity on the part of government while government said it was not sure if dealing with real Boko Haram.
12	September 2011	Babakura Fugu, brother-in-law of late Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, is shot dead two days after attending a peace meeting with ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo. Boko Haram denies any involvement in the incident.	Federal Government did not openly back peace deal by ex-President Obasanjo.	
13	4 November 2011	Series of bomb and gun attacks in Yobe and Borno states.	Arrest of many Boko Haram members.	
14	November 2011	Boko Haram announces that it will not hold talks with the government until all members of the sect, who have been arrested, are released.	Government increased budget spending on security equipment to counter Boko Haram.	
15	25 December 2011	Attacked Saint Theresa Catholic Church Madalla in Niger State, near Abuja killing 32 persons. One policeman killed in a failed bomb attack on a church in Jos, Plateau State.	Deployment of security personnel to places of worship. Attempts to douse tension between Christians and Muslims.	
16	January 2012		President Goodluck Jonathan alleges Boko Haram infiltration of his government.	
17	5-6, 20 January 2012	Boko Haram launches bomb attacks and heavy gun battles in Kano targeting the police headquarters. Over 150 civilians and 32 policemen killed.	Launch military assault on Boko Haram hide-outs in Kano.	

18	28 January 2012		Military forces ambushed and killed 11 Boko Haram terrorists.	
19	8 February 2012	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at a military cantonment in Kaduna.	A military investigation panel convened.	
20	16 February 2012	Another prison break staged in Koton Kanili, Kogi State. 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed.		Jail break possibly by Boko Haram to release members in detention.
21	March 2012	Boko Haram and government mediator, Dr Ibrahim Datti Ahmed (the president of National Supreme Council on Sharia) pulls out of negotiations pointing to a lack of sincerity on the government.		
22	31 May 2012		Joint Task Force in Kano raided Boko Haram hide-out resulting in death of 5 sect members and a German hostage.	Earlier in March 2012, an Italian hostage was killed by his abductors following attempt by Nigerian and British security effort to free them.
23	3 June 2012	15 church members killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi State. Boko Haram claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa.		
24	17 June 2012	Suicide bombers attacked three churches in Kaduna State killing over 50 persons.		
25	19 September 2012		Nigerian Military arrest Boko Haram members, reported death of Abu Qaqa.	
26	3 October 2012	Killed over 30 persons in Mubi town in Adamawa State during a night raid.		

27	November 2012	Alleged members of Boko Haram gave conditions for ceasefire naming Alhaji Shettima Ali Mongunu, General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd), Senator Bukar Abba, Ambassador Gaji Galtimari, Barrister Aisha Wakil and her husband as mediators.	Government welcomed offer but no significant efforts followed.	Some named mediators particularly General Muhammadu Buhari decline and disassociated from any dealings with Boko Haram.
28	18 March 2013	About 22 persons killed and 65 injured during a suicide car bomb explosion at a bus station in Kano city.		
29	April 2013		President Goodluck Jonathan set up a 26-member committee headed by Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu Turaki to explore the possibility of granting Amnesty to Boko Haram members.	It was thought that the Amnesty granted the Niger Delta militants could apply in the Boko Haram situation.
30	7 May 2013	Killed over 55 persons and freed 105 inmates in coordinated attacks on army barracks, a prison and police post in Bama town.	Military conduct raids on Boko Haram camps.	
	14 May 2013		Federal Government declared state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States.	This was to facilitate military containment of the situation.
31	6 July 2013	Killed 42 students in a Government Secondary School attack in Yobe State.		
32	29 September 2013	Attacked and killed 40 male students of College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe State.	Government order security coverage of schools. Announced adoption of soft approach to counter-terrorism alongside military operations.	
33	14 Jan 2014	Suicide bombing in Maiduguri, about 30 persons killed.	Intensified cordon and search military operations.	
34	15 and 24 February 2014	About 106 inhabitants of Izghe – Konduga in Borno State killed.	Security forces blamed for poor response.	

35	25 February 2014	About 29 school boys killed at Federal Government College Buni Yadi in Yobe State.		This may be Boko Haram's way of showing its anti-western education stance.
36	14 April 2014	Abducts about 276 girls of Government Girls Secondary School Chibok in Borno State. Sect leader Shekau said they would be treated as slaves as part of the "war booty."	Federal Government blamed by human right groups and the international community for poor initial response to the incident.	The where-about of 219 of the girls remains unknown to date.
37	14 April 2014	Two bombs exploded at a crowded bus station at Nyanya area of Abuja killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 200.	Suspected master-minder of the bombing, Oguche arrested in Sudan and repatriated to Nigeria for trial.	
38	1 May 2014	A car bomb exploded killing at least 19 people and injured at least 60 in the same Nyanya area of Abuja.	Government directs more interagency cooperation in tackling Boko Haram.	
39	15 May 2014	Boko Haram attacked Menari, Tsangayari and Garawa villages killing 60 people.	Vigilante force known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) fought back, killing 200 Boko Haram members.	CJTF complemented Nigerian military effort.
40	17 May 2014		A summit in Paris declared Boko Haram as part of al-Qaeda. Leaders from West African nations resolved to mount a region-wide offensive against the group. Western nations pledged to provide technical expertise and training to the new regional African effort against the Islamic extremists.	
41	20 May 2014	Twin bomb explosion kill 118 people in Jos.		
42	27 May 2014	Attack military location at Buni Yadi in Yobe State.	Injected more troops to confront Boko Haram in North eastern Nigeria.	
43	30 May 2014	Assassinated Muslim leader Alhaji Idrissa Timata, the Emir of Gwoza in Borno		

		State,		
44	1 June 2014	Mounted attack at a football field in Mubi, Adamawa State killing more than 40 people.		
45	2 June 2014	Boko Haram members dressed as soldiers killed about 200 civilians in three communities in Gwoza, Borno State.	Local residents complain they pleaded for help from the military, but that the military did not arrive on time.	
46	29 May-5 June 2014	Boko Haram conducts 6 attacks, killing 506 civilians, 5 military personnel. Abducts 20 women and 3 men.	Fleeing 60 Boko Haram terrorists killed by Cameroon's military.	
47	6-12 June 2014	About 5 civilians and 6 military men killed in 4 attacks by Boko Haram.	Military kill 50 Boko Haram members in a counter-attack.	
48	13 June-19 June 2014	2 attacks by Boko Haram left 46 civilians dead.	8 Boko Haram killed by Borno vigilante group (CJTF).	
49	21-26 June 2014	4 attacks by Boko Haram killing 93 civilians and 60 abducted.	A military fighter jet bombed unknown number of Boko Haram in counter-attack Killing 25 Boko Haram. Cameroon military killed 10 Boko Haram near border.	
50	4-10 July 2014	4 Boko Haram attacks, 11 civilians, 1 vigilante, 33 soldiers, 4 police killed.	53 Boko Haram were killed while attempting to capture a military base and police station in Borno on the 4th of July. On the 6th, soldiers killed Boko Haram leader and his brother at their home in Kaduna, 44 Boko Haram were killed in 2 military operations in Borno same day.	
51	11-17 July 2014	4 attacks, 81 civilians killed. German teacher kidnapped and 2 vigilantes killed in Adamawa State.	Military fighter jet in a failed counter-attack resulting in civilian casualties.	Civil society groups condemn killing of civilians.
52	18 July 2014	Attacked and occupied Damboa town in Borno State.		Boko Haram consolidating seizure and hold of territories.

	17 October 2014		Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff announced that a ceasefire had been brokered with Boko Haram.	
53	29 October 2014	Boko Haram seized Mubi town in Adamawa and Uba in Borno State.	Military forces overpowered by the terrorists in Mubi and Uba towns,	Boko Haram refutes claim days later.
54	31 October 2014	Bombed bus station in Gombe, Gombe State		
	2 November 2014	Attacked prison in Kogi, released 199 inmates.	Instituted panel of investigation.	
55	25 November 2014	2 female suicide bombings at Maiduguri market killed over 45 people.		
56	28 November 2014	Over 120 people killed in Kano during suicide bomb in a mosque where the Emir worshipped.	Government canvasses support of traditional and religious leaders to counter Boko Haram attacks.	
57	1 December 2014	In Damaturu, Yobe State, two female suicide bombers detonated bombs at the central Maiduguri market, killing about 30 persons.		
58	3 December 2014	Boko Haram abducted 20 women, mostly young girls, during an attack in Lassa town, Borno State.	Canvasses public support for its counter-terrorism efforts.	
59	4 December 2014	Boko Haram raided Bajoga, in Gombe State, occupying buildings briefly before leaving with stolen vehicles and motorbikes.		Looting is a possible major source of logistics for the terrorists.
60	10 December 2014	Boko Haram raided Gajigana, north of Borno State, killing at least 14 people. 2 female suicide bombers killed 4 persons in Kano.	Deployed more troops to Boko Haram held areas.	Female suicide bombings – an increasingly employed Boko Haram tactics.
	22 December 2014	Killed 22 persons in bus station bombing in Gombe.		
61	1 January	Boko Haram abducted 40		It is probable that

	2015	boys and young men from the village of Malari in Borno State, Nigeria.		abductees are radicalised and compelled to serve as foot soldiers for the sect.
62	3-7 January 2015	Razed the town of Baga in Borno State and captured multi-national military base.	Nigerian military vows to recapture military base. Niger and Chad troops withdraw from operation in the area.	
63	10 January 2015	A 10-year old female suicide bomber kill 20 persons in Maiduguri town.	Government condemns use of under-aged boys and girls in terrorism.	
64	11 January 2015	Two 10-year old female suicide bombers kill 5 persons in Potiskum town.		Increasing trend of Boko Haram use of female children for suicide missions.
65	25 January 2015	Captures town of Monguno including military barracks.	Renewed calls for joint efforts by neighbouring countries in fighting Boko Haram.	
66	January 2015		Nigerian military aided by Chadian forces re-capture Michika town in Adamawa State from Boko Haram.	
67	January-February 2015		Canvass for the establishment of an African Union force to Boko Haram.	Nigerian government acknowledge it could not contain Boko Haram alone.
68	2 February 2015	A female suicide bomb attack in Gombe shortly after President Goodluck Jonathan departed scene of a presidential election rally.		
69	6 February 2015	Raided Bosso and Diffa towns in Niger Republic. First time Boko Haram attacking Niger Republic.	Nigerien assisted by Chadian troop's repelled attacks.	
70	7 February 2015		Postpones general elections to allow military recapture and control areas held by Boko Haram fighters.	
71	12		Nigerian military forces	

	February 2015		supported by Chad, Cameroon and Niger invaded Boko Haram's Sambisa forest safe haven in Borno State killing many members of the Sect.	
72	13 February 2015	Attacked Chad Republic for the first time at Ngouboua village near the Lake Chad area.	Re-iterates call for multilateral action in containing Boko Haram.	
73	15 February 2015	Killed 16 persons in a suicide bomb in Damaturu.		
74	16 February 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Monguno town.	
75	21 February 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Baga town.	
76	22 February 2015	Suicide bomber kills 5 persons in Potiskum.		
77	24 February 2015	Suicide bomber kills 27 persons at bus stations in Potiskum and Kano.	Issues alerts and jingles on radios and television stations to sensitize public.	
78	February 2015	2 female suicide bombers kill 4 persons in Damaturu.		
79	7 March 2015	Killed 54 persons and wounded 143 in 5 separate suicide bombings in Maiduguri.	Launches ground and air offensive against Boko Haram strongholds.	
80	7 March 2015	Pledges allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.	Calls for more international support.	
81	17 March 2015		Bama town recaptured by Nigerian military from Boko Haram.	
82	18 March 2015		Damasak town recaptured by Nigerian and Chadian forces from Boko Haram.	
83	27 March 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Gwoza town from Boko Haram.	
84	28 March	Voters in Nigeria go to the		

	2015	polls for a general election. Gunmen kill at least 15 voters including an opposition house of assembly candidate for Dukku in Gombe.		
85	29 March 2015		Voting in the Nigerian general election is delayed for a second day due to delays and malfunctioning equipment. So far, 43 people have died in Boko Haram attacks.	
86	24 May 2015		Majority of areas held by Boko Haram's forces in control of Nigerian military. Most of the sect militants withdraw to the Sambisa forest.	This is attributed to joint military effort of contiguous countries and Nigeria's engagement of South African mercenaries.
87	29 May 2015		President Buhari during swearing in ceremony announced relocation of Military Command Centre to Maiduguri, the centre of Boko Haram activities.	
88	3-4 June 2015		President Buhari visited Chad and Niger urging closer and concerted effort against Boko Haram.	The visit considered worthwhile as Nigeria's neighbours were wary of Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts.
89	12 June 2015	Several days of night raids on six remote villages in Borno State. About 37 persons killed.		
90	16 June 2015	Twin suicide bombings by Boko Haram killed 24 people and wounded more than 100 in the first such attacks in Chad's capital N'Djamena. The attacks targeted the police headquarters and a police academy.	On 29 August 2015, the Chadian Government charged, tried and executed 10 terrorists involved in the attacks.	Decisive action by Chadian government a probable lesson for Nigeria.

91	17 June 2015		Chad bans people from wearing the full-face veil Burqa's, following two suicide bomb attacks. They also banned vehicles with tinted windows.	Some section of Nigerian society urge Nigerian government to emulate Chad's ban on Burqa's.
92	22 June 2015	2 teenaged female suicide bombers killed 30 at crowded mosque in Malari, Borno State (during holy month of Ramadan).		Sect perhaps targeting mosque they feel fall short in following 'The Prophet'.
93	01-02 July 2015	Multiple mosque attacks in Kukawa and two other towns in Borno State by Boko Haram kill about 142 persons.	Spate of attacks viewed as a renewed challenge to new government.	
94	5 July 2015	A suicide bomber attacks a church in the Potiskum area of Nigeria's Yobe State, killing five.		
95	6 July 2015	Two bomb attacks on the central Nigerian city of Jos have left at least 44 people dead.	Issued press release condemning attacks.	
96	11 July 2015	Male suicide bomber dressed in woman's burqa kills 15 and injures 80 in N'Djamena market.		Boko Haram increasingly attacking neighbouring countries.
97	23 July 2015	About 29 persons killed in bomb attacks at bus garages in Gombe town		
98	27-29 July 2015	Boko Haram attacks Burratai, hometown of Nigerian Chief of Army Staff.	Nigeria solicits for more foreign assistance. President Buhari paid state visit to Cameroon, seek cooperation to fight Boko Haram.	Niger bans dressing in full veil. Offensive against Boko Haram by Chadian Army result in killing of over a hundred terrorists around Lake Chad area.
99	4 August 2015	Report from Centre for Crisis Communication indicate Boko Haram faction demanding dialogue with	Government announced that it was open to dialogue.	


		Nigerian government.		
100	August 2015	Shekau in audio internet message denies claim by Chad's President Idriss Deby that Mahamat Daoud had replaced him as the leader of Boko Haram.		It was earlier rumoured that Shekau had been killed by Nigerian military.
101	13 August	Boko Haram raid Kukuwa village in Yobe State. About 60 people killed, many of them by drowning while fleeing from the attacks.	President Buhari gives a three month ultimatum to Service Chiefs during their swearing in ceremony to defeat Boko Haram.	
102	15 August 2015	Boko Haram attack Damboa village killing 13 persons.		
103	21 August 2015	Ambushed convoy of Nigerian Chief of Army Staff while visiting troop's locations. One soldier and 9 terrorists killed.		It was evident that Boko Haram had pockets of hide-outs and hidden camps in remote areas of Borno State.
104	25 August	24 persons killed in Boko Haram raid on Mafumudi village in Borno State.		
105	1 September 2015		Nigerian military announce its recapture of Gamboru and Ngala towns in Borno State.	
106	9 September 2015	Boko Haram members dislodged from by the military from some parts of Sambisa forest raid villages and towns along Nigeria - Cameroun border.	Nigeria's Director of Defence Information claims that the military had destroyed all known Boko Haram camps and the sect was so weakened that it could no longer hold territory.	
107	September 2015	Shekau in an audio message refutes claim by the Nigerian military of successes against Boko Haram.	The Nigerian military reacted by saying the message was cheap propaganda and demanded Shekau to surrender.	
108	16 September 2015		President Buhari announced in France that Nigerian government was negotiating with Boko Haram for the release of Chibok School	

			girls.	
109	September 2015		Security tightened in Lagos as US Embassy warns of possible Boko Haram attacks on air and sea ports in the city.	
111	20 September 2015	Series of bombings occurred in Maiduguri and Monguno towns. About 54 people killed.		
112	25 September 2015	Suspected Boko Haram members attacked Kogi State DSS office and freed 30 of their detained members. 4 people including a policeman were killed.		
113	27 September 2015	Boko Haram kills 9 persons and injure another 9 in an attack on Mailari village in Konduga town near Maiduguri.		
114	1 October 2015	Boko Haram attack Kirchinga Village in Adamawa State slitting the throat of four inhabitants.		
115	2 October 2015	Bombings at Nyanya and Kuje-Abuja killed 18 and wounded 41 persons.		
116	7 October 2015	15 people killed in three suicide bomb incidents in Damaturu, including attack in a crowded market.	JTF operations led to discovery of large cache of Boko Haram arms in Goniri town, Yobe State. 100 militants killed. Seven deaths recorded on side of military	A ten-year old girl suicide bomber involved in one of the incidents.
117	18 October 2015	Female suicide bombers kill 12 at Dar, Adamawa State.		
118	21 October 2015	Fleeing Boko Haram militants robbed, shot and killed commuters at Nganzai village. Also burnt down nearby village.	JTF operation conducted at Madagali and Gwoza killed 150 terrorists and rescued 36 captives.	
119	23 October 2015	Boko Haram suicide bombers killed 27 in a mosque in Yola.		

120	23 October 2015	Suicide bombing at mosque in Maiduguri, 21 killed including two suicide bombers.		Increasing use of suicide bombings by Boko Haram
121	24 October 2015		JTF intercept four female suicide bombers.	One casualty recorded.
122	28 October 2015		Military rescue 138 women and 192 children abducted by Boko Haram at Sambisa forest.	Their information reveal Boko Haram concentration in camps in the forest.

Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

Figure 7.2 Graphical Representation of Boko Haram's Major Activities and Government Concessions/Military Approaches



Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

This case scenario depicts an increasing military response been correspondingly matched by a rise in the activities of Boko Haram. The use of soft approaches has been at an unappreciable level when compared to the military response. In 2015, a large portion of Nigeria's territory seized by the terrorists was recaptured through the concerted efforts the AFN, CJTF,

mercenaries and the armed forces of Nigeria's contiguous countries. This however cannot be said to have substantially turned the tide in terms of countering the threat. I would therefore argue that although the battle to regain the territories that Nigeria lost to the terrorists appears won at the time of writing, the fight to contain terrorist bombings and other unconventional forms of attacks is far from being achieved. This necessitates an assessment of how impactful the responses of the Government of Nigeria were or have been in containing the activities of Boko Haram.

7.4 Assessment of Government Responses

The Nigerian government's measures to counter Boko Haram beginning from its evolutionary stages appear ad hoc and not driven by a definite counter terrorism policy or strategy. It is plausible that such ad hoc and reactionary approaches lend space and initiatives for the Boko Haram terrorists to operate. Wiwa notes that a mitigating factor to effective response was inadequacy of intelligence on the sect owing to the capacity problems of the intelligence agencies.⁸³ Media operations, public enlightenment, community engagement and other people-centric measures by the government that could have countered the Boko Haram ideology appeared not properly deployed.

Meanwhile, the sect kept attracting adherents based on its ideology that appealed to the unemployed and poor who felt that their condition was caused by governance failure, moral decadence and corruption by the elites. It effectively employed the media and other forms of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) platforms such as the Internet to publicise its cause and activities. Corruption and poor financial regulations gave the sect leverage to cover its source of funding believed to include ransoms, levies, drug cartels, fake

⁸³ L. W. Wiwa, Director Military Intelligence Nigerian Army. Interviewed 24 May 2014.

charity organizations and sympathetic individuals and groups within Nigeria as well as in Saudi Arabia and the UK.⁸⁴

The complexity and level of sophistication which the sect attained challenged the capacity of security agencies and other institutions involved in the government counter-terrorism effort, particularly as coordination and the needed synergy among government institutions seemed inadequate. The Nigerian military that is at the forefront of the government's counter-terrorism effort saw itself suffering many setbacks as it confronted the terrorists. A number of military locations were attacked by the terrorists to the extent that the weapons seized from the Nigerian soldiers became the major source of arms to Boko Haram.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the fact that Boko Haram activities transcended Nigeria's borders particularly in terms of training, financing, and re-groupings, kidnappings and arms acquisition raised concerns over border management and Nigeria's relations with her immediate neighbours as well as the international community in their commitment to contain terrorism in Nigeria.

In an effort to prosecute terrorists and their sponsors, the National Assembly enacted the TPA as earlier highlighted. The Act prohibits acts of terrorism and their funding. Certain provisions of the Act such as arrests and timeframe for prosecution were however found not to have been well defined. Similarly, legally defining terrorism and designating groups as such was problematic until the 13 November 2013 designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as FTOs by the US. The Government of Nigeria that had in May 2013 declared a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states to facilitate military operations against these groups did not dispute the designation by the US. This implied not only a tacit approval that Boko Haram and Ansaru were officially recognised as terrorist groups in Nigeria but also that

⁸⁴ Kathleen Caulderwood, "Fake Charities, Drug Cartels, Ransom and Extortion: Where Islamic Boko Haram Gets Its Cash", *International Business Times*, 16 May 2014. Also, Adisa Taiwo, "Boko Haram's funding traced to UK, S. Arabia", *Nigerian Tribune*, 13 February 2012.

⁸⁵ E. J. Amadasun, Defence Headquarters Abuja, interviewed 22 January 2015.

the activities of the Boko Haram sect were invariably beyond the containment of the Nigerian government alone.

From Figure 7.1, it could also be noted that unlike in the case of the Niger Delta crisis, concessions in the form of negotiations or concessions in what Obasanjo calls “the carrot and stick approach” appear not to have worked.⁸⁶ The relevant questions that may need to be answered however are what form of negotiations or concessions were given the terrorists and by what means in terms of delivery, appropriateness and approach? Also relevant is the question of the extent to which other response mechanisms apart from the military have been explored and exploited. All these questions are perhaps imperative for further research as one could conclude here that, as in the case studies previously examined, the continuing terrorism perpetrated by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is a probable function of the ineffectiveness of government’s responses. Following this, the succeeding chapter draws from the discussions in chapters four, five, six and this chapter, and appraises the responses of the Government of Nigeria to the threats of terrorism. It specifically examines counter-terrorism issues raised in the case studies that could inform an effective national counter-terrorism strategy.

⁸⁶ Zacheaus Somorin, “Boko Haram: Obasanjo Advocates ‘Carrot and Stick’ Approach” *This Day*, 9 January 2013. Online at <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-obasanjo-advocates-carrot-and-stick-approach/135805/>, accessed 14 May 2014. The carrot and stick as used here refer to a counter-terrorism policy that offers a combination of rewards and punishments to persuade or compel terrorists and potential terrorists from the act.

CHAPTER EIGHT

APPRAISAL OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE THREATS OF TERRORISM

8.1 Preamble

In chapters four, five, six and seven, I examined the various forms of terrorist threats that Nigeria has witnessed in its post-independence history. These are the terrorist threats posed by Maitatsine, the state under military rule, Niger Delta militants and that of the Boko Haram sect. Essentially, the case studies brought out the threat-response interface between terrorists and the Nigerian Government over time and space. In this chapter therefore, I will attempt, by way of an assessment, to relate these threats and responses to the question of a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

In the first case study, that is, terrorism perpetrated by the Maitatsine sect, it was observed that indecisiveness by the Nigerian Government and inappropriate handling by security forces escalated the sect's activities. The sect's activities consequently spread to Bauchi, Gombe, Yola and Maiduguri which, incidentally, are the hotbeds of the current wave of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram. The Maitatsine sect was finally contained through the use of military force. The terrorism witnessed during military rule was that of repression by the state against pro-democracy groups. As noted in chapter five, the state was the perpetrator, and the people were the victim. The death of General Sani Abacha combined with international pressure saw a return of the country to democratic rule but with a militarised society as evident in the emergence of militant groups. In the Niger Delta region, the militants employed hostage taking, kidnapping and other forms of terrorist tactics in advancing their cause. Again, government's response was more of the application of military force with less attention to the use of soft power approaches that alleviate citizens'

grievances. Terrorist activities by the Niger Delta militant groups were contained through an Amnesty Programme that involved negotiation, and a disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation process.

The fourth case examined, which is terrorism carried out by the Boko Haram sect, has its peculiarities. Firstly, while the classification of the first three cases discussed above as terrorism remain contentious among scholars and policy makers, the classification of the Boko Haram as such is less contentious as its activities have not only typified full-blown terrorism but also transcended Nigeria's borders. Secondly, and the most important for this study is that Boko Haram terrorism is not only ongoing but equally seem to have defied the responses so far undertaken by the Government of Nigeria.

From the threat-response assessments and the lessons highlighted in the case studies, some key points or observations are inherent. These include that terrorism threats and the Nigerian government responses to them demonstrate the imperative of direction and political will in the form of a national policy to guide government's counter-terrorism efforts. The case studies also raised the importance of governance that could enhance socio-economic development, democracy and the rule of law. In line with these are requirements for the institutions responsible for countering terrorism, the national security architecture, border management, international cooperation and public-private engagement in the counter-terrorism effort.

The key points derived from the case studies as highlighted above would need to be examined in depth to provide the threat-response and strategy linkage espoused in this study. This is considered imperative given the need to identify the weaknesses and challenges confronting the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism efforts with a view to adjusting the responses or crafting new approaches to countering terrorism. The understanding here is that

the effectiveness of the responses of government, or its efforts at countering the threat of terrorism, is a function of how articulate are its counter-terrorism policy, institutions and programmes. McCord buttresses this in observing that “as examples in social policy have shown, (counter-terrorism) programmes are often not effective and can sometimes increase the problem or cause further social negatives.”¹ In line with this, Lum, Kennedy and Sherley suggest that “evaluations of both effectiveness and harm are necessary for policy that involves phenomena like terrorism that can generate irrational thinking and hasty responses.”² Such an evaluation supports my intention in this chapter.

Before delving into the evaluation proper, it is perhaps important to reiterate two important concepts in view of the social constructivist approach of this study of terrorism threat-response processes in Nigeria. Firstly, terrorism and terrorists are not readily and easily defined. Thus, the government, media and other stakeholders have usually used the term with underlying political, ideological and other objectives. In this way, terrorists could just as easily be defined as political activists, freedom fighters, insurgents, or any number of other categories of organised violence. Secondly, the actions of terrorists and of the government agencies that respond are the actions of institutions and organisations which in turn, are composed of sets of individuals with particular ideas or conceptions of the world. Flick thus notes that, “the realities we study are social products of the actions, of interactions and institutions.”³ In this vein, and as I have sought to demonstrate with the case studies in chapters four to seven, the way in which terrorist groups develop and evolve their actions could be said to be in response to the perceived messages they observe in the actions of the Nigerian counter-terrorist actors and vice versa.

¹ J. McCord. “Cures that harm: Unanticipated outcomes of crime prevention programs.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 587 (2003), pp. 16-30.

² Lum C, Kennedy LW, Sherley, AJ. “The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies.” *Campbell Systematic Reviews* (Newark: Campbell Collaboration, 2009), p. 6.

³ U. Flick, *Designing Qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 2007), p. 12.

Similarly, from the case studies examined, one can reasonably hypothesise that the Nigerian government has sought to send out messages through their actions, both to the people they would categorise as terrorists, the terrorists' sympathisers and to the wider citizenry on the efficacy or otherwise of their counter-terrorism policies. It is the mutual perceptions of actions and reactions on both sides of the equation, and the opinions these help to form in the populace, that arguably determine how the security situation has played out in recent Nigerian history. However, the proof of the causal effect of inappropriate or lacking counter-terrorism strategy on the severity of the terrorist picture in Nigeria over the years cannot be assumed or established with definite degree of certainty. This is owing partly to the fact that the actors involved, that is the government and terrorists, are both working on the basis of perceptions, messages and reactions to the perceived intentions of actions. Herein comes the question and place of methodology in a research such as this. I would therefore amplify the methodology adopted to achieve the appraisal of government's responses to the threats of terrorism in Nigeria.

8.2 Methodology

In chapter one, I noted that this study adopted a mainly qualitative research method with a case study approach (as employed in the preceding four chapters). At one level therefore, this is a phenomenological study of the processes through which the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism responses shape and affect terrorist threats. But as observed in the study, terrorism is by no means an easily or precisely defined phenomenon given that it is a human action that seeks to shape opinion through largely symbolic acts of violence, and by generating psychological fear of violence in the populace in order to influence government action. For this reason, terrorism and responses to it cannot be seen as firmly set phenomena about which easy calculations and measurements can be made. I would further argue that since the government and terrorists are acting on the basis of perceptions, the interactions

between both actors in this process in Nigeria are not entirely positivist, although a certain degree of causality is implied in this study. This further highlights why in epistemological terms, this study takes the social constructivist approach in studying the threat-response processes towards shaping Nigeria's counter-terrorist strategy.

With this said, a further core dataset is offered here in the form of a number of qualitative semi-structured interviews. As Kvale contends, qualitative research interviews have the aim of "interpreting the meaning of the phenomena described."⁴ Having described the action-reaction phenomena inherent in a set of case studies in the previous chapters, the aim in this next chapter of the study is to use a set of qualitative interviews on the one hand and questionnaires on the other to triangulate the action-reaction hypothesis by way of what Hein terms "meaning making."⁵ I therefore developed a set of questions around the topical issues derived from the key points in the case studies, and which are imperatives for effective counter-terrorism effort. This sought to find out what the current pulse of government counter-terrorism efforts is, what this holds for the future of terrorism in Nigeria, and what public and expert opinion are as to how to better the government's counter-terrorism drive. Specifically, this second set of data covered the topical issues of counter terrorism policy and legislation, governance, counter terrorism institutions, national security architecture, border management and public strategic communication. The outcome of the survey is subsequently discussed in a definition of the issue, respondents' views and corroborating/ contending argument and analysis format.

8.3 Issue One: Policy and Legislation on Terrorism

⁴ S. Kvale, "Dialogue as Oppression and Interview Research." Paper presented at the Nordic Educational Research Association Conference, Tallinn, 7-9 March 2002, p. 9.

⁵ George E. Hein, "Is Meaning Making Constructivism? Is Constructivism Meaning Making?" Available online at http://name-aam.org/uploads/downloadables/EXH.fall_99/EXH_fall_99_Is%20Meaning%20Making%20Constructivism%20s%20Constructivism%20Meaning%20Making_Hein.pdf, accessed 4 July 2015.

A national policy to counter terrorism is fundamental for countries whose national security has been undermined or threatened by terrorism. According to Agholor, national policy is a set of principles and broad guidelines articulated to manage a nation's security decision making and actions.⁶ Applied to terrorism therefore, it is a frame of reference that describes how a country provides for and guarantees the security of the state and its citizens against terrorism. In countries such as the US and the UK, the policy exists in the form of an integrated document known as a counter-terrorism strategy. The document guides decisions on the part of the executives, communicates decisions to the implementation agencies, informs the public as well as provides a measure for gauging performance, evaluation and review. Alongside a policy is the legal framework consisting of legislations within which the counter-terrorism policy or strategy operates. In the UK, for instance, CONTEST defines terrorism as a security threat and sets priorities for dealing with it while the Terrorism Act gives a legal definition and establishes criminal procedures for handling cases of terrorism. The latter empowers institutions involved in terrorism and national security, facilitates speedy trial of terrorist suspects and ensures that every stakeholder operates within the law. The CONTEST and Terrorism Act are publicised not only among government and implementation bodies but also in print and electronic means for public awareness.

8.3.1 Respondents' View on Policy and Legislation on Terrorism

Among the questions that I posed to the respondents were those about their awareness of the existence of a national counter-terrorism strategy and of an act to prevent terrorism in Nigeria. My findings were that while very few of the respondents knew of the existence of the country's counter-terrorism strategy (that is NACTEST), more than half of them were aware of the TPA, which is the legislation against terrorism. However, for the more than half

⁶ NP Agholor, "National Security Policy: Imperatives for Nigeria", Commandant's Lecture delivered at the National Defence College Abuja Nigeria, April 2014.

that were aware of the TPA, the adequacy of the Act as a legal framework for curbing terrorism in Nigeria is a concern. For instance, Ashi asserted that many inadequacies were inherent in the Act especially on aspects that deal with arrests, detention and trial resulting in its criticism by human rights activists and civil society organizations.⁷ Many of the respondents in the areas where terrorism is prevalent felt the locals were often unjustly arrested and detained as suspected terrorists. However, Sampson was of the opinion that the TPA is fair and robust.⁸ He added that the laws have to be tough given the unprecedented level that terrorism has attained in Nigeria.⁹ For the NACTEST, Folorunsho observed that the released NACTEST has shortcomings as “it is undergoing testing, being relatively a new document when one considers its time of release.”¹⁰ Daramola was of the view that given the engagement of security agencies in the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram, the NACTEST could not have meaningful input from its users in terms of consultations, but on the other hand was hurriedly put together for their use.¹¹ In general, the outcome of my survey indicated that the NACTEST and TPA are yet to command a significant degree of acceptability as policy and legal instruments for countering terrorism in Nigeria.

8.3.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

The idea of a national counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria (with the acronym NACTEST) was mooted in December 2010 by the then NSA, General Andrew Azazi.¹² Its formulation was however stalled by ethno-religious and political sentiments mounted by pressure groups who felt it was targeted at Islamic elements in the northern part of the country.¹³ It thus remained in a draft until its endorsement in April 2014 by President Goodluck Jonathan and

⁷ Gabriel Ashi, telephone interview, Abuja, 12 June 2014.

⁸ Isaac Terwase Sampson, National Defence College Abuja, interviewed 17 May 2014.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ O Folorunsho, Joint Terrorism Analysis Bureau, Counter Terrorism Department Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja – Nigeria interviewed 12 November 2014.

¹¹ O Daramola, Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja, interviewed 12 November 2014.

¹² Office of the National Security Adviser Nigeria Archives, accessed 14 November 2013.

¹³ Anonymous to author.

subsequent release for operational use.¹⁴ This means that prior to this time, there were no documented guidelines for the conduct of counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Consequently, such matters as specific roles of counter-terrorism agencies, the interface between policy-makers and the security agencies, and with the public were not streamlined and therefore unwieldy. The NACTEST 2014 was released without adequate critiquing through workshops and seminars.¹⁵ It is equally yet to be well publicised. This probably accounts for the poor knowledge of its existence by members of the public as observed in the survey. The critiquing and circulation of the NACTEST is imperative particularly for the implementation agencies who ought to extract and interpret the provisions of the strategy as it affects them both individually and collectively.

In terms of legislation, the TPA was enacted on 22 June 2011.¹⁶ This was after five years during which a bill to that effect was sponsored in the National Assembly. Initially, it was lawmakers from the southern part of the country that opposed the bill for fear of categorizing the militancy in the Niger Delta as terrorism.¹⁷ Thereafter, opinion leaders in the northern part of the country opposed the bill ostensibly to safeguard attempts to arrest and prosecute perceived Islamic fundamentalists.¹⁸ It thus could be argued that the delay in formulating a counter-terrorism policy and an anti-terrorism legislation allowed for terrorism to take root in Nigeria. For instance, terrorist suspects such as Mohammed Ashafa, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Ilya Damagun that were arrested and charged with receiving funds for

¹⁴ Presidential Directive in *The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)*, Abuja, 2014.

¹⁵ National Defence College of Nigeria Course 22 Participants Seminar Report, Abuja, June 2014.

¹⁶ See Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, p. 1.

¹⁷ Terwase Sampson and Freedom Onuoha, "Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it Realise its Taste?"

Understanding the Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria" in *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol 5, No 3-4 (2011).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

terrorist operations could not be prosecuted.¹⁹ They were all released on the account that there were no requisite legislative provisions to deal with the cases.

The TPA enacted in 2011 covered issues such as acts that constitute terrorism and related offences, terrorism funding as well as mutual assistance and extradition.²⁰ It was reviewed in February 2013 to further empower the security agencies. The TPA 2013 empowers security personnel to arrest and to detain suspects for extended periods of time. Section 27(1) states that:

The court may, pursuant to an ex-parte application, grant an order for the detention of a suspect under this Act for a period not exceeding 90 days subject to renewal for a similar period until the conclusion of the investigation and prosecution of the matter that led to the arrest and detention is dispensed with.”²¹

The allowance for an indefinite number of extensions arguably allows for open-ended detention of suspects which is perhaps inimical to quick dispensation of justice. Similarly, the Act allows security personnel the freedom to carry out what Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri described as “haphazard large-scale arrests.”²² Equally were incidences of large scale retaliatory military deployments, urban lockdowns, door-to-door searches and communication intercepts which civil society organisations view as an intrusion into privacy and a violation of fundamental human rights.²³

It could equally be stated that the provisions in the TPA are not robust enough to ensure swift convictions thereby giving room for delayed or long trials as witnessed in the case of Senator

¹⁹ “Country Reports on Terrorism, Africa Review”, *Global Terrorism Organization Year Book*, (Washington D.C: International Business Publication, 2010), p. 83.

²⁰ See Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011

²¹ Terrorism (Prevention) Act, amended 2013, Section 27(1).

²² Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, “By the numbers: The Nigerian State’s efforts to counter Boko Haram” in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014), p. 192.

²³ *Ibid.* See also, Amnesty International. *Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands* (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2015) p. 33.

Ali Ndume who was arraigned for abetting terrorism.²⁴ Further inadequacies are the restrictions of handling cases of terrorism to federal courts, the absence of special courts and the insufficient number of lawyers trained to handle cases of terrorism.²⁵ All these inadequacies hinder effectiveness of the legislation process regarding the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. Therefore, the priorities for dealing with terrorism as would have been enshrined in a tested NACTEST and humane criminal procedures for handling cases of terrorism as ought to have been provided for in the TPA remain a concern. They consequently constitute a challenge to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. This raises the requirement for a proven counter-terrorism policy and the corollary review of existing legislation to contain terrorism in Nigeria.

8.3 Issue Two: Governance and Terrorism in Nigeria

Governance is critical in national security as it involves the management of a nation's resources to meet the needs of citizens including the security of citizens against threats such as terrorism. According to O'Neil, "states that lack legitimacy and control over the economy and other traditional levers of power provide the space and oxygen for terrorist groups to flourish."²⁶ Newman opines further that:

*It is in such environments - such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, Somalia, Georgia, Yemen, and Algeria - that local or transnational terrorist organizations can find a base of operations, a vacuum of authority, and a source of support.*²⁷

Lamba adds that such environments of governance deficit give rise to ungoverned spaces, and went on to define an ungoverned space as:

²⁴ Bayo Oladeji, Uchenna Awom and Chizoba Ogbeche, "Alleged Boko Haram Sponsorship – Senator Ali Ndume Arrested" *Leadership*, 22 November 2011.

²⁵ Adebisi Onanuga, "Lawyers seek special courts for terrorism" *The Nation*, available online, <http://thenationonline.net/lawyers-see-special-courts-terrorism/>, accessed 13 May 2015.

²⁶ See Edward Newman, "Exploring the "Root Causes" of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:8 (2006), pp. 749-772.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

*a place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behaviour.*²⁸

In line with the above, is the likelihood that within weak states occasioned by governance deficit are evidences of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, corruption and human rights abuse. While not dismissing the view of scholars such as Krueger and Maleckova that neither poverty nor education have a direct causal impact on terrorism, O'Neil's contention that terrorists need foot-soldiers who overwhelmingly come from the poor and down-trodden is significant.²⁹ The Nigerian situation could be said to fit in here from the outcome of my field survey.

8.3.1 Respondents' Views on Governance and Terrorism in Nigeria

Respondents overwhelmingly opined that the Nigerian government has over the years not met the expectations of Nigerians on aspects of the provision of security and basic human needs. Hassan, a traditional ruler, was of the opinion that the government had not empowered the people enough in terms of employment opportunities.³⁰ He pointed to the vast lands in his community that government could irrigate and resource the people to engage productively in agriculture. Many respondents believe that government presence was lacking as evident by lack of good roads, schools, hospitals, electricity and other essential needs for living. Mai'Adua viewed social and economic inequalities and the widening gap between the rich and the poor in the society as the crucial issues in the factor of governance and terrorism in

²⁸ Robert, D. Lamba, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Haven: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project". 2008. Available online at www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/ugash_report_final.pdf, accessed 12 January 2015.

²⁹ As cited in E. Newman, p. 753.

³⁰ Hassan Abdullahi, Community Head Mayo-Belwa, Adamawa State interviewed 12 February 2014.

Nigeria.³¹ He added that this was so as those in government composed the rich class while the masses constituted the poor.

8.3.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

Section 14 (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 affirms the importance of good governance by recognising that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.”³² The performances of successive Nigerian governments however seem to indicate a below average score in the achievement of this purpose. This is so when using yardsticks for measurement such as the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance.³³ The Mo Ibrahim’s five criteria for measurement of good governance are safety and security, rule of law, transparency and corruption, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and finally human development. Nigeria is thought to be deficient in the five criteria despite her enormous natural and human resources. It was rated among the poorly governed countries in Africa with a ranking of 37th position out of the 52 countries listed in the overall governance scale.³⁴

The country is plagued with high rates of poverty, economic disparity, political exclusion, illiteracy and unemployment which, as discussed in chapter three, abetted vulnerability to terrorist group appeal and membership. For instance, in 2011, the unemployment rate rose to 23.9 per cent from 21.1 per cent in 2010 and 19.7 per cent in 2009 with multiplier effects on poverty.³⁵ In 2014, the then Coordinating Minister for the Economy and Minister for Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala stated that no fewer than 5.3 million Nigerian youths were jobless

³¹ Mohammed Mai’Adua, Director Ministry of Labour Abuja, interviewed 12 March 2014.

³² The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.

³³ The M. O. Ibrahim Foundation was founded in 2006 by Dr Mohammed Ibrahim, a UK-based entrepreneur to encourage good governance in Africa. See <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/...>, accessed 14 May 2014.

³⁴ Ibangha Isine, “Nigeria, one of the Africa’s worst governed countries – Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, *Premium Times*, 1 October 2014

³⁵ O. A. Azazi “National Security Strategies: Issues and Challenges” Lecture delivered to National Defence College Course 20 Participants, 13 January 2012.

while 1.8 million graduates enter the labour market each year thereby increasing the unemployment rate, and by extension, the availability of idle youths that terrorist groups could recruit.

The nexus between governance and terrorism in Nigeria is particularly evident when one considers the situation in Northern Nigeria where Boko Haram terrorism prevails. The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics records in 2012 revealed that out of the total number of about 100 million Nigerians considered poor by World Bank standard, the northern part of the country has an average poverty rate of 70.1 per cent as compared to 36.9 per cent for the southern zones.³⁶ Equally, a recent report by the National Population Commission found that literacy rates are much lower among states in the north, and that 72 per cent of children around the age of 6 -16 years never attended schools in Borno, the state worst affected by Boko Haram activities.³⁷ All these are possible indications of the failure of government to deliver basic citizens' needs, a situation Onuoha opines results in people turning to religion, ethnicity and other expressions of identity for succour.³⁸ He further observes that:

...the failure to provide opportunities for better lives becomes an instrument for mobilizing and radicalizing the unemployed, unskilled, and poverty-ridden youths to join its (Boko Haram terrorists) cause and dislodge the secular controlled state as an alternative and plausible answer to their misery."³⁹

It could thus be argued that while poverty and unemployment may not be in themselves the prime factors for vulnerability to terrorist group recruitment and membership, the tendency for grievances and anti-state sentiments could easily be generated. This perhaps explains why in 2004, some students in Borno and Yobe states withdrew from school, tore up their

³⁶ Data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Abuja – Nigeria, 21 September 2013.

³⁷ National Population Commission Archives, 2013.

³⁸ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature (eds), *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa, 2013) pp. 407-430.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

certificates and joined the group of Koranic lessons and preaching, some of the preaching being highly critical of the state.⁴⁰ The students, one of whom was Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, felt that their education, apart from the Western and secular values unacceptable to them, was worthless in terms of employment opportunities.⁴¹

8.4 Issue Three: Counter-Terrorism Institutions

Institutions are the channels through which government carry out the management of a nation's resources to meet the needs of citizens including safeguards against threats such as terrorism. Kernal Dervis opines that "neither good policies nor good investments are likely to emerge or be sustainable in an environment with dysfunctional institutions."⁴² The institutions are therefore relatively a yardstick for gauging good governance or governance failure in aspects of citizens' security and welfare. In the context of terrorism and national security, the institutions could be divided into two. The first include those concerned with the socio-economic and political aspects including human security elements of eradicating poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and other factors that could possibly drive violent extremism and terrorism. The second comprise those institutions concerned with the traditional aspect of security which involve the conduct of counter-terrorism operations.

In Nigeria, the Federal Government institutions involved in counter-terrorism are outlined in Annex A of Section 7 of the NACTEST, enclosed as an Appendix in this study. They include a plethora of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) with their expected roles.

⁴⁰ F. C. Onuoha, "Youth Unemployment and Poverty: Connections and Concern for National Development in Nigeria", *International Journal of Modern Political Economy*, Vol.1, No. 1, 2010, pp.115-136.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Kernal Dervis, Forward in "Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance." *A World Bank Strategy*, Washington DC, November 2000.

8.4.1 Respondents' Views on Counter-Terrorism Institutions.

During my field survey, I sought respondents' opinions on the capacity and effectiveness of government agencies in meeting the expectations of Nigerians both in ameliorating conditions that could gravitate people to terrorism and in countering it. Their views were varied, but cumulatively showed a below average rating of the agencies both in capacity and effectiveness. Some of the respondents perceived that the Ministries of Labour, Youth Development, Agriculture and Education were yet to meet the expectations of Nigerians on employment generation, poverty alleviation, food security and literacy respectively.⁴³ Similarly, the Ministry of Justice, Economic and Financial Crime Commission and National Finance Intelligence Unit were said to have not delivered in terms of criminal justice, fighting corruption, monitoring terrorists funding networks and the arrest as well as prosecution of terrorists and their sponsors.⁴⁴ Many reasons bordering on funding, administration and corruption were adduced as responsible for the ineffectiveness of the institutions. A major consensus, however, was that the coordination of the agencies was deficient. Waya, for instance, stated that the bane of Nigeria's counter terrorism institutions was largely the dearth of coordination as each tends to act independently thus dissipating efforts and resources.⁴⁵

8.4.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis.

A recent report on the MDAs including those that comprise counter terrorism institutions revealed that they are poorly managed with an inherent lack of accountability and transparency, ailing infrastructure, poor staffing and funding.⁴⁶ All of these arguably impact

⁴³ T. Ologba, Director Department of State Services Abuja, interviewed 14 May 2014.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ T. T., Waya, Director Presidential Command Control and Communication Centre, State House Abuja, interviewed 17 January 2014.

⁴⁶ Report of Transition Committee set up by President Muhammadu Buhari to assess Federal Government Parastatals and Agencies, Abuja, June 2015.

negatively on their performance. Data obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics also suggest poor performance by the institutions.⁴⁷

This author observed that none of the MDAs was designated as lead-ministry or agency for coordinating counter-terrorism in Nigeria as applies in countries such as the UK. There have been ongoing debates for the designation of such an agency, but the choice between the Nigerian Police and the Department of State Services have often resulted in heated debates at the National Assembly without a decision.⁴⁸ There is equally unhealthy rivalry among some of these institutions which erodes the synergy that could have been derived from cooperation in terms of pulling resources together.⁴⁹

The CTC at the ONSA currently oversees the efforts of the counter-terrorism institutions. However, the Department is not sufficiently equipped, staffed or organized to carry out this role effectively.⁵⁰ It also took on responsibilities beyond its mandate in that the role of ONSA is advisory and not legally established to be involved in directing operational issues such as counter-terrorism.⁵¹ The CTC it was also observed, concentrates efforts more on the security agencies to the detriment of harnessing the potentials of civil government agencies, civil society organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and international development agencies involved in the counter terrorism effort. In this wise, it could be reasonably maintained that the CTC, as currently structured and task-organized, is not an appropriate counter-terrorism coordinating body. This therefore brings to fore the need for an appropriate body to coordinate the efforts of all the counter-terrorism institutions (military and civil) to enhance the achievement of national counter-terrorism objectives.

⁴⁷ <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pages/NBS%20eLibrary>, accessed 13 May 2014.

⁴⁸ The debates have been spearheaded by the Nigerian Senate Committee on National Intelligence led by Senator Nuhu Aliyu. Also see United States Department of Defense Country Report on Terrorism 2011, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf>, accessed 12 May 2015.

⁴⁹ A. A. Abdulsalami, "A Comprehensive Approach to National Security Management in Nigeria" being a paper delivered at NDC Abuja to NDC Course 22 participants on 7 Oct 2013.

⁵⁰ T. T. Waya, interviewed 17 January 2014.

⁵¹ Federal Government of Nigeria, *The National Security Act (CAP 278)*, 1986.

8.5 Issue Four: National Security and Intelligence Architecture

Nigeria's national security bodies involved in the counter-terrorism efforts of the government include the AFN, NPF, Nigeria Customs Service and the Nigeria Immigration Service. The other agencies involved are the Nigeria Prison Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, National Emergency Management Agency and the Nigerian Federal Fire Service. As noted in chapter three, the bulk of counter-terrorism intelligence effort is undertaken by the three Nigerian Secret Intelligence Agencies (officially addressed as the Nigeria Intelligence Community). It is on these national security bodies, particularly the AFN, which the Nigerian government's main counter-terrorism thrust revolves. This is to the extent that in August 2015, the country's President tasked the AFN to end Boko Haram attacks within three months.⁵²

8.5.1 Respondents' Views on the Efforts of Nigeria's Security Forces.

My survey indicated that Nigerians have high expectations on the security forces to counter the terrorist threat that the country is faced with. About two-thirds of my respondents were however not satisfied with the efforts so far made by Nigeria's security forces in countering terrorism. Some expected that with Nigeria's experience in Peace Support Operations and enviable record of restoring law and order in other countries, the threat of terrorism in Nigeria would have been easily dealt with. Some respondents in IDP camps account that they witnessed soldiers abandon their posts on sighting an advancing terrorist force. Mallam Isah, a seventy-two year old respondent asked me where the guns that were used to chase the Chadian rebels in 1982 were as he could not hear the sound of such artillery pieces on the side of the Nigerian troops.⁵³

⁵² Isiaka Wakili, "Buhari gives 3 months ultimatum to service chiefs to end B/Haram" *Daily Trust*, 13 August 2015.

⁵³ Mallam Usman Isah, Makata Village, Borno State, interviewed 18 June 2015.

Respondents who were members of the security forces opined that the basic challenge was that the AFN lacked adequate firepower and intelligence to combat the terrorists. A commander in the field further stated that signals and communication equipment were inadequate and the few available were not interoperable among the three Services of the AFN nor with other security agencies.⁵⁴ He added that the Nigerian government had to shut down telecommunication services in parts of north-eastern Nigeria because the security agencies could not leverage them to monitor the activities of Boko Haram; instead it was the terrorists that were using them actively against the security forces.⁵⁵

8.5.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

It could be said that the continued terrorist attacks in Nigeria have called to question the professional efficiency and capability of the AFN as well as the security and intelligence agencies in dealing with the threat of terrorism. It has been noted in several fora that long years of military rule in Nigeria led to decay in military professionalism and that the security agencies were mainly used as tools for keeping regimes in power. Training was de-emphasized and equipment were neither maintained nor replaced. The deficient state of the AFN and the security agencies in terms of manpower and equipment capability was to such an extent that the Nigerian Government had to hire mercenaries from South Africa to fight Boko Haram terrorists.⁵⁶ Varin contends that it was the use of the mercenaries, among other factors, that turned the tide against the Boko Haram terrorists in the days prior to Nigeria's presidential election held on 11 April, 2015.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Brigadier General A R Owolabi, 57 Division Signal Commander, 7 Division Nigerian Army Maiduguri, interviewed on 20 January 2014.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ed Cropley, "Boko Haram: Nigeria hires hundreds of mercenaries to help fight Islamist militant group" *The Independent*, 12 March 2015.

⁵⁷ Caroline Varin, "Mercenaries in Nigeria: opportunity or humiliation for the Nigerian Armed Forces?" being paper delivered at the 2nd Joint Africa Research Group and African Leadership Centre Event held at Kings College London, 6 October 2015.

The unprofessional handling of security issues has equally been a problem. For instance, the security agencies have been accused of been high-handed, inhumane and sometimes complicit in the mistreatment of suspects.⁵⁸ Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of the Boko Haram sect was supposedly extra-judicially killed by the police after his arrest in 2009. This possibly prompted the sect to seek revenge of the death of their leader. Additionally, the emphasis of government on the use of the military in its counter-terrorism effort have resulted in security forces being accused of collateral damage, brutality, torture and extra-judicial killing of suspects.⁵⁹ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri contend that this dynamic has left much of the local population caught between the brutality perpetrated by Boko Haram and the excesses wrought by the Nigerian security forces.⁶⁰ The situation has led to loss of public confidence on the security agencies thereby eroding the relations between the security agencies and the populace to the point that members of the public are unwilling to volunteer information to the security agencies.⁶¹ More worrisome is the fact that countries such as the US, which is at the forefront of the global fight against terrorism, show apathy in assisting the Nigerian military citing human right abuses by Nigeria's security forces as a reason.

Further worsening the capacity of security agencies is perhaps inadequate technological infrastructure which undermines their efforts in countering terrorism. According to Udeh, there is no integrated national data base, effective criminal records and forensic system. Also inadequate are Closed Circuit Television technology, Global Positioning System tracking devices, Predictive Screening Devices and Un-manned Aerial Vehicles.⁶² Udeh further opined that it was difficult to integrate intelligence on terrorists due to ineffective operational

⁵⁸ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., p. 192.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch, 2014.

⁶⁰ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, p. 193.

⁶¹ Ibis.

⁶² CS Udeh, "Boko Haram and Counter-terrorism Strategy in Nigeria: An Exploratory Anatomy" in O Mbachu and UM Bature, *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa publishers, 2013), p. 315.

fusion centres and that low technological infrastructure have adversely affected the capacity of security operatives thereby keeping them far behind the terrorists. This situation invariably did not allow the security agencies to pre-empt many Boko Haram attacks including those targeted at security establishments as evidenced in the terrorists attack on 202 Battalion of the Nigerian Army at Bama on 20 April 2012.⁶³

Poor remuneration and welfare packages add to the poor state of the Nigerian security and intelligence agencies. A soldier of the Nigerian Army, for instance, earns on the average 250 US Dollar monthly and operations allowances are often paid in arrears. Adding to this is the problem of corruption which has among other consequences bedevilled military procurement.⁶⁴ Up until early 2015 when the Nigerian military received some new fighting vehicles and helicopters, their firepower hardly matched that of the terrorists. The result was low morale of troops and consequent reluctance to engage the terrorists in combat. All these factors accounted for why the terrorists were able to capture and hold parts of north-eastern Nigeria where they hoisted black flags and proclaimed an Islamic State within Nigeria.

8.6 Issue Five: Border Management and Terrorism in Nigeria

A nation's borders are crucial to its security because they define the geographical limits of such a country and the extent to which it could manage threats within and outside. Nations maintain secured borders to prevent illegal movement of persons, goods and services that may constitute a threat to their national security. However, issues of international borders are not the prerogative of one country as all the countries involved share responsibility for its management. This is more so given the fact that globalisation, advancement in ICT as well as the activities of non-state actors have undermined the sanctity of traditional international borders. Additional to this, and with respect to terrorism, is the diffused nature of the threat

⁶³ OT Ethan, Chief of Civil Military Affairs, Nigerian Army Headquarters Abuja, interviewed on 10 January 2014.

⁶⁴ Amnesty International (UK) Report 2015,

and the blurring of the dividing line between domestic and international terrorism. Consequently, no one country can deal with terrorism alone whether within or across its borders.

Nigeria maintains land borders with Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroun as well as a maritime boundary with the Atlantic Ocean. The land borders are as shown in Table 8.6.

Table 8.1 Length of Borders between Nigeria and Contiguous Neighbours

Serial	Country	Length in km	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Cameroon	1,690 East of Nigeria	Not adequately manned
2.	Niger	1,497 North of Nigeria	“ “
3.	Benin	773 West of Nigeria	“ “
4.	Chad	87 North East of Nigeria	“ “

Source: M. Spencer “Border and State Insecurity: Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century” *International Perspective*, Vol. 2 (2007), p.110.

The table shows that Nigeria maintains about 4,047km land borders with its immediate neighbours. As Moro notes, the borders are porous with 84 regular entry and exit points as well as over 1,487 illegal routes.⁶⁵ The porosity and vastness of the Nigerian borders with immediate neighbours means that their effective management is an imperative. This however appears not to have been the case judging from the opinion of respondents from the field survey I conducted.

8.6.1 Respondents’ Views on Border Management to Curb Terrorism

In the field survey, I sought respondents’ views as to how effective they perceived Nigerian borders have been managed to curb terrorism. The respondents’ perceptions were generally

⁶⁵ Abba Moro, Presentation by Honourable Minister for Interior at the 2013 Ministerial Platform, Abuja, 20 July 2013.

that the border areas are neglected as there was little presence of government. The border posts were also said to be poorly manned. Hamza, for instance described the situation at most of the country's border posts as "pitiable; ill-defined, ill-equipped and ill-manned with ill-motivated officials."⁶⁶ A respondent opined that the officials at border posts were corrupt and collect bribes to allow free access of persons and goods thereby compromising security.⁶⁷ Amao opined that the porosity of Nigeria's international borders make them serve as a conduit for the supply of arms and recruits for Boko Haram as well as an escape route for its combatants.⁶⁸

8.6.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

This author had the opportunity to visit some of the border posts in Adamawa, one of the terrorist-affected states. The respondents' views of the poor state of the Nigeria's border posts was observed to be true. Ate and Akinterinwa, two renowned scholars on Nigeria's foreign policy contend that the country's borders are not only vast but largely un-demarcated, poorly manned and contested by all its immediate neighbours.⁶⁹ It is this situation, among other factors, that Boko Haram terrorists probably exploited to establish safe havens at border areas such as the Sambisa forest which border Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. It may be pertinent to note that the same circumstance is applicable to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border exploited by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Syria-Turkey border used by ISIS and Al-Shaabab's forays in Kenya-Somalia border areas. The common feature in all these examples, as is the case with Nigeria, is the impact of ungoverned spaces to collective security of nations. The stretch of the Trans-Saharan route that runs through the northern part of Nigeria up to Libya and Sudan

⁶⁶ K. I. Hamza, Comptroller Nigeria Customs Service, Borno State Command interviewed 17 April 2014.

⁶⁷ Respondent anonymous to author.

⁶⁸ Dayo Amao, Commander 75 Strike Group Yola, interviewed 18 March 2014.

⁶⁹ Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa, *Cross Border Armed Banditry in the North East: Issues in National Security and Nigeria's Relations with its Immediate Neighbours* (Lagos: NIIA, 2011).

arguably provides freedom of movement to terrorists, free flow of illicit consignments and the proliferation of weapons.

The nature of Nigeria's borders and its management could best be explained when one examines the situation in Borno State where Boko Haram activities are most prevalent. Borno State has international borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon, which measure over 600 kilometres.⁷⁰ A large portion of this border is unmanned, which allows illegal trafficking of arms and entry of aliens into Nigeria. According to Musa, there are 10 legal and 125 illegal entry points on Nigeria's international border in Borno State.⁷¹ The uncontrolled entry possibly exacerbated terrorist activities in Borno State, as some aliens served as mercenaries and arms suppliers of Boko Haram. Equally compounding this issue is the socio-cultural affinity and the informal economic and political activities among Nigeria's border communities. In Borno State, Nigerian tribes such as Hausa, Mandara, Kanuri, Fulani and Kotoko live in Cameroon, the Kanembu and Shuwa Arabs in Chad and the Hausa as well as the Fulani in Niger.⁷² Such affinity and informal interactions hinder the efforts of security agents at checking cross border movements. It consequently makes the area vulnerable to trans-border crimes and the intensification of terrorist activities.

The management of Nigeria's borders is also made problematic by the poor cooperation of Nigeria's contiguous countries. All the contiguous countries depend on Nigeria for goods and services particularly in the form of informal trade which thrives more through the illegal routes and at border communities that have socio-cultural affinity. The informal trade

⁷⁰ A. S. Adebajo, Comptroller of Immigration Services, interviewed at the National Defence College Abuja, 8 January 2014.

⁷¹ Sagir Musa, "Border Security, Arms Proliferation and Terrorism in Nigeria" *Sunday Trust*, <<http://www.sundaytrust.ng/index.php/comment-debate12753.border-security-arms-proliferation-and-terrorism-in-nigeria>>, accessed 7 January 2014.

⁷² A. E. Osewe, "Nigeria's Porous Borders and its Implications for Human and National Security", Quoted in HD Dlakwa and HI Bazza, *Peace Security Human Right and Development in the 21st Century*, (Kaduna: Pyla-Mak Services Ltd, Vol. 1, 2010), p. 79.

benefits the neighbouring countries and they therefore tacitly support it.⁷³ This allows for the unhindered movement of contraband, illegal arms and undesirable elements into Nigeria.

Apart from the tacit support for informal trade, the sometimes uncooperative attitude of contiguous countries could be viewed from the perspective of their deliberate response to Nigeria's big posture attitude towards them. The situation is not helped by the fact that all the four contiguous countries are Francophone with strong affiliations to France as against Nigeria that is Anglophone. The differences further hinder cooperation between the border agencies, the effectiveness of the MNJTF and other bilateral as well as multilateral security arrangements. Another very significant factor to consider is that the poor cooperation by Nigeria's contiguous neighbours is not all occasioned by a seeming deliberate effort on their part but rather the weak capacity of the countries, with perhaps the relative exception of Cameroon, to enforce border control. This places a strain on Nigeria's border management agencies. Worsening this is the fact that the various border committees and commissions established by the Nigerian Government are not properly task-organized to facilitate cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours on border management. The Nigeria Boundary Commission that is responsible for all border matters, internal and external, appears overwhelmed by problems of communal boundary disputes within Nigeria and therefore too occupied to effectively cope with international border issues.

8.7 Issue Six: Employment of Strategic Communication and Partnership

The concept of strategic communications revolves around the notion that nations cannot pursue their interest through the employment of military power alone. Strategic communications combine hard and soft power (otherwise known as smart power) through the planning, coordination and dissemination of desired messages from an organization to an

⁷³ Some scholars believe that the tacit support stems from the fact that some of the countries are land-lock and burdened by tariffs and duties attendant with formal trade. See Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa, NIIA, 2011.

identified target audience.⁷⁴ It entails persuading the international community to stand alongside the country in question or at least stay neutral, and influencing adversaries to believe that one has the power and the will to prevail over them. More pertinent, and in the context of this study, strategic communications entail persuading the nation's citizens to support the policies of government so that a national will is forged to accomplish national strategic objectives. In line with this is the government's strategic engagement of the society, in other words, the leveraging of Public-Private-Partnership in its counter-terrorism effort. However, the Nigerian government engagement of citizens in the formulation and implementation of its counter-terrorism programmes appears inadequate as adjudged from the outcome of my field survey.

8.7.1 Respondents' Opinion on the Adequacy of Strategic Communication and Public Private Partnership in Countering Terrorism in Nigeria

Respondents were asked for their opinion regarding the adequacy of strategic communications and PPP in counter-terrorism in Nigeria. About three-quarters of the respondents opined that the government's efforts at enlightening, persuading or engaging the citizens in its counter-terrorism effort were poor. Furthermore, it appeared from my field survey that people's trust and confidence in the government to secure their lives and property from the scourge of terrorism were low. This is judging from the opinion of respondents as to whether the Government of Nigeria is winning the fight against terrorism. More than half of the respondents felt that the government is at present not winning the fight. Some respondents preferred not to give a direct "Yes or No" answer. The large number of people not sure of the government's efforts to defeat terrorism further emphasizes the imperative of strategic communication that targets citizens' trust and confidence as well as their willingness to partner with government.

⁷⁴ J Nkwocha, "Strategic communications: The missing factor in Nigeria's downstream business" excerpt from paper delivered at International Conference on Refining & Petrochemicals organised by the University of Port Harcourt, 27 Sep 13.

8.7.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

It was observed during a three-day Strategic Communications Workshop on Counter Terrorism organized jointly by the National Defence College Abuja and the ONSA from 9-11 December 2013 that Nigeria was yet to effectively adopt the concept of strategic communications.⁷⁵ This was in spite of the ideological underpinnings of the Boko Haram sect which aim at driving public opinion against the government. It was further noted that there ought to be a strategic communications counter-narrative that targets the local populace, the international community and even the terrorists in order to win perception and influence attitudes favourably towards the Nigerian government's efforts.

According to Bello, the inadequate engagement of citizens by the government in its counter-terrorism efforts was a concern.⁷⁶ He added that this partly accounted for citizens' lack of trust and confidence on the government to secure their lives and property from the scourge of terrorism. Daramola observed that the situation is worsened by the absence of an institution in the form of a think tank centre or superintending body that will draw together all stakeholders in the public and private sector involved in the operations of strategic communications.⁷⁷ In a similar vein, Iredia observed that the media which, as the dominant means of communication, ought to be the pivot of strategic communication in Nigeria is yet to be properly integrated or co-opted into government's counter-terrorism efforts.⁷⁸ The import of all these factors is that the attainment of strategic communications requires a multi-disciplinary and multi-track approach to counter the frames and narratives of the terrorists, restore government legitimacy and win public confidence. This suggests and aligns with the

⁷⁵ M. S. Dasuki, Key Note Address presented at the Strategic Communications Plan Workshop for Counter Insurgency in Nigeria held at the National Defence College Abuja, 9 December 2014.

⁷⁶ S. Y. Bello, Presidential Coordinator Counter Terrorism Department, interviewed 23 April 2013.

⁷⁷ K. Daramola, Director Legal Interception Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja. Interviewed 12 November 2014.

⁷⁸ Tony Iredia, Nigeria Television Authority Presentation on Role of the Media in National Security, Mass Media Retreat, May 2013.

imperative of an all-stakeholder approach that employ both governmental and non-governmental means to counter terrorism.

The foregoing appraisal of issues pertaining to the responses of the Nigerian government to the threats of terrorism could be said to have further brought to light a plethora of lapses and challenges plaguing the counter terrorism efforts of the government. These range from inadequate policy and legal frameworks, governance deficit, weak and dysfunctional institutions to poor capacity of security and intelligence agencies. Equally are problems of ill border management and inadequate public-private partnership in the counter-terrorism effort of government. All of these have challenged and made ineffective government's current counter-terrorism efforts as could be adjudged by the continuous terrorist attacks in the country. The situation is worrisome as it creates a feeling of uncertainty as to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. A perhaps worthwhile question to ask given this situation is "what is the likely or possible future trend of terrorism in Nigeria"? The answer here is important as it is reckoned that such projection, combined with the appraisal of government responses made so far, stand to provide a better spectrum for suggesting an effective counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

8.8 Future Trends of Terrorism in Nigeria

The future trends of terrorism in Nigeria could be viewed through the prism of current developments in the country and those in the external environment that affects it. The developments that could shape the future of terrorism in Nigeria that will be examined are the outcome of the 2015 Nigeria's general elections, the role of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the activities of civil society organizations. The others are Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbours, the commitment of the international community and regional issues.

8.8.1 Outcome of 2015 General Election

A general election into Nigeria's Fifth Republic executive and legislative offices at the national level took place on 28 March 2015 while that at state level was held on 11 April 2015. Elections in Nigeria are more often than not accompanied with violence predicated on allegations of electoral malpractices. There was therefore prior to the elections anxiety on the part of Nigerians and the international community that in the event of such electoral violence in 2015, the already volatile security situation in the country could further degenerate. The terrorists could consequently take advantage of the situation to further their cause. The situation could also have necessitated further engagement of Nigeria's security forces that are already overstretched in internal security and counter-terrorism operations. This could have given the terrorists tactical and operational advantage and consequently prolonged the terrorism situation in Nigeria.

What was more significant about the outcome of the general election was who emerged as the President of Nigeria. This was predicated on the grounds that both the northern and southern politicians laid claims as to the region that ought to occupy the office of the President. As noted in chapter four, politics and religion in Nigeria are closely linked, and in almost the same manner that extreme Islamism is thought to be linked to terrorism. It was thus the view in some quarters that some Muslims in the northern part of the country may be sympathetic to the Boko Haram terrorist cause if Goodluck Jonathan or another southern Christian emerged as the President following the elections. Similarly, there were apprehensions that if a northern Muslim emerged as President, militancy in the Niger Delta region could resurface ostensibly in protest over the region being denied a second tenure as President. There were pronouncements by former militant leaders such as Asari Dokubo to this effect. Inter-party rivalry particularly between the then ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and the then opposition All Peoples' Congress (APC) heated the polity along these lines. There were

allegations by the PDP of APC's sponsorship of Boko Haram activities while the APC accused the ruling PDP of fuelling terrorism in the North East of the country (where it had less political support) in order to scuttle the conduct of elections there. In a nutshell, predictions were rife that Boko Haram terrorism could further assume more political colouration thereby providing the terrorists a political cause that could plunge the country into grave insurgency along ethno-religious lines.

The general elections were eventually conducted in a climate of relative peace, but the issues they raised are still potent. The APC presidential candidate, Major General Muhammed Buhari (retired) emerged victorious and was sworn in as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria on 29 May 2015. The APC also won more seats in the National Assembly and in 19 of 28 states declared by INEC thereby turning the tide between it and the PDP as the ruling and opposition party respectively. An observation pertinent to this study however is that the voting pattern in the election reflected the age-long security dilemma of North-South and Muslim-Christian divide. Equally, the north-eastern part of the country where terrorism prevails voted massively against the PDP, which is a probable indication of their dissatisfaction with the PDP-led government's counter-terrorism policies. There are compelling reasons to argue that the future trend of terrorism in Nigeria would therefore be largely determined by how committed the recently inaugurated government of President Buhari is in tackling the wider political and socio-economic issues affecting the Nigerian state. It could further be influenced by the political will to fight terrorism and in line with this, the counter-terrorism approach of the government.

So far, President Muhammadu Buhari has promised to reposition the Nigerian military and other security agencies to contain the activities of Boko Haram. It is opined that he could muster his advantage of being a northerner and a Muslim to mobilise the support of the people and traditional institutions in Northern Nigeria to contain the terrorism perpetrated by

Boko Haram. The problem would however be in the Niger Delta where he needs to pay significant attention to the yet to be fully resolved grievances of the militants and inhabitants of the area. Not doing this could provoke a resurgence of terrorist activities by the militants in the Niger Delta, other areas that may feel marginalised in the current political arrangement.

8.8.2 Role of Civilian Joint Task Force

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a vigilante organization established by some youths and able-bodied men to confront the activities of Boko Haram. Their emergence, Ross contends, was largely due to the over-stretching of government forces and the need to defend towns and villages where there was a deficit in security coverage.⁷⁹ The youths and able-bodied men summoned the courage to organise themselves into 'neighbourhood watch groups' against the sect in defence of their communities. Although they bore no firearms, their emergence significantly complemented the efforts of the security agencies particularly in information-gathering, which assisted in the arrest and killing of many Boko Haram members, including high profile commanders. They were equally able to effect arrest of suspected Boko Haram members on their own effort. According to Isang, the group arrested over 2,500 suspected members of Boko Haram between May and August 2013 using only sticks, disused iron rods and machetes.⁸⁰ The success that they achieved won them the tacit approval and support of both the security agencies and the government. This was more so as the security agencies that lacked the support of the locals were with the emergence of the CJTF given a boost to dislodge Boko Haram terrorists from some towns and villages such as Michika and the Maiduguri environs.⁸¹

⁷⁹ W. Ross, "Nigeria's Vigilante's Take on Boko Haram", *BBC News Africa Documentary*, 13 November 2013.

⁸⁰ P. J. Isang, Army Headquarters Abuja, interviewed 17 March 2014.

⁸¹ Z. Lorenzo, "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2013). pp. 21-34.

Similar to the CJTF is the mobilisation of local hunters to defend communities threatened or attacked by Boko Haram terrorists. The local hunters have good knowledge of both the human and physical terrain. Armed with Dane guns, spears and other traditional weapons for hunting, and relying on courage and the support of locals, the hunters assisted the military in confronting the terrorists with significant success.⁸² For instance, they complemented the military effort in recapturing towns such as Mubi, Maiha, Gwoza and Chibok which had earlier been overrun by the terrorists.⁸³

The involvement of the locals in complementing military effort is a novel and unfolding concept in counter terrorism in Nigeria. It demonstrates the zeal of the society for a collective effort or mechanism against the threat of terrorism. The point, however, that the use of non-state institutions for national security purposes could be considered a failure or break-down in the fabric of the state should not be lost. This is when one takes into account the Weberian notion that the state ought to have the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in safeguarding citizens and property.⁸⁴ Equally worth consideration is the tendency for their misuse or their getting out of state control. So far, the Nigerian government welcomes the initiative, viewing it as the citizens' exercise of their rights to defend themselves and the nation.⁸⁵ The government has equally avowed to regulate the activities of the CJTF and local hunters to ensure that they do not go out of their way to constitute a security problem in the long run. It is projected that as people continue to bear the brunt of terrorism, so would they develop ways and means of resilience and self-defence, a situation that security agencies and the government could exploit in the counter-terrorism effort. The sustenance and refinement

⁸² See *This Day*, 13 November 2014

⁸³ See *Premium Times*, 13 November 2014.

⁸⁴ Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78. Also see K. Grechenig and M. Kolmar, "The State's Enforcement Monopoly and Private Protection of Property" *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 170, Issue 1 (2014), pp. 5-23.

⁸⁵ Press Brief by Mike Omeri, the Coordinator National Information Centre Abuja, 4 December 2014.

of such partnership between the government/security agencies and the locals could positively shape the countering of terrorism in Nigeria.

8.8.3 Activities of Civil Society Organisations

Counter-terrorism measures are geared towards ensuring the security of people and the society at large. However, as scholars such as Howell and Lind posit, some of the fundamental human rights and liberties of people often end up being infringed upon by such measures.⁸⁶ It is this infringement of the rights and wellbeing of the people that is of interest to the civil society. This interest sometimes conflicts with that of the security agencies because the civil societies deem some counter-terrorism measures to be contravening civil liberties and rights.⁸⁷

In Nigeria, the civil society is as large, diverse and complex as its population. It includes organizations of different capacities, influence and degrees of formalities such as non-governmental, faith-based, professional, community-based, religious and traditional institutions as well as the media. Their activities include informal conflict mediation, reporting of incidents of armed violence, community education and victim assistance. They operate at grassroots level through community-based work and up to the federal level where they collaborate with government authorities as well as international actors.

In relation to terrorism in Nigeria, the government and security agencies have come under severe criticism for human right abuses in the effort to contain terrorism. This is as the government counter-terrorism approach has been mainly military-centred with allegations of brutality, collateral damage, indiscriminate arrests and detentions as well as extra-judicial killings. In June 2013, the National Human Rights Commission made a comprehensive report

⁸⁶ Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind, "Counter-terrorism measures and civil society in the UK and US" being paper delivered at NCVO/ESRC NGPA seminar series at the London School of Economics, 6 March 2009.

⁸⁷ See for instance Amnesty International June 2015 report, *Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands* which indicted the Nigerian military for war crimes.

of torture, extra-judicial killings and collateral damage by Nigerian security agencies at Baga town in Borno State.⁸⁸ Another such incriminating report was that by Amnesty International in June 2015.⁸⁹ Perhaps the group that has turned out more vocal recently is the Bring Back Our Girls campaign group whose membership includes former federal government ministers and politicians. The group came into existence following the capture of 276 girls of Government Secondary School in Chibok. It attained local and international recognition because of its tenacity of purpose, criticism of government counter-terrorism measures and support from other human right groups within and outside Nigeria.

The support of the international community (particularly states such as the US and UK) to the civil society organisations has boosted the latter's activities. In November 2014, the US government gave grants worth 9.2 million US Dollar to the civil society organisations in Nigeria.⁹⁰ Funds from sources such as this assist the organisations in promoting the rights of Nigerians and advocating for soft and "humane" counter-terrorism measures as against the use of brutal military force. Thus, while putting government on its toes to use all soft means to bring terrorism to an end, it could be said that the civil society's often conflicting interests with those of the military tends to slows down the military efforts. Since the government counter-terrorism efforts are mainly military-driven, the conflict of interest between the civil security organisations and the military may need to be bridged so as not to prolong the efforts to contain terrorism in Nigeria. This raises the need for the harmonisation of the efforts of the organisations with that of the government if a concerted and holistic approach to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria is to be achieved early.

⁸⁸ See "The Baga Incident and the Situation in North East Nigeria: An Interim Assessment and Report". Report by the National Human Rights Commission Nigeria, June 2013, available at premiumtimesng.com, accessed 26 November 2014.

⁸⁹ Amnesty International (UK), 2015.

⁹⁰ Stella Omona, "U.S. Gives \$9.2M to CSOs to Promote Democracy in Nigeria" *Daily Independent*, 11 November 2014.

8.8.4 Nigeria – Immediate Neighbours' Relations

Nigeria enjoys a considerable measure of cordial relationships with its immediate neighbours. It has bilateral agreement on defence and security with Niger Republic.⁹¹ As part of the agreement, joint military patrols are conducted to enhance security along the Nigeria – Niger border. Nigeria also has multilateral security agreements with Chad and Niger, which led to the establishment of a MNJTF in 1998 with its headquarters at Baga in Borno State.⁹² The MNJTF was originally established to check cross-border banditry and criminal activities such as human, arms and drug trafficking. However, with the upsurge of Boko Haram attacks in 2009, the Force's mandate was expanded to include counter-terrorism operations. This became necessary with the realisation that the Boko Haram terrorists were using the areas along the countries' common border as a safe haven.

The availability of safe havens in the neighbouring countries for Boko Haram to regroup and carry out training of their members possibly accounts to a large extent for the continued scourge of terrorism in Nigeria.⁹³ Worsening the situation is the fact that Nigeria has until recently received limited support from some of the neighbouring countries thereby enabling Boko Haram to secure external links and sustain itself. This was particularly the case with Cameroon which initially rebuffed diplomatic efforts by Nigeria for a joint security arrangement to counter Boko Haram.⁹⁴ In April and May 2014 however, following French initiatives, Nigeria entered into a joint agreement with the four Francophone contiguous countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.⁹⁵ The agreement covered an increased level

⁹¹ M. Bello, "Boko Haram: Nigeria, Niger Begin Joint Border Patrol", *This Day*, (Lagos), 16 Oct 12

⁹² B. J. Adele, "The Boko Haram Crisis and Nigeria's External Relations", *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2013), pp. 6-9. The headquarters was relocated to Ndjamena, the Capital City of Chad in July 2015.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ "Nigeria and Cameroon may clash over Boko Haram", *The Punch*, 1 March 2014.

⁹⁵ Kingsley Omonobi, "Nigeria: Terror – Nigeria, France, Four Others Join Forces" *Vanguard*, 19 Mar 2014, available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/03/terror-nigeria-france-4-others-join-forces/#sthash.k2vZrnXS.dpuf>, accessed 3 Apr 14.

of coordination and exchange of intelligence, effective policing of common borders and the repatriation of suspected terrorists in conformity with existing protocols. It also recommended the adoption of a doctrine proposed by President Goodluck Jonathan that “an act of terror against one nation is an act of terror against all.”⁹⁶ This was to ensure that the reactions of member-states to acts of terror were spontaneous and concerted. These efforts were cemented by President Buhari who undertook a state tour to all the four neighbouring countries in June and July 2015.

Another concerted effort by Nigeria and her immediate neighbours that could positively influence the containment of terrorism is the resuscitation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The commission was created on 22 May 1964 by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The Republic of Central Africa and Libya later joined in 1996 and 2008 respectively. The aim of the Commission is to manage the shared water resources of the Lake Chad Basin and promote regional integration, peace and security. In October 2014, an extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission was held in Niger’s capital, Niamey, to discuss terrorism in the region. The meeting reviewed ongoing collaboration against terror attacks and agreed on joint action to further curb insurgency within and across their common borders. The leaders further agreed to establish a multinational joint task force, define a common strategy and to forward a draft resolution to the UN Security Council and the AU for a legal framework on cross-border military operations against terrorism. A major issue noted by the Commission was that the armed forces of member countries operated only within their respective territories thus, the new focus was to get them work as a team.⁹⁷ This means that with the new focus of the commission, the armed forces of the member states could work together, allowing them

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Press brief by the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Mr Sanusi Abdullahi on 20 November 2014 in Abuja. Also see “Terrorism: Lake Chad Member Countries To Send Draft Resolution To UN, AU”, *Leadership Newspaper*, 26 November 2014.

access to operate in a joint manner in each other's territory to rid the region of terrorist activities. If this cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours is sustained, it holds a good prospect in shaping positively the efforts at countering terrorism not only in Nigeria but the sub-region as well.

8.8.5 Commitment of the International Community

As earlier noted, terrorism in Nigeria cannot be contained by Nigeria alone. The country requires international support to counter terrorism in the same way the terrorists require external support to sustain themselves and further their cause. The Boko Haram sect is known to have ties with the broader al-Qaeda network. A significant number of Boko Haram members are believed to have received training in Afghanistan, Yemen and Sudan, all of which have at one time or the other been enclaves for al-Qaeda and its affiliates.⁹⁸ Some documents discovered in Usama Bin Laden's Abbottabad compound in May 2011 also indicated that Boko Haram leaders have been in contact with the leadership of al-Qaeda.⁹⁹ It is thought to have established links with AQIM and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQIP).¹⁰⁰ The AQIM is known to support Boko Haram with funds, training and weapons including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS).¹⁰¹ Boko Haram is also acknowledged to have external support from other terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab. The Al-Shabaab group allegedly supports Boko Haram with training on guerrilla tactics, propaganda machinery and suicide terrorist operations.¹⁰² Ansaru, the offshoot of Boko Haram also has links with AQIM and the Movement for Oneness for Jihad in West Africa as mentioned earlier. The links terrorists in Nigeria enjoy with similar terrorist groups and organizations outside Nigeria portray the international dimension of terrorism in Nigeria and the need for the commitment

⁹⁸ See "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency", *International Crisis Group*, p.23 – 24.

⁹⁹ "Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru", *United States Department of State*, 13 November 2013.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ C. J. Radin, "Threat of Boko Haram and International Allies" *Long War Journal*. Vol 3, No 6 2010.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

of the international community in containing it. How committed the international community has been and particularly would be is however an issue that could shape the countering of terrorism in Nigeria.

Nigeria has received assistance in the form of security training, intelligence support and emergency relief from countries such as the US, UK, France, Germany and China. For instance, in 2012, a team from the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was in ONSA to assist in the formulation of a national counter terrorism strategy for Nigeria.¹⁰³ On its part, the United States through its United States Army Africa team commenced a three-phased counter terrorism training of a battalion of the Nigerian Army from April 2014.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, organisations such as the UN and the EU have contributed to the counter-terrorism efforts of the Government of Nigeria through grants and humanitarian assistance. In December 2013, the EU co-organised a symposium in Abuja aimed at reviewing the Nigerian government counter-terrorism strategy to conform to democratic best practices.

Some Nigerians however believe that the Western nations are not doing enough to help the country contain terrorism. This is in the light of their refusal (particularly in the case of the US) to sell arms to it under the guise of the Leahy Amendment. The Amendment stipulates that no assistance shall be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the US Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.¹⁰⁵ The US in this wise cited human rights abuses by the Nigerian security agencies and corruption by the government as its reasons for the refusal.¹⁰⁶ There are however recent moves by the US to relax the Leahy Agreement following bilateral talks with the new government of President Buhari.

¹⁰³ T. T., Waya, interviewed 17 January 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Department of Training and Operations Nigerian Army Headquarters Brief, Abuja, 12 July 2014.

¹⁰⁵ The Leahy Amendment is contained in Section 620 M of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).

¹⁰⁶ The United States point to the Leahy Agreement as the basis for its actions.

Another dimension to the perceived inadequate support of the US is the alleged CIA's prediction in 2000 that Nigeria would be a failed state by 2015.¹⁰⁷ The refusal by the US to sell arms to Nigeria was consequently viewed in some quarters through the lens of this prediction and hence, it has been postulated that the US may be deliberately allowing the disintegration of Nigeria. In December 2014, Nigeria announced the cancellation of an ongoing US training of a Nigerian Army battalion on counter-terrorism. This was ostensibly in protest over US refusals to sell her arms, although the Nigerian government officially stated that it was due to its inability to cope up with the logistics requirement of the US. Nigeria subsequently turned to Russia for acquisition of weapons to counter Boko Haram.¹⁰⁸ Nigeria also secretly employed the services of a South African private security company known as Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection. Although the government stated that the engagement of the company was for purely advisory purposes, there are indications of its conduct of mercenary activities in the North East of Nigeria between March and May 2015.¹⁰⁹

It is plausible that Nigeria may not want military assistance that would involve foreign combat troops on its soil as in the case of French operations against Islamic terrorists in Mali. However, the country does require actionable intelligence on the terrorists' sponsors, movement, finance and sources of arms. It equally requires military equipment to confront the terrorists and safeguard its territorial integrity. These requirements, in addition to other non-kinetic assistance, rest largely on the commitment of the international community. Thus, the commitment of the international community could shape the future of terrorism in Nigeria.

¹⁰⁷ See <http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2012/02/10/nigeria-and-the-2015-break-up-prediction/>

¹⁰⁸ De Capua "Analyst Weigh Nigeria-Russia Arms Deal", *Voice of America*, 10 December 2014. , accessed 12 September 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Daji Sanī, "Buhari: It is shameful that the military has not crushed Boko Haram", *This Day Newspaper*, 18 May 2015. Also, Wale Akinselure "How South African mercenaries helped Nigeria to rout Boko Haram" *Nigerian Tribune Newspaper*, 12 May 2015.

8.8.6 Regional Issues

Regional issues, and particularly conflicts in the West Africa and African region greatly influence events in Nigeria. This is evident in Boko Haram terrorism. Boko Haram exploited the political vacuum created by the conflict in Mali between 2011 and 2013 to establish links with the Islamic terrorists groups there, thereby facilitating its access to logistics, recruitment, training and other support. Similarly, the Arab Spring and in particular the Libyan Crisis left in their aftermath ungoverned spaces for terrorism to thrive within Nigeria's neighbourhood. The rebels from the North African countries became ready sources of manpower and their military hardware a source of weapons for the terrorists.

Also of significance is the poor socio-economic state of the countries that are within Nigeria's neighbourhood. The Sahel region is characterised by unfavourable climatic conditions resulting in drought that make farming and other occupation difficult. The inhabitants are therefore poor and often have to migrate south and northwards in search of a means of livelihood. They thus can become ready foot-soldiers for terrorists. The number of Tuaregs from Libya and Mali as well as Chadians and Nigerians so far arrested in connection with terrorism in Nigeria buttress the significance of the demographic factor occasioned by regional socio-economic and political crisis. Thus, developments that could have remained domestic concerns escalate to sub-regional and regional levels. It is in this light that the otherwise home-grown terrorism in Nigeria, as Boko Haram initially was, became connected with AQIM and other networks thereby attaining regional status. Terrorism has continued to expand by thriving on the weak capacity of governments of the region to effectively counter it. Conflict resolution mechanisms and security frameworks at both individual country and collective (regional) levels are a concern. This is so as attempts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU to establish such mechanisms and frameworks before now had largely remained at proposal level, or at best only partly

implemented. However, with the recent backing of the UN (and international regional organizations such as the EU as well as countries like the US), the AU standby force under the aegis of the Lake Chad Commission is near to achieving operational status. If the concerted efforts of governments concerned at regional level is sustained, this multilateral security arrangement could potentially hold good prospects for reversing the trend of terrorism in Nigeria.

In summary, the analysis of the responses of the Nigerian government to the threats of terrorism and the issues that could positively or negatively shape the trend of terrorism tend to indicate that government responses have not yielded expected outcomes. It equally reveals a trend that presupposes uncertainty as to the immediate containment of terrorism in Nigeria. This brings to the fore the need for a sustainable and effective national counter terrorism strategy for Nigeria. It is on the question of such a strategy that the next chapter focuses.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ISLAMIC JIHADISM¹ AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM

7.1 Preamble

This chapter is the fourth and concluding case of terrorist threats examined in this study of terrorism in Nigeria. Here, I focused on aspects of Islamic jihad using the Boko Haram Islamic sect as a case study. Fearon and Laitin as well as Sambanis and Zinn's arguments regarding insurgency; that large-scale conflagration emerges when governments apply coercion are demonstrated in this case study.² As would be observed subsequently, terrorist activity by the Boko Haram sect was escalated when repression by government was high. This was particularly so when the terrorists perceived a weakness in state coercive power and in spite of their (the terrorists) sustaining costs.

The chapter begins by clarifying the concept of Islamic jihad, and relating it to other concepts by which the Boko Haram sect could be associated with. In doing this, I made a number of inferences to Islamic fundamentalism covered in chapter four, noting in the process the evolutionary trend of Islamic terrorism in Nigeria from the Maitatsine period to the current Boko Haram situation. This dovetails into the central focus of the chapter, which is, a case study of the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and the responses of the Nigerian government to it.

¹ The term is used to denote an aspect of Islam that promotes jihad.

² Fearon, James and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97:1 (2003), pp. 75–90. Also Sambanis, Nicholas and Annalisa Zinn. "From Protest to Violence: An Analysis of Conflict Escalation with an Application to Self-Determination Movements." Unpublished Manuscript: Yale University, 2005.

7.2 Islamic Jihad and Terrorism

In chapter four, I highlighted the early history of Islam in Nigeria and the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism, as stated earlier, is based on an ideology that advocates a return to the practice of pure Islam. Islamic jihadism flows from Islamic fundamentalism. As John Esposito contends, one of the most defining features of Islamic fundamentalism is belief in the ‘reopening’ of the gates of jihad.³ This portrays jihad as firstly, a subset of (or stemming from) Islamic fundamentalism and secondly, as a contemporary phenomenon. In the *Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, the term ‘jihad’ is viewed as a fight, battle or holy war against infidels or as a religious duty.⁴ It is also averred that the word is used by Muslims to describe three different kinds of struggle – firstly; “a believer's internal struggle to live out the Muslim faith as well as possible”, secondly, “the struggle to build a good Muslim society”, and thirdly, “holy war: the struggle to defend Islam, with force if necessary”.⁵ In this study, jihad will focus on the third kind of struggle noting that to defend Islam could also mean to attack or take the offensive, and that as in relation to terrorism, jihad is more often associated with force.

Apart from been regarded as a jihadist movement, it is worth highlighting two other related concepts relevant to this study with which the Boko Haram sect could be identified. These are Islamism and “new terrorism”. Islamism (often referred to as Political Islam) is based on the belief that Islam should guide socio-political as well as personal life, and therefore advocates a state system based on Sharia as opposed to Western-based systems.⁶ The Boko Haram ideology, as would be seen in details later, advocates a state based on the fundamentals of

³ Esposito, John, *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 4.

⁴ Milton J. Cowah, ed. *Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. 3rd ed. (Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1979), p. 142.

⁵ BBC, 3 August 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/jihad_1.shtml, accessed 26 August 2013.

⁶ Shepard, W. E. Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam. Leiden, New York: E.J. Brill., (1996). p. 40. Also, Berman, Sheri, "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society". *Perspectives on Politics* Vol.1, Issue 2 (2003), p. 258.

Islam where corrupt and selfish officials would be replaced with 'puritans'. It could be argued here that one thing that made Boko Haram complex is the political angle to it. This could be attributed to the feelings in some quarters that the group is a political movement shrouded in religion. President Goodluck Jonathan lent credence to this assertion when he painted a picture of a puppet group that was being used by aggrieved politicians from the northern part of Nigeria to undermine his government for the reason that he is of southern extraction.⁷

The concept of "new terrorism" dwells on the evolutionary trend associated with terrorism which stresses that contemporary terrorism represents a significant departure from the past.⁸ Scholars associated with the coining and development of the term include Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur and Christopher Harmon.⁹ According to Tucker, the distinguishing features of new terrorism as opposed to old terrorism are; (1) a new structure that is a network facilitated by information technology, (2) new personnel that are amateurs who often come together in ad hoc or transitory groupings, and (3) a new attitude with an increased willingness to cause mass casualties through the use of weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological.¹⁰ It is surmised that new terrorism is more dangerous and difficult to counter.¹¹ The lethality of Boko Haram, its real and perceived external connections, its ad hoc groupings and its use of technology all of which I will later examine, indicate a shift of terrorism from the form witnessed during the Maitatsine situation of the 1980s.

⁷ Andrew Walker, "What is Boko Haram" in *United States Institute of Peace Special Report 308*, June 2012, p. 7.

⁸ Matthew Morgan, "The Origin of New Terrorism" 2004, p. 31, Available online at <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/04spring/morgan.pdf>, accessed 27 August 2013.

⁹ David Tucker, "What's New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?" in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 1–14. Available online at <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CTIW/files/the%20new%20terrorism.pdf>, accessed 28 August 2014.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

7.3 The Boko Haram Terrorist Group

Boko Haram is a Nigerian-based Islamic jihad group.¹² It gained local and international prominence in 2009 when it transformed from being a relatively quiet local radical Salafist group to a Salafi-jihadist group that has carried out major terrorist operations, including suicide attacks in parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun.¹³ In this segment of the chapter, I explored the etymological meaning and philosophy of Boko Haram, the origin of the sect and the immediate causes of its terrorist activities. Thereafter, I examine the nature of the threat posed by Boko Haram and the response of the Nigerian government to it before concluding with an assessment of the threat-response interplay that brought to the fore implications for counter-terrorism policy in Nigeria.

7.3.1 'Boko Haram' – Meaning and Ideology

There have been arguments over the etymological meaning of 'Boko Haram'. Abimbola Adesoji states that "'Boko Haram' is derived from a combination of the Hausa word 'boko' meaning 'book' and the Arabic word 'haram' which is 'something forbidden, ungodly or sinful.'"¹⁴ He adds that this literally means "book is sinful", but that its deeper meaning is that western education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden.¹⁵

Adamu and several other scholars find fault in the above view of the name which somehow has become the common perception particularly among Western-based scholars. According to Adamu, this mistake is often made by scholars with poor understanding of the Hausa language.

¹² David Cook, "The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria" in Paul R. Pillar, *American Perceptions of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Decade*, CTC Sentinel, September 2011 . Vol. 4 . Issue 9, pp. 3-4. Available online <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss92.pdf>, accessed 27 August 2013.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ A. Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State." *Africa Today*, July 2012.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

He opines that:

*It is the persistent theme of condemning aspects of Western schooling that earned the group the sobriquet of 'boko haram' in the Nigerian media, an expression widely translated, very wrongly, as 'Western education is sin'. This is because it is assumed that 'boko' – a Hausa onomatopoeic of 'book' – means 'Western education based on Western books'. Strictly, it does not.*¹⁶

By tracing the word 'boko' to the lexicon of Hausa language, Adamu gave the original meaning of the word as 'deceptive knowledge' hence, technically “‘boko haram’ means ‘deceptive knowledge which is sinful’, not ‘western education is a sin.’”¹⁷ He added that Muhammad Yusuf’s lectures and writing were geared towards convincing his followers that knowledge inspired by Western ideas is false in some respects, but neither he nor his followers actually proclaimed that such knowledge is sinful. Adamu further explains that it was in the process of demonising the movement that the projected medieval personality of the group as condemning Western education arose. In this wise, the sect frowns at being called Boko Haram. One of the sect’s professed members, Mallam Sani Umaru further explains that what the sect termed forbidden is actually Western civilisation and culture as a whole; not education which is only a subset of civilisation and culture.¹⁸ This could be understood from the point that Islam abhors anything contrary to the way of life preached by Prophet Mohammed. Adherents of Boko Haram reject the use of some modern or purportedly Western items such as wrist watches and safety helmets. Ironically however, the sect patronise products of Western civilisation such as laptops, arms, explosives and even have full-blown Internet websites to proclaim their ideals.¹⁹

¹⁶ U.A. Adamu, “Insurgency in Nigeria: The Northern Nigerian Experience” (Paper delivered at the Seminar of Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting On Complex Insurgencies In Nigeria at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, 29 August 2012.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See *Vanguard* 14 August 2009, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-jihad/>, accessed 14 May 2014.

¹⁹ Examples of such websites is www.yusufislamicbrothers.blogspot.com.

It is perhaps necessary to note that the Boko Haram sect has equally been known at various times by other names such as the *Nigerian Taliban*, *Ahl ul sunna wal'jama'ah hijra* and the *Yusufiyyah* sect.²⁰ It however prefers to be addressed as the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, loosely translated from Arabic as 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'.²¹ This preferred name underlines the sect's ideology which is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam. The sect strongly opposes Western ways of life, democratic institutions, constitutional laws and institutions of the Nigerian state. Hazzad notes that "the mission of the group is to clean the (Nigerian) system, which they view as polluted by Western education, and to uphold Sharia all over the country."²² It thus could be described as a jihadist movement that strives to destroy democracy and establish a Sharia state of Nigeria.

Onapajo et al posits that the ideology of the sect is embedded in the tradition and workings of Islamism and anticipates a political system modelled after that of the Taliban in Afghanistan.²³ By this, he notes that the sect attempts to attain an independent state that comprises all the tenets of a modern state, including a government, population, territory and security base that runs in line with its ideology.²⁴ Thus, its overriding goal is to wrest control from the Nigerian state in order to implement the Sharia legal code across the entire country.²⁵ In this vein, Boko Haram sees the Nigerian state as the major obstacle to true Islamic reform and the main persecutor of true Muslims, thus fuelling its belief that representative of the government like the police, military and government officials as well as

²⁰ See Freedom Onuoha, "From Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra to Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awati wal Jihad: The Evolutionary Phases of the Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria" in *African Insight* Vol. 1 (2012).

²¹ Farourk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram?" BBC News (August 26, 2011), online at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>

²² A Hazzad, "Nigeria clashes kill over 50 in northeastern city", Reuters, 26 July 2009.

²³ Onapajo, Hakeem & Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", *Africa Security Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2012), p. 27.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 28.

²⁵ Agbiboa, Daniel Egiegba, "The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism of Boko Haram", *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 13, No.1 (2013), p. 20.

their collaborators should be killed.²⁶ The aforementioned resort to violence is also in line with the Salafist view of radical Islam.²⁷ It is this Salafism that the Boko Haram sect embraces.²⁸

There were growing indications that rather than attempt to capture and Islamise all of Nigeria (or establish a Sharia state of Nigeria), Boko Haram may want to establish its own caliphate in line with the historic Kanem-Borno Caliphate but based on *takfiri* ideology rather than Sufi traditions.²⁹ According to Zen, this is as the hierarchy of Boko Haram continues to be dominated by the Kanuri tribe and its foothold is largely within the confines of the former Caliphate.³⁰ In other words, Boko Haram's current area of operations corresponds almost precisely to the territory of the former Kanem-Borno Caliphate which covers parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.³¹ However, in 2015, there were indications of claims by the sect to be establishing links with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to the extent of renaming itself as the Islamic State's West African Province (ISWAP).³²

7.3.2 Origin of Boko Haram

The origin of Boko Haram could be linked to the history of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria as earlier highlighted. It is believed in some quarters that Boko Haram is a product of

²⁶ Danjibo, Nathaniel Dominic, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria." *Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series*, Vol.1, No.21 (2009), p. 7.

²⁷ Hafez Kal, *Islam in Liberal Europe: Freedom, Equality and Tolerance*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p.366.

²⁸ James J. F. Forest, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram," *Joint Special Operations University Report*, 2012, p. 94.

²⁹ The *takfiri* ideology hinges on the view that all non-practising Muslims are kafirs (infidels) and urge its adherents to abandon existing Muslim societies, settle in isolated communities and fight the infidels. It thus a more radical form of belief system compared to Sufism that emphasizes mainly purification.

³⁰ Jacob Zenn, "How Boko Haram recruits members and finances its operations", *Jamestown Foundation Publication*, December 2014.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State, *BBC News* 7 March 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31784538>, and Ludovica Iaccino, "Nigeria: Boko Haram changes name to Islamic State's West African Province after Isis alliance", <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-boko-haram-changes-name-islamic-states-west-african-province-after-isis-alliance-1498696>, accessed 15 March 2015.

the Maitatsine uprisings indicating that it was members of Maitatsine who went underground that resurfaced later.³³ Some others opine however that the founder of Boko Haram was simply inspired by Maitatsine's ideologies.³⁴

It is unclear as to the exact year Boko Haram emerged. A number of accounts have it that the sect has been in existence since 1995 under the name of *Sahaba*³⁵ and *Ahl ul sunna wal'jama'ah hijra*.³⁶ According to these accounts, the group was then led by Abubakar Lawan who later left Nigeria for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia.³⁷ Following this, the group's leadership was transferred to Mohammed Yusuf who was said to have abandoned Lawan's style of conservative teachings to more radical ones. Some other accounts link the beginning of Boko Haram to the activities of a violent religious militant group that was formed in 2003 known as *Al-Sunna Wal Jamma* (Followers of the Prophet). This group was sometimes called the Nigerian Taliban because of their claim to being inspired by the Islamic militants in Afghanistan.³⁸ On 24 December 2003, the Nigerian Taliban attacked police stations and public buildings in Geidam and Kanama towns of Yobe State. They seized weapons from the police stations and replaced the Nigerian flag with that of Afghanistan at a public building they seized.³⁹ They were subsequently dislodged by

³³ A. Adesoji, *Africa Today*, July 2012.

³⁴ See Sahara Reporters 2012, "Comments on Gunmen Killed 10 persons in Kaduna," <http://www.mobile.saharareporters.com/news-page/gunmen-kill-10-personskaduna>, accessed 28 August 2013.

³⁵ Isioma Madike, "Boko Haram: Rise of a deadly sect," *National Mirror*, 19 June, 2011. Online at: http://nationalmirroronline.net/sunday-mirror/big_read/14548.html. See also Emma Ujah, Emeka Mamah, Kingsley Omonobi, Chioma Obinna & Daniel Idonor, 'Yar'Adua Orders Probe of Boko Haram's Leaders' Killing', *Vanguard* (online edition), 4 August 2009. Online at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/yaradua-orders-probe-of-boko-haram-leaders-killing/>.

³⁶ Julian Taiwo and Micheal Olugbode, Boko Haram leader killed, *This Day*, 31 July 2009, 4.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman (ed.s), *Armed and Aimless; Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS region*, Geneva, 2005. Also, Bestman Wellington, "Nigeria and the Threat of Al-Qaeda Terrorism," (12 June 2008).

³⁹ "Nigerians 'crush' Islamic uprising," *BBC News*, 5 January 2004. Online at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3368627.stm>.

troops of the Nigerian military.⁴⁰ On 21 September 2004, members of the group attacked Bama and Gwoza police stations in Borno State, killed several policemen and stole away arms and ammunition. A counter-attack launched by the police a few weeks later resulted in the death of 28 members while others fled to Cameroon across the Nigerian - Cameroon border.⁴¹ The remnants of the Taliban group are considered by several observers as having been involved in founding what today is known as Boko Haram.⁴²

In spite of the conflicting accounts, it is agreed by many observers that Boko Haram became an organised and formidable radical Islamic sect under the leadership of a charismatic cleric, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. In 2002, Yusuf established in Maiduguri town a religious complex that housed a mosque, an Islamic boarding school and a headquarters for a prayer group which he called *Jama'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'wati Wal-Jihad*.⁴³ The school is said to have attracted many children from poor homes across Northern Nigeria and from neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon.⁴⁴ The school complex became a recruiting ground for future jihadists.⁴⁵ This is as it drew members from neighbouring countries while entrenching the sect's hold in the Northern Nigerian states of Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Adamawa and Yobe.

The radicalisation process and events that led to the emergence of Boko Haram took another dimension when in 2004, some students from the University of Maiduguri, Ramat Polytechnic in Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic in Damaturu and other tertiary institutions, all

⁴⁰ Tajudeen Suleiman, *Terrorism unsettles the North*, *Tell*, 26 February 2007, p. 25.

⁴¹ "Nigeria police kill 27 Taleban," BBC News (24 September 2004), online at:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3685280.stm>.

⁴² James J. F. Forest, *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, *JSOU Report 2012* (Florida: JSUO Press), p. 59.

⁴³ This became the name by which the Sect wishes to be identified.

⁴⁴ Farourk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?" BBC News, January 11, 2012. As of February 5,

2013: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

in Borno and Yobe states withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and took up full preaching ministry and Koranic lessons with Boko Haram.⁴⁶

The years 2007 and 2008 could be regarded as the recruitment and training phase of the group's activities. The sect was alleged to have received funds from outside Nigeria for recruitment and training. In 2007, Mohammed Yusuf, and Mohammed Bello Damagun (another Muslim cleric and purported member of the Nigerian Taliban) were tried for terrorism-related offences in a federal high court in Abuja.⁴⁷ As mentioned in chapter two, Mohammed Damagun was charged for receiving monies, recruiting and training Nigerians for terrorism. Mohammed Yusuf's charges included receipt of monies from al-Qaeda to recruit terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners, especially Americans living in Nigeria.⁴⁸ Yusuf was acquitted on these charges. He was however re-arrested and prosecuted in 2008 alongside some of his members. They were released on bail by an Abuja High Court on 20 January 2009.⁴⁹ Some other arrests made in this period included foreigners such as Bukar Shekau from the Niger Republic. The foreigners were either deported or handed over to the police for prosecution. "Unfortunately", as Onuoha put it "these disciples usually found their way back into Nigerian society."⁵⁰ Together with the foreign elements (particularly from neighbouring countries), the radicalised Islamic youths developed Boko Haram into a formidable terrorist group.

7.3.3 Immediate Causes of Boko Haram Terrorism

⁴⁶ Abdulrafiu Lawal, *Rage of the puritans*, *Tell*, 10 August 2009, p. 34.

⁴⁷ J Peter Pham, *Strategic interests*, *World Defense Review*, 1 February 2007, <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham020107.shtml> (accessed 6 August 2013).

⁴⁸ See "Country Reports on Terrorism, Africa Review", *Global Terrorism Organization Year Book*, (Washington D.C: International Business Publication, 2010), p.83. Also in, "Tajudeen Suleiman, Terrorism unsettles the North", *Tell*, 26 February 2007, p. 24.

⁴⁹ Julian Taiwo and Micheal Olugbode, *Boko Haram leader killed*, *Thisday*, 31 July 2009, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Freedom C Onuoha, "The Islamist challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis explained", *African Security Review*, 2010, 19:2, 54-67. Online at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2010.503061>, accessed 6 August 2013.

It was supposedly easy for the sect to recruit members given the fact that the sect professed Islam and its practices, which were already entrenched in the lifestyle and belief system of a majority of the people in Northern Nigeria. The sect was also able to exploit the socio-economic and political discontent in the country especially the high rate of poverty, unemployment, insecurity, electoral malpractices and political hooliganism to gain a foothold in Borno, Yobe and other states in northern Nigeria where it spread. Over time, members of the sect became more dissatisfied with the secular authorities. They continued to view them as representatives of a corrupt, illegitimate and Western-styled government. At local government levels, the situation worsened in the summer of 2009, when authorities of Bauchi town in Bauchi State refused to allow members of the sect to preach and recruit publicly for fear of public safety.⁵¹ On 11 June 2009, police stopped a funeral procession of Boko Haram members who were riding on motorcycles without the use of helmets, as mandated by a law then recently passed. In the ensuing confrontation, 17 members of Boko Haram were shot and badly wounded by the police.⁵² It is probable that the brutal manner in which the Nigerian security forces responded to the activities of the Boko Haram group turned out to be the immediate cause of the resort of the group to turn violent and subsequently embrace terrorism.

Angered by the response of the police, Boko Haram members on 26 July 2009 staged an armed uprising in Bauchi. They attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi as well as the Bauchi Prison where they freed about 700 of their jailed members.⁵³ The violence subsequently spread to the states of Borno, Yobe, and Kano. Within four days,

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Isioma Madike, "Boko Haram: Rise of a Deadly Sect," National Mirror (June 19, 2011). Online at: http://nationalmirroronline.net/sunday-mirror/big_read/14548.html; and Isa Umar Gusau, "Boko Haram: How it All Began," Sunday Trust, (August 2, 2009), online at: <http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index>.

⁵³ F. C. Onuoha, "The 9/7 Boko Haram Attack on Bauchi Prison: A Case of Intelligence Failure", *Peace and Conflict Monitor*, 2 November 2010, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=754, accessed 2 June 2013.

the sect members had attacked police stations, schools, churches and public buildings across the states mentioned. A combined military and police operation was launched resulting in the killing of many of the sect members, and the arrest of others including Mohammed Yusuf. After a few hours in police custody, Yusuf was reported death in what appeared to have been an extrajudicial killing, although police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape.⁵⁴

The death of Yusuf was only a temporary setback as the sect regrouped under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau. It could be argued that Yusuf's death transformed the sect as it retreated temporarily, re-strategized and redefined its tactics.⁵⁵ It possibly used the videos of the July 2009 encounter with security forces, alongside leaflets and audio tapes to radicalize, publicize its cause and issue threats of revenge mission and intention to wage war on secular authorities. Marc-Antoine sums up the situation by arguing that the actions of the Nigerian security forces were a significant determinant in the trajectory of the Boko Haram crisis.⁵⁶ He observed that the repression of the sect in July 2009 was followed by repeated massacres, extra-judicial killings and arrests without trial that widened the gap between communities and the security forces.⁵⁷

7.3.4 The Nature of Boko Haram Terrorism

Boko Haram could be said to have begun as a home grown terrorist group and the threat posed by it localised to some parts of north-eastern Nigeria particularly Yobe and Borno states. Its leadership centred on Mohammed Yusuf as the *Amir-al-Aam* or Commander-in-Chief, with deputies and commanders in charge of the states and local government areas

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Isioma Madike, Op.Cit.

⁵⁶ Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis" Research Paper Africa Programme, Chatham House, September 2014. Available online https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140901BokoHaramPerouseMontclos_0.pdf, accessed 10 November 2014.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

where the sect existed.⁵⁸ It was further organised according to various roles such as the police and soldiers. The group's method of attack at this period was mainly ambush or what could be termed as 'hit and run' tactics which avoided protracted confrontation.⁵⁹ All these however changed or were modified from 2010 when the sect began to embark on revenge mission and threat of war under Shekau.

The Boko Haram that resurfaced under Shekau in 2010 became more deadly. Shekau provided the overall spiritual guidance and command but organised Boko Haram along a loose operating structure with disconnected cells that made it difficult for the Nigerian intelligence and security forces to detect and defeat them.⁶⁰ The sect graduated from 'hit and run' armed assault tactics to open armed confrontation with security forces. Veronica, a victim of the sect's attack, observed that Boko Haram raiding parties were composed of three groups of "shooters, looters and recruiters."⁶¹ The task of the first group was to fight the Nigerian troops, the second to rob local banks and shops, and the third to kidnap new recruits.⁶²

The sect further embraced the use of improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide terrorism. It equally expanded its attacks from low to high profile targets such as the attack on the headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in Abuja in June 2012.⁶³ This attack turned out to be the first known incidence of suicide bombing in

⁵⁸ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachau and U Bature, eds. *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa, 2013), p. 409.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 415.

⁶⁰ Oliver Guitta and Robin Simcox, "Terrorism in Nigeria: The Threat from Boko Haram and Ansaru" *The Henry Jackson Society Briefing*, London, June 2014.

⁶¹ Colin Freeman, "Nigeria school girl tells House of Lords of brutal Boko Haram attack" *The Telegraph*, 13 October 2015. Online at


<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11927617/Nigeria-schoolgirl-tells-House-of-Lords-of-brutal-Boko-Haram-attack.html>, accessed 15 October 2015.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachau and U Bature, eds., p. 418.

Nigeria. On 26 August 2012, the sect carried out an attack on a UN building in Abuja.⁶⁴ The attack on an international institution that is a symbol of global peace and security was presumably aimed at drawing international attention and publicity to the sect while in the process portraying government security lapses. The sect further extended its geographical reach to other parts of Northern Nigeria, and conducted series of attacks as depicted in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1. Map Showing Major Attacks by Boko Haram 2009 - 2013



Source: F. C. Onuoha, "Porous Borders and Boko Haram Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria", *Aljazeera Center for Studies*, 8 Sep 2013.

In January 2012, a splinter group known as Ansaru broke off from mainstream Boko Haram owing to disagreements over issues that were later evident in the ideological and operational

⁶⁴ Ibid.

differences between the sects. The Ansaru did not believe in indiscriminate killings but concentrated more on foreign targets, particularly the kidnap of expatriates.⁶⁵ The sect claimed to be fighting for the dignity of Muslims and for the creation of a caliphate in the West African region, and was thus more closely aligned with AQIM.⁶⁶ The sect in a video said to be released by one of its leader, Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, averred to defend the interest of Muslims and Islam not only in Nigeria but in Africa in general.⁶⁷ This perhaps revealed its links with AQIM and the Movement for Oneness for Jihad in West Africa, based in Mali. The activities of the Ansaru group declined as several of its leaders later re-joined Boko Haram particularly following the defeat of the Islamic terrorists groups by the French-led intervention in Mali in 2013.⁶⁸ It is thought that the French-led military operation in Mali disrupted Boko Haram and Ansaru's lines of communication, supplies and command network making it difficult for Ansaru to continue existing as a separate body from mainstream Boko Haram.

The attacks by Boko Haram were so devastating that, as indicated earlier, Nigeria's ranking in the Global Terrorism Index of most terrorized countries in the world continually worsen. According to former President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria had by mid-2014 recorded over 12,000 deaths with many more people injured and others displaced from their localities owing to the activities of Boko Haram.⁶⁹ The situation was made worse with the sect's abduction of women including schoolgirls. For instance, on 14 April 2014, the sect abducted about 276 girls from Government Girls' School Chibok. Of this number, 57 girls escaped following a breakdown of one of the trucks conveying them to the terrorists' hideout while

⁶⁵ Jacob Zenn, "Nigerian al-Qaedaism" Jamestown Foundation, 2014. Available online <http://www.hudson.org/research/10172-nigerian-al-qaedaism->, accessed 4 January 2015.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Farouk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Ansaru Islamists?" *BBC Africa*, 11 March 2013. Available online <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21510767>, accessed 4 July 2013.

⁶⁸ Oliver Guitta and Robin Simcox, London, June 2014.

⁶⁹ G. E. Jonathan, Presidential Address at the Regional Summit on Security in Nigeria at Paris-France, 17 May 2014.

the remaining 219 are still held by their abductors in yet to be identified locations.⁷⁰ This incident brought terrorism in Nigeria to such prominence that notable persons such as UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon and the wife of US President, Michelle Obama have actively condemned it while Nobel Peace Prize winner, Malala Yousafzai, has paid a visit to Nigeria solely for reason of seeking the possible rescue of the Chibok girls. An equally worrying development was that the sect graduated from serial attacks in public places to sieges of towns and villages, thereby threatening the territorial integrity of Nigeria. The size of the area held by the terrorists as at January 2015 equalled the size of Belgium.⁷¹ Added to this development is the sect's embrace of the ISIS tactics of beheadings of victims and the use of females (including girls as young as 10 years) for suicide terrorism.⁷² The activities of the Boko Haram sect have to date continued to be a concern not only to the Nigerian government but to the international community as well. It is in the light of this that I now examine government responses to the Boko Haram threat.

7.3.5 The Response of Nigerian Government to Boko Haram Terrorism

The Nigerian government condemns terrorism. Nigeria is a signatory to International Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism, and has signed the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.⁷³ However, the country's commitment to the fight against this strand of terrorism remained mainly passive until the 2009 upsurge of Boko Haram terrorist activities, and the attempt by Farouk Umar Abdulmutallab to bomb a

⁷⁰ Nana Bemba Nti, "Silence on the Lambs: The Abducted Chibok Schoolgirls in Nigeria and the Challenge to UNSCR 1325" Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Policy Brief 3, November 2014. Online at <http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Policy-Briefs/Policy-Briefs/Nana-KAIPTC-Policy-Brief-3—The-Abducted-Chibok-S.aspx>, accessed 14 December 2014.

⁷¹ Virginia Comolli, p. 161.

⁷² Jay Akbar, "Like master, like servant: Nigerian terror group Boko Haram releases first beheading video since pledging allegiance to ISIS" *Daily Mail Online*, 10 July 2015, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3156551/Like-master-like-servant-Nigerian-terror-group-Boko-Haram-releases-beheading-video-pledging-allegiance-ISIS.html>, Accessed 30 July 2015.

⁷³ Mbanefo, A., "On Agenda Item 166: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism – United Nations General Assembly, 56th Session, NY., www.un.org/terrorism/statement/nigeriaE, accessed 4 July 2013.

Northwest Airliner on Christmas Day of the same year.⁷⁴ The Nigerian government could be said to have been compelled to deploy the military in a full-scale offensive against the Boko Haram sect following upsurge of the sect's violent activities. In July 2011, a Joint Military Task Force (popularly known by its acronym JTF) was established in Borno State, and subsequently in other terrorist affected states in Nigeria.⁷⁵ The JTF consists of personnel of the AFN, NPF and DSS, as was the case with the Niger Delta Crisis discussed earlier. Furthermore, an army division with the nomenclature 7 Division Nigerian Army, was formed with headquarters in Maiduguri to confront the terrorists.⁷⁶

In order to ensure effective military counter terrorism operations, the Nigerian Government declared states of emergencies in the affected areas. The first was declared on 31 December 2011 for a six-month period covering 14 Local Government Areas across Borno, Niger, Plateau and Yobe states.⁷⁷ The second was declared on 14 May 2013 and covered all areas of the three states most affected by Boko Haram terrorism, that is, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.⁷⁸ In terms of legislation, Nigeria's highest law making body, the National Assembly, in February 2011 passed an anti-terrorism bill aimed at preventing and combating terrorism. This was later reviewed in June 2013 in line with the government's counter-terrorism drive.⁷⁹ Equally, the government appointed a Presidential Adviser on Terrorism in January 2011 and established a Counter-Terrorism Centre at the Office of the National Security Adviser to

⁷⁴ Farouk Umar Abdulmutallab popularly known as the Underwear Bomber is a Nigerian who attempted to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear while on board the plane en route from Amsterdam to Detroit

⁷⁵ J. A. H. Ewansiha, Chief of Training and Operations Nigerian Army, Abuja. Interviewed 3 March 2014.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Virginia Comolli, p. 112.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 120.

⁷⁹ Chinedu S. Udeh, "Boko Haram and Counter Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria" in O. Mbachu and U. M. Bature, pp. 307-322.

facilitate the implementation of counter-terrorism strategy and overall coordination of government effort.⁸⁰

Also noteworthy are the bilateral and multilateral engagement efforts of the Government of Nigeria with organisations and partners such as the UN and the European Union (EU), with states such as the US, UK and France as well as with contiguous countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.⁸¹ All these efforts of government have been in response to the activities of Boko Haram, and which have in the process further generated reactions from the sect. Table 7.1 details the major activities carried out by Boko Haram and the responses by government to them from July 2009 to October 2015. As in the previous case studies, the data used was obtained from a combination of primary and secondary sources.⁸² In Figure 7.1, incidents and casualty rate was used as unit of measure to graphically show the causal effect on the rise of Boko Haram by military responses on one hand, and the use of soft approaches such as negotiations and concessions on the other.

Table 7.1: Major Activities by Boko Haram and Government Responses from July 2009 to October 2015.

Serial	Date	Major Action and Reactions by Boko Haram	Government Actions and Reactions	Remarks
1.	26-27 July 2009	Boko Haram members staged uprising in Bauchi, Bauchi State. Attacked police stations, schools, churches and public buildings across Borno, Yobe and Kano states.	The Nigerian police and military confronts Boko Haram.	
2.	28-30 July 2009	Boko Haram kills hundreds in Maiduguri town and attack	Nigerian Army captured and handed over Mohammed	Extra-judicial killing of Yusuf

⁸⁰ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature, pp. 407-434.

⁸¹ Chinedu S. Udeh, pp. 307-322.

⁸² See footnote 67 in chapter four for details.

		security forces.	Yusuf, leader of Boko Haram to police. He was later found dead. The police claims he was killed while trying to escape. Residents and human rights groups claim that he was assassinated.	possibly provoke revenge mission by sect.
3.	September 2010	Boko Haram members attack a prison in Bauchi and freed hundreds of prisoners, including about 100 members of the sect.	Governor of Bauchi State asked Boko Haram members to leave the state. Many Boko Haram members arrested.	
4.	December 2010	Borno State Governorship candidate of the All Nigeria Peoples Party and seven others shot dead by gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members.		There were speculations that they may have been hired by political opponents,
5	December 2010	Bombings in Jos and Maiduguri towns kill about 80 people.	Increased military efforts at containing Boko Haram.	
6	31 December 2010	Boko Haram attack Mogadishu Army barracks market in Abuja.	Beefed up defensive security measures in military and other security installations.	Provoked more clamp down by the military on the sect.
7	May 2011	Bomb attacks in Abuja, Bauchi and other states after inauguration ceremony of President Goodluck Jonathan.	Alleged that political opposition involved in bombings and sponsorship of Boko Haram.	
8	16 June 2011	Bombed Police Headquarters in Abuja.	Scale and nature of attack shocked the government. Inspector General of Police later sacked.	First incidence of suicide terrorism in Nigeria.
9	June 2011	A Muslim cleric critical of Boko Haram, Ibrahim Birkuti, is shot dead by two gunmen on a motorcycle.	Some state governments ban use of commercial motor cycles at night and in city centres.	
10	July 2011		Federal Government states that it will inaugurate a panel to initiate negotiations with Boko Haram.	Boko Haram possibly took this as a sign of weakening coercive power of government.

11	August 2011		Federal Government reneges on negotiations with Boko Haram.	Boko Haram alleges insincerity on the part of government while government said it was not sure if dealing with real Boko Haram.
12	September 2011	Babakura Fugu, brother-in-law of late Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, is shot dead two days after attending a peace meeting with ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo. Boko Haram denies any involvement in the incident.	Federal Government did not openly back peace deal by ex-President Obasanjo.	
13	4 November 2011	Series of bomb and gun attacks in Yobe and Borno states.	Arrest of many Boko Haram members.	
14	November 2011	Boko Haram announces that it will not hold talks with the government until all members of the sect, who have been arrested, are released.	Government increased budget spending on security equipment to counter Boko Haram.	
15	25 December 2011	Attacked Saint Theresa Catholic Church Madalla in Niger State, near Abuja killing 32 persons. One policeman killed in a failed bomb attack on a church in Jos, Plateau State.	Deployment of security personnel to places of worship. Attempts to douse tension between Christians and Muslims.	
16	January 2012		President Goodluck Jonathan alleges Boko Haram infiltration of his government.	
17	5-6, 20 January 2012	Boko Haram launches bomb attacks and heavy gun battles in Kano targeting the police headquarters. Over 150 civilians and 32 policemen killed.	Launch military assault on Boko Haram hide-outs in Kano.	

18	28 January 2012		Military forces ambushed and killed 11 Boko Haram terrorists.	
19	8 February 2012	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at a military cantonment in Kaduna.	A military investigation panel convened.	
20	16 February 2012	Another prison break staged in Koton Kanili, Kogi State. 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed.		Jail break possibly by Boko Haram to release members in detention.
21	March 2012	Boko Haram and government mediator, Dr Ibrahim Datti Ahmed (the president of National Supreme Council on Sharia) pulls out of negotiations pointing to a lack of sincerity on the government.		
22	31 May 2012		Joint Task Force in Kano raided Boko Haram hide-out resulting in death of 5 sect members and a German hostage.	Earlier in March 2012, an Italian hostage was killed by his abductors following attempt by Nigerian and British security effort to free them.
23	3 June 2012	15 church members killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi State. Boko Haram claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa.		
24	17 June 2012	Suicide bombers attacked three churches in Kaduna State killing over 50 persons.		
25	19 September 2012		Nigerian Military arrest Boko Haram members, reported death of Abu Qaqa.	
26	3 October 2012	Killed over 30 persons in Mubi town in Adamawa State during a night raid.		

27	November 2012	Alleged members of Boko Haram gave conditions for ceasefire naming Alhaji Shettima Ali Mongunu, General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd), Senator Bukar Abba, Ambassador Gaji Galtimari, Barrister Aisha Wakil and her husband as mediators.	Government welcomed offer but no significant efforts followed.	Some named mediators particularly General Muhammadu Buhari decline and disassociated from any dealings with Boko Haram.
28	18 March 2013	About 22 persons killed and 65 injured during a suicide car bomb explosion at a bus station in Kano city.		
29	April 2013		President Goodluck Jonathan set up a 26-member committee headed by Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu Turaki to explore the possibility of granting Amnesty to Boko Haram members.	It was thought that the Amnesty granted the Niger Delta militants could apply in the Boko Haram situation.
30	7 May 2013	Killed over 55 persons and freed 105 inmates in coordinated attacks on army barracks, a prison and police post in Bama town.	Military conduct raids on Boko Haram camps.	
	14 May 2013		Federal Government declared state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States.	This was to facilitate military containment of the situation.
31	6 July 2013	Killed 42 students in a Government Secondary School attack in Yobe State.		
32	29 September 2013	Attacked and killed 40 male students of College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe State.	Government order security coverage of schools. Announced adoption of soft approach to counter-terrorism alongside military operations.	
33	14 Jan 2014	Suicide bombing in Maiduguri, about 30 persons killed.	Intensified cordon and search military operations.	
34	15 and 24 February 2014	About 106 inhabitants of Izghe – Konduga in Borno State killed.	Security forces blamed for poor response.	

35	25 February 2014	About 29 school boys killed at Federal Government College Buni Yadi in Yobe State.		This may be Boko Haram's way of showing its anti-western education stance.
36	14 April 2014	Abducts about 276 girls of Government Girls Secondary School Chibok in Borno State. Sect leader Shekau said they would be treated as slaves as part of the "war booty."	Federal Government blamed by human right groups and the international community for poor initial response to the incident.	The where-about of 219 of the girls remains unknown to date.
37	14 April 2014	Two bombs exploded at a crowded bus station at Nyanya area of Abuja killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 200.	Suspected master-minder of the bombing, Oguche arrested in Sudan and repatriated to Nigeria for trial.	
38	1 May 2014	A car bomb exploded killing at least 19 people and injured at least 60 in the same Nyanya area of Abuja.	Government directs more interagency cooperation in tackling Boko Haram.	
39	15 May 2014	Boko Haram attacked Menari, Tsangayari and Garawa villages killing 60 people.	Vigilante force known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) fought back, killing 200 Boko Haram members.	CJTF complemented Nigerian military effort.
40	17 May 2014		A summit in Paris declared Boko Haram as part of al-Qaeda. Leaders from West African nations resolved to mount a region-wide offensive against the group. Western nations pledged to provide technical expertise and training to the new regional African effort against the Islamic extremists.	
41	20 May 2014	Twin bomb explosion kill 118 people in Jos.		
42	27 May 2014	Attack military location at Buni Yadi in Yobe State.	Injected more troops to confront Boko Haram in North eastern Nigeria.	
43	30 May 2014	Assassinated Muslim leader Alhaji Idrissa Timata, the Emir of Gwoza in Borno		

		State,		
44	1 June 2014	Mounted attack at a football field in Mubi, Adamawa State killing more than 40 people.		
45	2 June 2014	Boko Haram members dressed as soldiers killed about 200 civilians in three communities in Gwoza, Borno State.	Local residents complain they pleaded for help from the military, but that the military did not arrive on time.	
46	29 May-5 June 2014	Boko Haram conducts 6 attacks, killing 506 civilians, 5 military personnel. Abducts 20 women and 3 men.	Fleeing 60 Boko Haram terrorists killed by Cameroon's military.	
47	6-12 June 2014	About 5 civilians and 6 military men killed in 4 attacks by Boko Haram.	Military kill 50 Boko Haram members in a counter-attack.	
48	13 June-19 June 2014	2 attacks by Boko Haram left 46 civilians dead.	8 Boko Haram killed by Borno vigilante group (CJTF).	
49	21-26 June 2014	4 attacks by Boko Haram killing 93 civilians and 60 abducted.	A military fighter jet bombed unknown number of Boko Haram in counter-attack Killing 25 Boko Haram. Cameroon military killed 10 Boko Haram near border.	
50	4-10 July 2014	4 Boko Haram attacks, 11 civilians, 1 vigilante, 33 soldiers, 4 police killed.	53 Boko Haram were killed while attempting to capture a military base and police station in Borno on the 4th of July. On the 6th, soldiers killed Boko Haram leader and his brother at their home in Kaduna, 44 Boko Haram were killed in 2 military operations in Borno same day.	
51	11-17 July 2014	4 attacks, 81 civilians killed. German teacher kidnapped and 2 vigilantes killed in Adamawa State.	Military fighter jet in a failed counter-attack resulting in civilian casualties.	Civil society groups condemn killing of civilians.
52	18 July 2014	Attacked and occupied Damboa town in Borno State.		Boko Haram consolidating seizure and hold of territories.

	17 October 2014		Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff announced that a ceasefire had been brokered with Boko Haram.	
53	29 October 2014	Boko Haram seized Mubi town in Adamawa and Uba in Borno State.	Military forces overpowered by the terrorists in Mubi and Uba towns,	Boko Haram refutes claim days later.
54	31 October 2014	Bombed bus station in Gombe, Gombe State		
	2 November 2014	Attacked prison in Kogi, released 199 inmates.	Instituted panel of investigation.	
55	25 November 2014	2 female suicide bombings at Maiduguri market killed over 45 people.		
56	28 November 2014	Over 120 people killed in Kano during suicide bomb in a mosque where the Emir worshipped.	Government canvasses support of traditional and religious leaders to counter Boko Haram attacks.	
57	1 December 2014	In Damaturu, Yobe State, two female suicide bombers detonated bombs at the central Maiduguri market, killing about 30 persons.		
58	3 December 2014	Boko Haram abducted 20 women, mostly young girls, during an attack in Lassa town, Borno State.	Canvasses public support for its counter-terrorism efforts.	
59	4 December 2014	Boko Haram raided Bajoga, in Gombe State, occupying buildings briefly before leaving with stolen vehicles and motorbikes.		Looting is a possible major source of logistics for the terrorists.
60	10 December 2014	Boko Haram raided Gajigana, north of Borno State, killing at least 14 people. 2 female suicide bombers killed 4 persons in Kano.	Deployed more troops to Boko Haram held areas.	Female suicide bombings – an increasingly employed Boko Haram tactics.
	22 December 2014	Killed 22 persons in bus station bombing in Gombe.		
61	1 January	Boko Haram abducted 40		It is probable that

	2015	boys and young men from the village of Malari in Borno State, Nigeria.		abductees are radicalised and compelled to serve as foot soldiers for the sect.
62	3-7 January 2015	Razed the town of Baga in Borno State and captured multi-national military base.	Nigerian military vows to recapture military base. Niger and Chad troops withdraw from operation in the area.	
63	10 January 2015	A 10-year old female suicide bomber kill 20 persons in Maiduguri town.	Government condemns use of under-aged boys and girls in terrorism.	
64	11 January 2015	Two 10-year old female suicide bombers kill 5 persons in Potiskum town.		Increasing trend of Boko Haram use of female children for suicide missions.
65	25 January 2015	Captures town of Monguno including military barracks.	Renewed calls for joint efforts by neighbouring countries in fighting Boko Haram.	
66	January 2015		Nigerian military aided by Chadian forces re-capture Michika town in Adamawa State from Boko Haram.	
67	January-February 2015		Canvass for the establishment of an African Union force to Boko Haram.	Nigerian government acknowledge it could not contain Boko Haram alone.
68	2 February 2015	A female suicide bomb attack in Gombe shortly after President Goodluck Jonathan departed scene of a presidential election rally.		
69	6 February 2015	Raided Bosso and Diffa towns in Niger Republic. First time Boko Haram attacking Niger Republic.	Nigerien assisted by Chadian troop's repelled attacks.	
70	7 February 2015		Postpones general elections to allow military recapture and control areas held by Boko Haram fighters.	
71	12		Nigerian military forces	

	February 2015		supported by Chad, Cameroon and Niger invaded Boko Haram's Sambisa forest safe haven in Borno State killing many members of the Sect.	
72	13 February 2015	Attacked Chad Republic for the first time at Ngouboua village near the Lake Chad area.	Re-iterates call for multilateral action in containing Boko Haram.	
73	15 February 2015	Killed 16 persons in a suicide bomb in Damaturu.		
74	16 February 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Monguno town.	
75	21 February 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Baga town.	
76	22 February 2015	Suicide bomber kills 5 persons in Potiskum.		
77	24 February 2015	Suicide bomber kills 27 persons at bus stations in Potiskum and Kano.	Issues alerts and jingles on radios and television stations to sensitize public.	
78	February 2015	2 female suicide bombers kill 4 persons in Damaturu.		
79	7 March 2015	Killed 54 persons and wounded 143 in 5 separate suicide bombings in Maiduguri.	Launches ground and air offensive against Boko Haram strongholds.	
80	7 March 2015	Pledges allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.	Calls for more international support.	
81	17 March 2015		Bama town recaptured by Nigerian military from Boko Haram.	
82	18 March 2015		Damasak town recaptured by Nigerian and Chadian forces from Boko Haram.	
83	27 March 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Gwoza town from Boko Haram.	
84	28 March	Voters in Nigeria go to the		

	2015	polls for a general election. Gunmen kill at least 15 voters including an opposition house of assembly candidate for Dukku in Gombe.		
85	29 March 2015		Voting in the Nigerian general election is delayed for a second day due to delays and malfunctioning equipment. So far, 43 people have died in Boko Haram attacks.	
86	24 May 2015		Majority of areas held by Boko Haram's forces in control of Nigerian military. Most of the sect militants withdraw to the Sambisa forest.	This is attributed to joint military effort of contiguous countries and Nigeria's engagement of South African mercenaries.
87	29 May 2015		President Buhari during swearing in ceremony announced relocation of Military Command Centre to Maiduguri, the centre of Boko Haram activities.	
88	3-4 June 2015		President Buhari visited Chad and Niger urging closer and concerted effort against Boko Haram.	The visit considered worthwhile as Nigeria's neighbours were wary of Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts.
89	12 June 2015	Several days of night raids on six remote villages in Borno State. About 37 persons killed.		
90	16 June 2015	Twin suicide bombings by Boko Haram killed 24 people and wounded more than 100 in the first such attacks in Chad's capital N'Djamena. The attacks targeted the police headquarters and a police academy.	On 29 August 2015, the Chadian Government charged, tried and executed 10 terrorists involved in the attacks.	Decisive action by Chadian government a probable lesson for Nigeria.

91	17 June 2015		Chad bans people from wearing the full-face veil Burqa's, following two suicide bomb attacks. They also banned vehicles with tinted windows.	Some section of Nigerian society urge Nigerian government to emulate Chad's ban on Burqa's.
92	22 June 2015	2 teenaged female suicide bombers killed 30 at crowded mosque in Malari, Borno State (during holy month of Ramadan).		Sect perhaps targeting mosque they feel fall short in following 'The Prophet'.
93	01-02 July 2015	Multiple mosque attacks in Kukawa and two other towns in Borno State by Boko Haram kill about 142 persons.	Spate of attacks viewed as a renewed challenge to new government.	
94	5 July 2015	A suicide bomber attacks a church in the Potiskum area of Nigeria's Yobe State, killing five.		
95	6 July 2015	Two bomb attacks on the central Nigerian city of Jos have left at least 44 people dead.	Issued press release condemning attacks.	
96	11 July 2015	Male suicide bomber dressed in woman's burqa kills 15 and injures 80 in N'Djamena market.		Boko Haram increasingly attacking neighbouring countries.
97	23 July 2015	About 29 persons killed in bomb attacks at bus garages in Gombe town		
98	27-29 July 2015	Boko Haram attacks Burratai, hometown of Nigerian Chief of Army Staff.	Nigeria solicits for more foreign assistance. President Buhari paid state visit to Cameroon, seek cooperation to fight Boko Haram.	Niger bans dressing in full veil. Offensive against Boko Haram by Chadian Army result in killing of over a hundred terrorists around Lake Chad area.
99	4 August 2015	Report from Centre for Crisis Communication indicate Boko Haram faction demanding dialogue with	Government announced that it was open to dialogue.	


		Nigerian government.		
100	August 2015	Shekau in audio internet message denies claim by Chad's President Idriss Deby that Mahamat Daoud had replaced him as the leader of Boko Haram.		It was earlier rumoured that Shekau had been killed by Nigerian military.
101	13 August	Boko Haram raid Kukuwa village in Yobe State. About 60 people killed, many of them by drowning while fleeing from the attacks.	President Buhari gives a three month ultimatum to Service Chiefs during their swearing in ceremony to defeat Boko Haram.	
102	15 August 2015	Boko Haram attack Damboa village killing 13 persons.		
103	21 August 2015	Ambushed convoy of Nigerian Chief of Army Staff while visiting troop's locations. One soldier and 9 terrorists killed.		It was evident that Boko Haram had pockets of hide-outs and hidden camps in remote areas of Borno State.
104	25 August	24 persons killed in Boko Haram raid on Mafumudi village in Borno State.		
105	1 September 2015		Nigerian military announce its recapture of Gamboru and Ngala towns in Borno State.	
106	9 September 2015	Boko Haram members dislodged from by the military from some parts of Sambisa forest raid villages and towns along Nigeria - Cameroun border.	Nigeria's Director of Defence Information claims that the military had destroyed all known Boko Haram camps and the sect was so weakened that it could no longer hold territory.	
107	September 2015	Shekau in an audio message refutes claim by the Nigerian military of successes against Boko Haram.	The Nigerian military reacted by saying the message was cheap propaganda and demanded Shekau to surrender.	
108	16 September 2015		President Buhari announced in France that Nigerian government was negotiating with Boko Haram for the release of Chibok School	

			girls.	
109	September 2015		Security tightened in Lagos as US Embassy warns of possible Boko Haram attacks on air and sea ports in the city.	
111	20 September 2015	Series of bombings occurred in Maiduguri and Monguno towns. About 54 people killed.		
112	25 September 2015	Suspected Boko Haram members attacked Kogi State DSS office and freed 30 of their detained members. 4 people including a policeman were killed.		
113	27 September 2015	Boko Haram kills 9 persons and injure another 9 in an attack on Mailari village in Konduga town near Maiduguri.		
114	1 October 2015	Boko Haram attack Kirchinga Village in Adamawa State slitting the throat of four inhabitants.		
115	2 October 2015	Bombings at Nyanya and Kuje-Abuja killed 18 and wounded 41 persons.		
116	7 October 2015	15 people killed in three suicide bomb incidents in Damaturu, including attack in a crowded market.	JTF operations led to discovery of large cache of Boko Haram arms in Goniri town, Yobe State. 100 militants killed. Seven deaths recorded on side of military	A ten-year old girl suicide bomber involved in one of the incidents.
117	18 October 2015	Female suicide bombers kill 12 at Dar, Adamawa State.		
118	21 October 2015	Fleeing Boko Haram militants robbed, shot and killed commuters at Nganzai village. Also burnt down nearby village.	JTF operation conducted at Madagali and Gwoza killed 150 terrorists and rescued 36 captives.	
119	23 October 2015	Boko Haram suicide bombers killed 27 in a mosque in Yola.		

120	23 October 2015	Suicide bombing at mosque in Maiduguri, 21 killed including two suicide bombers.		Increasing use of suicide bombings by Boko Haram
121	24 October 2015		JTF intercept four female suicide bombers.	One casualty recorded.
122	28 October 2015		Military rescue 138 women and 192 children abducted by Boko Haram at Sambisa forest.	Their information reveal Boko Haram concentration in camps in the forest.

Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

Figure 7.2 Graphical Representation of Boko Haram's Major Activities and Government Concessions/Military Approaches



Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

This case scenario depicts an increasing military response been correspondingly matched by a rise in the activities of Boko Haram. The use of soft approaches has been at an unappreciable level when compared to the military response. In 2015, a large portion of Nigeria's territory seized by the terrorists was recaptured through the concerted efforts the AFN, CJTF,

mercenaries and the armed forces of Nigeria's contiguous countries. This however cannot be said to have substantially turned the tide in terms of countering the threat. I would therefore argue that although the battle to regain the territories that Nigeria lost to the terrorists appears won at the time of writing, the fight to contain terrorist bombings and other unconventional forms of attacks is far from being achieved. This necessitates an assessment of how impactful the responses of the Government of Nigeria were or have been in containing the activities of Boko Haram.

7.4 Assessment of Government Responses

The Nigerian government's measures to counter Boko Haram beginning from its evolutionary stages appear ad hoc and not driven by a definite counter terrorism policy or strategy. It is plausible that such ad hoc and reactionary approaches lend space and initiatives for the Boko Haram terrorists to operate. Wiwa notes that a mitigating factor to effective response was inadequacy of intelligence on the sect owing to the capacity problems of the intelligence agencies.⁸³ Media operations, public enlightenment, community engagement and other people-centric measures by the government that could have countered the Boko Haram ideology appeared not properly deployed.

Meanwhile, the sect kept attracting adherents based on its ideology that appealed to the unemployed and poor who felt that their condition was caused by governance failure, moral decadence and corruption by the elites. It effectively employed the media and other forms of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) platforms such as the Internet to publicise its cause and activities. Corruption and poor financial regulations gave the sect leverage to cover its source of funding believed to include ransoms, levies, drug cartels, fake

⁸³ L. W. Wiwa, Director Military Intelligence Nigerian Army. Interviewed 24 May 2014.

charity organizations and sympathetic individuals and groups within Nigeria as well as in Saudi Arabia and the UK.⁸⁴

The complexity and level of sophistication which the sect attained challenged the capacity of security agencies and other institutions involved in the government counter-terrorism effort, particularly as coordination and the needed synergy among government institutions seemed inadequate. The Nigerian military that is at the forefront of the government's counter-terrorism effort saw itself suffering many setbacks as it confronted the terrorists. A number of military locations were attacked by the terrorists to the extent that the weapons seized from the Nigerian soldiers became the major source of arms to Boko Haram.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the fact that Boko Haram activities transcended Nigeria's borders particularly in terms of training, financing, and re-groupings, kidnappings and arms acquisition raised concerns over border management and Nigeria's relations with her immediate neighbours as well as the international community in their commitment to contain terrorism in Nigeria.

In an effort to prosecute terrorists and their sponsors, the National Assembly enacted the TPA as earlier highlighted. The Act prohibits acts of terrorism and their funding. Certain provisions of the Act such as arrests and timeframe for prosecution were however found not to have been well defined. Similarly, legally defining terrorism and designating groups as such was problematic until the 13 November 2013 designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as FTOs by the US. The Government of Nigeria that had in May 2013 declared a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states to facilitate military operations against these groups did not dispute the designation by the US. This implied not only a tacit approval that Boko Haram and Ansaru were officially recognised as terrorist groups in Nigeria but also that

⁸⁴ Kathleen Caulderwood, "Fake Charities, Drug Cartels, Ransom and Extortion: Where Islamic Boko Haram Gets Its Cash", *International Business Times*, 16 May 2014. Also, Adisa Taiwo, "Boko Haram's funding traced to UK, S. Arabia", *Nigerian Tribune*, 13 February 2012.

⁸⁵ E. J. Amadasun, Defence Headquarters Abuja, interviewed 22 January 2015.

the activities of the Boko Haram sect were invariably beyond the containment of the Nigerian government alone.

From Figure 7.1, it could also be noted that unlike in the case of the Niger Delta crisis, concessions in the form of negotiations or concessions in what Obasanjo calls “the carrot and stick approach” appear not to have worked.⁸⁶ The relevant questions that may need to be answered however are what form of negotiations or concessions were given the terrorists and by what means in terms of delivery, appropriateness and approach? Also relevant is the question of the extent to which other response mechanisms apart from the military have been explored and exploited. All these questions are perhaps imperative for further research as one could conclude here that, as in the case studies previously examined, the continuing terrorism perpetrated by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is a probable function of the ineffectiveness of government’s responses. Following this, the succeeding chapter draws from the discussions in chapters four, five, six and this chapter, and appraises the responses of the Government of Nigeria to the threats of terrorism. It specifically examines counter-terrorism issues raised in the case studies that could inform an effective national counter-terrorism strategy.

⁸⁶ Zacheaus Somorin, “Boko Haram: Obasanjo Advocates ‘Carrot and Stick’ Approach” *This Day*, 9 January 2013. Online at <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-obasanjo-advocates-carrot-and-stick-approach/135805/>, accessed 14 May 2014. The carrot and stick as used here refer to a counter-terrorism policy that offers a combination of rewards and punishments to persuade or compel terrorists and potential terrorists from the act.

CHAPTER EIGHT

APPRAISAL OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE THREATS OF TERRORISM

8.1 Preamble

In chapters four, five, six and seven, I examined the various forms of terrorist threats that Nigeria has witnessed in its post-independence history. These are the terrorist threats posed by Maitatsine, the state under military rule, Niger Delta militants and that of the Boko Haram sect. Essentially, the case studies brought out the threat-response interface between terrorists and the Nigerian Government over time and space. In this chapter therefore, I will attempt, by way of an assessment, to relate these threats and responses to the question of a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

In the first case study, that is, terrorism perpetrated by the Maitatsine sect, it was observed that indecisiveness by the Nigerian Government and inappropriate handling by security forces escalated the sect's activities. The sect's activities consequently spread to Bauchi, Gombe, Yola and Maiduguri which, incidentally, are the hotbeds of the current wave of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram. The Maitatsine sect was finally contained through the use of military force. The terrorism witnessed during military rule was that of repression by the state against pro-democracy groups. As noted in chapter five, the state was the perpetrator, and the people were the victim. The death of General Sani Abacha combined with international pressure saw a return of the country to democratic rule but with a militarised society as evident in the emergence of militant groups. In the Niger Delta region, the militants employed hostage taking, kidnapping and other forms of terrorist tactics in advancing their cause. Again, government's response was more of the application of military force with less attention to the use of soft power approaches that alleviate citizens'

grievances. Terrorist activities by the Niger Delta militant groups were contained through an Amnesty Programme that involved negotiation, and a disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation process.

The fourth case examined, which is terrorism carried out by the Boko Haram sect, has its peculiarities. Firstly, while the classification of the first three cases discussed above as terrorism remain contentious among scholars and policy makers, the classification of the Boko Haram as such is less contentious as its activities have not only typified full-blown terrorism but also transcended Nigeria's borders. Secondly, and the most important for this study is that Boko Haram terrorism is not only ongoing but equally seem to have defied the responses so far undertaken by the Government of Nigeria.

From the threat-response assessments and the lessons highlighted in the case studies, some key points or observations are inherent. These include that terrorism threats and the Nigerian government responses to them demonstrate the imperative of direction and political will in the form of a national policy to guide government's counter-terrorism efforts. The case studies also raised the importance of governance that could enhance socio-economic development, democracy and the rule of law. In line with these are requirements for the institutions responsible for countering terrorism, the national security architecture, border management, international cooperation and public-private engagement in the counter-terrorism effort.

The key points derived from the case studies as highlighted above would need to be examined in depth to provide the threat-response and strategy linkage espoused in this study. This is considered imperative given the need to identify the weaknesses and challenges confronting the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism efforts with a view to adjusting the responses or crafting new approaches to countering terrorism. The understanding here is that

the effectiveness of the responses of government, or its efforts at countering the threat of terrorism, is a function of how articulate are its counter-terrorism policy, institutions and programmes. McCord buttresses this in observing that “as examples in social policy have shown, (counter-terrorism) programmes are often not effective and can sometimes increase the problem or cause further social negatives.”¹ In line with this, Lum, Kennedy and Sherley suggest that “evaluations of both effectiveness and harm are necessary for policy that involves phenomena like terrorism that can generate irrational thinking and hasty responses.”² Such an evaluation supports my intention in this chapter.

Before delving into the evaluation proper, it is perhaps important to reiterate two important concepts in view of the social constructivist approach of this study of terrorism threat-response processes in Nigeria. Firstly, terrorism and terrorists are not readily and easily defined. Thus, the government, media and other stakeholders have usually used the term with underlying political, ideological and other objectives. In this way, terrorists could just as easily be defined as political activists, freedom fighters, insurgents, or any number of other categories of organised violence. Secondly, the actions of terrorists and of the government agencies that respond are the actions of institutions and organisations which in turn, are composed of sets of individuals with particular ideas or conceptions of the world. Flick thus notes that, “the realities we study are social products of the actions, of interactions and institutions.”³ In this vein, and as I have sought to demonstrate with the case studies in chapters four to seven, the way in which terrorist groups develop and evolve their actions could be said to be in response to the perceived messages they observe in the actions of the Nigerian counter-terrorist actors and vice versa.

¹ J. McCord. “Cures that harm: Unanticipated outcomes of crime prevention programs.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 587 (2003), pp. 16-30.

² Lum C, Kennedy LW, Sherley, AJ. “The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies.” *Campbell Systematic Reviews* (Newark: Campbell Collaboration, 2009), p. 6.

³ U. Flick, *Designing Qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 2007), p. 12.

Similarly, from the case studies examined, one can reasonably hypothesise that the Nigerian government has sought to send out messages through their actions, both to the people they would categorise as terrorists, the terrorists' sympathisers and to the wider citizenry on the efficacy or otherwise of their counter-terrorism policies. It is the mutual perceptions of actions and reactions on both sides of the equation, and the opinions these help to form in the populace, that arguably determine how the security situation has played out in recent Nigerian history. However, the proof of the causal effect of inappropriate or lacking counter-terrorism strategy on the severity of the terrorist picture in Nigeria over the years cannot be assumed or established with definite degree of certainty. This is owing partly to the fact that the actors involved, that is the government and terrorists, are both working on the basis of perceptions, messages and reactions to the perceived intentions of actions. Herein comes the question and place of methodology in a research such as this. I would therefore amplify the methodology adopted to achieve the appraisal of government's responses to the threats of terrorism in Nigeria.

8.2 Methodology

In chapter one, I noted that this study adopted a mainly qualitative research method with a case study approach (as employed in the preceding four chapters). At one level therefore, this is a phenomenological study of the processes through which the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism responses shape and affect terrorist threats. But as observed in the study, terrorism is by no means an easily or precisely defined phenomenon given that it is a human action that seeks to shape opinion through largely symbolic acts of violence, and by generating psychological fear of violence in the populace in order to influence government action. For this reason, terrorism and responses to it cannot be seen as firmly set phenomena about which easy calculations and measurements can be made. I would further argue that since the government and terrorists are acting on the basis of perceptions, the interactions

between both actors in this process in Nigeria are not entirely positivist, although a certain degree of causality is implied in this study. This further highlights why in epistemological terms, this study takes the social constructivist approach in studying the threat-response processes towards shaping Nigeria's counter-terrorist strategy.

With this said, a further core dataset is offered here in the form of a number of qualitative semi-structured interviews. As Kvale contends, qualitative research interviews have the aim of "interpreting the meaning of the phenomena described."⁴ Having described the action-reaction phenomena inherent in a set of case studies in the previous chapters, the aim in this next chapter of the study is to use a set of qualitative interviews on the one hand and questionnaires on the other to triangulate the action-reaction hypothesis by way of what Hein terms "meaning making."⁵ I therefore developed a set of questions around the topical issues derived from the key points in the case studies, and which are imperatives for effective counter-terrorism effort. This sought to find out what the current pulse of government counter-terrorism efforts is, what this holds for the future of terrorism in Nigeria, and what public and expert opinion are as to how to better the government's counter-terrorism drive. Specifically, this second set of data covered the topical issues of counter terrorism policy and legislation, governance, counter terrorism institutions, national security architecture, border management and public strategic communication. The outcome of the survey is subsequently discussed in a definition of the issue, respondents' views and corroborating/ contending argument and analysis format.

8.3 Issue One: Policy and Legislation on Terrorism

⁴ S. Kvale, "Dialogue as Oppression and Interview Research." Paper presented at the Nordic Educational Research Association Conference, Tallinn, 7-9 March 2002, p. 9.

⁵ George E. Hein, "Is Meaning Making Constructivism? Is Constructivism Meaning Making?" Available online at http://name-aam.org/uploads/downloadables/EXH.fall_99/EXH_fall_99_Is%20Meaning%20Making%20Constructivism%20Is%20Constructivism%20Meaning%20Making_Hein.pdf, accessed 4 July 2015.

A national policy to counter terrorism is fundamental for countries whose national security has been undermined or threatened by terrorism. According to Agholor, national policy is a set of principles and broad guidelines articulated to manage a nation's security decision making and actions.⁶ Applied to terrorism therefore, it is a frame of reference that describes how a country provides for and guarantees the security of the state and its citizens against terrorism. In countries such as the US and the UK, the policy exists in the form of an integrated document known as a counter-terrorism strategy. The document guides decisions on the part of the executives, communicates decisions to the implementation agencies, informs the public as well as provides a measure for gauging performance, evaluation and review. Alongside a policy is the legal framework consisting of legislations within which the counter-terrorism policy or strategy operates. In the UK, for instance, CONTEST defines terrorism as a security threat and sets priorities for dealing with it while the Terrorism Act gives a legal definition and establishes criminal procedures for handling cases of terrorism. The latter empowers institutions involved in terrorism and national security, facilitates speedy trial of terrorist suspects and ensures that every stakeholder operates within the law. The CONTEST and Terrorism Act are publicised not only among government and implementation bodies but also in print and electronic means for public awareness.

8.3.1 Respondents' View on Policy and Legislation on Terrorism

Among the questions that I posed to the respondents were those about their awareness of the existence of a national counter-terrorism strategy and of an act to prevent terrorism in Nigeria. My findings were that while very few of the respondents knew of the existence of the country's counter-terrorism strategy (that is NACTEST), more than half of them were aware of the TPA, which is the legislation against terrorism. However, for the more than half

⁶ NP Agholor, "National Security Policy: Imperatives for Nigeria", Commandant's Lecture delivered at the National Defence College Abuja Nigeria, April 2014.

that were aware of the TPA, the adequacy of the Act as a legal framework for curbing terrorism in Nigeria is a concern. For instance, Ashi asserted that many inadequacies were inherent in the Act especially on aspects that deal with arrests, detention and trial resulting in its criticism by human rights activists and civil society organizations.⁷ Many of the respondents in the areas where terrorism is prevalent felt the locals were often unjustly arrested and detained as suspected terrorists. However, Sampson was of the opinion that the TPA is fair and robust.⁸ He added that the laws have to be tough given the unprecedented level that terrorism has attained in Nigeria.⁹ For the NACTEST, Folorunsho observed that the released NACTEST has shortcomings as “it is undergoing testing, being relatively a new document when one considers its time of release.”¹⁰ Daramola was of the view that given the engagement of security agencies in the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram, the NACTEST could not have meaningful input from its users in terms of consultations, but on the other hand was hurriedly put together for their use.¹¹ In general, the outcome of my survey indicated that the NACTEST and TPA are yet to command a significant degree of acceptability as policy and legal instruments for countering terrorism in Nigeria.

8.3.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

The idea of a national counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria (with the acronym NACTEST) was mooted in December 2010 by the then NSA, General Andrew Azazi.¹² Its formulation was however stalled by ethno-religious and political sentiments mounted by pressure groups who felt it was targeted at Islamic elements in the northern part of the country.¹³ It thus remained in a draft until its endorsement in April 2014 by President Goodluck Jonathan and

⁷ Gabriel Ashi, telephone interview, Abuja, 12 June 2014.

⁸ Isaac Terwase Sampson, National Defence College Abuja, interviewed 17 May 2014.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ O Folorunsho, Joint Terrorism Analysis Bureau, Counter Terrorism Department Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja – Nigeria interviewed 12 November 2014.

¹¹ O Daramola, Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja, interviewed 12 November 2014.

¹² Office of the National Security Adviser Nigeria Archives, accessed 14 November 2013.

¹³ Anonymous to author.

subsequent release for operational use.¹⁴ This means that prior to this time, there were no documented guidelines for the conduct of counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Consequently, such matters as specific roles of counter-terrorism agencies, the interface between policy-makers and the security agencies, and with the public were not streamlined and therefore unwieldy. The NACTEST 2014 was released without adequate critiquing through workshops and seminars.¹⁵ It is equally yet to be well publicised. This probably accounts for the poor knowledge of its existence by members of the public as observed in the survey. The critiquing and circulation of the NACTEST is imperative particularly for the implementation agencies who ought to extract and interpret the provisions of the strategy as it affects them both individually and collectively.

In terms of legislation, the TPA was enacted on 22 June 2011.¹⁶ This was after five years during which a bill to that effect was sponsored in the National Assembly. Initially, it was lawmakers from the southern part of the country that opposed the bill for fear of categorizing the militancy in the Niger Delta as terrorism.¹⁷ Thereafter, opinion leaders in the northern part of the country opposed the bill ostensibly to safeguard attempts to arrest and prosecute perceived Islamic fundamentalists.¹⁸ It thus could be argued that the delay in formulating a counter-terrorism policy and an anti-terrorism legislation allowed for terrorism to take root in Nigeria. For instance, terrorist suspects such as Mohammed Ashafa, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Ilya Damagun that were arrested and charged with receiving funds for

¹⁴ Presidential Directive in *The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)*, Abuja, 2014.

¹⁵ National Defence College of Nigeria Course 22 Participants Seminar Report, Abuja, June 2014.

¹⁶ See Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, p. 1.

¹⁷ Terwase Sampson and Freedom Onuoha, "Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it Realise its Taste?"

Understanding the Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria" in *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol 5, No 3-4 (2011).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

terrorist operations could not be prosecuted.¹⁹ They were all released on the account that there were no requisite legislative provisions to deal with the cases.

The TPA enacted in 2011 covered issues such as acts that constitute terrorism and related offences, terrorism funding as well as mutual assistance and extradition.²⁰ It was reviewed in February 2013 to further empower the security agencies. The TPA 2013 empowers security personnel to arrest and to detain suspects for extended periods of time. Section 27(1) states that:

The court may, pursuant to an ex-parte application, grant an order for the detention of a suspect under this Act for a period not exceeding 90 days subject to renewal for a similar period until the conclusion of the investigation and prosecution of the matter that led to the arrest and detention is dispensed with.”²¹

The allowance for an indefinite number of extensions arguably allows for open-ended detention of suspects which is perhaps inimical to quick dispensation of justice. Similarly, the Act allows security personnel the freedom to carry out what Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri described as “haphazard large-scale arrests.”²² Equally were incidences of large scale retaliatory military deployments, urban lockdowns, door-to-door searches and communication intercepts which civil society organisations view as an intrusion into privacy and a violation of fundamental human rights.²³

It could equally be stated that the provisions in the TPA are not robust enough to ensure swift convictions thereby giving room for delayed or long trials as witnessed in the case of Senator

¹⁹ “Country Reports on Terrorism, Africa Review”, *Global Terrorism Organization Year Book*, (Washington D.C: International Business Publication, 2010), p. 83.

²⁰ See Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011

²¹ Terrorism (Prevention) Act, amended 2013, Section 27(1).

²² Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, “By the numbers: The Nigerian State’s efforts to counter Boko Haram” in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014), p. 192.

²³ *Ibid.* See also, Amnesty International. *Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands* (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2015) p. 33.

Ali Ndume who was arraigned for abetting terrorism.²⁴ Further inadequacies are the restrictions of handling cases of terrorism to federal courts, the absence of special courts and the insufficient number of lawyers trained to handle cases of terrorism.²⁵ All these inadequacies hinder effectiveness of the legislation process regarding the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. Therefore, the priorities for dealing with terrorism as would have been enshrined in a tested NACTEST and humane criminal procedures for handling cases of terrorism as ought to have been provided for in the TPA remain a concern. They consequently constitute a challenge to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. This raises the requirement for a proven counter-terrorism policy and the corollary review of existing legislation to contain terrorism in Nigeria.

8.3 Issue Two: Governance and Terrorism in Nigeria

Governance is critical in national security as it involves the management of a nation's resources to meet the needs of citizens including the security of citizens against threats such as terrorism. According to O'Neil, "states that lack legitimacy and control over the economy and other traditional levers of power provide the space and oxygen for terrorist groups to flourish."²⁶ Newman opines further that:

*It is in such environments - such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, Somalia, Georgia, Yemen, and Algeria - that local or transnational terrorist organizations can find a base of operations, a vacuum of authority, and a source of support.*²⁷

Lamba adds that such environments of governance deficit give rise to ungoverned spaces, and went on to define an ungoverned space as:

²⁴ Bayo Oladeji, Uchenna Awom and Chizoba Ogbeche, "Alleged Boko Haram Sponsorship – Senator Ali Ndume Arrested" *Leadership*, 22 November 2011.

²⁵ Adebisi Onanuga, "Lawyers seek special courts for terrorism" *The Nation*, available online, <http://thenationonline.net/lawyers-see-special-courts-terrorism/>, accessed 13 May 2015.

²⁶ See Edward Newman, "Exploring the "Root Causes" of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:8 (2006), pp. 749-772.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

*a place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behaviour.*²⁸

In line with the above, is the likelihood that within weak states occasioned by governance deficit are evidences of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, corruption and human rights abuse. While not dismissing the view of scholars such as Krueger and Maleckova that neither poverty nor education have a direct causal impact on terrorism, O'Neil's contention that terrorists need foot-soldiers who overwhelmingly come from the poor and down-trodden is significant.²⁹ The Nigerian situation could be said to fit in here from the outcome of my field survey.

8.3.1 Respondents' Views on Governance and Terrorism in Nigeria

Respondents overwhelmingly opined that the Nigerian government has over the years not met the expectations of Nigerians on aspects of the provision of security and basic human needs. Hassan, a traditional ruler, was of the opinion that the government had not empowered the people enough in terms of employment opportunities.³⁰ He pointed to the vast lands in his community that government could irrigate and resource the people to engage productively in agriculture. Many respondents believe that government presence was lacking as evident by lack of good roads, schools, hospitals, electricity and other essential needs for living. Mai'Adua viewed social and economic inequalities and the widening gap between the rich and the poor in the society as the crucial issues in the factor of governance and terrorism in

²⁸ Robert, D. Lamba, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Haven: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project". 2008. Available online at www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/ugash_report_final.pdf, accessed 12 January 2015.

²⁹ As cited in E. Newman, p. 753.

³⁰ Hassan Abdullahi, Community Head Mayo-Belwa, Adamawa State interviewed 12 February 2014.

Nigeria.³¹ He added that this was so as those in government composed the rich class while the masses constituted the poor.

8.3.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

Section 14 (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 affirms the importance of good governance by recognising that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.”³² The performances of successive Nigerian governments however seem to indicate a below average score in the achievement of this purpose. This is so when using yardsticks for measurement such as the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance.³³ The Mo Ibrahim’s five criteria for measurement of good governance are safety and security, rule of law, transparency and corruption, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and finally human development. Nigeria is thought to be deficient in the five criteria despite her enormous natural and human resources. It was rated among the poorly governed countries in Africa with a ranking of 37th position out of the 52 countries listed in the overall governance scale.³⁴

The country is plagued with high rates of poverty, economic disparity, political exclusion, illiteracy and unemployment which, as discussed in chapter three, abetted vulnerability to terrorist group appeal and membership. For instance, in 2011, the unemployment rate rose to 23.9 per cent from 21.1 per cent in 2010 and 19.7 per cent in 2009 with multiplier effects on poverty.³⁵ In 2014, the then Coordinating Minister for the Economy and Minister for Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala stated that no fewer than 5.3 million Nigerian youths were jobless

³¹ Mohammed Mai’Adua, Director Ministry of Labour Abuja, interviewed 12 March 2014.

³² The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.

³³ The M. O. Ibrahim Foundation was founded in 2006 by Dr Mohammed Ibrahim, a UK-based entrepreneur to encourage good governance in Africa. See <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iag/...>, accessed 14 May 2014.

³⁴ Ibangha Isine, “Nigeria, one of the Africa’s worst governed countries – Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, *Premium Times*, 1 October 2014

³⁵ O. A. Azazi “National Security Strategies: Issues and Challenges” Lecture delivered to National Defence College Course 20 Participants, 13 January 2012.

while 1.8 million graduates enter the labour market each year thereby increasing the unemployment rate, and by extension, the availability of idle youths that terrorist groups could recruit.

The nexus between governance and terrorism in Nigeria is particularly evident when one considers the situation in Northern Nigeria where Boko Haram terrorism prevails. The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics records in 2012 revealed that out of the total number of about 100 million Nigerians considered poor by World Bank standard, the northern part of the country has an average poverty rate of 70.1 per cent as compared to 36.9 per cent for the southern zones.³⁶ Equally, a recent report by the National Population Commission found that literacy rates are much lower among states in the north, and that 72 per cent of children around the age of 6 -16 years never attended schools in Borno, the state worst affected by Boko Haram activities.³⁷ All these are possible indications of the failure of government to deliver basic citizens' needs, a situation Onuoha opines results in people turning to religion, ethnicity and other expressions of identity for succour.³⁸ He further observes that:

*...the failure to provide opportunities for better lives becomes an instrument for mobilizing and radicalizing the unemployed, unskilled, and poverty-ridden youths to join its (Boko Haram terrorists) cause and dislodge the secular controlled state as an alternative and plausible answer to their misery.*³⁹

It could thus be argued that while poverty and unemployment may not be in themselves the prime factors for vulnerability to terrorist group recruitment and membership, the tendency for grievances and anti-state sentiments could easily be generated. This perhaps explains why in 2004, some students in Borno and Yobe states withdrew from school, tore up their

³⁶ Data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Abuja – Nigeria, 21 September 2013.

³⁷ National Population Commission Archives, 2013.

³⁸ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature (eds), *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa, 2013) pp. 407-430.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

certificates and joined the group of Koranic lessons and preaching, some of the preaching being highly critical of the state.⁴⁰ The students, one of whom was Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, felt that their education, apart from the Western and secular values unacceptable to them, was worthless in terms of employment opportunities.⁴¹

8.4 Issue Three: Counter-Terrorism Institutions

Institutions are the channels through which government carry out the management of a nation's resources to meet the needs of citizens including safeguards against threats such as terrorism. Kernal Dervis opines that "neither good policies nor good investments are likely to emerge or be sustainable in an environment with dysfunctional institutions."⁴² The institutions are therefore relatively a yardstick for gauging good governance or governance failure in aspects of citizens' security and welfare. In the context of terrorism and national security, the institutions could be divided into two. The first include those concerned with the socio-economic and political aspects including human security elements of eradicating poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and other factors that could possibly drive violent extremism and terrorism. The second comprise those institutions concerned with the traditional aspect of security which involve the conduct of counter-terrorism operations.

In Nigeria, the Federal Government institutions involved in counter-terrorism are outlined in Annex A of Section 7 of the NACTEST, enclosed as an Appendix in this study. They include a plethora of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) with their expected roles.

⁴⁰ F. C. Onuoha, "Youth Unemployment and Poverty: Connections and Concern for National Development in Nigeria", *International Journal of Modern Political Economy*, Vol.1, No. 1, 2010, pp.115-136.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Kernal Dervis, Forward in "Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance." *A World Bank Strategy*, Washington DC, November 2000.

8.4.1 Respondents' Views on Counter-Terrorism Institutions.

During my field survey, I sought respondents' opinions on the capacity and effectiveness of government agencies in meeting the expectations of Nigerians both in ameliorating conditions that could gravitate people to terrorism and in countering it. Their views were varied, but cumulatively showed a below average rating of the agencies both in capacity and effectiveness. Some of the respondents perceived that the Ministries of Labour, Youth Development, Agriculture and Education were yet to meet the expectations of Nigerians on employment generation, poverty alleviation, food security and literacy respectively.⁴³ Similarly, the Ministry of Justice, Economic and Financial Crime Commission and National Finance Intelligence Unit were said to have not delivered in terms of criminal justice, fighting corruption, monitoring terrorists funding networks and the arrest as well as prosecution of terrorists and their sponsors.⁴⁴ Many reasons bordering on funding, administration and corruption were adduced as responsible for the ineffectiveness of the institutions. A major consensus, however, was that the coordination of the agencies was deficient. Waya, for instance, stated that the bane of Nigeria's counter terrorism institutions was largely the dearth of coordination as each tends to act independently thus dissipating efforts and resources.⁴⁵

8.4.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis.

A recent report on the MDAs including those that comprise counter terrorism institutions revealed that they are poorly managed with an inherent lack of accountability and transparency, ailing infrastructure, poor staffing and funding.⁴⁶ All of these arguably impact

⁴³ T. Ologba, Director Department of State Services Abuja, interviewed 14 May 2014.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ T. T., Waya, Director Presidential Command Control and Communication Centre, State House Abuja, interviewed 17 January 2014.

⁴⁶ Report of Transition Committee set up by President Muhammadu Buhari to assess Federal Government Parastatals and Agencies, Abuja, June 2015.

negatively on their performance. Data obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics also suggest poor performance by the institutions.⁴⁷

This author observed that none of the MDAs was designated as lead-ministry or agency for coordinating counter-terrorism in Nigeria as applies in countries such as the UK. There have been ongoing debates for the designation of such an agency, but the choice between the Nigerian Police and the Department of State Services have often resulted in heated debates at the National Assembly without a decision.⁴⁸ There is equally unhealthy rivalry among some of these institutions which erodes the synergy that could have been derived from cooperation in terms of pulling resources together.⁴⁹

The CTC at the ONSA currently oversees the efforts of the counter-terrorism institutions. However, the Department is not sufficiently equipped, staffed or organized to carry out this role effectively.⁵⁰ It also took on responsibilities beyond its mandate in that the role of ONSA is advisory and not legally established to be involved in directing operational issues such as counter-terrorism.⁵¹ The CTC it was also observed, concentrates efforts more on the security agencies to the detriment of harnessing the potentials of civil government agencies, civil society organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and international development agencies involved in the counter terrorism effort. In this wise, it could be reasonably maintained that the CTC, as currently structured and task-organized, is not an appropriate counter-terrorism coordinating body. This therefore brings to fore the need for an appropriate body to coordinate the efforts of all the counter-terrorism institutions (military and civil) to enhance the achievement of national counter-terrorism objectives.

⁴⁷ <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pages/NBS%20eLibrary>, accessed 13 May 2014.

⁴⁸ The debates have been spearheaded by the Nigerian Senate Committee on National Intelligence led by Senator Nuhu Aliyu. Also see United States Department of Defense Country Report on Terrorism 2011, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf>, accessed 12 May 2015.

⁴⁹ A. A. Abdulsalami, "A Comprehensive Approach to National Security Management in Nigeria" being a paper delivered at NDC Abuja to NDC Course 22 participants on 7 Oct 2013.

⁵⁰ T. T Waya, interviewed 17 January 2014.

⁵¹ Federal Government of Nigeria, *The National Security Act (CAP 278)*, 1986.

8.5 Issue Four: National Security and Intelligence Architecture

Nigeria's national security bodies involved in the counter-terrorism efforts of the government include the AFN, NPF, Nigeria Customs Service and the Nigeria Immigration Service. The other agencies involved are the Nigeria Prison Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, National Emergency Management Agency and the Nigerian Federal Fire Service. As noted in chapter three, the bulk of counter-terrorism intelligence effort is undertaken by the three Nigerian Secret Intelligence Agencies (officially addressed as the Nigeria Intelligence Community). It is on these national security bodies, particularly the AFN, which the Nigerian government's main counter-terrorism thrust revolves. This is to the extent that in August 2015, the country's President tasked the AFN to end Boko Haram attacks within three months.⁵²

8.5.1 Respondents' Views on the Efforts of Nigeria's Security Forces.

My survey indicated that Nigerians have high expectations on the security forces to counter the terrorist threat that the country is faced with. About two-thirds of my respondents were however not satisfied with the efforts so far made by Nigeria's security forces in countering terrorism. Some expected that with Nigeria's experience in Peace Support Operations and enviable record of restoring law and order in other countries, the threat of terrorism in Nigeria would have been easily dealt with. Some respondents in IDP camps account that they witnessed soldiers abandon their posts on sighting an advancing terrorist force. Mallam Isah, a seventy-two year old respondent asked me where the guns that were used to chase the Chadian rebels in 1982 were as he could not hear the sound of such artillery pieces on the side of the Nigerian troops.⁵³

⁵² Isiaka Wakili, "Buhari gives 3 months ultimatum to service chiefs to end B/Haram" *Daily Trust*, 13 August 2015.

⁵³ Mallam Usman Isah, Makata Village, Borno State, interviewed 18 June 2015.

Respondents who were members of the security forces opined that the basic challenge was that the AFN lacked adequate firepower and intelligence to combat the terrorists. A commander in the field further stated that signals and communication equipment were inadequate and the few available were not interoperable among the three Services of the AFN nor with other security agencies.⁵⁴ He added that the Nigerian government had to shut down telecommunication services in parts of north-eastern Nigeria because the security agencies could not leverage them to monitor the activities of Boko Haram; instead it was the terrorists that were using them actively against the security forces.⁵⁵

8.5.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

It could be said that the continued terrorist attacks in Nigeria have called to question the professional efficiency and capability of the AFN as well as the security and intelligence agencies in dealing with the threat of terrorism. It has been noted in several fora that long years of military rule in Nigeria led to decay in military professionalism and that the security agencies were mainly used as tools for keeping regimes in power. Training was de-emphasized and equipment were neither maintained nor replaced. The deficient state of the AFN and the security agencies in terms of manpower and equipment capability was to such an extent that the Nigerian Government had to hire mercenaries from South Africa to fight Boko Haram terrorists.⁵⁶ Varin contends that it was the use of the mercenaries, among other factors, that turned the tide against the Boko Haram terrorists in the days prior to Nigeria's presidential election held on 11 April, 2015.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Brigadier General A R Owolabi, 57 Division Signal Commander, 7 Division Nigerian Army Maiduguri, interviewed on 20 January 2014.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ed Cropley, "Boko Haram: Nigeria hires hundreds of mercenaries to help fight Islamist militant group" *The Independent*, 12 March 2015.

⁵⁷ Caroline Varin, "Mercenaries in Nigeria: opportunity or humiliation for the Nigerian Armed Forces?" being paper delivered at the 2nd Joint Africa Research Group and African Leadership Centre Event held at Kings College London, 6 October 2015.

The unprofessional handling of security issues has equally been a problem. For instance, the security agencies have been accused of been high-handed, inhumane and sometimes complicit in the mistreatment of suspects.⁵⁸ Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of the Boko Haram sect was supposedly extra-judicially killed by the police after his arrest in 2009. This possibly prompted the sect to seek revenge of the death of their leader. Additionally, the emphasis of government on the use of the military in its counter-terrorism effort have resulted in security forces being accused of collateral damage, brutality, torture and extra-judicial killing of suspects.⁵⁹ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri contend that this dynamic has left much of the local population caught between the brutality perpetrated by Boko Haram and the excesses wrought by the Nigerian security forces.⁶⁰ The situation has led to loss of public confidence on the security agencies thereby eroding the relations between the security agencies and the populace to the point that members of the public are unwilling to volunteer information to the security agencies.⁶¹ More worrisome is the fact that countries such as the US, which is at the forefront of the global fight against terrorism, show apathy in assisting the Nigerian military citing human right abuses by Nigeria's security forces as a reason.

Further worsening the capacity of security agencies is perhaps inadequate technological infrastructure which undermines their efforts in countering terrorism. According to Udeh, there is no integrated national data base, effective criminal records and forensic system. Also inadequate are Closed Circuit Television technology, Global Positioning System tracking devices, Predictive Screening Devices and Un-manned Aerial Vehicles.⁶² Udeh further opined that it was difficult to integrate intelligence on terrorists due to ineffective operational

⁵⁸ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., p. 192.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch, 2014.

⁶⁰ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, p. 193.

⁶¹ Ibis.

⁶² CS Udeh, "Boko Haram and Counter-terrorism Strategy in Nigeria: An Exploratory Anatomy" in O Mbachu and UM Bature, *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa publishers, 2013), p. 315.

fusion centres and that low technological infrastructure have adversely affected the capacity of security operatives thereby keeping them far behind the terrorists. This situation invariably did not allow the security agencies to pre-empt many Boko Haram attacks including those targeted at security establishments as evidenced in the terrorists attack on 202 Battalion of the Nigerian Army at Bama on 20 April 2012.⁶³

Poor remuneration and welfare packages add to the poor state of the Nigerian security and intelligence agencies. A soldier of the Nigerian Army, for instance, earns on the average 250 US Dollar monthly and operations allowances are often paid in arrears. Adding to this is the problem of corruption which has among other consequences bedevilled military procurement.⁶⁴ Up until early 2015 when the Nigerian military received some new fighting vehicles and helicopters, their firepower hardly matched that of the terrorists. The result was low morale of troops and consequent reluctance to engage the terrorists in combat. All these factors accounted for why the terrorists were able to capture and hold parts of north-eastern Nigeria where they hoisted black flags and proclaimed an Islamic State within Nigeria.

8.6 Issue Five: Border Management and Terrorism in Nigeria

A nation's borders are crucial to its security because they define the geographical limits of such a country and the extent to which it could manage threats within and outside. Nations maintain secured borders to prevent illegal movement of persons, goods and services that may constitute a threat to their national security. However, issues of international borders are not the prerogative of one country as all the countries involved share responsibility for its management. This is more so given the fact that globalisation, advancement in ICT as well as the activities of non-state actors have undermined the sanctity of traditional international borders. Additional to this, and with respect to terrorism, is the diffused nature of the threat

⁶³ OT Ethan, Chief of Civil Military Affairs, Nigerian Army Headquarters Abuja, interviewed on 10 January 2014.

⁶⁴ Amnesty International (UK) Report 2015,

and the blurring of the dividing line between domestic and international terrorism. Consequently, no one country can deal with terrorism alone whether within or across its borders.

Nigeria maintains land borders with Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroun as well as a maritime boundary with the Atlantic Ocean. The land borders are as shown in Table 8.6.

Table 8.1 Length of Borders between Nigeria and Contiguous Neighbours

Serial	Country	Length in km	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Cameroon	1,690 East of Nigeria	Not adequately manned
2.	Niger	1,497 North of Nigeria	“ “
3.	Benin	773 West of Nigeria	“ “
4.	Chad	87 North East of Nigeria	“ “

Source: M. Spencer “Border and State Insecurity: Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century” *International Perspective*, Vol. 2 (2007), p.110.

The table shows that Nigeria maintains about 4,047km land borders with its immediate neighbours. As Moro notes, the borders are porous with 84 regular entry and exit points as well as over 1,487 illegal routes.⁶⁵ The porosity and vastness of the Nigerian borders with immediate neighbours means that their effective management is an imperative. This however appears not to have been the case judging from the opinion of respondents from the field survey I conducted.

8.6.1 Respondents’ Views on Border Management to Curb Terrorism

In the field survey, I sought respondents’ views as to how effective they perceived Nigerian borders have been managed to curb terrorism. The respondents’ perceptions were generally

⁶⁵ Abba Moro, Presentation by Honourable Minister for Interior at the 2013 Ministerial Platform, Abuja, 20 July 2013.

that the border areas are neglected as there was little presence of government. The border posts were also said to be poorly manned. Hamza, for instance described the situation at most of the country's border posts as "pitiable; ill-defined, ill-equipped and ill-manned with ill-motivated officials."⁶⁶ A respondent opined that the officials at border posts were corrupt and collect bribes to allow free access of persons and goods thereby compromising security.⁶⁷ Amao opined that the porosity of Nigeria's international borders make them serve as a conduit for the supply of arms and recruits for Boko Haram as well as an escape route for its combatants.⁶⁸

8.6.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

This author had the opportunity to visit some of the border posts in Adamawa, one of the terrorist-affected states. The respondents' views of the poor state of the Nigeria's border posts was observed to be true. Ate and Akinterinwa, two renowned scholars on Nigeria's foreign policy contend that the country's borders are not only vast but largely un-demarcated, poorly manned and contested by all its immediate neighbours.⁶⁹ It is this situation, among other factors, that Boko Haram terrorists probably exploited to establish safe havens at border areas such as the Sambisa forest which border Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. It may be pertinent to note that the same circumstance is applicable to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border exploited by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Syria-Turkey border used by ISIS and Al-Shaabab's forays in Kenya-Somalia border areas. The common feature in all these examples, as is the case with Nigeria, is the impact of ungoverned spaces to collective security of nations. The stretch of the Trans-Saharan route that runs through the northern part of Nigeria up to Libya and Sudan

⁶⁶ K. I. Hamza, Comptroller Nigeria Customs Service, Borno State Command interviewed 17 April 2014.

⁶⁷ Respondent anonymous to author.

⁶⁸ Dayo Amao, Commander 75 Strike Group Yola, interviewed 18 March 2014.

⁶⁹ Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa, *Cross Border Armed Banditry in the North East: Issues in National Security and Nigeria's Relations with its Immediate Neighbours* (Lagos: NIIA, 2011).

arguably provides freedom of movement to terrorists, free flow of illicit consignments and the proliferation of weapons.

The nature of Nigeria's borders and its management could best be explained when one examines the situation in Borno State where Boko Haram activities are most prevalent. Borno State has international borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon, which measure over 600 kilometres.⁷⁰ A large portion of this border is unmanned, which allows illegal trafficking of arms and entry of aliens into Nigeria. According to Musa, there are 10 legal and 125 illegal entry points on Nigeria's international border in Borno State.⁷¹ The uncontrolled entry possibly exacerbated terrorist activities in Borno State, as some aliens served as mercenaries and arms suppliers of Boko Haram. Equally compounding this issue is the socio-cultural affinity and the informal economic and political activities among Nigeria's border communities. In Borno State, Nigerian tribes such as Hausa, Mandara, Kanuri, Fulani and Kotoko live in Cameroon, the Kanembu and Shuwa Arabs in Chad and the Hausa as well as the Fulani in Niger.⁷² Such affinity and informal interactions hinder the efforts of security agents at checking cross border movements. It consequently makes the area vulnerable to trans-border crimes and the intensification of terrorist activities.

The management of Nigeria's borders is also made problematic by the poor cooperation of Nigeria's contiguous countries. All the contiguous countries depend on Nigeria for goods and services particularly in the form of informal trade which thrives more through the illegal routes and at border communities that have socio-cultural affinity. The informal trade

⁷⁰ A. S. Adebajo, Comptroller of Immigration Services, interviewed at the National Defence College Abuja, 8 January 2014.

⁷¹ Sagir Musa, "Border Security, Arms Proliferation and Terrorism in Nigeria" *Sunday Trust*, <<http://www.sundaytrust.ng/index.php/comment-debate12753.border-security-arms-proliferation-and-terrorism-in-nigeria>>, accessed 7 January 2014.

⁷² A. E. Osewe, "Nigeria's Porous Borders and its Implications for Human and National Security", Quoted in HD Dlakwa and HI Bazza, *Peace Security Human Right and Development in the 21st Century*, (Kaduna: Pyla-Mak Services Ltd, Vol. 1, 2010), p. 79.

benefits the neighbouring countries and they therefore tacitly support it.⁷³ This allows for the unhindered movement of contraband, illegal arms and undesirable elements into Nigeria.

Apart from the tacit support for informal trade, the sometimes uncooperative attitude of contiguous countries could be viewed from the perspective of their deliberate response to Nigeria's big posture attitude towards them. The situation is not helped by the fact that all the four contiguous countries are Francophone with strong affiliations to France as against Nigeria that is Anglophone. The differences further hinder cooperation between the border agencies, the effectiveness of the MNJTF and other bilateral as well as multilateral security arrangements. Another very significant factor to consider is that the poor cooperation by Nigeria's contiguous neighbours is not all occasioned by a seeming deliberate effort on their part but rather the weak capacity of the countries, with perhaps the relative exception of Cameroon, to enforce border control. This places a strain on Nigeria's border management agencies. Worsening this is the fact that the various border committees and commissions established by the Nigerian Government are not properly task-organized to facilitate cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours on border management. The Nigeria Boundary Commission that is responsible for all border matters, internal and external, appears overwhelmed by problems of communal boundary disputes within Nigeria and therefore too occupied to effectively cope with international border issues.

8.7 Issue Six: Employment of Strategic Communication and Partnership

The concept of strategic communications revolves around the notion that nations cannot pursue their interest through the employment of military power alone. Strategic communications combine hard and soft power (otherwise known as smart power) through the planning, coordination and dissemination of desired messages from an organization to an

⁷³ Some scholars believe that the tacit support stems from the fact that some of the countries are land-lock and burdened by tariffs and duties attendant with formal trade. See Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa, NIIA, 2011.

identified target audience.⁷⁴ It entails persuading the international community to stand alongside the country in question or at least stay neutral, and influencing adversaries to believe that one has the power and the will to prevail over them. More pertinent, and in the context of this study, strategic communications entail persuading the nation's citizens to support the policies of government so that a national will is forged to accomplish national strategic objectives. In line with this is the government's strategic engagement of the society, in other words, the leveraging of Public-Private-Partnership in its counter-terrorism effort. However, the Nigerian government engagement of citizens in the formulation and implementation of its counter-terrorism programmes appears inadequate as adjudged from the outcome of my field survey.

8.7.1 Respondents' Opinion on the Adequacy of Strategic Communication and Public Private Partnership in Countering Terrorism in Nigeria

Respondents were asked for their opinion regarding the adequacy of strategic communications and PPP in counter-terrorism in Nigeria. About three-quarters of the respondents opined that the government's efforts at enlightening, persuading or engaging the citizens in its counter-terrorism effort were poor. Furthermore, it appeared from my field survey that people's trust and confidence in the government to secure their lives and property from the scourge of terrorism were low. This is judging from the opinion of respondents as to whether the Government of Nigeria is winning the fight against terrorism. More than half of the respondents felt that the government is at present not winning the fight. Some respondents preferred not to give a direct "Yes or No" answer. The large number of people not sure of the government's efforts to defeat terrorism further emphasizes the imperative of strategic communication that targets citizens' trust and confidence as well as their willingness to partner with government.

⁷⁴ J Nkwocha, "Strategic communications: The missing factor in Nigeria's downstream business" excerpt from paper delivered at International Conference on Refining & Petrochemicals organised by the University of Port Harcourt, 27 Sep 13.

8.7.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

It was observed during a three-day Strategic Communications Workshop on Counter Terrorism organized jointly by the National Defence College Abuja and the ONSA from 9-11 December 2013 that Nigeria was yet to effectively adopt the concept of strategic communications.⁷⁵ This was in spite of the ideological underpinnings of the Boko Haram sect which aim at driving public opinion against the government. It was further noted that there ought to be a strategic communications counter-narrative that targets the local populace, the international community and even the terrorists in order to win perception and influence attitudes favourably towards the Nigerian government's efforts.

According to Bello, the inadequate engagement of citizens by the government in its counter-terrorism efforts was a concern.⁷⁶ He added that this partly accounted for citizens' lack of trust and confidence on the government to secure their lives and property from the scourge of terrorism. Daramola observed that the situation is worsened by the absence of an institution in the form of a think tank centre or superintending body that will draw together all stakeholders in the public and private sector involved in the operations of strategic communications.⁷⁷ In a similar vein, Iredia observed that the media which, as the dominant means of communication, ought to be the pivot of strategic communication in Nigeria is yet to be properly integrated or co-opted into government's counter-terrorism efforts.⁷⁸ The import of all these factors is that the attainment of strategic communications requires a multi-disciplinary and multi-track approach to counter the frames and narratives of the terrorists, restore government legitimacy and win public confidence. This suggests and aligns with the

⁷⁵ M. S. Dasuki, Key Note Address presented at the Strategic Communications Plan Workshop for Counter Insurgency in Nigeria held at the National Defence College Abuja, 9 December 2014.

⁷⁶ S. Y. Bello, Presidential Coordinator Counter Terrorism Department, interviewed 23 April 2013.

⁷⁷ K. Daramola, Director Legal Interception Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja. Interviewed 12 November 2014.

⁷⁸ Tony Iredia, Nigeria Television Authority Presentation on Role of the Media in National Security, Mass Media Retreat, May 2013.

imperative of an all-stakeholder approach that employ both governmental and non-governmental means to counter terrorism.

The foregoing appraisal of issues pertaining to the responses of the Nigerian government to the threats of terrorism could be said to have further brought to light a plethora of lapses and challenges plaguing the counter terrorism efforts of the government. These range from inadequate policy and legal frameworks, governance deficit, weak and dysfunctional institutions to poor capacity of security and intelligence agencies. Equally are problems of ill border management and inadequate public-private partnership in the counter-terrorism effort of government. All of these have challenged and made ineffective government's current counter-terrorism efforts as could be adjudged by the continuous terrorist attacks in the country. The situation is worrisome as it creates a feeling of uncertainty as to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. A perhaps worthwhile question to ask given this situation is "what is the likely or possible future trend of terrorism in Nigeria"? The answer here is important as it is reckoned that such projection, combined with the appraisal of government responses made so far, stand to provide a better spectrum for suggesting an effective counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

8.8 Future Trends of Terrorism in Nigeria

The future trends of terrorism in Nigeria could be viewed through the prism of current developments in the country and those in the external environment that affects it. The developments that could shape the future of terrorism in Nigeria that will be examined are the outcome of the 2015 Nigeria's general elections, the role of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the activities of civil society organizations. The others are Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbours, the commitment of the international community and regional issues.

8.8.1 Outcome of 2015 General Election

A general election into Nigeria's Fifth Republic executive and legislative offices at the national level took place on 28 March 2015 while that at state level was held on 11 April 2015. Elections in Nigeria are more often than not accompanied with violence predicated on allegations of electoral malpractices. There was therefore prior to the elections anxiety on the part of Nigerians and the international community that in the event of such electoral violence in 2015, the already volatile security situation in the country could further degenerate. The terrorists could consequently take advantage of the situation to further their cause. The situation could also have necessitated further engagement of Nigeria's security forces that are already overstretched in internal security and counter-terrorism operations. This could have given the terrorists tactical and operational advantage and consequently prolonged the terrorism situation in Nigeria.

What was more significant about the outcome of the general election was who emerged as the President of Nigeria. This was predicated on the grounds that both the northern and southern politicians laid claims as to the region that ought to occupy the office of the President. As noted in chapter four, politics and religion in Nigeria are closely linked, and in almost the same manner that extreme Islamism is thought to be linked to terrorism. It was thus the view in some quarters that some Muslims in the northern part of the country may be sympathetic to the Boko Haram terrorist cause if Goodluck Jonathan or another southern Christian emerged as the President following the elections. Similarly, there were apprehensions that if a northern Muslim emerged as President, militancy in the Niger Delta region could resurface ostensibly in protest over the region being denied a second tenure as President. There were pronouncements by former militant leaders such as Asari Dokubo to this effect. Inter-party rivalry particularly between the then ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and the then opposition All Peoples' Congress (APC) heated the polity along these lines. There were

allegations by the PDP of APC's sponsorship of Boko Haram activities while the APC accused the ruling PDP of fuelling terrorism in the North East of the country (where it had less political support) in order to scuttle the conduct of elections there. In a nutshell, predictions were rife that Boko Haram terrorism could further assume more political colouration thereby providing the terrorists a political cause that could plunge the country into grave insurgency along ethno-religious lines.

The general elections were eventually conducted in a climate of relative peace, but the issues they raised are still potent. The APC presidential candidate, Major General Muhammed Buhari (retired) emerged victorious and was sworn in as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria on 29 May 2015. The APC also won more seats in the National Assembly and in 19 of 28 states declared by INEC thereby turning the tide between it and the PDP as the ruling and opposition party respectively. An observation pertinent to this study however is that the voting pattern in the election reflected the age-long security dilemma of North-South and Muslim-Christian divide. Equally, the north-eastern part of the country where terrorism prevails voted massively against the PDP, which is a probable indication of their dissatisfaction with the PDP-led government's counter-terrorism policies. There are compelling reasons to argue that the future trend of terrorism in Nigeria would therefore be largely determined by how committed the recently inaugurated government of President Buhari is in tackling the wider political and socio-economic issues affecting the Nigerian state. It could further be influenced by the political will to fight terrorism and in line with this, the counter-terrorism approach of the government.

So far, President Muhammadu Buhari has promised to reposition the Nigerian military and other security agencies to contain the activities of Boko Haram. It is opined that he could muster his advantage of being a northerner and a Muslim to mobilise the support of the people and traditional institutions in Northern Nigeria to contain the terrorism perpetrated by

Boko Haram. The problem would however be in the Niger Delta where he needs to pay significant attention to the yet to be fully resolved grievances of the militants and inhabitants of the area. Not doing this could provoke a resurgence of terrorist activities by the militants in the Niger Delta, other areas that may feel marginalised in the current political arrangement.

8.8.2 Role of Civilian Joint Task Force

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a vigilante organization established by some youths and able-bodied men to confront the activities of Boko Haram. Their emergence, Ross contends, was largely due to the over-stretching of government forces and the need to defend towns and villages where there was a deficit in security coverage.⁷⁹ The youths and able-bodied men summoned the courage to organise themselves into 'neighbourhood watch groups' against the sect in defence of their communities. Although they bore no firearms, their emergence significantly complemented the efforts of the security agencies particularly in information-gathering, which assisted in the arrest and killing of many Boko Haram members, including high profile commanders. They were equally able to effect arrest of suspected Boko Haram members on their own effort. According to Isang, the group arrested over 2,500 suspected members of Boko Haram between May and August 2013 using only sticks, disused iron rods and machetes.⁸⁰ The success that they achieved won them the tacit approval and support of both the security agencies and the government. This was more so as the security agencies that lacked the support of the locals were with the emergence of the CJTF given a boost to dislodge Boko Haram terrorists from some towns and villages such as Michika and the Maiduguri environs.⁸¹

⁷⁹ W. Ross, "Nigeria's Vigilante's Take on Boko Haram", *BBC News Africa Documentary*, 13 November 2013.

⁸⁰ P. J. Isang, Army Headquarters Abuja, interviewed 17 March 2014.

⁸¹ Z. Lorenzo, "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2013). pp. 21-34.

Similar to the CJTF is the mobilisation of local hunters to defend communities threatened or attacked by Boko Haram terrorists. The local hunters have good knowledge of both the human and physical terrain. Armed with Dane guns, spears and other traditional weapons for hunting, and relying on courage and the support of locals, the hunters assisted the military in confronting the terrorists with significant success.⁸² For instance, they complemented the military effort in recapturing towns such as Mubi, Maiha, Gwoza and Chibok which had earlier been overrun by the terrorists.⁸³

The involvement of the locals in complementing military effort is a novel and unfolding concept in counter terrorism in Nigeria. It demonstrates the zeal of the society for a collective effort or mechanism against the threat of terrorism. The point, however, that the use of non-state institutions for national security purposes could be considered a failure or break-down in the fabric of the state should not be lost. This is when one takes into account the Weberian notion that the state ought to have the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in safeguarding citizens and property.⁸⁴ Equally worth consideration is the tendency for their misuse or their getting out of state control. So far, the Nigerian government welcomes the initiative, viewing it as the citizens' exercise of their rights to defend themselves and the nation.⁸⁵ The government has equally avowed to regulate the activities of the CJTF and local hunters to ensure that they do not go out of their way to constitute a security problem in the long run. It is projected that as people continue to bear the brunt of terrorism, so would they develop ways and means of resilience and self-defence, a situation that security agencies and the government could exploit in the counter-terrorism effort. The sustenance and refinement

⁸² See *This Day*, 13 November 2014

⁸³ See *Premium Times*, 13 November 2014.

⁸⁴ Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78. Also see K. Grechenig and M. Kolmar, "The State's Enforcement Monopoly and Private Protection of Property" *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 170, Issue 1 (2014), pp. 5-23.

⁸⁵ Press Brief by Mike Omeri, the Coordinator National Information Centre Abuja, 4 December 2014.

of such partnership between the government/security agencies and the locals could positively shape the countering of terrorism in Nigeria.

8.8.3 Activities of Civil Society Organisations

Counter-terrorism measures are geared towards ensuring the security of people and the society at large. However, as scholars such as Howell and Lind posit, some of the fundamental human rights and liberties of people often end up being infringed upon by such measures.⁸⁶ It is this infringement of the rights and wellbeing of the people that is of interest to the civil society. This interest sometimes conflicts with that of the security agencies because the civil societies deem some counter-terrorism measures to be contravening civil liberties and rights.⁸⁷

In Nigeria, the civil society is as large, diverse and complex as its population. It includes organizations of different capacities, influence and degrees of formalities such as non-governmental, faith-based, professional, community-based, religious and traditional institutions as well as the media. Their activities include informal conflict mediation, reporting of incidents of armed violence, community education and victim assistance. They operate at grassroots level through community-based work and up to the federal level where they collaborate with government authorities as well as international actors.

In relation to terrorism in Nigeria, the government and security agencies have come under severe criticism for human right abuses in the effort to contain terrorism. This is as the government counter-terrorism approach has been mainly military-centred with allegations of brutality, collateral damage, indiscriminate arrests and detentions as well as extra-judicial killings. In June 2013, the National Human Rights Commission made a comprehensive report

⁸⁶ Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind, "Counter-terrorism measures and civil society in the UK and US" being paper delivered at NCVO/ESRC NGPA seminar series at the London School of Economics, 6 March 2009.

⁸⁷ See for instance Amnesty International June 2015 report, *Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands* which indicted the Nigerian military for war crimes.

of torture, extra-judicial killings and collateral damage by Nigerian security agencies at Baga town in Borno State.⁸⁸ Another such incriminating report was that by Amnesty International in June 2015.⁸⁹ Perhaps the group that has turned out more vocal recently is the Bring Back Our Girls campaign group whose membership includes former federal government ministers and politicians. The group came into existence following the capture of 276 girls of Government Secondary School in Chibok. It attained local and international recognition because of its tenacity of purpose, criticism of government counter-terrorism measures and support from other human right groups within and outside Nigeria.

The support of the international community (particularly states such as the US and UK) to the civil society organisations has boosted the latter's activities. In November 2014, the US government gave grants worth 9.2 million US Dollar to the civil society organisations in Nigeria.⁹⁰ Funds from sources such as this assist the organisations in promoting the rights of Nigerians and advocating for soft and "humane" counter-terrorism measures as against the use of brutal military force. Thus, while putting government on its toes to use all soft means to bring terrorism to an end, it could be said that the civil society's often conflicting interests with those of the military tends to slows down the military efforts. Since the government counter-terrorism efforts are mainly military-driven, the conflict of interest between the civil security organisations and the military may need to be bridged so as not to prolong the efforts to contain terrorism in Nigeria. This raises the need for the harmonisation of the efforts of the organisations with that of the government if a concerted and holistic approach to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria is to be achieved early.

⁸⁸ See "The Baga Incident and the Situation in North East Nigeria: An Interim Assessment and Report". Report by the National Human Rights Commission Nigeria, June 2013, available at premiumtimesng.com, accessed 26 November 2014.

⁸⁹ Amnesty International (UK), 2015.

⁹⁰ Stella Omona, "U.S. Gives \$9.2M to CSOs to Promote Democracy in Nigeria" *Daily Independent*, 11 November 2014.

8.8.4 Nigeria – Immediate Neighbours' Relations

Nigeria enjoys a considerable measure of cordial relationships with its immediate neighbours. It has bilateral agreement on defence and security with Niger Republic.⁹¹ As part of the agreement, joint military patrols are conducted to enhance security along the Nigeria – Niger border. Nigeria also has multilateral security agreements with Chad and Niger, which led to the establishment of a MNJTF in 1998 with its headquarters at Baga in Borno State.⁹² The MNJTF was originally established to check cross-border banditry and criminal activities such as human, arms and drug trafficking. However, with the upsurge of Boko Haram attacks in 2009, the Force's mandate was expanded to include counter-terrorism operations. This became necessary with the realisation that the Boko Haram terrorists were using the areas along the countries' common border as a safe haven.

The availability of safe havens in the neighbouring countries for Boko Haram to regroup and carry out training of their members possibly accounts to a large extent for the continued scourge of terrorism in Nigeria.⁹³ Worsening the situation is the fact that Nigeria has until recently received limited support from some of the neighbouring countries thereby enabling Boko Haram to secure external links and sustain itself. This was particularly the case with Cameroon which initially rebuffed diplomatic efforts by Nigeria for a joint security arrangement to counter Boko Haram.⁹⁴ In April and May 2014 however, following French initiatives, Nigeria entered into a joint agreement with the four Francophone contiguous countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.⁹⁵ The agreement covered an increased level

⁹¹ M. Bello, "Boko Haram: Nigeria, Niger Begin Joint Border Patrol", *This Day*, (Lagos), 16 Oct 12

⁹² B. J. Adele, "The Boko Haram Crisis and Nigeria's External Relations", *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2013), pp. 6-9. The headquarters was relocated to Ndjamena, the Capital City of Chad in July 2015.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ "Nigeria and Cameroon may clash over Boko Haram", *The Punch*, 1 March 2014.

⁹⁵ Kingsley Omonobi, "Nigeria: Terror – Nigeria, France, Four Others Join Forces" *Vanguard*, 19 Mar 2014, available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/03/terror-nigeria-france-4-others-join-forces/#sthash.k2vZrnXS.dpuf>, accessed 3 Apr 14.

of coordination and exchange of intelligence, effective policing of common borders and the repatriation of suspected terrorists in conformity with existing protocols. It also recommended the adoption of a doctrine proposed by President Goodluck Jonathan that “an act of terror against one nation is an act of terror against all.”⁹⁶ This was to ensure that the reactions of member-states to acts of terror were spontaneous and concerted. These efforts were cemented by President Buhari who undertook a state tour to all the four neighbouring countries in June and July 2015.

Another concerted effort by Nigeria and her immediate neighbours that could positively influence the containment of terrorism is the resuscitation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The commission was created on 22 May 1964 by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The Republic of Central Africa and Libya later joined in 1996 and 2008 respectively. The aim of the Commission is to manage the shared water resources of the Lake Chad Basin and promote regional integration, peace and security. In October 2014, an extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission was held in Niger’s capital, Niamey, to discuss terrorism in the region. The meeting reviewed ongoing collaboration against terror attacks and agreed on joint action to further curb insurgency within and across their common borders. The leaders further agreed to establish a multinational joint task force, define a common strategy and to forward a draft resolution to the UN Security Council and the AU for a legal framework on cross-border military operations against terrorism. A major issue noted by the Commission was that the armed forces of member countries operated only within their respective territories thus, the new focus was to get them work as a team.⁹⁷ This means that with the new focus of the commission, the armed forces of the member states could work together, allowing them

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Press brief by the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Mr Sanusi Abdullahi on 20 November 2014 in Abuja. Also see “Terrorism: Lake Chad Member Countries To Send Draft Resolution To UN, AU”, *Leadership Newspaper*, 26 November 2014.

access to operate in a joint manner in each other's territory to rid the region of terrorist activities. If this cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours is sustained, it holds a good prospect in shaping positively the efforts at countering terrorism not only in Nigeria but the sub-region as well.

8.8.5 Commitment of the International Community

As earlier noted, terrorism in Nigeria cannot be contained by Nigeria alone. The country requires international support to counter terrorism in the same way the terrorists require external support to sustain themselves and further their cause. The Boko Haram sect is known to have ties with the broader al-Qaeda network. A significant number of Boko Haram members are believed to have received training in Afghanistan, Yemen and Sudan, all of which have at one time or the other been enclaves for al-Qaeda and its affiliates.⁹⁸ Some documents discovered in Usama Bin Laden's Abbottabad compound in May 2011 also indicated that Boko Haram leaders have been in contact with the leadership of al-Qaeda.⁹⁹ It is thought to have established links with AQIM and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQIP).¹⁰⁰ The AQIM is known to support Boko Haram with funds, training and weapons including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS).¹⁰¹ Boko Haram is also acknowledged to have external support from other terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab. The Al-Shabaab group allegedly supports Boko Haram with training on guerrilla tactics, propaganda machinery and suicide terrorist operations.¹⁰² Ansaru, the offshoot of Boko Haram also has links with AQIM and the Movement for Oneness for Jihad in West Africa as mentioned earlier. The links terrorists in Nigeria enjoy with similar terrorist groups and organizations outside Nigeria portray the international dimension of terrorism in Nigeria and the need for the commitment

⁹⁸ See "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency", *International Crisis Group*, p.23 – 24.

⁹⁹ "Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru", *United States Department of State*, 13 November 2013.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ C. J. Radin, "Threat of Boko Haram and International Allies" *Long War Journal*. Vol 3, No 6 2010.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

of the international community in containing it. How committed the international community has been and particularly would be is however an issue that could shape the countering of terrorism in Nigeria.

Nigeria has received assistance in the form of security training, intelligence support and emergency relief from countries such as the US, UK, France, Germany and China. For instance, in 2012, a team from the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was in ONSA to assist in the formulation of a national counter terrorism strategy for Nigeria.¹⁰³ On its part, the United States through its United States Army Africa team commenced a three-phased counter terrorism training of a battalion of the Nigerian Army from April 2014.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, organisations such as the UN and the EU have contributed to the counter-terrorism efforts of the Government of Nigeria through grants and humanitarian assistance. In December 2013, the EU co-organised a symposium in Abuja aimed at reviewing the Nigerian government counter-terrorism strategy to conform to democratic best practices.

Some Nigerians however believe that the Western nations are not doing enough to help the country contain terrorism. This is in the light of their refusal (particularly in the case of the US) to sell arms to it under the guise of the Leahy Amendment. The Amendment stipulates that no assistance shall be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the US Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.¹⁰⁵ The US in this wise cited human rights abuses by the Nigerian security agencies and corruption by the government as its reasons for the refusal.¹⁰⁶ There are however recent moves by the US to relax the Leahy Agreement following bilateral talks with the new government of President Buhari.

¹⁰³ T. T., Waya, interviewed 17 January 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Department of Training and Operations Nigerian Army Headquarters Brief, Abuja, 12 July 2014.

¹⁰⁵ The Leahy Amendment is contained in Section 620 M of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).

¹⁰⁶ The United States point to the Leahy Agreement as the basis for its actions.

Another dimension to the perceived inadequate support of the US is the alleged CIA's prediction in 2000 that Nigeria would be a failed state by 2015.¹⁰⁷ The refusal by the US to sell arms to Nigeria was consequently viewed in some quarters through the lens of this prediction and hence, it has been postulated that the US may be deliberately allowing the disintegration of Nigeria. In December 2014, Nigeria announced the cancellation of an ongoing US training of a Nigerian Army battalion on counter-terrorism. This was ostensibly in protest over US refusals to sell her arms, although the Nigerian government officially stated that it was due to its inability to cope up with the logistics requirement of the US. Nigeria subsequently turned to Russia for acquisition of weapons to counter Boko Haram.¹⁰⁸ Nigeria also secretly employed the services of a South African private security company known as Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection. Although the government stated that the engagement of the company was for purely advisory purposes, there are indications of its conduct of mercenary activities in the North East of Nigeria between March and May 2015.¹⁰⁹

It is plausible that Nigeria may not want military assistance that would involve foreign combat troops on its soil as in the case of French operations against Islamic terrorists in Mali. However, the country does require actionable intelligence on the terrorists' sponsors, movement, finance and sources of arms. It equally requires military equipment to confront the terrorists and safeguard its territorial integrity. These requirements, in addition to other non-kinetic assistance, rest largely on the commitment of the international community. Thus, the commitment of the international community could shape the future of terrorism in Nigeria.

¹⁰⁷ See <http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2012/02/10/nigeria-and-the-2015-break-up-prediction/>

¹⁰⁸ De Capua "Analyst Weigh Nigeria-Russia Arms Deal", *Voice of America*, 10 December 2014. , accessed 12 September 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Daji Sanī, "Buhari: It is shameful that the military has not crushed Boko Haram", *This Day Newspaper*, 18 May 2015. Also, Wale Akinselure "How South African mercenaries helped Nigeria to rout Boko Haram" *Nigerian Tribune Newspaper*, 12 May 2015.

8.8.6 Regional Issues

Regional issues, and particularly conflicts in the West Africa and African region greatly influence events in Nigeria. This is evident in Boko Haram terrorism. Boko Haram exploited the political vacuum created by the conflict in Mali between 2011 and 2013 to establish links with the Islamic terrorists groups there, thereby facilitating its access to logistics, recruitment, training and other support. Similarly, the Arab Spring and in particular the Libyan Crisis left in their aftermath ungoverned spaces for terrorism to thrive within Nigeria's neighbourhood. The rebels from the North African countries became ready sources of manpower and their military hardware a source of weapons for the terrorists.

Also of significance is the poor socio-economic state of the countries that are within Nigeria's neighbourhood. The Sahel region is characterised by unfavourable climatic conditions resulting in drought that make farming and other occupation difficult. The inhabitants are therefore poor and often have to migrate south and northwards in search of a means of livelihood. They thus can become ready foot-soldiers for terrorists. The number of Tuaregs from Libya and Mali as well as Chadians and Nigerians so far arrested in connection with terrorism in Nigeria buttress the significance of the demographic factor occasioned by regional socio-economic and political crisis. Thus, developments that could have remained domestic concerns escalate to sub-regional and regional levels. It is in this light that the otherwise home-grown terrorism in Nigeria, as Boko Haram initially was, became connected with AQIM and other networks thereby attaining regional status. Terrorism has continued to expand by thriving on the weak capacity of governments of the region to effectively counter it. Conflict resolution mechanisms and security frameworks at both individual country and collective (regional) levels are a concern. This is so as attempts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU to establish such mechanisms and frameworks before now had largely remained at proposal level, or at best only partly

implemented. However, with the recent backing of the UN (and international regional organizations such as the EU as well as countries like the US), the AU standby force under the aegis of the Lake Chad Commission is near to achieving operational status. If the concerted efforts of governments concerned at regional level is sustained, this multilateral security arrangement could potentially hold good prospects for reversing the trend of terrorism in Nigeria.

In summary, the analysis of the responses of the Nigerian government to the threats of terrorism and the issues that could positively or negatively shape the trend of terrorism tend to indicate that government responses have not yielded expected outcomes. It equally reveals a trend that presupposes uncertainty as to the immediate containment of terrorism in Nigeria. This brings to the fore the need for a sustainable and effective national counter terrorism strategy for Nigeria. It is on the question of such a strategy that the next chapter focuses.

CHAPTER NINE

TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA

9.1 Preamble

Defeating terrorism is more difficult and far-reaching than we have assumed....We may be advancing the ball down the field at will, running over our opponent's defences, but winning the game is another matter altogether.

- Wesley Clark¹

The above assertion indicates the complexity of counter-terrorism, and of arriving at acceptable parameters for judging its success or otherwise. More significant to this study is the question of appropriate and workable strategies. In the Campbell Systematic Review, it was observed "that there is an almost complete absence of evaluation research on counter-terrorism strategies."² It added that for the few studies available, some strategies do not appear to be effective as they "either didn't work or sometimes increased the likelihood of terrorism and terrorism-related harm."³ This seems to reflect the Nigerian situation as this researcher found no evidence of a comprehensive review of Nigeria's responses or strategy to counter terrorism either by policy makers or researchers. In his inaugural presidential speech, Buhari alluded to this fact when he submitted that his government intends after defeating Boko Haram:

...to commission a sociological study to determine the origin, remote and immediate causes of the movement, its sponsors, the international connections to ensure that measures are taken to prevent a recurrence of this evil.⁴

¹ Wesley Clark, *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), p. 5.

² Lum C, Kennedy LW, Sherley, AJ. "The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies." *Campbell Systematic Reviews* (Newark: Campbell Collaboration, 2009), p. 4.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Muhammadu Buhari, Inaugural Speech during Swearing-in Ceremony as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at Abuja on 29 May, 2015.

While considering the proposal worthy, this researcher is of the opinion that the more appropriate thing for the government to do could be to conduct such an exercise even as the terrorism perpetrated by the sect is ongoing. This could be in the form of a counter-terrorism review that would address the lapses inherent in the current strategy with the aim of effectively containing the activities of the group.

Following the lack of evaluation of strategies by past and current regimes, it could be said that the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism effort has continued to be largely ill-defined, reactionary and ad hoc. Some of the responses as observed in the previous chapters and particularly those involving the use of military force have instead created unanticipated negative consequences. This is worrisome considering that huge sum of money, estimated at 4.62 trillion Naira (23.2 billion US Dollar) was expended on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2015.⁵ Arising from this background, I will in this chapter look at the current posture of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy both in theory, that is, policy (as spelt out in the NACTEST, TPA and presidential directives) and in practice or what obtains on the ground. This will dovetail into the fundamental question of the way forward in terms of a sustainable and effective counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

9.2 Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Policy versus Practice

The policy framework for counter-terrorism in Nigeria, as has previously been noted, is primarily enshrined in the NACTEST. The NACTEST is a 48-page document endorsed by President Goodluck Jonathan on 30 April 2014 and subsequently released for execution. It contains such aspects as the nature of the terrorist threat that Nigeria faces, the response guidelines and mechanism, the roles of stakeholders as well as institutions involved in countering terrorism. The NACTEST is organised into five work streams each with its key objectives. The work streams are Forestall, Secure, Identify, Prepare and Implement.

⁵ Morgan Windsor, "Goodluck Jonathan's Administration Spent Trillions On Nigerian National Security In Past Five Years Yet Boko Haram Remains: Report" *International Business Times*, 19 June, 2015.

Forestall aims to stop people from becoming terrorists, Secure strengthens protection capacity against terrorists and Identify aims at pre-emption through detection and early warning. The Prepare work stream has the objective of mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks while Implement outlines the framework for the mobilisation of a coordinated cross-governmental counter-terrorism effort. Although its formulation and release is a commendable achievement by the Government of Nigeria, there are identified gaps which need to be addressed for it to provide the necessary strategic framework for countering terrorism in Nigeria. The gaps as obtained from my field survey and secondary data are outlined in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 Gaps in Nigeria's National Counter Terrorism Strategy

Serial	Observed Gaps	Implications of Gap
1	Silent on the national definition of terrorism.	Poses a challenge to policy implementation as terrorist acts could be subjected to varying interpretations.
2	Placed its driving organ, the Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) under the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA).	This could inhibit the effective implementation of the strategy because the NSA does not have executive functions but advisory roles (as an adviser to the President).
3	Tends to solely emphasise the Boko Haram Sect.	Its provisions may not readily apply to other categories of terrorism or terrorist-related threats that could arise.
4	Government's disposition to negotiation with terrorists not stated.	Raises doubts and suspicion on policy trust of government.
5	Silent on the protection of Nigeria's interests abroad and on responses to state-sponsored terrorism.	Necessary contingency plans may not be developed.
6	Discrepancies and lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities assigned to MDAs for implementation.	Erodes the authority or command directive NACTEST as a policy instrument ought to have.
7	No designated lead ministry or agency.	Makes the coordination of MDAs involve in counter-terrorism difficult.
8	Ambiguity on the Nigerian government's overall strategic approach.	Could result in disconnect between policy-makers and implementation agencies.

Source: Author's compilation, 2015.⁶

Among the gaps outlined in the table and crucial to this study is the ambiguity of the Nigerian Government's overall strategic approach. A defined strategic approach to counter terrorism is a prerequisite in the articulation and implementation of a counter-terrorism strategy. This is more so given the fact that terrorism situations differ from nation to nation, therefore requiring that a nation's counter-terrorism approach captures the threat situation or the circumstances that are peculiar to it. For instance, the Israeli counter terrorism strategy is military-centred because terrorism in that country is often associated with the military wing of formidable armed political groups such as Hamas. Equally, security threat to the country and consequently its threat perception has often been traditional (against the existence of the state) thereby requiring a military approach. On the other hand, the UK counter-terrorism strategy employs the criminal justice model, which is based on law enforcement and respect for human rights. Similarly, the US counter terrorism strategy, which emphasises global reach to contain al-Qaeda, has between its 2003 and 2011 versions of the NSCT witnessed an increasing shift from emphasis on war to more liberal democratic counter-terrorism practices. The highlights of the UK CONTEST and the US NSCT as examples of national counter-terrorism strategies have been discussed in chapter two.

The NACTEST is not clear on the Nigerian Government's strategic approach. Evidence on the ground indicate a hard traditional military approach to counter-terrorism. However, comments from the ONSA that supervises NACTEST have often been that Nigeria was employing a soft approach to counter-terrorism.⁷ The picture presented to the public by the policy makers therefore appears different from what obtains on the ground. It could be surmised that in practice, Nigeria's counter-terrorism posture could be said to be more

⁶ See Office of the National Security Adviser, *The National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)*, 2014. Data obtained from interviews, National Defence College Abuja syndicate groups presentations and publications were used in the compilation.

⁷ Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, paper presented on the Roll Out of Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism held in Abuja, 18 March 2014.

military driven as opposed to law enforcement. The problem here is the attendant collateral damage and human rights abuses which, as noted earlier in the study, have not only tended to alienate the military from the public but also attracted condemnation particularly from civil societies and some members of the international community.⁸

Rosendorff and Sandler's dilemma of appropriate response to terrorism comes to play here. While too little response at some points has portrayed the Nigerian Government as weak, too much response in terms of employment of the military strategy has on the other hand made it appear tyrannical with attendant opposition.⁹ In the northeast of Nigeria, for instance, the local population have often complained of harsh security measures such as imposition of curfew following declaration of a state of emergency, conduct of searches especially of women wearing hijab dress, the establishment of check points, and restrictions on social activities. The resentment to the deployment of the military to the area is to such an extent that the Northern Elders and traditional rulers have sometimes called on the Nigerian Government to withdraw military troops from the area.¹⁰

The resort of the Nigerian Government to employ military force could be understood from some viewpoints. As stated in chapter three, the military was the only institution and element of national power that the colonial government could be said to have fully developed and bequeathed to post-colonial Nigeria. Also, the use of military force became inevitable as the terrorist did not only engage in armed confrontation with security forces but also the seizure and occupation of Nigeria's territory. The sophistication of the terrorists was such that the police were overwhelmed, and as the constitution of Nigeria provided, the military had to intervene in such circumstances. According to Michael Clarke, "When military power is

⁸ For example Amnesty International allegations of extrajudicial killings in their report *Rank on Their Shoulders. Blood in Their Hands* and the United States refusal to sell arms to Nigeria on claims of human right abuses by the Nigerian military.

⁹ Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing?: The Proactive Response Dilenma", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Sage Publications Inc, 2004), p. 659.

¹⁰ "Borno Elders Join Call On FG To Withdraw JTF" Sahara Reporters, 14 July 2011, available online at <http://saharareporters.com/2011/07/14/borno-elders-join-call-fg-withdraw-jtf>, accessed 24 May 2014.

really required, nothing else will do”¹¹ General David Richards, while contesting the assertion that there is no military solution to a given crisis posits that, “history is clear: there will sometimes be no alternative to standing up for oneself, for one’s friends or for what is right.... In times of crisis, military strength is comfortingly reassuring.”¹² The point however is that while the dependence on the military by the Nigerian Government in its counter-terrorism drive is considered sometimes expedient, concerns have been raised over the manner of its employment and the general conduct of troops in the theatre of operations.

The professional standard of the Nigerian military in counter-terrorism has been questionable. This is especially in the areas of civil-military relations, human rights observance and general rules of engagement of the military. Also, the terrorists have kept changing tactics in an asymmetrical warfare that has challenged the Nigerian military in terms of capacity. Onuoha notes that although the Nigerian military was able to use conventional tactics to recapture territories held by the terrorists, it has been unable to cope with the terrorists’ unconventional tactics of suicide bombings, abductions and guerrilla attacks.¹³ All these suggests a re-strategizing of the Nigerian Government counter-terrorism efforts and to this end, the exploitation of other lines of counter terrorism effort (non-military or soft) for their employment either alongside the military or essentially on their own as the situation dictates. Rineheart made a distinction between “hard” and “soft” power responses to terrorism noting that this requires restructuring the counter-terrorism debate around a direct and indirect approach.¹⁴ He sees the direct approach as an enemy-centric doctrine consisting of primarily offensive hard power tactics as earlier discussed. The indirect or soft power approach on the other hand consists of population-centric methods with features such as capacity building,

¹¹ See Michael Clarke, cover note in Adrian Johnson, ed., *Wars in Peace: British Military Operations Since 1991* (London: RUSI, 2014).

¹² General David Richards (UK Chief of Defence Staff, 2009-2013), Forward in Adrian Johnson, eds., 2014.

¹³ Freedom C. Onuoha, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for African Research Studies Abuja, interviewed 2 June 2015.

¹⁴ Jason Rineheart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency” in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Terrorism Research Initiative, Vol 4, No 5 (2010).

economic development, counter-extremism, de-radicalization and community integration that focus on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive.¹⁵ In religious, ideological and socio-economic grievance-driven cases of terrorism such as Nigeria appears to have had and is currently experiencing, winning the hearts and minds of the citizens as well as those of the terrorists and their sympathisers are significant. Measures aimed at national orientation, winning the confidence of the populace and social re-engineering including granting concessions to the terrorists could arguably in such situations better contain terrorism than the traditional hard approach.

As would be highlighted subsequently, the scope and possibilities of measures to counter terrorism as well as their application have continued to broaden. This is as scholars continue to research and make inroads into the field of counter-terrorism that could be described as living and dynamic. Of importance to this study is finding the balance or right combination between hard and soft approaches to counter-terrorism as this is arguably the key to a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy. It is in this wise that counter-terrorism techniques that cut across hard and soft strategic approaches are examined.

9.3 Counter Terrorism Techniques

As stated earlier, counter-terrorism models are often categorised into the military and the criminal justice or law enforcement model.¹⁶ Shettima views counter-terrorism from three "Ds" perspectives of Defence, Diplomacy and Dialogue. Defence here has to do with the military approach, diplomacy with international cooperation and dialogue in terms of negotiation with or concessions to terrorists. The Lutzs in their discourse on techniques of counter-terrorism identified nine possible responses to terrorism, a combination of which could be said to form the counter-terrorism strategies of many governments.¹⁷ These are

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ P. Wilkinson and A. P. Schmid, "Framework for Conceptualizing Terrorism" in *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 16 Issue 2 (2006), pp.197-221.

¹⁷ J. Lutz and B. Lutz. *Global Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2013), P.214.

increased security, intelligence gathering (detection and prevention), disrupting finances, repression, retaliation or punishment, pre-emptive action, use of special counter-terrorism units, concessions and reforms as well as diplomatic approaches. I will discuss each of these as an embodiment to a possible counter-terrorism strategy that Nigeria could adopt.

9.3.1 Increased Security

The Lutzs opine that increasing security around critical targets or personnel is an obvious response which many nations have used to counter the threat posed by terrorists.¹⁸ They however observe that there are far too many targets for security measures to be effective. Also, security measures cannot eliminate all dangers of terrorist attacks and may equally have only temporary effects in reducing attacks. The terrorists could also change tactics or shift to less protected targets. Enders and Sandler note that after September 11, protective actions in terms of increased security by developing countries led to terrorist groups transferring attacks to weakly protected zones in developing countries.¹⁹

In Nigeria, terrorism has occasioned the placement of protective security barriers around office buildings and places of worship, increased VIP guards/escorts and checks at airports, hotels and other key places or vulnerable points. Nonetheless, the terrorists still find their way to penetrate some of these places, and particularly concentrate in places where there is less security coverage such as markets, villages and towns in the remote areas of Nigeria's vast swathes of land. Although the gains of increased security cannot easily be quantified, it also comes at a great cost as Lum (et al) noted.²⁰ In Nigeria's 2014 budget, 20 per cent representing 968.27 billion Naira (5.949 billion US Dollar) out of 4.96 trillion Naira (30.486 billion US Dollar) was allocated to the defence sector of which the provision of increased security formed a major component. Thus, resources that would have been devoted to other

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 215.

¹⁹ W. Enders and Todd Sandler, *The Political Economy of Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 2.

²⁰ C. Lum, Kennedy L. W, Sherley, A. J., p. 4.

sectors such as human and infrastructural development are diverted towards increasing security measures. Also is the social cost in terms of infringement on the privacy and fundamental human rights of citizens. The use of Closed Circuit Television cameras, body scanners and eaves-dropping devices are measures that cause disquiet among some in the population. For a population-centric counter-terrorism strategy, this aspect needs to be considered.

9.3.2 Intelligence Gathering – Detection and Prevention

Nations employ their intelligence and security agencies for intelligence gathering and the infiltration of terrorist groups in order to detect, prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks. Depending on its nature, the intelligence could either be of tactical or strategic value. Tactical counter-terrorism intelligence determines the intentions, capabilities and the threat of terrorist groups for day-to-day tactical and operational use. Strategic counter-terrorism intelligence on the other hand centres on trends and patterns in international terrorism and could contribute to changes in foreign policy as well as the amount of resources that are allocated to counter-terrorism.²¹

The multiplicity of targets and of terrorist cells particularly in loose terrorist networks make intelligence gathering and infiltration of groups difficult. In Nigeria, gathering of intelligence is based more on human than technical or electronic means. This currently presents problems for the intelligence agencies. This is more so as the areas affected by Boko Haram terrorism have socio-cultural affinity to the extent that penetration of the group by operatives who are not indigenes is difficult. Owing to this, many security operatives have been identified and killed by the terrorists. The dilemma for Nigeria is that it is not technologically advanced to leverage on the production of modern intelligence equipment and so has to rely almost solely on countries such as the US, UK, China, Israel and others for surveillance and such other

²¹ A. Hunsicker, *Understanding International Counter Terrorism* (Washington: Universal Publishers, 2006), pp. 75-81.

means of monitoring terrorist activities. It is therefore imperative that this dependency is factored into the national counter-terrorism plan while efforts are made to develop local capacity.

9.3.3 Disrupting Finances

The limiting and elimination of financial support for terrorist groups has been used alongside other measures to counter terrorism. Terrorist sources of funding include sponsor governments, private individuals, dummy corporations and charity organizations.²² Money laundering is acknowledged to have contributed to financing terrorism and many financial institutions have either intentionally or unintentionally been involved in the movement of funds in and out of offshore banks.²³ Terrorists are equally known to use the *Hawala* which is an ancient South Asian financial system that is today used around the world to conduct untraceable remittances.²⁴

The use of money laundering and other financial regulations are employed by governments to curtail undesirable flow of funds. However, this has been difficult in Nigeria due to weaknesses in legislations and the capacity of institutions concerned to implement them. The problem of corruption and the fact that Nigeria still operates a largely cash economy also allow for easy and undetected movement of funds. As a means of disrupting terrorist financing, Buckley and Meese suggest the freezing and blocking of financial assets of terrorist leaders and sponsors, adequate intelligence to track the flow of terrorist financing, and law enforcement of terrorist financing.²⁵ These could be considered imperatives for inclusion in Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.3.4 Repression

²² J. Lutz and B. Lutz, p. 278.

²³ Patrick D. Buckley and Michael J. Meese, "The Financial Front in the Global War on Terrorism" in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, *Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment* (Connecticut: McGraw Hills, 2004), pp. 51-61.

²⁴ Matthew Rosenberg, "Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash from Kabul" *The Wall Street Journal*, New York, 25 June 2010.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

It is contended that the presence of a totalitarian political system or powerful authoritarian state is a factor that has made a difference for the occurrence of non-state terrorism or its absence.²⁶ This is owing to their possession of effective intelligence agencies and the ruthless nature of such regimes which enables them manage to avoid terrorist threats by eliminating dissidents or potential dissidents. To this end, repression of violent groups, to a certain extent, is thought to be a counter-terrorism option for all states including democracies.

In Nigeria, repression of what were considered dissident groups was common during the military regimes. Although the regimes were an expression of state terrorism, their repressive responses perhaps helped to curtail the activities of non-state terrorist actors or insurgent-related groups as discussed earlier in chapter five. The irony however was that many of the dissident groups went underground and resurfaced in later democratic regimes. Similarly, Boko Haram was suppressed in July 2009 only to resurface with greater tenacity in 2010. This could imply that a counter-terrorism strategy that emphasises repression may not be sustainable or at best would have only short term benefits.

9.3.5 Retaliation or Punishment

Retaliation as a counter terrorism option is used where there is evidence of support by another country for domestic terrorists. It is thought to be a popular option by states but as the Lutzs aver, it is a choice fraught with difficulties as issues such as interference in the internal affairs of other states often arise.²⁷ The US have applied this technique against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the NATO countries against Libya and Israel against Hamas militants. Retaliations could take forms other than military action. For instance, diplomatic or economic sanctions can be applied against the country suspected of encouraging terrorism as was recently the case against Syria and Iran by the US. It could also be considered an option against a state that refuses to cooperate in the fight against terrorism particularly if such an

²⁶ J. Lutz and B. Lutz, p. 280.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 281.

uncooperative state is contiguous to an affected state requiring support. As noted earlier, it is necessary that responses to state-sponsored terrorism form part of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.3.6 Pre-emptive Action

Pre-emptive strikes directed against the training camps of terrorist groups or against state supporters could be a necessary response for countering terrorist threats. This was widely used by the US against terrorist bases in Pakistan, and France against Islamic militants in Northern Mali. The use of this technique is highly dependent on the acquisition of adequate intelligence on the terrorists particularly the right locations of their training camps and bases. This would avoid strikes at wrong locations or targets that could result in damages that usually prompt hostile reactions by the local population including possible stimulation of the uprising of new dissident groups.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram is known to have its bases in the forests and mountainous areas especially along its border areas with Niger, Chad and Cameroun. The group has also been identified with terrorist training camps in neighbouring countries including Mali and Libya.²⁸

The monitoring and conduct of pre-emptive strikes at terrorist locations within and outside Nigeria could have disrupted terrorist activities in their early stages. Pre-emption ought to also entail proactive rather than reactionary conduct of counter-terrorism operations. This is a worthwhile consideration in the Forestall and Identify work-streams of the NACTEST.

9.3.7 Special Counter Terrorism Units

²⁸ See Jane's Intelligence Report, 2012.

As the Lutzs contend, the establishment and deployment of specially trained counter terrorism units to terrorist affected areas has been a strategic option used by many countries to deal with terrorist situations.²⁹ The units popularly known as Special Forces are often used for pre-emptive strikes, retaliation, in aid of regular security and for search and rescue missions. It is believed that their presence could help to deter some terrorist attacks and discourage hostage taking or actions.³⁰

In the US NSCT, the role of Special Forces is given due recognition. The use of a detachment of the US Marines in the elimination of Usama Bin Laden demonstrates the crucial role the forces could play in the military line of operation of a counter-terrorism strategy. Following the upsurge in terrorist activities in Nigeria, the government established counter-terrorism training schools at Jaji and Kotangora towns. A Special Forces battalion was formed and deployed to north-eastern Nigeria to counter Boko Haram terrorist activities. The lack of equipment and other logistics have however hampered the effectiveness of this unit. In the light of this, Nigeria could reconsider the offer by the US Government for special counter-terrorism training of some units of the Nigerian Army and subsequently inculcate this aspect in the country's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.3.8 Concessions and Reforms

In concessions and reforms, the government seeks to change policies to address grievances that are perceived to have led to the terrorist activities. The process often involves negotiation with the terrorists through intermediaries which some people view as rewarding violence.³¹ The strategy seems to work where there is a real problem or where it is intended to reduce support for dissidents. For instance, the Indian government has used it effectively at times in confronting the Naxalites insurgency. Often however, the demands of the terrorists may be

²⁹ J. Lutz and B. Lutz, p. 286.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Peter Neumann, "Negotiating With Terrorists" in *Foreign Affairs* 86(1) 2007, pp. 128-129.

difficult to meet, or meeting them may stir up grievances in another section of a religiously or ideologically divided country.

In chapters six and seven, two different situations were observed in Nigeria. While negotiations with the Niger Delta militants proved successful as evidenced in their acceptance of the Federal Government Amnesty Programme, it has so far been difficult with the Boko Haram sect. Unlike the Niger Delta militants whose grievances and demands could be said to be socio-economic at root, those of the Boko Haram sect appear to be ideological in their outward expression and hinge on the integrity of the Nigerian state. The hard-line stance of the Boko Haram leadership makes matters worse. For instance, Shekau had, in one of his video messages, stated that it was the Nigerian government that needed an amnesty and not the sect. Negotiations have also failed because of what some regard as insincerity and politicisation of the issue on the part of the Nigerian government.³² The government had however stated that it was open to negotiations once Boko Haram make known its real leadership. The exchange of detained suspected Boko Haram leaders for the 219 Chibok School girls held hostage by the members of the sect has been under consideration by the Government of Nigeria. Aside from negotiation, the inclusion of socio-economic reforms that facilitate counter-radicalization and counter violent extremism could enhance a soft approach for Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.3.9 Diplomatic Approaches

The diplomatic approach involve international cooperation through agreements and joint actions against terrorists by countries. Although problems exist over states' definition of terrorism and the fear of retaliation by some members of the international community, agreements have been reached by many countries on areas such as extradition of suspected

³² Virginia Comolli, p. 119.

terrorists and granting of asylum.³³ The notion that no state can fight terrorism alone has made the diplomatic approach even more significant.

Nigeria has reached out to its immediate neighbours in the counter-terrorism effort against Boko Haram. This has been in the form of bilateral and multilateral actions against the sect and proposals for joint development of the Lake Chad Basin area where Boko Haram has found sanctuary. President Buhari between June and August 2015 paid visit to all the immediate neighbours of Nigeria and to the UK, US and France in an effort to seek both military and diplomatic assistance to counter terrorism in Nigeria. However, diplomatic approaches are arguably complementary to other efforts, meaning that they can only be worthwhile when the nation involved has put other measures in place at the domestic level. In other words, the benefits from international cooperation can only be meaningful when national counter-terrorism efforts are appropriate and sustainable. The import of this is that Nigeria ought to put itself in order in terms of a sustainable and effective national counter-terrorism strategy that would guide its counter-terrorism efforts as well the efforts of nations and international partners supporting or interested in supporting it. It is therefore to the question of a counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria that is both sustainable and effective that I now turn attention to.

9.4 A Sustainable and Effective Counter Terrorism Strategy for Nigeria

It is perhaps worth stating here that the purpose in this section of the thesis is not to make an explicit policy proposal to the Nigerian government. It is rather intended to model what a sensible counter-terrorism strategy could look like, and the elements it could usefully involve, based on the findings of this study. This is more so as the study is undertaken as a mechanism for further exploring the intricate relationship between government policy and action, and the

³³ J. Lutz and B. Lutz, p. 289.

development of terrorist threats thereby requiring what possible shape a strategy for countering such threats should take.

In couching or espousing counter terrorism strategies, a major point pertinent to re-iterate is that the subject of terrorism is complex, and so is counter-terrorism. Wilkinson observes that there is “no universally applicable counter-terrorism policy for democracies. Every conflict involving terrorism has its own unique characteristics.”³⁴ Consequently, counter-terrorism strategies will differ according to the country’s socio-political context, the current threat environment and the will of the government in power. The strategies ought also to be adaptive, and reflective of time and space.

Furthermore and flowing from the definition of counter-terrorism, it could be said that the prevention, deterrence, pre-emption and responses to terrorism require bringing on board all aspects of a nation’s power. Thus, I would argue that counter-terrorism need to be seen as an all-inclusive line of effort, and whichever strategy is adopted should not only be dictated by the prevailing situation but equally ought to have the lines of effort mutually supportive of each other. That is to say economic, social, political, security, diplomatic and such other lines of effort have to complement each other.

This again brings to fore the imperative of having the right balance between hard and soft power approaches in counter-terrorism. In this wise, Ebulue opines that for a counter-terrorism strategy to have the right mix of hard and soft power and to achieve sustainability and effectiveness, there must first be a right definition of the threat, understanding the threat and following this, the objectives of the strategy.³⁵ The ends, ways and means that constitute such a strategy equally need to be balanced and unambiguous. The above is contingent upon an understanding of the problem and the employment of a comprehensive approach and plan,

³⁴ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (New York: Routledge, 2006) p. 203.

³⁵ Nonye Ebulue, Analyst, Intelligence Production Centre, Directorate of Military Intelligence Abuja-Nigeria, interviewed 11 August 2015.

while simultaneously learning and adapting to the emerging threat scenario. It ought also to be feasible, suitable and command acceptability among stakeholders for it to achieve its objective. In utilizing hard and soft approaches in a counter-terrorism strategy, Oyebade stressed the point that "it must always be borne in mind that the main role of the military is the shaping or cushioning of the environment for other elements of national power to be employed in the counter-terrorism effort."³⁶ In this vein, once an acceptable level of safety is achieved through the use of the hard approach in a terrorist affected environment, the military and other instruments of the hard approach necessary have to give way or play a secondary role to soft power.

From the foregoing, this author is of the view that a workable counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria needs to reflect the perspective that terrorism in Nigeria is multi-causal and multifaceted thereby requiring a multipronged approach. The domestic nature of terrorism also requires a people-centred counter-terrorism strategy that has at its heart socio-economic transformations, democracy and human rights observance. It ought to be a holistic strategy that goes beyond kinetic response (as represented by the use of the military) to non-kinetic (or soft power) thereby utilising all instruments of national power in the counter-terrorism effort. It is in the light of this that this study would suggest the development of a population-centric counter-terrorism strategy which integrates whole-of-government and non-governmental (or society) approaches.

The pertinent question arising from this is: how can this whole-of-government and non-governmental approach be achieved? And flowing from this, what measures could be embarked upon to realise a sustainable and effective counter-terrorism strategy? To begin with, the proposed strategy needs to interface between policy makers, implementation agencies and the public. The strategy consequently has to be clear in formulation, effectively

³⁶ A Oyebade, Deputy Commandant National Defence College of Nigeria, Lecture Series on Higher Military Strategy delivered to Course 22 Participants, 15 April 2014.

communicated, actively and relentlessly executed and informed by best practices. In the previous chapters, I noted a number of issues, weaknesses and challenges that have hampered the effectiveness of the Nigerian government response to the threat of terrorism. To achieve the desired strategy therefore, the identified issues, weaknesses and challenges would need to be addressed. This would mean rethinking some of the counter-terrorism responses or approaches and the crafting of new ones appropriate to the contemporary situation.

Considering the fact that the NACTEST ought to be the pivot of the decision-making and implementation of the counter-terrorism effort of the Nigerian Government, my focus would first be on addressing the gaps inherent in the NACTEST. This, as will be highlighted, could be in the form of a review aimed at restructuring the NACTEST. The counter-terrorism policy and programmes of government, as highlighted earlier, are driven by institutions. In view of this, I would subsequently dwell on the ways and means of maximising the performance of the counter-terrorism institutions to achieve the ends of containing terrorism. Further emphasis would be made on building of the capacity of security agencies. Following this are the programmes of government that would support and sustain the counter-terrorism strategy. One of the programmes is the strengthening of good governance and democracy for socio-economic development, the deficit of which this study has identified to have contributed as both pull and push factors in the development of terrorism in Nigeria.

Further to the above are programmes and measures to enhance international cooperation. This is in view of the need for better border management and relations with contiguous countries as well as fostering the goodwill of international partners, both governmental and non-governmental. Finally is the imperative of participation of the public and private sectors, in other words, an all-stakeholders approach where the whole-of-government and society effort are harnessed to counter terrorism.

9.4.1 Review of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy

A review of the Nigerian NACTEST is considered necessary given the several gaps in it as outlined in Table 9.1. The focus of such a review ought to be that of addressing the gaps for the NACTEST to meet its requirement of being the instrument that facilitates the interface between counter-terrorism policy-making and counter-terrorism implementation. In this regard a national definition of terrorism would need to be included in the NACTEST to avoid varying interpretations given to terrorist acts. This is particularly so as armed banditry, robbery, cattle rustling, communal clashes, abductions, child trafficking and other criminal activities with perceived links to terrorism are rife in Nigeria.³⁷ It could be argued that once a problem (such as terrorism) is defined, the pathways towards solutions to it could be more easily facilitated.

In the area of placement of the CTC under ONSA, there is a need for a review of the NACTEST in order to provide definite supporting structures that reduces bureaucracy and in which far-reaching political decisions could be taken. For instance, in the UK CONTEST, the National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister has oversight of CONTEST and takes regular reports on its progress.³⁸ The NACTEST could be reviewed to reflect a similar arrangement.

In laying sole emphasis on Boko Haram, the NACTEST has failed to recognise the fact that not all acts of terrorism are religious or ideologically motivated as is ostensibly the case with Boko Haram, and therefore has not taken into account future terrorism or terrorist-related threats that could emerge. The problem is compounded by the fact that Nigeria does not have a National Security Strategy from which the NACTEST ought to have drawn its source of guidance. In this regard, it could be averred that the NACTEST needs to be sufficiently broad-based in order to cover all possible contingencies of terrorism.

³⁷ These are thought to not only feed into the terrorism situation in Nigeria but also carried out by them to sustain themselves and fund their activities.

³⁸ HM Government, *The United Kingdom Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, (London: TSO, 2011)

It is also considered necessary that the NACTEST provides an overview of the Nigerian Government disposition to negotiation with terrorists. This is because, while negotiation is one of the key tools used by some governments in dealing with terrorists, the same practice is opposed by others.³⁹ The review could therefore include conditions that may warrant negotiation (if the government is disposed to it) or succinctly state that the government is adopting a 'no negotiation' stance with terrorists. Equally important is the need to state in the NACTEST how the government intends to protect Nigeria's interests abroad and possible responses to state terrorism which potentially could either be internally generated or externally sponsored, perhaps by Nigeria's neighbours.⁴⁰ All these are arguably necessary for public awareness, and for planning as well as the development of contingencies by implementation agencies. The review of the NACTEST is therefore considered imperative to block gaps that terrorists could capitalise upon, and to facilitate the much needed policy making, implementation agencies and citizen's interface that is needed for an effective counter-terrorism effort.

9.4.2 Effective Coordination of Counter Terrorism Institutions

In the previous chapter, the poor performance of Nigeria's counter-terrorism institutions was noted. They were found to be poorly managed, ill-coordinated and clogged by a lack of synergy between actors in the process. Unhealthy rivalry among agencies was found to have resulted in duplication of effort rather than the economy of effort that interagency cooperation would have achieved. In some countries, measures aimed at fostering interagency cooperation and facilitating the synergy required in the national counter-terrorism effort are put in place. In the US, for instance, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) leads the "nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the

³⁹ P. Neumann, pp. 128-129.

⁴⁰ This is as there have been allegations that several Boko Haram leaders are from Chad, and that the Sect had surreptitiously enjoyed the support of the Chadian and Cameroonian government. These allegations have been refuted by both governments. See Vanguard Newspaper, 4 December 2014.

threat, sharing information with partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”⁴¹ This, according to Rasmussen has to a large extent helped to reduce the friction between counter-terrorism agencies.⁴² However, this is not to say that everything is perfect with the US counter-terrorism effort as major issues in coordinating the 17 different agencies that collect intelligence still exist.⁴³

The designation of a lead ministry and agency for counter terrorism is equally recommended to foster synergy. In the UK, the Home Office is designated by Her Majesty’s Government as the lead ministry for coordinating the counter-terrorism effort of the government within the country and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office outside the country. For a lead agency, the Metropolitan Police Service leads the day-to-day counter-terrorism operations in the UK as the Federal Bureau of Investigation does in the US. In Nigeria where such arrangement is lacking, the designation of a similar lead ministry and agency is considered worthwhile for effective counter-terrorism strategy implementation.

9.4.3 Capacity Building of Security Agencies

In line with the coordination of counter-terrorism institutions is the requirement for capacity building. This study considers building of the capacity of the security component of the institutions based on the earlier appraisal made of the Nigeria’s security and intelligence architecture. The appraisal observed the imperative of building the capacity of the security agencies in terms of requisite training, acquisition of modern equipment and respect for human rights as well as democratic values. In line with this is the necessity for top-down reforms to boost the poor morale of troops and end corruption that has plagued military

⁴¹ The United States National Counter Terrorism Center Mission Statement available at [www.nctc.gov/...](http://www.nctc.gov/), accessed 2 August 2015.

⁴² Nicholas J Rasmussen, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States” *Statement for the Record Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 12 February 2015.

⁴³

procurement.⁴⁴ The newly elected government of President Buhari had from June 2015 taken steps to build the capacity of the security agencies. He announced the relocation of the Military Command Centre to Maiduguri town where Boko Haram has its strongest foothold. The President has also changed the leadership of the AFN and that of the MNJTF. While these efforts are laudable, it is expected that further measures including the fostering of civil-military relations and confidence building measures are undertaken. This is pertinent as the domestic nature of the terrorism that Nigeria is witnessing requires that the locals are on the side of the military.⁴⁵ More in terms of capacity building is perhaps the establishment, training and equipping of Special Forces capable of focused targeting that could avoid the collateral damage the Nigerian military has often been accused of. The leveraging of modern precision armaments including locating artillery and strike aircrafts could dislodge the terrorists in their safe havens, disorganise their lines of supply and disrupt their regroupings. In this way, both pre-emption and punishment technique could be effectively applied in the Nigerian counter-terrorism strategy.

This author believes that although the military strategy cannot on its own win the fight against terrorism, the military would continue to play a significant role in the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism effort. This is so as the implementation of other counter-terrorism strategies; political, economic and social would depend on a safe environment which the military provides. The role of the military to cushion the ground for other elements of national power to be employed in the counter-terrorism effort is therefore fundamental and hence, the need to ensure it's professional and combat efficiency.

The conduct of intelligence-led counter-terrorism operations has been found to be a major enabler in the counter-terrorism efforts of many nations. The US is said to place considerable

⁴⁴ "Four reasons why Nigeria's military can't contain Boko Haram" *CBC Radio-Canada*, 15 January 2015.

⁴⁵ General Petraeus observed the need for this during his tour of duty in Afghanistan when he stated the need for US troops to live and work with the locals for confidence building.

emphasis on intelligence such that intelligence is regarded as the third most decisive line of its counter-terrorism effort after the political and military lines. Michael Herman sums up intelligence from the perspective of knowledge obtained for planning.⁴⁶ Applied to the conduct of operations, it could be said that with intelligence, counter-terrorism operations would not be ad hoc and reactionary (as the study revealed is the case in Nigeria) but planned, targeted and pre-emptive. The employment of technology for intelligence on terrorists and their sponsors, their movements, sources of finance, equipment and other logistic becomes crucial. In this vein is the imperative for an integrated management of intelligence resources that would promote a joint approach to intelligence, build trust, and maximize resource utilization. Equally necessary is the development of net-centric capabilities by upgrading and integrating existing information technology platforms, data bases and fusion centres at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Furthermore, the Nigerian government ought to deepen engagements with foreign countries for intelligence and guide against acts that could undermine good working relationships with them or weaken international trust on its intelligence and security establishments. The conduct of comprehensive and thorough inquest to ensure that its agencies have not been infiltrated by extremist sympathizers is perhaps imperative. This is considered important as there have been several allegations of complicity of security personnel in counter-terrorism operations.⁴⁷ It is suggested that concrete steps to deal with those providing supportive infrastructure to the terrorists is taken, by making public their names and initiating legal actions against them.

9.4.4 Good Governance and Democracy

⁴⁶ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.2.
⁴⁷ Nicholas Ibekwe, "How fifth columnists in Nigerian military leaked operational plan to Boko Haram – ex-Defence Chief" *Premium Times*, 30 July 2015. In this press interview, Air Marshal Alex Badeh, the immediate past Chief of Defence Staff Nigerian Armed Forces stated that some military personnel leaked operational information and abetted terrorism.

In the appraisal of the issue of governance and terrorism in Nigeria made in chapter eight, the link between governance deficit and the rate of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and political exclusion that could potentially fuel grievances and vulnerability to terrorist group appeal was noted. The situation raises the need to strengthen good governance and democratic values that could ensure broad socio-economic and political transformations. Good governance and democracy, it could be said, are key to the success of this strategy as they tend to target at addressing the grievances that potentially created the threat group in the first place. They also provide a platform for the administration of justice and social order often manipulated by terrorists to portray government in a bad light. It is in this line perhaps that Crenshaw, Wilkinson and the Lutzs argue that the formulation and execution of socio-economic reform programmes is the best antidote against terrorism.⁴⁸ Similarly, Marie Harf observes that:

*We need to go after the root causes that lead people to join these ((terrorist) groups, whether it is lack of opportunity for jobs or other factors. We can work with countries around the world to help improve their governance. We can help them build their economies so they can have job opportunities for these people....It is evident that well educated and rich people join the groups for reasons other than poverty or unemployment. However, good governance and people oriented policies will assist in denying legitimacy to the (terrorist) groups.*⁴⁹

Specifically on the Nigerian situation, Emir Sanusi of Kano opines that:

*if government is fighting (terrorism) on the field like in Sambisa forest, it also must fight these root causes of poverty, lack of education, ignorance, corruption and injustice from the background ... (otherwise) we just allow the tree to grow and we cut the branches without uprooting the roots, which also means that the tree will still grow again.*⁵⁰

⁴⁸ See Martha Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts" in Crenshaw, ed *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p.23. P. Wilkinson, "Politics, Diplomacy and Peace Processes: Pathways out of Terrorism" in M.Taylor and J. Horgan. eds *The Future of Terrorism* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).p. 82. Also J. M Lutz, and Lutz, B.J., *Global Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2004).

⁴⁹ Marie Harf, the US Department of State deputy spokesperson, Chester 2015, 1-3

⁵⁰ HRH Muhammad Sanusi (II), Emir of Kano, paper presented at International Security Workshop at Abuja, 28 October, 2015.

Aligning with these thoughts, the Government of Nigeria could reposition its MDAs responsible for poverty alleviation, youth empowerment, education and other human as well as capital resource development. It could further demonstrate strong commitment to fight corruption by strengthening the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Crimes Commission, which are the principal agencies vested with this responsibility. This may help to ensure that resources are judiciously used for developmental purposes and in the process deconstruct and neutralise the appeal to Boko Haram's ideology. In a similar vein, the government could establish a special intervention development fund where monies from government sources, the private sector, Non-Governmental Organizations and the international community are channelled towards the reconstruction of infrastructures destroyed by the terrorists and the general development of the areas affected by terrorism. Also, the agricultural sector could be developed in order to provide job opportunities and reduce dependence on federal government resources that has occasioned the struggle by the North and South for control of the central government.⁵¹

The good governance response could equally be directed at enhancing national cohesion and integration. This is particularly so as terrorists aim to create a divide between the government and the citizens as well as between ethno-religious, cultural or political sections of the society as evident in Nigeria. Accordingly, the government would need to tenaciously implement social enlightenment programmes, an educational system that encourages integration, religious tolerance at all levels, equality of citizens and the tenets of human rights. In a nutshell, it is considered that the government could demonstrate the political will to deploy all instruments of governance to counter terrorism in Nigeria.

⁵¹ The states in the north particularly could be resourced to develop their dominantly agricultural based economies, which provides comparative advantage to the region against the south with oil.

9.4.5 International Cooperation

International cooperation in the fight against terrorism is the basic pillar of the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy, the tenets of which nations are expected to adhere to.⁵² To Nigeria, this is vital as the activities of Boko Haram have evidently reaffirmed that no one country can fight terrorism alone. In terms of geostrategic interest, it brought to fore the fact that Nigeria and her immediate neighbours, and by extension, the West African sub-region are commonly influenced by events in their locality. Nigeria has been accused by its neighbours of a “bluff attitude of being giant of Africa.”⁵³ In this wise, Nigeria would need to moderate and see all its neighbours as equals and partners in the fight against terror. Nigeria could improve relations with them on economic, political and cultural areas noting that countries that jointly harness their common interests would do all possible to fight threats common to them or that jeopardizes their common interests. For instance, the Government of Nigeria could lobby Cameroon for more joint economic investments in each other’s territory and the joint exploitation of economic resources such as crude oil and others that are found along their common border. The bilateral and multilateral engagements could include the joint development of border communities in order to win the hearts and minds of the people towards government and in the process weaken their support for terrorists who use the border communities as safe havens.

The Government of Nigeria could further establish a joint border control agency as against the current joint border committees and sub-regional security arrangements that are found to have not been very effective. The existing joint border committees such as the Nigeria-Cameroun Trans-Border Security Committee, Nigeria - Niger Border Commission and the Nigeria - Benin Border Commission could all be coalesced into one body, that is, a national

⁵² “United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” being *Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 48.

⁵³ T. Onimisi, “Globalisation and the Nigerian National Security: An Overview” in *Journal of Good Governance and sustainable Development in Africa*, Vol. 2 Issue 2 (2014), pp. 80-85.

border agency. The agency could liaise with the relevant authorities in each of the contiguous countries on border management including mechanism for land, air and sea ports control.

Beyond its immediate neighbours, Nigeria ought to champion collective security mechanisms at regional levels while creating favourable conditions to leverage foreign support and other gains of diplomacy at global level. The implementation of the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy, commitment to the US initiated TSCP programme and pursuit for the firm establishment of the AU Standby Force are imperatives. Comolli observes here that given the scale of the Nigerian economy, its strategic role in the African continent and the large presence of foreign nationals in the country, the situation in Nigeria is being watched by non-African countries such as the US and UK with concern.⁵⁴ This means that terrorism in Nigeria cannot be easily ignored by the international community and in this wise there is an opportunity that Nigeria could exploit diplomatically. However, Nigeria's diplomatic counter-terrorism line of effort needs to transcend defence and soliciting for military assistance to development and lobbying for infrastructural as well as human development particularly in the terrorism affected areas. In this regard, the role of USAID, DFID and other international development partners could be factored into the overall counter-terrorism effort. The UK's Stabilisation Unit model that integrates the efforts of the military, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DFID could be a reference in this regard. This could further ensure a balance between the kinetic and non-kinetic aspect of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.4.6 All Stakeholders' Approach

An all stakeholders' approach to counter-terrorism is proffered as a panacea for the deficit in strategic communication and public-private partnership, and on the premise that government cannot do it all alone without the involvement of the citizens. This is saying that the

⁵⁴ Virginia Comolli, p. 142.

government, its security agencies and the society (which are equally the target of the terrorists) all need to be involved. The traditional rulers, religious leaders, youth groups, women groups and other community-based organizations need to be resourced to actively participate in the counter-terrorism effort. Yudinisev argues particularly for the inclusion of the efforts of private-public co-operations which he contends should not be limited to the business community but include Non-Governmental Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, media, tourism and hotels⁵⁵ Furthermore, messages that portray Islam as a peaceful religion, that the Government of Nigeria's counter terrorism effort is not against Muslims and that the government is winning the fight against terrorism need to be articulated and relentlessly communicated. In this wise, the government could explore dialogue with a range of clerics to determine whether there could be some sort of mechanism for approving and accrediting imams who proffer messages of peace and conciliation rather than extremism.

The all-stakeholders' approach could be complemented by the establishment of information and security think tanks for public discourse on security issues. Think tank institutes and foundations such as the Royal United Service Institute and Chatham House in the UK as well as the Jamestown Foundation in the US are noted for crystallizing ideas on national security issues in the countries mentioned. The centres, institutes and foundations could be open to members of the public and private sectors particularly security experts, academics, Non-Governmental Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, trade unions, traditional and religious institutions. Training sessions, seminars and workshops on terrorism and other burning national security issues could be held in these places. It could form the forum for public scrutiny of the NACTEST. The Nigerian government could further use these centres to

⁵⁵ A., Yudinisev, "Promoting public private partnerships." *The Beam UN CTITF*, Volume 5 (January-May 2012), p.8.

deepen its anti-terror campaign and public enlightenment as well as inculcate security consciousness and situation awareness on the citizens.

The imperative of countering the ideology of Boko Haram which runs contrary to the ideals of the Nigerian state has been pointed out in this study. The inputs from the think tanks could be used to articulate the right strategic messages and explore the political approach to containing the threat posed by Boko Haram. This includes the possibility of reaching out to the terrorists to embrace peace and dialogue. Negotiations and platforms for demobilization, de-radicalization and re-integration of those who denounce terrorism could be put in place. However, it could on the other hand formulate messages or plans to create rival factions within the terrorist ranks. The think tank centres could, by providing the opportunity for national security input from every citizen broaden the scope of Nigeria's counter-terrorism effort currently limited to security agencies, a few government departments and concerned individuals. The broadening of the scope of the counter-terrorism effort could consequently embrace the all-of-society and whole-of-government approach to counter terrorism in Nigeria as canvassed in this study.

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Preamble

This chapter reviews my research work on terrorism in Nigeria which focused primarily on the threat-response interplay, and flowing from this, the quest for a suitable counter-terrorism strategy. The conclusion draws from the whole body of research in terms of highlights of key aspects of the study and summary of findings. Thereafter, a set of recommendations for policy and further academic research is presented.

10.2 Highlights of the Study

Nigeria is beset with security problems of which terrorism appears to be currently the greatest concern. This study accordingly set out an examination of the various terrorist threats, the responses of the Nigerian governments to them and in the light of observed lapses in governments' responses, suggested a possible national strategy to counter-terrorism in Nigeria. The study noted that although terrorism in Nigeria currently revolves around the activities of Boko Haram, the phenomenon has precursors in the Maitatsine uprising, military rule and the Niger Delta Crisis.

The Maitatsine terrorism was a case of religious fundamentalism based on ideology that ran counter to the political, economic and social establishment of the Nigerian state. The sect's ideology centred on the purification of Islam which its members believe have been corrupted by Westernization and the formation of the modern state system. As indicated in chapter four, infighting among political parties, poor socio-economic conditions of citizens and the influx of illegal immigrants occasioned by porous borders accentuated the wave of violence. The study put

forward a theory, however, that what was the immediate cause of the uprising of terror was ill handling of the sect (in other words poor response to the threat) by the security agencies. According to Isichei and Falola, the situation led to the death of about 4,117 persons in Kano and the destruction of property worth millions of Naira within 12 days.¹ Although the sect was later contained through the use of military force, there is a belief that it resurfaced as Boko Haram.

Terrorism in Nigeria during military rule was perpetrated by the state. It was characterised by state repression of pro-democratic organizations. I noted in chapter five that state terrorism under military rule witnessed extensive use of explosive devices, a method that became entrenched in the subsequent cases of terrorism witnessed in Nigeria. Furthermore, state terrorism as perpetrated by the Nigerian military associated it (the Nigerian military) with human rights abuses, the stigma of which human right groups such as Amnesty International observe as evident to date.² The response of the people of Nigeria to state terrorism was boosted by the international community's condemnation of the acts. The result was the return of the country to democracy in 1999.

The return to democratic rule witnessed the rise of militant groups. The most prominent of the militant groups were those in the Niger Delta area who, as the Lutzs aver, resorted to terrorism ostensibly in pursuit of better socio-economic and political conditions for the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.³ The Niger Delta militants employed hostage taking, kidnapping and other forms of terrorist tactics in advancing their cause. The response of the Nigerian government to the situation in the Niger Delta was its usual application of military force. This, as noted in chapter six, was characterised by high-handedness which further alienated the people. In the long run, it

¹ Isichei Elizabeth, p. 194. See also, Toyin Falola, p. 155.

² Amnesty International (UK), 2015.

³ J. and B. Lutz, pp 212-216.

was a soft approach involving negotiations, conciliation and concessions through an Amnesty Programme that relatively ended terrorist activities by militants in the Niger Delta area. The shift from a targeted approach to what is considered a more acceptable people oriented and broader community based soft approach is consequently thought by some to be a model for similar situations in Nigeria⁴

The ongoing terrorism by the Boko Haram sect, unlike the other three cases mentioned, assumed full-blown status with perceived linkages to al-Qaeda networks. The sect strongly opposes Western way of life, democratic institutions, constitutional laws and institutions of the Nigerian state. Its overriding goal is to establish a Sharia state by usurping control of the Nigerian state through its brand of jihad. Apart from the religious perspective, the activities of the sect assumed political and criminal dimensions as well as transcending Nigeria's borders thereby placing greater demand on the response requirement of the Nigerian government to the threat. The study highlighted that the responses by the Government of Nigeria to the threat at some points escalated rather than contained it. The sect went beyond bomb attacks in public places to the abduction of school girls, use of women for suicide terrorism, employment of child-soldiers in guerrilla warfare, beheading tactic, pledge of allegiance to the ISIS and the seizure as well as occupation of territories all of which raise issues pertaining to the Nigerian Government's counter-terrorism efforts.

In the threat-response assessment made, I noted that central to the issues involving the containment of terrorism in Nigeria is the national counter-terrorism strategy, which, apart from been published only recently, is fraught with gaps that could easily be exploited by terrorists. There are also issues with institutional frameworks, governance, border management, the

⁴ Michael Nwankpa, "The Politics of Amnesty in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of the Boko Haram and Niger Delta Insurgencies" *Journal of Terrorism Research* Volume 5 Issue 1 (February 2014), p. 67.

capacity of security agencies and the employment of strategic communications. All these constitute challenges to the counter terrorism drive of the Nigerian government and call for a re-strategizing of efforts. It is in the light of these problems that the study proffered, by way of a synthesis of the findings of my research, a national strategy for counter-terrorism that incorporates whole-of-government and non-governmental approaches.

10.3 Summary of Major Findings

This research is in part a retrospective study in that it is based on historical case studies in Nigeria focusing on the interplay between the actions of terrorists and the reactions of government, and vice versa. A major outcome of this is the indication that the Nigerian Government has failed to effectively counter terrorism because of the ineffectiveness of its strategy. Arising from this, therefore, is the second objective of the study which is about the quest for effective and sustainable strategy for countering terrorism in Nigeria. The study specifically addresses the research questions posed in section 1.3 of chapter one.

The study found that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. As seen in the accounts of Oyeniyi and others, the colonial regime used its army against the indigenous population to perpetrate acts that could be classified as state terrorism.⁵ The army arguably retained its character of repression against the populace in post-colonial Nigeria to the extent that during the Generals Babangida and Abacha regimes, terrorist acts such as bombings, assaults, physical and psychological intimidations as well as assassinations of persons were common. Another

⁵ Adeyemi Bukola Oyeniyi, p. 18. Phillip Igbafe, "Western Ibo Society and its Resistance to British Rule: The Ekumeku Movement 1898-1911" *Journal of African History*, Vol. 12, Issue 03 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, July 1971), pp 441-449. Also, Paul E. Lovejoy and J. S. Hogendorn, "Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905-6" in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Cambridge University Press 1990), pp. 217-244. Article available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/182766>, accessed 12 June 2013.

dimension was terrorism orchestrated by violent extremist Islamic sects. The first major case that fitted terrorism classification was the Maitatsine uprising in the 1980s that is thought to have historical linkage with the current wave of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram. All these cases including the Niger Delta Crisis were mainly of domestic nature, although with some degree of international dimension. Terrorism under military regimes attracted international condemnation: that in the Niger Delta became internationalised because of oil politics, while that by Boko Haram is increasingly assuming part of the global jihadist network. As the origin and nature of terrorism espoused by the groups differ, so are the factors that supposedly caused them very various. Terrorism in Nigeria is therefore thought to be multi-causal with structural and rational factors perhaps being most dominant.

The study revealed that the threat of terrorism in Nigeria has evolved over the years from small, highly hierarchically-structured and largely locally based groups as witnessed in the Maitatsine era, to larger, loosed structured and transnationally connected groups as evident in Boko Haram. The lethality of the groups has increased as Boko Haram, for instance, has imbibed modern technology for making IEDs, use of high calibre assault weapons for attacks, engagement of suicide bombers including females and the use of electronic and print media particularly the Internet for propaganda and other communication purposes. Terrorism in Nigeria has also evolved from the traditional threat to criminality and other dimensions. This is so as while funding by earlier terrorist groups such as Maitatsine was mainly by levies, Boko Haram currently engages in kidnapping, drug trafficking, armed robbery and other criminal activities to raise funds thereby making the threat more complex. The expanding network of the sect across the sub-Saharan region resulted in its categorisation with its offshoot, Ansaru as an FTO, and the threat continues to evolve with greater sophistication given its perceived alliance with ISIS.

It was established in this study that the responses of successive governments in Nigeria to the threat of terrorism have largely been ad hoc and reactionary. In this way, the threats have been dealt with as they emerged without proactive arrangements or a strategic framework. It was revealed throughout the case studies that there have been over reliance on the military instrument of response. This posed problems as it was found that apart from capacity issues, public reputation on the military and security agencies such as the police, customs and immigrations significantly diminished. Mechanisms of counter-terrorism responses such as policy and legal instruments were also either lacking or inadequate. The TPA was enacted in 2011 after Boko Haram terrorism had become firmly rooted in the country. Also, the NACTEST was endorsed in April 2014 after five years of trying to counter Boko Haram thereby lending credence to the point that counter-terrorism efforts of government have been based hitherto on ad hoc provisions. Even with this, the NACTEST is fraught with gaps. Similarly, the institutions to drive the counter-terrorism effort of the government have been uncoordinated with seeming lack of synergy. Cooperation with contiguous countries are bedevilled with suspicion while the commitment of the international community has been impaired with allegations of human rights abuses on the part of the Nigerian military. Worsening the responses of successive governments to the threat of terrorism is the inadequacy of public-private partnerships and the attendant lack of strategic communication in the national counter-terrorism drive.

The responses of the Nigerian Government, as the study reveals, have had undesirable policy implications by way of shortcomings in its overall counter-terrorism effort. This is evident in the continuing attacks by the terrorists. The policy of the use of the military without corresponding human security approaches has often tended to alienate the military (and by extension the government itself) from the citizenry. This is in view of the repressions of the military and the

resultant collateral damage as well as human rights abuses associated with its counter-terrorism operations. The challenges of lacking policy and legal frameworks over the years was found to have lent space for the emergence and growth of terrorist groups as there were no guidelines and appropriate laws to sustain the counter-terrorism effort. For instance, persons that were arrested by security agencies could not be prosecuted, as there was not yet a law under which to do so (as the TPA only came in in 2011). The NACTEST released in 2014 failed to articulate and populate the means in a clear manner that resourced the ways in order to achieve the national objective. It consequently appear to have a mismatch of ends, ways and means which could lead to strategic surprise or outright failure. Also, inadequate capacity and coordination of institutions meant a clog in the channels through which government ought to drive counter-terrorism. Similarly, the study found out that unresolved international cooperation issues gave terrorists the freedom to network across borders and facilitate their recruitment, funding and logistic support. Furthermore, the poor engagement of the citizenry in government counter-terrorism efforts is a shortcoming as a major aspect of counter-terrorism ought to be geared at winning public confidence and getting citizens' support of government policies so that a national will is forged to counter terrorism.

Given these findings therefore, the strategic approach to countering terrorism, this study suggests, ought to be holistic and encompassing the resolving of not only the inherent lapses in the current NACTEST but equally overcoming the shortcomings highlighted. It is in this vein that I subsequently have proffered, by way of summarising the findings of this study, some suggestions for building an effective and sustainable national counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

10.4 Recommendations

This study recommends that Nigeria's national counter-terrorism strategy should reflect a whole-of-government and all-of-society approach. It should be people-centred, rational and cause as little harm to the citizens as necessary. The strategy suggested must involve simultaneously the efforts of the Nigerian Government, the Nigerian society and the international community. This would entail the Government of Nigeria formulating and implementing robust counter-terrorism programmes and harnessing such efforts with the active involvement and collaboration of the citizens and its international partners at both governmental and non-governmental levels. On the part of government specifically is the imperative of reviewing the NACTEST to address the gaps in it as highlighted in chapters eight and nine. These include the provision of a national definition of terrorism, appropriate roles for agencies and coverage of other possible terrorist threats apart from Boko Haram.

The Nigerian government has to strengthen the capacity of its counter-terrorism institutions through the provision of appropriate modern equipment, joint training, the integration of intelligence and communication assets as well as collaboration with foreign security agencies. To resolve the problem of coordination of counter-terrorism institutions, a lead ministry should be designated to coordinate and ultimately synergize their efforts as obtained in countries such as the UK. Also crucial is the repositioning of relevant MDAs to achieve the MDGs goals of alleviating poverty, unemployment and illiteracy as well as judicial and political reforms that enhance good governance and consequently reduce vulnerability to terrorism. The establishment of a Special Intervention Fund for the northeast region of Nigeria for purposes of rehabilitating the IDPs, rebuilding of infrastructures devastated by terrorists and the general development of the region could additionally be considered. Nigeria should also, in collaboration with its neighbours, improve on border management possibly through the establishment of a border

agency responsible for liaison with the relevant contiguous neighbours' border authorities on joint security and border development issues. Furthermore, it is recommended that the canvassed strategy that reflects whole-of-government and society approach should entail the engagement of citizens. This could be achieved through the adoption of an all stakeholders' and all participatory system that facilitates the coalescence of ideas from citizens on national security, enhance public enlightenment and forge the collective will of Nigerians to counter terrorism.

Research on terrorism and counter-terrorism in Nigeria, as noted earlier in this study, is still low. It is recommended that the government sponsor more research in this field. As Lum noted, the interaction between social scientists and government has led to many social advances, and the area of terrorism is no exception.⁶ Accordingly, the sociological study on Boko Haram being envisioned by the government of President Buhari after the defeat of the sect should be embarked upon promptly and not wait until the period of its defeat, which in any case is indeterminate.⁷ The scope of the study needs to be expanded to include assessment of government responses, rules of engagement of the military and the roles of the civil society. It should also, as prescribed by the Campbell Systematic Review of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies, make a holistic review of its counter-terrorism measures in terms of noting their possible harms and cost effectiveness of expenditure on them.⁸ In line with this is the need for government to equally sponsor research on emerging and future security threats such as political violence, cultism, armed banditry and communal clashes that feed into the terrorism threat. This should also lead to the formulation of a National Security Strategy which Nigeria currently lacks.

⁶ C. Lum, Kennedy L. W, Sherley, A, J, p. 35.

⁷ Muhammadu Buhari, Inaugural Speech during Swearing-in Ceremony as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at Abuja on 29 May, 2015.

⁸ C. Lum, Kennedy L. W, Sherley, A. J, p. 3.

There are several gaps that this study has possibly raised for further research. The question of whether negotiation is a viable response option for dealing with terrorists in Nigeria, and in what manner and circumstances remain highly contestable. Also worth investigating is the use of private military and security organizations by the government in countering terrorism. Along this line is the need to determine the necessity and implication of the use of locals and their organization into CJTF for quasi-military counter-terrorism roles as currently evident in Nigeria. The position in this study is that while this arguably challenges traditional notions of the Westphalian state and Weberian notions of security, I would suggest that in a post-colonial and globalising world, such non-eurocentric notions of how a state could successfully deliver security to its citizens should be explored further.

Further research are also needed in the area of analysis of counter-terrorism strategies particularly in terms of methodology as this study has only adopted a fraction out of perhaps a gamut of approaches in counter-terrorism studies. As Lum affirms, it is one aspect to evaluate or analyse counter-terrorism strategies and another to explore ways in which terrorism strategies could be analysed and the different types of methodologies which may be useful.⁹ This study utilized a qualitative methodology and an avowedly social constructivist approach. For an analysis of an action-reaction phenomenon as proffered here, this seems an entirely appropriate and effective approach, and delivered valuable findings. I would like to conclude on the point that research on terrorism and counter-terrorism is complex and logistically difficult. Approaches building on that offered in this study will help to advance the understanding of difficult and complicated threat environments such as Nigeria, or indeed the post-colonial landscape more widely.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 36.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ISLAMIC JIHADISM¹ AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM

7.1 Preamble

This chapter is the fourth and concluding case of terrorist threats examined in this study of terrorism in Nigeria. Here, I focused on aspects of Islamic jihad using the Boko Haram Islamic sect as a case study. Fearon and Laitin as well as Sambanis and Zinn's arguments regarding insurgency; that large-scale conflagration emerges when governments apply coercion are demonstrated in this case study.² As would be observed subsequently, terrorist activity by the Boko Haram sect was escalated when repression by government was high. This was particularly so when the terrorists perceived a weakness in state coercive power and in spite of their (the terrorists) sustaining costs.

The chapter begins by clarifying the concept of Islamic jihad, and relating it to other concepts by which the Boko Haram sect could be associated with. In doing this, I made a number of inferences to Islamic fundamentalism covered in chapter four, noting in the process the evolutionary trend of Islamic terrorism in Nigeria from the Maitatsine period to the current Boko Haram situation. This dovetails into the central focus of the chapter, which is, a case study of the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and the responses of the Nigerian government to it.

¹ The term is used to denote an aspect of Islam that promotes jihad.

² Fearon, James and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97:1 (2003), pp. 75–90. Also Sambanis, Nicholas and Annalisa Zinn. "From Protest to Violence: An Analysis of Conflict Escalation with an Application to Self-Determination Movements." Unpublished Manuscript: Yale University, 2005.

7.2 Islamic Jihad and Terrorism

In chapter four, I highlighted the early history of Islam in Nigeria and the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism, as stated earlier, is based on an ideology that advocates a return to the practice of pure Islam. Islamic jihadism flows from Islamic fundamentalism. As John Esposito contends, one of the most defining features of Islamic fundamentalism is belief in the ‘reopening’ of the gates of jihad.³ This portrays jihad as firstly, a subset of (or stemming from) Islamic fundamentalism and secondly, as a contemporary phenomenon. In the *Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, the term ‘jihad’ is viewed as a fight, battle or holy war against infidels or as a religious duty.⁴ It is also averred that the word is used by Muslims to describe three different kinds of struggle – firstly; “a believer's internal struggle to live out the Muslim faith as well as possible”, secondly, “the struggle to build a good Muslim society”, and thirdly, “holy war: the struggle to defend Islam, with force if necessary”.⁵ In this study, jihad will focus on the third kind of struggle noting that to defend Islam could also mean to attack or take the offensive, and that as in relation to terrorism, jihad is more often associated with force.

Apart from been regarded as a jihadist movement, it is worth highlighting two other related concepts relevant to this study with which the Boko Haram sect could be identified. These are Islamism and “new terrorism”. Islamism (often referred to as Political Islam) is based on the belief that Islam should guide socio-political as well as personal life, and therefore advocates a state system based on Sharia as opposed to Western-based systems.⁶ The Boko Haram ideology, as would be seen in details later, advocates a state based on the fundamentals of

³ Esposito, John, *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 4.

⁴ Milton J. Cowah, ed. *Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. 3rd ed. (Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1979), p. 142.

⁵ BBC, 3 August 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/jihad_1.shtml, accessed 26 August 2013.

⁶ Shepard, W. E. Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam. Leiden, New York: E.J. Brill., (1996). p. 40. Also, Berman, Sheri, "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society". *Perspectives on Politics* Vol.1, Issue 2 (2003), p. 258.

Islam where corrupt and selfish officials would be replaced with 'puritans'. It could be argued here that one thing that made Boko Haram complex is the political angle to it. This could be attributed to the feelings in some quarters that the group is a political movement shrouded in religion. President Goodluck Jonathan lent credence to this assertion when he painted a picture of a puppet group that was being used by aggrieved politicians from the northern part of Nigeria to undermine his government for the reason that he is of southern extraction.⁷

The concept of "new terrorism" dwells on the evolutionary trend associated with terrorism which stresses that contemporary terrorism represents a significant departure from the past.⁸ Scholars associated with the coining and development of the term include Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur and Christopher Harmon.⁹ According to Tucker, the distinguishing features of new terrorism as opposed to old terrorism are; (1) a new structure that is a network facilitated by information technology, (2) new personnel that are amateurs who often come together in ad hoc or transitory groupings, and (3) a new attitude with an increased willingness to cause mass casualties through the use of weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological.¹⁰ It is surmised that new terrorism is more dangerous and difficult to counter.¹¹ The lethality of Boko Haram, its real and perceived external connections, its ad hoc groupings and its use of technology all of which I will later examine, indicate a shift of terrorism from the form witnessed during the Maitatsine situation of the 1980s.

⁷ Andrew Walker, "What is Boko Haram" in *United States Institute of Peace Special Report 308*, June 2012, p. 7.

⁸ Matthew Morgan, "The Origin of New Terrorism" 2004, p. 31, Available online at <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/04spring/morgan.pdf>, accessed 27 August 2013.

⁹ David Tucker, "What's New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?" in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 1–14. Available online at <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CTIW/files/the%20new%20terrorism.pdf>, accessed 28 August 2014.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

7.3 The Boko Haram Terrorist Group

Boko Haram is a Nigerian-based Islamic jihad group.¹² It gained local and international prominence in 2009 when it transformed from being a relatively quiet local radical Salafist group to a Salafi-jihadist group that has carried out major terrorist operations, including suicide attacks in parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun.¹³ In this segment of the chapter, I explored the etymological meaning and philosophy of Boko Haram, the origin of the sect and the immediate causes of its terrorist activities. Thereafter, I examine the nature of the threat posed by Boko Haram and the response of the Nigerian government to it before concluding with an assessment of the threat-response interplay that brought to the fore implications for counter-terrorism policy in Nigeria.

7.3.1 'Boko Haram' – Meaning and Ideology

There have been arguments over the etymological meaning of 'Boko Haram'. Abimbola Adesoji states that "'Boko Haram' is derived from a combination of the Hausa word 'boko' meaning 'book' and the Arabic word 'haram' which is 'something forbidden, ungodly or sinful.'" ¹⁴ He adds that this literally means "book is sinful", but that its deeper meaning is that western education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden.¹⁵

Adamu and several other scholars find fault in the above view of the name which somehow has become the common perception particularly among Western-based scholars. According to Adamu, this mistake is often made by scholars with poor understanding of the Hausa language.

¹² David Cook, "The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria" in Paul R. Pillar, *American Perceptions of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Decade*, CTC Sentinel, September 2011 . Vol. 4 . Issue 9, pp. 3-4. Available online <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss92.pdf>, accessed 27 August 2013.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ A. Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State." *Africa Today*, July 2012.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

He opines that:

*It is the persistent theme of condemning aspects of Western schooling that earned the group the sobriquet of 'boko haram' in the Nigerian media, an expression widely translated, very wrongly, as 'Western education is sin'. This is because it is assumed that 'boko' – a Hausa onomatopoeic of 'book' – means 'Western education based on Western books'. Strictly, it does not.*¹⁶

By tracing the word 'boko' to the lexicon of Hausa language, Adamu gave the original meaning of the word as 'deceptive knowledge' hence, technically “‘boko haram’ means ‘deceptive knowledge which is sinful’, not ‘western education is a sin.’”¹⁷ He added that Muhammad Yusuf’s lectures and writing were geared towards convincing his followers that knowledge inspired by Western ideas is false in some respects, but neither he nor his followers actually proclaimed that such knowledge is sinful. Adamu further explains that it was in the process of demonising the movement that the projected medieval personality of the group as condemning Western education arose. In this wise, the sect frowns at being called Boko Haram. One of the sect’s professed members, Mallam Sani Umaru further explains that what the sect termed forbidden is actually Western civilisation and culture as a whole; not education which is only a subset of civilisation and culture.¹⁸ This could be understood from the point that Islam abhors anything contrary to the way of life preached by Prophet Mohammed. Adherents of Boko Haram reject the use of some modern or purportedly Western items such as wrist watches and safety helmets. Ironically however, the sect patronise products of Western civilisation such as laptops, arms, explosives and even have full-blown Internet websites to proclaim their ideals.¹⁹

¹⁶ U.A. Adamu, “Insurgency in Nigeria: The Northern Nigerian Experience”(Paper delivered at the Seminar of Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting On Complex Insurgencies In Nigeria at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, 29 August 2012.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See *Vanguard* 14 August 2009, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-jihad/>, accessed 14 May 2014.

¹⁹ Examples of such websites is www.yusufislamicbrothers.blogspot.com.

It is perhaps necessary to note that the Boko Haram sect has equally been known at various times by other names such as the *Nigerian Taliban*, *Ahl ul sunna wal'jama'ah hijra* and the *Yusufiyyah* sect.²⁰ It however prefers to be addressed as the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, loosely translated from Arabic as 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'.²¹ This preferred name underlines the sect's ideology which is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam. The sect strongly opposes Western ways of life, democratic institutions, constitutional laws and institutions of the Nigerian state. Hazzad notes that "the mission of the group is to clean the (Nigerian) system, which they view as polluted by Western education, and to uphold Sharia all over the country."²² It thus could be described as a jihadist movement that strives to destroy democracy and establish a Sharia state of Nigeria.

Onapajo et al posits that the ideology of the sect is embedded in the tradition and workings of Islamism and anticipates a political system modelled after that of the Taliban in Afghanistan.²³ By this, he notes that the sect attempts to attain an independent state that comprises all the tenets of a modern state, including a government, population, territory and security base that runs in line with its ideology.²⁴ Thus, its overriding goal is to wrest control from the Nigerian state in order to implement the Sharia legal code across the entire country.²⁵ In this vein, Boko Haram sees the Nigerian state as the major obstacle to true Islamic reform and the main persecutor of true Muslims, thus fuelling its belief that representative of the government like the police, military and government officials as well as

²⁰ See Freedom Onuoha, "From Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra to Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awati wal Jihad: The Evolutionary Phases of the Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria" in *African Insight* Vol. 1 (2012).

²¹ Farourk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram?" BBC News (August 26, 2011), online at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>

²² A Hazzad, "Nigeria clashes kill over 50 in northeastern city", Reuters, 26 July 2009.

²³ Onapajo, Hakeem & Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", *Africa Security Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2012), p. 27.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 28.

²⁵ Agbiboa, Daniel Egiegba, "The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism of Boko Haram", *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 13, No.1 (2013), p. 20.

their collaborators should be killed.²⁶ The aforementioned resort to violence is also in line with the Salafist view of radical Islam.²⁷ It is this Salafism that the Boko Haram sect embraces.²⁸

There were growing indications that rather than attempt to capture and Islamise all of Nigeria (or establish a Sharia state of Nigeria), Boko Haram may want to establish its own caliphate in line with the historic Kanem-Borno Caliphate but based on *takfiri* ideology rather than Sufi traditions.²⁹ According to Zen, this is as the hierarchy of Boko Haram continues to be dominated by the Kanuri tribe and its foothold is largely within the confines of the former Caliphate.³⁰ In other words, Boko Haram's current area of operations corresponds almost precisely to the territory of the former Kanem-Borno Caliphate which covers parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.³¹ However, in 2015, there were indications of claims by the sect to be establishing links with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to the extent of renaming itself as the Islamic State's West African Province (ISWAP).³²

7.3.2 Origin of Boko Haram

The origin of Boko Haram could be linked to the history of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria as earlier highlighted. It is believed in some quarters that Boko Haram is a product of

²⁶ Danjibo, Nathaniel Dominic, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria." *Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series*, Vol.1, No.21 (2009), p. 7.

²⁷ Hafez Kal, *Islam in Liberal Europe: Freedom, Equality and Tolerance*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p.366.

²⁸ James J. F. Forest, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram," *Joint Special Operations University Report*, 2012, p. 94.

²⁹ The *takfiri* ideology hinges on the view that all non-practising Muslims are kafirs (infidels) and urge its adherents to abandon existing Muslim societies, settle in isolated communities and fight the infidels. It thus a more radical form of belief system compared to Sufism that emphasizes mainly purification.

³⁰ Jacob Zenn, "How Boko Haram recruits members and finances its operations", *Jamestown Foundation Publication*, December 2014.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State, *BBC News* 7 March 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31784538>, and Ludovica Iaccino, "Nigeria: Boko Haram changes name to Islamic State's West African Province after Isis alliance", <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-boko-haram-changes-name-islamic-states-west-african-province-after-isis-alliance-1498696>, accessed 15 March 2015.

the Maitatsine uprisings indicating that it was members of Maitatsine who went underground that resurfaced later.³³ Some others opine however that the founder of Boko Haram was simply inspired by Maitatsine's ideologies.³⁴

It is unclear as to the exact year Boko Haram emerged. A number of accounts have it that the sect has been in existence since 1995 under the name of *Sahaba*³⁵ and *Ahl ul sunna wal'jama'ah hijra*.³⁶ According to these accounts, the group was then led by Abubakar Lawan who later left Nigeria for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia.³⁷ Following this, the group's leadership was transferred to Mohammed Yusuf who was said to have abandoned Lawan's style of conservative teachings to more radical ones. Some other accounts link the beginning of Boko Haram to the activities of a violent religious militant group that was formed in 2003 known as *Al-Sunna Wal Jamma* (Followers of the Prophet). This group was sometimes called the Nigerian Taliban because of their claim to being inspired by the Islamic militants in Afghanistan.³⁸ On 24 December 2003, the Nigerian Taliban attacked police stations and public buildings in Geidam and Kanama towns of Yobe State. They seized weapons from the police stations and replaced the Nigerian flag with that of Afghanistan at a public building they seized.³⁹ They were subsequently dislodged by

³³ A. Adesoji, *Africa Today*, July 2012.

³⁴ See Sahara Reporters 2012, "Comments on Gunmen Killed 10 persons in Kaduna," <http://www.mobile.saharareporters.com/news-page/gunmen-kill-10-personskaduna>, accessed 28 August 2013.

³⁵ Isioma Madike, "Boko Haram: Rise of a deadly sect," *National Mirror*, 19 June, 2011. Online at: http://nationalmirroronline.net/sunday-mirror/big_read/14548.html. See also Emma Ujah, Emeka Mamah, Kingsley Omonobi, Chioma Obinna & Daniel Idonor, 'Yar'Adua Orders Probe of Boko Haram's Leaders' Killing', *Vanguard* (online edition), 4 August 2009. Online at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/yaradua-orders-probe-of-boko-haram-leaders-killing/>.

³⁶ Julian Taiwo and Micheal Olugbode, Boko Haram leader killed, *This Day*, 31 July 2009, 4.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman (ed.s), *Armed and Aimless; Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS region*, Geneva, 2005. Also, Bestman Wellington, "Nigeria and the Threat of Al-Qaeda Terrorism," (12 June 2008).

³⁹ "Nigerians 'crush' Islamic uprising," *BBC News*, 5 January 2004. Online at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3368627.stm>.

troops of the Nigerian military.⁴⁰ On 21 September 2004, members of the group attacked Bama and Gwoza police stations in Borno State, killed several policemen and stole away arms and ammunition. A counter-attack launched by the police a few weeks later resulted in the death of 28 members while others fled to Cameroon across the Nigerian - Cameroon border.⁴¹ The remnants of the Taliban group are considered by several observers as having been involved in founding what today is known as Boko Haram.⁴²

In spite of the conflicting accounts, it is agreed by many observers that Boko Haram became an organised and formidable radical Islamic sect under the leadership of a charismatic cleric, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. In 2002, Yusuf established in Maiduguri town a religious complex that housed a mosque, an Islamic boarding school and a headquarters for a prayer group which he called *Jama'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'wati Wal-Jihad*.⁴³ The school is said to have attracted many children from poor homes across Northern Nigeria and from neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon.⁴⁴ The school complex became a recruiting ground for future jihadists.⁴⁵ This is as it drew members from neighbouring countries while entrenching the sect's hold in the Northern Nigerian states of Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Adamawa and Yobe.

The radicalisation process and events that led to the emergence of Boko Haram took another dimension when in 2004, some students from the University of Maiduguri, Ramat Polytechnic in Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic in Damaturu and other tertiary institutions, all

⁴⁰ Tajudeen Suleiman, *Terrorism unsettles the North*, *Tell*, 26 February 2007, p. 25.

⁴¹ "Nigeria police kill 27 Taleban," BBC News (24 September 2004), online at:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3685280.stm>.

⁴² James J. F. Forest, *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, *JSOU Report 2012* (Florida: JSUO Press), p. 59.

⁴³ This became the name by which the Sect wishes to be identified.

⁴⁴ Farourk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?" BBC News, January 11, 2012. As of February 5,

2013: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

in Borno and Yobe states withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and took up full preaching ministry and Koranic lessons with Boko Haram.⁴⁶

The years 2007 and 2008 could be regarded as the recruitment and training phase of the group's activities. The sect was alleged to have received funds from outside Nigeria for recruitment and training. In 2007, Mohammed Yusuf, and Mohammed Bello Damagun (another Muslim cleric and purported member of the Nigerian Taliban) were tried for terrorism-related offences in a federal high court in Abuja.⁴⁷ As mentioned in chapter two, Mohammed Damagun was charged for receiving monies, recruiting and training Nigerians for terrorism. Mohammed Yusuf's charges included receipt of monies from al-Qaeda to recruit terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners, especially Americans living in Nigeria.⁴⁸ Yusuf was acquitted on these charges. He was however re-arrested and prosecuted in 2008 alongside some of his members. They were released on bail by an Abuja High Court on 20 January 2009.⁴⁹ Some other arrests made in this period included foreigners such as Bukar Shekau from the Niger Republic. The foreigners were either deported or handed over to the police for prosecution. "Unfortunately", as Onuoha put it "these disciples usually found their way back into Nigerian society."⁵⁰ Together with the foreign elements (particularly from neighbouring countries), the radicalised Islamic youths developed Boko Haram into a formidable terrorist group.

7.3.3 Immediate Causes of Boko Haram Terrorism

⁴⁶ Abdulrafiu Lawal, *Rage of the puritans*, *Tell*, 10 August 2009, p. 34.

⁴⁷ J Peter Pham, *Strategic interests*, *World Defense Review*, 1 February 2007, <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham020107.shtml> (accessed 6 August 2013).

⁴⁸ See "Country Reports on Terrorism, Africa Review", *Global Terrorism Organization Year Book*, (Washington D.C: International Business Publication, 2010), p.83. Also in, "Tajudeen Suleiman, Terrorism unsettles the North", *Tell*, 26 February 2007, p. 24.

⁴⁹ Julian Taiwo and Micheal Olugbode, *Boko Haram leader killed*, *Thisday*, 31 July 2009, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Freedom C Onuoha, "The Islamist challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis explained", *African Security Review*, 2010, 19:2, 54-67. Online at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2010.503061>, accessed 6 August 2013.

It was supposedly easy for the sect to recruit members given the fact that the sect professed Islam and its practices, which were already entrenched in the lifestyle and belief system of a majority of the people in Northern Nigeria. The sect was also able to exploit the socio-economic and political discontent in the country especially the high rate of poverty, unemployment, insecurity, electoral malpractices and political hooliganism to gain a foothold in Borno, Yobe and other states in northern Nigeria where it spread. Over time, members of the sect became more dissatisfied with the secular authorities. They continued to view them as representatives of a corrupt, illegitimate and Western-styled government. At local government levels, the situation worsened in the summer of 2009, when authorities of Bauchi town in Bauchi State refused to allow members of the sect to preach and recruit publicly for fear of public safety.⁵¹ On 11 June 2009, police stopped a funeral procession of Boko Haram members who were riding on motorcycles without the use of helmets, as mandated by a law then recently passed. In the ensuing confrontation, 17 members of Boko Haram were shot and badly wounded by the police.⁵² It is probable that the brutal manner in which the Nigerian security forces responded to the activities of the Boko Haram group turned out to be the immediate cause of the resort of the group to turn violent and subsequently embrace terrorism.

Angered by the response of the police, Boko Haram members on 26 July 2009 staged an armed uprising in Bauchi. They attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi as well as the Bauchi Prison where they freed about 700 of their jailed members.⁵³ The violence subsequently spread to the states of Borno, Yobe, and Kano. Within four days,

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Isioma Madike, "Boko Haram: Rise of a Deadly Sect," National Mirror (June 19, 2011). Online at: http://nationalmirroronline.net/sunday-mirror/big_read/14548.html; and Isa Umar Gusau, "Boko Haram: How it All Began," Sunday Trust, (August 2, 2009), online at: <http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index>.

⁵³ F. C. Onuoha, "The 9/7 Boko Haram Attack on Bauchi Prison: A Case of Intelligence Failure", *Peace and Conflict Monitor*, 2 November 2010, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=754, accessed 2 June 2013.

the sect members had attacked police stations, schools, churches and public buildings across the states mentioned. A combined military and police operation was launched resulting in the killing of many of the sect members, and the arrest of others including Mohammed Yusuf. After a few hours in police custody, Yusuf was reported death in what appeared to have been an extrajudicial killing, although police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape.⁵⁴

The death of Yusuf was only a temporary setback as the sect regrouped under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau. It could be argued that Yusuf's death transformed the sect as it retreated temporarily, re-strategized and redefined its tactics.⁵⁵ It possibly used the videos of the July 2009 encounter with security forces, alongside leaflets and audio tapes to radicalize, publicize its cause and issue threats of revenge mission and intention to wage war on secular authorities. Marc-Antoine sums up the situation by arguing that the actions of the Nigerian security forces were a significant determinant in the trajectory of the Boko Haram crisis.⁵⁶ He observed that the repression of the sect in July 2009 was followed by repeated massacres, extra-judicial killings and arrests without trial that widened the gap between communities and the security forces.⁵⁷

7.3.4 The Nature of Boko Haram Terrorism

Boko Haram could be said to have begun as a home grown terrorist group and the threat posed by it localised to some parts of north-eastern Nigeria particularly Yobe and Borno states. Its leadership centred on Mohammed Yusuf as the *Amir-al-Aam* or Commander-in-Chief, with deputies and commanders in charge of the states and local government areas

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Isioma Madike, Op.Cit.

⁵⁶ Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis" Research Paper Africa Programme, Chatham House, September 2014. Available online https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140901BokoHaramPerouseMontclos_0.pdf, accessed 10 November 2014.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

where the sect existed.⁵⁸ It was further organised according to various roles such as the police and soldiers. The group's method of attack at this period was mainly ambush or what could be termed as 'hit and run' tactics which avoided protracted confrontation.⁵⁹ All these however changed or were modified from 2010 when the sect began to embark on revenge mission and threat of war under Shekau.

The Boko Haram that resurfaced under Shekau in 2010 became more deadly. Shekau provided the overall spiritual guidance and command but organised Boko Haram along a loose operating structure with disconnected cells that made it difficult for the Nigerian intelligence and security forces to detect and defeat them.⁶⁰ The sect graduated from 'hit and run' armed assault tactics to open armed confrontation with security forces. Veronica, a victim of the sect's attack, observed that Boko Haram raiding parties were composed of three groups of "shooters, looters and recruiters."⁶¹ The task of the first group was to fight the Nigerian troops, the second to rob local banks and shops, and the third to kidnap new recruits.⁶²

The sect further embraced the use of improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide terrorism. It equally expanded its attacks from low to high profile targets such as the attack on the headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in Abuja in June 2012.⁶³ This attack turned out to be the first known incidence of suicide bombing in

⁵⁸ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature, eds. *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa, 2013), p. 409.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 415.

⁶⁰ Oliver Guitta and Robin Simcox, "Terrorism in Nigeria: The Threat from Boko Haram and Ansaru" *The Henry Jackson Society Briefing*, London, June 2014.

⁶¹ Colin Freeman, "Nigeria school girl tells House of Lords of brutal Boko Haram attack" *The Telegraph*, 13 October 2015. Online at


<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11927617/Nigeria-schoolgirl-tells-House-of-Lords-of-brutal-Boko-Haram-attack.html>, accessed 15 October 2015.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature, eds., p. 418.

Nigeria. On 26 August 2012, the sect carried out an attack on a UN building in Abuja.⁶⁴ The attack on an international institution that is a symbol of global peace and security was presumably aimed at drawing international attention and publicity to the sect while in the process portraying government security lapses. The sect further extended its geographical reach to other parts of Northern Nigeria, and conducted series of attacks as depicted in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1. Map Showing Major Attacks by Boko Haram 2009 - 2013



Source: F. C. Onuoha, "Porous Borders and Boko Haram Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria", *Aljazeera Center for Studies*, 8 Sep 2013.

In January 2012, a splinter group known as Ansaru broke off from mainstream Boko Haram owing to disagreements over issues that were later evident in the ideological and operational

⁶⁴ Ibid.

differences between the sects. The Ansaru did not believe in indiscriminate killings but concentrated more on foreign targets, particularly the kidnap of expatriates.⁶⁵ The sect claimed to be fighting for the dignity of Muslims and for the creation of a caliphate in the West African region, and was thus more closely aligned with AQIM.⁶⁶ The sect in a video said to be released by one of its leader, Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, averred to defend the interest of Muslims and Islam not only in Nigeria but in Africa in general.⁶⁷ This perhaps revealed its links with AQIM and the Movement for Oneness for Jihad in West Africa, based in Mali. The activities of the Ansaru group declined as several of its leaders later re-joined Boko Haram particularly following the defeat of the Islamic terrorists groups by the French-led intervention in Mali in 2013.⁶⁸ It is thought that the French-led military operation in Mali disrupted Boko Haram and Ansaru's lines of communication, supplies and command network making it difficult for Ansaru to continue existing as a separate body from mainstream Boko Haram.

The attacks by Boko Haram were so devastating that, as indicated earlier, Nigeria's ranking in the Global Terrorism Index of most terrorized countries in the world continually worsen. According to former President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria had by mid-2014 recorded over 12,000 deaths with many more people injured and others displaced from their localities owing to the activities of Boko Haram.⁶⁹ The situation was made worse with the sect's abduction of women including schoolgirls. For instance, on 14 April 2014, the sect abducted about 276 girls from Government Girls' School Chibok. Of this number, 57 girls escaped following a breakdown of one of the trucks conveying them to the terrorists' hideout while

⁶⁵ Jacob Zenn, "Nigerian al-Qaedaism" Jamestown Foundation, 2014. Available online <http://www.hudson.org/research/10172-nigerian-al-qaedaism->, accessed 4 January 2015.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Farouk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Ansaru Islamists?" *BBC Africa*, 11 March 2013. Available online <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21510767>, accessed 4 July 2013.

⁶⁸ Oliver Guitta and Robin Simcox, London, June 2014.

⁶⁹ G. E. Jonathan, Presidential Address at the Regional Summit on Security in Nigeria at Paris-France, 17 May 2014.

the remaining 219 are still held by their abductors in yet to be identified locations.⁷⁰ This incident brought terrorism in Nigeria to such prominence that notable persons such as UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon and the wife of US President, Michelle Obama have actively condemned it while Nobel Peace Prize winner, Malala Yousafzai, has paid a visit to Nigeria solely for reason of seeking the possible rescue of the Chibok girls. An equally worrying development was that the sect graduated from serial attacks in public places to sieges of towns and villages, thereby threatening the territorial integrity of Nigeria. The size of the area held by the terrorists as at January 2015 equalled the size of Belgium.⁷¹ Added to this development is the sect's embrace of the ISIS tactics of beheadings of victims and the use of females (including girls as young as 10 years) for suicide terrorism.⁷² The activities of the Boko Haram sect have to date continued to be a concern not only to the Nigerian government but to the international community as well. It is in the light of this that I now examine government responses to the Boko Haram threat.

7.3.5 The Response of Nigerian Government to Boko Haram Terrorism

The Nigerian government condemns terrorism. Nigeria is a signatory to International Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism, and has signed the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.⁷³ However, the country's commitment to the fight against this strand of terrorism remained mainly passive until the 2009 upsurge of Boko Haram terrorist activities, and the attempt by Farouk Umar Abdulmutallab to bomb a

⁷⁰ Nana Bemba Nti, "Silence on the Lambs: The Abducted Chibok Schoolgirls in Nigeria and the Challenge to UNSCR 1325" Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Policy Brief 3, November 2014. Online at <http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Policy-Briefs/Policy-Briefs/Nana-KAIPTC-Policy-Brief-3--The-Abducted-Chibok-S.aspx>, accessed 14 December 2014.

⁷¹ Virginia Comolli, p. 161.

⁷² Jay Akbar, "Like master, like servant: Nigerian terror group Boko Haram releases first beheading video since pledging allegiance to ISIS" *Daily Mail Online*, 10 July 2015, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3156551/Like-master-like-servant-Nigerian-terror-group-Boko-Haram-releases-beheading-video-pledging-allegiance-ISIS.html>. Accessed 30 July 2015.

⁷³ Mbanefo, A., "On Agenda Item 166: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism – United Nations General Assembly, 56th Session, NY., www.un.org/terrorism/statement/nigeriaE, accessed 4 July 2013.

Northwest Airliner on Christmas Day of the same year.⁷⁴ The Nigerian government could be said to have been compelled to deploy the military in a full-scale offensive against the Boko Haram sect following upsurge of the sect's violent activities. In July 2011, a Joint Military Task Force (popularly known by its acronym JTF) was established in Borno State, and subsequently in other terrorist affected states in Nigeria.⁷⁵ The JTF consists of personnel of the AFN, NPF and DSS, as was the case with the Niger Delta Crisis discussed earlier. Furthermore, an army division with the nomenclature 7 Division Nigerian Army, was formed with headquarters in Maiduguri to confront the terrorists.⁷⁶

In order to ensure effective military counter terrorism operations, the Nigerian Government declared states of emergencies in the affected areas. The first was declared on 31 December 2011 for a six-month period covering 14 Local Government Areas across Borno, Niger, Plateau and Yobe states.⁷⁷ The second was declared on 14 May 2013 and covered all areas of the three states most affected by Boko Haram terrorism, that is, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.⁷⁸ In terms of legislation, Nigeria's highest law making body, the National Assembly, in February 2011 passed an anti-terrorism bill aimed at preventing and combating terrorism. This was later reviewed in June 2013 in line with the government's counter-terrorism drive.⁷⁹ Equally, the government appointed a Presidential Adviser on Terrorism in January 2011 and established a Counter-Terrorism Centre at the Office of the National Security Adviser to

⁷⁴ Farouk Umar Abdulmutallab popularly known as the Underwear Bomber is a Nigerian who attempted to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear while on board the plane en route from Amsterdam to Detroit

⁷⁵ J. A. H. Ewansiha, Chief of Training and Operations Nigerian Army, Abuja. Interviewed 3 March 2014.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Virginia Comolli, p. 112.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 120.

⁷⁹ Chinedu S. Udeh, "Boko Haram and Counter Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria" in O. Mbachu and U. M. Bature, pp. 307-322.

facilitate the implementation of counter-terrorism strategy and overall coordination of government effort.⁸⁰

Also noteworthy are the bilateral and multilateral engagement efforts of the Government of Nigeria with organisations and partners such as the UN and the European Union (EU), with states such as the US, UK and France as well as with contiguous countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.⁸¹ All these efforts of government have been in response to the activities of Boko Haram, and which have in the process further generated reactions from the sect. Table 7.1 details the major activities carried out by Boko Haram and the responses by government to them from July 2009 to October 2015. As in the previous case studies, the data used was obtained from a combination of primary and secondary sources.⁸² In Figure 7.1, incidents and casualty rate was used as unit of measure to graphically show the causal effect on the rise of Boko Haram by military responses on one hand, and the use of soft approaches such as negotiations and concessions on the other.

Table 7.1: Major Activities by Boko Haram and Government Responses from July 2009 to October 2015.

Serial	Date	Major Action and Reactions by Boko Haram	Government Actions and Reactions	Remarks
1.	26-27 July 2009	Boko Haram members staged uprising in Bauchi, Bauchi State. Attacked police stations, schools, churches and public buildings across Borno, Yobe and Kano states.	The Nigerian police and military confronts Boko Haram.	
2.	28-30 July 2009	Boko Haram kills hundreds in Maiduguri town and attack	Nigerian Army captured and handed over Mohammed	Extra-judicial killing of Yusuf

⁸⁰ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature, pp. 407-434.

⁸¹ Chinedu S. Udeh, pp. 307-322.

⁸² See footnote 67 in chapter four for details.

		security forces.	Yusuf, leader of Boko Haram to police. He was later found dead. The police claims he was killed while trying to escape. Residents and human rights groups claim that he was assassinated.	possibly provoke revenge mission by sect.
3.	September 2010	Boko Haram members attack a prison in Bauchi and freed hundreds of prisoners, including about 100 members of the sect.	Governor of Bauchi State asked Boko Haram members to leave the state. Many Boko Haram members arrested.	
4.	December 2010	Borno State Governorship candidate of the All Nigeria Peoples Party and seven others shot dead by gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members.		There were speculations that they may have been hired by political opponents,
5	December 2010	Bombings in Jos and Maiduguri towns kill about 80 people.	Increased military efforts at containing Boko Haram.	
6	31 December 2010	Boko Haram attack Mogadishu Army barracks market in Abuja.	Beefed up defensive security measures in military and other security installations.	Provoked more clamp down by the military on the sect.
7	May 2011	Bomb attacks in Abuja, Bauchi and other states after inauguration ceremony of President Goodluck Jonathan.	Alleged that political opposition involved in bombings and sponsorship of Boko Haram.	
8	16 June 2011	Bombed Police Headquarters in Abuja.	Scale and nature of attack shocked the government. Inspector General of Police later sacked.	First incidence of suicide terrorism in Nigeria.
9	June 2011	A Muslim cleric critical of Boko Haram, Ibrahim Birkuti, is shot dead by two gunmen on a motorcycle.	Some state governments ban use of commercial motor cycles at night and in city centres.	
10	July 2011		Federal Government states that it will inaugurate a panel to initiate negotiations with Boko Haram.	Boko Haram possibly took this as a sign of weakening coercive power of government.

11	August 2011		Federal Government reneges on negotiations with Boko Haram.	Boko Haram alleges insincerity on the part of government while government said it was not sure if dealing with real Boko Haram.
12	September 2011	Babakura Fugu, brother-in-law of late Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, is shot dead two days after attending a peace meeting with ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo. Boko Haram denies any involvement in the incident.	Federal Government did not openly back peace deal by ex-President Obasanjo.	
13	4 November 2011	Series of bomb and gun attacks in Yobe and Borno states.	Arrest of many Boko Haram members.	
14	November 2011	Boko Haram announces that it will not hold talks with the government until all members of the sect, who have been arrested, are released.	Government increased budget spending on security equipment to counter Boko Haram.	
15	25 December 2011	Attacked Saint Theresa Catholic Church Madalla in Niger State, near Abuja killing 32 persons. One policeman killed in a failed bomb attack on a church in Jos, Plateau State.	Deployment of security personnel to places of worship. Attempts to douse tension between Christians and Muslims.	
16	January 2012		President Goodluck Jonathan alleges Boko Haram infiltration of his government.	
17	5-6, 20 January 2012	Boko Haram launches bomb attacks and heavy gun battles in Kano targeting the police headquarters. Over 150 civilians and 32 policemen killed.	Launch military assault on Boko Haram hide-outs in Kano.	

18	28 January 2012		Military forces ambushed and killed 11 Boko Haram terrorists.	
19	8 February 2012	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at a military cantonment in Kaduna.	A military investigation panel convened.	
20	16 February 2012	Another prison break staged in Koton Kanili, Kogi State. 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed.		Jail break possibly by Boko Haram to release members in detention.
21	March 2012	Boko Haram and government mediator, Dr Ibrahim Datti Ahmed (the president of National Supreme Council on Sharia) pulls out of negotiations pointing to a lack of sincerity on the government.		
22	31 May 2012		Joint Task Force in Kano raided Boko Haram hide-out resulting in death of 5 sect members and a German hostage.	Earlier in March 2012, an Italian hostage was killed by his abductors following attempt by Nigerian and British security effort to free them.
23	3 June 2012	15 church members killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi State. Boko Haram claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa.		
24	17 June 2012	Suicide bombers attacked three churches in Kaduna State killing over 50 persons.		
25	19 September 2012		Nigerian Military arrest Boko Haram members, reported death of Abu Qaqa.	
26	3 October 2012	Killed over 30 persons in Mubi town in Adamawa State during a night raid.		

27	November 2012	Alleged members of Boko Haram gave conditions for ceasefire naming Alhaji Shettima Ali Mongunu, General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd), Senator Bukar Abba, Ambassador Gaji Galtimari, Barrister Aisha Wakil and her husband as mediators.	Government welcomed offer but no significant efforts followed.	Some named mediators particularly General Muhammadu Buhari decline and disassociated from any dealings with Boko Haram.
28	18 March 2013	About 22 persons killed and 65 injured during a suicide car bomb explosion at a bus station in Kano city.		
29	April 2013		President Goodluck Jonathan set up a 26-member committee headed by Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu Turaki to explore the possibility of granting Amnesty to Boko Haram members.	It was thought that the Amnesty granted the Niger Delta militants could apply in the Boko Haram situation.
30	7 May 2013	Killed over 55 persons and freed 105 inmates in coordinated attacks on army barracks, a prison and police post in Bama town.	Military conduct raids on Boko Haram camps.	
	14 May 2013		Federal Government declared state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States.	This was to facilitate military containment of the situation.
31	6 July 2013	Killed 42 students in a Government Secondary School attack in Yobe State.		
32	29 September 2013	Attacked and killed 40 male students of College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe State.	Government order security coverage of schools. Announced adoption of soft approach to counter-terrorism alongside military operations.	
33	14 Jan 2014	Suicide bombing in Maiduguri, about 30 persons killed.	Intensified cordon and search military operations.	
34	15 and 24 February 2014	About 106 inhabitants of Izghe – Konduga in Borno State killed.	Security forces blamed for poor response.	

35	25 February 2014	About 29 school boys killed at Federal Government College Buni Yadi in Yobe State.		This may be Boko Haram's way of showing its anti-western education stance.
36	14 April 2014	Abducts about 276 girls of Government Girls Secondary School Chibok in Borno State. Sect leader Shekau said they would be treated as slaves as part of the "war booty."	Federal Government blamed by human right groups and the international community for poor initial response to the incident.	The where-about of 219 of the girls remains unknown to date.
37	14 April 2014	Two bombs exploded at a crowded bus station at Nyanya area of Abuja killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 200.	Suspected master-minder of the bombing, Oguche arrested in Sudan and repatriated to Nigeria for trial.	
38	1 May 2014	A car bomb exploded killing at least 19 people and injured at least 60 in the same Nyanya area of Abuja.	Government directs more interagency cooperation in tackling Boko Haram.	
39	15 May 2014	Boko Haram attacked Menari, Tsangayari and Garawa villages killing 60 people.	Vigilante force known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) fought back, killing 200 Boko Haram members.	CJTF complemented Nigerian military effort.
40	17 May 2014		A summit in Paris declared Boko Haram as part of al-Qaeda. Leaders from West African nations resolved to mount a region-wide offensive against the group. Western nations pledged to provide technical expertise and training to the new regional African effort against the Islamic extremists.	
41	20 May 2014	Twin bomb explosion kill 118 people in Jos.		
42	27 May 2014	Attack military location at Buni Yadi in Yobe State.	Injected more troops to confront Boko Haram in North eastern Nigeria.	
43	30 May 2014	Assassinated Muslim leader Alhaji Idrissa Timata, the Emir of Gwoza in Borno		

		State,		
44	1 June 2014	Mounted attack at a football field in Mubi, Adamawa State killing more than 40 people.		
45	2 June 2014	Boko Haram members dressed as soldiers killed about 200 civilians in three communities in Gwoza, Borno State.	Local residents complain they pleaded for help from the military, but that the military did not arrive on time.	
46	29 May-5 June 2014	Boko Haram conducts 6 attacks, killing 506 civilians, 5 military personnel. Abducts 20 women and 3 men.	Fleeing 60 Boko Haram terrorists killed by Cameroon's military.	
47	6-12 June 2014	About 5 civilians and 6 military men killed in 4 attacks by Boko Haram.	Military kill 50 Boko Haram members in a counter-attack.	
48	13 June-19 June 2014	2 attacks by Boko Haram left 46 civilians dead.	8 Boko Haram killed by Borno vigilante group (CJTF).	
49	21-26 June 2014	4 attacks by Boko Haram killing 93 civilians and 60 abducted.	A military fighter jet bombed unknown number of Boko Haram in counter-attack Killing 25 Boko Haram. Cameroon military killed 10 Boko Haram near border.	
50	4-10 July 2014	4 Boko Haram attacks, 11 civilians, 1 vigilante, 33 soldiers, 4 police killed.	53 Boko Haram were killed while attempting to capture a military base and police station in Borno on the 4th of July. On the 6th, soldiers killed Boko Haram leader and his brother at their home in Kaduna, 44 Boko Haram were killed in 2 military operations in Borno same day.	
51	11-17 July 2014	4 attacks, 81 civilians killed. German teacher kidnapped and 2 vigilantes killed in Adamawa State.	Military fighter jet in a failed counter-attack resulting in civilian casualties.	Civil society groups condemn killing of civilians.
52	18 July 2014	Attacked and occupied Damboa town in Borno State.		Boko Haram consolidating seizure and hold of territories.

	17 October 2014		Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff announced that a ceasefire had been brokered with Boko Haram.	
53	29 October 2014	Boko Haram seized Mubi town in Adamawa and Uba in Borno State.	Military forces overpowered by the terrorists in Mubi and Uba towns,	Boko Haram refutes claim days later.
54	31 October 2014	Bombed bus station in Gombe, Gombe State		
	2 November 2014	Attacked prison in Kogi, released 199 inmates.	Instituted panel of investigation.	
55	25 November 2014	2 female suicide bombings at Maiduguri market killed over 45 people.		
56	28 November 2014	Over 120 people killed in Kano during suicide bomb in a mosque where the Emir worshipped.	Government canvasses support of traditional and religious leaders to counter Boko Haram attacks.	
57	1 December 2014	In Damaturu, Yobe State, two female suicide bombers detonated bombs at the central Maiduguri market, killing about 30 persons.		
58	3 December 2014	Boko Haram abducted 20 women, mostly young girls, during an attack in Lassa town, Borno State.	Canvasses public support for its counter-terrorism efforts.	
59	4 December 2014	Boko Haram raided Bajoga, in Gombe State, occupying buildings briefly before leaving with stolen vehicles and motorbikes.		Looting is a possible major source of logistics for the terrorists.
60	10 December 2014	Boko Haram raided Gajigana, north of Borno State, killing at least 14 people. 2 female suicide bombers killed 4 persons in Kano.	Deployed more troops to Boko Haram held areas.	Female suicide bombings – an increasingly employed Boko Haram tactics.
	22 December 2014	Killed 22 persons in bus station bombing in Gombe.		
61	1 January	Boko Haram abducted 40		It is probable that

	2015	boys and young men from the village of Malari in Borno State, Nigeria.		abductees are radicalised and compelled to serve as foot soldiers for the sect.
62	3-7 January 2015	Razed the town of Baga in Borno State and captured multi-national military base.	Nigerian military vows to recapture military base. Niger and Chad troops withdraw from operation in the area.	
63	10 January 2015	A 10-year old female suicide bomber kill 20 persons in Maiduguri town.	Government condemns use of under-aged boys and girls in terrorism.	
64	11 January 2015	Two 10-year old female suicide bombers kill 5 persons in Potiskum town.		Increasing trend of Boko Haram use of female children for suicide missions.
65	25 January 2015	Captures town of Monguno including military barracks.	Renewed calls for joint efforts by neighbouring countries in fighting Boko Haram.	
66	January 2015		Nigerian military aided by Chadian forces re-capture Michika town in Adamawa State from Boko Haram.	
67	January-February 2015		Canvass for the establishment of an African Union force to Boko Haram.	Nigerian government acknowledge it could not contain Boko Haram alone.
68	2 February 2015	A female suicide bomb attack in Gombe shortly after President Goodluck Jonathan departed scene of a presidential election rally.		
69	6 February 2015	Raided Bosso and Diffa towns in Niger Republic. First time Boko Haram attacking Niger Republic.	Nigerien assisted by Chadian troop's repelled attacks.	
70	7 February 2015		Postpones general elections to allow military recapture and control areas held by Boko Haram fighters.	
71	12		Nigerian military forces	

	February 2015		supported by Chad, Cameroon and Niger invaded Boko Haram's Sambisa forest safe haven in Borno State killing many members of the Sect.	
72	13 February 2015	Attacked Chad Republic for the first time at Ngouboua village near the Lake Chad area.	Re-iterates call for multilateral action in containing Boko Haram.	
73	15 February 2015	Killed 16 persons in a suicide bomb in Damaturu.		
74	16 February 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Monguno town.	
75	21 February 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Baga town.	
76	22 February 2015	Suicide bomber kills 5 persons in Potiskum.		
77	24 February 2015	Suicide bomber kills 27 persons at bus stations in Potiskum and Kano.	Issues alerts and jingles on radios and television stations to sensitize public.	
78	February 2015	2 female suicide bombers kill 4 persons in Damaturu.		
79	7 March 2015	Killed 54 persons and wounded 143 in 5 separate suicide bombings in Maiduguri.	Launches ground and air offensive against Boko Haram strongholds.	
80	7 March 2015	Pledges allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.	Calls for more international support.	
81	17 March 2015		Bama town recaptured by Nigerian military from Boko Haram.	
82	18 March 2015		Damasak town recaptured by Nigerian and Chadian forces from Boko Haram.	
83	27 March 2015		Nigerian military recaptures Gwoza town from Boko Haram.	
84	28 March	Voters in Nigeria go to the		

	2015	polls for a general election. Gunmen kill at least 15 voters including an opposition house of assembly candidate for Dukku in Gombe.		
85	29 March 2015		Voting in the Nigerian general election is delayed for a second day due to delays and malfunctioning equipment. So far, 43 people have died in Boko Haram attacks.	
86	24 May 2015		Majority of areas held by Boko Haram's forces in control of Nigerian military. Most of the sect militants withdraw to the Sambisa forest.	This is attributed to joint military effort of contiguous countries and Nigeria's engagement of South African mercenaries.
87	29 May 2015		President Buhari during swearing in ceremony announced relocation of Military Command Centre to Maiduguri, the centre of Boko Haram activities.	
88	3-4 June 2015		President Buhari visited Chad and Niger urging closer and concerted effort against Boko Haram.	The visit considered worthwhile as Nigeria's neighbours were wary of Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts.
89	12 June 2015	Several days of night raids on six remote villages in Borno State. About 37 persons killed.		
90	16 June 2015	Twin suicide bombings by Boko Haram killed 24 people and wounded more than 100 in the first such attacks in Chad's capital N'Djamena. The attacks targeted the police headquarters and a police academy.	On 29 August 2015, the Chadian Government charged, tried and executed 10 terrorists involved in the attacks.	Decisive action by Chadian government a probable lesson for Nigeria.

91	17 June 2015		Chad bans people from wearing the full-face veil Burqa's, following two suicide bomb attacks. They also banned vehicles with tinted windows.	Some section of Nigerian society urge Nigerian government to emulate Chad's ban on Burqa's.
92	22 June 2015	2 teenaged female suicide bombers killed 30 at crowded mosque in Malari, Borno State (during holy month of Ramadan).		Sect perhaps targeting mosque they feel fall short in following 'The Prophet'.
93	01-02 July 2015	Multiple mosque attacks in Kukawa and two other towns in Borno State by Boko Haram kill about 142 persons.	Spate of attacks viewed as a renewed challenge to new government.	
94	5 July 2015	A suicide bomber attacks a church in the Potiskum area of Nigeria's Yobe State, killing five.		
95	6 July 2015	Two bomb attacks on the central Nigerian city of Jos have left at least 44 people dead.	Issued press release condemning attacks.	
96	11 July 2015	Male suicide bomber dressed in woman's burqa kills 15 and injures 80 in N'Djamena market.		Boko Haram increasingly attacking neighbouring countries.
97	23 July 2015	About 29 persons killed in bomb attacks at bus garages in Gombe town		
98	27-29 July 2015	Boko Haram attacks Burratai, hometown of Nigerian Chief of Army Staff.	Nigeria solicits for more foreign assistance. President Buhari paid state visit to Cameroon, seek cooperation to fight Boko Haram.	Niger bans dressing in full veil. Offensive against Boko Haram by Chadian Army result in killing of over a hundred terrorists around Lake Chad area.
99	4 August 2015	Report from Centre for Crisis Communication indicate Boko Haram faction demanding dialogue with	Government announced that it was open to dialogue.	


		Nigerian government.		
100	August 2015	Shekau in audio internet message denies claim by Chad's President Idriss Deby that Mahamat Daoud had replaced him as the leader of Boko Haram.		It was earlier rumoured that Shekau had been killed by Nigerian military.
101	13 August	Boko Haram raid Kukuwa village in Yobe State. About 60 people killed, many of them by drowning while fleeing from the attacks.	President Buhari gives a three month ultimatum to Service Chiefs during their swearing in ceremony to defeat Boko Haram.	
102	15 August 2015	Boko Haram attack Damboa village killing 13 persons.		
103	21 August 2015	Ambushed convoy of Nigerian Chief of Army Staff while visiting troop's locations. One soldier and 9 terrorists killed.		It was evident that Boko Haram had pockets of hide-outs and hidden camps in remote areas of Borno State.
104	25 August	24 persons killed in Boko Haram raid on Mafumudi village in Borno State.		
105	1 September 2015		Nigerian military announce its recapture of Gamboru and Ngala towns in Borno State.	
106	9 September 2015	Boko Haram members dislodged from by the military from some parts of Sambisa forest raid villages and towns along Nigeria - Cameroun border.	Nigeria's Director of Defence Information claims that the military had destroyed all known Boko Haram camps and the sect was so weakened that it could no longer hold territory.	
107	September 2015	Shekau in an audio message refutes claim by the Nigerian military of successes against Boko Haram.	The Nigerian military reacted by saying the message was cheap propaganda and demanded Shekau to surrender.	
108	16 September 2015		President Buhari announced in France that Nigerian government was negotiating with Boko Haram for the release of Chibok School	

			girls.	
109	September 2015		Security tightened in Lagos as US Embassy warns of possible Boko Haram attacks on air and sea ports in the city.	
111	20 September 2015	Series of bombings occurred in Maiduguri and Monguno towns. About 54 people killed.		
112	25 September 2015	Suspected Boko Haram members attacked Kogi State DSS office and freed 30 of their detained members. 4 people including a policeman were killed.		
113	27 September 2015	Boko Haram kills 9 persons and injure another 9 in an attack on Mailari village in Konduga town near Maiduguri.		
114	1 October 2015	Boko Haram attack Kirchinga Village in Adamawa State slitting the throat of four inhabitants.		
115	2 October 2015	Bombings at Nyanya and Kuje-Abuja killed 18 and wounded 41 persons.		
116	7 October 2015	15 people killed in three suicide bomb incidents in Damaturu, including attack in a crowded market.	JTF operations led to discovery of large cache of Boko Haram arms in Goniri town, Yobe State. 100 militants killed. Seven deaths recorded on side of military	A ten-year old girl suicide bomber involved in one of the incidents.
117	18 October 2015	Female suicide bombers kill 12 at Dar, Adamawa State.		
118	21 October 2015	Fleeing Boko Haram militants robbed, shot and killed commuters at Nganzai village. Also burnt down nearby village.	JTF operation conducted at Madagali and Gwoza killed 150 terrorists and rescued 36 captives.	
119	23 October 2015	Boko Haram suicide bombers killed 27 in a mosque in Yola.		

120	23 October 2015	Suicide bombing at mosque in Maiduguri, 21 killed including two suicide bombers.		Increasing use of suicide bombings by Boko Haram
121	24 October 2015		JTF intercept four female suicide bombers.	One casualty recorded.
122	28 October 2015		Military rescue 138 women and 192 children abducted by Boko Haram at Sambisa forest.	Their information reveal Boko Haram concentration in camps in the forest.

Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

Figure 7.2 Graphical Representation of Boko Haram's Major Activities and Government Concessions/Military Approaches



Source: Author's compilation, 2015 (see footnote 67 of chapter four).

This case scenario depicts an increasing military response been correspondingly matched by a rise in the activities of Boko Haram. The use of soft approaches has been at an unappreciable level when compared to the military response. In 2015, a large portion of Nigeria's territory seized by the terrorists was recaptured through the concerted efforts the AFN, CJTF,

mercenaries and the armed forces of Nigeria's contiguous countries. This however cannot be said to have substantially turned the tide in terms of countering the threat. I would therefore argue that although the battle to regain the territories that Nigeria lost to the terrorists appears won at the time of writing, the fight to contain terrorist bombings and other unconventional forms of attacks is far from being achieved. This necessitates an assessment of how impactful the responses of the Government of Nigeria were or have been in containing the activities of Boko Haram.

7.4 Assessment of Government Responses

The Nigerian government's measures to counter Boko Haram beginning from its evolutionary stages appear ad hoc and not driven by a definite counter terrorism policy or strategy. It is plausible that such ad hoc and reactionary approaches lend space and initiatives for the Boko Haram terrorists to operate. Wiwa notes that a mitigating factor to effective response was inadequacy of intelligence on the sect owing to the capacity problems of the intelligence agencies.⁸³ Media operations, public enlightenment, community engagement and other people-centric measures by the government that could have countered the Boko Haram ideology appeared not properly deployed.

Meanwhile, the sect kept attracting adherents based on its ideology that appealed to the unemployed and poor who felt that their condition was caused by governance failure, moral decadence and corruption by the elites. It effectively employed the media and other forms of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) platforms such as the Internet to publicise its cause and activities. Corruption and poor financial regulations gave the sect leverage to cover its source of funding believed to include ransoms, levies, drug cartels, fake

⁸³ L. W. Wiwa, Director Military Intelligence Nigerian Army. Interviewed 24 May 2014.

charity organizations and sympathetic individuals and groups within Nigeria as well as in Saudi Arabia and the UK.⁸⁴

The complexity and level of sophistication which the sect attained challenged the capacity of security agencies and other institutions involved in the government counter-terrorism effort, particularly as coordination and the needed synergy among government institutions seemed inadequate. The Nigerian military that is at the forefront of the government's counter-terrorism effort saw itself suffering many setbacks as it confronted the terrorists. A number of military locations were attacked by the terrorists to the extent that the weapons seized from the Nigerian soldiers became the major source of arms to Boko Haram.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the fact that Boko Haram activities transcended Nigeria's borders particularly in terms of training, financing, and re-groupings, kidnappings and arms acquisition raised concerns over border management and Nigeria's relations with her immediate neighbours as well as the international community in their commitment to contain terrorism in Nigeria.

In an effort to prosecute terrorists and their sponsors, the National Assembly enacted the TPA as earlier highlighted. The Act prohibits acts of terrorism and their funding. Certain provisions of the Act such as arrests and timeframe for prosecution were however found not to have been well defined. Similarly, legally defining terrorism and designating groups as such was problematic until the 13 November 2013 designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as FTOs by the US. The Government of Nigeria that had in May 2013 declared a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states to facilitate military operations against these groups did not dispute the designation by the US. This implied not only a tacit approval that Boko Haram and Ansaru were officially recognised as terrorist groups in Nigeria but also that

⁸⁴ Kathleen Caulderwood, "Fake Charities, Drug Cartels, Ransom and Extortion: Where Islamic Boko Haram Gets Its Cash", *International Business Times*, 16 May 2014. Also, Adisa Taiwo, "Boko Haram's funding traced to UK, S. Arabia", *Nigerian Tribune*, 13 February 2012.

⁸⁵ E. J. Amadasun, Defence Headquarters Abuja, interviewed 22 January 2015.

the activities of the Boko Haram sect were invariably beyond the containment of the Nigerian government alone.

From Figure 7.1, it could also be noted that unlike in the case of the Niger Delta crisis, concessions in the form of negotiations or concessions in what Obasanjo calls “the carrot and stick approach” appear not to have worked.⁸⁶ The relevant questions that may need to be answered however are what form of negotiations or concessions were given the terrorists and by what means in terms of delivery, appropriateness and approach? Also relevant is the question of the extent to which other response mechanisms apart from the military have been explored and exploited. All these questions are perhaps imperative for further research as one could conclude here that, as in the case studies previously examined, the continuing terrorism perpetrated by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is a probable function of the ineffectiveness of government’s responses. Following this, the succeeding chapter draws from the discussions in chapters four, five, six and this chapter, and appraises the responses of the Government of Nigeria to the threats of terrorism. It specifically examines counter-terrorism issues raised in the case studies that could inform an effective national counter-terrorism strategy.

⁸⁶ Zacheaus Somorin, “Boko Haram: Obasanjo Advocates ‘Carrot and Stick’ Approach” *This Day*, 9 January 2013. Online at <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-obasanjo-advocates-carrot-and-stick-approach/135805/>, accessed 14 May 2014. The carrot and stick as used here refer to a counter-terrorism policy that offers a combination of rewards and punishments to persuade or compel terrorists and potential terrorists from the act.

CHAPTER EIGHT

APPRAISAL OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE THREATS OF TERRORISM

8.1 Preamble

In chapters four, five, six and seven, I examined the various forms of terrorist threats that Nigeria has witnessed in its post-independence history. These are the terrorist threats posed by Maitatsine, the state under military rule, Niger Delta militants and that of the Boko Haram sect. Essentially, the case studies brought out the threat-response interface between terrorists and the Nigerian Government over time and space. In this chapter therefore, I will attempt, by way of an assessment, to relate these threats and responses to the question of a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

In the first case study, that is, terrorism perpetrated by the Maitatsine sect, it was observed that indecisiveness by the Nigerian Government and inappropriate handling by security forces escalated the sect's activities. The sect's activities consequently spread to Bauchi, Gombe, Yola and Maiduguri which, incidentally, are the hotbeds of the current wave of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram. The Maitatsine sect was finally contained through the use of military force. The terrorism witnessed during military rule was that of repression by the state against pro-democracy groups. As noted in chapter five, the state was the perpetrator, and the people were the victim. The death of General Sani Abacha combined with international pressure saw a return of the country to democratic rule but with a militarised society as evident in the emergence of militant groups. In the Niger Delta region, the militants employed hostage taking, kidnapping and other forms of terrorist tactics in advancing their cause. Again, government's response was more of the application of military force with less attention to the use of soft power approaches that alleviate citizens'

grievances. Terrorist activities by the Niger Delta militant groups were contained through an Amnesty Programme that involved negotiation, and a disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation process.

The fourth case examined, which is terrorism carried out by the Boko Haram sect, has its peculiarities. Firstly, while the classification of the first three cases discussed above as terrorism remain contentious among scholars and policy makers, the classification of the Boko Haram as such is less contentious as its activities have not only typified full-blown terrorism but also transcended Nigeria's borders. Secondly, and the most important for this study is that Boko Haram terrorism is not only ongoing but equally seem to have defied the responses so far undertaken by the Government of Nigeria.

From the threat-response assessments and the lessons highlighted in the case studies, some key points or observations are inherent. These include that terrorism threats and the Nigerian government responses to them demonstrate the imperative of direction and political will in the form of a national policy to guide government's counter-terrorism efforts. The case studies also raised the importance of governance that could enhance socio-economic development, democracy and the rule of law. In line with these are requirements for the institutions responsible for countering terrorism, the national security architecture, border management, international cooperation and public-private engagement in the counter-terrorism effort.

The key points derived from the case studies as highlighted above would need to be examined in depth to provide the threat-response and strategy linkage espoused in this study. This is considered imperative given the need to identify the weaknesses and challenges confronting the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism efforts with a view to adjusting the responses or crafting new approaches to countering terrorism. The understanding here is that

the effectiveness of the responses of government, or its efforts at countering the threat of terrorism, is a function of how articulate are its counter-terrorism policy, institutions and programmes. McCord buttresses this in observing that “as examples in social policy have shown, (counter-terrorism) programmes are often not effective and can sometimes increase the problem or cause further social negatives.”¹ In line with this, Lum, Kennedy and Sherley suggest that “evaluations of both effectiveness and harm are necessary for policy that involves phenomena like terrorism that can generate irrational thinking and hasty responses.”² Such an evaluation supports my intention in this chapter.

Before delving into the evaluation proper, it is perhaps important to reiterate two important concepts in view of the social constructivist approach of this study of terrorism threat-response processes in Nigeria. Firstly, terrorism and terrorists are not readily and easily defined. Thus, the government, media and other stakeholders have usually used the term with underlying political, ideological and other objectives. In this way, terrorists could just as easily be defined as political activists, freedom fighters, insurgents, or any number of other categories of organised violence. Secondly, the actions of terrorists and of the government agencies that respond are the actions of institutions and organisations which in turn, are composed of sets of individuals with particular ideas or conceptions of the world. Flick thus notes that, “the realities we study are social products of the actions, of interactions and institutions.”³ In this vein, and as I have sought to demonstrate with the case studies in chapters four to seven, the way in which terrorist groups develop and evolve their actions could be said to be in response to the perceived messages they observe in the actions of the Nigerian counter-terrorist actors and vice versa.

¹ J. McCord. “Cures that harm: Unanticipated outcomes of crime prevention programs.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 587 (2003), pp. 16-30.

² Lum C, Kennedy LW, Sherley, AJ. “The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies.” *Campbell Systematic Reviews* (Newark: Campbell Collaboration, 2009), p. 6.

³ U. Flick, *Designing Qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 2007), p. 12.

Similarly, from the case studies examined, one can reasonably hypothesise that the Nigerian government has sought to send out messages through their actions, both to the people they would categorise as terrorists, the terrorists' sympathisers and to the wider citizenry on the efficacy or otherwise of their counter-terrorism policies. It is the mutual perceptions of actions and reactions on both sides of the equation, and the opinions these help to form in the populace, that arguably determine how the security situation has played out in recent Nigerian history. However, the proof of the causal effect of inappropriate or lacking counter-terrorism strategy on the severity of the terrorist picture in Nigeria over the years cannot be assumed or established with definite degree of certainty. This is owing partly to the fact that the actors involved, that is the government and terrorists, are both working on the basis of perceptions, messages and reactions to the perceived intentions of actions. Herein comes the question and place of methodology in a research such as this. I would therefore amplify the methodology adopted to achieve the appraisal of government's responses to the threats of terrorism in Nigeria.

8.2 Methodology

In chapter one, I noted that this study adopted a mainly qualitative research method with a case study approach (as employed in the preceding four chapters). At one level therefore, this is a phenomenological study of the processes through which the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism responses shape and affect terrorist threats. But as observed in the study, terrorism is by no means an easily or precisely defined phenomenon given that it is a human action that seeks to shape opinion through largely symbolic acts of violence, and by generating psychological fear of violence in the populace in order to influence government action. For this reason, terrorism and responses to it cannot be seen as firmly set phenomena about which easy calculations and measurements can be made. I would further argue that since the government and terrorists are acting on the basis of perceptions, the interactions

between both actors in this process in Nigeria are not entirely positivist, although a certain degree of causality is implied in this study. This further highlights why in epistemological terms, this study takes the social constructivist approach in studying the threat-response processes towards shaping Nigeria's counter-terrorist strategy.

With this said, a further core dataset is offered here in the form of a number of qualitative semi-structured interviews. As Kvale contends, qualitative research interviews have the aim of "interpreting the meaning of the phenomena described."⁴ Having described the action-reaction phenomena inherent in a set of case studies in the previous chapters, the aim in this next chapter of the study is to use a set of qualitative interviews on the one hand and questionnaires on the other to triangulate the action-reaction hypothesis by way of what Hein terms "meaning making."⁵ I therefore developed a set of questions around the topical issues derived from the key points in the case studies, and which are imperatives for effective counter-terrorism effort. This sought to find out what the current pulse of government counter-terrorism efforts is, what this holds for the future of terrorism in Nigeria, and what public and expert opinion are as to how to better the government's counter-terrorism drive. Specifically, this second set of data covered the topical issues of counter terrorism policy and legislation, governance, counter terrorism institutions, national security architecture, border management and public strategic communication. The outcome of the survey is subsequently discussed in a definition of the issue, respondents' views and corroborating/ contending argument and analysis format.

8.3 Issue One: Policy and Legislation on Terrorism

⁴ S. Kvale, "Dialogue as Oppression and Interview Research." Paper presented at the Nordic Educational Research Association Conference, Tallinn, 7-9 March 2002, p. 9.

⁵ George E. Hein, "Is Meaning Making Constructivism? Is Constructivism Meaning Making?" Available online at http://name-aam.org/uploads/downloadables/EXH.fall_99/EXH_fall_99_Is%20Meaning%20Making%20Constructivism%20Is%20Constructivism%20Meaning%20Making_Hein.pdf, accessed 4 July 2015.

A national policy to counter terrorism is fundamental for countries whose national security has been undermined or threatened by terrorism. According to Agholor, national policy is a set of principles and broad guidelines articulated to manage a nation's security decision making and actions.⁶ Applied to terrorism therefore, it is a frame of reference that describes how a country provides for and guarantees the security of the state and its citizens against terrorism. In countries such as the US and the UK, the policy exists in the form of an integrated document known as a counter-terrorism strategy. The document guides decisions on the part of the executives, communicates decisions to the implementation agencies, informs the public as well as provides a measure for gauging performance, evaluation and review. Alongside a policy is the legal framework consisting of legislations within which the counter-terrorism policy or strategy operates. In the UK, for instance, CONTEST defines terrorism as a security threat and sets priorities for dealing with it while the Terrorism Act gives a legal definition and establishes criminal procedures for handling cases of terrorism. The latter empowers institutions involved in terrorism and national security, facilitates speedy trial of terrorist suspects and ensures that every stakeholder operates within the law. The CONTEST and Terrorism Act are publicised not only among government and implementation bodies but also in print and electronic means for public awareness.

8.3.1 Respondents' View on Policy and Legislation on Terrorism

Among the questions that I posed to the respondents were those about their awareness of the existence of a national counter-terrorism strategy and of an act to prevent terrorism in Nigeria. My findings were that while very few of the respondents knew of the existence of the country's counter-terrorism strategy (that is NACTEST), more than half of them were aware of the TPA, which is the legislation against terrorism. However, for the more than half

⁶ NP Agholor, "National Security Policy: Imperatives for Nigeria", Commandant's Lecture delivered at the National Defence College Abuja Nigeria, April 2014.

that were aware of the TPA, the adequacy of the Act as a legal framework for curbing terrorism in Nigeria is a concern. For instance, Ashi asserted that many inadequacies were inherent in the Act especially on aspects that deal with arrests, detention and trial resulting in its criticism by human rights activists and civil society organizations.⁷ Many of the respondents in the areas where terrorism is prevalent felt the locals were often unjustly arrested and detained as suspected terrorists. However, Sampson was of the opinion that the TPA is fair and robust.⁸ He added that the laws have to be tough given the unprecedented level that terrorism has attained in Nigeria.⁹ For the NACTEST, Folorunsho observed that the released NACTEST has shortcomings as “it is undergoing testing, being relatively a new document when one considers its time of release.”¹⁰ Daramola was of the view that given the engagement of security agencies in the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram, the NACTEST could not have meaningful input from its users in terms of consultations, but on the other hand was hurriedly put together for their use.¹¹ In general, the outcome of my survey indicated that the NACTEST and TPA are yet to command a significant degree of acceptability as policy and legal instruments for countering terrorism in Nigeria.

8.3.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

The idea of a national counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria (with the acronym NACTEST) was mooted in December 2010 by the then NSA, General Andrew Azazi.¹² Its formulation was however stalled by ethno-religious and political sentiments mounted by pressure groups who felt it was targeted at Islamic elements in the northern part of the country.¹³ It thus remained in a draft until its endorsement in April 2014 by President Goodluck Jonathan and

⁷ Gabriel Ashi, telephone interview, Abuja, 12 June 2014.

⁸ Isaac Terwase Sampson, National Defence College Abuja, interviewed 17 May 2014.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ O Folorunsho, Joint Terrorism Analysis Bureau, Counter Terrorism Department Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja – Nigeria interviewed 12 November 2014.

¹¹ O Daramola, Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja, interviewed 12 November 2014.

¹² Office of the National Security Adviser Nigeria Archives, accessed 14 November 2013.

¹³ Anonymous to author.

subsequent release for operational use.¹⁴ This means that prior to this time, there were no documented guidelines for the conduct of counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Consequently, such matters as specific roles of counter-terrorism agencies, the interface between policy-makers and the security agencies, and with the public were not streamlined and therefore unwieldy. The NACTEST 2014 was released without adequate critiquing through workshops and seminars.¹⁵ It is equally yet to be well publicised. This probably accounts for the poor knowledge of its existence by members of the public as observed in the survey. The critiquing and circulation of the NACTEST is imperative particularly for the implementation agencies who ought to extract and interpret the provisions of the strategy as it affects them both individually and collectively.

In terms of legislation, the TPA was enacted on 22 June 2011.¹⁶ This was after five years during which a bill to that effect was sponsored in the National Assembly. Initially, it was lawmakers from the southern part of the country that opposed the bill for fear of categorizing the militancy in the Niger Delta as terrorism.¹⁷ Thereafter, opinion leaders in the northern part of the country opposed the bill ostensibly to safeguard attempts to arrest and prosecute perceived Islamic fundamentalists.¹⁸ It thus could be argued that the delay in formulating a counter-terrorism policy and an anti-terrorism legislation allowed for terrorism to take root in Nigeria. For instance, terrorist suspects such as Mohammed Ashafa, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Ilya Damagun that were arrested and charged with receiving funds for

¹⁴ Presidential Directive in *The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)*, Abuja, 2014.

¹⁵ National Defence College of Nigeria Course 22 Participants Seminar Report, Abuja, June 2014.

¹⁶ See Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, p. 1.

¹⁷ Terwase Sampson and Freedom Onuoha, "Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it Realise its Taste?"

Understanding the Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria" in *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol 5, No 3-4 (2011).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

terrorist operations could not be prosecuted.¹⁹ They were all released on the account that there were no requisite legislative provisions to deal with the cases.

The TPA enacted in 2011 covered issues such as acts that constitute terrorism and related offences, terrorism funding as well as mutual assistance and extradition.²⁰ It was reviewed in February 2013 to further empower the security agencies. The TPA 2013 empowers security personnel to arrest and to detain suspects for extended periods of time. Section 27(1) states that:

The court may, pursuant to an ex-parte application, grant an order for the detention of a suspect under this Act for a period not exceeding 90 days subject to renewal for a similar period until the conclusion of the investigation and prosecution of the matter that led to the arrest and detention is dispensed with.”²¹

The allowance for an indefinite number of extensions arguably allows for open-ended detention of suspects which is perhaps inimical to quick dispensation of justice. Similarly, the Act allows security personnel the freedom to carry out what Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri described as “haphazard large-scale arrests.”²² Equally were incidences of large scale retaliatory military deployments, urban lockdowns, door-to-door searches and communication intercepts which civil society organisations view as an intrusion into privacy and a violation of fundamental human rights.²³

It could equally be stated that the provisions in the TPA are not robust enough to ensure swift convictions thereby giving room for delayed or long trials as witnessed in the case of Senator

¹⁹ “Country Reports on Terrorism, Africa Review”, *Global Terrorism Organization Year Book*, (Washington D.C: International Business Publication, 2010), p. 83.

²⁰ See Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011

²¹ Terrorism (Prevention) Act, amended 2013, Section 27(1).

²² Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, “By the numbers: The Nigerian State’s efforts to counter Boko Haram” in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014), p. 192.

²³ *Ibid.* See also, Amnesty International. *Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands* (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2015) p. 33.

Ali Ndume who was arraigned for abetting terrorism.²⁴ Further inadequacies are the restrictions of handling cases of terrorism to federal courts, the absence of special courts and the insufficient number of lawyers trained to handle cases of terrorism.²⁵ All these inadequacies hinder effectiveness of the legislation process regarding the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. Therefore, the priorities for dealing with terrorism as would have been enshrined in a tested NACTEST and humane criminal procedures for handling cases of terrorism as ought to have been provided for in the TPA remain a concern. They consequently constitute a challenge to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. This raises the requirement for a proven counter-terrorism policy and the corollary review of existing legislation to contain terrorism in Nigeria.

8.3 Issue Two: Governance and Terrorism in Nigeria

Governance is critical in national security as it involves the management of a nation's resources to meet the needs of citizens including the security of citizens against threats such as terrorism. According to O'Neil, "states that lack legitimacy and control over the economy and other traditional levers of power provide the space and oxygen for terrorist groups to flourish."²⁶ Newman opines further that:

*It is in such environments - such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, Somalia, Georgia, Yemen, and Algeria - that local or transnational terrorist organizations can find a base of operations, a vacuum of authority, and a source of support.*²⁷

Lamba adds that such environments of governance deficit give rise to ungoverned spaces, and went on to define an ungoverned space as:

²⁴ Bayo Oladeji, Uchenna Awom and Chizoba Ogbeche, "Alleged Boko Haram Sponsorship – Senator Ali Ndume Arrested" *Leadership*, 22 November 2011.

²⁵ Adebisi Onanuga, "Lawyers seek special courts for terrorism" *The Nation*, available online, <http://thenationonline.net/lawyers-see-special-courts-terrorism/>, accessed 13 May 2015.

²⁶ See Edward Newman, "Exploring the "Root Causes" of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:8 (2006), pp. 749-772.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

*a place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behaviour.*²⁸

In line with the above, is the likelihood that within weak states occasioned by governance deficit are evidences of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, corruption and human rights abuse. While not dismissing the view of scholars such as Krueger and Maleckova that neither poverty nor education have a direct causal impact on terrorism, O'Neil's contention that terrorists need foot-soldiers who overwhelmingly come from the poor and down-trodden is significant.²⁹ The Nigerian situation could be said to fit in here from the outcome of my field survey.

8.3.1 Respondents' Views on Governance and Terrorism in Nigeria

Respondents overwhelmingly opined that the Nigerian government has over the years not met the expectations of Nigerians on aspects of the provision of security and basic human needs. Hassan, a traditional ruler, was of the opinion that the government had not empowered the people enough in terms of employment opportunities.³⁰ He pointed to the vast lands in his community that government could irrigate and resource the people to engage productively in agriculture. Many respondents believe that government presence was lacking as evident by lack of good roads, schools, hospitals, electricity and other essential needs for living. Mai'Adua viewed social and economic inequalities and the widening gap between the rich and the poor in the society as the crucial issues in the factor of governance and terrorism in

²⁸ Robert, D. Lamba, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Haven: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project". 2008. Available online at www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/ugash_report_final.pdf, accessed 12 January 2015.

²⁹ As cited in E. Newman, p. 753.

³⁰ Hassan Abdullahi, Community Head Mayo-Belwa, Adamawa State interviewed 12 February 2014.

Nigeria.³¹ He added that this was so as those in government composed the rich class while the masses constituted the poor.

8.3.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

Section 14 (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 affirms the importance of good governance by recognising that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.”³² The performances of successive Nigerian governments however seem to indicate a below average score in the achievement of this purpose. This is so when using yardsticks for measurement such as the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance.³³ The Mo Ibrahim’s five criteria for measurement of good governance are safety and security, rule of law, transparency and corruption, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and finally human development. Nigeria is thought to be deficient in the five criteria despite her enormous natural and human resources. It was rated among the poorly governed countries in Africa with a ranking of 37th position out of the 52 countries listed in the overall governance scale.³⁴

The country is plagued with high rates of poverty, economic disparity, political exclusion, illiteracy and unemployment which, as discussed in chapter three, abetted vulnerability to terrorist group appeal and membership. For instance, in 2011, the unemployment rate rose to 23.9 per cent from 21.1 per cent in 2010 and 19.7 per cent in 2009 with multiplier effects on poverty.³⁵ In 2014, the then Coordinating Minister for the Economy and Minister for Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala stated that no fewer than 5.3 million Nigerian youths were jobless

³¹ Mohammed Mai’Adua, Director Ministry of Labour Abuja, interviewed 12 March 2014.

³² The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.

³³ The M. O. Ibrahim Foundation was founded in 2006 by Dr Mohammed Ibrahim, a UK-based entrepreneur to encourage good governance in Africa. See <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iag/...>, accessed 14 May 2014.

³⁴ Ibangha Isine, “Nigeria, one of the Africa’s worst governed countries – Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, *Premium Times*, 1 October 2014

³⁵ O. A. Azazi “National Security Strategies: Issues and Challenges” Lecture delivered to National Defence College Course 20 Participants, 13 January 2012.

while 1.8 million graduates enter the labour market each year thereby increasing the unemployment rate, and by extension, the availability of idle youths that terrorist groups could recruit.

The nexus between governance and terrorism in Nigeria is particularly evident when one considers the situation in Northern Nigeria where Boko Haram terrorism prevails. The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics records in 2012 revealed that out of the total number of about 100 million Nigerians considered poor by World Bank standard, the northern part of the country has an average poverty rate of 70.1 per cent as compared to 36.9 per cent for the southern zones.³⁶ Equally, a recent report by the National Population Commission found that literacy rates are much lower among states in the north, and that 72 per cent of children around the age of 6 -16 years never attended schools in Borno, the state worst affected by Boko Haram activities.³⁷ All these are possible indications of the failure of government to deliver basic citizens' needs, a situation Onuoha opines results in people turning to religion, ethnicity and other expressions of identity for succour.³⁸ He further observes that:

*...the failure to provide opportunities for better lives becomes an instrument for mobilizing and radicalizing the unemployed, unskilled, and poverty-ridden youths to join its (Boko Haram terrorists) cause and dislodge the secular controlled state as an alternative and plausible answer to their misery.*³⁹

It could thus be argued that while poverty and unemployment may not be in themselves the prime factors for vulnerability to terrorist group recruitment and membership, the tendency for grievances and anti-state sentiments could easily be generated. This perhaps explains why in 2004, some students in Borno and Yobe states withdrew from school, tore up their

³⁶ Data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Abuja – Nigeria, 21 September 2013.

³⁷ National Population Commission Archives, 2013.

³⁸ F. C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Evolving tactical Repertoire and State Responses" in O Mbachu and U Bature (eds), *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa, 2013) pp. 407-430.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

certificates and joined the group of Koranic lessons and preaching, some of the preaching being highly critical of the state.⁴⁰ The students, one of whom was Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, felt that their education, apart from the Western and secular values unacceptable to them, was worthless in terms of employment opportunities.⁴¹

8.4 Issue Three: Counter-Terrorism Institutions

Institutions are the channels through which government carry out the management of a nation's resources to meet the needs of citizens including safeguards against threats such as terrorism. Kernal Dervis opines that "neither good policies nor good investments are likely to emerge or be sustainable in an environment with dysfunctional institutions."⁴² The institutions are therefore relatively a yardstick for gauging good governance or governance failure in aspects of citizens' security and welfare. In the context of terrorism and national security, the institutions could be divided into two. The first include those concerned with the socio-economic and political aspects including human security elements of eradicating poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and other factors that could possibly drive violent extremism and terrorism. The second comprise those institutions concerned with the traditional aspect of security which involve the conduct of counter-terrorism operations.

In Nigeria, the Federal Government institutions involved in counter-terrorism are outlined in Annex A of Section 7 of the NACTEST, enclosed as an Appendix in this study. They include a plethora of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) with their expected roles.

⁴⁰ F. C. Onuoha, "Youth Unemployment and Poverty: Connections and Concern for National Development in Nigeria", *International Journal of Modern Political Economy*, Vol.1, No. 1, 2010, pp.115-136.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Kernal Dervis, Forward in "Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance." *A World Bank Strategy*, Washington DC, November 2000.

8.4.1 Respondents' Views on Counter-Terrorism Institutions.

During my field survey, I sought respondents' opinions on the capacity and effectiveness of government agencies in meeting the expectations of Nigerians both in ameliorating conditions that could gravitate people to terrorism and in countering it. Their views were varied, but cumulatively showed a below average rating of the agencies both in capacity and effectiveness. Some of the respondents perceived that the Ministries of Labour, Youth Development, Agriculture and Education were yet to meet the expectations of Nigerians on employment generation, poverty alleviation, food security and literacy respectively.⁴³ Similarly, the Ministry of Justice, Economic and Financial Crime Commission and National Finance Intelligence Unit were said to have not delivered in terms of criminal justice, fighting corruption, monitoring terrorists funding networks and the arrest as well as prosecution of terrorists and their sponsors.⁴⁴ Many reasons bordering on funding, administration and corruption were adduced as responsible for the ineffectiveness of the institutions. A major consensus, however, was that the coordination of the agencies was deficient. Waya, for instance, stated that the bane of Nigeria's counter terrorism institutions was largely the dearth of coordination as each tends to act independently thus dissipating efforts and resources.⁴⁵

8.4.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis.

A recent report on the MDAs including those that comprise counter terrorism institutions revealed that they are poorly managed with an inherent lack of accountability and transparency, ailing infrastructure, poor staffing and funding.⁴⁶ All of these arguably impact

⁴³ T. Ologba, Director Department of State Services Abuja, interviewed 14 May 2014.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ T. T., Waya, Director Presidential Command Control and Communication Centre, State House Abuja, interviewed 17 January 2014.

⁴⁶ Report of Transition Committee set up by President Muhammadu Buhari to assess Federal Government Parastatals and Agencies, Abuja, June 2015.

negatively on their performance. Data obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics also suggest poor performance by the institutions.⁴⁷

This author observed that none of the MDAs was designated as lead-ministry or agency for coordinating counter-terrorism in Nigeria as applies in countries such as the UK. There have been ongoing debates for the designation of such an agency, but the choice between the Nigerian Police and the Department of State Services have often resulted in heated debates at the National Assembly without a decision.⁴⁸ There is equally unhealthy rivalry among some of these institutions which erodes the synergy that could have been derived from cooperation in terms of pulling resources together.⁴⁹

The CTC at the ONSA currently oversees the efforts of the counter-terrorism institutions. However, the Department is not sufficiently equipped, staffed or organized to carry out this role effectively.⁵⁰ It also took on responsibilities beyond its mandate in that the role of ONSA is advisory and not legally established to be involved in directing operational issues such as counter-terrorism.⁵¹ The CTC it was also observed, concentrates efforts more on the security agencies to the detriment of harnessing the potentials of civil government agencies, civil society organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and international development agencies involved in the counter terrorism effort. In this wise, it could be reasonably maintained that the CTC, as currently structured and task-organized, is not an appropriate counter-terrorism coordinating body. This therefore brings to fore the need for an appropriate body to coordinate the efforts of all the counter-terrorism institutions (military and civil) to enhance the achievement of national counter-terrorism objectives.

⁴⁷ <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pages/NBS%20eLibrary>, accessed 13 May 2014.

⁴⁸ The debates have been spearheaded by the Nigerian Senate Committee on National Intelligence led by Senator Nuhu Aliyu. Also see United States Department of Defense Country Report on Terrorism 2011, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf>, accessed 12 May 2015.

⁴⁹ A. A. Abdulsalami, "A Comprehensive Approach to National Security Management in Nigeria" being a paper delivered at NDC Abuja to NDC Course 22 participants on 7 Oct 2013.

⁵⁰ T. T. Waya, interviewed 17 January 2014.

⁵¹ Federal Government of Nigeria, *The National Security Act (CAP 278)*, 1986.

8.5 Issue Four: National Security and Intelligence Architecture

Nigeria's national security bodies involved in the counter-terrorism efforts of the government include the AFN, NPF, Nigeria Customs Service and the Nigeria Immigration Service. The other agencies involved are the Nigeria Prison Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, National Emergency Management Agency and the Nigerian Federal Fire Service. As noted in chapter three, the bulk of counter-terrorism intelligence effort is undertaken by the three Nigerian Secret Intelligence Agencies (officially addressed as the Nigeria Intelligence Community). It is on these national security bodies, particularly the AFN, which the Nigerian government's main counter-terrorism thrust revolves. This is to the extent that in August 2015, the country's President tasked the AFN to end Boko Haram attacks within three months.⁵²

8.5.1 Respondents' Views on the Efforts of Nigeria's Security Forces.

My survey indicated that Nigerians have high expectations on the security forces to counter the terrorist threat that the country is faced with. About two-thirds of my respondents were however not satisfied with the efforts so far made by Nigeria's security forces in countering terrorism. Some expected that with Nigeria's experience in Peace Support Operations and enviable record of restoring law and order in other countries, the threat of terrorism in Nigeria would have been easily dealt with. Some respondents in IDP camps account that they witnessed soldiers abandon their posts on sighting an advancing terrorist force. Mallam Isah, a seventy-two year old respondent asked me where the guns that were used to chase the Chadian rebels in 1982 were as he could not hear the sound of such artillery pieces on the side of the Nigerian troops.⁵³

⁵² Isiaka Wakili, "Buhari gives 3 months ultimatum to service chiefs to end B/Haram" *Daily Trust*, 13 August 2015.

⁵³ Mallam Usman Isah, Makata Village, Borno State, interviewed 18 June 2015.

Respondents who were members of the security forces opined that the basic challenge was that the AFN lacked adequate firepower and intelligence to combat the terrorists. A commander in the field further stated that signals and communication equipment were inadequate and the few available were not interoperable among the three Services of the AFN nor with other security agencies.⁵⁴ He added that the Nigerian government had to shut down telecommunication services in parts of north-eastern Nigeria because the security agencies could not leverage them to monitor the activities of Boko Haram; instead it was the terrorists that were using them actively against the security forces.⁵⁵

8.5.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

It could be said that the continued terrorist attacks in Nigeria have called to question the professional efficiency and capability of the AFN as well as the security and intelligence agencies in dealing with the threat of terrorism. It has been noted in several fora that long years of military rule in Nigeria led to decay in military professionalism and that the security agencies were mainly used as tools for keeping regimes in power. Training was de-emphasized and equipment were neither maintained nor replaced. The deficient state of the AFN and the security agencies in terms of manpower and equipment capability was to such an extent that the Nigerian Government had to hire mercenaries from South Africa to fight Boko Haram terrorists.⁵⁶ Varin contends that it was the use of the mercenaries, among other factors, that turned the tide against the Boko Haram terrorists in the days prior to Nigeria's presidential election held on 11 April, 2015.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Brigadier General A R Owolabi, 57 Division Signal Commander, 7 Division Nigerian Army Maiduguri, interviewed on 20 January 2014.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ed Cropley, "Boko Haram: Nigeria hires hundreds of mercenaries to help fight Islamist militant group" *The Independent*, 12 March 2015.

⁵⁷ Caroline Varin, "Mercenaries in Nigeria: opportunity or humiliation for the Nigerian Armed Forces?" being paper delivered at the 2nd Joint Africa Research Group and African Leadership Centre Event held at Kings College London, 6 October 2015.

The unprofessional handling of security issues has equally been a problem. For instance, the security agencies have been accused of been high-handed, inhumane and sometimes complicit in the mistreatment of suspects.⁵⁸ Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of the Boko Haram sect was supposedly extra-judicially killed by the police after his arrest in 2009. This possibly prompted the sect to seek revenge of the death of their leader. Additionally, the emphasis of government on the use of the military in its counter-terrorism effort have resulted in security forces being accused of collateral damage, brutality, torture and extra-judicial killing of suspects.⁵⁹ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri contend that this dynamic has left much of the local population caught between the brutality perpetrated by Boko Haram and the excesses wrought by the Nigerian security forces.⁶⁰ The situation has led to loss of public confidence on the security agencies thereby eroding the relations between the security agencies and the populace to the point that members of the public are unwilling to volunteer information to the security agencies.⁶¹ More worrisome is the fact that countries such as the US, which is at the forefront of the global fight against terrorism, show apathy in assisting the Nigerian military citing human right abuses by Nigeria's security forces as a reason.

Further worsening the capacity of security agencies is perhaps inadequate technological infrastructure which undermines their efforts in countering terrorism. According to Udeh, there is no integrated national data base, effective criminal records and forensic system. Also inadequate are Closed Circuit Television technology, Global Positioning System tracking devices, Predictive Screening Devices and Un-manned Aerial Vehicles.⁶² Udeh further opined that it was difficult to integrate intelligence on terrorists due to ineffective operational

⁵⁸ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., p. 192.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch, 2014.

⁶⁰ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, p. 193.

⁶¹ Ibis.

⁶² CS Udeh, "Boko Haram and Counter-terrorism Strategy in Nigeria: An Exploratory Anatomy" in O Mbachu and UM Bature, *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Kaduna: Medusa publishers, 2013), p. 315.

fusion centres and that low technological infrastructure have adversely affected the capacity of security operatives thereby keeping them far behind the terrorists. This situation invariably did not allow the security agencies to pre-empt many Boko Haram attacks including those targeted at security establishments as evidenced in the terrorists attack on 202 Battalion of the Nigerian Army at Bama on 20 April 2012.⁶³

Poor remuneration and welfare packages add to the poor state of the Nigerian security and intelligence agencies. A soldier of the Nigerian Army, for instance, earns on the average 250 US Dollar monthly and operations allowances are often paid in arrears. Adding to this is the problem of corruption which has among other consequences bedevilled military procurement.⁶⁴ Up until early 2015 when the Nigerian military received some new fighting vehicles and helicopters, their firepower hardly matched that of the terrorists. The result was low morale of troops and consequent reluctance to engage the terrorists in combat. All these factors accounted for why the terrorists were able to capture and hold parts of north-eastern Nigeria where they hoisted black flags and proclaimed an Islamic State within Nigeria.

8.6 Issue Five: Border Management and Terrorism in Nigeria

A nation's borders are crucial to its security because they define the geographical limits of such a country and the extent to which it could manage threats within and outside. Nations maintain secured borders to prevent illegal movement of persons, goods and services that may constitute a threat to their national security. However, issues of international borders are not the prerogative of one country as all the countries involved share responsibility for its management. This is more so given the fact that globalisation, advancement in ICT as well as the activities of non-state actors have undermined the sanctity of traditional international borders. Additional to this, and with respect to terrorism, is the diffused nature of the threat

⁶³ OT Ethan, Chief of Civil Military Affairs, Nigerian Army Headquarters Abuja, interviewed on 10 January 2014.

⁶⁴ Amnesty International (UK) Report 2015,

and the blurring of the dividing line between domestic and international terrorism. Consequently, no one country can deal with terrorism alone whether within or across its borders.

Nigeria maintains land borders with Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroun as well as a maritime boundary with the Atlantic Ocean. The land borders are as shown in Table 8.6.

Table 8.1 Length of Borders between Nigeria and Contiguous Neighbours

Serial	Country	Length in km	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Cameroon	1,690 East of Nigeria	Not adequately manned
2.	Niger	1,497 North of Nigeria	“ “
3.	Benin	773 West of Nigeria	“ “
4.	Chad	87 North East of Nigeria	“ “

Source: M. Spencer “Border and State Insecurity: Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century” *International Perspective*, Vol. 2 (2007), p.110.

The table shows that Nigeria maintains about 4,047km land borders with its immediate neighbours. As Moro notes, the borders are porous with 84 regular entry and exit points as well as over 1,487 illegal routes.⁶⁵ The porosity and vastness of the Nigerian borders with immediate neighbours means that their effective management is an imperative. This however appears not to have been the case judging from the opinion of respondents from the field survey I conducted.

8.6.1 Respondents’ Views on Border Management to Curb Terrorism

In the field survey, I sought respondents’ views as to how effective they perceived Nigerian borders have been managed to curb terrorism. The respondents’ perceptions were generally

⁶⁵ Abba Moro, Presentation by Honourable Minister for Interior at the 2013 Ministerial Platform, Abuja, 20 July 2013.

that the border areas are neglected as there was little presence of government. The border posts were also said to be poorly manned. Hamza, for instance described the situation at most of the country's border posts as "pitiable; ill-defined, ill-equipped and ill-manned with ill-motivated officials."⁶⁶ A respondent opined that the officials at border posts were corrupt and collect bribes to allow free access of persons and goods thereby compromising security.⁶⁷ Amao opined that the porosity of Nigeria's international borders make them serve as a conduit for the supply of arms and recruits for Boko Haram as well as an escape route for its combatants.⁶⁸

8.6.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

This author had the opportunity to visit some of the border posts in Adamawa, one of the terrorist-affected states. The respondents' views of the poor state of the Nigeria's border posts was observed to be true. Ate and Akinterinwa, two renowned scholars on Nigeria's foreign policy contend that the country's borders are not only vast but largely un-demarcated, poorly manned and contested by all its immediate neighbours.⁶⁹ It is this situation, among other factors, that Boko Haram terrorists probably exploited to establish safe havens at border areas such as the Sambisa forest which border Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. It may be pertinent to note that the same circumstance is applicable to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border exploited by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Syria-Turkey border used by ISIS and Al-Shaabab's forays in Kenya-Somalia border areas. The common feature in all these examples, as is the case with Nigeria, is the impact of ungoverned spaces to collective security of nations. The stretch of the Trans-Saharan route that runs through the northern part of Nigeria up to Libya and Sudan

⁶⁶ K. I. Hamza, Comptroller Nigeria Customs Service, Borno State Command interviewed 17 April 2014.

⁶⁷ Respondent anonymous to author.

⁶⁸ Dayo Amao, Commander 75 Strike Group Yola, interviewed 18 March 2014.

⁶⁹ Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa, *Cross Border Armed Banditry in the North East: Issues in National Security and Nigeria's Relations with its Immediate Neighbours* (Lagos: NIIA, 2011).

arguably provides freedom of movement to terrorists, free flow of illicit consignments and the proliferation of weapons.

The nature of Nigeria's borders and its management could best be explained when one examines the situation in Borno State where Boko Haram activities are most prevalent. Borno State has international borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon, which measure over 600 kilometres.⁷⁰ A large portion of this border is unmanned, which allows illegal trafficking of arms and entry of aliens into Nigeria. According to Musa, there are 10 legal and 125 illegal entry points on Nigeria's international border in Borno State.⁷¹ The uncontrolled entry possibly exacerbated terrorist activities in Borno State, as some aliens served as mercenaries and arms suppliers of Boko Haram. Equally compounding this issue is the socio-cultural affinity and the informal economic and political activities among Nigeria's border communities. In Borno State, Nigerian tribes such as Hausa, Mandara, Kanuri, Fulani and Kotoko live in Cameroon, the Kanembu and Shuwa Arabs in Chad and the Hausa as well as the Fulani in Niger.⁷² Such affinity and informal interactions hinder the efforts of security agents at checking cross border movements. It consequently makes the area vulnerable to trans-border crimes and the intensification of terrorist activities.

The management of Nigeria's borders is also made problematic by the poor cooperation of Nigeria's contiguous countries. All the contiguous countries depend on Nigeria for goods and services particularly in the form of informal trade which thrives more through the illegal routes and at border communities that have socio-cultural affinity. The informal trade

⁷⁰ A. S. Adebajo, Comptroller of Immigration Services, interviewed at the National Defence College Abuja, 8 January 2014.

⁷¹ Sagir Musa, "Border Security, Arms Proliferation and Terrorism in Nigeria" *Sunday Trust*, <<http://www.sundaytrust.ng/index.php/comment-debate12753.border-security-arms-proliferation-and-terrorism-in-nigeria>>, accessed 7 January 2014.

⁷² A. E. Osewe, "Nigeria's Porous Borders and its Implications for Human and National Security", Quoted in HD Dlakwa and HI Bazza, *Peace Security Human Right and Development in the 21st Century*, (Kaduna: Pyla-Mak Services Ltd, Vol. 1, 2010), p. 79.

benefits the neighbouring countries and they therefore tacitly support it.⁷³ This allows for the unhindered movement of contraband, illegal arms and undesirable elements into Nigeria.

Apart from the tacit support for informal trade, the sometimes uncooperative attitude of contiguous countries could be viewed from the perspective of their deliberate response to Nigeria's big posture attitude towards them. The situation is not helped by the fact that all the four contiguous countries are Francophone with strong affiliations to France as against Nigeria that is Anglophone. The differences further hinder cooperation between the border agencies, the effectiveness of the MNJTF and other bilateral as well as multilateral security arrangements. Another very significant factor to consider is that the poor cooperation by Nigeria's contiguous neighbours is not all occasioned by a seeming deliberate effort on their part but rather the weak capacity of the countries, with perhaps the relative exception of Cameroon, to enforce border control. This places a strain on Nigeria's border management agencies. Worsening this is the fact that the various border committees and commissions established by the Nigerian Government are not properly task-organized to facilitate cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours on border management. The Nigeria Boundary Commission that is responsible for all border matters, internal and external, appears overwhelmed by problems of communal boundary disputes within Nigeria and therefore too occupied to effectively cope with international border issues.

8.7 Issue Six: Employment of Strategic Communication and Partnership

The concept of strategic communications revolves around the notion that nations cannot pursue their interest through the employment of military power alone. Strategic communications combine hard and soft power (otherwise known as smart power) through the planning, coordination and dissemination of desired messages from an organization to an

⁷³ Some scholars believe that the tacit support stems from the fact that some of the countries are land-lock and burdened by tariffs and duties attendant with formal trade. See Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa, NIIA, 2011.

identified target audience.⁷⁴ It entails persuading the international community to stand alongside the country in question or at least stay neutral, and influencing adversaries to believe that one has the power and the will to prevail over them. More pertinent, and in the context of this study, strategic communications entail persuading the nation's citizens to support the policies of government so that a national will is forged to accomplish national strategic objectives. In line with this is the government's strategic engagement of the society, in other words, the leveraging of Public-Private-Partnership in its counter-terrorism effort. However, the Nigerian government engagement of citizens in the formulation and implementation of its counter-terrorism programmes appears inadequate as adjudged from the outcome of my field survey.

8.7.1 Respondents' Opinion on the Adequacy of Strategic Communication and Public Private Partnership in Countering Terrorism in Nigeria

Respondents were asked for their opinion regarding the adequacy of strategic communications and PPP in counter-terrorism in Nigeria. About three-quarters of the respondents opined that the government's efforts at enlightening, persuading or engaging the citizens in its counter-terrorism effort were poor. Furthermore, it appeared from my field survey that people's trust and confidence in the government to secure their lives and property from the scourge of terrorism were low. This is judging from the opinion of respondents as to whether the Government of Nigeria is winning the fight against terrorism. More than half of the respondents felt that the government is at present not winning the fight. Some respondents preferred not to give a direct "Yes or No" answer. The large number of people not sure of the government's efforts to defeat terrorism further emphasizes the imperative of strategic communication that targets citizens' trust and confidence as well as their willingness to partner with government.

⁷⁴ J Nkwocha, "Strategic communications: The missing factor in Nigeria's downstream business" excerpt from paper delivered at International Conference on Refining & Petrochemicals organised by the University of Port Harcourt, 27 Sep 13.

8.7.2 Collaborating/Contending Arguments and Analysis

It was observed during a three-day Strategic Communications Workshop on Counter Terrorism organized jointly by the National Defence College Abuja and the ONSA from 9-11 December 2013 that Nigeria was yet to effectively adopt the concept of strategic communications.⁷⁵ This was in spite of the ideological underpinnings of the Boko Haram sect which aim at driving public opinion against the government. It was further noted that there ought to be a strategic communications counter-narrative that targets the local populace, the international community and even the terrorists in order to win perception and influence attitudes favourably towards the Nigerian government's efforts.

According to Bello, the inadequate engagement of citizens by the government in its counter-terrorism efforts was a concern.⁷⁶ He added that this partly accounted for citizens' lack of trust and confidence on the government to secure their lives and property from the scourge of terrorism. Daramola observed that the situation is worsened by the absence of an institution in the form of a think tank centre or superintending body that will draw together all stakeholders in the public and private sector involved in the operations of strategic communications.⁷⁷ In a similar vein, Iredia observed that the media which, as the dominant means of communication, ought to be the pivot of strategic communication in Nigeria is yet to be properly integrated or co-opted into government's counter-terrorism efforts.⁷⁸ The import of all these factors is that the attainment of strategic communications requires a multi-disciplinary and multi-track approach to counter the frames and narratives of the terrorists, restore government legitimacy and win public confidence. This suggests and aligns with the

⁷⁵ M. S. Dasuki, Key Note Address presented at the Strategic Communications Plan Workshop for Counter Insurgency in Nigeria held at the National Defence College Abuja, 9 December 2014.

⁷⁶ S. Y. Bello, Presidential Coordinator Counter Terrorism Department, interviewed 23 April 2013.

⁷⁷ K. Daramola, Director Legal Interception Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja. Interviewed 12 November 2014.

⁷⁸ Tony Iredia, Nigeria Television Authority Presentation on Role of the Media in National Security, Mass Media Retreat, May 2013.

imperative of an all-stakeholder approach that employ both governmental and non-governmental means to counter terrorism.

The foregoing appraisal of issues pertaining to the responses of the Nigerian government to the threats of terrorism could be said to have further brought to light a plethora of lapses and challenges plaguing the counter terrorism efforts of the government. These range from inadequate policy and legal frameworks, governance deficit, weak and dysfunctional institutions to poor capacity of security and intelligence agencies. Equally are problems of ill border management and inadequate public-private partnership in the counter-terrorism effort of government. All of these have challenged and made ineffective government's current counter-terrorism efforts as could be adjudged by the continuous terrorist attacks in the country. The situation is worrisome as it creates a feeling of uncertainty as to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. A perhaps worthwhile question to ask given this situation is "what is the likely or possible future trend of terrorism in Nigeria"? The answer here is important as it is reckoned that such projection, combined with the appraisal of government responses made so far, stand to provide a better spectrum for suggesting an effective counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

8.8 Future Trends of Terrorism in Nigeria

The future trends of terrorism in Nigeria could be viewed through the prism of current developments in the country and those in the external environment that affects it. The developments that could shape the future of terrorism in Nigeria that will be examined are the outcome of the 2015 Nigeria's general elections, the role of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the activities of civil society organizations. The others are Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbours, the commitment of the international community and regional issues.

8.8.1 Outcome of 2015 General Election

A general election into Nigeria's Fifth Republic executive and legislative offices at the national level took place on 28 March 2015 while that at state level was held on 11 April 2015. Elections in Nigeria are more often than not accompanied with violence predicated on allegations of electoral malpractices. There was therefore prior to the elections anxiety on the part of Nigerians and the international community that in the event of such electoral violence in 2015, the already volatile security situation in the country could further degenerate. The terrorists could consequently take advantage of the situation to further their cause. The situation could also have necessitated further engagement of Nigeria's security forces that are already overstretched in internal security and counter-terrorism operations. This could have given the terrorists tactical and operational advantage and consequently prolonged the terrorism situation in Nigeria.

What was more significant about the outcome of the general election was who emerged as the President of Nigeria. This was predicated on the grounds that both the northern and southern politicians laid claims as to the region that ought to occupy the office of the President. As noted in chapter four, politics and religion in Nigeria are closely linked, and in almost the same manner that extreme Islamism is thought to be linked to terrorism. It was thus the view in some quarters that some Muslims in the northern part of the country may be sympathetic to the Boko Haram terrorist cause if Goodluck Jonathan or another southern Christian emerged as the President following the elections. Similarly, there were apprehensions that if a northern Muslim emerged as President, militancy in the Niger Delta region could resurface ostensibly in protest over the region being denied a second tenure as President. There were pronouncements by former militant leaders such as Asari Dokubo to this effect. Inter-party rivalry particularly between the then ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and the then opposition All Peoples' Congress (APC) heated the polity along these lines. There were

allegations by the PDP of APC's sponsorship of Boko Haram activities while the APC accused the ruling PDP of fuelling terrorism in the North East of the country (where it had less political support) in order to scuttle the conduct of elections there. In a nutshell, predictions were rife that Boko Haram terrorism could further assume more political colouration thereby providing the terrorists a political cause that could plunge the country into grave insurgency along ethno-religious lines.

The general elections were eventually conducted in a climate of relative peace, but the issues they raised are still potent. The APC presidential candidate, Major General Muhammed Buhari (retired) emerged victorious and was sworn in as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria on 29 May 2015. The APC also won more seats in the National Assembly and in 19 of 28 states declared by INEC thereby turning the tide between it and the PDP as the ruling and opposition party respectively. An observation pertinent to this study however is that the voting pattern in the election reflected the age-long security dilemma of North-South and Muslim-Christian divide. Equally, the north-eastern part of the country where terrorism prevails voted massively against the PDP, which is a probable indication of their dissatisfaction with the PDP-led government's counter-terrorism policies. There are compelling reasons to argue that the future trend of terrorism in Nigeria would therefore be largely determined by how committed the recently inaugurated government of President Buhari is in tackling the wider political and socio-economic issues affecting the Nigerian state. It could further be influenced by the political will to fight terrorism and in line with this, the counter-terrorism approach of the government.

So far, President Muhammadu Buhari has promised to reposition the Nigerian military and other security agencies to contain the activities of Boko Haram. It is opined that he could muster his advantage of being a northerner and a Muslim to mobilise the support of the people and traditional institutions in Northern Nigeria to contain the terrorism perpetrated by

Boko Haram. The problem would however be in the Niger Delta where he needs to pay significant attention to the yet to be fully resolved grievances of the militants and inhabitants of the area. Not doing this could provoke a resurgence of terrorist activities by the militants in the Niger Delta, other areas that may feel marginalised in the current political arrangement.

8.8.2 Role of Civilian Joint Task Force

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a vigilante organization established by some youths and able-bodied men to confront the activities of Boko Haram. Their emergence, Ross contends, was largely due to the over-stretching of government forces and the need to defend towns and villages where there was a deficit in security coverage.⁷⁹ The youths and able-bodied men summoned the courage to organise themselves into 'neighbourhood watch groups' against the sect in defence of their communities. Although they bore no firearms, their emergence significantly complemented the efforts of the security agencies particularly in information-gathering, which assisted in the arrest and killing of many Boko Haram members, including high profile commanders. They were equally able to effect arrest of suspected Boko Haram members on their own effort. According to Isang, the group arrested over 2,500 suspected members of Boko Haram between May and August 2013 using only sticks, disused iron rods and machetes.⁸⁰ The success that they achieved won them the tacit approval and support of both the security agencies and the government. This was more so as the security agencies that lacked the support of the locals were with the emergence of the CJTF given a boost to dislodge Boko Haram terrorists from some towns and villages such as Michika and the Maiduguri environs.⁸¹

⁷⁹ W. Ross, "Nigeria's Vigilante's Take on Boko Haram", *BBC News Africa Documentary*, 13 November 2013.

⁸⁰ P. J. Isang, Army Headquarters Abuja, interviewed 17 March 2014.

⁸¹ Z. Lorenzo, "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2013). pp. 21-34.

Similar to the CJTF is the mobilisation of local hunters to defend communities threatened or attacked by Boko Haram terrorists. The local hunters have good knowledge of both the human and physical terrain. Armed with Dane guns, spears and other traditional weapons for hunting, and relying on courage and the support of locals, the hunters assisted the military in confronting the terrorists with significant success.⁸² For instance, they complemented the military effort in recapturing towns such as Mubi, Maiha, Gwoza and Chibok which had earlier been overrun by the terrorists.⁸³

The involvement of the locals in complementing military effort is a novel and unfolding concept in counter terrorism in Nigeria. It demonstrates the zeal of the society for a collective effort or mechanism against the threat of terrorism. The point, however, that the use of non-state institutions for national security purposes could be considered a failure or break-down in the fabric of the state should not be lost. This is when one takes into account the Weberian notion that the state ought to have the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in safeguarding citizens and property.⁸⁴ Equally worth consideration is the tendency for their misuse or their getting out of state control. So far, the Nigerian government welcomes the initiative, viewing it as the citizens' exercise of their rights to defend themselves and the nation.⁸⁵ The government has equally avowed to regulate the activities of the CJTF and local hunters to ensure that they do not go out of their way to constitute a security problem in the long run. It is projected that as people continue to bear the brunt of terrorism, so would they develop ways and means of resilience and self-defence, a situation that security agencies and the government could exploit in the counter-terrorism effort. The sustenance and refinement

⁸² See *This Day*, 13 November 2014

⁸³ See *Premium Times*, 13 November 2014.

⁸⁴ Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78. Also see K. Grechenig and M. Kolmar, "The State's Enforcement Monopoly and Private Protection of Property" *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 170, Issue 1 (2014), pp. 5-23.

⁸⁵ Press Brief by Mike Omeri, the Coordinator National Information Centre Abuja, 4 December 2014.

of such partnership between the government/security agencies and the locals could positively shape the countering of terrorism in Nigeria.

8.8.3 Activities of Civil Society Organisations

Counter-terrorism measures are geared towards ensuring the security of people and the society at large. However, as scholars such as Howell and Lind posit, some of the fundamental human rights and liberties of people often end up being infringed upon by such measures.⁸⁶ It is this infringement of the rights and wellbeing of the people that is of interest to the civil society. This interest sometimes conflicts with that of the security agencies because the civil societies deem some counter-terrorism measures to be contravening civil liberties and rights.⁸⁷

In Nigeria, the civil society is as large, diverse and complex as its population. It includes organizations of different capacities, influence and degrees of formalities such as non-governmental, faith-based, professional, community-based, religious and traditional institutions as well as the media. Their activities include informal conflict mediation, reporting of incidents of armed violence, community education and victim assistance. They operate at grassroots level through community-based work and up to the federal level where they collaborate with government authorities as well as international actors.

In relation to terrorism in Nigeria, the government and security agencies have come under severe criticism for human right abuses in the effort to contain terrorism. This is as the government counter-terrorism approach has been mainly military-centred with allegations of brutality, collateral damage, indiscriminate arrests and detentions as well as extra-judicial killings. In June 2013, the National Human Rights Commission made a comprehensive report

⁸⁶ Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind, "Counter-terrorism measures and civil society in the UK and US" being paper delivered at NCVO/ESRC NGPA seminar series at the London School of Economics, 6 March 2009.

⁸⁷ See for instance Amnesty International June 2015 report, *Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands* which indicted the Nigerian military for war crimes.

of torture, extra-judicial killings and collateral damage by Nigerian security agencies at Baga town in Borno State.⁸⁸ Another such incriminating report was that by Amnesty International in June 2015.⁸⁹ Perhaps the group that has turned out more vocal recently is the Bring Back Our Girls campaign group whose membership includes former federal government ministers and politicians. The group came into existence following the capture of 276 girls of Government Secondary School in Chibok. It attained local and international recognition because of its tenacity of purpose, criticism of government counter-terrorism measures and support from other human right groups within and outside Nigeria.

The support of the international community (particularly states such as the US and UK) to the civil society organisations has boosted the latter's activities. In November 2014, the US government gave grants worth 9.2 million US Dollar to the civil society organisations in Nigeria.⁹⁰ Funds from sources such as this assist the organisations in promoting the rights of Nigerians and advocating for soft and "humane" counter-terrorism measures as against the use of brutal military force. Thus, while putting government on its toes to use all soft means to bring terrorism to an end, it could be said that the civil society's often conflicting interests with those of the military tends to slows down the military efforts. Since the government counter-terrorism efforts are mainly military-driven, the conflict of interest between the civil security organisations and the military may need to be bridged so as not to prolong the efforts to contain terrorism in Nigeria. This raises the need for the harmonisation of the efforts of the organisations with that of the government if a concerted and holistic approach to the containment of terrorism in Nigeria is to be achieved early.

⁸⁸ See "The Baga Incident and the Situation in North East Nigeria: An Interim Assessment and Report". Report by the National Human Rights Commission Nigeria, June 2013, available at premiumtimesng.com, accessed 26 November 2014.

⁸⁹ Amnesty International (UK), 2015.

⁹⁰ Stella Omona, "U.S. Gives \$9.2M to CSOs to Promote Democracy in Nigeria" *Daily Independent*, 11 November 2014.

8.8.4 Nigeria – Immediate Neighbours' Relations

Nigeria enjoys a considerable measure of cordial relationships with its immediate neighbours. It has bilateral agreement on defence and security with Niger Republic.⁹¹ As part of the agreement, joint military patrols are conducted to enhance security along the Nigeria – Niger border. Nigeria also has multilateral security agreements with Chad and Niger, which led to the establishment of a MNJTF in 1998 with its headquarters at Baga in Borno State.⁹² The MNJTF was originally established to check cross-border banditry and criminal activities such as human, arms and drug trafficking. However, with the upsurge of Boko Haram attacks in 2009, the Force's mandate was expanded to include counter-terrorism operations. This became necessary with the realisation that the Boko Haram terrorists were using the areas along the countries' common border as a safe haven.

The availability of safe havens in the neighbouring countries for Boko Haram to regroup and carry out training of their members possibly accounts to a large extent for the continued scourge of terrorism in Nigeria.⁹³ Worsening the situation is the fact that Nigeria has until recently received limited support from some of the neighbouring countries thereby enabling Boko Haram to secure external links and sustain itself. This was particularly the case with Cameroon which initially rebuffed diplomatic efforts by Nigeria for a joint security arrangement to counter Boko Haram.⁹⁴ In April and May 2014 however, following French initiatives, Nigeria entered into a joint agreement with the four Francophone contiguous countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.⁹⁵ The agreement covered an increased level

⁹¹ M. Bello, "Boko Haram: Nigeria, Niger Begin Joint Border Patrol", *This Day*, (Lagos), 16 Oct 12

⁹² B. J. Adele, "The Boko Haram Crisis and Nigeria's External Relations", *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2013), pp. 6-9. The headquarters was relocated to Ndjamena, the Capital City of Chad in July 2015.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ "Nigeria and Cameroon may clash over Boko Haram", *The Punch*, 1 March 2014.

⁹⁵ Kingsley Omonobi, "Nigeria: Terror – Nigeria, France, Four Others Join Forces" *Vanguard*, 19 Mar 2014, available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/03/terror-nigeria-france-4-others-join-forces/#sthash.k2vZrnXS.dpuf>, accessed 3 Apr 14.

of coordination and exchange of intelligence, effective policing of common borders and the repatriation of suspected terrorists in conformity with existing protocols. It also recommended the adoption of a doctrine proposed by President Goodluck Jonathan that “an act of terror against one nation is an act of terror against all.”⁹⁶ This was to ensure that the reactions of member-states to acts of terror were spontaneous and concerted. These efforts were cemented by President Buhari who undertook a state tour to all the four neighbouring countries in June and July 2015.

Another concerted effort by Nigeria and her immediate neighbours that could positively influence the containment of terrorism is the resuscitation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The commission was created on 22 May 1964 by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The Republic of Central Africa and Libya later joined in 1996 and 2008 respectively. The aim of the Commission is to manage the shared water resources of the Lake Chad Basin and promote regional integration, peace and security. In October 2014, an extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission was held in Niger’s capital, Niamey, to discuss terrorism in the region. The meeting reviewed ongoing collaboration against terror attacks and agreed on joint action to further curb insurgency within and across their common borders. The leaders further agreed to establish a multinational joint task force, define a common strategy and to forward a draft resolution to the UN Security Council and the AU for a legal framework on cross-border military operations against terrorism. A major issue noted by the Commission was that the armed forces of member countries operated only within their respective territories thus, the new focus was to get them work as a team.⁹⁷ This means that with the new focus of the commission, the armed forces of the member states could work together, allowing them

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Press brief by the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Mr Sanusi Abdullahi on 20 November 2014 in Abuja. Also see “Terrorism: Lake Chad Member Countries To Send Draft Resolution To UN, AU”, *Leadership Newspaper*, 26 November 2014.

access to operate in a joint manner in each other's territory to rid the region of terrorist activities. If this cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours is sustained, it holds a good prospect in shaping positively the efforts at countering terrorism not only in Nigeria but the sub-region as well.

8.8.5 Commitment of the International Community

As earlier noted, terrorism in Nigeria cannot be contained by Nigeria alone. The country requires international support to counter terrorism in the same way the terrorists require external support to sustain themselves and further their cause. The Boko Haram sect is known to have ties with the broader al-Qaeda network. A significant number of Boko Haram members are believed to have received training in Afghanistan, Yemen and Sudan, all of which have at one time or the other been enclaves for al-Qaeda and its affiliates.⁹⁸ Some documents discovered in Usama Bin Laden's Abbottabad compound in May 2011 also indicated that Boko Haram leaders have been in contact with the leadership of al-Qaeda.⁹⁹ It is thought to have established links with AQIM and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQIP).¹⁰⁰ The AQIM is known to support Boko Haram with funds, training and weapons including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS).¹⁰¹ Boko Haram is also acknowledged to have external support from other terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab. The Al-Shabaab group allegedly supports Boko Haram with training on guerrilla tactics, propaganda machinery and suicide terrorist operations.¹⁰² Ansaru, the offshoot of Boko Haram also has links with AQIM and the Movement for Oneness for Jihad in West Africa as mentioned earlier. The links terrorists in Nigeria enjoy with similar terrorist groups and organizations outside Nigeria portray the international dimension of terrorism in Nigeria and the need for the commitment

⁹⁸ See "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency", *International Crisis Group*, p.23 – 24.

⁹⁹ "Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru", *United States Department of State*, 13 November 2013.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ C. J. Radin, "Threat of Boko Haram and International Allies" *Long War Journal*. Vol 3, No 6 2010.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

of the international community in containing it. How committed the international community has been and particularly would be is however an issue that could shape the countering of terrorism in Nigeria.

Nigeria has received assistance in the form of security training, intelligence support and emergency relief from countries such as the US, UK, France, Germany and China. For instance, in 2012, a team from the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was in ONSA to assist in the formulation of a national counter terrorism strategy for Nigeria.¹⁰³ On its part, the United States through its United States Army Africa team commenced a three-phased counter terrorism training of a battalion of the Nigerian Army from April 2014.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, organisations such as the UN and the EU have contributed to the counter-terrorism efforts of the Government of Nigeria through grants and humanitarian assistance. In December 2013, the EU co-organised a symposium in Abuja aimed at reviewing the Nigerian government counter-terrorism strategy to conform to democratic best practices.

Some Nigerians however believe that the Western nations are not doing enough to help the country contain terrorism. This is in the light of their refusal (particularly in the case of the US) to sell arms to it under the guise of the Leahy Amendment. The Amendment stipulates that no assistance shall be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the US Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.¹⁰⁵ The US in this wise cited human rights abuses by the Nigerian security agencies and corruption by the government as its reasons for the refusal.¹⁰⁶ There are however recent moves by the US to relax the Leahy Agreement following bilateral talks with the new government of President Buhari.

¹⁰³ T. T., Waya, interviewed 17 January 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Department of Training and Operations Nigerian Army Headquarters Brief, Abuja, 12 July 2014.

¹⁰⁵ The Leahy Amendment is contained in Section 620 M of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).

¹⁰⁶ The United States point to the Leahy Agreement as the basis for its actions.

Another dimension to the perceived inadequate support of the US is the alleged CIA's prediction in 2000 that Nigeria would be a failed state by 2015.¹⁰⁷ The refusal by the US to sell arms to Nigeria was consequently viewed in some quarters through the lens of this prediction and hence, it has been postulated that the US may be deliberately allowing the disintegration of Nigeria. In December 2014, Nigeria announced the cancellation of an ongoing US training of a Nigerian Army battalion on counter-terrorism. This was ostensibly in protest over US refusals to sell her arms, although the Nigerian government officially stated that it was due to its inability to cope up with the logistics requirement of the US. Nigeria subsequently turned to Russia for acquisition of weapons to counter Boko Haram.¹⁰⁸ Nigeria also secretly employed the services of a South African private security company known as Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection. Although the government stated that the engagement of the company was for purely advisory purposes, there are indications of its conduct of mercenary activities in the North East of Nigeria between March and May 2015.¹⁰⁹

It is plausible that Nigeria may not want military assistance that would involve foreign combat troops on its soil as in the case of French operations against Islamic terrorists in Mali. However, the country does require actionable intelligence on the terrorists' sponsors, movement, finance and sources of arms. It equally requires military equipment to confront the terrorists and safeguard its territorial integrity. These requirements, in addition to other non-kinetic assistance, rest largely on the commitment of the international community. Thus, the commitment of the international community could shape the future of terrorism in Nigeria.

¹⁰⁷ See <http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2012/02/10/nigeria-and-the-2015-break-up-prediction/>

¹⁰⁸ De Capua "Analyst Weigh Nigeria-Russia Arms Deal", *Voice of America*, 10 December 2014. , accessed 12 September 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Daji Sanī, "Buhari: It is shameful that the military has not crushed Boko Haram", *This Day Newspaper*, 18 May 2015. Also, Wale Akinselure "How South African mercenaries helped Nigeria to rout Boko Haram" *Nigerian Tribune Newspaper*, 12 May 2015.

8.8.6 Regional Issues

Regional issues, and particularly conflicts in the West Africa and African region greatly influence events in Nigeria. This is evident in Boko Haram terrorism. Boko Haram exploited the political vacuum created by the conflict in Mali between 2011 and 2013 to establish links with the Islamic terrorists groups there, thereby facilitating its access to logistics, recruitment, training and other support. Similarly, the Arab Spring and in particular the Libyan Crisis left in their aftermath ungoverned spaces for terrorism to thrive within Nigeria's neighbourhood. The rebels from the North African countries became ready sources of manpower and their military hardware a source of weapons for the terrorists.

Also of significance is the poor socio-economic state of the countries that are within Nigeria's neighbourhood. The Sahel region is characterised by unfavourable climatic conditions resulting in drought that make farming and other occupation difficult. The inhabitants are therefore poor and often have to migrate south and northwards in search of a means of livelihood. They thus can become ready foot-soldiers for terrorists. The number of Tuaregs from Libya and Mali as well as Chadians and Nigerians so far arrested in connection with terrorism in Nigeria buttress the significance of the demographic factor occasioned by regional socio-economic and political crisis. Thus, developments that could have remained domestic concerns escalate to sub-regional and regional levels. It is in this light that the otherwise home-grown terrorism in Nigeria, as Boko Haram initially was, became connected with AQIM and other networks thereby attaining regional status. Terrorism has continued to expand by thriving on the weak capacity of governments of the region to effectively counter it. Conflict resolution mechanisms and security frameworks at both individual country and collective (regional) levels are a concern. This is so as attempts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU to establish such mechanisms and frameworks before now had largely remained at proposal level, or at best only partly

implemented. However, with the recent backing of the UN (and international regional organizations such as the EU as well as countries like the US), the AU standby force under the aegis of the Lake Chad Commission is near to achieving operational status. If the concerted efforts of governments concerned at regional level is sustained, this multilateral security arrangement could potentially hold good prospects for reversing the trend of terrorism in Nigeria.

In summary, the analysis of the responses of the Nigerian government to the threats of terrorism and the issues that could positively or negatively shape the trend of terrorism tend to indicate that government responses have not yielded expected outcomes. It equally reveals a trend that presupposes uncertainty as to the immediate containment of terrorism in Nigeria. This brings to the fore the need for a sustainable and effective national counter terrorism strategy for Nigeria. It is on the question of such a strategy that the next chapter focuses.

CHAPTER NINE

TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA

9.1 Preamble

Defeating terrorism is more difficult and far-reaching than we have assumed....We may be advancing the ball down the field at will, running over our opponent's defences, but winning the game is another matter altogether.

- Wesley Clark¹

The above assertion indicates the complexity of counter-terrorism, and of arriving at acceptable parameters for judging its success or otherwise. More significant to this study is the question of appropriate and workable strategies. In the Campbell Systematic Review, it was observed "that there is an almost complete absence of evaluation research on counter-terrorism strategies."² It added that for the few studies available, some strategies do not appear to be effective as they "either didn't work or sometimes increased the likelihood of terrorism and terrorism-related harm."³ This seems to reflect the Nigerian situation as this researcher found no evidence of a comprehensive review of Nigeria's responses or strategy to counter terrorism either by policy makers or researchers. In his inaugural presidential speech, Buhari alluded to this fact when he submitted that his government intends after defeating Boko Haram:

...to commission a sociological study to determine the origin, remote and immediate causes of the movement, its sponsors, the international connections to ensure that measures are taken to prevent a recurrence of this evil.⁴

¹ Wesley Clark, *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), p. 5.

² Lum C, Kennedy LW, Sherley, AJ. "The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies." *Campbell Systematic Reviews* (Newark: Campbell Collaboration, 2009), p. 4.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Muhammadu Buhari, Inaugural Speech during Swearing-in Ceremony as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at Abuja on 29 May, 2015.

While considering the proposal worthy, this researcher is of the opinion that the more appropriate thing for the government to do could be to conduct such an exercise even as the terrorism perpetrated by the sect is ongoing. This could be in the form of a counter-terrorism review that would address the lapses inherent in the current strategy with the aim of effectively containing the activities of the group.

Following the lack of evaluation of strategies by past and current regimes, it could be said that the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism effort has continued to be largely ill-defined, reactionary and ad hoc. Some of the responses as observed in the previous chapters and particularly those involving the use of military force have instead created unanticipated negative consequences. This is worrisome considering that huge sum of money, estimated at 4.62 trillion Naira (23.2 billion US Dollar) was expended on the fight against terrorism between 2011 and 2015.⁵ Arising from this background, I will in this chapter look at the current posture of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy both in theory, that is, policy (as spelt out in the NACTEST, TPA and presidential directives) and in practice or what obtains on the ground. This will dovetail into the fundamental question of the way forward in terms of a sustainable and effective counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

9.2 Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Policy versus Practice

The policy framework for counter-terrorism in Nigeria, as has previously been noted, is primarily enshrined in the NACTEST. The NACTEST is a 48-page document endorsed by President Goodluck Jonathan on 30 April 2014 and subsequently released for execution. It contains such aspects as the nature of the terrorist threat that Nigeria faces, the response guidelines and mechanism, the roles of stakeholders as well as institutions involved in countering terrorism. The NACTEST is organised into five work streams each with its key objectives. The work streams are Forestall, Secure, Identify, Prepare and Implement.

⁵ Morgan Windsor, "Goodluck Jonathan's Administration Spent Trillions On Nigerian National Security In Past Five Years Yet Boko Haram Remains: Report" *International Business Times*, 19 June, 2015.

Forestall aims to stop people from becoming terrorists, Secure strengthens protection capacity against terrorists and Identify aims at pre-emption through detection and early warning. The Prepare work stream has the objective of mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks while Implement outlines the framework for the mobilisation of a coordinated cross-governmental counter-terrorism effort. Although its formulation and release is a commendable achievement by the Government of Nigeria, there are identified gaps which need to be addressed for it to provide the necessary strategic framework for countering terrorism in Nigeria. The gaps as obtained from my field survey and secondary data are outlined in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 Gaps in Nigeria's National Counter Terrorism Strategy

Serial	Observed Gaps	Implications of Gap
1	Silent on the national definition of terrorism.	Poses a challenge to policy implementation as terrorist acts could be subjected to varying interpretations.
2	Placed its driving organ, the Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) under the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA).	This could inhibit the effective implementation of the strategy because the NSA does not have executive functions but advisory roles (as an adviser to the President).
3	Tends to solely emphasise the Boko Haram Sect.	Its provisions may not readily apply to other categories of terrorism or terrorist-related threats that could arise.
4	Government's disposition to negotiation with terrorists not stated.	Raises doubts and suspicion on policy trust of government.
5	Silent on the protection of Nigeria's interests abroad and on responses to state-sponsored terrorism.	Necessary contingency plans may not be developed.
6	Discrepancies and lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities assigned to MDAs for implementation.	Erodes the authority or command directive NACTEST as a policy instrument ought to have.
7	No designated lead ministry or agency.	Makes the coordination of MDAs involve in counter-terrorism difficult.
8	Ambiguity on the Nigerian government's overall strategic approach.	Could result in disconnect between policy-makers and implementation agencies.

Source: Author's compilation, 2015.⁶

Among the gaps outlined in the table and crucial to this study is the ambiguity of the Nigerian Government's overall strategic approach. A defined strategic approach to counter terrorism is a prerequisite in the articulation and implementation of a counter-terrorism strategy. This is more so given the fact that terrorism situations differ from nation to nation, therefore requiring that a nation's counter-terrorism approach captures the threat situation or the circumstances that are peculiar to it. For instance, the Israeli counter terrorism strategy is military-centred because terrorism in that country is often associated with the military wing of formidable armed political groups such as Hamas. Equally, security threat to the country and consequently its threat perception has often been traditional (against the existence of the state) thereby requiring a military approach. On the other hand, the UK counter-terrorism strategy employs the criminal justice model, which is based on law enforcement and respect for human rights. Similarly, the US counter terrorism strategy, which emphasises global reach to contain al-Qaeda, has between its 2003 and 2011 versions of the NSCT witnessed an increasing shift from emphasis on war to more liberal democratic counter-terrorism practices. The highlights of the UK CONTEST and the US NSCT as examples of national counter-terrorism strategies have been discussed in chapter two.

The NACTEST is not clear on the Nigerian Government's strategic approach. Evidence on the ground indicate a hard traditional military approach to counter-terrorism. However, comments from the ONSA that supervises NACTEST have often been that Nigeria was employing a soft approach to counter-terrorism.⁷ The picture presented to the public by the policy makers therefore appears different from what obtains on the ground. It could be surmised that in practice, Nigeria's counter-terrorism posture could be said to be more

⁶ See Office of the National Security Adviser, *The National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)*, 2014. Data obtained from interviews, National Defence College Abuja syndicate groups presentations and publications were used in the compilation.

⁷ Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, paper presented on the Roll Out of Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism held in Abuja, 18 March 2014.

military driven as opposed to law enforcement. The problem here is the attendant collateral damage and human rights abuses which, as noted earlier in the study, have not only tended to alienate the military from the public but also attracted condemnation particularly from civil societies and some members of the international community.⁸

Rosendorff and Sandler's dilemma of appropriate response to terrorism comes to play here. While too little response at some points has portrayed the Nigerian Government as weak, too much response in terms of employment of the military strategy has on the other hand made it appear tyrannical with attendant opposition.⁹ In the northeast of Nigeria, for instance, the local population have often complained of harsh security measures such as imposition of curfew following declaration of a state of emergency, conduct of searches especially of women wearing hijab dress, the establishment of check points, and restrictions on social activities. The resentment to the deployment of the military to the area is to such an extent that the Northern Elders and traditional rulers have sometimes called on the Nigerian Government to withdraw military troops from the area.¹⁰

The resort of the Nigerian Government to employ military force could be understood from some viewpoints. As stated in chapter three, the military was the only institution and element of national power that the colonial government could be said to have fully developed and bequeathed to post-colonial Nigeria. Also, the use of military force became inevitable as the terrorist did not only engage in armed confrontation with security forces but also the seizure and occupation of Nigeria's territory. The sophistication of the terrorists was such that the police were overwhelmed, and as the constitution of Nigeria provided, the military had to intervene in such circumstances. According to Michael Clarke, "When military power is

⁸ For example Amnesty International allegations of extrajudicial killings in their report *Rank on Their Shoulders. Blood in Their Hands* and the United States refusal to sell arms to Nigeria on claims of human right abuses by the Nigerian military.

⁹ Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing?: The Proactive Response Dilenma", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Sage Publications Inc, 2004), p. 659.

¹⁰ "Borno Elders Join Call On FG To Withdraw JTF" Sahara Reporters, 14 July 2011, available online at <http://saharareporters.com/2011/07/14/borno-elders-join-call-fg-withdraw-jtf>, accessed 24 May 2014.

really required, nothing else will do”¹¹ General David Richards, while contesting the assertion that there is no military solution to a given crisis posits that, “history is clear: there will sometimes be no alternative to standing up for oneself, for one’s friends or for what is right.... In times of crisis, military strength is comfortingly reassuring.”¹² The point however is that while the dependence on the military by the Nigerian Government in its counter-terrorism drive is considered sometimes expedient, concerns have been raised over the manner of its employment and the general conduct of troops in the theatre of operations.

The professional standard of the Nigerian military in counter-terrorism has been questionable. This is especially in the areas of civil-military relations, human rights observance and general rules of engagement of the military. Also, the terrorists have kept changing tactics in an asymmetrical warfare that has challenged the Nigerian military in terms of capacity. Onuoha notes that although the Nigerian military was able to use conventional tactics to recapture territories held by the terrorists, it has been unable to cope with the terrorists’ unconventional tactics of suicide bombings, abductions and guerrilla attacks.¹³ All these suggests a re-strategizing of the Nigerian Government counter-terrorism efforts and to this end, the exploitation of other lines of counter terrorism effort (non-military or soft) for their employment either alongside the military or essentially on their own as the situation dictates. Rineheart made a distinction between “hard” and “soft” power responses to terrorism noting that this requires restructuring the counter-terrorism debate around a direct and indirect approach.¹⁴ He sees the direct approach as an enemy-centric doctrine consisting of primarily offensive hard power tactics as earlier discussed. The indirect or soft power approach on the other hand consists of population-centric methods with features such as capacity building,

¹¹ See Michael Clarke, cover note in Adrian Johnson, ed., *Wars in Peace: British Military Operations Since 1991* (London: RUSI, 2014).

¹² General David Richards (UK Chief of Defence Staff, 2009-2013), Forward in Adrian Johnson, eds., 2014.

¹³ Freedom C. Onuoha, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for African Research Studies Abuja, interviewed 2 June 2015.

¹⁴ Jason Rineheart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency” in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Terrorism Research Initiative, Vol 4, No 5 (2010).

economic development, counter-extremism, de-radicalization and community integration that focus on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive.¹⁵ In religious, ideological and socio-economic grievance-driven cases of terrorism such as Nigeria appears to have had and is currently experiencing, winning the hearts and minds of the citizens as well as those of the terrorists and their sympathisers are significant. Measures aimed at national orientation, winning the confidence of the populace and social re-engineering including granting concessions to the terrorists could arguably in such situations better contain terrorism than the traditional hard approach.

As would be highlighted subsequently, the scope and possibilities of measures to counter terrorism as well as their application have continued to broaden. This is as scholars continue to research and make inroads into the field of counter-terrorism that could be described as living and dynamic. Of importance to this study is finding the balance or right combination between hard and soft approaches to counter-terrorism as this is arguably the key to a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy. It is in this wise that counter-terrorism techniques that cut across hard and soft strategic approaches are examined.

9.3 Counter Terrorism Techniques

As stated earlier, counter-terrorism models are often categorised into the military and the criminal justice or law enforcement model.¹⁶ Shettima views counter-terrorism from three “Ds” perspectives of Defence, Diplomacy and Dialogue. Defence here has to do with the military approach, diplomacy with international cooperation and dialogue in terms of negotiation with or concessions to terrorists. The Lutzs in their discourse on techniques of counter-terrorism identified nine possible responses to terrorism, a combination of which could be said to form the counter-terrorism strategies of many governments.¹⁷ These are

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ P. Wilkinson and A. P. Schmid, “Framework for Conceptualizing Terrorism” in *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 16 Issue 2 (2006), pp.197-221.

¹⁷ J. Lutz and B. Lutz. *Global Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2013), P.214.

increased security, intelligence gathering (detection and prevention), disrupting finances, repression, retaliation or punishment, pre-emptive action, use of special counter-terrorism units, concessions and reforms as well as diplomatic approaches. I will discuss each of these as an embodiment to a possible counter-terrorism strategy that Nigeria could adopt.

9.3.1 Increased Security

The Lutzs opine that increasing security around critical targets or personnel is an obvious response which many nations have used to counter the threat posed by terrorists.¹⁸ They however observe that there are far too many targets for security measures to be effective. Also, security measures cannot eliminate all dangers of terrorist attacks and may equally have only temporary effects in reducing attacks. The terrorists could also change tactics or shift to less protected targets. Enders and Sandler note that after September 11, protective actions in terms of increased security by developing countries led to terrorist groups transferring attacks to weakly protected zones in developing countries.¹⁹

In Nigeria, terrorism has occasioned the placement of protective security barriers around office buildings and places of worship, increased VIP guards/escorts and checks at airports, hotels and other key places or vulnerable points. Nonetheless, the terrorists still find their way to penetrate some of these places, and particularly concentrate in places where there is less security coverage such as markets, villages and towns in the remote areas of Nigeria's vast swathes of land. Although the gains of increased security cannot easily be quantified, it also comes at a great cost as Lum (et al) noted.²⁰ In Nigeria's 2014 budget, 20 per cent representing 968.27 billion Naira (5.949 billion US Dollar) out of 4.96 trillion Naira (30.486 billion US Dollar) was allocated to the defence sector of which the provision of increased security formed a major component. Thus, resources that would have been devoted to other

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 215.

¹⁹ W. Enders and Todd Sandler, *The Political Economy of Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 2.

²⁰ C. Lum, Kennedy L. W, Sherley, A. J., p. 4.

sectors such as human and infrastructural development are diverted towards increasing security measures. Also is the social cost in terms of infringement on the privacy and fundamental human rights of citizens. The use of Closed Circuit Television cameras, body scanners and eaves-dropping devices are measures that cause disquiet among some in the population. For a population-centric counter-terrorism strategy, this aspect needs to be considered.

9.3.2 Intelligence Gathering – Detection and Prevention

Nations employ their intelligence and security agencies for intelligence gathering and the infiltration of terrorist groups in order to detect, prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks. Depending on its nature, the intelligence could either be of tactical or strategic value. Tactical counter-terrorism intelligence determines the intentions, capabilities and the threat of terrorist groups for day-to-day tactical and operational use. Strategic counter-terrorism intelligence on the other hand centres on trends and patterns in international terrorism and could contribute to changes in foreign policy as well as the amount of resources that are allocated to counter-terrorism.²¹

The multiplicity of targets and of terrorist cells particularly in loose terrorist networks make intelligence gathering and infiltration of groups difficult. In Nigeria, gathering of intelligence is based more on human than technical or electronic means. This currently presents problems for the intelligence agencies. This is more so as the areas affected by Boko Haram terrorism have socio-cultural affinity to the extent that penetration of the group by operatives who are not indigenes is difficult. Owing to this, many security operatives have been identified and killed by the terrorists. The dilemma for Nigeria is that it is not technologically advanced to leverage on the production of modern intelligence equipment and so has to rely almost solely on countries such as the US, UK, China, Israel and others for surveillance and such other

²¹ A. Hunsicker, *Understanding International Counter Terrorism* (Washington: Universal Publishers, 2006), pp. 75-81.

means of monitoring terrorist activities. It is therefore imperative that this dependency is factored into the national counter-terrorism plan while efforts are made to develop local capacity.

9.3.3 Disrupting Finances

The limiting and elimination of financial support for terrorist groups has been used alongside other measures to counter terrorism. Terrorist sources of funding include sponsor governments, private individuals, dummy corporations and charity organizations.²² Money laundering is acknowledged to have contributed to financing terrorism and many financial institutions have either intentionally or unintentionally been involved in the movement of funds in and out of offshore banks.²³ Terrorists are equally known to use the *Hawala* which is an ancient South Asian financial system that is today used around the world to conduct untraceable remittances.²⁴

The use of money laundering and other financial regulations are employed by governments to curtail undesirable flow of funds. However, this has been difficult in Nigeria due to weaknesses in legislations and the capacity of institutions concerned to implement them. The problem of corruption and the fact that Nigeria still operates a largely cash economy also allow for easy and undetected movement of funds. As a means of disrupting terrorist financing, Buckley and Meese suggest the freezing and blocking of financial assets of terrorist leaders and sponsors, adequate intelligence to track the flow of terrorist financing, and law enforcement of terrorist financing.²⁵ These could be considered imperatives for inclusion in Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.3.4 Repression

²² J. Lutz and B. Lutz, p. 278.

²³ Patrick D. Buckley and Michael J. Meese, "The Financial Front in the Global War on Terrorism" in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, *Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment* (Connecticut: McGraw Hills, 2004), pp. 51-61.

²⁴ Matthew Rosenberg, "Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash from Kabul" *The Wall Street Journal*, New York, 25 June 2010.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

It is contended that the presence of a totalitarian political system or powerful authoritarian state is a factor that has made a difference for the occurrence of non-state terrorism or its absence.²⁶ This is owing to their possession of effective intelligence agencies and the ruthless nature of such regimes which enables them manage to avoid terrorist threats by eliminating dissidents or potential dissidents. To this end, repression of violent groups, to a certain extent, is thought to be a counter-terrorism option for all states including democracies.

In Nigeria, repression of what were considered dissident groups was common during the military regimes. Although the regimes were an expression of state terrorism, their repressive responses perhaps helped to curtail the activities of non-state terrorist actors or insurgent-related groups as discussed earlier in chapter five. The irony however was that many of the dissident groups went underground and resurfaced in later democratic regimes. Similarly, Boko Haram was suppressed in July 2009 only to resurface with greater tenacity in 2010. This could imply that a counter-terrorism strategy that emphasises repression may not be sustainable or at best would have only short term benefits.

9.3.5 Retaliation or Punishment

Retaliation as a counter terrorism option is used where there is evidence of support by another country for domestic terrorists. It is thought to be a popular option by states but as the Lutzs aver, it is a choice fraught with difficulties as issues such as interference in the internal affairs of other states often arise.²⁷ The US have applied this technique against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the NATO countries against Libya and Israel against Hamas militants. Retaliations could take forms other than military action. For instance, diplomatic or economic sanctions can be applied against the country suspected of encouraging terrorism as was recently the case against Syria and Iran by the US. It could also be considered an option against a state that refuses to cooperate in the fight against terrorism particularly if such an

²⁶ J. Lutz and B. Lutz, p. 280.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 281.

uncooperative state is contiguous to an affected state requiring support. As noted earlier, it is necessary that responses to state-sponsored terrorism form part of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.3.6 Pre-emptive Action

Pre-emptive strikes directed against the training camps of terrorist groups or against state supporters could be a necessary response for countering terrorist threats. This was widely used by the US against terrorist bases in Pakistan, and France against Islamic militants in Northern Mali. The use of this technique is highly dependent on the acquisition of adequate intelligence on the terrorists particularly the right locations of their training camps and bases. This would avoid strikes at wrong locations or targets that could result in damages that usually prompt hostile reactions by the local population including possible stimulation of the uprising of new dissident groups.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram is known to have its bases in the forests and mountainous areas especially along its border areas with Niger, Chad and Cameroun. The group has also been identified with terrorist training camps in neighbouring countries including Mali and Libya.²⁸

The monitoring and conduct of pre-emptive strikes at terrorist locations within and outside Nigeria could have disrupted terrorist activities in their early stages. Pre-emption ought to also entail proactive rather than reactionary conduct of counter-terrorism operations. This is a worthwhile consideration in the Forestall and Identify work-streams of the NACTEST.

9.3.7 Special Counter Terrorism Units

²⁸ See Jane's Intelligence Report, 2012.

As the Lutzs contend, the establishment and deployment of specially trained counter terrorism units to terrorist affected areas has been a strategic option used by many countries to deal with terrorist situations.²⁹ The units popularly known as Special Forces are often used for pre-emptive strikes, retaliation, in aid of regular security and for search and rescue missions. It is believed that their presence could help to deter some terrorist attacks and discourage hostage taking or actions.³⁰

In the US NSCT, the role of Special Forces is given due recognition. The use of a detachment of the US Marines in the elimination of Usama Bin Laden demonstrates the crucial role the forces could play in the military line of operation of a counter-terrorism strategy. Following the upsurge in terrorist activities in Nigeria, the government established counter-terrorism training schools at Jaji and Kotangora towns. A Special Forces battalion was formed and deployed to north-eastern Nigeria to counter Boko Haram terrorist activities. The lack of equipment and other logistics have however hampered the effectiveness of this unit. In the light of this, Nigeria could reconsider the offer by the US Government for special counter-terrorism training of some units of the Nigerian Army and subsequently inculcate this aspect in the country's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.3.8 Concessions and Reforms

In concessions and reforms, the government seeks to change policies to address grievances that are perceived to have led to the terrorist activities. The process often involves negotiation with the terrorists through intermediaries which some people view as rewarding violence.³¹ The strategy seems to work where there is a real problem or where it is intended to reduce support for dissidents. For instance, the Indian government has used it effectively at times in confronting the Naxalites insurgency. Often however, the demands of the terrorists may be

²⁹ J. Lutz and B. Lutz, p. 286.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Peter Neumann, "Negotiating With Terrorists" in *Foreign Affairs* 86(1) 2007, pp. 128-129.

difficult to meet, or meeting them may stir up grievances in another section of a religiously or ideologically divided country.

In chapters six and seven, two different situations were observed in Nigeria. While negotiations with the Niger Delta militants proved successful as evidenced in their acceptance of the Federal Government Amnesty Programme, it has so far been difficult with the Boko Haram sect. Unlike the Niger Delta militants whose grievances and demands could be said to be socio-economic at root, those of the Boko Haram sect appear to be ideological in their outward expression and hinge on the integrity of the Nigerian state. The hard-line stance of the Boko Haram leadership makes matters worse. For instance, Shekau had, in one of his video messages, stated that it was the Nigerian government that needed an amnesty and not the sect. Negotiations have also failed because of what some regard as insincerity and politicisation of the issue on the part of the Nigerian government.³² The government had however stated that it was open to negotiations once Boko Haram make known its real leadership. The exchange of detained suspected Boko Haram leaders for the 219 Chibok School girls held hostage by the members of the sect has been under consideration by the Government of Nigeria. Aside from negotiation, the inclusion of socio-economic reforms that facilitate counter-radicalization and counter violent extremism could enhance a soft approach for Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.3.9 Diplomatic Approaches

The diplomatic approach involve international cooperation through agreements and joint actions against terrorists by countries. Although problems exist over states' definition of terrorism and the fear of retaliation by some members of the international community, agreements have been reached by many countries on areas such as extradition of suspected

³² Virginia Comolli, p. 119.

terrorists and granting of asylum.³³ The notion that no state can fight terrorism alone has made the diplomatic approach even more significant.

Nigeria has reached out to its immediate neighbours in the counter-terrorism effort against Boko Haram. This has been in the form of bilateral and multilateral actions against the sect and proposals for joint development of the Lake Chad Basin area where Boko Haram has found sanctuary. President Buhari between June and August 2015 paid visit to all the immediate neighbours of Nigeria and to the UK, US and France in an effort to seek both military and diplomatic assistance to counter terrorism in Nigeria. However, diplomatic approaches are arguably complementary to other efforts, meaning that they can only be worthwhile when the nation involved has put other measures in place at the domestic level. In other words, the benefits from international cooperation can only be meaningful when national counter-terrorism efforts are appropriate and sustainable. The import of this is that Nigeria ought to put itself in order in terms of a sustainable and effective national counter-terrorism strategy that would guide its counter-terrorism efforts as well the efforts of nations and international partners supporting or interested in supporting it. It is therefore to the question of a counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria that is both sustainable and effective that I now turn attention to.

9.4 A Sustainable and Effective Counter Terrorism Strategy for Nigeria

It is perhaps worth stating here that the purpose in this section of the thesis is not to make an explicit policy proposal to the Nigerian government. It is rather intended to model what a sensible counter-terrorism strategy could look like, and the elements it could usefully involve, based on the findings of this study. This is more so as the study is undertaken as a mechanism for further exploring the intricate relationship between government policy and action, and the

³³ J. Lutz and B. Lutz, p. 289.

development of terrorist threats thereby requiring what possible shape a strategy for countering such threats should take.

In couching or espousing counter terrorism strategies, a major point pertinent to re-iterate is that the subject of terrorism is complex, and so is counter-terrorism. Wilkinson observes that there is “no universally applicable counter-terrorism policy for democracies. Every conflict involving terrorism has its own unique characteristics.”³⁴ Consequently, counter-terrorism strategies will differ according to the country’s socio-political context, the current threat environment and the will of the government in power. The strategies ought also to be adaptive, and reflective of time and space.

Furthermore and flowing from the definition of counter-terrorism, it could be said that the prevention, deterrence, pre-emption and responses to terrorism require bringing on board all aspects of a nation’s power. Thus, I would argue that counter-terrorism need to be seen as an all-inclusive line of effort, and whichever strategy is adopted should not only be dictated by the prevailing situation but equally ought to have the lines of effort mutually supportive of each other. That is to say economic, social, political, security, diplomatic and such other lines of effort have to complement each other.

This again brings to fore the imperative of having the right balance between hard and soft power approaches in counter-terrorism. In this wise, Ebulue opines that for a counter-terrorism strategy to have the right mix of hard and soft power and to achieve sustainability and effectiveness, there must first be a right definition of the threat, understanding the threat and following this, the objectives of the strategy.³⁵ The ends, ways and means that constitute such a strategy equally need to be balanced and unambiguous. The above is contingent upon an understanding of the problem and the employment of a comprehensive approach and plan,

³⁴ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (New York: Routledge, 2006) p. 203.

³⁵ Nonye Ebulue, Analyst, Intelligence Production Centre, Directorate of Military Intelligence Abuja-Nigeria, interviewed 11 August 2015.

while simultaneously learning and adapting to the emerging threat scenario. It ought also to be feasible, suitable and command acceptability among stakeholders for it to achieve its objective. In utilizing hard and soft approaches in a counter-terrorism strategy, Oyebade stressed the point that "it must always be borne in mind that the main role of the military is the shaping or cushioning of the environment for other elements of national power to be employed in the counter-terrorism effort."³⁶ In this vein, once an acceptable level of safety is achieved through the use of the hard approach in a terrorist affected environment, the military and other instruments of the hard approach necessary have to give way or play a secondary role to soft power.

From the foregoing, this author is of the view that a workable counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria needs to reflect the perspective that terrorism in Nigeria is multi-causal and multifaceted thereby requiring a multipronged approach. The domestic nature of terrorism also requires a people-centred counter-terrorism strategy that has at its heart socio-economic transformations, democracy and human rights observance. It ought to be a holistic strategy that goes beyond kinetic response (as represented by the use of the military) to non-kinetic (or soft power) thereby utilising all instruments of national power in the counter-terrorism effort. It is in the light of this that this study would suggest the development of a population-centric counter-terrorism strategy which integrates whole-of-government and non-governmental (or society) approaches.

The pertinent question arising from this is: how can this whole-of-government and non-governmental approach be achieved? And flowing from this, what measures could be embarked upon to realise a sustainable and effective counter-terrorism strategy? To begin with, the proposed strategy needs to interface between policy makers, implementation agencies and the public. The strategy consequently has to be clear in formulation, effectively

³⁶ A Oyebade, Deputy Commandant National Defence College of Nigeria, Lecture Series on Higher Military Strategy delivered to Course 22 Participants, 15 April 2014.

communicated, actively and relentlessly executed and informed by best practices. In the previous chapters, I noted a number of issues, weaknesses and challenges that have hampered the effectiveness of the Nigerian government response to the threat of terrorism. To achieve the desired strategy therefore, the identified issues, weaknesses and challenges would need to be addressed. This would mean rethinking some of the counter-terrorism responses or approaches and the crafting of new ones appropriate to the contemporary situation.

Considering the fact that the NACTEST ought to be the pivot of the decision-making and implementation of the counter-terrorism effort of the Nigerian Government, my focus would first be on addressing the gaps inherent in the NACTEST. This, as will be highlighted, could be in the form of a review aimed at restructuring the NACTEST. The counter-terrorism policy and programmes of government, as highlighted earlier, are driven by institutions. In view of this, I would subsequently dwell on the ways and means of maximising the performance of the counter-terrorism institutions to achieve the ends of containing terrorism. Further emphasis would be made on building of the capacity of security agencies. Following this are the programmes of government that would support and sustain the counter-terrorism strategy. One of the programmes is the strengthening of good governance and democracy for socio-economic development, the deficit of which this study has identified to have contributed as both pull and push factors in the development of terrorism in Nigeria.

Further to the above are programmes and measures to enhance international cooperation. This is in view of the need for better border management and relations with contiguous countries as well as fostering the goodwill of international partners, both governmental and non-governmental. Finally is the imperative of participation of the public and private sectors, in other words, an all-stakeholders approach where the whole-of-government and society effort are harnessed to counter terrorism.

9.4.1 Review of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy

A review of the Nigerian NACTEST is considered necessary given the several gaps in it as outlined in Table 9.1. The focus of such a review ought to be that of addressing the gaps for the NACTEST to meet its requirement of being the instrument that facilitates the interface between counter-terrorism policy-making and counter-terrorism implementation. In this regard a national definition of terrorism would need to be included in the NACTEST to avoid varying interpretations given to terrorist acts. This is particularly so as armed banditry, robbery, cattle rustling, communal clashes, abductions, child trafficking and other criminal activities with perceived links to terrorism are rife in Nigeria.³⁷ It could be argued that once a problem (such as terrorism) is defined, the pathways towards solutions to it could be more easily facilitated.

In the area of placement of the CTC under ONSA, there is a need for a review of the NACTEST in order to provide definite supporting structures that reduces bureaucracy and in which far-reaching political decisions could be taken. For instance, in the UK CONTEST, the National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister has oversight of CONTEST and takes regular reports on its progress.³⁸ The NACTEST could be reviewed to reflect a similar arrangement.

In laying sole emphasis on Boko Haram, the NACTEST has failed to recognise the fact that not all acts of terrorism are religious or ideologically motivated as is ostensibly the case with Boko Haram, and therefore has not taken into account future terrorism or terrorist-related threats that could emerge. The problem is compounded by the fact that Nigeria does not have a National Security Strategy from which the NACTEST ought to have drawn its source of guidance. In this regard, it could be averred that the NACTEST needs to be sufficiently broad-based in order to cover all possible contingencies of terrorism.

³⁷ These are thought to not only feed into the terrorism situation in Nigeria but also carried out by them to sustain themselves and fund their activities.

³⁸ HM Government, *The United Kingdom Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, (London: TSO, 2011)

It is also considered necessary that the NACTEST provides an overview of the Nigerian Government disposition to negotiation with terrorists. This is because, while negotiation is one of the key tools used by some governments in dealing with terrorists, the same practice is opposed by others.³⁹ The review could therefore include conditions that may warrant negotiation (if the government is disposed to it) or succinctly state that the government is adopting a 'no negotiation' stance with terrorists. Equally important is the need to state in the NACTEST how the government intends to protect Nigeria's interests abroad and possible responses to state terrorism which potentially could either be internally generated or externally sponsored, perhaps by Nigeria's neighbours.⁴⁰ All these are arguably necessary for public awareness, and for planning as well as the development of contingencies by implementation agencies. The review of the NACTEST is therefore considered imperative to block gaps that terrorists could capitalise upon, and to facilitate the much needed policy making, implementation agencies and citizen's interface that is needed for an effective counter-terrorism effort.

9.4.2 Effective Coordination of Counter Terrorism Institutions

In the previous chapter, the poor performance of Nigeria's counter-terrorism institutions was noted. They were found to be poorly managed, ill-coordinated and clogged by a lack of synergy between actors in the process. Unhealthy rivalry among agencies was found to have resulted in duplication of effort rather than the economy of effort that interagency cooperation would have achieved. In some countries, measures aimed at fostering interagency cooperation and facilitating the synergy required in the national counter-terrorism effort are put in place. In the US, for instance, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) leads the "nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the

³⁹ P. Neumann, pp. 128-129.

⁴⁰ This is as there have been allegations that several Boko Haram leaders are from Chad, and that the Sect had surreptitiously enjoyed the support of the Chadian and Cameroonian government. These allegations have been refuted by both governments. See Vanguard Newspaper, 4 December 2014.

threat, sharing information with partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”⁴¹ This, according to Rasmussen has to a large extent helped to reduce the friction between counter-terrorism agencies.⁴² However, this is not to say that everything is perfect with the US counter-terrorism effort as major issues in coordinating the 17 different agencies that collect intelligence still exist.⁴³

The designation of a lead ministry and agency for counter terrorism is equally recommended to foster synergy. In the UK, the Home Office is designated by Her Majesty’s Government as the lead ministry for coordinating the counter-terrorism effort of the government within the country and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office outside the country. For a lead agency, the Metropolitan Police Service leads the day-to-day counter-terrorism operations in the UK as the Federal Bureau of Investigation does in the US. In Nigeria where such arrangement is lacking, the designation of a similar lead ministry and agency is considered worthwhile for effective counter-terrorism strategy implementation.

9.4.3 Capacity Building of Security Agencies

In line with the coordination of counter-terrorism institutions is the requirement for capacity building. This study considers building of the capacity of the security component of the institutions based on the earlier appraisal made of the Nigeria’s security and intelligence architecture. The appraisal observed the imperative of building the capacity of the security agencies in terms of requisite training, acquisition of modern equipment and respect for human rights as well as democratic values. In line with this is the necessity for top-down reforms to boost the poor morale of troops and end corruption that has plagued military

⁴¹ The United States National Counter Terrorism Center Mission Statement available at [www.nctc.gov/...](http://www.nctc.gov/), accessed 2 August 2015.

⁴² Nicholas J Rasmussen, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States” *Statement for the Record Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 12 February 2015.

⁴³

procurement.⁴⁴ The newly elected government of President Buhari had from June 2015 taken steps to build the capacity of the security agencies. He announced the relocation of the Military Command Centre to Maiduguri town where Boko Haram has its strongest foothold. The President has also changed the leadership of the AFN and that of the MNJTF. While these efforts are laudable, it is expected that further measures including the fostering of civil-military relations and confidence building measures are undertaken. This is pertinent as the domestic nature of the terrorism that Nigeria is witnessing requires that the locals are on the side of the military.⁴⁵ More in terms of capacity building is perhaps the establishment, training and equipping of Special Forces capable of focused targeting that could avoid the collateral damage the Nigerian military has often been accused of. The leveraging of modern precision armaments including locating artillery and strike aircrafts could dislodge the terrorists in their safe havens, disorganise their lines of supply and disrupt their regroupings. In this way, both pre-emption and punishment technique could be effectively applied in the Nigerian counter-terrorism strategy.

This author believes that although the military strategy cannot on its own win the fight against terrorism, the military would continue to play a significant role in the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism effort. This is so as the implementation of other counter-terrorism strategies; political, economic and social would depend on a safe environment which the military provides. The role of the military to cushion the ground for other elements of national power to be employed in the counter-terrorism effort is therefore fundamental and hence, the need to ensure it's professional and combat efficiency.

The conduct of intelligence-led counter-terrorism operations has been found to be a major enabler in the counter-terrorism efforts of many nations. The US is said to place considerable

⁴⁴ "Four reasons why Nigeria's military can't contain Boko Haram" *CBC Radio-Canada*, 15 January 2015.

⁴⁵ General Petraeus observed the need for this during his tour of duty in Afghanistan when he stated the need for US troops to live and work with the locals for confidence building.

emphasis on intelligence such that intelligence is regarded as the third most decisive line of its counter-terrorism effort after the political and military lines. Michael Herman sums up intelligence from the perspective of knowledge obtained for planning.⁴⁶ Applied to the conduct of operations, it could be said that with intelligence, counter-terrorism operations would not be ad hoc and reactionary (as the study revealed is the case in Nigeria) but planned, targeted and pre-emptive. The employment of technology for intelligence on terrorists and their sponsors, their movements, sources of finance, equipment and other logistic becomes crucial. In this vein is the imperative for an integrated management of intelligence resources that would promote a joint approach to intelligence, build trust, and maximize resource utilization. Equally necessary is the development of net-centric capabilities by upgrading and integrating existing information technology platforms, data bases and fusion centres at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Furthermore, the Nigerian government ought to deepen engagements with foreign countries for intelligence and guide against acts that could undermine good working relationships with them or weaken international trust on its intelligence and security establishments. The conduct of comprehensive and thorough inquest to ensure that its agencies have not been infiltrated by extremist sympathizers is perhaps imperative. This is considered important as there have been several allegations of complicity of security personnel in counter-terrorism operations.⁴⁷ It is suggested that concrete steps to deal with those providing supportive infrastructure to the terrorists is taken, by making public their names and initiating legal actions against them.

9.4.4 Good Governance and Democracy

⁴⁶ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.2.
⁴⁷ Nicholas Ibekwe, "How fifth columnists in Nigerian military leaked operational plan to Boko Haram – ex-Defence Chief" *Premium Times*, 30 July 2015. In this press interview, Air Marshal Alex Badeh, the immediate past Chief of Defence Staff Nigerian Armed Forces stated that some military personnel leaked operational information and abetted terrorism.

In the appraisal of the issue of governance and terrorism in Nigeria made in chapter eight, the link between governance deficit and the rate of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and political exclusion that could potentially fuel grievances and vulnerability to terrorist group appeal was noted. The situation raises the need to strengthen good governance and democratic values that could ensure broad socio-economic and political transformations. Good governance and democracy, it could be said, are key to the success of this strategy as they tend to target at addressing the grievances that potentially created the threat group in the first place. They also provide a platform for the administration of justice and social order often manipulated by terrorists to portray government in a bad light. It is in this line perhaps that Crenshaw, Wilkinson and the Lutzs argue that the formulation and execution of socio-economic reform programmes is the best antidote against terrorism.⁴⁸ Similarly, Marie Harf observes that:

*We need to go after the root causes that lead people to join these ((terrorist) groups, whether it is lack of opportunity for jobs or other factors. We can work with countries around the world to help improve their governance. We can help them build their economies so they can have job opportunities for these people....It is evident that well educated and rich people join the groups for reasons other than poverty or unemployment. However, good governance and people oriented policies will assist in denying legitimacy to the (terrorist) groups.*⁴⁹

Specifically on the Nigerian situation, Emir Sanusi of Kano opines that:

*if government is fighting (terrorism) on the field like in Sambisa forest, it also must fight these root causes of poverty, lack of education, ignorance, corruption and injustice from the background ... (otherwise) we just allow the tree to grow and we cut the branches without uprooting the roots, which also means that the tree will still grow again.*⁵⁰

⁴⁸ See Martha Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts" in Crenshaw, ed *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p.23. P. Wilkinson, "Politics, Diplomacy and Peace Processes: Pathways out of Terrorism" in M.Taylor and J. Horgan. eds *The Future of Terrorism* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).p. 82. Also J. M Lutz, and Lutz, B.J., *Global Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2004).

⁴⁹ Marie Harf, the US Department of State deputy spokesperson, Chester 2015, 1-3

⁵⁰ HRH Muhammad Sanusi (II), Emir of Kano, paper presented at International Security Workshop at Abuja, 28 October, 2015.

Aligning with these thoughts, the Government of Nigeria could reposition its MDAs responsible for poverty alleviation, youth empowerment, education and other human as well as capital resource development. It could further demonstrate strong commitment to fight corruption by strengthening the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Crimes Commission, which are the principal agencies vested with this responsibility. This may help to ensure that resources are judiciously used for developmental purposes and in the process deconstruct and neutralise the appeal to Boko Haram's ideology. In a similar vein, the government could establish a special intervention development fund where monies from government sources, the private sector, Non-Governmental Organizations and the international community are channelled towards the reconstruction of infrastructures destroyed by the terrorists and the general development of the areas affected by terrorism. Also, the agricultural sector could be developed in order to provide job opportunities and reduce dependence on federal government resources that has occasioned the struggle by the North and South for control of the central government.⁵¹

The good governance response could equally be directed at enhancing national cohesion and integration. This is particularly so as terrorists aim to create a divide between the government and the citizens as well as between ethno-religious, cultural or political sections of the society as evident in Nigeria. Accordingly, the government would need to tenaciously implement social enlightenment programmes, an educational system that encourages integration, religious tolerance at all levels, equality of citizens and the tenets of human rights. In a nutshell, it is considered that the government could demonstrate the political will to deploy all instruments of governance to counter terrorism in Nigeria.

⁵¹ The states in the north particularly could be resourced to develop their dominantly agricultural based economies, which provides comparative advantage to the region against the south with oil.

9.4.5 International Cooperation

International cooperation in the fight against terrorism is the basic pillar of the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy, the tenets of which nations are expected to adhere to.⁵² To Nigeria, this is vital as the activities of Boko Haram have evidently reaffirmed that no one country can fight terrorism alone. In terms of geostrategic interest, it brought to fore the fact that Nigeria and her immediate neighbours, and by extension, the West African sub-region are commonly influenced by events in their locality. Nigeria has been accused by its neighbours of a “bluff attitude of being giant of Africa.”⁵³ In this wise, Nigeria would need to moderate and see all its neighbours as equals and partners in the fight against terror. Nigeria could improve relations with them on economic, political and cultural areas noting that countries that jointly harness their common interests would do all possible to fight threats common to them or that jeopardizes their common interests. For instance, the Government of Nigeria could lobby Cameroon for more joint economic investments in each other’s territory and the joint exploitation of economic resources such as crude oil and others that are found along their common border. The bilateral and multilateral engagements could include the joint development of border communities in order to win the hearts and minds of the people towards government and in the process weaken their support for terrorists who use the border communities as safe havens.

The Government of Nigeria could further establish a joint border control agency as against the current joint border committees and sub-regional security arrangements that are found to have not been very effective. The existing joint border committees such as the Nigeria-Cameroun Trans-Border Security Committee, Nigeria - Niger Border Commission and the Nigeria - Benin Border Commission could all be coalesced into one body, that is, a national

⁵² “United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” being *Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 48.

⁵³ T. Onimisi, “Globalisation and the Nigerian National Security: An Overview” in *Journal of Good Governance and sustainable Development in Africa*, Vol. 2 Issue 2 (2014), pp. 80-85.

border agency. The agency could liaise with the relevant authorities in each of the contiguous countries on border management including mechanism for land, air and sea ports control.

Beyond its immediate neighbours, Nigeria ought to champion collective security mechanisms at regional levels while creating favourable conditions to leverage foreign support and other gains of diplomacy at global level. The implementation of the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy, commitment to the US initiated TSCP programme and pursuit for the firm establishment of the AU Standby Force are imperatives. Comolli observes here that given the scale of the Nigerian economy, its strategic role in the African continent and the large presence of foreign nationals in the country, the situation in Nigeria is being watched by non-African countries such as the US and UK with concern.⁵⁴ This means that terrorism in Nigeria cannot be easily ignored by the international community and in this wise there is an opportunity that Nigeria could exploit diplomatically. However, Nigeria's diplomatic counter-terrorism line of effort needs to transcend defence and soliciting for military assistance to development and lobbying for infrastructural as well as human development particularly in the terrorism affected areas. In this regard, the role of USAID, DFID and other international development partners could be factored into the overall counter-terrorism effort. The UK's Stabilisation Unit model that integrates the efforts of the military, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DFID could be a reference in this regard. This could further ensure a balance between the kinetic and non-kinetic aspect of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy.

9.4.6 All Stakeholders' Approach

An all stakeholders' approach to counter-terrorism is proffered as a panacea for the deficit in strategic communication and public-private partnership, and on the premise that government cannot do it all alone without the involvement of the citizens. This is saying that the

⁵⁴ Virginia Comolli, p. 142.

government, its security agencies and the society (which are equally the target of the terrorists) all need to be involved. The traditional rulers, religious leaders, youth groups, women groups and other community-based organizations need to be resourced to actively participate in the counter-terrorism effort. Yudinisev argues particularly for the inclusion of the efforts of private-public co-operations which he contends should not be limited to the business community but include Non-Governmental Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, media, tourism and hotels⁵⁵ Furthermore, messages that portray Islam as a peaceful religion, that the Government of Nigeria's counter terrorism effort is not against Muslims and that the government is winning the fight against terrorism need to be articulated and relentlessly communicated. In this wise, the government could explore dialogue with a range of clerics to determine whether there could be some sort of mechanism for approving and accrediting imams who proffer messages of peace and conciliation rather than extremism.

The all-stakeholders' approach could be complemented by the establishment of information and security think tanks for public discourse on security issues. Think tank institutes and foundations such as the Royal United Service Institute and Chatham House in the UK as well as the Jamestown Foundation in the US are noted for crystallizing ideas on national security issues in the countries mentioned. The centres, institutes and foundations could be open to members of the public and private sectors particularly security experts, academics, Non-Governmental Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, trade unions, traditional and religious institutions. Training sessions, seminars and workshops on terrorism and other burning national security issues could be held in these places. It could form the forum for public scrutiny of the NACTEST. The Nigerian government could further use these centres to

⁵⁵ A., Yudinisev, "Promoting public private partnerships." *The Beam UN CTITF*, Volume 5 (January-May 2012), p.8.

deepen its anti-terror campaign and public enlightenment as well as inculcate security consciousness and situation awareness on the citizens.

The imperative of countering the ideology of Boko Haram which runs contrary to the ideals of the Nigerian state has been pointed out in this study. The inputs from the think tanks could be used to articulate the right strategic messages and explore the political approach to containing the threat posed by Boko Haram. This includes the possibility of reaching out to the terrorists to embrace peace and dialogue. Negotiations and platforms for demobilization, de-radicalization and re-integration of those who denounce terrorism could be put in place. However, it could on the other hand formulate messages or plans to create rival factions within the terrorist ranks. The think tank centres could, by providing the opportunity for national security input from every citizen broaden the scope of Nigeria's counter-terrorism effort currently limited to security agencies, a few government departments and concerned individuals. The broadening of the scope of the counter-terrorism effort could consequently embrace the all-of-society and whole-of-government approach to counter terrorism in Nigeria as canvassed in this study.

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Preamble

This chapter reviews my research work on terrorism in Nigeria which focused primarily on the threat-response interplay, and flowing from this, the quest for a suitable counter-terrorism strategy. The conclusion draws from the whole body of research in terms of highlights of key aspects of the study and summary of findings. Thereafter, a set of recommendations for policy and further academic research is presented.

10.2 Highlights of the Study

Nigeria is beset with security problems of which terrorism appears to be currently the greatest concern. This study accordingly set out an examination of the various terrorist threats, the responses of the Nigerian governments to them and in the light of observed lapses in governments' responses, suggested a possible national strategy to counter-terrorism in Nigeria. The study noted that although terrorism in Nigeria currently revolves around the activities of Boko Haram, the phenomenon has precursors in the Maitatsine uprising, military rule and the Niger Delta Crisis.

The Maitatsine terrorism was a case of religious fundamentalism based on ideology that ran counter to the political, economic and social establishment of the Nigerian state. The sect's ideology centred on the purification of Islam which its members believe have been corrupted by Westernization and the formation of the modern state system. As indicated in chapter four, infighting among political parties, poor socio-economic conditions of citizens and the influx of illegal immigrants occasioned by porous borders accentuated the wave of violence. The study put

forward a theory, however, that what was the immediate cause of the uprising of terror was ill handling of the sect (in other words poor response to the threat) by the security agencies. According to Isichei and Falola, the situation led to the death of about 4,117 persons in Kano and the destruction of property worth millions of Naira within 12 days.¹ Although the sect was later contained through the use of military force, there is a belief that it resurfaced as Boko Haram.

Terrorism in Nigeria during military rule was perpetrated by the state. It was characterised by state repression of pro-democratic organizations. I noted in chapter five that state terrorism under military rule witnessed extensive use of explosive devices, a method that became entrenched in the subsequent cases of terrorism witnessed in Nigeria. Furthermore, state terrorism as perpetrated by the Nigerian military associated it (the Nigerian military) with human rights abuses, the stigma of which human right groups such as Amnesty International observe as evident to date.² The response of the people of Nigeria to state terrorism was boosted by the international community's condemnation of the acts. The result was the return of the country to democracy in 1999.

The return to democratic rule witnessed the rise of militant groups. The most prominent of the militant groups were those in the Niger Delta area who, as the Lutzs aver, resorted to terrorism ostensibly in pursuit of better socio-economic and political conditions for the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.³ The Niger Delta militants employed hostage taking, kidnapping and other forms of terrorist tactics in advancing their cause. The response of the Nigerian government to the situation in the Niger Delta was its usual application of military force. This, as noted in chapter six, was characterised by high-handedness which further alienated the people. In the long run, it

¹ Isichei Elizabeth, p. 194. See also, Toyin Falola, p. 155.

² Amnesty International (UK), 2015.

³ J. and B. Lutz, pp 212-216.

was a soft approach involving negotiations, conciliation and concessions through an Amnesty Programme that relatively ended terrorist activities by militants in the Niger Delta area. The shift from a targeted approach to what is considered a more acceptable people oriented and broader community based soft approach is consequently thought by some to be a model for similar situations in Nigeria⁴

The ongoing terrorism by the Boko Haram sect, unlike the other three cases mentioned, assumed full-blown status with perceived linkages to al-Qaeda networks. The sect strongly opposes Western way of life, democratic institutions, constitutional laws and institutions of the Nigerian state. Its overriding goal is to establish a Sharia state by usurping control of the Nigerian state through its brand of jihad. Apart from the religious perspective, the activities of the sect assumed political and criminal dimensions as well as transcending Nigeria's borders thereby placing greater demand on the response requirement of the Nigerian government to the threat. The study highlighted that the responses by the Government of Nigeria to the threat at some points escalated rather than contained it. The sect went beyond bomb attacks in public places to the abduction of school girls, use of women for suicide terrorism, employment of child-soldiers in guerrilla warfare, beheading tactic, pledge of allegiance to the ISIS and the seizure as well as occupation of territories all of which raise issues pertaining to the Nigerian Government's counter-terrorism efforts.

In the threat-response assessment made, I noted that central to the issues involving the containment of terrorism in Nigeria is the national counter-terrorism strategy, which, apart from been published only recently, is fraught with gaps that could easily be exploited by terrorists. There are also issues with institutional frameworks, governance, border management, the

⁴ Michael Nwankpa, "The Politics of Amnesty in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of the Boko Haram and Niger Delta Insurgencies" *Journal of Terrorism Research* Volume 5 Issue 1 (February 2014), p. 67.

capacity of security agencies and the employment of strategic communications. All these constitute challenges to the counter terrorism drive of the Nigerian government and call for a re-strategizing of efforts. It is in the light of these problems that the study proffered, by way of a synthesis of the findings of my research, a national strategy for counter-terrorism that incorporates whole-of-government and non-governmental approaches.

10.3 Summary of Major Findings

This research is in part a retrospective study in that it is based on historical case studies in Nigeria focusing on the interplay between the actions of terrorists and the reactions of government, and vice versa. A major outcome of this is the indication that the Nigerian Government has failed to effectively counter terrorism because of the ineffectiveness of its strategy. Arising from this, therefore, is the second objective of the study which is about the quest for effective and sustainable strategy for countering terrorism in Nigeria. The study specifically addresses the research questions posed in section 1.3 of chapter one.

The study found that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. As seen in the accounts of Oyeniya and others, the colonial regime used its army against the indigenous population to perpetrate acts that could be classified as state terrorism.⁵ The army arguably retained its character of repression against the populace in post-colonial Nigeria to the extent that during the Generals Babangida and Abacha regimes, terrorist acts such as bombings, assaults, physical and psychological intimidations as well as assassinations of persons were common. Another

⁵ Adeyemi Bukola Oyeniya, p. 18. Phillip Igbafe, "Western Ibo Society and its Resistance to British Rule: The Ekumeku Movement 1898-1911" *Journal of African History*, Vol. 12, Issue 03 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, July 1971), pp 441-449. Also, Paul E. Lovejoy and J. S. Hogendorn, "Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905-6" in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Cambridge University Press 1990), pp. 217-244. Article available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/182766>, accessed 12 June 2013.

dimension was terrorism orchestrated by violent extremist Islamic sects. The first major case that fitted terrorism classification was the Maitatsine uprising in the 1980s that is thought to have historical linkage with the current wave of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram. All these cases including the Niger Delta Crisis were mainly of domestic nature, although with some degree of international dimension. Terrorism under military regimes attracted international condemnation: that in the Niger Delta became internationalised because of oil politics, while that by Boko Haram is increasingly assuming part of the global jihadist network. As the origin and nature of terrorism espoused by the groups differ, so are the factors that supposedly caused them very various. Terrorism in Nigeria is therefore thought to be multi-causal with structural and rational factors perhaps being most dominant.

The study revealed that the threat of terrorism in Nigeria has evolved over the years from small, highly hierarchically-structured and largely locally based groups as witnessed in the Maitatsine era, to larger, loosed structured and transnationally connected groups as evident in Boko Haram. The lethality of the groups has increased as Boko Haram, for instance, has imbibed modern technology for making IEDs, use of high calibre assault weapons for attacks, engagement of suicide bombers including females and the use of electronic and print media particularly the Internet for propaganda and other communication purposes. Terrorism in Nigeria has also evolved from the traditional threat to criminality and other dimensions. This is so as while funding by earlier terrorist groups such as Maitatsine was mainly by levies, Boko Haram currently engages in kidnapping, drug trafficking, armed robbery and other criminal activities to raise funds thereby making the threat more complex. The expanding network of the sect across the sub-Saharan region resulted in its categorisation with its offshoot, Ansaru as an FTO, and the threat continues to evolve with greater sophistication given its perceived alliance with ISIS.

It was established in this study that the responses of successive governments in Nigeria to the threat of terrorism have largely been ad hoc and reactionary. In this way, the threats have been dealt with as they emerged without proactive arrangements or a strategic framework. It was revealed throughout the case studies that there have been over reliance on the military instrument of response. This posed problems as it was found that apart from capacity issues, public reputation on the military and security agencies such as the police, customs and immigrations significantly diminished. Mechanisms of counter-terrorism responses such as policy and legal instruments were also either lacking or inadequate. The TPA was enacted in 2011 after Boko Haram terrorism had become firmly rooted in the country. Also, the NACTEST was endorsed in April 2014 after five years of trying to counter Boko Haram thereby lending credence to the point that counter-terrorism efforts of government have been based hitherto on ad hoc provisions. Even with this, the NACTEST is fraught with gaps. Similarly, the institutions to drive the counter-terrorism effort of the government have been uncoordinated with seeming lack of synergy. Cooperation with contiguous countries are bedevilled with suspicion while the commitment of the international community has been impaired with allegations of human rights abuses on the part of the Nigerian military. Worsening the responses of successive governments to the threat of terrorism is the inadequacy of public-private partnerships and the attendant lack of strategic communication in the national counter-terrorism drive.

The responses of the Nigerian Government, as the study reveals, have had undesirable policy implications by way of shortcomings in its overall counter-terrorism effort. This is evident in the continuing attacks by the terrorists. The policy of the use of the military without corresponding human security approaches has often tended to alienate the military (and by extension the government itself) from the citizenry. This is in view of the repressions of the military and the

resultant collateral damage as well as human rights abuses associated with its counter-terrorism operations. The challenges of lacking policy and legal frameworks over the years was found to have lent space for the emergence and growth of terrorist groups as there were no guidelines and appropriate laws to sustain the counter-terrorism effort. For instance, persons that were arrested by security agencies could not be prosecuted, as there was not yet a law under which to do so (as the TPA only came in in 2011). The NACTEST released in 2014 failed to articulate and populate the means in a clear manner that resourced the ways in order to achieve the national objective. It consequently appear to have a mismatch of ends, ways and means which could lead to strategic surprise or outright failure. Also, inadequate capacity and coordination of institutions meant a clog in the channels through which government ought to drive counter-terrorism. Similarly, the study found out that unresolved international cooperation issues gave terrorists the freedom to network across borders and facilitate their recruitment, funding and logistic support. Furthermore, the poor engagement of the citizenry in government counter-terrorism efforts is a shortcoming as a major aspect of counter-terrorism ought to be geared at winning public confidence and getting citizens' support of government policies so that a national will is forged to counter terrorism.

Given these findings therefore, the strategic approach to countering terrorism, this study suggests, ought to be holistic and encompassing the resolving of not only the inherent lapses in the current NACTEST but equally overcoming the shortcomings highlighted. It is in this vein that I subsequently have proffered, by way of summarising the findings of this study, some suggestions for building an effective and sustainable national counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria.

10.4 Recommendations

This study recommends that Nigeria's national counter-terrorism strategy should reflect a whole-of-government and all-of-society approach. It should be people-centred, rational and cause as little harm to the citizens as necessary. The strategy suggested must involve simultaneously the efforts of the Nigerian Government, the Nigerian society and the international community. This would entail the Government of Nigeria formulating and implementing robust counter-terrorism programmes and harnessing such efforts with the active involvement and collaboration of the citizens and its international partners at both governmental and non-governmental levels. On the part of government specifically is the imperative of reviewing the NACTEST to address the gaps in it as highlighted in chapters eight and nine. These include the provision of a national definition of terrorism, appropriate roles for agencies and coverage of other possible terrorist threats apart from Boko Haram.

The Nigerian government has to strengthen the capacity of its counter-terrorism institutions through the provision of appropriate modern equipment, joint training, the integration of intelligence and communication assets as well as collaboration with foreign security agencies. To resolve the problem of coordination of counter-terrorism institutions, a lead ministry should be designated to coordinate and ultimately synergize their efforts as obtained in countries such as the UK. Also crucial is the repositioning of relevant MDAs to achieve the MDGs goals of alleviating poverty, unemployment and illiteracy as well as judicial and political reforms that enhance good governance and consequently reduce vulnerability to terrorism. The establishment of a Special Intervention Fund for the northeast region of Nigeria for purposes of rehabilitating the IDPs, rebuilding of infrastructures devastated by terrorists and the general development of the region could additionally be considered. Nigeria should also, in collaboration with its neighbours, improve on border management possibly through the establishment of a border

agency responsible for liaison with the relevant contiguous neighbours' border authorities on joint security and border development issues. Furthermore, it is recommended that the canvassed strategy that reflects whole-of-government and society approach should entail the engagement of citizens. This could be achieved through the adoption of an all stakeholders' and all participatory system that facilitates the coalescence of ideas from citizens on national security, enhance public enlightenment and forge the collective will of Nigerians to counter terrorism.

Research on terrorism and counter-terrorism in Nigeria, as noted earlier in this study, is still low. It is recommended that the government sponsor more research in this field. As Lum noted, the interaction between social scientists and government has led to many social advances, and the area of terrorism is no exception.⁶ Accordingly, the sociological study on Boko Haram being envisioned by the government of President Buhari after the defeat of the sect should be embarked upon promptly and not wait until the period of its defeat, which in any case is indeterminate.⁷ The scope of the study needs to be expanded to include assessment of government responses, rules of engagement of the military and the roles of the civil society. It should also, as prescribed by the Campbell Systematic Review of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies, make a holistic review of its counter-terrorism measures in terms of noting their possible harms and cost effectiveness of expenditure on them.⁸ In line with this is the need for government to equally sponsor research on emerging and future security threats such as political violence, cultism, armed banditry and communal clashes that feed into the terrorism threat. This should also lead to the formulation of a National Security Strategy which Nigeria currently lacks.

⁶ C. Lum, Kennedy L. W, Sherley, A, J, p. 35.

⁷ Muhammadu Buhari, Inaugural Speech during Swearing-in Ceremony as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at Abuja on 29 May, 2015.

⁸ C. Lum, Kennedy L. W, Sherley, A. J, p. 3.

There are several gaps that this study has possibly raised for further research. The question of whether negotiation is a viable response option for dealing with terrorists in Nigeria, and in what manner and circumstances remain highly contestable. Also worth investigating is the use of private military and security organizations by the government in countering terrorism. Along this line is the need to determine the necessity and implication of the use of locals and their organization into CJTF for quasi-military counter-terrorism roles as currently evident in Nigeria. The position in this study is that while this arguably challenges traditional notions of the Westphalian state and Weberian notions of security, I would suggest that in a post-colonial and globalising world, such non-eurocentric notions of how a state could successfully deliver security to its citizens should be explored further.

Further research are also needed in the area of analysis of counter-terrorism strategies particularly in terms of methodology as this study has only adopted a fraction out of perhaps a gamut of approaches in counter-terrorism studies. As Lum affirms, it is one aspect to evaluate or analyse counter-terrorism strategies and another to explore ways in which terrorism strategies could be analysed and the different types of methodologies which may be useful.⁹ This study utilized a qualitative methodology and an avowedly social constructivist approach. For an analysis of an action-reaction phenomenon as proffered here, this seems an entirely appropriate and effective approach, and delivered valuable findings. I would like to conclude on the point that research on terrorism and counter-terrorism is complex and logistically difficult. Approaches building on that offered in this study will help to advance the understanding of difficult and complicated threat environments such as Nigeria, or indeed the post-colonial landscape more widely.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 36.

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APPENDIX

National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2014.

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

1. Terrorism always seeks to undermine national security. Its perpetrators do not believe in the avowed unity of the country and the sanctity of human life. The phenomenon has become a major international issue that requires a comprehensive strategy. The lack of a commonly agreed meaning and terminology for terrorism has led to a situation where perpetrators have successfully invoked religious and social sentiments to defend their activities. Terrorism is not about religion, race or political inclinations as the mass killing of innocent citizens of any race and religion can never be justified. The fear induced could be palpable, thereby rendering society impotent.

2. Terrorism stalls social and economic development and undermines national cohesion. In places where it has found root, it polarizes societies and impacts on national integration. In a plural society like Nigeria, the effects of terrorists' activities include the closure of schools, banks, petrol stations and the day-to-day activities of law-abiding citizens. The result is high level paranoia, lack of development and mass relocation of people to perceived safer areas.

3. In view of the devastating effects of terrorism, a well-coordinated counter-approach involving all stakeholders has to be evolved. This would be led by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The Office will drive the process by supporting institutions to develop the capabilities and capacities to respond to threats. This would be done through the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 and a well-articulated National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) that would respect the rights of the citizenry and operate within the ambit of International Human Rights (IHR) and the Rule of Law.

4. As part of my transformation agenda to bequeath a peaceful, secure and prosperous nation where citizens can go about their lives freely and with confidence, I directed that a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism be developed. The national strategy will give impetus to strengthening coordination and capacity-building efforts. It will give clear direction to institutions as to what measures are to be in place to ensure a secure environment for all citizens to contribute to national development. It will also encourage our friends to have confidence in our capacity as a nation.

5. I therefore direct the National Security Adviser to set up the necessary machinery and architecture to coordinate and drive this strategy.

Given this day of 2014 in Abuja.

DR GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN, GCFR

President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria

FOREWORD

1. This National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) is a living document that requires constant review as the issues involved are fluid and constantly evolving. The review could be on a bi-annual basis or as the security situation and threats demand. Over the years terrorism has shown an uncanny potential for mutation. The first major terror incident recorded in Nigeria was the Maitasine riots in the 80s. Since then, the phenomenon has transformed and assumed a level of sophistication that has seen incidents rise in profile. Like the American 9/11 and British July 7, 2005 Nigeria can also reference the 1 October 2010 Eagle Square and 16 June 2011 Police Headquarters bombings as well as the 28 August 2011 United Nations Office suicide bomb attack as game changing incidents.

2. The various security services and Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) are expected to abide strictly with the roles and responsibilities assigned in this document to enhance the nation's capability to deter and combat terrorism and ultimately defend the nation against threats. The civil society and the citizenry would all be carried along and be a part of the counter terrorism drive. Efforts will therefore be made to constantly engage them for a clear understanding of the issues involved to ensure that there is an agreed collective approach to NACTEST.

3. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) will provide the required leadership and ensure synergy of efforts of all stakeholders for the benefit of the nation and the safety of the citizenry. NACTEST is therefore to provide the working template for countering terrorism.

MOHAMMED SAMBO DASUKI
National Security Adviser.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Presidential Directive.....	1
Foreword.....	2
Executive Summary.....	4
Strategic Context.....	4
The Response.....	4
Introduction.....	9
Section I: Overview.....	11
Global.....	12
Domestic.....	12
Terror Incidents Between 2009-2014.....	12
Section II: The Threat.....	14
Terrorism in Nigeria.....	14
Nature of Incidents.....	16
Response to the Threats.....	16
Principles.....	17
Section III: Forestall.....	19
Security Awareness.....	19
Tackling Disadvantages and Supporting Reforms.....	20
Deterring Those Who Facilitate Terrorism.....	20

Section IV: Secure.....	22
Strengthening Border Security.....	22
Protecting Critical National Infrastructure.....	23
Building Capacity for Security Forces.....	23
Protecting Transportation System and Crowded Places.....	23
Section V: Identify.....	25
Security Powers.....	25
Investigation.....	26
Prosecution.....	26
Deportation.....	26
Financial Control.....	27
Seizing and Freezing of Assets.....	27
Proscription.....	27
Working with Communities.....	27
Section VI: Prepare.....	29
Reassuring Communities.....	30
Section VII: Implement.....	31
Roles and Responsibilities.....	31
Conclusion.....	36
Annex A: Roles and Responsibilities of MDAs.....	37
Annex B: Glossary of Terms.....	44

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) is the first major attempt by the Government of Nigeria to address the terror attacks that are being perpetrated by violent extremist organizations against the citizens of this country. NACTEST is also the first published document that has chronicled the country's effort at combating an apparently new phenomenon. As a subset of the overarching National Security Strategy, it holds a strong promise for Nigerians and seeks to re-engage a stakeholder population that is losing or may have lost faith in ongoing efforts aimed at addressing threats. This document describes that strategy and is not only fairly simple, straightforward, achievable and time-bound; it also explains what organizations and individuals can do to help in its implementation in order to reduce the risks and ensure that people go about their lives freely and with confidence.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

2. Terrorism in its present form, is a relatively new phenomenon in Nigeria, even though terror-related acts had occurred in the 1950s in Kano and, again, in 1982 when the Maitasine religious uprising was recorded. Both were respectively dismissed as mere

violent crimes or externally sponsored extremist acts that were promptly nipped in the bud. While it may not be entirely correct to conclude that these events may have sowed the seeds for the growth of the current threat posed by Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad aka *Boko Haram*, what is clear is that the group, unlike its predecessors, has remained faceless with no defined frontiers, making it extremely difficult to effectively contain the threat. The group is a tiny minority within the Muslim communities which first emerged in Borno State in 2000 using a distorted and unrepresentative interpretation of the Islamic faith to justify violence. With links to other global Islamic groups like al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, the group is considered to be genuinely international in scope and, like its foreign affiliates, driven by particularly violent and extremist Islamist beliefs. Clearly, the threat from global Islamist terrorism is real and involves a variety of groups, networks and individuals blinded by extremist beliefs and determined to cause indiscriminate mass casualties, regardless of age, sex, race and nationality, or the religion of the victims. In certain cases, the terrorists are prepared to commit suicide to kill others.

3. A number of factors will continue to enable terrorist groups to grow and survive. They include: conflict and instability, aspects of modern technology, a pervasive ideology, and radicalisation. Unfortunately, these are variables that will remain an integral part of globalisation. It is therefore safe to judge that the scale of the threat has the potential to increase and is not likely to diminish significantly in the coming years.

THE RESPONSE

4. The NACTEST is organised around five work streams, each with its key objectives and success indicators within the period 2014-2016. The five work streams are:

- a. Forestall: to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- b. secure: strengthen protection capacity against terrorist attacks;
- c. identify: pre-emption through detection, early warning and ensuring that terrorist acts are properly investigated;
- d. prepare: to mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks by building resilience and redundancies to ensure continuity of business;
- e. implement: a framework for the mobilization of coordinated cross-governmental efforts.

Forestall

5. The **Forestall** strand is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals and emphasizing security awareness amongst the populace. The key objectives are:

- a. Develop an effective counter-narrative strategy to respond to the challenge of terrorism;

- b. create conditions to deter people from embracing terrorism and extremist ideologies;
- c. initiate programs that would require engagements with key sectors, particularly the internet, identified as possible tools for radicalisation;
- d. initiate program to identify the underlying causes of radicalisation and develop strategies that provide solutions;
- e. create opportunity and hope for people in the affected communities and restore their faith in the government.

Success in **Forestall** will entail:

- a. Considerable reduction in the number of persons that are at risk of being radicalized;
- b. considerable increase in societal awareness;
- c. isolation of extremists, making them unable to operate freely on the internet and other high-risk areas.

SECURE

6. The **Secure** strand is concerned with safeguarding citizens and infrastructure by reducing their vulnerability to attacks. The key objectives are:

- a. Initiate measures aimed at strengthening border security;
- b. introduce effective ways for protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and building resilience;
- c. embark on capacity-building programs for security forces;
- d. reduce the vulnerability of the transport system;
- e. improve protective security for crowded places including worship centres.

Success in **Secure** will entail:

- a. Considerable reduction in the influx of illegal aliens and in the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) as well as cross-border crimes;
- b. credible information sharing among security agencies and with other contiguous countries operating around the borders;
- c. reducing to the minimum the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, including airports and oil installations;
- d. a measurable increase in capacity building for personnel of the security agencies;

- f. a considerable reduction in the number of attacks on crowded places, particularly worship centres.

IDENTIFY

- 7. The **Identify** strand is concerned with stopping terrorist threats and attacks on Nigeria and her interests. The key objectives are:
 - a. Disrupt terrorist threats before they are executed;
 - b. ensure an increase in the capabilities of security agencies to detect, prevent, investigate and prosecute;
 - c. deny terrorists the ability to raise funds;
 - d. maintaining through government agencies a sustainable relationship with community representatives, traditional and religious institutions and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs);
 - e. work with foreign governments and multilateral organizations to better tackle threats from the source;
 - f. continue to assess security powers and review them as necessary, and
 - g. build and improve capacity for the Criminal Justice System (CJS) to investigate, prosecute and sanction people who commit terrorist offences.

Success in **Identify** will entail:

- a. Considerable reduction in the frequency of terrorist attacks;
- b. considerable reduction in terrorists' ability to raise funds by identifying their sources of funds and activities that generate funds for them;
- c. security agencies building the requisite capacity to effectively detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats, and
- d. government effectively leveraging the capacity of community representatives, traditional and religious institutions and CSOs to effectively assist law enforcement.

PREPARE

- 8. The **Prepare** strand is concerned with ensuring that the nation is able to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. The key objectives are:
 - a. First responders, security agencies and stakeholder organizations are able to respond to, and effectively recover from, various categories of terrorist attacks;
 - b. there are dedicated agencies with capacity to respond to identified high-risk areas such as symbolic structures and worship centres;

- c. there are additional capabilities readily available to manage both ongoing and new terrorist attacks, and
- d. there are in-built redundancies to ensure continuity of government business and measures adopted to ensure civil society resilience in the event of an attack.

Success in **Prepare** will entail:

- a. First responders, security agencies and stakeholder organizations able to respond to, and effectively recover from, various categories of terrorist attacks;
- b. there are dedicated agencies with proven capacity to respond to attacks on identified high-risk areas;
- c. there are additional capabilities readily available to manage both ongoing and new terrorist attacks, and
- d. there is a considerable civil society capacity development to ensure business continuity.

IMPLEMENT

9. The **Implement** strand involves the cooperation at all levels – from the public to the private sector including Civil Society Organisations. It includes a cross-governmental approach and stipulates how Ministries, Departments and Agencies (*MDAs*) and stakeholder organizations will execute tasks consistent with their roles and statutory responsibilities. The Office of the National Security Adviser will provide the requisite leadership role in the national CT effort. The **Implement** strand describes how the accountability of the strategy will be ensured and its progress effectively monitored.

10. It is expected that MDAs and the police will work together closely on a common set of objectives, with transparency and openness. Dialogue will be sought with the private sector, voluntary organizations, community groups and the general public. Success here will depend on the quality of engagement with all stakeholders, close allies and multilateral organizations.

CONCLUSION

11. Terrorism is the most potent threat currently confronting Nigeria. The NACTEST has been developed to tackle the threat and assure Nigerians of their safety. This document spells out government's priorities and its resolve to protect the citizenry and make conditions unfavourable for terrorists and those who sponsor them.

12. The implementation of NACTEST imposes tasks on the security agencies as well as government and non-governmental agencies. Laying the foundation for goals to be attained in the short, medium and long term, the focus is to strive to have a strategy that will be effective, proportionate, transparent, collaborative, proactive and flexible.

INTRODUCTION

1. Terrorism has become a worldwide phenomenon that takes many forms and is therefore a cause for concern to all those seeking peace, security and stability. Terrorist activities have not only continued to pose significant challenges to international peace and security, they have compelled nations to place them on the list of their priorities, thereby stretching to the limit available meagre resources needed for developmental purposes. Terrorism is an unlawful and intentional act that causes death, physical and psychological injury, loss of liberty and serious damage to property and environment. It often involves an individual or a group united on a particular cause and resolved to unleash violence against society with the aim of creating fear in the populace and undermining the Government in order to achieve set political, ideological, economic or social goals. Nigeria has had its fair share of terror attacks in the past nine years. While not exhaustive, outlined below is a timeline of major terrorist incidents in the country:

- 1 October 2010 – VBIED attack in Eagle Square, Abuja;
- 31 December 2010 – Bomb blast at Mogadishu Barracks, Abuja;
- 16 June 2011 – Bombing of Police Force Headquarters in Abuja;
- 26 August 2011 – UN Building bombing in Abuja;

- 22 January 2012 – Multiple bomb explosions and attacks in Kano on Police facilities and Security Agency offices: death toll two hundred and fifteen (215);
- 8 March 2012 – British and Italian hostages killed in a foiled rescue attempt in Sokoto;
- 13 July 2012 – Suicide bomb attack on the Shehu of Borno in Maiduguri-5 killed;
- 2 November 2012 – Boko Haram activists killed Maj Gen. Mamman Shuwa (rtd) at his home in Maiduguri;
- 19 January 2013 – Five (5) are killed in an attack on the convoy of the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero in Kano;
- 17 February 2013 – Seven (7) foreigners, a Briton, an Italian, a Greek and 4 Lebanese workers including 2 women and a Policeman, kidnapped at a construction company, Setraco, in Bauchi;
- 19 February 2013 – Boko Haram kidnapped 7 French family members in northern Cameroon;
- 7 May 2013 - Unprecedented onslaught in Bama by suspected Boko Haram members resulted in the death of 64 persons including 3 soldiers, 22 policemen, 14 Prison officers and 21 Boko Haram members;
- 6 July 2013 – Twenty-four (24) School children, a Teacher and an Islamic Preacher killed when gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members attacked Government Secondary School Mamudo, Yobe State.
- 01 October 2013 – Boko Haram militants murdered about 50 students of the Yobe State College of Agriculture, Gujba, Yobe State when they invaded the students hostel in the night;
- 2 December 2013 - Coordinated attacks by Boko Haram suspects on Nigerian Air Force Base and 333 Artillery Regiment of the Nigerian Army in Maiduguri. Five aircraft including 3 decommissioned military aircraft and 2 helicopters were destroyed. Two Air Force personnel were injured while 24 suspected members of the sect were killed;
- 25 February 2014 – Boko Haram suspects attacked Federal Government College Buni Yadi killing twenty-nine (29) students and injured several others;
- 14 March 2014 – Boko Haram militants attacked Giwa Barracks Maiduguri, Borno State, freeing a number of detained militants;
- 14 April 2014 – Nyanya Bus Park vehicle borne IED attack by Boko Haram suspects killing 76 people and injuring 165 others;
- 15 April 2014 – Boko Haram militants kidnapped two hundred and thirty-six (236) students of Government Girls' Secondary School Chibok, Borno State.

- 01 May 2014 – Vehicle Borne IED attack near Nyanya Bus Park killing nineteen (19) people and injured sixty-six (66) others.
2. Since the coordinated terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, in the United States of America (USA) by Al-Qaeda, the phenomenon has assumed a global dimension. No country, including Nigeria, is immune to attacks by terrorist groups.
 3. Terrorism is the most serious security threat confronting Nigeria today. This is due to the actions of persons or groups who choose to advance their cause by committing acts of extreme violence. The acts, which were hitherto considered as mere violent crimes, have claimed many lives and have been on the increase in the recent past. The current intensity of actions by such groups clearly points to an intention to create fear among the people and undermine the authority of Government. This, therefore, informed the need for a comprehensive National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) to effectively address the threat and reduce the risks so as to provide a safe environment where people can go about their daily lives freely and confidently.
 4. Terrorism is a complex subject to tackle; therefore, actions taken to counter it must include the whole of a society approach. Considering the uncertainty that revolves around terrorism, it is challenging to collect credible data sufficient to propose holistic preventive measures. To effectively address issues of terrorism within the country, properly planned preventive measures have been articulated in this document. These measures developed in the NACTEST would enable the effective protection of the public, assist appropriate organizations in preparing to deal with acts of terrorism, and pursue terrorists and those who sponsor them. Government's strategy is informed by the counter-terrorism strategies of countries which have experienced the phenomenon. The NACTEST is therefore based on international best practices and tailored to address our domestic peculiarities with due cognizance of international human rights standards and the rule of law. The range of policies, plans and programmes described in this text will, however, continue to be reviewed as necessary. NACTEST will provide explanation regarding actions being taken to safeguard the populace and public institutions in the face of terrorist activities.

SECTION I

OVERVIEW

GLOBAL

1.1 This is the first published version of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). This new strategy takes full account of the terrorist threats in Nigeria and abroad and incorporates the measures put in place to counter these threats. The aim of NACTEST is to reduce the risk to the country and its interests abroad from terrorism and to ensure that people can go about their lives unhindered.

1.2 It is on record that, in 2011 alone, over 15,000 people were killed in terrorist-related actions around the world. But, with collaboration and partnerships built by countries to check threats, terrorist groups have changed their modus operandi. There is a clear indication that Al Qaeda appears weak and directionless after the death of its two main leaders, Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki while several senior leaders have been placed on 'kill or capture' list. This has not deterred the group and its affiliates as they continue to pose a threat to global security. It has since announced the appointment of Ayman al-Zawahiri as its new leader.

1.3 Al Qaeda affiliates have continued to grow using the Al Qaeda name but often operating without reference to the leadership. The most significant of these groups has proved to be the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) formed in 2009 when members of the Al Qaeda fled Saudi Arabia and joined an Al Qaeda network based in Yemen. Apart from masterminding the attack on a Detroit-bound airliner, AQAP also conducts operations internally and outside the Peninsula. The other group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is known to confine its operational activity to the Maghreb and Sahel-Saharan African sub-region where they have repeatedly taken western hostages in exchange for ransom. Funds raised from these have significantly enhanced its operational capability and enabled it to operate more widely in Mali and Niger. It has been confirmed that the recent instability in Libya has also enabled AQIM to acquire weapons from different sources. Boko Haram has established links with AQIM to enhance its capacity to make forays into volatile areas in the North-East of Nigeria and other parts of the country.


1.4 Other affiliates such as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalions (AQKB) have indicated an aspiration to export terrorist activities to other parts of the globe. The Pakistan Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is known to collaborate with Al Qaeda and other local groups. In Somalia, the clan-based militia Al Shabaab continues to control parts of the south. Al Shabaab has adopted the global jihadist ideology and has attracted hundreds of foreign fighters including Nigerians. It has links with Al Qaeda and AQIM and operates more widely in East Africa. It is likely that Al Shabaab, which is reportedly providing training and support to Boko Haram, may formally affiliate with Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist groups by their actions of recruiting people, raising funds and driven by extremist religious ideologies collectively pose a threat to Nigeria and her interests abroad. Factors that will continue to fuel the growth and survival of terrorist groups are conflicts and instability, modern technology, radicalisation, extreme ideologies, poverty, unemployment, ethno-religious differences and societal vices.

DOMESTIC

1.5 The greatest threat to Nigeria currently has come from the Boko Haram terrorist group based in the North-Eastern part of the country, and more prevalent in Borno, and Yobe States. Nigerians among other nationals have travelled to training grounds in

Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia to mention but a few. This has increased the threat levels in Nigeria. In the past three years, there have been more than a hundred terrorist attacks. Below is a chart showing a State-by-State analysis of attacks:

TERROR INCIDENCES BETWEEN 2009 - 2014



1.6 The emergence of Boko Haram did not occur overnight. It is the outcome of a consistent deterioration process, fuelled not only by religious fundamentalism but social, economic, political and global factors. The fundamental conditions that are the root causes of the menace still exist and serve as fertile grounds for further escalation. Boko Haram's ideology, much like other al Qaeda affiliates, is based on complete denouncement of western culture and civilisation. Their ultimate goal is to overthrow the existing political order and replace it with a strict Islamic system. In recent times, we have witnessed a surge in the levels of violence associated with Boko Haram. This worrisome trend has led to a rise in the group's level of sophistication which has emboldened them to launch strikes across the entire nation, causing substantial damage to lives and property.

1.7 The assumption is that future activities of Boko Haram will evolve in accordance with the modus operandi of global Islamic terrorist groups. Challenging though this might seem, it provides the opportunity to make predictions and outline elements that should be incorporated into a strategy that would comprehensively address the threat. As with other notorious terrorist groups like al Qaeda, the established trend has been to launch attacks on symbolic structures but, lately, Boko Haram has included Christian worship centres to its list of soft targets. The aim is to inflame religious and ethnic sentiments and further cause divisions in the polity. To this end, print and electronic media operations would be necessary to shape public opinion. The struggle against terrorism is not limited to defined frontiers, but very much influenced by the ability to control public agenda and manage public opinion. Public support is the ultimate objective because the long-term struggle can only be determined by winning the hearts and minds of the population. This strategy therefore addresses the social and political climate that has contributed to the creation of the scourge and seeks ways to eliminate the root causes.

1.8 The number of arrests made in Nigeria on suspicion of terrorism from 2004 to date is quite substantial. Many have undergone prosecution in various courts but with scant convictions. Many more are yet to be charged to court and remain in custody. The prison system and indeed the entire Criminal Justice System (CJS) are undergoing a substantial overhaul in order to address the issues properly. Concerted efforts are being put in place to build capacity for the various sections that make up the CJS so that those charged with the responsibility of working with the laws are able to understand them properly.

1.9 It is pertinent to state that the ongoing terrorist threat in the country is not being viewed in the right perspective. No doubt, the global network on terror is determined to bring the free world to its knees. By going ideological, it is clear that terrorist groups are prepared for the long haul. The response therefore should be tailored towards a sustained awareness campaign. Nigerians should be aware and come to terms with the fact that it is a phenomenon that would require long-term measures to contain. What is happening now is not an anomaly; rather, it is an unfolding reality of the twenty-first century which has witnessed advancements in technology and transformed the world into a massive global village. It is only our collective effort and resolve as a people to come to terms with this phenomenon and our determination to fight it that will keep the situation at tolerable levels.

SECTION II

THE THREAT

2.1 Terrorism is an old tool used by those who hold extremist views on issues with little regard for human lives. The United Nations defines terrorism as the use of military weapons or forces to generate multiple causality incidents in which non-combatants and vulnerable civilians are the victims. It feeds on fear amongst the populace and media

coverage for attention. From the early 1990s, groups claiming to be Islamist terrorist organizations have carried out numerous attacks in many countries. Worldwide, bomb attacks were carried out against the World Trade Centre in 1993 and the Paris metro in 1995. These were followed by attacks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tanzania, Kenya and Yemen.

2.2 The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, the commercial nerve-centre of the world, in which nearly 3, 000 people were killed is regarded as the watershed in international terrorism. Since then, other attacks have been carried out in countries such as Tunisia, Indonesia, Jordan and Qatar. The Bali bombing in Indonesia in 2002 also took a great toll on human life. The attacks have continued unabated with those of Madrid in 2004, United Kingdom in 2005 and consistently sustained attacks in Pakistan, Iraq, Kenya and Afghanistan.

2.3 At the regional level, attacks on the USA embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salam in Tanzania as well as a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, on 7 August 1998 by al Qaeda and others in Egypt and Algeria had already placed Africa on the terrorism map. Activities of al-Shabaab fundamentalists in Somalia have compounded the situation in the East and the Horn of Africa. On 21st September 2013 the group attacked Westgate Mall where 67 people were killed and several others held hostage injured. Furthermore, the increased activities of the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which has now transformed to AQIM in North Africa and parts of West Africa such as in Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, Niger and Nigeria, remain areas of serious security concern. AQIM has conducted a series of terrorist acts in West Africa, which include the kidnapping of Europeans.

TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

2.4 Terrorism in its present form is a relatively new phenomenon in Nigeria. Suicide attacks were never a part of the calculation whenever the issue of terrorism was discussed. The early acts of terrorism, especially the Kano killings of 1952, were dismissed as mere violent crimes. The first recorded major incident was in 1980 when an extremist religious group, "the Maitatsine religious sect" which is believed to have developed from a neighbouring country carried out attacks in many parts of northern Nigeria over a period of time, but was successfully contained by Government largely because the frontlines were easily defined. In October 1993, a political dimension was added to the national experience when a Nigeria Airways flight was hijacked in Kano by a group known as the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy in Nigeria led by Jerry Yusuf. Terrorist attacks were also perpetrated by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and other South-South and South-East groups predicated on agitations against environmental degradation, perceived marginalization and the quest for resource control. The culminations of these agitations were incidents of kidnapping, killings of government security agents, attacks on oil installations, illegal oil bunkering and other acts of armed banditry witnessed in the Niger Delta.

2.5 The current threat is mainly from the *Boko Haram* which emerged in Borno State in 2000. The group was founded by the late Mohammed Yusuf who moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, close to the border with Niger Republic, in 2003 at a base dubbed 'Afghanistan'. The movement, 'The Nigerian Taliban', which eventually emerged, targeted the Police and other security agencies to source for weapons, thus creating fear and a sense of insecurity in the locals. This group was initially contained by the security forces, again because the frontiers were defined. But when it later metamorphosed into the Boko Haram sect, it gradually went underground and became faceless. Currently, a splinter faction has emerged from the wider Boko Haram umbrella called *Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan* simply known as *Ansaru*.

2.6 Today, Boko Haram is seeking to impose the Sharia legal system on some selected States in the North while holding strong abhorrence for Western ideals. The threat is serious and remains sustained as the sect vows to continue its activities at all costs. The extent of its international reach cannot be ascertained but it is clear that it is linked to the international terror network. Its link with AQIM and al-Shabaab points to its web in the global terrorist network driven by particularly violent and extremist inclination and beliefs aimed at causing mass casualties. It has been assessed that the threat is not likely to diminish soon probably due to the immense support it enjoys from global terrorist groups like AQAP, AQIM and al-Shabaab. Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the profile of the sect has continued to assume martyrdom status.

2.7 Several factors are responsible for the creation and nurturing of terrorism in Nigeria by individuals and groups. They could be categorized under economic, political and social reasons. Nigeria is perceived as a potential terrorist interest area as expressed in a televised Osama Bin Laden video message. Furthermore, Nigeria is the gateway to the strategically important Gulf of Guinea from where Western countries especially the USA draw a huge amount of their energy requirements. The close economic ties with USA could be a major reason for singling out Nigeria as a country ripe for a Jihad. With the Salafist ideological teaching that propagates western civilisation as evil, the predominantly large Muslim population is cited as a fertile ground for recruitment.

2.8 Activities of the Boko Haram sect have led to mixed reactions amongst a cross-section of the populace. Despite the increasing radicalization and frequency of attacks, the nation's intelligence and security agencies have recorded significant breakthrough in dealing with attacks by the Islamic terrorists. The tragic incidents of 1 October 2010 (Independence Day), 25 and 31 December 2010, and other bombing incidents in Abuja have shown that eliminating the threat of terrorism in Nigeria would require dynamic, consistent and sustained measures.

2.9 The NACTEST has identified certain pitfalls in the national security system and some common and regular crimes which have further worsened the security situation and inadvertently provided an environment conducive for terrorist acts. These include crimes involving religious extremism, armed banditry, kidnapping and assassinations. Others are arms smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, bombings and the

increased use of improvised explosive devices. The most significant fault line, however, is the twin issue of poverty and unemployment. According to statistics released by the Nigerian Manpower Board (NMB), only about 3.2 million out of an estimated 22 million in the school system enter the labour market annually because the labour system can hardly absorb 10 percent of the entire school output.

NATURE OF INCIDENTS

2.10 The phenomenon of terrorism may have no particular trend or pattern. It may also have no distinctive characteristic; however, the nature of terrorist incidents can be said to assume the following pattern:

- a. The threat is generally ubiquitous – the same way terrorist attacks have been carried out in many countries. These attacks have been carried out by individuals or groups from the core group or by outsiders or a combination of both. This accounts for the nexus between the domestic and international dimensions of terrorism. Facilitating the ease of attacks is the nature of the globalised world where there exists a seamless ease for travelling as well as information and money flow across the world.
- b. The influence of non-state actors in sponsoring terrorism has become more pronounced in contemporary terrorism.
- c. The threat of terrorism comes from organized groups and individuals with loosely organized networks. However, the different elements that constitute these groups may have different goals to achieve.
- d. Terrorist groups operate indiscriminately, mostly in loose or sleeper cells. They could also be nimble and therefore difficult to trace. The main goal is to cause mass death and destruction regardless of age, sex, race, nationality or religion. Fundamentally, terrorists target prominent government institutions, but they also target institutions/infrastructures that have symbolic value for the message they intend to convey. In many cases, terrorists are prepared to go suicidal in the process of carrying out such attacks.
- e. People involved in these attacks are driven by passionate violent and extremist beliefs either as religious bigots/adherents or in an attempt to express their views which they perceive as being discounted.

RESPONSE TO THE THREATS

2.11 Responding to the threat require a strategy for counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. Ostensibly, the NACTEST is about how to reduce the risk to Nigeria from terrorism so that people can go about their daily businesses freely. To realize this goal, the Federal Government through the the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) has put in place a comprehensive programme of action in the short and long terms. The objectives involve activities at both national and local levels.

2.12 The Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) has the overall responsibility for coordinating the National Counter-Terrorism Programme. The primary responsibilities of the CTC include the development, direction and implementation of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It is also responsible for the implementation of some aspects of the strategy, while facilitating oversight of operations by security and intelligence agencies. The NACTEST is divided into five work streams with the acronym F SIPI [pronounced as ef-cee-pee]. The work streams are:

- a. **Forestall:** Preventing terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment/sensitization campaign and de-radicalization programmes.
- b. **Secure:** Ensuring protection of life and property, public and key national infrastructure/services including Nigerian interests around the world.
- c. **Identify:** Ensuring that all terrorist acts are properly investigated while terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice.
- d. **Prepare:** Preparing the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents could be mitigated.
- e. **Implement:** Devising a framework to effectively mobilize and sustain a coordinated cross-governmental population-centred effort.

In doing these, the government will take cognizance of international law and human rights standards which will be integral to driving the counter-terrorism effort. In a similar vein, the campaign efforts would aim at achieving social cohesion, active citizenship and equality in order to build active population resistance to terrorism.

PRINCIPLES

2.13 The Government believes that respect for international law and human rights must be an integral part of its efforts to counter terrorism. The provision and promotion of good governance is also a key element of wider efforts to combat terrorism and extremism. Similarly, the drive for equality, social inclusion, community cohesion and active citizenship will strengthen society and resistance to terrorism.

2.14 The successful delivery of NACTEST, therefore, depends on partnership between all tiers of Government; the public, private sector and voluntary organizations as well as partnerships with foreign governments and organizations. This document emphasizes cohesive action from all government departments charged with law enforcement, border control, finance, health, foreign affairs, and defence policies. A lot also depends on the efforts of all well-meaning Nigerians and members of host communities. In essence, the overriding principles of NACTEST must be:

- a. **Effective:** The progress made and outcome of the strategy will be regularly assessed while all actions taken would be measurable.

- b. **Proportionate:** Government will ensure that efforts put into its National Counter-Terrorism Programmes (NCTP) are proportionate to the risks we face and necessary to reduce those risks to a level adjudged acceptable.
- c. **Transparent:** At all times and consistent with the security threats we face, we will seek to make information available about the threats we face, the options we have and the response we intend.
- d. **Flexible:** Terrorists will seek new tactics to exploit vulnerabilities in our protective security; we will, therefore, regularly re-assess the risk and ensure that such assessment is the foundation of Government efforts.
- e. **Collaborative:** Countering terrorism requires a local, national and international response. Apart from the much-needed interagency collaboration, the government in conjunction with relevant agencies will continue to work with all tiers of government (Federal, State and Local Governments), public, private sectors, foreign governments, regional and international organizations and the public; and
- f. **Proactive:** Focus would be on the disruption of terrorist acts before they take root.

SECTION III

FORESTALL

3.1 The **ForeSTALL** aspect of the NACTEST entails both domestic and international efforts and would cover the period 2014 to 2016. At the national level, the Government will focus on addressing issues which will diminish the capability of terrorists to operate freely in Nigeria. Priorities in this regard will involve creating and emphasizing security awareness amongst the populace, reducing the possibility and ability of terrorist groups to recruit new members, while introducing measures that will deter potential terrorists. Properly planned and adequately resourced preventive measures, when employed, would reduce the frequency of attacks. The objectives of the ForeSTALL pillar of NACTEST within the period 2014-2016 will be to:

- a. Develop an effective counter-narrative to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism from those who propagate it.
- b. create conditions to deter people from embracing terrorism and extremist ideologies.
- c. Initiate programs that would require engagements with key sectors (education, criminal justice, faith-based organisations, health as well as the internet) identified as possible areas for radicalisation.
- d. Initiate programmes to identify the underlying causes of radicalisation and develop strategies that provide solutions.

- e. Create opportunities and hope for people in the affected communities and restore their faith in the government.

SECURITY AWARENESS

3.2 It has been observed – and reasonably so too – that carnage arising from the action of terrorist groups over the years could have been reduced if the populace was more security-conscious. Most Nigerians would see situations, events or objects that are inimical to their personal security without realizing that they face grave danger. It is, therefore, necessary to develop security consciousness amongst the entire populace. An informed, proactive and situation-aware citizenry is an invaluable asset in combating terrorist activities.

3.3 Concerted media campaigns will need to be developed towards keeping the populace aware in order to dispel the uncertainties associated with terrorist attacks. School curricular at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels should not only be geared towards promoting national security awareness but should also include robust civic education programmes. Civic education especially should be taught as a distinct subject because it is foundational and provides the opportunity to positively impact on the minds of future generations of Nigerians and create highly patriotic citizens. The media (print and electronic) will be employed to effect changes in the attitude and behaviours of people to enable them take appropriate actions that will prevent or frustrate terrorist attacks. A comprehensive awareness campaign strategy would also include other forms of engagement with stakeholders in the public and private sectors including the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Both would be time-bound, reviewable and address all unfolding terrorism scenarios.

TACKLING DISAVANTAGES AND SUPPORTING REFORMS

3.4 Another area of action to prevent terrorism lies in addressing structural problems in the country that may contribute to providing willing hands for recruitment by terrorist groups. Governments (Federal, State and Local) will aggressively tackle structures which give vent to social systems that exploit and impoverish individuals in their formative years. As young adults, these people are neither educated nor possess any skills to enable them integrate fully into society. Of particular concern are social systems that promote issues like the 'Area Boys' and the 'Almajiri' systems. These systems, which thrive in areas of extreme poverty and deprivation, produce youths who are easily radicalized through inappropriate teachings.

3.5 To stem the number of available persons who may be easily recruited by terrorists, government will address matters relating to incitement and recruitment in places of religious training or worship by introducing legislations which criminalize such behaviour. Additionally, promotion of good governance, education and economic prosperity will be emphasized and aggressively implemented at all levels. Deterrence can be achieved where infrastructural facilities such as roads, energy, hospitals and health centres are available. These should be provided in conjunction with dependable

information technology architecture to assist security managers in timely information processing, sharing and utilization.

DETERRING THOSE WHO FACILITATE TERRORISM

3.6 A major area of action towards preventing terrorism is by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalizing others can operate as well as deterring those who facilitate terrorist activities and those who encourage others to become terrorists. The influence of particular places of worship has already been mentioned. There is also evidence that individuals can become radicalized through brainwashing, coercion and threat to family members.

3.7 Government will work with local authorities to identify areas where radicalization may be taking place and to help communities protect themselves and counter the efforts of extremists. Therefore, challenging and responding to ideological motivations and extremist beliefs that justify the use of violence are a priority. In particular, Government will work with communities to help them discourage susceptible individuals from turning towards extremist activities. Efforts will be made to leverage on the capacities of institutions like prisons and schools to de-radicalize persons who may not have reached the tipping point in the radicalization ladder. The process will be driven by specialists in the health sector and trained administrators in the educational sector. For the detained extremists, it will be necessary to establish a de-radicalization centre to help integrate them into the society. As for the convicted terrorists serving jail terms, a comprehensive program will be developed to not only get them de-radicalized but ensure that they are introduced to sustainable vocational training that would prepare and rehabilitate them for reintegration into the main society. The Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS) should develop capacity for its personnel and institutions for this form of de-radicalization.

3.8 Furthermore, the signing into law of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 is a clear indication of Government's resolve to deal decisively with individuals or groups who choose to challenge the sovereignty of the nation. Government's response to contravention of extant laws shall, therefore, be swift with the aim of sending a clear message to perpetrators and deterring like-minded individuals and groups that terrorism is unacceptable in Nigeria. Government will therefore support and encourage capacity-building initiatives in all key areas of the CJS.

3.9 The **Forestall** programme is, by its very nature, a long-term dynamic commitment that will take time to produce concrete results. Even with a robust programme in place, complete prevention of terrorism acts cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, stringent measures will be employed to minimize attacks by ensuring strategic improvements in protection and security. Success in **Forestall** would entail:

- a. A considerable reduction in the number of persons that are at risk of being radicalised.

- b. Increased awareness penetration in the public and private sectors.
- c. Ensuring that extremists are isolated and not able to operate freely on the internet and other high-risk radicalisation forums.
- d. Creation of job opportunities through establishment of Small Business Enterprises and other government initiatives.
- e. Identification of credible voices in communities to speak out against extremism.
- f. A considerable number of terrorist convicts are de-radicalised.
- g. A considerable number of Staff NPS are professionally trained to handle terror suspects and issues of rehabilitation.

SECTION IV

SECURE

4.1 Within the period 2014–2016, the **Secure** aspect of NACTEST will be concerned with safeguarding citizens, utilities and infrastructure by reducing their vulnerability to attacks. The **Secure** work stream covers a range of issues which include strengthening border security, protecting Critical National Infrastructures, capacity building for security forces and reducing risks to transportation systems, crowded places and worship centres. The objectives of the **Secure** strand within the period 2014 -2016 will be to:

- a. Initiate measures aimed at strengthening border security.
- b. introduce effective ways for protecting critical national infrastructure and build resiliency.
- c. embark on capacity-building programs for security forces.
- d. reduce the vulnerability of the transport system.
- e. improve protective security for crowded places including worship centres.

STRENGTHENING BORDER SECURITY

4.2 A major security concern within Nigeria is the ease with which persons and goods enter and leave the country through borders which are inadequately protected. Notwithstanding the provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement between member states, it is expected that persons entering the country must be duly documented and accounted for. The porous nature of the borders has been responsible for the influx of illegal aliens, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, smuggling, trafficking in persons, illegal cross-border trading and other trans-border crimes. Irrespective of the strength in cross-border cultural affinity, the effect of criminally

minded individuals entering the country to perpetrate acts of terrorism is high. This will require establishing joint border patrols with contiguous neighbours and enhance traditional border security systems.

4.3 Security at the borders will be strengthened through intensification of patrols. The effectiveness of the agencies would also be enhanced through provision of adequate equipment, building synergy and promoting closer collaboration. The entire border management system will cooperate with security agencies of neighbouring countries. This will strengthen border security and also minimize illegitimate traffic. All national assets would be harnessed and properly exploited to strengthen and enhanced border security.

4.4 In essence, the objectives of the programme include: the provision of effective border control and improvement on intelligence sharing within and outside Nigeria in support of border operations. Other objectives will involve joint identification and management of risks as well as minimizing the impact of these operations on legitimate traffic and business.

PROTECTING CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

4.5 The **Secure** paradigm of NACTEST is aimed at reducing the nation's vulnerability to attacks on its infrastructure which are critical to the corporate existence of Nigeria and the comfort of the populace. These infrastructures are essential to the wellbeing of Nigerians and they allow the citizenry to participate in the developmental programmes of the nation. They include key utilities such as energy, water as well as key services like transport, communication and finance. A comprehensive data of these infrastructure and installations are being maintained and would be reviewed periodically. Knowledge of the infrastructure and analyzing it from an adversary's point of view and training based on such knowledge would help build an effective protection plan.

4.6 Measures for protecting or defending key assets and essential facilities against terrorist attacks include collecting intelligence, analyzing vulnerabilities and applying preventive measures. Risks are identified and assessed to consider the probability of the occurrence with a view to predicting the impact. This helps to determine the priorities for protection, with the aim of reducing the vulnerability to, and the likelihood of, a terrorist attack.

BUILDING CAPACITY FOR SECURITY FORCES

4.7 Terrorists are usually fanatical, given their orientation and belief in their cause. The use of terror tactics worldwide has increased over the years due to the effect on the civil populace and governments. This upward trend is not expected to abate in the near future as terrorists are becoming more daring, ruthless and willing to go to violent extremes to accomplish their goals. This, therefore, requires the positioning of security forces that are sufficiently trained and equipped to adequately respond to the threat posed by terrorists.

4.8 Counter-terrorist forces must essentially be available to act with the various security response assets to intercede and prevent terrorists from carrying out attacks. It is crucial that individuals and organizations whose duty it is to protect installations do so accurately and effectively, either as part of law enforcement, emergency response, or military counter-terrorist teams. It is also crucial that these individuals or organizations be prepared and are able to work effectively with each other and with other specialized response personnel. This implies that the teams and other emergency response assets must plan and train for eventualities. The need for collective information sharing, scenario-based training and the development of similar and complementary capabilities is therefore crucial.

4.9 All security and intelligence agencies are mandated to maintain Response Units (RU) or outfits in all parts of the country. These RUs are essential in protecting not only infrastructure but the entire citizenry. The ONSA, through the CTC, is to coordinate and ensure oversight.

PROTECTING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND CROWDED PLACES

4.10 Terrorists perpetrate acts that endanger human lives, cause substantial damage to property or bring about other consequences dangerous to the public. These acts are committed to disrupt public safety and intimidate the population in order to cause loss of confidence in the Government.

4.11 Public knowledge of terrorism is, in general, limited to either specific terrorist incidents or censored information which governments and law enforcement bodies reveal to the media, usually after an attack. Therefore measures must be put in place to protect people in public and crowded places against acts of terrorism. Crowded places include shopping centres, airports, worship centres, sports arena, parks and recreational areas where maximum casualty could be achieved in the event of an attack. There is an increase in the level of armed protection at many key sites across the country. Protective security advice will be reliably provided to vulnerable sites which are prioritized based on assessed risks.

4.12 Aviation security has increasingly been on high priority since 2009. The incident where a taxi driver broke security and rammed into a passenger airliner at the Calabar Airport in 2010, the stowaway episode at Benin Airport in August 2013 and the attack at Nigerian Air force Base Maiduguri by some elements of the Boko Haram sect in November 2013 have shown that airport security system can be breached. Also, the vulnerability of aircraft from shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAM), especially from take-off and or landing, is an area of serious security concern. Although, our Airport security for passengers in the country has been strengthened with the introduction of non-discriminatory screening of persons and luggage using explosive detection devices, due attention would be given to the security of the perimeter of the airports, including aerial surveillance to mitigate these threats. These security measures will be regularly assessed and upgraded to detect and prevent any attack. Also an envisaged increase in the private ownership of infrastructure means that the private sector must understand

the risks and vulnerabilities to enable capacity-building in the area of resiliency. This would obviously require sharing of information in a safe and transparent manner.

4.13 The maritime domain is equally vulnerable to terrorist attack. A single container laden with explosives can cause considerable mass casualties, severe property damage, and attendant disruption of commerce. The critical oil and gas industry is located within the maritime domain and its special protection from terror attack becomes inevitable. The ONSA is to put in place a maritime security strategy to ensure a coordinated effort by all security agencies to safeguard this vital national interest. Success in **Secure** will entail that, within the 2014–2016 period, the following has been achieved:

- a. Considerable reduction in the influx of illegal aliens and in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as cross-border crimes;
- b. there is credible information sharing between security agencies and other contiguous countries' agencies operating along our common borders;
- c. the vulnerability of Critical National Infrastructure including airports and oil installations has been reduced to the minimum;
- d. there is a measurable increase in capacity building for personnel of the security agencies;
- e. there is a considerable reduction in the number of attacks on crowded places, particularly worship centres.

SECTION V

IDENTIFY

5.1 The **Identify** aspect of the NACTEST within the period 2014–2016 is concerned with stopping terrorist threats and attacks on Nigeria and her interests. This implies detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible instance as well as disrupting terrorist operations before they can endanger the public, and ensuring the prosecution of those responsible. The objectives of the **Identify** pillar within the period 2014-2016 will be:

- a. Disrupt terrorist threats before they are executed;
- b. ensure an increase in the capabilities of security agencies to detect, investigate and prosecute;
- c. disrupt terrorists' ability to raise funds;
- d. government, through its agencies, maintains a sustainable relationship with community representatives, traditional and religious institutions and civil society organizations;
- e. work with foreign governments and multilateral organizations to better tackle threats from the source;
- f. continue to assess security powers and review them as necessary;

- g. build and improve capacity of the CJS to successfully investigate, prosecute and punish people for terrorist offences.

SECURITY POWERS

5.2 The Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 provide sufficient grounds for security and intelligence agencies to deal with issues of terrorism. In particular, Part V of the Act adequately provides essential powers to conduct all forms of searches on individuals and structures, intelligence gathering and detention of suspects. The Attorney-General of the Federation and other law enforcement agencies are variously empowered on issues of terrorism, especially on investigations and prosecution.

5.3 Terrorists operate in secret; therefore, intelligence is vital towards countering their threats. Successful counter-terrorist operations depend upon the collection and exploitation of information and intelligence that helps identify terrorist networks, including their membership, finances, intentions and modes of operation. The synergy of ONSA, Department of State Services (DSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Police, Armed Forces, and other stakeholders, particularly the civil populace, is therefore crucial to the work on **Identify**.

5.4 A major step in this direction will be the identification and profiling of groups or individuals whose actions promote terrorism. This depends on availability of data, which will assist in identifying those engaged in terrorism-related activities, their associates and locations. It allows for appropriate action against suspects and sympathisers. Government will therefore commit resources into gathering and analyzing information on the threat, organizing and tasking departments and agencies in the most effective way to address it. It must be emphasized that understanding the threat through adequate risk assessment still remains the fulcrum.

5.5 The safety of the public is the top priority for Government. It will, therefore, fully support the police and other security agencies in the challenges they encounter. Operational decisions on how to conduct counter-terrorism operations rest principally with the ONSA supported by other law enforcement agencies. The intelligence agencies led by the DSS are expected to drive the intelligence and information process to support such operations and to update the National Data Base on terrorism. The implication is the need for a robust system to facilitate information exchange/sharing amongst the various agencies. A national information sharing system, which will also ensure that agencies have access to information that may be relevant to serious crimes and terrorist threats, is therefore necessary and is being developed. This would ensure that the national security system has access to police records which will be integrated with information from other security agencies. A National Data Base on terrorism and related crimes will be developed and domiciled in a place prescribed by the ONSA to which the various agencies will revert when the need arises.

5.6 An important aspect of the data is communication data, as terrorists are known to use all available modes to convey organizational messages, information and threats. It is, therefore, necessary for all Nigerians to register their SIM cards. Efforts are in top gear to ensure that the cyberspace, especially the internet, is well monitored in conjunction with other countries. Where appropriate, legislation will be enacted to allow lawful interception of communication between individuals/organizations by security agencies. This will greatly assist intelligence gathering and data collection on terrorist activities, their supporters and sponsors.

5.7 **Investigation:** All law enforcement and security agencies are responsible for the gathering of intelligence and investigation of cases of terrorism.

5.8 Prosecution remains the preferred way of responding to persons involved in terrorism activity as provided for in the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013. Other options may include deportation, freezing and seizing of financial assets and proscription of organizations.

5.9 **Prosecution:** The preferred way of disrupting terrorism activities is by apprehending those involved in planning acts of terrorism before they are able to execute their intentions and ensuring their successful prosecution in a court of law. This can be achieved through efficient gathering of necessary evidence and conduct of thorough investigations. Where prosecution is not possible, effective use will be made of a number of other security measures designed to make Nigeria a more hostile environment for terrorists to operate in.

5.10 **Deportation:** Where a person connected with terrorism activities in Nigeria is a foreign national, deportation and reporting his/her terrorist activities to the home State and other States will usually be an appropriate means of disrupting his activities. The enactments of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 have provided sufficient legal tools to deport and exclude foreign nationals who have participated in terrorism in Nigeria.

5.11 **Financial Control:** Terrorism acts often revolve around personnel and resources which usually require funding. Mainstream terrorist groups may have steady funding; however, most groups that engage in terrorism receive considerable clandestine funding from sponsors, which sometimes include governments. Unless sponsored by a government, terrorists tend to generate funds by engaging in conventional crimes such as bank robberies, kidnapping, syndicated car snatching, human and narcotics trafficking and operating seemingly lawful business ventures, among many others. When terrorists operate within the financial system, they can generate vital clues that could lead to their disruption and apprehension. To make the most of the financial intelligence, and make it harder for terrorists to operate, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and other such financial regulatory bodies have instituted control measures to check unusual/suspicious movement of funds. Financial institutions are required to keep proper records and report suspicious activities. The CBN, EFCC and

NFIU will work closely with the ONSA and provide the required information regularly. To support this effort and to identify and eliminate sources of such funding, every suspected terrorist is to be subjected to financial investigation irrespective of the outcome of his case.

5.12 Seizing and Freezing of Assets: In spite of the financial control measures put in place, disrupting terrorists' ability to raise, move and use funds still poses a major challenge to law enforcement agents. The cost of carrying out bombing incidents may be relatively low but terrorist networks also need significant funding to support the rest of their activities such as recruitment, training and welfare payments to the families of deceased members. This is often achieved through ordinary criminal activities such as identity and cheque frauds and misuse of charities. Reports on these are to be rendered to the ONSA regularly by the Law Enforcement/Intelligence Agencies. To further challenge terrorist fund raising, provisions in the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 could freeze any existing assets and disable terrorists' ability to raise or move funds. Furthermore, going by relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, countries are required to freeze the assets of individuals who are involved in terrorism and stop them from receiving payments directly from such assets.

5.13 Proscription: The proscription of terrorist organizations also contributes towards making a place less conducive to terrorists and sends a strong signal that the country totally rejects such organizations and any claims they may wish to advance for legitimacy. Proscription is a difficult provision as it has the effect of outlawing previously lawful activity. Once an organization is proscribed, it is a criminal offence to belong to, support, or display support for that organization.

5.14 Working with Communities: Counter-terrorism operations can have an impact on relations between the law enforcement and local communities. It is in the interest of all that these operations are conducted in the most professional manner, taking due account of community and cultural sensitivities. It is also important that local communities are requested to establish counter-terrorism committees, and they will be provided with as much information as possible in a transparent and open manner. However, this needs to be balanced against maintaining the integrity of an ongoing counter-terrorism operation as well as legal constraints. Considerable effort is to be made by law enforcement agencies at all levels to engage local community leaders and persons in such circumstances through partnerships, regular informal contacts with community representatives, traditional, religious institutions and Civil Society Organizations. Success in **Identify** would entail that, in the period 2014-2016, the following has been achieved:

- a. Considerable reduction in the frequency of terrorist attacks;
- b. considerable reduction in terrorists' ability to raise funds including the identification of their sources of funds and activities that generate funds;

- c. the security agencies have built the requisite capacity to effectively detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats;
- d. government has effectively leveraged the capacity of community representatives, traditional and religious institutions and civil society organisations.

SECTION VI

PREPARE

6.1 The **Prepare** aspect of the NACTEST within the period 2014–2016 will be concerned with ensuring that the nation is ready to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack where it cannot be stopped, and increase resilience for an immediate recovery from the aftermath of an attack. The objectives of the **Prepare** stream in the period will be:

- a. Build capacity for all security agencies and stakeholder organizations to respond to and recover from all categories of terrorist attacks and other emergencies.
- b. Prepare dedicated agencies for response and recovery tasks for specified high-risk areas.
- c. Enhance information sharing and communication amongst agencies through joint training, operation and the provision of equipment.

6.2 To save lives, minimize damage, and recover from any future terrorist attacks, an efficient and effective response will be developed for any terrorist attack/incident. This informs the need for a comprehensive national system to harmonize and coordinate all necessary response assets quickly and effectively. This also involves planning, equipping, training and supervising the various response agencies and units adequately and regularly.

6.3 Attaining this objective involves developing and improving the capability of the units to respond effectively to the direct damage caused by terrorist attacks, and in particular to those individuals affected by it. There will be a ready response or backup to those essential services which may be disrupted by an attack in order to absorb and minimize further indirect disruption.

6.4 For contingency planning to be harmonized and efficient, all organizations likely to contribute to the **Prepare** effort are to be identified for coordination. This is being done early with the provision of sound leadership if the response to an emergency is to be as effective as possible. Therefore, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) will provide appropriate leadership and direction to ensure resilience and purpose in safeguarding the nation, which is of fundamental importance to the **Prepare** effort.

6.5 Key elements of the **Prepare** aspect of this strategy include identification of potential risks the nation could face from terrorism and assessing their impact. Others are building capacities to respond to the threats as well as regular evaluation of preparedness. Responsibilities of all the stakeholders for the **Prepare** effort are specified in the **Identify** pillar of NACTEST. In view of the vast range of potential terrorist attack scenarios and the likely consequences, it is impracticable to plan for every scenario. Therefore, planning seeks to build generic capabilities in response to a wide range of terrorist incidents and eventualities. It is important to rigorously assess the level of preparedness through training on scenario-based situations so as to keep pace with the evolving risks and enhance the efficiency of response mechanisms.

REASSURING COMMUNITIES

6.6 In most instances, terrorism aims to create fear, suspicion and division among communities or between communities and the Government. It is, therefore, necessary to put in place measures to monitor the reaction of communities to incidents and assess the risks to vulnerable sections. The task involves the Police, other public agencies and community leaders working together.

6.7 It must be noted that tackling an internal security challenge is impossible without public goodwill. All actions against terrorists must, therefore, assure the citizenry of Government's good intentions. Counter-terrorism actions executed professionally will build positive public opinion, which is a necessary precondition for successful operations. Success in the **Prepare** will entail that:

- a. First responders, security agencies and stakeholder organizations are able to respond to, and effectively recover from, various categories of terrorist attacks.
- b. There are dedicated agencies with capacity to respond to especially high-risk areas.
- c. There are additional capabilities readily available to manage both ongoing and new terrorist attacks.

SECTION VII

IMPLEMENT

7.1 The **Implement** aspect of the NACTEST in the 2014-2016 period involves the various elements acting together and cooperating to deal with a complex threat. Much of the work requires partnerships across the public sector involving the Police and emergency services, local authorities, and Federal Government Departments as well as partnerships with businesses in the private sector, and voluntary organizations. The **Implement** stream of the NACTEST therefore stipulates how it will be successfully

executed and which Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) play what role. The summary of roles and responsibilities is included in Annex A.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

7.2 Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA): The ONSA will provide the requisite leadership role in all national CT efforts. The CTC will be the driving tool of these efforts. To minimize vulnerabilities, the ONSA has conducted, as part of its risk assessment, an evaluation of the functional state of defence systems around Critical National Infrastructure and its implementation is ongoing.

7.3 Information Sharing System: ONSA will develop a single comprehensive database to serve as an information sharing system for the various agencies. The aim is to provide a mechanism where law enforcement, public safety and security agencies can collate their various data bases for a single purpose and easy access. Similar facilities will need to be created at State levels and linked to the central system.

7.4 Crime Registry: The Police/DSS will reactivate their respective crime registries immediately and store information digitally for ease of access. The National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) is being strengthened to ensure that all Nigerians are identified through biometric data capture and at every opportunity well ahead of any requirements, e.g. in hospitals, health centres, health posts and schools. The Police/DSS will also develop a fingerprint identification system for all persons arrested for any offence which can also be accessed centrally by any of the national security agencies. The Police and other counter-terrorism outfits will have unrestricted access to the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), Population Census and Voter Registration Data Base.

7.5 Border Management: The Ministry of Internal Affairs will overhaul the entire border management system to make it more efficient while still supporting legitimate traffic of persons and commerce. The borders will provide greater security through sound intelligence and coordinated national efforts and international cooperation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs will also ensure that persons passing through the borders are adequately documented and possess legitimate travel and identity documents. A multi-layer vetting system will be introduced between 2014 and 2016 to help ensure the correct identity of persons applying for such documents. The agencies will further step up efforts and cooperation with relevant security agencies, as appropriate, to improve on the security of production and issuance of identity and travel documents, and to prevent or detect any alterations. However, the Nigerian government through the ONSA should develop a comprehensive border security system capable of tackling the recurring security challenges stemming from the porous borders of the nation.

7.6 Internal Vetting and Screening of Security Personnel: In order to shore up the capacity of the various security agencies, each service/agency will conduct a comprehensive internal and external screening and vetting of its employees latest by the end of first quarter 2015 and thereafter forward details to the DSS for final vetting.

This process will also be continuous and must apply to all subsequent selection processes. Cross vetting among various security agencies would also be encouraged.

7.7 Security of Airports and Seaports: In order to prevent undesirable elements from coming into the country or the importation of unauthorized and unlawful items, all the ports of entry will be adequately equipped, manned and secured. FAAN, NIMASA, NIS, NCS, DSS, NPA, NPF, NSCDC and the military have major roles to play, as checks must be thorough and accurately maintained. The roles of the services and agencies are prescribed in the appropriate legislations and regulations.

7.8 Vehicle Registration: All vehicles in the country must be registered against an individual or a particular organization. The FRSC has embarked on a total overhaul of the National Vehicle Identification System in order to restore the integrity of the vehicle number plates and enhance its overall security feature in line with global best practices. This is with a view to strengthening their capacity to support the National Security System. The Corps is revalidating all motor vehicle number plates' currently in circulation and replacing them with the improved number plates. This will make the forgery of these products extremely difficult and unattractive, thereby discouraging parallel production of vehicle number plates. Additionally, the Corps will tie the issuance of vehicle number plates to individual vehicle owners and no longer to the vehicles, and link vehicle registration with compulsory insurance cover, GSM SIM registration and FIRS tax clearance certification. The colours of vehicles at the time of registration will also be taken into cognizance. The colour of vehicles must be recorded by the FRSC and VIO at the point of registration. No vehicle should be given 2 registration numbers, except for high-profile security cases, which must be cleared from the ONSA. All these will facilitate the tracking of those engaged in terrorism activities.

7.9 Issuance of Driver's Licence: Towards implementing a credible system of obtaining driver's licence and facilitating multi-layer vetting of drivers' licence issuance, the FRSC has put in place some strategies. Since 2008, records of new traffic offenders are obtained online and are accessible to all security agencies for crime detection and investigation. The Corps has also introduced a central printing facility. The process include physical capture and biometric entries (including the ten fingers) of an applicant at Information Processing Centres (IPC). The data will be instantly transferred to the central printing facility which conducts background security checks and authenticates the applicant's biometrics, physical features vis-a-vis valid GSM SIM registration.

7.10 Use of CCTV in Traffic and Crime Management: CCTV is an advanced form of road traffic management which utilizes the advantages of IT to monitor, control and track offenders. The effectiveness of CCTV would depend on availability of credible and reliable data base for prompt verification of traffic offenders and criminals by security agencies. Such a data base is being developed. Deployment of CCTVs at critical intersections to run 24 hours of the day and through the week requires a central control room manned by trained personnel from relevant security agencies. It also requires installation of infrastructure to link the CCTV to FRSC and police electronic data for purposes of verification and investigation. Public and private organizations, individuals

and corporate bodies should be encouraged to provide CCTVs in their areas of operation (shops, schools, restaurants, hotels, parks, filling stations etc). Access should also be granted to law enforcement agencies when required. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) is to embark on a nationwide campaign to promote this initiative to complement government efforts.

7.11 End User Certificate: ONSA will ensure a strict control of end user's certificate for arms, ammunition, explosives, specified CT scanning equipment and other military-related hardware being imported into the country. A periodic review of the list of items will be made from time to time.

7.12 Enforcement of Firearms and Explosive Ordnances Laws: In order to prevent firearms and explosives from being illegally imported and unlawfully used, and from falling into wrong hands, the NPF supported by the DSS, NIS, NCS, NSCDC, FAAN, NIMASA, NIA, Ministry of Solid Minerals and Ministry of Agriculture will work to ensure the enforcement of extant laws. Detailed information on quarries in each locality will be maintained and monitored by the NPF, NSCDC and DSS.

7.13 Registration of Foreign House-helpers: The NIS in each locality, with the support of the NPF and the NSCDC, will register all foreign house-helpers in Nigeria irrespective of the provision of ECOWAS treaties.

7.14 Registration of Foreign and Casual Workers: The NIS, with the support of the NPF and NSCDC, will register all foreign construction and casual workers in Nigeria irrespective of the provision of the ECOWAS treaties.

7.15 Control of IED-Making Materials: In order to control and minimize the availability of bomb-making materials, the ONSA, NPF, DSS, Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Federal Ministry of Mine and Steel and other Law Enforcement Agencies shall strengthen measures to monitor and control the sale, distribution and use of materials that can be used in making IEDS. The ONSA in collaboration with other Security Agencies are to develop a Counter-IED Strategy for the country.

7.16 Strict Measures on Birth and Death Registration: All births and deaths must henceforth be registered from Ward to State level irrespective of location by the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) through collaboration with the National Population Commission (NPC). Mechanisms shall be put in place to strengthen existing health data collection systems and ensure the compliance of all concerned. The data so gathered will be maintained centrally by the ministries of National Planning and Health as well as the National Population Commission, which can be accessed by the NPF and other stakeholders.

7.17 Cyber Security: The Internet was created primarily to enhance unregulated and unlimited access to commercial, social and educational opportunities. The cyberspace has, however, been used by criminal elements to perpetrate crimes that range from advance fee fraud, business espionage, identity theft, banking fraud, outright attacks on data in computer networks, radicalization and recruitment of

terrorists. The ONSA is to lead all relevant Agencies and Stakeholders to develop mechanisms in order to control the activities of cyber criminals.

7.18 Investigation and Prosecution: The Law Enforcement Agencies in Nigeria shall be responsible for the gathering of intelligence and investigations of terrorist acts while prosecution efforts will be coordinated by the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice. This is to ensure fair and speedy trial of terrorism-related cases.

7.19 Disaster Management Efforts: In order to minimize the effects of terrorism attacks when they happen, NEMA, as the coordinating agency, will ensure that designated Disaster Response Units (DRUs) are created by Establishments and all Stakeholders. They are to constantly engage in joint training activities on their roles and coordination to be facilitated by NEMA. On all occasions, non-security and intelligence departments, especially the Federal Ministry of Health, must be well represented on such activities.

7.20 Special Counter-Terrorism Force: Security Agencies and Armed Forces have, in recent times, developed counter-terrorism capabilities. However, employing these capabilities jointly for national counter-terrorism requires that they be organized and coordinated. ONSA and MOD will therefore ensure the availability of a dedicated force for counter-insurgency, swift reaction and efficient handling of counter-terrorism situations.

7.21 Maritime Security: The shipping industry and oil and gas installations, which are important sources of income for the growth of the country's economy, are confronted daily by diverse threats. This has become a major challenge which the NIMASA and the NN and other maritime security agencies have to contend with. Piracy, illegal bunkering and terrorism are also known threats. The expanse of Nigeria's maritime area compares to about one-third of the total land area. However, the support of other maritime agencies will be needed to complement the efforts of the NN and NIMASA in order to improve the security of shipping and oil installations. The gaps between the security establishments and bases along the coastlines must be bridged with the development of coastal radars and deployment of more operational platforms to enable sufficient coverage of Nigeria's maritime domain. Government is to develop a robust Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) infrastructure in the form of Regional Maritime Domain Awareness Capability (RMDAC) to cover Nigeria's entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Additionally, the Navy Special Boat Service (SBS) which is vital for combating maritime terrorism will need to be equipped with specialized boats, weapons, and sensors for more effective performance. Furthermore, intelligence gathered, especially details of arrests made at sea must be domiciled in the national information sharing system at ONSA. There is a need therefore to incorporate NAF maritime surveillance assets in liaison with NIMASA for maritime surveillance duties.

7.22 Security Alertness Plan: To ensure security alertness of the populace, the CTC-ONSA in collaboration with the Ministry of Information and Communication and the

NOA will develop public enlightenment strategies that will sensitize the public on security awareness. The plan will include extensive use of the media to educate the masses, continued checks and monitoring of threat levels, issuance of threat level indicators and liaison with relevant Security and Law Enforcement Agencies towards working out measures against terrorism threats.

7.23 Counter Narratives: The CTC-ONSA will have an elaborate programme to counter extremist ideologies through print and electronic media, online and advocacy platforms. It will institutionalize strategic communication within the curriculum of Nigerian armed forces and security agencies training institutes, and expand the scope of the Civil Military Relations Department of the Nigerian Army. It will also develop a national identity plan that focuses on education, in particular the school curriculum to enforce critical thinking skills as well as ethnic and religious unity.

7.24 De-Radicalization and Challenging Ideology: Radicalization has been the main factor behind acts of faith-based terrorism in Nigeria. To address this trend with a view to its reversal, the CTC-ONSA will develop measures towards counter radicalization and de-radicalization of extreme ideologies. The Government will carry out effective monitoring of the radicalization processes and its indicators, systematic identification of the highly vulnerable groups for assimilation into the society, and launching of anti-radicalization campaigns. The CTC-ONSA in liaison with religious and other Stakeholders will also develop programmes on counter radicalization and de-radicalization of fundamentalists and extremists.

7.25 Re-appraisal of the Criminal Justice System: To promote Criminal Justice System in counter-terrorism, the Federal Ministry of Justice shall create in its structure a dedicated Counter-Terrorism Division/Unit/Branch in order to drive the desired reform. To improve the law enforcement capability of Security Agencies, the Ministry of Justice will periodically organize workshops for all the relevant Stakeholders to review national legislation on terrorism, provide advice on drafting enabling laws, and provide in-depth assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies on the implementation of the legislation against terrorism. The Ministry of Justice will also ensure the development of an integrated criminal justice database, a direct line of interaction between the Director of Public Prosecutions of the Federation, the Police, the Nigerian Prisons, the DSS, the NSCDC and other law enforcement agencies to strengthen and guide investigations and avoid instances where crucial evidence is compromised.

7.26 Emergency Medical Response: The Ministry of Health at the Federal and State levels and Health Departments in Local Government are to establish robust Emergency Disaster Response Teams (EDRT) in their various areas of responsibilities. The teams will be adequately equipped to manage physical and psychological cases arising from terrorism-induced incidents, among others. The Ministries and Health Departments are also to ensure the provision of an Emergency Communication Centre (ECC) which will be domiciled with the EDRT and function on a 24-hour basis.

7.27 Counter-Terrorism Call Centre: There shall be developed a toll-free CT Call Centre domiciled in ONSA for citizens to pass information anonymously on terrorism activities for security agencies. The Call Centre will function on 24-hour daily basis.

CONCLUSION

8.1 Terrorism is the most serious security threat currently confronting Nigeria. In keeping with Government's responsibility to ensure the safety of Nigerians, the NACTEST was developed to tackle the threat posed by terrorists and assure Nigerians of their safety. Additionally, this document is a reflection of Government's resolve that terrorists and those who sponsor them have no space to operate in the country.

8.2 Adequate measures have been proposed to prevent people from carrying out terror attacks or joining terrorist groups. The NACTEST also provides for measures to protect Critical National Infrastructure. Should these fail, there are other measures to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks on the citizenry.

8.3 Government is also establishing structures that will address situations that permit criminal elements and terrorist groups to operate with impunity in Nigeria. These measures include reforms within the national security apparatus. The ONSA has been tasked to develop adequate information sharing systems in order to enhance synergy amongst the security agencies. A Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) has been established in ONSA to coordinate these activities.

8.4 The implementation of the NACTEST imposes tasks on the security agencies as well as government and non-governmental agencies. This aspect of the NACTEST involves goals that would be attained within the period 2014-2016. The overall aim of NACTEST is the assurance of Government's commitment towards the protection and well-being of the Nigerian people.

ANNEX A

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

OF MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

MINISTRIES

1. **FEDERAL MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE**

Contribute to NACTEST by promoting the development of agriculture to attain food sufficiency and generate employment. The Ministry will coordinate with Stakeholders in formulating and implementing policies to cover the importation, distribution and usage of fertilizer products as part of counter IEDs strategy.

2. **MINISTRY OF AVIATION**

Lead agency on oversight, safety and security of air travel and ensure periodic review of aviation security protocol. Charge relevant agencies with the screening of air travellers and their baggage as well as the need for proper screening in the following air security areas:

- i. Pre-board screening;
- ii. hold baggage screening;
- iii. non-passenger screening for restricted areas;
- iv. ensure the safety of approaches to airports for safe takeoff and landing;
- v. ensure the progressive erection of perimeter fence at airports.

3. **FEDERAL MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT**

Collaborate with the Ministry of Information, National Orientation Agency (NOA), organized private sector and associations to promote a friendly investment atmosphere and develop trade guidelines that will discourage terrorist financing and illicit transactions.

4. **FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION**

Work with other stakeholders to develop a communication strategy to disrupt terrorist media campaigns at local and international levels. Develop an Information Assurance and Awareness (IAA) strategy and collaborate with stakeholders to combat the spread of radical extremist messages.

5. **MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

Support NACTEST by appropriately equipping and training the Armed Forces to face contemporary security challenges in CT and COIN. In the event of a terrorist attack, the ministry is to direct and support the Armed Forces to offer assistance to appropriate civil authorities.

6. **FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION**

Support the **Prevent** pillar of NACTEST by providing an enabling environment for education to be free from, and devoid of, any form of extremist ideology. Develop curricula to address needs at the grass roots consistent with national unity and human development objectives. This should include a robust civic education programme in schools. The Ministry will introduce a process where education administrators and practitioners are trained to identify and counsel pupils/students who are at the threshold of being radicalized.

7. **FEDERAL MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT**

Ensure environmental protection and conservation of natural resources. The Ministry is responsible for dealing with, and managing the impact of, terrorist incidents on the environment, plants and animal health, food and drinking water, waste management, farming, fisheries, communities etc in the event of a terrorist attack.

8. **MINISTRY OF FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY**

Liaise with other security agencies and key federal departments to develop a blueprint for the security and administration of the Federal Capital Territory in line with identified threats and challenges.

9. **MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

In conjunction with NIA and DIA, the Ministry has overall responsibility for the coordination and delivery of NACTEST overseas.

10. **MINISTRY OF INTERIOR**

Support NACTEST by providing oversight for immigration, passport control, Prison administration and Fire Service. Ensure there is an appropriate upgrade of the entire border security management system, especially for the northern part of the country. The Ministry of Interior along with the NPS will drive de-radicalization programme in prisons.

11. **FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE**

Establish a dedicated division/section for National Security that will ensure that there is a significant capacity in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) to deal with terrorism cases efficiently, effectively and securely. Partner with relevant institutions to introduce legislation that criminalizes incitement and recruitment in places of religious training and worship. Ensure fair and speedy trial of terror suspects in accordance with the rule of law and develop an integrated criminal justice database. Provide leadership in the development of a seamless and coordinated approach to investigation and prosecution of terror cases among the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) of the Federation, the Police, the DSS, Nigeria Prisons and other Law Enforcement Agencies.

12. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES

Contribute to NACTEST as lead ministry for all energy matters. In conjunction with security agencies/services, it is responsible for ensuring the security of the nation's energy supplies (oil and gas) and assets.

13. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT

Responsible for national transportation policies and programmes and enhance the security of the transportation system through continuous response to identified threats and security needs. Adopt a risk management approach and develop measures designed to mitigate vulnerabilities and threats in the transportation system.

14. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND PRODUCTIVITY

Support NACTEST with efforts aimed at generating employment for Nigerians and drive skill acquisition processes at Federal, State and Local Government levels.

15. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF YOUTH DEVELOPMENT

In conjunction with the Ministry of Education, re-appraise the 'Almajiri' system and develop a comprehensive framework to cater to the needs of under-aged children. Introduce a coordinating mechanism with State governments for 'Area Boys' and other street urchins to engage in more productive ventures.

16. FEDERAL MINISTRY HEALTH

In collaboration with the Ministry of National Planning and National Population Commission, put in place mechanisms to strengthen existing health data collection systems. Set up institutions to develop skills for the identification and counselling of vulnerable persons who are at the threshold of being radicalized. Provide emergency preparedness and response support to deal with emergencies arising from catastrophic acts of terrorism.

17. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Contribute to the **Forestall** strand of NACTEST by encouraging the exploration of scientific methods of research and development for CT capabilities. Work in conjunction with the Nigerian Communications Satellite (NIGCOMSAT) to explore how NIGCOMSAT 1 & 2 can be deployed to complement border security.

18. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF POWER

In conjunction with other security agencies, ensure adequate security for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and set up a back-up mechanism in case of terror-related breaches.

19. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF MINES AND STEEL DEVELOPMENT

Contribute to NACTEST by giving information on the importation, distribution, sales, handling and consumption of explosives and accessories in Nigeria. It will also assist in the restriction on the movement of explosives and accessories allowed into the country. It will also assist in reporting on the theft and diversion of explosives and accessories in the country.

DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES

1. NIGERIAN COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NCC)

The Commission is responsible for the regulation of electronic signals and the allocation of GSM telephone networks in the country. The NCC is to establish a National Call Centre for information acquisition, dissemination and review, re-invigorate and enforce regulations on SIM card registration.

2. FEDERAL RADIO CORPORATION OF NIGERIA (FRCN)

The FRCN will disseminate information and educate the public on CT issues and complement the CT awareness campaign efforts of Government.

3. NIGERIAN BROADCASTING COMMISSION (NBC)

The Commission is to regulate radio/TV broadcasts, allocation of frequencies as well as the control/monitoring of transmissions.

4. NIGERIAN COMMUNICATION SATELLITE (NIGCOMSAT)

The NIGCOMSAT will assist in the collation of data via satellite.

5. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (CBN)

The CBN and NFIU are to work closely with the ONSA and other security agencies to monitor unusual/suspicious movement of funds.

6. NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (NNPC)

Ensure secure and safe distribution of petroleum products and, in conjunction with other agencies, develop a contingency plan for terror-related disruptions. The NNPC will secure the operation of the downstream and upstream sectors of the energy industry.

7. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SERVICES (DSS)

The Department is to serve as the lead agency on information/Intelligence collection/collation on all non-military components of internal security as well as

prevention and detection of terror-related activities/crimes. The agency is to reactivate/resuscitate the crime registry for the storage of digital information and collaborate with the Ministry of Information and NOA to develop public enlightenment programs that will sensitize the public.

8. **NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NIA)**

The NIA is to serve as the lead agency for external information/intelligence collection/collation and, in conjunction with relevant MDAs, monitor all terror-related activities in the **Forestall, Identify** and **Secure** strands of NACTEST.

9. **DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)**

The Agency is to coordinate the CT effort of the DMI, DNI and DAI and, in conjunction with relevant agencies, is the lead agency for the collation of military-related intelligence within and outside the country.

10. **NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE (NPF)**

The NPF is the lead agency for the maintenance of law and order and the prevention and detection of crime. The NPF is the first responder in the **Identify** and **Prepare** strands of NACTEST with support from other security agencies. It will update the crime registry and store information digitally for easy access. In conjunction with the DSS, NSCDC, NIS, NCS, FAAN, NIMASA, NIA and the Ministry of Solid Minerals, ensure that firearms and explosives are not illegally imported and unlawfully used in the country. In collaboration with DSS, maintain and monitor information on quarries and industrial explosive sites in the country. The NPF is to institute measures to monitor and control the sales, distribution and use of materials that may be used in making IEDs. In collaboration with the National Space Research Development Agency (NASRDA), Ministries of Science and Technology, Finance, Information and the Military, the NPF shall develop mechanisms to control the activities of cybercriminals.

11. **FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY CORPS (FRSC)**

The FRSC is to provide support especially data for the **Forestall, Identify** and **Prepare** strands of NACTEST.

12. **ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION (EFCC)**

In collaboration with relevant agencies, investigate financial crimes, money laundering and terrorist financing in support of the **Forestall** and **Identify** work streams of NACTEST.

13. **NATIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (NDLEA)**

Monitoring and detection of drug-related crimes and, in collaboration with other agencies, target the leaders of narcotic rings, money laundering organizations as well as terrorist funding.

14. **NIGERIAN FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (NFIU)**

In conjunction with other relevant financial institutions, the NFIU is responsible for the receipt and analysis of financial disclosures and currency transactions. NFIU will report suspicious transactions and disseminate financial intelligence to competent authorities.

15. **NIGERIAN IMMIGRATION SERVICE (NIS)**

NIS controls and monitors immigration activities at all entry and exit points in the country. Complement internal security efforts through effective manning of major entry points as well as the patrolling of borders. Register all foreign house-holds and foreign construction workers in the country and, in conjunction with other agencies, monitor and ensure the control of refugees and refugee camps in the country.

16. **NIGERIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE (NCS)**

Collaborative functions with other agencies to support and enforce the prevention of illegal importation of arms and ammunition, illicit drugs including toxic and hazardous substances. The NCS is to provide first-hand intelligence on importation and exportation trends to help contain terrorist threats.

17. **NIGERIAN PRISONS SERVICE**

Develop capacity for prison personnel and institutions to tackle the issue of de-radicalization of convicted terrorists.

18. **NIGERIAN SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS (NSCDC)**

Assist in the maintenance of law and order, and will be the lead agency in emergencies and disasters. Protection of government facilities and oversight functions for private security guards.

19. **NATIONAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION (NIMC)** Responsible for the issuance of IDs for eligible Nigerians only and maintaining a proper record/database for all categories of persons.

20. **FEDERAL AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF NIGERIA (FAAN)**
The FAAN in conjunction with other agencies is responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the airports and, in collaboration with other agencies, ensure the protection of airport facilities and all aircrafts including during takeoff and landing.

21. **NATIONAL AGENCY FOR FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL (NAFDAC)**
The Agency is charged among others with responsibility to ensure manufacturing, importations and distributions of safe drugs in Nigeria. It will also collaborate with other Stakeholders in formulating and implementing policies in our counter IEDs strategy.

22. **NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (NEMA)**
Coordinating agency for disaster management and saddled with the exploration of the imperatives of multi-agency cooperation in emergency management. The NEMA is to provide appropriate leadership and direction to other relevant agencies on CT response

matters to ensure resilience. It will ensure that Disaster Response Units (DRUs) are created by respective establishments. It will also coordinate training for Stakeholders (including NGOs and faith-based organizations) and encourage regular joint training activities.

23. NATIONAL ORIENTATION AGENCY (NOA)

The NOA is to serve as the information hub of government, responsible for the publication and dissemination of government activities. With other relevant agencies, develop security consciousness and situational awareness through concerted media campaigns. The NOA will embark on a nationwide campaign to promote the installation of CCTV by public and private organizations, individuals and corporate bodies.

24. NATIONAL AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (NAPTIP)

Responsible for the supervision and prevention of child labour, prevent children from being used or sold into slavery, assist victims of child trafficking and combat trafficking of persons who could be exploited for terrorist activities.

25. NIGERIA INTER-RELIGIOUS COUNCIL (NIREC)

Foster inter-religious harmony among Nigerians and ensure the integration of faith-based organizations into the humanitarian response system in emergencies and terrorist attacks.

26. DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

Establish a robust CT/COIN Unit (Special Operation Force) and coordinate the operational CT efforts of the Armed Forces of Nigeria and other security agencies. The DHQ is to coordinate and implement the Nigeria-Republic of Niger Joint Border Patrol involving the Armed Forces, Police, DSS, Immigrations, NSCDC, NIA and Customs and all other such patrols that could be established with Nigeria's neighbours.

27. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

The ONSA is to provide the requisite leadership role in all national CT efforts and drive NACTEST. It will maintain a comprehensive list of the country's Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and formulate a policy for its protection. ONSA will coordinate synergy among the DSS, NIA, the Police, Armed Forces and other Stakeholders. ONSA is to coordinate and ensure oversight of response units in the respective Services. It is to develop a single and comprehensive database to serve as an information sharing system for the various agencies. It will also ensure stricter control for the issue of end user's certificate for arms, ammunition, explosives, CT scanning equipment and other military security-related hardware. In conjunction with other agencies, ONSA will use the media to educate the public on threat levels including issuance of threat level indicators and liaise with the Services/Agencies towards the mitigation of terrorism

threats. It will work out modalities on how the Nigeria-Republic of Niger Joint Border Patrol could be replicated with Chad and Cameroon. It will also develop a benchmarking framework for the evaluation of the implementation and review of NACTEST.

28. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs)

The Government (ONSA-CTC) is to partner with CSOs in all facets of its CT programme, particularly of the following areas:

- (a) Addressing conditions conducive for the spread of terrorism including, human rights, conflict resolution, rule of law, social, political and economic issues. The CSOs are to engage in outreach activities and taking proactive steps to address the root causes of terrorism.
- (b) Targeted programmes of cooperation focusing on promotion of dialogue and tolerance.
- (c) Provide Policy advice and expertise on aspects of preventing terrorism and developing security consciousness and situation awareness through sustained public enlightenment campaigns.
- (d) Mobilization and the sensitization of the general public on how to respond to major emergency security situations.

ANNEX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AQAP	-	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI	-	Al Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM	-	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AQKB	-	Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalion
BOKO HARAM	-	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad
CBN	-	Central Bank of Nigeria
CCTV	-	Close-Circuit Television
CJS	-	Criminal Justice System
COIN	-	Counter Insurgency

CNI	-	Critical National Infrastructure
CSO	-	Civil Society Organizations
CT	-	Counter-Terrorism
CTC	-	Counter-Terrorism Centre
CVE	-	Counter Violent Extremism
DMUs	-	Disaster Management Units
DRU	-	Disaster Response Unit
DSS	-	Department of State Services
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
EFCC	-	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
FAAN	-	Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria
FRSC	-	Federal Road Safety Corps
IAA	-	Information Assurance and Awareness
IEDs	-	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGP	-	Inspector-General of Police
IPC	-	Information Processing Centre
IT	-	Information Technology
MAD	-	Movement for the Advancement of Democracy
MEND	-	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MoD	-	Ministry of Defence
MOOTW	-	Military Operations Other Than War
NACTEST	-	National Counter-Terrorism Strategy
NASRDA	-	National Space Research Development Agency
NCS	-	Nigeria Customs Service
NEMA	-	National Emergency Management Agency
NFIU	-	Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit
NIA	-	National Intelligence Agency
NIGCOMSAT	-	Nigeria Communication Satellite

NIMASA	-	The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
NIMS	-	National Identity Management Scheme
NIS	-	Nigeria Immigration Service
NMB	-	Nigerian Manpower Board
NOA	-	National Orientation Agency
NPA	-	Nigeria Ports Authority
NPF	-	The Nigeria Police Force
NSA	-	National Security Adviser
NSCDC	-	National Security and Civil Defence Corps
ONSA	-	Office of the National Security Adviser
RU	-	Response Units
SIM Card	-	Subscriber Identification Module Card
SALW	-	Small Arms and Light Weapons
TTP	-	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UN	-	United Nations
VBIED	-	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VIO	-	Vehicle Inspection Officer