Sloane, Peter and Kristian Shaw eds. *Kazuo Ishiguro: Twenty-First Century Perspectives* (Manchester University Press)

Chapter 7: Peter Sloane, 'Empathy and the ethics of posthuman reading in *Never Let Me Go*'

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a chapter published by Manchester University Press in Peter Sloane and Kristian Shaw (eds) *Kazuo Ishiguro: Twenty-First Century Perspectives* in March 2023, available at:

https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526182555/

https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526157546/9781526157546.xml

https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526157546/9781526157546.00015.xml

DOI: https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526157546.00015

Sloane, Peter. "'Empathy and the ethics of posthuman reading in *Never Let Me Go*" In *Kazuo Ishiguro: Twenty-First Century Perspectives* edited by Peter Sloane and Kristian Shaw, 146-169. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2023.

It is deposited under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Never Let Me Go: Empathy and the Ethics of Posthuman Reading

Peter Sloane

In a seminar on what is often held to be Kazuo Ishiguro's most moving, even most human(e) fiction, *Never Let Me Go* (2005), I asked my students for their initial emotional responses. Predictably, words like tragic, futile, and unethical summed up the general sentiment to this admittedly dark speculative dystopia about bioethics, bio-harvesting, and 'the socially underprivileged' (Whitehead 2011: 63). I polemically suggested that they had misread; *Never Let Me Go* is not a tragedy at all, but rather a farce, predicated on the misconception that the subjects of the novel, the therapeutic clones, are human, when they are at best posthuman, and at worst simply non-human. That is to say, *Never Let Me Go* employs narrative techniques and the very form of the novel to manipulate readers into empathising with the narrator, Kathy H. – a clone 'carer' who stoically nurses her friends as they undergo mandatory 'donations' of organs until they finally 'complete' – and through her a range of non-human characters who, though humanesque, are simply facsimiles of human beings; unwittingly succumbing to a category error, my students had read the posthuman as human, and had thus attributed to the novel an unwarranted degree of empathy by invoking categorically inappropriate ethical systems.

Richard F. Storrow also takes what might be considered a humanist approach to the posthuman text and narrator, passionately claiming that 'Embracing Kathy's story forces us to conclude that human clones are every bit as human as the rest of us if only because their lives are likewise defined by love and loss and hope' (2009: 270). Exploiting the nurturing word 'embracing' which simultaneously foregrounds the text's absence of parental love and echoes Kathy 'clutching' a 'pillow to stand in for' a baby that she can never have, Storrow's impassioned claim seems a little specious. This rather romantic idea of a person derives from a problematically Western understanding of humanism which is the subject of intense and increasing scrutiny. As Myra J. Seaman notes, 'Posthumanism observes that there has never been one unified, cohesive "human", a title that was granted by and to those with the material and cultural luxury to bestow upon themselves the faculties of "reason", autonomous agency, and the privileges of "being human"' (2007: 246-247). Love and

loss and hope, then, fulfil only certain geographically, temporally, and culturally specific criteria of personhood. Jeff Wallace articulates the fact that, 'under the rubric of an implicit universalism, humanism can be a narrowly Western version of liberal-humanist individualism' (2010: 693). In the wake of posthuman, post-structural, postmodern, and postcolonial theory, the idea that the Western subject stands as a kind of archetypical proxy for the human subject broadly construed has been aggressively decentred in what Thomas A. Shannon refers to as the 'postgeneration' (2005: 269).

Despite her ostensibly more sceptical stance towards the credibility of a universally valent definition of 'human nature', Seaman comes to a similarly passionate conclusion about *Never Let Me Go*, arguing that, 'For the reader, the clones' experiences and responses to those experiences regularly confirm their humanity, but within the posthuman world of the narrative, their humanity must be proven […] The clones who are the central figures of the novel are shown, through the narrative, to meet that requirement as fully as any humans' (2007: 266). Seaman's argument is more rhetorically sophisticated; clones are produced from humans, and so need to demonstrate certain behaviours that, while always arbitrary and conventional, are nonetheless vital to species categorisation. That is to say, the requirements are not only fluid but so diverse and malleable as to be, essentially, meaningless, leading to the inevitable conclusion that neither clone nor human are 'human', but that each participates in a common, but inarticulable humanity. Storrow and Seaman raise the troubling implication that our moral obligation to empathise with fictional characters, and by extension real-world entities, is predicated on their being 'like us', sharing a common 'human nature'. Indeed, if Seaman identifies the problematic fact that intra-diegetically the clones must repeatedly prove their humanity, she overlooks some of the more worrying indications that she too requires the clones to continually affirm and prove that they are human in the extra-diegetic sense. One might even suggest that this is precisely the question that the novel (and the more recent *Klara and the Sun*) poses: must something be human in order to be worthy of our identification and empathy, and, perhaps more importantly, social justice?

Attempting to answer this requires engaging with progressively more imperative issues about novel reading and readers' responses to fictions, especially those that feature non-standard human characters, being received by, perhaps, in an ever more bioengineered 'postgeneration' society, non-

traditional human readers. Informed by Suzanne Keen's argument that, despite the fact that readers are endowed with the capacity 'to convert their emotional fusion with the denizens of make-believe worlds into actions on behalf of real world others', they 'rarely decide to do so', this essay's concerns with empathy are broader, highlighting the pervasive anthropocentricism evidenced in critical responses to novels, and the ways in which this reflects a more systemic unwillingness to empathise with the non-human *qua* non-human (2010: 168). How then do humans read posthuman texts and posthumans read human texts? If we agree with Donna Haraway's prescient polemic that 'we are *all* chimeras […] *all* cyborgs', perhaps *Never Let Me Go* offers a rich simulated socio-political space in which, rather than attempting to empathise with posthuman characters by tracing intersections with their humanity, the reader is encouraged to recognise their own posthumanity, to acknowledge not that *they are like us*, but that *we are like them*, and that we share constitutive differences which paradoxically unite (1991: 150 italics mine).

This chapter examines a range of novels that explore the scientific creation of posthumans, notably *Frankenstein* (1818), *Brave New World* (1932), and *Where Late the Sweet Birds Sang* (1976), to provide a continuum within which to situate a more focused discussion of Ishiguro's novel, in turn interrogating whether the presence of affective response in the reader is either a sufficient or necessary condition to confer the nebulous status of human onto other entities. Indeed, N. Katherine Hayles has suggested that 'the age of the human has given way to the posthuman', that 'the concept of the human has given way to its evolutionary heir', while Armstrong, seeing a comparable paradigm shift in literature, proposes that the contemporary novel 'confront[s] us with forms of human life so innovative as to make it next to impossible for us to recognize ourselves in them' (2016: 247; 2014: 442). With the aid of Martha Nussbaum's work in *Frontiers of Justice* (2006), this essay is also an attempt to think through the literary implications, the ethics of reading in a world in which the human subject is, demonstrably, becoming a more fluid species. Much influential criticism of Ishiguro's novel assumes a human reader, and so, as I will argue below, participates in both the anthropocentricism and human exceptionalism which it attempts, at least in principle, to challenge. I argue here that the novel as a form has always posed questions about human nature and human identity; that empathising in and with novels does not extend to real world altruism; and, that

Armstrong exemplifies a strand of criticism which assumes a human reader (ourselves) of the posthuman (other), placing an implicit bias on reading as a human. Armstrong powerfully demonstrates her thesis, that 'novels featuring an apparently damaged, subhuman, or insufficiently individuated human being prepare us to attempt the kind of sympathetic identification that novels have traditionally offered readers. They do so in order to turn a critical eye on all such person-to-person relationships' (2014: 442). However, the contemporary novel aspires to more than simply 'person-to-person' relationships: both text and reader are undergoing an epistemological and even ontological resituating in relation to the refiguration of the humanities to the posthumanities in what Francis Fukuyama somewhat anxiously refers to as the '"posthuman" stage of history' (2003: 7). Indeed, one might consider Ishiguro to be advocating for a neo-humanism, a recognition of species fluidity alongside a commitment to extending both empathy and rights to the traditionally post or non-human.

Fictions of Cloning

Armstrong is certainly correct in her observation that the contemporary novel challenges the reader to the degree that it represents a 'sea change in the traditional subject of fiction' (2014: 442). That said, much earlier fiction grapples with questions of the limits of the human and the efficacy of the novel as a catalyst for both sympathy and real-world altruism. We might consider *Frankenstein* the first text to construct an imaginary scenario within which to explore the ethical and theological implications of the scientific production of a humanoid non-human. If, as Storrow has suggested, cloning is conceived to be an 'an affront to human dignity' because human clones 'lack a connection to two genetic parents,' this affront is exacerbated by the monster's uncanny virtue of being composed of many corporeal 'parents' but of being born of none of these (2009: 259). The literary and cultural resonance of Shelley's ground-breaking work of gothic science fiction is immeasurable, while it is also adduced as an allegory for the dangers of unregulated scientific endeavour. Michael Mulkay draws attention to the novel's frequent use in popular press, and in official discourse shortly after the advent of the biotechnological revolution in the latter part of the last century, quoting a prominent newspaper's (*The Sun* 1987) claim that 'The Government admits that the prospect of Frankenstein-style experiments is unlikely, but it wants to stop any genetic tinkering with embryos which would predetermine

characteristics' (1996: 161). Mulkay shows that *Frankenstein* has been used as an exemplum of the potential harms of genetic engineering to support a 'proposal to establish strict control over the activities of scientists engaged in research on human embryos' (1996: 161). This intersection between science fiction and real-world regulation of the sciences supports Amit Marcus's hypothesis that science fiction and clone narratives 'can provide insights pertinent to the ethics of human cloning in actuality' (2012: 407).

These precautions reflect initial widespread religious, scientific, political, and public fears about genetic modification, cloning, new eugenics, and even 'designer babies'. But, the uncertainty also represents more abstract and philosophical worries about whether 'the eugenic or dysgenic effects of genetic engineering could ever become sufficiently widespread to affect human nature itself' (Fukuyama 2003: 80). Wallace sees Fukuyama as representing a 'popular' as opposed to a 'critical' strand of posthumanism, describing his position as a 'reactionary' response to biotechnology perceived as a threat to the 'integrity of human nature' (2010: 692). Indeed, despite never offering any kind of precise definition of human nature, Fukuyama anxiously asserts that 'human nature exists, is a meaningful concept, and has provided a stable continuity to our experience as a species', proposing that the 'most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into the "posthuman" stage of history' (2003: 7). Such amorphous and seemingly irrational fears over the potential harms of genetic engineering abated somewhat around the turn of the millennium, shortly after the completion of the human genome project, with one 'major recent advance [being] the emerging consensus on the acceptability of stem cell research' (Singer 2000: 283). However, there remains an unease in the 21st century about genetic manipulation, and the science seems to have stalled in the face of strict regulation and nebulous public repugnance.

Frankenstein is also fascinated with the ways that texts and reading influence behaviour and foster community. Reading is a recurring and highly potent motif at every level of the narrative: Victor Frankenstein frequently excitedly expounds upon his avid, obsessive reading which, inevitably, leads to or facilitates his own monstrous transgression. But, where Victor reads the sciences and to a degree loses what we might think of as his humanity, it is from the arts that the monster develops

some insight into the human condition, recalling that Goethe's *The Sorrows of Young Werther* and Milton's *Paradise Lost* evoked in him 'an infinity of new images and feelings', finally provoking the fundamental question of the novel: 'Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination?' (2012: 89). The monster is forced in his exposure to human literature to acknowledge simultaneously his radical physical and experiential alterity, and the fact that his difference does not render him incapable of inter-species empathy. Without evolutionary or cultural history, ancestors, or the possibility of genetic progeny, his situation gives rise to a series of unique existential uncertainties. However, as a posthuman he is still able to respond to human texts, and, to have an expectation that literature is the place to seek a sense of community and fellow feeling. The monster is a compassionate posthuman reader with a clear concern for a species that is not his, and with a powerfully acute, preternaturally perceptive awareness of his own difference, each of which is mediated by the precariousness of his position as the single member of his species (hence the desire for a mate).

A similar scenario occurs in *Brave New World*, a novel peopled entirely with clones produced through a procedure known as 'Bokanovsky's Process'. The Director observers gleefully that they, the World State, have traversed 'the realm of mere slavish imitation of nature into the much more interesting world of human invention' (10). Jean Baudrillard has called cloning the 'delirious apotheosis of a productive technology', and this jubilant, celebratory mood is shared by the Director (2002: 97). Tellingly, reading plays a crucial role in the novel, in terms of its major plot points but also its conceptual matrix. Bernard Marx, the novel's absurd hero, recounts finding a volume of Shakespeare, recalling with reverence the 'words and the strange, strange story out of which they were taken (he couldn't make head or tail of it, but it was wonderful, wonderful all the same)' (114). The genre-standard counterpoint to the high-living World State Marx, John the Savage, raised in nature in the reservations outside the city walls, is equally taken with Shakespeare. During one scene John recites *Romeo and Juliet* for Marx and Helmholtz, the novel's intellectual, who suffers a bout of what Marx refers to as 'obscene' laughter, before declaring, '"But fathers and mothers!" He shook his head. "You can't expect me to keep a straight face about fathers and mothers. And who's going to get excited about a boy having a girl or not having her?"' (162). In this passage, a posthuman product of

selective breeding and cloning, living in a society that operates on a basis of 'all for all' in sexual terms, reads a definitively human text and finds it comedic precisely because the interpersonal relationships portrayed, the fascination with romantic love and monogamy are socio-culturally ridiculous in the context of the World State. The passage draws our attention to the politico-historical and cultural specificity of what we think of as both human value and human essence. The posthuman reading of the human presented in both texts reveals some interesting things about the nature of being human, and the inherently contingent and constructivist nature of what might traditionally be thought of as Human Nature.

Clones are the subject of Kate Wilhelm's novel of environmental catastrophe and worldwide famine *Where Late the Sweet Birds Sang.* As flu strains and plagues ravage the population, a research group led by David Sumner begin researching animal cloning and fertility, at which point they realise that the men and women in their commune of around 200 have become sterile. The impetus naturally shifts to perpetuating their own species. In this novel, unlike *Frankenstein* and *Never Let Me Go,* clones are not sterile – they only become less sterile by the fourth generation. After overseeing the production of the first successful batch of clones, David remarks to his uncle Walt that '"They're inhuman, aren't they"' (47). However, the clones rapidly develop their own sense of community, one that is aggressively distinct from that of their human creators. As the clone W-1 says to David, "we realized that each of you is alone. We're not like you David […] sexual reproduction is not the only answer. Just because the higher organisms evolved to it, it doesn't mean it's the best. Each time a species has died out, there has been another higher one to replace it […] You pay a high price for individuality" (60). There is a suggestion here that what makes human beings distinct is also what leads, inevitably, to their decline. Jerng remarks on the text's preoccupation with individuation, concluding that 'the question of individuation is used to distinguish clones from humans: clones are depicted as beings who are unable to individuate […] The humans are distinguished by these traits because they are reared within the parent-child relationship, which provides a site for this form of maturation and separation' (2008: 369-370). So crucial is this differentiation that the clones form a committee and decide that they are a separate species. After David attempts to sabotage the cloning operation, he is brought before the clones who tell him that 'We agree now that there is still the

instinct to preserve one's species. Preservation of the species is a very strong instinct, a drive if you will' (66). David replies with alarm that 'You are not a separate species' (66). David is banished, and, later, while surveying the destruction of the cities the clones remark that it was 'done by savages', 'another species, extinct now' (90). A similar technique is used by Michel Houellebecq in *La Possibilité d'une île* (2003) (which develops the conceit of Samuel Beckett's *Krapp's Last Tape* (1958)): the central character, Daniel1 records his life, his memories, his consciousness, which is then reflected upon in a post-apocalyptic future by Daniel24, his own clone around 1000 years in the future, who looks back less than favourably on his human forebear's exploits. Perhaps, though, this is because Daniel1's obsession with sex, and his existential anxiety are almost cosmically anachronistic: Adams suggests in his review of the novel that 'In the absence of the necessity of sex and death, the post-human clones have found that all human emotion has, over the centuries, become extinct' (*Guardian* October 2005).

It is hard to dispute the idea that, due to the manner in which clones are conceived, gestated, birthed, and raised, their sense of communal identity, their means of reproduction, and their unique cultural heritage, that Frankenstein's monster, Daniel24, and the clones in Wilhelm's novel are in fact a distinct variety of intelligent life. Daniel24 certainly thinks so, commenting on the remaining humans that 'For them I feel no pity, nor any sense of common belonging; I simply consider them to be slightly more intelligent monkeys' (17). However, *Where Late the Sweet Birds Sang* turns away from its more interesting premises; Molly, individuated after spending time outside the community, is exiled and has a child with another clone. Eventually, that child leads a group of fertile females away, reproduces sexually, only to return after 20 years to discover that the clone community has died out. One might argue of course that the novel, written during the cold war, enacts the failure of both the communist and capitalist ideals, showing that neither radical communitarian politics or radically individualistic politics is tenable. It also makes some interesting points about obsolescence and species differentiation that have resurfaced in two recent films, Alex Garland's *Ex Machina* (2015), and Spike Jonze's *Her* (2013): in each of these films it is the AI, the synthetic human consciousness that outstrips, outgrows, and eventually abandons its less capable human ancestor.

One concern raised by the humans in these texts, and *Never Let Me Go,* is that something is lost in the manner of duplication, and, further, that the thing that is lost will have a profound impact on human society and development. That may be the soul, human dignity, or simply 'human nature'. Importantly, whatever is intuited or assumed to be missing also often leads to scientifically produced human or humanlike forms being considered either simply non-human, even inhumane, and generally being excluded from basic human rights or comparable non-human rights. Baudrillard addresses some of the reasons for this in 'Clone Story', in which he draws a comparison between the mechanically reproduced clone and the printed text. He refers to Walter Benjamin's suggestion that what is lost in a 'work that is serially reproduced, is its *aura,* its singular quality', suggesting that this 'is what happens to us with cloning, no longer at the level of message, but at the level of individuals' (2002: 99). Something is lost, according to Baudrillard, in the human subject, something that replicates, re-enacts, even paradoxically duplicates that which is lost in the mechanical reproduction of works of art or literature. Copying seems to disinvest, to render something empty, missing some profound, and profoundly intangible quality. For Baudrillard, in cloning, 'the subject is also gone, since by identical duplication' the key 'mirror stage [is] abolished in cloning, or rather it is parodied therein in monstrous fashion' (2002: 97). However, fabrication, replication and simulation are central to the contemporary experience of being human, and may in fact represent a future that will be, inevitably, more mechanized, more bioengineered, more complex in the figuration of reproduction. These fears then seem to belong to a past age.

Never Let Me Go

Never Let Me Go shares concerns (family, friendship, service, failure) and a narrative perspective that are central to Ishiguro's other novels; like them, it is narrated by a person who 'looks back over his or her life in old age' (Shaffer and Wong, 2008: 114). Tragically, in this case old age for the narrator Kathy H. is thirty-one: she opens her memoir by telling us that she's 'been a carer now for over eleven years', but that she will only be a carer 'until the end of this year', after which, presumably, she will become a donor, and will 'complete', or die, usually after the fourth organ removal (*NLMG* 3). *Never Let Me Go* is interested in memory, fabrication, a fetishization of the modernist aesthetic of the unreliable narrator, and foremost, a preoccupation with dignity which recurs in Ono (*AFW*),

Stevens (*RD*), and Ryder (*U*). There is a further refinement in this novel: it is *human* dignity that is in question, because human dignity is precisely what is assumed to be missing in cloned humans, Baudrillard and Benjamin's 'aura'. Indeed, policy on cloning has been directly driven by this vague concept, with UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights recommending a ban on 'practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning' (UNESCO 1997).

In an interview with Tim Adams of *The Guardian*, Ishiguro said that the novel, which takes place predominantly in a clone boarding school called Hailsham, is an allegory for childhood and parenting: 'Hailsham is like a physical manifestation of what we have to do to all children […] It is a protected world. To some extent at least you have to shield children from what you know and drip-feed information to them. Sometimes that is kindly meant, and sometimes not' (2005). Trauma is a recurring theme of Ishiguro's works, and, with memory, a related theme, has become the standard point of critical reception (see Justine Baillie and Sean Matthews, Groes (2010), Yugin Teo (2014), Cynthia Wong (2000); Matthew Mead (2014)). I have argued elsewhere (Sloane 2018) that trauma does not account for, or mitigate, some of the more reprehensible behaviour that Ishiguro's narrators confess to in their reflective narratives (Nazi appeasement in *The Remains of the Day*, support for the Imperial Japanese ideology of pre-war Japan in *An Artist of the Floating World*). This holds true for Kathy, too, who is remarkably passive towards, and even participates in, a brutal programme of organ harvesting. Yet, despite the horrors masked by the façade of care, in comparison to earlier incarnations of clone rearing, Hailsham is indeed something of a sanctuary, one that nurtures and protects the clones in ways which were advanced. As the 'guardians' Madame and Miss Emily inform Kathy and her friend Tommy near novel's end, 'there are students being reared in deplorable conditions, conditions you Hailsham students could hardly imagine. And now we're no more, things will only get worse' (255). While the word 'reared' at once recalls the 'hatcheries' of *Brave New World* and betrays some less admirable sentiments, indicating perhaps that underneath a surface of empathy is a fear and recognition of the clone's radical otherness, there is nonetheless a degree of care that one might think of as an allegory for protecting children from the very many bad things happening in the world.

The novel's title offers a key to understanding what it has to say about empathy. It is taken from the fictional song of the same name, one that Kathy listens to and is absorbed by. The song, as Kathy remarks, is 'slow and late night and American' (*NLMG* 69). Kathy listens to the song over and over, and in one crucial scene she is observed by Madame while she dances, lovingly, desperately grasping a pillow. Later, when Kathy and Tommy track down the old school managers after Hailsham is closed, Kathy tells Madame that she 'imagined it was about this woman who'd been told she couldn't have babies. But then she'd had one, and she was so pleased, and she was holding it ever so tightly to her breast, really afraid something might separate them, and she's going baby, baby, never let me go' (*NLMG* 266). Madame, however, misinterprets Kathy's reasons for dancing in the manner that she does, and so imposes onto the performance of the posthuman something that is misplaced and which involves a degree of socio-cultural awareness about both society and their place within it from which the clones are precluded:

> When I watched you dancing that day, I saw something else. I saw a new world coming rapidly. More scientific, efficient, yes. More cures for the old sicknesses. Very good. But a harsh, cruel world. And I saw a little girl, her eyes tightly closed, holding to her breast the old kind world, one that she knew in her heart could not remain, and she was holding it and pleading, never to let her go. That is what I saw. It wasn't really you, what you were doing, I know that. But I saw you and it broke my heart. And I've never forgotten. (*NLMG* 266)

Indicated here, explicitly in the line 'it wasn't really you', is the fact that empathy is not an emotion that has to do with the subject that is empathised with, but rather the subject empathising: in that sense, empathy is a purely theoretical construct, a function of the imagination, as opposed to a transitive, outwardly directed one. Ishiguro presents us with a song that itself is problematic – it is about a romantic love that is the illusory product of American popular culture, one that perhaps gives rise to a conception of human nature as involving 'love and loss and hope' and which thus contributes to the distinctively contemporary and distinctively western conception of the human being. Further, the work of art is merely the catalyst for one response from posthuman and sterile Kathy, and a second response from human Madame, while the misalignment provokes a third response from the reader. There is even a degree of insensitivity here: Kathy has never known an 'old kind world'; for her the world has, and always will be 'harsh, cruel'. Given this, the young girl that is the subject of Madame's empathy cannot be Kathy, and so the affective bond is doubly illusory. Perhaps Madame

even, mirroring Kathy's fantasy, imagines that Kathy is the child that she might have had, and the child that she may have found herself unable to nurture, to protect. Importantly, the tape is a clone of an original recording. This fact is foregrounded when Kathy's tape goes missing, and her friend Tommy finds another, identical copy, notably while they are on a trip to Norfolk to try to locate their 'originals', something that poses a fascination for the clones. At the centre of the misunderstanding is the 'me' of the song's title: for the human subject it is about autonomy, individuation, a being in a cultural, political, and social world that is constructed for and around it. For the posthuman subject, the clone, that 'me' has an altogether different status, and requires an act of imagination to make relevant, to facilitate empathy.

Empathy, then, in its relation to the work of art, initiates a response that is only tangentially related to that work and the subjects depicted therein. Not only does this imply that the novel is about misreading, as many of Ishiguro's ambiguous and often deceptive first-person novels are, but also that it exploits the feeling generated in the recipient, that is to say the reader. The novel as a form manipulates the fundamental human capacity for empathy, especially, as Keen notes, first person fiction, which 'more readily evokes feeling responsiveness' (2010: 215). Indeed, there is a tendency in discussions of empathetic responses to read too much into the implication that what is being empathised with is necessarily human. In their introduction to *Rethinking Empathy Through Literature*, Hammond and Kim begin by suggesting that the collection 'challenges common understandings of empathy', only to then define empathy studies as investigating 'how "thinking with" or "feeling with" another happens' within or because of literary texts (2014: 1). Keen is perhaps guilty of precisely this anthropocentric assumption: although she concedes that 'Humans feel empathy. We aren't the only animals to do so', she also defines empathy as 'a vicarious, spontaneous sharing of affect, [that] can be provoked by witnessing another's emotional state, by hearing about another's condition, or even by reading' (2010: 6; 208). Underlying this definition of empathy is a presupposition, even a requirement that it is a person, 'another', that facilitates or even necessitates 'feeling responsiveness'. However, popular culture shows us that human beings empathize with, and enjoy the consoling and valorising illusion that they empathise with, all manner of fictive quasi-sentient entities, from orphaned dear, Buzz Light-Year toys, Minions, and even, in Quentin Dupiex's

recent film *Rubber* (2010), a somewhat psychotic car tyre. Keen argues that 'narratives in prose and film infamously manipulate our feelings and call upon out built-in capacity to feel with others', but, that evocation is not dependent upon, or does not necessarily entail that the recipients are human.

Anne Whitehead develops Keen's work, also refuting Nussbaum's claim that reading is 'productive of an empathetic sensibility, and such a sympathy [is] an inherently moral virtue' (2011: 55). She also shares Keen's dissatisfaction with Nussbaum's hypothesis that empathy generated in and for fictional worlds can 'result in altruistic' behaviour in the real world. To suggest that it can is to place 'too great a burden on both empathy and the novel' (Keen 2010: 168). In *Poetic Justice* Nussbaum does indeed make some bold claims for the novel as a tool for simulating scenarios and stimulating change: 'The novel constructs a paradigm of a style of ethical reasoning that is context-specific without being relativistic, in which we get potentially universizable concrete prescriptions by bringing a general idea of human flourishing to bear on a concrete situation, which we are invited to enter through the imagination' (1995: 8). This pre-empts Marcus's conviction that science fiction 'can provide insights pertinent to the ethics of human cloning in actuality'; both argue that the act of reading fosters a sense of ethical engagement that extends beyond the page. As a result, Nussbaum proposes, as Whitehead sees it, 'literature is central to the functioning of a healthy democratic society' (2011: 54). Both Keen and Whitehead are interested in *failed empathy*, and its tendency to 'lament the inefficiency of shared feelings in provoking action that would lead to positive social or political change'; and *false empathy,* which emphasizes the 'self-congratulatory delusions of those who incorrectly believe that they have caught the feelings of suffering others' (Keen 2010: 159).

Much emphasis is placed on the benefits of reading in *Never Let Me Go*; the clones are encouraged to read, particularly Victorian fictions, 'a lot of nineteenth-century stuff by Thomas Hardy and people like that', especially, as Whitehead remarks, Nussbaum's personal favourite George Eliot (*NLMG* 97). Whitehead argues that this is a practice employed by the Guardians of Hailsham to make the clones more human, and perhaps even more sensitive and empathetic carers. But, she asks rhetorically whether 'the Victorian novels that the clones read, articulate entirely misleading and inappropriate hopes and desires', that they produce 'false hope' (2011: 72). Whitehead sees in Kathy a remarkable 'lack of maturity or growth [which] is in particularly marked contrast to the Victorian

novels that she herself reads, both at Hailsham and the Cottages, which offer her a range of variations on the themes of self-development' (2011: 70). Evident here is that the novels do not in fact reflect the manner in which clones mature or fail to mature; they are, as Kathy herself tells us in relation to sex education, 'more or less useless' (*NLMG* 97). If that is the case, then the bildungsroman would be an alien narrative that would not inspire empathy in characters that clearly in the text do not mature or develop in any meaningful sense. However, this estrangement from standard narratives is also true of John the Savage and Marx in *Brave New World:* Shakespeare is entirely 'strange' to them, and the world and emotions he describes largely redundant. This is why Helmholtz is inspired to write new literature that reflects his condition. Keen and Whitehead read Nussbaum through *Not for Profit,* and *Poetic Justice,* two works that deal largely with the importance in empathetic, socio-political, and therapeutic settings that involve human beings and the relationships that texts establish, a nexus of concern between text, reader, and society. Whitehead suggests that the novel is about the 'complex entanglement of human relations', and in her logic novels necessarily exclude the post/non-human.

Hailsham is in fact a special case, and the education that the 'students' receive is a vital ingredient in the project; it is an experiment to prove that 'if students were reared in humane, cultivated environments, it was possible for them to grow to be as sensitive and intelligent as any ordinary human being' while also fostering a universal sense that clones should 'take their place in society' (*NLMG* 256). Part of the assessment process involves the art and creative writing classes at the school, where paintings and poetry would be produced, and some taken away by the guardians (I shall discuss this more below). The project is overseen by Madame (Marie-Claude) and Miss Emily. Late in the novel, when Kathy and Tommy visit these two after Hailsham has been closed, Miss Emily remarks that 'Marie-Claude worked hard for our project. And the way it all ended has left her feeling somewhat disillusioned. As for myself, whatever the disappointments, I don't feel so badly about it. I think what we achieved merits some respect. Look at the two of you. You've turned out well' (*NLMG* 251). What is suggested here is that there is set of human-posthuman entanglements, empathetic connections between Madame, Miss Emily, and the students of Hailsham, ones that at least are suggestive of a powerful bond of care.

However, Kathy recalls an incident in which Marie-Claude came into direct contact with the students and Kathy saw her 'shudder', thinking that the custodians were 'afraid of us in the same way someone might be afraid of spiders' (perhaps inspired by *Gulliver's Travels,* Gulliver tiny in Brobdingnag, his master's wife 'screamed and ran back [when first seeing him], as women in England do at the sight of a toad or a spider' (35) (*NLMG* 85). Miss Emily admits that:

> "We're *all* afraid of you. I myself had to fight back my dread of you all almost every day I was at Hailsham. There were times I'd look down at you all from my study window and I'd feel such revulsion..." She stopped, then something in her eyes flashed again. "But I was determined not to let such feelings stop me doing what was right. I fought those feelings and I won". (*NLMG* 264)

Crucial here is that the guardians recognise that the clones are not human, but that it is still the *right* thing to care for and to try to help them, not because they are human, because that is not the case, but because they are posthuman, but sentient. The winning here involves overcoming not a theoretical response to the clones as we the reader might have at a distance mediated by text, but a feeling of visceral repulsion in direct contact, a contact that the novel precludes between reader and subject. As Whitehead and Keen both suggest, the novel enacts a kind of nexus of care, but not one that necessarily extends into extra-textual altruism. The visceral response is something of an evolutionary defence, as Nussbaum proposes, 'The core objects of disgust are reminders of mortality and animality, seen as pollutants to the human' (2004*:* 99). Leon Kass, as Jean Bethke Elshtain notes, discusses shuddering in relation to failed clones of Dolly the sheep, but asks some deeper questions, suggesting that we should be mindful of those things we find '"offensive, "repulsive," or "distasteful"', that 'repugnance may be the only voice left that speaks up to defend the central core of our humanity. Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder' (Kass, 'The Wisdom of Repugnance', qtd. in Baillie and Casey 2005: 167). If shuddering is an indicator of some profound sense of ethical or moral repugnance, one that is not abstract, then the guardians' response to the clones might in fact indicate that they are uncannily, frighteningly other, non-human.

In their discussions with Madame and Miss Emily, Tommy and Ruth develop and awareness of the truth about their situation, and about their relationship with human beings. As Madame notes, there is a fear, and a double standard: 'It's one thing to create students, such as yourselves, for the donation programme. But a generation of created children who'd take their place in society? Children

demonstrably superior to the rest of us? Oh no. That frightened people. They recoiled from that'. (258-259). However, of central importance to this paper and the reading of posthuman texts that depend on empathy is the continued suggestion, in the novel, that being human is the criteria for care. As Madame remarks, 'However uncomfortable people were about your existence, their overwhelming concern was that their own children, their spouses, their parents, their friends, did not die from cancer, motor neurone disease, heart disease […] they tried to convince themselves you weren't really like us. That you were less than human, so it didn't matter' (259). At stake here is the empathetic and ethical value of the novel as a form, not simply because it might not, as Keen and Whitehead argue in contradistinction to Nussbaum, extend to the real world, but because it is predicated on the presence of human beings. The question raised in this text peopled with characters that are not human in vital ways, is why it is imperative to prove human status to accord value and justice and basic rights to another species. Nussbaum, thinking through the implications of John Rawls' seminal work of political ethics, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), recalls his statement 'that animals lack those properties of human beings "in virtue of which they are to be treated in accordance with the principles of justice"' (504)' (2016: 331). The properties are however held by clones: 'a capacity for a conception of the good and a capacity for a sense of justice' (2016: 331). Regardless of whether the entity that possesses these capacities is human, Nussbaum argues, it is unjust to not accord full rights to them. Of course, today, animal rights and social justice are top of the agenda, but these should not involve demonstrating similitude to human behaviour as the determining criteria: empathy is to empathise, not to be empathised with.

Sex and sexual reproduction are perhaps the single most common theme in speculative fictions: as with *Where Late the Sweet Birds,* Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* (1985), Orwell's *1984* (1949), Marge Piercy's *Woman on the Edge of Time* (1986) and numerous other important examples hypothesise dilemmas which arise from, or result in changes to human reproduction. Questions of procreation, however, provoke more pervasive unease about asexual reproduction, as Stephen E. Levick remarks, 'by removing the sexual glue heretofore necessary for human reproduction, [reproductive cloning] may fundamentally undermine the family as the most fundamental basis of society' (2004: 226). After being informed that they cannot reproduce, *Never Let*

Me Go's clones are told that '"sex affects [human] emotions in ways you'd never expect"': 'people out there were different from us students: they could have babies from sex […] even though, as we knew, it was completely impossible for any of us to have babies, out there, we had to behave like them. We had to respect the rules and treat sex as something pretty special' (*NLMG* 82). This meditation is remarkably reminiscent to Helmholtz's rhetorical question as to 'who's going to get excited about a boy having a girl or not having her?' As a result of her inability to feel and think about sex as a reproductive as opposed to simply pleasurable act, Kathy is ostensibly excluded from what has traditionally, in conventional and patriarchal societies, been conceived of as a fundamental component of being human. Simulacra that they undeniably are, they must *perform* humanness, behave 'like' a 'them' which defines a category that is irretrievably other by the same logic. This is troubling; if we return to Seaman's suggestion that 'The clones who are the central figures of the novel are shown, through the narrative, to meet that requirement as fully as any humans'; they may well be simulating human behaviour in the way that, for example, Data in *Star Trek: The Next Generation* tries and fails, the female extra-terrestrial of Jonathan Glazer's *Under the Skin* (2013), Deckard and the replicants in *Blade Runner* (1982) and *Blade Runner 2049* (2017), and the Cylons in *Battlestar Gallactica* manage more successfully. *Never Let Me Go* takes the concept of performativity beyond the question of gender, provocatively suggesting that those aspects of being human which appear most fundamental, intransient, pancultural are subject to cultural and discursive remodulation.

Perhaps the most tragic part of *Never Let Me Go* is the idea of 'deferment'. In Hailsham, the artworks that the clones are required to produce serve two purposes: they are either sold or swapped with other inmates, or, more exceptionally, taken by Madame for what in the text is referred to as her 'gallery'. A consoling rumour develops among the clones that exceptional works are selected for inclusion in this mythical gallery because they 'reveal their souls'. However, and much to the profound disappointment of Kathy and Tommy, Madame corrects them: 'Well, you weren't far wrong about that. We took away your art because we thought it would reveal your souls. Or to put it more finely, we did it *to prove you had souls at all*' (255). Kathy and her peers also come to believe, possibly because of Kathy's own propensity for circulating fantastic rumours, that if two clones 'could prove they were properly in love that they can get their donations put back for 'three years'

(151). Once more this fabulous word 'love' reappears, with the implication a) that it is definitional of humanity and b) sufficiently sacred to confer, however temporarily, life and rights on the non-human. Again, here, it is not enough that the pictures demonstrate a world view, and intelligent and affective response to the world, but, they are used to put on 'large events all around the country […] "There, look!" we could say. "Look at this art! How dare you claim these children are anything less than fully human?"' (256). This insidious assumption that humanness is a necessary condition for empathy and rights manifests in readings of texts which feature posthumans, such as *Never Let Me Go*, scholarship of which takes for granted that the clones are sufficiently similar to us to warrant empathy *by virtue of that similarity.*

After leaving Hailsham, Tommy spends his spare time sketching what Kathy refers to as 'fantastic creatures'. He tells Kathy, 'It's like they come to life by themselves. Then you have to draw in all these different details for them. You have to think about how they'd protect themselves, how they'd reach things' (*NLMG* 176). Kathy is impressed, if a little confused:

> The first impression was like one you'd get if you took the back off a radio set: tiny canals, weaving tendons, miniature screws and wheels were all drawn with obsessive precision […] For all their busy, metallic features, there was something sweet, even vulnerable about each of them. I remembered him telling me, in Norfolk, that he worried, even as he created them, how they'd protect themselves or be able to reach and fetch things, and looking at them now, I could feel the same sort of concerns. (184-185)

It seems important, here, that the guardians of Hailsham refer to Tommy, Kathy, and the clones as creatures, rhetorically asking, with sincere emotion: 'Poor creatures. What did we do to you? With all our schemes and plans?' (249). Tommy, however, is sensitive to the needs of a species that are at once imaginary but to him viable: in creating, he accepts responsibility to ensure that the creatures are capable of self-care. His concerns are with their needs, drawing attention not to any use function they may have as machines, but to the needs of the imaginary created animal and how it can serve its own ends in its pursuit of the good. Importantly, in a shared moment of posthuman bonding, Kathy can also 'feel' and therefore share both Tommy's concern and the plight of the creatures. This reflects Steven Pinker's more inclusive notion of empathy as 'the ability to put oneself into the position of some other person, animal, or object, and imagine that sensation of being in that situation' (Pinker, qtd. in Hammond and Kim, 2014: 8). Tommy's artwork gestures toward such an inclusive and non-

anthropocentric conception of empathy, one not predicated on 'person-to-person' compassion. Indeed, there is a profound intimacy to this moment in which Tommy shares with Kathy, reveals to her his vulnerable progeny, and in this moment he entrusts to her not simply their care, but his too, as he moves toward completion.

Of course, tragically, Tommy's own creatures are used to draw our attention to the awful fact that the clones cannot protect themselves, and even more troublingly for certain critics demonstrate no desire to do so. Whitehead comments on Kathy's 'frustrating passivity' when she does not seek 'any form of reprisal from the system' (2011: 73). It is conceivable, however, that genetic engineering has rendered them passive, incapable of revolt because they have not been designed to 'protect themselves'. Tommy's creatures represent perhaps both literary representation, fantastic textual creatures in the small pages of a book, and the possibility of genetic manipulation. He however also manages here, as he does elsewhere, to intuit the brutal reality of his passivity, his coded inability to rebel, and so ensures that his creations will be capable of resisting similar fates.

Ishiguro poses questions about artistic expression in the broadest sense. This notion of having souls, and having souls and experiencing 'real love' as a fundamental criterion for being conferred the status of personhood is of course a hangover from early Greek philosophy and its fascination with metempsychosis (a key word in *Ulysses* (1920), and played on in David Foster Wallace's *Infinite Jest* (1996) in the character Madame Psychosis), and Judeo-Christian beliefs which were instrumental in the formation of Western civilization. Nussbaum proposes, convincingly, that a capabilities approach to social justice, one grounded in the idea of flourishing, both human and non-human, might enable a broader definition, and so application, of justice. As she notes, 'A truly global justice requires not simply looking across the world for other fellow species members who are entitled to a decent life. It also requires looking, both in one's own nation and around the world, at other sentient beings with whose lives our own are inextricably and complexly entwined' (2006: 406). This brings to mind Whitehead's phrase concerning the 'complex entanglement of human relations'. If we return to Nussbaum, Whitehead, and Keen's comments about narrative empathy, we might think more about the ways in which the novel form can facilitate inter-group empathy with a range of new varieties of human life. That is to say, there is something a little reductive about concluding with Hayles that we

have always been posthuman; technology is radically affecting the nature of being human, and literature can provide an empathetic bridge to newer forms of *homo* life.

Indeed, many theorists and writers have seen an inevitable move towards an eventual bifurcation of the species. As Diane B. Paul remarks, 'H. G. Wells describes a future in which humanity has split into two species […] Peter Sloterdijk anticipates a division of humanity onto genetic engineers and the genetically engineered […] Lee Silver predicts that in the distant future the species will break into two, the "genrich" and the "normal"' (2005: 134). Although these may be in the very distant future, society already contains a host of radically different experiences, ones that, in some cases, question the possibility of humanity being a single species. Literature is at the forefront of bridging these existential and empathetic spaces, between different cultures and histories and sexualities. As Jerng notes, much speculative fiction bears out 'Paul John Eakin's concern that "normative models of personhood" will be used to judge others as "lacking in the very nature of [their] being" (2001: 119)' (2008: 371). If human narratives involve love, the sanctity of sex, child birth, developing and radical independence, self-development, then they exclude lives that do not touch upon these coordinates. Literature, the novel, must be more open to nonstandard narratives, if it is to remain relevant and perhaps even an important spur to social justice as the ways of being human and posthuman multiply.

Now, in the posthuman world, literary fiction may provide an invaluable vehicle to acknowledge the many sub-species that genus *Homo* seems on the brink of fragmenting into. As Armstrong proposes, 'By forcing us to feel beyond the present limits of personhood, for all we know, contemporary novels may be developing a generation of readers with an emotional repertoire more attuned to the demands of our time' (2014: 464). That is not by conferring or refusing to confer the status of human being, and therefore empathising in that way, but, as Nussbaum argues, by recognising that flourishing and the desire to flourish, having preferences as Peter Singer suggests, warrant justice, and equality. However, we as readers need to also acknowledge that our responses, at a distance, outside the text, away from possible contamination, give us an illusion about our capacity for real-world empathy. We witness Frankenstein's 'breathless horror and disgust' on first seeing his creation (36); Madame 'shudder' at the feelings of 'dread' and 'revulsion' on coming into direct

contact with the clones that she so deeply cares for; David's assertion that his clones, of himself and his family, were 'inhuman'. It should suggest to us that literature presents an imaginative access to empathy only, and that, in actuality, we would likely share in the responses of these characters: how many times do we recoil from racial or sexual slurs in a canonical work of fiction, from the idea of slavery, of anti-Semitism, and from the comfort of an armchair sit securely in the knowledge that we would never behave like that, with such inhumanity. Another possibility is that we recoil at the uncanny horror of self-recognition – in these characters we see mirrored our own fragility as a species, and are forced to recognise our kinship with the posthuman. This then is the ethic of posthuman reading, which might then be more appropriately described as neo-humanism.

Works Cited

Adams, Tim. '"For me, England is a mythical place": An Interview with Kazuo Ishiguro'. *The Guardian*, 20 February 2005. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/feb/20/fiction.kazuoishiguro

---. 'The Book of Daniels'. *The Guardian*, 30 October, 2005. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/oct/30/fiction.michelhouellebecq

Amit Marcus. 'The Ethics of Human Cloning in Narrative Fiction'. *Comparative Literature Studies*, 49: 3, 2012, pp. 405–433.

Armstrong, Nancy. 'The Affective Turn in Contemporary Fiction'. *Contemporary Literature*, 55: 3, Fall 2014, pp. 441-465 (Article)

Barthes, Roland, 'The Death of the Author', *Image – Music – Text*, trans. New York, Fontana, 1993.

Baudrillard, Jean. *Simulacra and Simulation.* Trans., Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 'The Body and the Quest for Control'. In Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey (eds), *Is Human Nature Obsolete: Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005, pp. 155-175.

Fukuyama, Francis. *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution.* London: Profile books, 2003.

Hammond, Meghan Marie. And Sue J. Kim, eds. *Rethinking Empathy Through Literature.* London. Palgrave, 2014.

Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and SocialistFeminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York; Routledge, 1991), pp.149-181. ⊄

Hart, Joy L., Kandi L. Walker & Jennifer L. Gregg (2007) 'Communication Ethics and *My Sister's Keeper*', *Communication Teacher*, 21:4, 123-127.

Hayles, N. Katherine. 'The Life Cycle of Cyborgs: Writing the Posthuman'. In Sherryl Vint (ed), *Science Fiction and Cultural Theory: A Reader.* London: Routledge, 2016, pp. 247-257.

Houellebecq, Michel. *The Possibility of an Island.* London: Phoenix, 2005.

Huxley, Aldous. *Brave New World.* London: Vintage, 2007.

---. *The Hidden Huxley.* Ed. David Bradshaw. London: Faber and Faber, 1994.

Ishiguro, Kazuo. *Never Let Me Go.* London: Faber and Faber, 1995.

---. *The Unconsoled.* London: Faber and Faber, 2013.
---. *An Artist of the Floating World.* London: Faber and Faber, 2013.
---. *A Pale View of Hills.* London: Faber and Faber. 2005.
Jerng, Mark. 'Giving Form to Life: Cloning and Narrative Expectations of the Human'. *Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas*, 6: 2, June 2008, pp. 369-393.
Keen, Suzanne. *Empathy and the Novel.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Levick, Stephen E. *Clone Being: Exploring the Psychological and Social Dimensions.* Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.

Marcus, Amit. 'The ethics of human cloning in narrative fiction'. *Comparative Literature Studies*, 49-3, 2012, pp405-433.

Marsh, Alec, *John Kasper and Ezra Pound (Historicizing Modernism).* London: Bloomsbury, 2015.
Mori, M., K. F. MacDorman and N. Kageki, 'The Uncanny Valley [From the Field]'. *IEEE Robotics & Automation Magazine*, 19: 2, pp. 98-100, June 2012.
Mulkay, Michael. 'Frankenstein and the Debate over Embryo Research'. *Science, Technology, & Human Values*, 21: 2, 1996, pp. 157–176.
Nussbaum, Martha C. *Poetic Justice.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1995.
---. *Hiding from Humanity*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton university Press, 2004.
---. *Frontiers of Justice.* Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 2006.
Paul, Diane, B. 'Genetic Engineering and Eugenics: The Uses of History'. In Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey (eds), *Is Human Nature Obsolete: Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005, pp. 123-152.
Pearlman, Daniel. 'The Anti-Semitism of Ezra Pound'. *Contemporary Literature*, 22: 1, 1981, pp. 104–115.
Picoult, Jodi. *My Sister's Keeper.*
Seaman, Myra J. 'Becoming More (than) Human: Affective Posthumanisms, Past and Future'. *Journal of Narrative Theory*, 37: 2, 2007, pp. 246–275.
Shaffer, Brian W. and Cynthia F. Wong, eds. *Conversations with Kazuo Ishiguro (Literary Conversations Series).* Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2008.
Shannon, Thomas A. 'Human Nature in a Post-Human Genome Project World'. In Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey (eds), *Is Human Nature Obsolete: Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition,* Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005, pp. 270-316.
Shelley, Mary. *Frankenstein.* Ed., J. Paul Hunter. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2012.
Singer, Peter. 'Recent Advances: Medical Ethics'. *BMJ: British Medical Journal*, 321: 7256, 2000, pp. 282-285.

Sloane, Peter. 'Literatures of Resistance Under U.S. "Cultural Siege": Kazuo Ishiguro's Narratives of Occupation'. *Studies in Contemporary Fiction* 59: 2 (2018), 154-167.

--- *Kazuo Ishiguro's Gestural Poetics*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2021.

Storrow, Richard F. 'Therapeutic Reproduction and Human Dignity'. *Law and Literature*, 21: 2, 2009, pp. 257–274.
Suvin, Darko. 'The State of the Art in Science Fiction Theory: Determining and Delimiting the Genre'. *Science Fiction Studies*, 6: 1, 1979, pp. 32–45.
Swift, Jonathan, *Gulliver's Travels.* London: Penguin, 2003.

UNESCO: Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. Paris. 1997

Wallace, Jeff. 'Literature and Posthumanism'. *Literature Compas* 7/8 (2010), pp. 692-701.

Whitehead, Anne. ‘Writing with Care: Kazuo Ishiguro’s “*Never Let Me Go*”’. *Contemporary Literature*, 52: 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 54-83.
Wilhelm, Kate. *Where Late the Sweet Birds Sang.* London: Orion, 2006.