THE UNIVERSITY OF BUCKINGHAM

The Military Challenges to the Boko Haram Insurgency Campaign Within Nigeria's Political, Economic, and Societal Contexts (2002-2020).

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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Buckingham

[November 2022]

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Declaration of Originality

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Abstract

The Nigeria Boko Haram insurgency underscores the Hobbesian thesis of man's aggressiveness in the state of nature that requires the leviathan intervention. The Nigerian government's failure to provide public goods precipitated the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency. As a result, the citizens contest their rights to life (in danger), withdrawing their loyalty and support from the government and the armed forces. The current praxis explains the power shift from the Nigerian government to the identified local group (Boko Haram). The change is accompanied by continuous violence between soldiers and the insurgents, resulting in mass civilian casualties, genocide, systemic rape, and unquantifiable property destruction fostering human insecurity.

The literature construct argues the overlapping concept of the phenomenon under investigation: 'The military challenges to the Boko Haram insurgency campaign within Nigeria's political, economic, and societal contexts (2002–2020)'. The thesis explains the military's challenges in ending the Boko Haram insurgency within domestic factors of political consideration, economic dynamics, ethnicity, and the military. The Boko Haram unconventional war in nature is now twenty years old. The investigation employs a mixed research design that combines a survey and a subset of the stakeholders' qualitative interviews. The said approach is a compromised method that allows for overcoming access to the investigation (which is difficult in war matters). Combining a survey instrument accompanied by qualitative interviews checks causality by asking for explicit causal mechanisms descriptions and identifying influences that previous works may have overlooked.

The thesis found political consideration and economic conditions more statistically significant than ethnicity and military factors as the main challenges of the military in the Boko Haram insurgency. The work questions the rationale for military deployment in matters that re-echo Nigeria generational grievances that domestic socialisation strategy should ordinarily resolve.

Keywords:
War, Insurgency, Military leadership, Military tactical operations, Political leadership, Traditional war, Leviathan.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

A.D. – Anno Domini

ADC – Aide-de-Camp

ADIE – Assessing, Developing, Implementing and Evaluating

AG – Action Group

CAS – Chief of Air Staff

CNS – Chief of Naval Staff

COAS – Chief of Army Staff

CMO -Civil Military Operation

COR – Calabar-Ogoja-River

DC – District of Columbia

FAAC – Federation Accounts Allocation Committee

FG – Federal Government

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GOC – General Officer Commanding

GWF – Global World Force

HMNS – Her Majesty's Naval Ship

ICG – International Conference on Governance

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IPOB – Indigenous People of Biafra

ISWAP – Islamic State of West African Province

JTF – Joint Task Force

KSAs – Knowledge, Skills, Abilities and Attitudes

MBTs – Main Battle Tanks

MNJTF – Multinational Joint Task Force

NA – Nigerian Army

NAF – Nigerian Air Force

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCBWA – National Congress of British West Africa

NCNC – National Convention of Nigeria and Cameroons/ National Convention of Nigerian
Citizens

NDA - Nigeria Defence Academy

NN – Nigerian Navy

NNDP – Nigerian National Democratic Party

RNC – Royal Niger Company

R2P – Responsibility to Protect

UN – United Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

US – United States

VAT – Value Added Tax

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

WAFF – West African Frontier Force

Acronyms

Cdr. - Commander

Lt. – Lieutenant

Lt. Cdr. – Lieutenant Commander

S/Lt. – Second Lieutenant

Acknowledgements

My supervisor, Professor Matthias Strohn, is the primary source of my inspiration for this work. He is the source of my encouragement; as it is, this is not my first doctorate, meaning I needed more motivation to complete the degree successfully. My appreciation goes to him for his interrogation of every chapter sent to him for review, and his comments were very useful in completing the studies. I have attended several seminars that were helpful in this work. Professor Lloyd Clark's seminars, particularly his seminal work on 'History of the British Army; military transition and change; lesson learning; leadership and command', which provides opportunities to learn practical collaborative leadership. For this, I extend my appreciation. My first-year review examiner made changes that initially looked like I had not started this work then! today, those changes left me with the great joy of an exciting career with the innovative suggestion made by Professor John Drew, and I am very grateful. Dr. Okajare, Head of the History Department of Obafemi Awolowo University, was useful to me in providing access to the accurate account of historical events, which was quite helpful in the construction of Chapter One of this work when I interrogated him.

My colleague at the Energy Group of companies, where I am the group managing director, was very kind in making business decisions, with little or no involvement on my part during the period of this study. They were thoughtful in managing known and unknown risks when I was at the 'battle front' of the Boko Haram studies. I express my sincere appreciation to them. Some of my friends have always been curious about this study and its associated risks, particularly during data collection. I am very appreciative of Biodun Ojo, Susan Ayeni, Bimbo Ogunlusi, Biodun Olanipekun, Laide and Ibironke Adedokun. Thank you all for your concerns. It is also natural that in the three years of investigation leading to this work, family commitments suffer in large attendance, and my appreciation goes to Rashidat and Dupe for keeping the home. Moreover, Tope, Bimbo, Demola and Ayomide, David, Bukky and Seun, I acknowledge their show of love.

Dedication

      The work is dedicated to soldiers and civilians who lost their lives during the Boko Haram insurgency. Moreover, to my late senior brother, Akintola Aliu Jimoh, with whom ordinarily I would have enjoyed an incredible engagement of interactive discussion, at least from the legal perspective of the phenomenon, but he left the insecure world so soon. I also dedicate this work to my lovely parents, who passed on during this work. Again, it is the love of God and benefits humanity.

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Overview

The general introduction chapter gives a broad background of the phenomenon. It explains what readers are expected to know in summary about the investigation chapter by chapter, the research question, literature review, its limitation, and how the research was put together (investigation process management). Finally, it concludes with an inviting insight into the phenomenon, the military challenges, data gathering, and identified independent and dependable variables. The investigation is rooted in checking causality by asking for explicit causal mechanism descriptions and identifying previous influences that may have been overlooked in the phenomenon under study.

The Boko Haram Insurgency and the challenges

The Boko Haram insurgency presents a typical example of postcolonial African states. Nigeria parades the unenviable feature of sustained struggle with sundry challenges of nation-building and national integration in the context of its overlapping ethnic, religious, political, and regional divisions. Some of these challenges have manifested through unconventional wars against the Nigerian sovereignty by some non-state actors who act as the embodiment of the centrifugal and centripetal forces governing the country's historical development process. Moreover, the Nigerian complex identity configuration has provided templates for fomenting troubles by actors who promote divisions and struggle over space, resources, and identity, as witnessed in the Biafran civil war (1967- 70), agitations in the Niger Delta (1992-2016), Christian-Muslim rivalry in the North of Nigeria (since the Maitatsine Uprising of 1980), and so on. However, apart from the 1967-1970 Biafran civil war, the Boko Haram insurgency ranks high as one significant and direct confrontation against Nigeria's march to true nationhood and sustainable development, which explains the converging generational grievances.

Boko Haram (translated to mean 'Western education is a sin') was founded as Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Iidda'awati wal Jihad, meaning 'people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad,' by late Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State, in 2002. Driven by the ideology that Western civilization, democracy, and other forms of the secular architecture of governance and social life were against the spirit and letters of the Shari'a (Islamic legal code). The original members of Boko Haram pursued the agenda for a change of government in Nigeria[1]

The alleged decay in the governmental system of Borno State during the early 2000s provided the enabling social context for the popularity of the ideology of a 'sane and neat' society promoted by Mohammed Yusuf. He leveraged it and deployed his personality cult to attract a huge following in no time. This concurred with Curtas' argument that! Insurgencies do not happen if the population either supports the government or sees nothing to gain from fighting Boko Haram[2]

In Nigeria, the perceived 'generosity' of Mohammed Yusuf was the immediate factor that drew his followers to him. From the inception of his group, Yusuf 'attracted followers through his fiery rejection of the corrupt secular state while building a community based on sharia principles and the provision of basic needs. Boko Haram offered one meal a day, arranged low-cost marriages, and provided loans for petty commercial activities, thus offering basic social dignity to the poor and unemployed'[3] in 2009 and the subsequent death of his over seven hundred followers during a bloody clash with the Police was the spark that ignited the dry tinder. This was the turning point at which Boko Haram transitioned from pursuers of Islam-based governance to a full-blown terrorist organization. Hence from 2010, the organization was effectively led by Abu Shekau until he died in 2021.

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[1] Dunn, G. "The Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeast Nigeria on Childhood Wasting: A Double-difference Study", *Conflict and Health*, 12 (6), 2018, p. 2

[2] Curtas, S. D. A New Type of Insurgency? A Case Study of the Resistance in Iraq, Graduate Thesis and Dissertation Scholar Commons, University of South Florida, USA 2006

[3] Meagher, K. 'Beyond Terror: Addressing the Boko Haram Challenges in Nigeria'– Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre *Policy Brief*. See also ICG (International Crisis Group), 2014, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency*. Africa Report no. 216, Brussels: ICG. 2014.

However, there were divisions along the ranks of the group and the merger of some factions with ISWAP (Islamic States of West African Province).

The Boko Haram movement was established in 2002. It only became a terrorist organization from 2009/to 2010. Since then, it has carried out several deadly attacks against the Nigerian state. The military and civil society lost several lives, conservatively estimated at tens of thousands (including soldiers and other security operatives). Properties worth several million in the dollar were lost, while over two million people (including women and children) were rendered homeless and displaced[4]. These displaced humans are exposed to the most harrowing of living experiences in IDP Camps, where their human dignity is constantly threatened. The organization has grown in influence and deadly attacks beyond its immediate base in the famous Sambisa Forest in Northwest Nigeria to become an international body of terrorists covering a broad swathe of space across entire Northern Nigeria and West African Sahel. And as explained in chapter three of this work there were sporadic attacks in some towns and cities of Southern Nigeria, thus making the trajectories of the Boko Haram operations across Nigeria quite unprecedented.

Over the years, the insurgents have adopted well-coordinated but often sporadic attack styles entailing scorched earth tactics, mass killing with AK-47 and other rifle brands. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide operations in locations (motor parks, open bars, drinking joints, churches, mosques, police stations, military formations, and so on) where a sizeable number of harmless and (often) unsuspecting armless victims assemble. The kidnapping of school children is also a powerful tactic of Boko Haram. The 2014 and 2018 individual cases of Chibok, Borno State, and Dapchi, Yobe State, where young female secondary school students were kidnapped, readily come to mind. Other people, including marrying couples, teachers/lecturers, and clergy members, particularly of the Chris- tian faith, have also been kidnapped.

In the face of the Nigerian leviathan, human lives are accompanied by continuous violence between soldiers and the insurgents, resulting in mass civilian casualties,

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[4] https://www.undp.org/.../Assessing-the-Impact-of-Conflict-on-Development- in-NE-Nigeria

genocide, systemic rape, and unquantifiable property destruction fostering human insecurity. Again, this is a demonstration of the limited application of the Hobbesian thesis and confirmation of the abuse of power of the leviathan in a weak state of Nigeria. Boko Haram is creating a condition, saying the least, in the presence of the leviathan that makes the life of man rather '[is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'[5]

The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is as multiple as its damaging activities. Apart from causing many untimely deaths and destruction of properties, it has forced the reduction of governance in the Northwest and Northeast states to maintain security as the topmost priority, almost neglecting other competing, even equally important matters. Sadly, its operations have spiralled to the North-central states and parts of Southern Nigeria. As a result, there is currently a palpable atmosphere of psychological trauma and confusion across Nigeria. Criminal acts of bandits armed highway robbers, cattle rustlers, kidnappers, and violent Fulani herders are considered Boko Haram onslaughts as the former are barely separable in form and intensity from those of the insurgents. What this has portended mainly is sheer difficulty in profiling the criminals when caught and a general feeling of insecurity across the land.

The conflict is trading across the Nigeria border; for instance, the President of Chad, who paid a solidarity visit to the soldiers fighting the insurgents at the military base, was recently killed on the spot by Boko Haram in the presence of these soldiers. Again, the insurgents killed the president of Chad (the leviathan) before the military. And this is far from the expectation of the thesis of Thomas Hobbes. Chad shares a border with Nigeria. A crisis of inevitable war is confronting peace and limiting human security conditions with massive genocide. The present work is to close the many gaps in the literature and offer new insight into the military challenges in practical and theoretical terms—a unique contribution to literature emerging in ending the insurgency. insurgency has negatively

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[5] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. by Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell., 1946, esp. Chapter. 13

impacted the country's institutional standing and international clout. As a direct assault against the Nigerian sovereignty and internal security, the Boko Haram insurgency has not only seriously stretched the Nigerian military forces (notably the Army and Air Force) almost beyond limits. The military counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is failing, annex two of this study. The civil revolt is growing around the COIN strategy, suggesting that the military reengage a feasibility assessment of her operations. Society demands collaborative participation and contribution to the inner workings of the military plan and engagement. They require, in the face of the military, a legitimacy of involvement rather than aggressive military attacks on the civil population without a human face.

A non-conventional conflict requires the support of the civil population to end before military infuriation, which is one way of preventing a revolt and hatred of the civil population towards the military. The direction of collaboration must reiterate that the civil population will be gaining more than losing in ending the crises because the halter to the military is growing from nonviolent resistance to the violent scenario. This is because the aggressive nature of the tactical operation of the military in an unconventional conflict against Boko Haram is destroying human values, thereby fostering human insecurity. the country has been labelled as one of the most hazardous locations in the world! It beats the imagination that a group of rag-tag insurgents could sustain military assaults against the laurel-winning armed forces of Nigeria for about two decades without any clear sign of abating. This has compelled the need for a more robust and all-embracing contextual interrogation of the Boko Haram insurgency beyond the narrow confines of military engagements.

Boko Haram insurgency further shown the fragility of national integration in Nigeria by setting Muslims against Christians, thus worsening the hitherto unhealthy and distrust-fraught relation- ship. Operating under the aegis of Islam, it has created the misleading impression that Muslims are intolerant of and fighting against their Christian

compatriots. Among many Muslims, members of Boko Haram are agents of the devil who kill other Muslims and create the wrong impression that Nigerian Muslims are anti-Christian. This position is an emotional denial and actual antithesis of the Islamic root of the insurgent group. However, a sharply contradictory but supremely held view has reached the crescendo in the Nigerian Christian community in recent times that the Boko Haram body was a mere cannon fodder by the Nigerian Muslim community for a well-planned genocidal war against Christians. As a Christian leader[6] describes the grieving situation. 'A systematic genocide and persecution through the instrumentality of the Islamic fundamentalist sect, Boko Haram, led to the killing of thousands of Christians and the destruction of hundreds of churches and over 50,000 houses, the current unprecedented onslaught against Christians in Southern Kaduna by the Islamic fundamentalists disguising as Fulani herdsmen under the watch of the Kaduna State Governor, Mallam Nasir el-Rufai, and President Muhammadu Buhari has reached an alarming stage' the menace of Boko Haram has thoroughly shattered every ligament of national integration and vestiges of inter-religious tolerance cum inter-ethnic understanding in Nigeria to shreds.

The Boko Haram insurgency is still ongoing, notwithstanding the works of scholars on the conflict. It is also now the case that the neighbouring countries in Nigeria are critically affected. This danger portrays human insecurity. There are suggested reasons for the immediate and remote causes of Boko Haram. Adelaja, Labo and Penar[77]conducted a survey in which the resulting factors for insurgency include variables such as unemployment, dislike for government, religious ideology, poverty, economic challenges, and disrespect by politicians. Again, these scholars also identify Boko Haram's desire to fight security forces as a reason for the prolonged conflict. A logical reference could be

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[6] Olokor, F. 'Buhari's silence, endorsement of Kaduna killings says CAN', in *The Punch*, 2 January2017 p. 12

[7] Adesoji Adedaja O. Abdullah Labo and Evar Penar, 'Public Opinion on the Root Causes of Terrorism and Objectives of Terrorists: A Boko Haram Case Study', *Perspective on Terrorism volume* 12 (3) 2018, pp.35–49.

drawn from a comparative analysis of events in Iraq. Ali Parchami's work[8] suggested that, concerning Iraq, since 1979, the insurgency was correlated to the impact of history, politics, and religion (which are domestic conditions close to our concern). He contended that the complexities of religion arising from the disagreement between Islamism and Iran's classic rulers are fixated on sectarian concerns and geopolitical developments. The Nigeria situation con- firms that the most important variable affecting the political impact of domestic socialisation is like the Iraq situation, as Islamic fundamentalists converge in the Northeastern part of Nigeria— the Boko Haram zone.

The current investigation of the phenomenon explains the military challenges, particularly in the face of Nigeria's political, economic, and military societal contexts. This is imperative because these domestic factors are fundamentals that converge to offer explanations of their impacts on national interests. The whole idea is if the study could explicitly locate causality (cause and effect) of the military challenges within the convergence of domestic factors. For instance, whether preferences for the 'new nation' identity of succession from Nigeria as proposed by Boko Haram is rejection of the Nigeria national identity. Or could it be that the preference for Boko Haram identity as suggested by the insurgents is the reason for the crisis? This explains the need to interrogate domestic socialisation factors in understanding the phenomenon.

Research Questions.

The discussion above triggered some basic primary and secondary research questions that will help the current study, and answers to these questions will contribute to knowledge of the subject.

(1)   Does the Nigeria military faces constraints in winning the Boko Haram War in Nigeria?

(2)   The Nigeria military's main challenges in winning the Boko Haram insurgency are political factors in nature?

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[8] Ali Parchami, ed. by Matthias Strohn, *Winning wars* (PA: Casemate Publishers, 2020, p. 270.

(Chapters Four and Five of this work, explained political consideration and ethnicity as independent variables that impact military success).

(3)   The economic factor of poor living conditions is the real challenge for the military winning the Boko Haram war. (Chapter four of this work explains economic factors as impediments to the success of the military in fighting or ending the Boko Haram insurgency. We considered the economic variables of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), basic standard of living and provision of infrastructure facilities in the Northeast region of Nige- ria where Boko Haram dominates).

(4)   Social and ethnic factors account for the success or failure of the military? (In Chapter Six, we discuss the imperativeness of other factors such as ethnicity, culture and religion impacting the success or otherwise of the military in ending Boko Haram).

Chapter 1: Nigeria in Early History.

Chapter 1— 'Nigeria in Early History'—welcome**s** the research to the historical trajectory explanation of the phenomenon, and as it is in the subject of the humanities**,** historical accounts assist in the understanding of events and easy predictability of the future. What is more, it assist**s** in understanding the past and the present. The chapter extends this lens to the Nigeria generational grievances that resulted in civil conflicts. It provides a general overview of the subject. Nigeria is at the centre of events from the early period of pre-1500, alluded to as a country that was dateless and without a name, with people scattered and dotted across her geographical boundary. The trajectory also briefly explained the colonial events from 1500 until 1960, when Nigeria gained her independence from the British colonial master. The amalgamation of the two protectorates in 1914— British Congress' approval of the name Nigeria in 1899. The chapter chronologically ex- plains the consequences of the forced amalgamation of the two Nigerian protectorates, the Biafra civil war and the Boko Haram insurgency.

Chapter 2: Field Reports

The chapter interprets the data collected from the field and explains the data using statistical tools to offer an explanation. It presents the data and the survey questions that the respondents answered. A random selection of 50 surveys, with nearly 10% of the data collected which the study present as the first cut on data interpretation to reduces biases and show the initial navigating pattern of the variable impacts and the initial interpretation led to the eventual data presentation. A large dataset of over 500 data points was finally presented. The data results require an interpretation that is objective. Being mindful of how the interviewer's behaviour can impact interview responses, practitioner theory suggests using the reflective framework (experimental circle) of David Kolb[9]. This illustrates the rotation of 'think, plan, experience, and reflect' with the data and interview process, which will assist the researcher in analysing interview contents. Think about the process first; plan for the engagement and user experience to manage respondents' encounters (Be an ethnographer! kindly, friendly, honest, precise, observant, unobtrusive, candid, chaste, fair, and literary) and reflect on the whole excise before arriving at the findings.[10]

Chapter 3: The Military Answer to the Boko Haram Problem/the Military Factor

This chapter explains the military answer to the Boko Haram problem/the military factor, distilling the anatomy of the military, the military traits, and its taxonomy. The Nigeria military is set up to provide defence for Nigeria's territorial integrity, as explained in this chapter. The military was invited to primarily bear such a responsibility to end the Boko Haram insurgency. The chapter describes the military nature, structure, culture, operational strategy, and more importantly, the military capability of creating or providing that much-needed peace given the convergence of complexities arising from ethnicities identified in chapter six. The chapter briefly explains the nature of the Boko Haram

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[9] David A. Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984.
[10] Gray Alan Fine and David Shulman in Organisation Ethnography: Studying the Complexities of Everyday Life. SAGE Publication Ltd Chapter9 2009 P. 181 https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446278925.n10

insurgency and the Nigerian military counterinsurgency. It identifies a significant obstacle to military performance; for instance, at issue is the military in politics, which situates the Nigerian military completely outside their professional engagement. It further exposes them to the risk of inefficiency in governance and professional incompetence. Once they stayed long in politics, they soon began launching a coup and countercoup d'état, increasing their interest in politics rather than the constitutional duties of protecting Nigeria's sovereignty.[11]

Briefly, Annex Two provides an overview of the insurgency activities and their consequences and the military's counterinsurgency (COIN) effort and immediately discusses why the military is failing.

Chapter 4: The Economic Factor.

The Chapter interrogates the challenges of economic living conditions of the People of the North-east as a Military challenge in ending the Boko Haram. The Chapter explains such an economic independent variable as the major causality explaining the challenges of cause and effects of Military success or otherwise in the Boko Haran Insurgency. Again, there is the issue of the capacity of the Government to translate the Country's gross domestic product (GDP) to the practical economic reality, thereby impoverishing the people. Economic variables themselves are measured by economic indices such as unemployment and inflation, which generally include the consumer price index, balance of trade, housing, and interest rate. In Specific Terms in the Northeast Region, the Ethic Region of Boko Haram This Chapter explains, with the empirical evidence from the Survey, how economic factors make it difficult for the Military to succeed against the Boko Haram Insurgency.

Chapter 5: The Political Factor

The study saw political considerations as statistically significant in the data presentation in Chapters 2 and 5 of this work and, as such, compelling explanation as an

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[11] The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1999

independent variable that impacts the success or otherwise of the military in the investigation of the challenges in the hands of the military in ending the Boko Haram insurgency. The chapter explains several studies on the historical political circumstances of Nigeria and note that the amalgamation of 1914 is one of the political factors that is affecting the military in its success against the Boko Haram insurgency. A politically driven factor that distracts from military success is the lack of engagement by the Nigerian Government of domestic socialisation rather than military deployment. In the concluding chapters, certain recommendations were made given that the military are not established to provide political solutions to a regional conflict that is driven by ethnicity and/or religious fanaticism, as seen in the data. The chapter also interrogates some contingency theories between social identity and deprivation theories in explaining human political development and agitation.

Chapter 6: Society and the Ethnic Factor

Ethnicity, religion, culture, and other societal factors play critical roles as impacting variables that constitute challenges for the military in ending the Boko Haram insurgency. The impacting variable underscoring military performance and making it very difficult for the military to end the conflicts. The study explains how societal factors and ethnicity fuel political consideration. One challenge with the military is the lack of legitimacy of engagement and operation from the civil society, thereby making the winning goal an arduous task; the chapter explains that the lack of feasibility assessment review of the military operations which distance civil society from military engagements. The chapter suggests the need for the military to always be in constant with the civil society and offers acceptable explanations on what the civil society tends to gain in supporting the military operations in ending the war and what they stand to lose. As explained in this chapter, the military in a general team requires a strategy that encourages interaction and collaboration with the civil population as the only way to prevent public revolt against the military desire to end the war.

The study saw the imperativeness of domestic socialisation and present such an opportunity of domestic socialisation as a condition precedent to ending the Boko Haram

conflict. Domestic socialisation as a strategy for ending the Boko Haram insurgency is also suggested for future investigation and empirical research. In addition, the investigation saw the reoccurring leadership laps as challenges within the society facing the military and presents some imperative arguments considering the phenomenon under investigation.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Against the background of the study's findings, the investigation engages some analysis of various options available for the Nigeria military in resolving the converging challenges seen in this study. The study discussed the option of employing domestic socialisation within the context of the country's self-invitation for United Nations intervention. Again, and as the study explained that such an option will assist the military and the Nigerian State in its commitment to nation-building.

Where this is not possible, the investigation signals the warning that since Boko Haram travels across the Nigerian borders and engaging the borders of other nations, international intervention may be inevitable, and the research cited the cases of UN interventions in similar circumstances, such as Somalia and the Gulf War of 1990−1991. The study argues that once a conflict engages other sovereign state borders, it is legally permissible for the UN Security Council to intervene. There is still within the international commitment for responsibility to protect (R2P). the chapter conclude that while actions are necessary in reducing the challenges of the military in ending the war, the legitimacy of the people in the new policy directive is imperative, as Nigeria cannot afford a new civil war.

Literature Review

This is not the first work on the many concepts that make up the investigation of this current phenomenon and explaining the literature will enable us to understand how far scholars have gone in discussing the phenomenon—the military challenges to the Boko Haram insurgency campaign within Nigeria's political, economic, and societal contexts (2002–2020). Chapters 1 and 3 of this work review specific literature in explaining the

Nigerian state and the anatomy of the military within the context of deprivation[12]and social development[13]theories of human development and agitation. These works are further interrogated in this chapter in defining a specific concept that made the phenomenon. For instance, no known previous work did not capture the phenomenon under investigation in this study in totality. The chapter presented a number of options for Nigeria in ending the Boko Harm insurgency.

It is the case that when armed conflict between different countries or within diverse groups within a country occurs, the military is at the centre of ending the war. Armed conflicts involve the process of allocating resources and defining war strategy as 'the employment of battles to gain the end of the war' (Carl von Clausewitz 1780–1831)[14] or 'the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy (Liddell Hart)[15]. Sir Michael Howard observed that those who yearn for peace assume that war is deeply abnormal. However, those who study the world in all its complexity soon realise that war is a deeply seated part of our social lives. The outcomes of war are the killing of human beings and the destruction of social, economic, and political gains. This sometimes makes war an uncomfortable reality. War is inevitable because 'war makes the state, and the state makes war' [16]. The existence of the various types of war argues for the visibility of the universal theory of war. Clausewitz confirmed that wars represent a rational means of achieving a political goal.

Our approach to discussing the phenomenon's literature requires identifying concepts that explain the topic under investigation. The main concepts that represent the societal concept to which military challenges are explained include the concepts of the military, the Nigeria political structure, the economic system and Nigerian Societal factor (Ethnic and

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[12] Denton E. Morrison, 'Some notes toward theory on relative deprivation, social movements, and social change', *The American Behavior Scientist*, 14 (5).1971, pp. 656-675.

[13] Abimbola Adesoji, 'Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State', *Africa Today*, 57 (4). 2011, pp.98–119.

[14] Carl von Clausewitz cited by Paret, Peter 'Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy'. *Journal of Military History*. 76 (3): 2012. Pp.837–45

[15] Liddel Hart 7/1920/7-9 Training Circulars for 10 Infantry Brigade.

[16] Charles Tilly, The formation of national states in Western Europe Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Religious Considerations) are contexts that made up the phenomenon under investigation and the literature review are discussed to cover those concepts.

Military Challenges

The military anatomy as discussed in Chapter Three of this work and its structures in fighting war are facing many challenges that became cap in hand, triggering the success or failure in winning the Boko Harm war.

Scholars have identified hundreds of variables that shape the success or failure of the military on the battlefield.[17] Some of the noticeable challenges include demand for control of the military by the political class, lack of military control of media coverage, new technology development around online reporting computers, military diversity, information management and the impact of globalisation.[18] The desire for changing praxis and military tradition arising from contemporary military or the military of tomorrow, military structure, training, soldier's loyalty, payment of allowance, insurance and compensation for falling soldiers, and several other factors. The discussion of what constitutes challenges to the military in ending the Boko Haram insurgence is a continuous debate. Contributions of some scholars have helped in engaging with the war. Moreover, suggestions such as the thesis of the contemporary military have no such space in the mentality of the Nigerian political class, perhaps due to the importance of the environment on the contemporary military.

A defined strategic approach is imperative to end the conflicts. For instance, the allocation of resources and the engagement of military capabilities through long-term policy review, planning and operational procurements are all significant in the military's

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[17] See Chapter One of this work where the work of Isa, 2010; Adesoji, 2010, 2011: Cook, 2011; proponents of deprivation theory on one hand and Onuoha, 2012; Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012; Barkindo, 2014; Cook, 2014, who explained that desire for identity imperativeness i.e., the Social Identity Theorist Agbiboa and Maiangwa, 2014 Akinola, 2014 were discussed.

[18] Timothy Onimisi 'Globalization and the Nigerian National Security: An Overview', *Journal of Good Governance* and Sustainable Development in Africa, 2. 2014, pp. 80–85.

successful operation. The seminar work of Montgomery[19], NATO[20], and Viscount Alenbrooke[21]. Explained that the strategy of allocation of resources, although necessary, is entirely different from the military tactical capacity approach, the entire military strategy for instance involves the techniques of engagement in actual fighting and taking control or disposition of military forces which can only be well coordinated for effective winning in typical conflicts, such as the Boko Haram insurgency. A challenge is at hand when a resource allocation strategy overrides tactical capacity desire or the opposite. What is a challenge in military terms? It is a concept in military intelligence that identifies an imminent capability to use military force to resolve diplomatic or economic disputes. The contemporary military appears to have dynamically changed in structure and affected the entire operations of the military[22]. For instance, the rapid change in civilian life perfectly influences the military in developing countries through the new system of government democracies.[23] Again, the transformation of the impact of technology in the geopolitical system influences the operational dynamics of the contemporary military. The new changes trigger the approach to understanding the conventional distinctions between 'War,' 'Peace,' 'Front' and 'Rear'. Bellamy[24] contended that the present-day military was organised within the convergence of electronics and information technology

The army's task and the environment are real challenges to the success or otherwise of the military operation. Environmental risk affects the internal structure of the military and the operational task. The seminar work of Shamir and Ben-Ari[25] explains further the issue of cultural diversity in the military as a critical challenge. Again, this is because the contemporary military requires new training and education to accommodate the demands of the changing environment. The new environments are referred to as the investigation of

[19] Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery. *A History of Warfare* World Publishing Co, 1968.

[20] *North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949*. (n.d.), *Office of the Historian* <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato> access date Sunday8th August 2022

[21] Cited by Arthur Bryant, *The turn of the tide 1939-1943. A study based on the diaries and autobiographical* notes of Field Marshall the Viscount Alenbrooke (London: Collins, 1957).

[22] Chris Bellamy, Knight in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace, (London: Random House, 1996)

[23] Chris Bellamy p.7

[24]Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery. *A History of Warfare* World Publishing Co, 1968.

[25] Boas Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, 'Challenges of military leadership in changing armies', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology,* 28 2000, p. 43.

military success in the Boko Haram insurgency with societal factors. The influence, for instance, could arise from the changing martial praxis of the reconfiguration of the changing dynamics of political or economic factors. There are also other issues of diversity hanging around ethnicity and religious influence that trigger cultural diversity, as noted by Shamir and Ben-Ari.[26]

The new environment for military performance requires the reconfiguration of the new leadership dashboard of the military hierarchy and command structure. Bellamy[27] identified the difficulties of managing the risk of exposing the military to social media. Specifically, regarding Boko Haram, the media portrayed the military as less successful in the fight against the insurgency. One reason for this may be the lack of information since much military communications is restricted. Still, there are challenges of getting approval from the command hierarchy of the military to have anything published by the media as it affects operations. Again, there are no special conditions for the media to be part of the battlefield with appropriate coverage. The military commanding officer on the battlefield does not control what the press will publish.

The Boko Haram insurgency took advantage of contemporary online media to launch its propaganda strategy by explaining how they were winning the war and discrediting the military in societal content. This constitutes a challenge to the military. On the changing influence and the exposure of the military to social media war of information, digital, cyber or computer war, there is the risk arising from the integration of the new technology into the military-industrial interface, which Mendelsohn et al.[28] says is the inherent effect of the post-World War II era. Van Creveld's seminal work,[29] says it is now inevitable not to talk about them. The challenge is putting the military (a process institution with a restricted communication system clustered in the hierarchy) on the spot. For instance, social media or discussing the restricted military policy of operation in the media

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[26] Shamir and Ben-Ari P. 58
[27] Bellamy, p.27
[28] Mendelsohn, E., Smit M.R, and Weingart, P. *Science, Technology and the Military* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).
[29] Van Creveld M., *Technology and War* New York, NY: Free Press, 1991).

or online information that can go viral and expect military reactions. Such a set of challenges comes with the changing environment of a new geopolitical system.

In the contest of the Boko Haram insurgency, the military struggles to counter some of the alleged successful operations of the insurgent in the social media (which were not true). They also need the approval to counter such information, which remains a propaganda approach of Boko Haram insurgents against the military. The insurgent needs no such permission to publish data from their end on any attack on military formations. Even if they fail, they can change the news and run viral videos on misinformation management arising from the risk of emergent social media and information technology. The public believes in such a statement in the absence of contrary statements. Again, it takes military approval of the hierarchy to counter such damaging news from the warfront. Gray[30] explained the imperativeness of new information technology challenges with computer aids with country security networks to a war fought on air, land, and sea. More importantly, there is the saturation of further compelling electronic communication among various battlefields.[31] The question to ask remains: What is the possibility of the exclusive nature of such internet since the military is not alone in the war? There is the opposition party See Shamir and Ben-Ari [32]. Michael Mann[33] suggested that the media challenges were mitigated by what they called the 'Mass-spectator militarism', meaning that the use of television to show the general situation on the battlefield improved the perspective of the public judgement and showcased improvement in the level of information. The challenge in developing countries like Nigeria is that the military's effort is less covered by television. Yes, from Vietnam to Gulf War, television has proven to be a suitable mechanism in providing information on the battlefield's military activities, which is often televised as 'live

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[30] Chris Hables Gray, *Postmodern War* London: Routledge, 1997.
[31] Shamir, B. and Salomon, I. 'Work at Home and the quality of Working Life' Academy of Management Review 10: 1985 p. 455-464.
[32] Shamir B. and E. Ben-Ari, 'Leadership in the Open Army: Civilian connections, Inter-organizational Frameworks, and Changes in the military Leadership' In J.G (Jerry) Hunt, G. Dodge and L. Wing (eds) out-of-the-box leadership Transforming the Twenty-First Century Army and Other Top- Reforming Organisation Stanford. (CT JAI Press, 1999).
[33] Mann., M. 'War and Social Theory: Into Battle with Classes, Nations, and States 1987 p. 54-72. In C. Creighton and Show M. (eds); The Sociology of War and Peace. London: Macmillan.

from the battlefield'[34] This is not the case in Boko Haram insurgency, as stated earlier, thus making it difficult for the commanding officer to exercise control of the media coverage

A radical transformation of electronic information is inevitable. The converging challenge here is as follows: Will the commanding officer at the information centre unit transmit the order to those on the war fronts and or decipher data? See U.S. literature Force XXI 'the Army of tomorrow'. Bonnie's[35] further reminded us of the conventional uniqueness of the military, which lies in its combat design. He cited the experience of the Gulf War, saying, only ground troops can take and hold land'. However, will the military conventions be repugnant to the contemporary world? One view expressed by Zakai[36] is for the military to remain focused, inspiring, in self-control, and proficient in the face of changing circumstances, thereby exhibiting personal example. Still, is such praxis comforting with the change dynamics? The question is important because any changes that arose from the contemporary terms that will be incorporated into the military must be consistent with the essential vision and objectives of the military. On the challenges relating to cultural diversity, Johansen[37] explained: The insurgent location or the battlefield is not a permanent establishment of the military base.

The study is raising the issue of cultural diversity, thereby promoting temporary structure and fuzzy boundaries. For instance, Boko Haram understands cultural diversity driven by ethnicity within its region of operation of the Northeast than the military, which needs to understudy such ethnic groups. Doing so is a potential challenge. For instance, lack of adequate knowledge of the geomorphology and climate conditions may slow down the pace of success in the military tactical operation at the initial engagement stage. Personnel from the military also are from divers' regions within the Nigeria ethnicity configuration. See Chapter One of this work.

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[34] Arnett. P. Live from the battlefield from Vietnam to Baghdad: 35 Years in the World's War Zones London: Corgi, 1994.

[35] Jobs, R. I. and Bonnie Smith. 'The Mirror of History' French *Politics, Culture & Society*, SPECIAL ISSUE Decolonization and Religion in the French Empire (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015, p. 119-133

[36] Dan Zakai, 'Military Leadership within the Technology of the Future' Skira Khodshit

[37] Robert C. Johansen, 'UN Peacekeeping: The Changing Utility of Military Force', *Third World Quarterly*, 12 (2).1990: pp. 53-70.

Environmental and technological change constitute challenges in the success of the military on the battlefield. They are driven by the new phenomenon of globalisation, which tends to prefer or work towards a flexible organisation rather than a structured, formal, rigid organisation like the military. Globalisation prefers an external environment that could be regarded as a 'boundaryless organization' Davis[38] explained that globalisation is more of a temporary system with less fixed structures encouraging more people's connection to the organisation because of its new forms. Hecksher Donnellon[39] says the new form of organisation changes both the internal and external environment and simplifies its bureaucratic nature. The military is a technical professional organisation that promotes a formal structure with a hierarchical process. Its lack of flexibility in design and internal mechanisms constitutes challenges in fighting such an insurgency as Boko Haram. Operational tactics require much flexibility. For instance, is the frequency of relationship change required in its internal and external operation and is the demand for necessary socialisation in the organisation's complexities' rank and file. The military will not win a war that requires flexibility of integrations when her structure is so rigid and is kept thin on a defined boundary. House[40] observed that new changes in the global environment require changes in the military's organisational structure, which its leadership must embrace for such vital change imposed new responsibility for military leadership. Does the question remain the extent to which the military can change its praxis?

Again, can the contemporary military change its tradition and attitude or its commanding structure in the face of military conventions and norms? Globalisation demands a new set of relationships between the employee and the employer that is more flexible. If the military accepts the new development as required by globalisation, it will require the unique responsibility of its leadership. Again, must the military embrace all forms of change put forward by globalisation and its geopolitical phenomenon? the study

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[38] Davis, D, 'Form, function and strategy in boundary-less organizations', in *The Changing Nature of Work, ed.* by A. Howard (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1995.
[39] Charles Hecksher and Anne Donnellon, *The Post-Bureaucratic Organization: New perspectives on Organizational Change* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994.
[40] House, R. J. 'Leadership in the Twenty First Century: A Speculative Inquiry' in *The Changing Nature of Work*, ed. by Howard A. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995. P. 411

asked because the military is a rudimentary prototype bureaucratic organisation. In the conferment of its legitimate power and standardisation of operations, it maintains a fixed division of the labour process within its operational rules. Often, incorporating her praxis or norms and, such bureaucratic process hangs her efficiency of operations and its reliability of specific pattern of authority[41]

The Nigerian military system has not embraced a contemporary military approach in its operational system, which challenges its success in internal conflicts such as Boko Haram. It is not the case that the Nigerian military lacks the skill in using contemporary technology if they are available, but its communication system is mainly official. For instance, low reliance on the formal hierarchy is at a low ebb and is decentralisation in decision making. The Boko Haram insurgent took advantage of the slow pace of movement of the Nigerian Military to the contemporary signal to reduce the level of military success (See Chapter 3 of this work).

Several scholars have recommended solutions to the environmental challenges that were distilled in our survey and tested in the field (see Chapter Two of this work). Such scholars and their suggested solutions include Burns and Stalker[42] (who suggested the adoption of environments with high turbulence and non-routine tasks). Bellamy,[43] (presented the social structure of the future army where everyone is an 'officer'). The challenges remain in need for the simplification of the organic system of the military. The study saw the challenges created by the organic structure in scholars' works explaining that organic organisation features high role-ambiguity, making predictability difficult in shifting relationships[44]. Again, Ouchi[45], saw such 'clan' control in its development of values, ideas, and identities (normative structure). Bellam[46] captured the challenges

[41] John R. P. French and Raven BġH, 'The Bases of Social Power', in *Group Dynamicsed,* ed. by D. Cartwright and Zander, A. 2nd Edn NY: Row-Peterson, 1960, pp. 607–623.
[42] Tom Burns and G.M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation* London: Tavistock, 1961.
[43] Bellamy, p. 199.
[44] Karl E. Weick, 'Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems '*Administrative Science Quarterly* 21 (1976), 1-19. Henry Wiseman, *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* New York: Pergamon, 1983.
[45] William G. Ouchi, 'Markets, Bureaucracies and Clans y Administrative Science Quarterly 25 1980 129-141
[46] Bellamy, p. 199.

encountered in such military relationships propelled by the military organic form in a peace-keeping operation: 'is the man or woman negotiating, acting as the intermediary, who matters. Ordinary soldiers, and certainly the most junior commanders, will need to understand their commanders' 'intent' very well and apply it in their dealings with local parties'. Yes, this statement is specific to the military deployed to the Boko Haram insurgency zone in the Northeast. The Nigerian military unchangeably keeps destiny with their military tradition dated to her established trajectory and is not likely to change her praxis. For the military, the demand to submit to political control and the challenge of its inability to control media converges with its ability to end the conflict. The converging complexity will, in time, redefine the military when such challenges are taken as an opportunity for innovation of both internal and the military rudimentary prototype bureaucratic systems. These cannot be changed easily within the comfort of the military battlefield.

One fundamental objective of the military is to end the Boko Haram conflict. Doing so requires the loyalty and support of the soldiers, as well as the efficiency of the military leadership. This work interrogates the work of scholars in this direction and specifically to the Boko Haram insurgency. For instance, Robbins and Judge[47] offered a significant definition that will be adopted for this investigation because of the nature of war and political insurgency: 'Leadership is the ability to influence a group toward achieving a vision or set of goals'. The collaborative effort of the military is to support peace and defend nations' territorial integrity. How valuable will the leadership of the military impact be on the political insurgency or dissolving the conflict? The above definition explains the impetus of what leadership behaviour in the military will lead to the successful execution of objectives. How do military leadership make any impact within the context of power, influence, and authority in the face of conflict? Chapter 3 of this work answers these questions.

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[47] Stephen P. Robbins and Tim Judge, *Essentials of Organizational Behavior*, 13th ed New York: Pearson, 2012.

Leadership behaviour is centred on using power, authority, and influence. Behaviour is either dominant or collaborative. A selected style of leadership behaviour or a combination of both is essential to the success of any engagement. Yukl[48] contends that the leadership trait distinguishes dominant from collaborative leaders. The author explained the five big traits of Surgency, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Adjustment, and Intelligence. These traits were discussed along with the three factors of the personality taxonomy, which are broadly defined skills, such as technical, interpersonal, and conceptual. In evaluating behaviour traits on page 163 of his work, the author posited, 'A better understanding of leadership in an organisation may be gained by examining the pattern of traits for the executive team, rather focusing on the traits of a single leader. For instance, such as the chief executive officer'. This suggestion means a reflection of the battalion command behaviour is more significant than that of its commanding officer.

The challenges of the demand for political control of military leadership by the political class in Nigeria makes it more difficult to win against Boko Haram. An instance is the military leaders' invitation by the National Assembly to publicly account for the money spent on logistics by the military on the battlefield and specific to the Boko Haram insurgency. This made the interrogation of the nuance of whether the political leadership in Nigeria constitutes a challenge to the military in winning the war quite compelling (see Chapter Three of this work). Suppose military leadership reflects the commanding officer's anatomy of the top hierarchy. Is that also of the same pattern in the battalion commanding unit, or is leadership in the military is what the military says is leadership? We know that regular payment of insurance, allowances and salaries of the soldiers is imperative to their success, and the excellent leadership of the military is significant for the realisation of such a desire. The study also finds non-payment of salary as one issue that is affecting the moral of solders. See chapter three of this work.

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[48] Yukl, G. A. *Leadership in Organizations* (2nd ed.) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989.

The Nigerian Political System

In chapter one, the study further reviewed some literature explaining Nigeria in history. It now examines the Nigerian political system in a more detailed manner. This is because political consideration is one of the important variables the study is investigating as an impacting factor in the military challenges in ending the Boko Haram conflicts (see Chapter Five). Understanding the political system will help explain the influence of the system on the military and expose some of the postulations of the difficulties in the historical belief. For instance, the Ooni of Ife (the Yoruba nation's most respected monarch and Imperial Majesty in Southwestern Nigeria) says all human civilisation and emergences are from Ile-Ife and that the first Ooni of Ile Ife came from heaven! He was the first human to appear, and it was from him all nations emerged, and his children, both black and white, set up all the countries in today's world[49] at different times. If this is true, Ooni should account for the first military and its formation in the geocentric world. By extension, it means that the first military emerged from Nigeria according to the historical account of the Ooni! The current ethnographer visited Ile Ife: the Kingdom of the Ooni in the cause of this work to provide a further explanation of the historical claim (see Chapter One of this work for an understanding of Ile-Ife's historical trajectory).

In another work, the current ethnographer noted that 'Nigeria, a former British colony, had no consanguineous name embracing its northern and southern halves until 1914. Up to then, the Nigeria of today consisted of diverse ethnic groups scattered across what is the country's current geographical space. The ethnic groups were not united within a single country or empire in pre- colonial days.[50] In 1914, Nigeria's name was officially adopted for the amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates. The British colonial master attempted to foster civilisation and development to ensure the success of the colonial project, and a sustainable post-colonial relationship period. The Nigerian political system can be explained through literature in two ways: the period before 1914 and the

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[49] The author's interview with the Ooni of Ife during this work on 2nd October 2021.
[50] Jimoh, I.F. et. al. *How Megaprojects are Damaging Nigeria and how to fix it*, London: Palgrave/ Macmillan Press 2022.

post-1914 period. Coleman[51] noted that human activities (agriculture, hunting, farming, food production, long-distance trading, and gathering), including bronze and iron, were noticed in Ile-Ife, Benin, and intergroup contact with the North and southern Nigeria as early as 700 A.D., suggesting the influence of trade in the political economy of Southern Nigeria. The political system was basically a traditional system of government. As Olupona[52] noted, there are two hundred and one gods, over 400 religious cult convergences at Ile-Ife, whose traditions were manipulated to political advantage by the Ooni (the king and imperial majesty) who presided over all political, economic, and religious affairs. The Ooni presides over his traditional supreme court. He was the hegemon for the Yoruba race in southern Nigeria. In the Northern protectorate, the conventional system of political arrangement was influenced by the religious beliefs of the normative. As noted by Balogun[53] Islam was introduced to Hausa land from the Mali Empire in the 14th century along the caravan routes of famous trans-Saharan trade. It strengthened monarchical and commercial contacts, but it remained predominantly an urban religion until the 19th century.

The postulation of Harry Eckstein could explain the Nigerian political system and Ted R. Gurr's theoretical framework of congruence-consonance in explaining regime classification and specifically to military affairs in governance in response to congruence-consonance theory[54] E.C. Ejiogu clarified that the political dynamics of the Nigerian polity system are trajectorially related to her social traits. As we explained in Chapter One of this work, he wants us to believe that diverse nationalities play a significant role in understanding the political system. Makinde concluded that Africa's history was essential to understanding events that explain colonialism in Nigeria[55]. See Chapter One of this work.

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[51] Coleman J. S Nigeria: Background to Nationalism University of California press Berkely and Los Angeles 1958 pp 437.

[52] Olupona Jacob K, *Kingship, religion, and rituals in a Nigerian community a phenomenological study of Ondo Yoruba festivals*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, c1991, pp. 7- 195.

[53] Balogun cited Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 24.

[52] Tedd Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 24.

[55] Olu Makinde. Historical Foundations of Counselling in Africa. The Journal of Negro Education Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer, 1978), pp.303-311.

However, he also admitted that there are questions surrounding African state-building, which are largely unresolved.

How can we correlate the Nigerian political system from the unresolved African state-building dated to her trajectory? Or does the disorder in African history, as noted by the learned scholar, explain the social problems in Nigeria? This question is crucial because we investigate military challenges within a societal context in which the understanding of the historical events becomes significant to how the military was configured. Again, Forde,[56] Kenyo,[57] Johnson[58] Biobaku[59] and Oguntomisin[60] all argued and in specific reference to the Yoruba race, that the political traits of monarchical polity system came from Ile-Ife, the very city of the hegemon. Oduduwa was believed to be the direct descendant of Olodunmare (God).

In the southwest of the Niger basin, their homeland occupies an area that stretches more than 200 miles[61] as far as the present-day Benin Republic and Togoland (westwards) and northwards to- wards Nupeland. Johnson[62] and Biobaku[63] argued that all Yoruba subgroups shared some traditional and cultural traits and the same tradition of origin traceable to the town of Ile-Ife and the same mythical ancestor, Oduduwa [64] However, each Yoruba subgroup founded its monarchical polity, which differed slightly from each other in some ways[65], Oguntomisin[66]. With respect to the Hausa-Fulani, Smith 1960 explained

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[56] Forde, D, *The Yoruba-speaking peoples of S. W. Nigeria* London, I.A.I., 19 J.A. Atanda, The New Oyo Empire: A study of British Indirect rule of Oyo province 1 (Ph.D. Thesis, Ibadan, 1967), p. 2-14. R.C.C. Law 'Heritage of Oduduwa: The History and Political Propaganda among the Yoruba.' Journal of African History XIV, 2, 1973, p 210.

[57] Olu Makinde p. 299.

[58] Saburi O Biobaku, *the origin of the Yoruba* (Nigeria: The Lugard lectures; published by the Federal Information Service for the Nigerian Broadcast Service, 1955).

[59] Saburi O Biobaku, p.27.

[60] Oguntomisin, G.O. 'Political Change and Adaptation in Yorubaland in Nineteenth Century', Canadian *Journal of Africa Studies, 15* (2). *(*1981), PP. 223-37 https://www.africabib.org/htp.php?RID=190080884

[61] Olu Makinde p. 230.

[62] Johnson, S. The History of the Yorubas: From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Protectorates, Lagos: CMS Nigeria Bookshop, 1921.

[63] Saburi O. Biobaku, *The origin of the* Yoruba (Federal Information Service for the Nigerian Broadcast Service, 1955).

[64] Oguntommisin, G.O. and Edo, V. O. eds., *African Civilization from the Earliest Times to 1500 A.D.* (Ibadan: John Archers), pp. 103-11

[65] Oguntommisin, p.101.

[66] Oguntommisin, p.103.

the district block in Northeast Nigeria. The assimilated nationalities became open in 1804, after the conquest of the Hausa by the Fulani. The jihad, Smith says, affected 'the largest share of the population of all the nationalities that inhabit the upper Niger basin'[67] the traditional political system was infuriated by religion Greenberg[68]. Coleman 1958 lays claim to the Hausa-speaking Fulani, who have their Fulani language as a 'homogenous mix' in the grassland ecological zone in Northern Nigeria.[69]

The Fulani occupied the Niger zone—the political system was primarily influenced by the Islamic religion. The dominance of the hegemon dates to the days of the political community of the papacy and Holy Roman Empire of Europe, which went crying against the legitimacy of legally sovereign states. For instance, it was not until the 17th century that they started just one of many political organisations in a world that included overlapping sets of empires, feudal fiefs, religious communities, etc., and tribal chiefdoms. The political evolution and governance in northern Nigeria were generally influenced by the circumstances of the environment. A significant event in the political system, as noted by Smith in 1960, was that in 1903, the Fulani arrangement was abruptly truncated by the British conquest. After that, the political system reflected the British structure, which led to various constitutional arrangements from 1914 to 1960, when Nigeria became independent.

In 1960, the independence constitution was reflective of the British political system, which led to the enactment of the 1963 parliamentary constitutional arrangement. This development continued until the military took over the political landscape and came with various governance systems by decrees and edicts. This lasted for over thirty years, one of the effects of the 1914 amalgamation. The political development after the military system brought in a democratic political culture of a presidential brand with constitutional enactment of which democracy was headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former Nigerian military Head of State. He was also elected president of the new democracy in

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[67] Greenberg Coleman 1958 Nigeria: Background of Colonialism. University of California press 1958. p,169
[68] Greenberg, J. H. 'Islam and Clan Organization among the Hausa. Southwestern' *Journal of Anthropology* 1947 pp.193-211.
[69] Coleman J. S Nigeria: Background to Nationalism University of California press Berkely and Los Angeles 1958 pp 437.

1999. He later transmitted the political democracy to a new civilian government headed by Alhaji Umaru Yar'Adua, who later died in office. Following this, a new government was formed and headed by the Nigerian Vice President, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who later conducted election and handed over power to President Mohammadu Buhari in 2015. The new president is a former military head of state and a retired military general.

As discussed above, the converging complexities in the political system creates a deficit in leadership in the Nigerian political system. Moreover, the management of political conflicts may explain the policy deployment of the military as an option to end insurgence rather than a domestic socialisation approach. This ordinarily would have encouraged discussion of disagreements and negotiation on a friendly table for solutions. But the somewhat correlative ethnicity and its converging complex in the political system also constitute a challenge for the military in winning the Boko Haram conflicts.

The Nigeria Economic System

In 2014, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted a study around the poverty rates in Nigeria within the context of the monthly allocation of financial resources in all the state of the Nigerian federation. This academic source places economic conditions as impending danger that can trigger regional conflicts in Nigeria and to which the military cannot resolve. The work observed that poverty is not equally distributed, for instance as of 2014, when the conflict had already started, the poverty rates in the Northeast states of Nigeria was 50.2% compared to the southern states where poverty rates were 16%. This disparity showcases empirical evidence of unequal distribution of financial allocation or its usage by the political governance class (See Figure 1.1).

Figure 0.1 IMF/World Bank (2014) evidence of poverty rates among the Federating Regions in Nigeria

Figure 1. Poverty Rates
(Percent of population)

Source: World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report 2014 - GHS 2012/2013

Figure 2. FAAC Allocation, 2014M1-M7
(Naira per capita)

Source: Nigerian authorities

The study noted earlier in the seminal works of Adelaja, Labo and Penar[70], which also saw the insurgency explained by variables such as unemployment, dislike for government and religious ideology. The current ethnographer noted in another study that the current Nigeria foreign direct investment declined from $8.8B in 2011 to $3.3B in 2019, the current account balance deteriorated from $10.6B in 2011 to -17B in 2019 (related to falling oil prices) and inflation stayed at around 11% in both years, while unemployment deteriorated drastically from 4% to over 14% between 2015 and 2017. Over 80% of the 186 million citizens live on less than $2.00 a day, and while the population grew by over 5%, the economy only grew by 2.2% in 2019.[71] Public debt increased from 17% of the GDP in 2011 to 29% in 2019; foreign debt increased from$21B to $35B in the same period. While this level of indebtedness looks reasonable, the debts consume a large part of the Nigerian annual budget that is highly dependent on oil: the external loan servicing ratio is already over 40% of the annual budget, which ran at 3.66 trillion naira in 2011. With recurrent expenditures

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[70] Adedaja, Labo, and Penar, *Perspective on Terrorism Coverage: 2007-2019*, Vol. 1, No. 2 - Vol. 13, No. 2, Terrorism Research Initiative, 2018.
[71] Jimoh, I. F. *The impact of oil revenue on the Nigeria Economy* Unpublished thesis submitted to the University of Cambridge for the award of MBA degree 2017.

consuming more than 50% of this budget, less than 20% of the budget remains for investments and capital expenditure. Again, and currently, the debt servicing ratio is close to 50% of the annual budget.[72] Those indicators signify that Nigeria may not have the financial resources to fund the military in the battlefield and that constitutes a challenge to the military in ending the conflict.

The challenge is noticeable from the police's inability to handle the conflict, which led to the drafting of military personnel to engage the insurgents under a joint effort of the Nigerian army, navy, police, and air force. The joint patrol and operation did not prevent the abduction of over 200 young Chibok girls. However, the deployment of military troops brought about the recapturing of Maiduguri from the insurgents whose activities became prominent in the Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states of Nigeria. The insurgents retained the Sambisa Forest as their main operational base despite military land and air strikes, took over the control of six local government areas in Borno State, hoisted their own flag and lowered the Nigeria flag. Meagher (2014)[73] identified lack of education resulting in unemployment as a critical factor in Northeast Nigeria and such low economic living conditions as the main factor assisting in pro- longing the Boko Haram insurgency. He saw factors such as 'unleashed significant resentment' against Western education, which Boko Haram insurgent alleged as the basis for the fight against the government. The large number of poor people also saw the employment of educated Western graduates struggling with the little job available as distaste (ICG, 2014).[74] Meagher further explained that the consequence of Western education was increasing unemployment and rural- urban migration, which underscores regular support for Islamic education.

It was common to see those with Western education flourishing comparably to those with a Koranic education. According to Boko Haram insurgents, such a practice is killing or eroding the religious belief and the normative value of the Koranic education

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[72] See the budget of the Federal Government of Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Finance 2019.
[73] Kate Meagher *Beyond Terror: Addressing the Boko Haram Challenge in Nigeria* (The Norwegian Peacebuilding https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Beyond%20terror.pdf
[74] Robert J. House, Leadership in the twenty-first century: a speculative inquiry Reginald H. Jones Centre for Management Policy, Strategy, and Organization Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 1994

systems. It is becoming common to see Koranic studies graduates subjected to deprivation and poverty, thus making the traditional system of low value, and encouraging the fight based on the normative ideology against Western education. For instance, the cities in Northern Nigeria were massively populated by the youth. Again, and beyond the economic living conditions, is the Christian-Muslim polarisation crystalising in Northern Nigeria's radicalisation of Islam, with increasing intolerance and extremist violence. All these are seen as Boko Haram preference as radical Islamic preachers took over the change of extreme Islamic preaching which again becomes a challenge to the government in making any noticeable attempt to improve economic condition as the environment becomes complicated. The poor governance approach precipitated Boko Haram insurgence, as the government is incapable of meeting the challenges of rising unemployment converging with extreme Islamic preaching.

The Nigerian Societal Contexts (Ethnic and Religious Considerations)

Could the military challenges in fighting the Boko Haram insurgence be explained by Nigerian societal contexts where ethnicity and religion are significant? This is one of the questions that this study investigates. In specific terms of race and ethnicity, as captured early in this chapter, there is agitation from diverse ethnic tendencies in the political system in Nigeria in its history. The anatomy of the military and its ethnicity are also discussed in Chapter Three of this work. From its literature discussion, the study has established that the military is a victim of the political system and Nigeria in history. Could the 1804 Fulani-led jihad or the 1914 amalgamation be a source of strength to Boko Haram that can explain the military's failure to end the war? This question is asked because the study locates and examines the imperativeness of those issues in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this work. The variables of ethnicity and religious consideration are so important that the study's findings were tested in the survey for validity using the empirical approach. The questions were answered in Chapter Six of the work which explained the military's lack of feasible assessment and an actionable plan in ending the war and the society's lack of legitimacy for the military explanation, which increases levels of hatred and revolt by the civil population.

Again, scholars Zacharias Pieri and Jacob Zenn have also argued that the attempt to invade and incorporate the Kanem-Borno Empire by the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria fuelled the Boko Haram paradox. Yes, even if this is the case, for instance, recalling historical memory, how can the military approach succeed in conflict resolution emerging from the specifically unimplemented political arrangement? The critical challenges (at least from abstract construct) of the military arising from such ethnic dominance can be explained by such factors of ethnicity. For instance, Wisdom Oghosa and Iyekekpolo[75] have identified historical North–South identity fractionalisation as the driver of the Boko Haram insurgency. There are also identified unrelated traits of the amalgamation of 1914 as the source of this historical North–South identity fractionalisation.

Wisdom Oghosa and Iyekekpolo [76] further explained that the state-centred approach arose because of the normative religious ideology triggers structural vulnerabilities. For instance, an extreme religious ideology can usually promote estrangement with the political class leading to the prolonged conflict that will be a com- plex challenge in the hands of the military, particularly in the direction of tactical operation and strategy on the battlefield. Abimbola Adesoji[77] has argued that Boko Haram was bred from the fertile ground of Nigeria's religious sensitivity. Again, this is the uprising of the 1980 Maitatsine group promoting Islamic values and ethnoreligious challenges. Such results in unprecedented killings and destruction of material and human losses, which is a challenge to the military in creating an appropriate strategy for a response, and the Nigerian government, for Nigeria, is a secular state. Isichei[78] and Ibrahim[79] cited the growing concern for Islamisation and the promotion of contrary secular ideology in the Maitatsine uprisings, such as the Kano

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[75]Wisdom Oghosa, Iyekekpolo, 'Political Elites and the Rise of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, Terrorism and Political Violence', *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 32 (4). (2020), pp. 749–767. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1400431.

[76] Wisdom Oghosa, Iyekekpolo p.765.

[77] Abimbola Adesoji, 'The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria', *Africa Spectrum*, 45 (2).2010, pp. 95– 108.

[78] [75]Elizabeth Isichei, 'The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria, 1980-1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited', *Journal of Religion in Africa,* 17 1987, 194–208 (3).

[79] Omar F. Ibrahim, 'Religion and Politics: A View from the North', in *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida*, ed. by Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 1987 pp. 509–534.

riot of 1980 and Bauchi crises of 1985. These crises are completely antagonistic to the Nigerian constitution, which guarantees the right to religion.

The military is expected to operate within the constitutional provision, which may demand some violent attack that could create a challenge. Such a military strategy of operation will be opposed in the northern region or areas where the proclamation of normative Islamic religious value negates the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. For instance, the various crises that occurred in Jos cited by Omipidan[80] Akaeze[81] which includes Jos, Shagamu conflicts of 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2008 Imo 1995:[82], Ibrahim 1997[83] and Enwerem[84] also explained the imperativeness of the growing conflict arising from religion. They cited the Zangon-Kataf riot 1992, the Kano civil disturbance of 1991, the Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/Funtua religious riots of March 1987, and Abimbola Adesoji explained that those crises constitute a security threat to the Nigerian state. The study may ask what the size of the military is and its capacity to cope with such arithmetical daily growing conflicts. In chapter three, the study explained more crises that the military was called to respond to at different locations in northern Nigeria. These conflicts are provoked by the Boko Haram insurgents or riot arising from religious ideology. The study also discussed the size of the military and its anatomy.

What is impossible to conceive (and which may explain the continuous lack of success of the war, thereby making the military fail) is the demand for the Islamisation of the secular Nigerian state. The primary purpose of the adoption of sharia in northern Nigeria is to extend political legitimacy to Boko Haram by some states in the region. This does not satisfy Boko Haram's proponents. The military size and its budget are insufficient to fight

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[80] Ismail Omipidan, 'Why North is on Fire', *Sunday Sun* (Lagos), 2 August 2009a, pp 5–6.
[81] Anthony Akaeze, 'From Maitatsine to Boko Haram', *Newswatch* (Lagos), 28 October 2009. <http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option =com_content&task=view&id=1459&Itemid=26> (28 February 2010.
[82] Cyril Imo, *Religion and the Unity of Nigeria*, Uppsala Research Reports in the History of Religions, 6, (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1995).
[83] Ibrahim, pp. 512-516.
[84]Iheanyi Enwerem, 'An Assessment of Government's Formal Responses to Ethnic/Religious Riots, 1980-1990s', in *Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria*, ed. by Ernest E. Uwazie, Isaac O. Albert and Godfrey N. Uzoigwe (Maryland, U.S.A.: Lexington, 1999, pp. 121–135.

the insurgency beyond the complex challenges of the Nigerian societal contexts of ethnicity and religion, which promotes conflicts daily and the budget is also misapplied to less significant factor as we saw at the introduction page and chapter four of this work. The military personnel, soldiers and officers come from different ethnically diversified groups, so they also belong to various religions. Again, this constitutes the challenges of identity, ethnicity/religion, and political consideration in the hands of the military.

Limitations of the Literature Review

The Boko Haram insurgency is still counting, notwithstanding scholarly suggestions and seminal works on how to end it. The war is expanding and capturing entire northern Nigeria with occasional visits to the uprising to destroy and cause human insecurity in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. Again, the activities of the terrorist group continue to rise and spread across the Sahelian belt of West Africa. The civil conflict assumes international dimensions and probably calls for the United Nations Security Council intervention. See chapter seven of this work on the critical analysis of our findings and why U.N. should intervene in relaxing the Nigerian military's societal challenges in the battlefield of the Boko Haram conflict. Unlike the previous scholars' work, no one makes this specific request. This makes the current investigation unique and original.

One distinction noticeable and correlative in the work of various scholars is their findings on the causes of the Boko Haram crisis (heavy reliance on causality), neglecting the challenges of the military in a societal context. This is where the current investigation departs. For instance, what causes Boko Haram may not be a challenge to the military. This thesis investigates the challenges facing the military in ending the Boko Haram crisis. Yes, religion and ethnicity may cause the Boko Haram crisis, as has been seen in the work of many scholars. Still, they are not very statistically significant variables that constitute severe challenges to the military, such as political considerations or the economic living conditions of the people of the Northeast. See Chapters Four and Five of this work, which explain that the work investigates such study gaps. Of course, the causes of Boko Haram and the military challenges may overlap. However, empirically, not all the reasons explaining Boko Haram's motivations are also significant challenges for the military. In

this investigation, the military has a specific signal as to what challenges are facing them in ending the war and how their value stick can be arranged or reconstructed. This is a gap in previous studies and narrative information provided by various scholars. This work, therefore, becomes imperative and opens the debate to current studies on war and conflict. It shows in the military 'shoes' where the pains are coming from, focusing on military challenges rather than the causes of Boko Haram.

One unique approach to the current investigation is the empirical method adopted and unlike many of the techniques that adopted the narrative strategies without empirical evidence, it confronts the challenges of internal validity and legitimacy of its findings, which are not statistically tested such that its prediction can be made to enhance a strong argument on how to end the conflicts. Still, in this investigation, the approach adopted helps critical test variables that show where the military problems lie in ending the war. And with the survey, the ontological account as we saw in Chapter One is different from epistemology interactions as reported with practical experience of those who encounter the conflict in the battlefield. See chapters two, three, four, five and six of this work

Methodology

The general introduction of this work explains the methodology approach and method selection for this investigation (mixed methods). The explanation of the method at that introduction stage was more of an abstract description. In this chapter, the research process management is explained. The study approach econometrics with data or simple regression? What software was used to distil the data? The above questions are essential for the legitimacy of the investigation result and to properly seat causality (cause, and effects). Yes, it is not the study aim to generalise or approach generalisation, as it is in scientific investigations, because it is not the study desire to make a new theory. (Although it is not also the case that the study closes it eyes if one idea emerges), but the internal validity of our **a**pproach and outcome must be accepted by the population of interest. Again, there is the issue of a unit of analysis for our interview. How do we eliminate ecological fallacy in our augment such that we do not use group judgement of an object as the individual judgement

of vis-vis visa? Our approach is to assert and ensure the legitimacy and validity of our investigation findings.

Data Gathering

The Informal Approach

The approach to data gathering through informal discussion of the phenomenon meeting of people (most people interviewed will not want their names appears anywhere and in such situation this work has adopted coded names to which the respondents' have no objection).

One question the ethnographer asked of the respondents was, 'the Boko Haram insurgency is now twenty years old how will you assess the situation so far' the whole idea is to have a general feeling and the respondent's assessment of the conflict. One responded coded with the name 'Army General OL' replied. 'Yes, that is terrible, and the military is almost helpless and can only do little with the configuration and complex situation we find ourselves created by politicians.' Another question asked Army Captain FL was, 'Why is military causality in the Boko Haram that high'? Captain FL replied, 'Why are you saying that when Boko Haram is massively killing the military?' We again asked Army Major IY why the military finds it difficult to win the war. And he replied. 'Of course, we don't even understand the Boko Haram people, the military does not even have the necessary equipment, and they are afraid of the Boko Haram People. He further added Boko Haram is about the politics of religion, and the military cannot fight that.'

These informal discussions helped us prepare appropriate questions to be asked in a formal interview and in the preparation of the survey. The study on 7th October 2021 visited military officers Mess located at Ojo military cantonment' with the desire of having the feelings of the military personnel on the feasible assessment of the military performance at the war front. The ethnographer used his connection with officers in the military particularly is long-time social capital network with Army Brigadier General FL. And together he accompanied some of those military officers in visiting the officers' mess in

Ikeja and Abuja military barrack. There was another visit to Okitipupa 19 battalion officers' mess. As the drink and hot pepper soup were served and discussion went on, questions were asked in an informal setting: one example of the question we started with the discussions was 'By the way, why is the military not winning the Boko Haram war?

The study saw responses such as 'don't start what you cannot, who tells you the military is not winning the war?' the ethnographer replied 'because the war is now 20 years old' one response. 'Hence, it is when Boko Haram kills all of us that you know we are winning' the ethnographer replied to him no officer, it's just that the military is winning in peacekeeping operations abroad. Still, there appear to be some challenges with Boko Haram. 'Yes, my brother, too many politics from above, we have a moral concern about the massive killing of our brothers. The religion of a thing is big trouble for us' The study found the informal discussions very useful in data gathering. It encourages the study to investigate further the fundamental challenges facing the military in ending the war, at least from the informal discussion. We can now identify variables that correlate with our findings in the literature construct, such as political, religious, economic and ethnicity, for research testing of hypothesis and investigation question/concern.

Our informal data-gathering approach is not open- ended. We completed it in seven months with encounters in strategic locations, such as discussion in the military officers' mess and soldiers cheeking points. We talk to the next person sitting with the ethnographer during local flights and sometimes after church service. In the literature review chapters, we have identified some of the findings of scholars on many impacting variables relating to the phenomenon. Again, those constructs were measured in Chapter two. We cannot test all those variables or even put them together in one survey, as the respondents will find the survey very cumbersome to administer.

Formal Data Gathering

The challenge with data gathering, and as we saw it in the field, is the question that some interpretive researchers would usually ask whether data are out there to be 'gathered'

or are constructed through the data gathering process. This necessitated our informal approach to engagement and interaction with the research subject(s)there are various methods of gathering data, and there is no one best approach, implying that each has strengths and weaknesses. The choice of method depends on the ontology (as it is) and epistemology (interaction with experience) of the subject of investigation. the study has the option to approach our investigation through action research, observation, diary, interview, focus group, documents, and visual data. The study opted for an interview and survey. Our objective is to intervene in the research context to achieve pre-set outcomes. See R. Chambers (1994) and appreciative enquiry. Robson and McCartan (2002)[85]

It is also the case that the study took diary notes during the interview and administered the survey to the respondents. Again, during the informal data-gathering encounter, the study took a diary note: How was this done? Each started with set of notes with a title head, including diagrams of the setting at the beginning of the notes, left margins wide enough for our own (and others') comments. We started new paragraphs often, used quotation marks to record actual speech as often as possible, and recorded our remarks, actions, and observations. We recorded our feelings, interpretations, preconceptions, and future research plans.

How the Survey Was Conducted

Our general approach was the guiding principle suggesting that we must be friendly, patient and not explicit about our intentions. 'It requires that one must act interestingly when bored and encourage informants to provide more vibrant details. One should nod his head with polite eyes but tired ears at verbose informants and wait for chances to redirect the conversation' Fine and Shulman[86] information is approached by an informal approach to data gathering and identified variables from scholars' work to design the interview and survey questionnaire. This approach helps the work remain focused on its phenomenon. The supervisor approved the questionnaire. After making his remark, we set the first

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[85] Robson, C. Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002.
[86] Gray Alan Fine and David Shulman in Organisation Ethnography: Studying the Complexities of Everyday Life. SAGE Publication Ltd Chapter9 2009 P. 181 https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446278925.n10.

general questions to the field of some number of the respondents to feel their reaction only to find out that the questions were too many and there is a need for us to reduce the questions to a reasonable size. The study redesigned the questionnaire. The questions asked were based on the supervisor's approval. The supervisor approved the second cut of the questionnaire, from which the completed survey questionnaire was ready to be administered. The ethnography approached the interview method, took information from the military websites, and made calls to some officers who were personal friends of the ethnographer to reach out to military formations to book interviews and administer the survey question.

One significant approach adopted was to visit the military institution, for instance, Nigeria Defence Academy and the Institute of Policy Studies in Abuja and ask students to administer a survey in the case of the Nigeria Defence Academy this was done on 17th January 2022. An unstructured format approached the few survey assistants. This is understandable, with the NDA being a military institution. The supervisor's letter to specific institutions was helpful, as the study used the supervisor and the university integrity in booking an appointment to many institutions for an interview and the administration of the survey, and this was helpful, as it reduced the challenges of how and why questions in interview.

Identified variables from the literature construct were tested to see how such constructs had been translated into measures those identified variables by scholars cited (see literature review in the General introduction chapter). As a result, the measures identified by the study were not arbitrary inventions but were tested and validated previously. The investigation used 'Likert scale' questions of the type 'To what extent do you agree with the following statement (1 = not at all, 4 = neutral, 7 = strongly)?' Likert scale answers are quantifiable and can be (and routinely are) used as quantitative answers. They can be answered by respondents on the spot using their knowledge of the context. However, they are less precise than IT-based archival numbers, and they may invite respondents to give biased answers. However, this work addressed this worry by asking different respondents questions about the battlefield's military activities. The internally

displaced people and stakeholders whose activities are affected by the Boko Haram crises to give collective effect; data were interpreted together with statistics aid of graphic design.

Methodology process management requires three stages of data gathering (Bryman 1988). It involves doing the requisite work quickly, with as little perturbation as possible (for the organisation) and a low risk for the researcher. Understanding the known and unknown risks in investigating war/conflict is essential. One approach used by was not to go to the war front but to ask questions of those affected by the war of military officers or soldiers engaged in the Boko Haram war. We also identified locations with impacts, such as Adamawa, Kaduna, and Jos, where most questionnaires were administered. The ethnographer visited the Army Headquarters informally after our friends in the military helped us gain entrance. The study put up the mask of a friend of the military to engage some of the officers nicely. For instance, questions such as 'Have the military chiefs located in Sambisa Forest after the presidential directive?', among others, were asked. The answer from one respondent was, 'It is not possible for now. Still, the military chiefs always pay regular visits, not completely relocated'.

The research process also includes 'Getting into, getting on, and getting out of the organisation'. The study did not want to keep any distance from the military formations visited; the visit was short, fast, and snappy because the military was too sensitive for an extended stay. The study visited some of the barracks, such as Ojo military barracks, to informally interview people because the military personnel are more relaxed at the barracks. When questions such as who sent us were asked in Abuja, our reply was 'ho, it is just for some academic exercise', the study immediately put up the student cap showing the university identity card' most time they are comfortable speaking with students. Again, organisations (government departments and military formations) visited during this investigation differ; for instance, the paramilitary departments, such as the office of the Peacekeeping force, were visited in Abuja and were very accommodating, and the environment was not as tense. Still, it took so long waiting before being attended to, and it did not matter that an appointment was made.

Getting into the various organisations involved identifying the organisation, then contacting per- sons, establishing these contacts (for instance, via mail, email, phone, or face-to-face communications) and setting the terms of engagement; that is, how long to stay in the organisation, the engagement rules (including defining confidentiality was assured) and the best time to visit institutions. Therefore, the investigation was not open-ended but time-bound, intending to complete data gathering with three waves of interviews by the summer of 2021 and questionnaire responses. The study adopted a survey, which is more prominent than experimental research in all types of investigations. Nevertheless, the study can see other places where the humanities survey has been used. For instance, the British Home Office used a survey design to investigate 'British attitudes towards immigration'. More than 13,000 people participated in the survey. Its results show that 'the vast majority of people are 'balancers'; they don't see immigration as a black and white issue'.

This example demonstrates that survey research is feasible when its requirements are satisfied. This explains why a combined method offers a powerful opportunity as the best-informed decision in answering the research question.

The use of a mixed-method design can achieve the objectives of the investigation, which include the requirements of credibility, trustworthiness, and internal validity. A combination of approaches offers the most powerful insight into the study of the phenomenon. Specifically, our objective is to find out what remains a challenge in the hands of the military when the study analyse the Boko Haram insurgency within the dashboard of Nigerian societal contexts. The study was conducted with the help of a survey. See Chapter two of this work.

Requirements for a Survey

The study adopted the typical instruments the respondents completed to meet the survey requirements. The study did one crucial thing: translate the literature construct into measurable measures and test some of the constructs in the survey questions. Again, the previous informal interviews triggered queries about the variables, which were also tested in the survey questions. the drafted initial questions based on the above explanations and

submitted them to the supervisor. Who listed additional requirements for the survey administration, such as proper editing and creating a box at the end of each question section space for the respondent to express his opinion in writing regarding the question asked?[87] The initial draft of the survey was sent to a select few respondents. The study observed that the question asked was too many enabled us to reduce the questions asked to a reasonable number that set a road map for the investigation of the variables. After the entire survey was administered and data was collected, the study took 50 of the administered surveys randomly selected from the total returned administered survey for testing. At this initial stage, only political factors and economic considerations were statistically significant in offering explanations for the military challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency. For example, the P-values was more that 0.005 Again, the results were sent for supervisor consideration before the study embarked on full-scale data analysis (see Chapter Two of this work). The study did not ask many questions, because a small sample may be sufficient to achieve statistical significance. If the differences across respondents were systematic and robust, we also ensured that the respondents had the needed information. The questions were structured so that the respondents could give a truthful answer. Finally, the study followed the pattern of the golden rule ('Do unto your respondents as you would have them do unto you') because you are asking for their time, their attention, their trust, and often their personal information[88]

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[87] See a copy of the survey in annexure to this work.

[88] Trochim, W.M. and Donnelly, J.P. The Research Methods Knowledge Base. 3rd Edition, Atomic Dog, Cincinnati, OH. 2006

'To stay within the military realm, the conceptual component of fighting power can only be enhanced if we engage intellectually with the problems that present themselves to us'
Professor. Matthias Strohn,

Chapter One: The Historical Context

Overview

The historical chapter welcomes the research as it provides background for the trajectory of Nigeria in history. And how generational grievances impact the military success of the Boko Haram conflict. Before 1400–1899, a nameless Nigeria did not emerge, as the chapter noted. Nigeria existed without a name from the pre-14th century until 1900; in July 1899, the House of Commons in England officially approved the name sequence to an article suggesting various names for the country published by the London Times. Floral Louise Shaw, a British journalist who wrote the report, told the name Nigeria. In 1914, Nigeria's name was officially adopted after the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates. Over three hundred ethnic groups exist in various parts of the country. The ethnic groups were not united under a single government called Nigeria in the pre-colonial era.

The chapter is essential to the work because it provides narratives on the configuration of the Nigerian anatomy and the critical events of the amalgamation of 1914 and its consequences, which showcase the societal nature of challenges of political, ethnicity, and economic factors to the military in ending the Boko Haram insurgency. The chapter's argument of human evolution was explained by development theory. As humans develop, the normative ideology puts them at the centre of agitation (social differences), which can trigger conflicts. The chapter explains that the military and its personnel are integral to the converging complex Nigerian society and the success of the military in ending the war is contingent on the unity they can create within the complexities converging from historical account of generational differences that underscore the principle of neutrality.

Introduction

Nigeria in Historical Context

The current investigation falls into one of the challenging areas of modern war studies. The military challenges to the Boko Haram insurgency campaign within Nigeria's political, economic, and societal contexts (2002–2020). This investigation is critical to Nigeria's present civil crisis featuring the Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram is currently seated at its headquarters in Sambisa Forest, Borno State in the Northeast of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, sharing boards with the Northern states of Nigeria including the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The Boko Haram crisis is currently of international concern, as efforts have been made to resolve the problem without success. The conflicts have not called for international intervention in Nigeria's internal affairs in the form of Allied military action or sanctions. There are other situations and circumstances, such as the Nigerian experience in which international intervention was carried out.

The historical account of the Nigerian state and the understanding of the taxonomies or anatomy of military behaviour There is no scintilla of doubt that the quest for development is central to all human pursuits, particularly at the collective society's level and at all human history stages. Therefore, social development theory is a useful contextual framework for explaining and understanding the qualitative changes in society's structure and framework that help it better articulate and realise its set goals and objectives. Development theory interfaces with the normative theory of development. The qualitative changes explain the social differences, which can only be driven by increasing awareness (a safe synonym for lessons and knowledge of history).

Nigeria in history within the context of development of the people, institution and society can be explained by social development and normative theory and the imperativeness of such understanding predictably helps the people better organise available human and material resources for the crucial purpose of quickening development.[89] Thus, evolution, which is often taken to be the result of society's capacity to organise resources

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[89] Chapter Three of this work detailed the military structure and the Boko Haram insurgency.

to solve problems and explore opportunities, is explained by such theory. Pioneers in any given community usually drive the process of development. These pioneers introduced novel and innovative ideas, habits and practices that are accepted and imitated, organised and adapted for many society members. This applies to migration and state formation, which constitute the preliminary of any given group or society's historical experience. This underscores the view that development is a human process driven almost solely by human agents. Thus, people's level of awareness/education, the intensity of their aspirations, quality of their mental and physical energies, attitudes and values, skills and information are critical elements of any group's historical experience. Jacob and Asokan explained the imperativeness of the development of the individual, family, community, nation, or the whole world.[90]

The current investigation centred on the military challenges to the Boko Haram insurgency campaign within Nigeria's political, economic, and societal contexts (2002-2020). It is imperative to explain that Nigeria dotted humanity adventure in the past or that the clustered development pattern at every given time characterised the history of human civilisation. Development can be positive or negative; social development theory must explain both the changes that have taken place in the emergent history of human society. Social development is an all-encompassing term that describes the whole gamut of development as it applies to human life and culture. Hence, Praiva sees social development as developing people's capacity to work continuously for their good and society's welfare. He argues that 'social development's goal and substance are the people's welfare as determined by the people themselves'. He further observed the consequent creation or alteration of institutions (including people's values, individual behaviour, and motivation).[91] Mingley's seminal work[92] sees social development as 'a process of social change designed to promote the well- being of the population as a whole within the context of a dynamic of the multifaceted development process'. The expectation regarding the Nigerian military's

[90] Jacobs, G., and N. Asokan, 'Towards a Comprehensive Theory', in *Human Choice – The Genetic Code for Social Development* Minneapolis MN: World Academy of Arts and Science, 1999, p. 51.
[91] Praiva, J.F.X., 'A Conception of Social Development', Social Science Review, 51 1977, p. 327–336 (2), Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/30015486.
[92] Mingley, J., *Social Development: Theory and Practice* London: Sage, 2014, p. 13.

loyalty is to secure the country's territorial integrity so that we can foster the peaceful coexistence of the Nigerian nation. The Boko Haram insurgency presents a challenge that undermines the peaceful coexistence and development agenda of the Nigerian country.

What is familiar with the initial postulations is that social development theory is society-focused and people-centred. Therefore, it is a theory that can provide a reliable and right intellectual context for a better understanding of the man–society interface and mutual interactions and how man manages society and adjusts to changes that emanate as a direct consequence of such interface. This is a very apt theoretical framework for understanding the contours and nuance of changes and continuity in Nigerian history since the precolonial era. The understanding of the phenomenon can only be appreciated when we know how people emerged to engage in development in specific terms in Nigeria. It can also be assumed that conflict is inevitable where development is rooted, for man is a political animal. Nigeria is situated between the latitudes 4oN and 14oN, bounded in the North by the Sahara Desert and the Niger Republic, in the South by the Gulf of Guinea, a tributary of the Atlantic Ocean. It is banded in the West by the Republic of Benin and on the East by Lake Chad and Cameroon. The historical account itself encompasses change and continuity. Olaniyan explains that such an ac- count provided 'perhaps the greatest value (of history), which is that it gives us a long reach into the past, as well as the ability to project into the unrevealed future'.[93]

In 1914, the name 'Nigeria' was officially adopted after the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates. Over three hundred ethic groups exist in various parts of the country, showing human activities. The ethnic groups were not united as a single entity until the amalgamation in 1914. Significant events of Nigerian history from 1500 were central to the preparation of grounds for the full establishment and operation of colonial rule. Colonial rule started officially in 1900; the colonisation of Nigeria and its political and economic implications can be explained within those events from the 1500s to the 1850s. Notably, the slave trade from around 1485, missionary activities (which, in

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[93] Olaniyan, J. R., 'Foreword', in *Essays in Contemporary Nigerian History*, ed. by S. O. Arifalo and Gboyega Ajayi Lagos: First Academics, 2003.

part, contributed to the abolition of the slave trade) in Nigeria, legitimate trade and company rule from the 1800s, the attack on Lagos in 1851, and its annexation as part of the British Empire a decade later, among others, were significant events that midwifed colonial rule and shaped its nature and contents. These events cannot be taken separately while interrogating the colonial trajectories of Nigerian history. For the present purpose, the colonial period of Nigerian history spans 1500 to 1960. Predictably, the post-colonial period is the phase from 1960 to the present, often safely called the contemporary Nigerian history phase.

The Southern Protectorate of Nigeria

The Yoruba are significant ethnic stocks in modern Nigeria and one of Africa's largest homogenous groups. As an ethnic group with a vibrant cultural heritage and comparatively high-level civilisation, which had grown over time, the Yoruba are about the most researched West African group. The Yoruba's most visible account traces their origin to Ile-Ife,[94] generally regarded as the epicentre of the Yoruba world and civilisation and the cradle of their existence. The Yoruba cosmology is influenced by myths, legends, traditions, and beliefs heavily woven around the Yoruba race Coleman[95] noted that human activities (agriculture, hunting, farming, food production, long-distance trading, and gathering), including bronze and iron, were noticed in Ile- Ife, Benin and intergroup contact with the North and southern Nigeria as early as 700 A.D. to 1850. This shows some inclusion of economic and participatory community activities central to human involvement. For most of the late 18th to the 19th centuries, Yorubaland was entangled in the vortex of interstate wars, which permanently altered the Yoruba country's face and its power con- figuration. New power centres such as Ibadan, Ijaiye and Egba emerged to replace the once-powerful Oyo. A new form of constitutional arrangement appeared in the centralised monarchy; Ibadan adopted a republican system. Egba embraced the condition of the federal

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[94] Akinjogbin, I. A., and Emmanuel Ayankami Ayandele, 'Yorubaland up to 1800', in Ikime 1980, pp. 121-123.
[95] David McCullough, *Why History*? Reader's Digest, 2002.

system in which 'kings were recognised, but authority was decentralised'[96] On the other hand, Ile-Ife and Ijebu held on to the old order. This threw up the challenge of what form of government would likeliest hold the expansive Yorubaland as one united family. Eventually, the crisis, on the one hand, made Yorubaland include its outlying districts and war theatres. On the other hand, it made the land vulnerable to the colonisers' manipulative tendencies, such that 20th century, most parts of Yorubaland were effectively under colonial rule. This was in addition to Lagos, which had become a British colony in 1861.

In the same vein, Olomola describes the precolonial Yoruba experience: 'The Yoruba distinguished between internal and external affairs. However, both internal and external affairs were conducted purposely to further states' political and economic interests. The authorities realised those external relations entailed painstaking negotiations and diplomatic protocols with neighbouring states.[97] Again, Smith also expressed a similar view that the Yoruba kingdoms maintained considerable diplomatic intercourse among themselves. 'along recognised lines and according to strict practical protocol'[98] Akinrinade alludes further to it that the Yoruba, even in war times, leave room for diplomatic negotiations to smoothen rough edges of interstate or intergroup relations[99] Two, and closely associated with the first, they had evolved well-calibrated conflict management and peace-building architecture, which guaranteed warring parties' genuine recon- ciliation through arbitration-centred judicial administration. This comparatively more enduring system sustained peaceful intra-group harmony and congenial intergroup relations in precolonial Nigeria. Sadly, the Western judicial system that dethroned and replaced it under colonial rule proved to be more adversarial and punitive, with litigation tearing the cord of unity, peace and reconciliation among individuals, families, and groups into shreds. Nigerian precolonial history across different kingdoms was characterised by creativity and

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[96] Akinjogbin and Ayandele, p. 137.
[97] Olomola, G.I., 'Precolonial Patterns of Inter-state Relations in Eastern Yorubaland' (PhD Thesis, Department of History, University of Ife, Ile Ife, 1977), p. 167.
[98] Nigeria Order-in-Council, para XVII, 1913 p. 241.
[99] Akinrinade, S., 'Warring but not unto Death: Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanisms in Yoruba Military Traditions', in *Lagos Historical Records*, *Journal of the Department of History*, University of Lagos, 4 2004.

natural deployment of the initiative and responsive development of necessary structures, institutions and mechanisms that attended to the people's needs as time unfolded. The peoples had evolved clear-cut ways of life, mastered their natural environment, and tamed flora and fauna that concurred with their peculiar circumstances.

The Igbo in Eastern Nigeria

The Igbos Were Probably the Most Visible and Famous because of Their Territory and Population Density. The Igbo Characteristic of the Nri's Society (Ọ̀ ràézè Ǹrì) Monarchical Institutions (Asaba, Onitsha and Aboh), the Kingdoms' Influence of Igala and Benin and Their Cultural Cord or Inter- actions with the Yoruba, Is Evidence of Human Activities in Nigeria Before Independence. The Igbos Occupied Dotted Villages in Eastern Nigeria. The Federation of the Towns Did Not Con- verge in One Single Unitary State. Like the People of Southern Nigeria in Rivers and Cross River States, the Federation of the Villages They Occupied Was Dotted along the Boundaries of the River of Nigeria's Geographical Territory. A Traditional Monarchical Arrangement in which the Monarch Was an Imperial King Dominated the Entire Community System of Administration. However, the Igbo System Was Considerably Diversified, As Administration Was Configured Up to the Family, Clan, and Village Levels. Therefore, the Igbo System Is Often Termed 'Acephalous' or 'Stateless'. Several Oracles and Local Cults Attracted Devotees, While the Central Deity, the Earth Mother and Fertility Figure, Known as Ala, Was Venerated at Shrines Throughout Igboland.

In the early 19th century, oral and written documents became more available than before, thus marking a shift from the hitherto almost exclusive reliance on archaeological evidence. In a seminal study of the Cross River valley and eastern Niger Delta peoples, Alagoa[100] has shown migration and contact patterns, state formation processes, and other significant internal developments. One such important development is the Nsibidi, which was a creative and original reduction in the writing of the sign language used in the Ekpe, Ukpotio, Ukwa and Isong Esil societies among the Ekoi people, on both banks of the Cross

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[100] Alagoa, p. 61–63.

River and in Igbo country, Bende, and among the Efik and Ibibio. Among the Cross-River axis peoples, Alagoa established that there were strong linguistic and historical connections with the middle Benue region and that Efik traditions and the sharing of cultural items like Ekpe, Nsibidi and others show closer links between them and the Igbo groups to the west of the Cross River. Alagoa's study further dwells on migration and state formation, and linguistic characteristics of the Eastern Niger Delta people.

It is well known that environmental factors were a prominent determinant of the Delta people's emergent social formation and political economy, particularly in the Eastern Seaboard. Indeed, the people swapped fishing, a subsidiary industry for a long time, for farming. Since the time of their firm settlement in the area, fishing has remained their core industry. The second most crucial engagement is salt production, followed by farming. This was to influence later fundamental political developments, such as the lineage headship with the title Amanyanabo. The holder of this title was not just the head of the fishing village; he was the proprietor and head of the commercial house, endowed with colossal executive and political authority. By extension, he had a more remarkable influence on an individual member of each commercial house's life and survival chance. Thus, he had the power to leverage on to command his commercial house and village members' unalloyed loyalty[97]

The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria

Borno's history predated the 9th century when Arabic writers in North Africa noted the kingdom and its very efficient monarchical system of governance in practice. Such an approach is similar to other areas in Nigeria. It was also in the way in Northern Nigeria, with kingdoms established in the lake Chad area of Kanem's, a clement habitat for humans and animals. It attracted settlements and encouraged exchange. This explains why it was quite convenient for a religious group, ancestors of the Kanuri, to establish a centralised state over those referred to collectively as the Sao, being the region's original settlers.

In a well-structured political system, the king (known in local parlance as Mai) of Kanem ruled in conjunction with a council of elders/advisers who were his peers as a constitutional monarch. In the eleventh century, the Kanem monarchy embraced Islam first as a court

religion and later as a thoroughly entrenched state religion. This was akin to the fashion of Western empires. How- ever, while Islam was used to strengthen the state's political and social structures, many established customs were maintained at this stage. In other words, though the rulers of Borno embraced Islam, the monarchy's system remained traditional. For instance, women like the queen mother and other female officials continued to exercise considerable political power and influence, as it had been since the beginning of the Saifawa dynasty. Pre-Islamic beliefs dictated the monarch's selection, the coronation rites, and other bases of royal authority.

The princes and other royal family members were granted fiefs and posted away from the capital to govern from their zones. At the same time, people of slave origin were preferred by royal guards and palace officials.[101]

The king regularly deployed (and often personally led) his mounted bodyguard, composed of slave-soldiers (known as abid), and a budding army of nobles to embark on an expansionist territorial policy of extending governance to kingdoms such as Kanem's authority into Borno, on the western shore of Lake Chad. The independent Borno Empire resorted to a broad foreign policy that blended well with domestic policies by structuring its internal governance architecture. And external relations that assured the promotion of state power to deepen trade, improve governance system and embark on a series of wars state interest. Borno's prosperity from the late fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries depended mainly on the volume of the prominent trans-Sudanic slave trade and most agricultural products, such as salt and livestock, in commercial quantity. Borno court and mosque were also famous for Islamic culture, as at that time establishing learning centres. For many centuries, the Hausa[102] have occupied the northern plains beyond the Jos Plateau, which were geographically a network of crossroads open not only to Borno. Consequently, armed conflict borne out of economic concerns was commonplace.

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[101] Alagoa, pp. 61–63.
[102] Alan Cuthbert Burns, *History of Nigeria* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929), pp 46–58.

Hausa states often formed alliances to prosecute insurgency against the Nupe and Jukun[103] in the middle belt in matters relating to control of trade (this again occurred recently when the Hausas killed multiple people in Borno in their hundreds, where there was a dispute for grazing and farmland). This was mainly the nature of the Hausa states before and up to 1500. It was a relatively all-encompassing political economy in which even commoners played crucial roles as they took charge of trade. Within the cities, the commoners formed themselves into guilds. Each of them was self-regulating, controlled transactions worked for trade routes' safety, and collected taxes from its members to be transmitted to the king as their mark of loyalty. Islam [104]was introduced to Hausa land from the Mali Empire in the 14th century along the caravan routes. It strengthened both monarchical and commercial contacts, but it remained predominantly an urban religion until the 19th century. Acceptance of Islam was gradual in both Western Sudan and Kanem-Borno, first as the court religion and later as the state religion. This was mainly the general picture up to the close of the 18th and early years of the 19th centuries; thus, providing the needed spark, the ignited the dry tinder for 1804-1810 Sokoto Jihad.[105]

Nigeria, 1960–2020: An Overview

The more significant part of Nigeria's post-independent history (between 1960 and 2020) features instability, which is the consequence of the historical past. The political system's good stability was not accessible after the British left immediately after independence in 1960. The military offered a respite for governance by interventions from 1966 to 1993. In all, a total of nine military coups occurred in the polity. Democratic

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[103] Abubakar, S. 'Peoples of the Upper Benue Basin and the Bauchi Plateau before 1900', in Ikime,1980, pp. 165-186. See also Obayemi A. 'States and Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence Area', in Ikime 1980, pp. 144-164.

[104] Balogun, S. A. 'History of Islam up to 1800', in Ikime, 1980 pp. 210–223. 1980), See also Gbadamosi T. G. O. and J. F. Ade-Ajayi', Islam and Christianity in Nigeria', in Ikime, 1980, pp. 347-366.
[105] Abubakar, S., 'The Established Caliphate: Sokoto, The Emirates and their Neighbours', in Ikime 1980, pp. 303-326.

regimes easily showcase the historical challenges and consequences leading to unhealthy military intervention in governance. The dichotomy in the taxonomies of the two merged protectorates plays a greater role in democratic regimes. The military (as we shall see in chapter three of this thesis) is not insular to the converging challenges that underscore the Nigerian nation's excellent professionalism and growth. The result is the accumulation of adverse effects leading to state failure, now manifesting in civil crises and the Boko Haram insurgency. The successive constitutions of the colonisation years were not too different, as they had one fundamental flaw. Yet, they represented Nigeria's march to independence, which officially concluded on October 1, 1960. That immense euphoria that followed the attainment of independence in Nigeria was a truism. Nigerians of all persuasions looked forward to a newly independent country with many expectations for a better life, more humane treatment, and a responsibility-endangered state-citizen social contract. That Nigerians could sit together and discuss their affairs to work out their governance contour and nuances was a lofty feat laced with pride and fulfilment. However, the trends in Nigerian history since 1960 have thrown up a mix-grill narrative. Some fundamentals of that history are considered hereunder.

One significant aspect of Nigeria's post-independence history was the immediate change in its status in the international system. This independence symbolised Nigeria's entry into nations' comity as a respectable member of various international systems of its choice. The country's freedom from the tutelary relationship it had hitherto maintained with the international society under British guide. In demonstrating the newfound freedom of action, Nigeria enlisted into the United Nations' membership on October 7, 1960, as the 99th member. This was when the Cold War occurred be- tween the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (led by the United States of America). Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact (led by the defunct Soviet Union), which is a fallout of the post-World War II power game, was a dominant theme and significant influencer of states' behaviours. While the Nigerian government under Tafawa Balewa professed non-alignment in the next power game, it, in most cases, was pro-West, with a very lukewarm disposition to the Eastern bloc at least for some time before 1964/65. Some political issues have influenced Nigerian foreign policy,

patterns of international behaviours, policy decisions, an entire gamut of external relations and economics. All of these are encompassed in neo-colonialism.

Osoba seminar work explained that decolonisation and neo- colonialism are two sides of the same colonial coin. He defines neo-colonialism as the strategy devised by the departing colonial powers to recoup their loss of direct political control in emergent nations by consolidating and even enhancing their traditional economic influence and control. This has played out well in post-independence Nigeria through spurious bilateral agreements, which the British colonial administration imposed on Nigeria as the attainment of independence was nearby. Two examples of such agreements are the Bilateral Tax Agreement of 1957 and the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact. Other Western powers followed suit shortly after independence. This trend has not changed significantly since 1960. The extant global economy is a thoroughly skewed setting designed to ensure the core-periphery or, better still, the global North and South dichotomy. Nige- ria, like many other Third World countries, belongs to the latter.

In specific terms, the history of Nigeria's external relations since independence has been primarily dominated by the principle of Afro-centrism whereby the promotion and protection of Africa's collective interests had mainly influenced Nigerian foreign policy's nature. This drive peaked during the Murtala-Obasanjo regime (1975-1979), with some fundamental foreign policy decisions taken by that regime in Africa's overall interest. It is also a chequered narrative, shaped by some internal dynamics like the military incursion into politics, civil war (1967-70), oil boom (from 1970-71), and idiosyncrasies successive leaders of the country. From 1966 to 1999, military incursion was a prominent, if not predictable, Nigerian body polity feature. The military had more shots at the corridors of power than civilian politicians supposed to be purveyors of enduring democracy. These civilian politicians were hands in glove with the military junta to scuttle the entrenchment of democratic culture

Meredith explained that Nigeria's hope to serve as a stronghold of democracy in Africa came to an abrupt halt on January 15, 1966. Despite the promising start of independence in 1960. Nigeria was soon engulfed by an intense struggle between the

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country's three main political parties for supremacy over the Federal Government. Control of the federal government determined the allocation of development resources. Politicians on all sides whipped up ethnic fear, suspicion and jealousy for their advantage and entrenched themselves in power. Tribalism became the ideology of politics.[106] The import of this early challenge was more profound than imagined. The civil war, oil boom, and associated malaise of mismanaged fortune were immediate consequences of the failed political experiment at independence. The latter factor of leadership idiosyncrasies was most prominent in the Abacha years (1993-1998) when, June 12, 1993, debacle put Nigeria on the spot in the court of global public opinion. Following the unenviable international infamy that Nigeria experienced from 1993, a new lease of life came with the unique civil rule experience from 1999 to the present. Apart from successful reintegration to nations' comity, Nigeria's voice has become louder in the last two decades. There is now a paradigm shift from Nigeria's old traditional Western friends to a new trajectory of international relations characterised by China's binary opportunities. This has redefined the nature and character of foreign powers' engagements with Nigeria. How- ever, this comes with some not too pleasant consequences.[107] The nature of inter-ethnic relations in post-independence Nigeria is a continuity of the unresolved imbroglio of the final decade of decolonisation. From 1960 to the present, Nigeria's sectional/ethnic diversity has been more of a bane than a blessing. Nigeria's post-colonial history is replete with many instances of inter-ethnic skirmishes and outright wars. As Ajayi has argued, while the colonial policy of divide and rule pitched one ethnoreligious group against another safeguarded colonial rule and interests, this policy did nothing (right) for the post-colonial unity of diverse people. After independence, the nationalists' activities were mostly carried out in an uncoordinated fashion by regionally based political parties and parochial leaders

The various ethnic nationalities were developing at different paces (in the decolonisation years) with the colonial administration's implicit endorsement. This was

[106] Meredith, M., The State of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence London: Simon & Schuster, 2021, pp. 193-194.
[107] Solomon Tai Okajare, 'Sino-Western Rivalry as a New Trajectory of Neo-imperialism: A Critical Challenge for African Diplomacy and Development', *Social Transformations: Journal of the Global South* 3(1). 2015, pp. 27–55

when a seed of discord that was intended to harm post-colonial Nigeria was planted.[108] Indeed, this seed germinated and grew into an oak tree from the First Republic. Even now, nothing has significantly changed because one major singsong among Nigerians is the discordant tune of ethnicity, whereby an average Nigerian subordinate his/her national citizenship to ethnic cleavages. Closely associated with this also is the reckless deployment of religion to promote the group's political interests to the overall disadvantage of the country's national interest. Sadly, many critical aspects of Nigerian national life since 1960 are bedevilled by one hard- biting challenge or the other. Yet, the country's astonishing human capital and enormous material wealth remain the main levers of hope for its survival beyond the rubrics of forces threatening life out of its national integrity, sovereignty, and nationhood. Added to the above challenges is the political leadership's inability to provide workable solutions to Nigeria's constitutions and constitutional problems.[109]

Colonialism: The Consequences of Amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914.

The Nigeria event of 1914 is a watershed the Governor General of Nigeria, Lord Frederick Lugard, amidst protest, signed the birth of Nigeria by the merger of the Northern and Southern Protectorate to one single British empire called Nigeria. The British government claimed administrative convince and one reason for amalgamation. In 1919, Lord Frederick Lugard completed his assignment, which provided a roadmap for British constitutional development for Nigeria. And this led to the setting up of various representative governments in 1922, headed by Lord Clifford and other subsequent developments, the Lord Richard constitution of 1946, the Lord John MacPherson constitution of 1951, Lord Lyttleton constitution of 1954, and finally, the independence of 1960.[110]

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[108] Ajayi, I.A., 'Mismanaged Nigeria's Diversity', in *Freedom, Self-determination and Growth in Africa*, ed. by Owette, K.I. et al. Berlin, Germany: Mediateam IT Education Center GmbH, 2014.

[109] Idowu, A.A., 'Problems of the Nigerian Constitutions and Constitutional Problems of Nigeria: Workable Solutions', in *Inaugural Lecture Series 308* Ile Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2017, pp. 18-34

[110] Idowu, p.25

There are complaints of differences, perhaps complicated, to unite in one country. There are very many variances in the taxonomy of the two protectorates' actors, and evidence of their unwillingness and sheer lack of readiness to cooperate. Again, what does this portray to the military post-independence and whey they are to resolve regional conflict. See chapter three of this work. They ordinarily would have to prefer to become independent entities on their own. Adeyemi explained the history of Nigeria's amalgamation of 1914 within the context of economic exploitation and gains. What informed this project was not to achieve integration, unity and development among the various tribes that later merged, but the rather economic interest of British imperialists. Despite the protest that witnessed the amalgamation, the British government merged the two separate protectorates. The merger is done notwithstanding shape differences in traits, unequal development, education, and shape variance in leadership style. However, the merged protectorates were well managed by the British during the colonial period.

The amalgamation opened a panorama body of discords between the two protectorates and their actors. In just seven years after independence, one of the regions in the defunct southern protectorate launched a civil war on the entire Nigerian state, challenging her independence and sovereignty and asking to secede as the Republic of Biafra. After several civil protests from independence undermining Nigeria's democracy, which also led to the Nigeria military intervention in governance, in recent times, a well-organised Boko Haram from the Northern protectorate is engaging the Nigerian State peace of Sovereignty and in close to two decades in an unending civil war generating international interest.

Colonialism: Consequence One: The Biafra Civil War

The Nigerian government went into civil war to protect less than 5% of her territory occupied by Biafra (the eastern part of Nigeria that demanded to secede). The civil war led to the death of over 3 million people with the destruction of estimated billions of properties; there were several re- ported cases of human abuse and demystification of the dignity of men, women, children, and young people. What led to Biafra's demand for secession are within the realms of immediate and remote causes. One primary factor that ignited the civil

war was the authorisation of its legitimacy from the Eastern Nigeria Consultative Assembly's passing a secession resolution of the Biafra Republic. The resolution claimed that there were over 30,000 innocent Easterners who were murdered. Again, the displacement of over 2,000,000 people was absurd to the mandate given for the Republic of Biafra's actualisation by Col. Ojukwu to secede and declare Biafra sovereignty.[111]

The remote causes of the civil war emanated from a convergence of several complexities within the Nigerian Union, beginning with the amalgamation of 1914 when the British delineated the population along ethnic lines and incorporated them centrally and governed them as a Nigerian state. These self-serving imperialistic actions led to unhealthy ethnic rivalries for economic and political power and a fear of domination by one ethnic group by another. These ethnic tensions and rivalries caused sporadic clashes, such as the Jos and Kano riots of 1945 and 1953 between Ibos and Hausas, respectively, where precursors to the 1966 massacre of the Ibos in Northern Nigeria, which led to the departure of Ibos from Northern Nigeria for their homeland and led to secession and civil war.[112] However, the civil war's other cause could be traced to a combination of a chain of events—a failed military coup, a countercoup, and massacres of Igbos residents in Northern Nigeria. There was also a hidden interest in the Niger Delta Crude Oil. The initial condition precedent to the agreement of various federation parts to form a federation based on trust and equal justice and opportunities is threatened by breach of trust, which ignited the Biafra war. The people of Eastern Nigeria (this was part of Nigeria's southern protectorate) federation protest human insecurity from unequal opportunity and fear of freedom emerging immediately after Nigeria's independence.

Colonialism Consequence Two: The Boko Haram War

The prevailing sentiment before 9/11 was that terrorism was a serious but manageable problem. A change in the thinking around terrorism differentiates the belief after the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001,

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[111] Chima Kotieh, The Nigeria-Biafra War: Genocide and the Politics of Memory Cambria Press, 2012).

[112] Lasse Heerten and Dirk Moses 'The Nigeria–Biafra war: postcolonial conflict and the question of genocide', (2014), volume 16, Issue 2-3: Special double issue: The Nigeria-Biafra war, 1967–1970: postcolonial conflict and the question of genocide.

demonstrates that terrorism has become a matter of intense focus for states around the world[113] It has now assumed a much greater significance in the eyes of the world's governments. The terrorist combines several characteristics: a dominant ideology, an element of surprise in its attacks, a global network of allies and supporters, and an understanding of modern technology. The nightmare scenario for counterterrorism planners is acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons – by one of these non-state groups. The WMD threat is more frightening, because the familiar concept of deterrence, whereby states discourage attacks through the risk of severe retaliation, is hard to apply against individuals and non-state groups.

The complex nature of the operation of a terrorist under committed normative ideology, modern technology, and social capital capacity network raises concern for the Nigerian military in its counter-insurgency approach and tactical strategy. For instance, the challenges of misinformation and disinformation around the insurgent leaders and military bias exhibited in the infiltration phase of the engagement. Historical context as provided above also shows it is difficult for the military to fight the war with absolute neutrality as many of the personnel come from Northern Nigeria, as this study explained in chapter three. Regional sentiments are distilled into the anatomy of the military operations and capacity to end the war, for example. Seven years after Nigeria's independence (and the end of colonialism.) A part of the Southern Protectorate protested the amalgamation of 1914, threatening succession, and the right to sovereignty, they expressed the desire to create the Biafra Republic (of which recognition generated diverse interest among the international community.) Again, is the current Boko Haram originating from the Northern Protectorate (as it then was), has in the last twenty years launched a civil war on the Nigeria-nation, creating conditions for human insecurity and using religious ideology to question Nigeria's identity thereby re-echoing generational grievances associated with the Nigeria-nation as identified in this chapter.

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[113] Tilly, C. The formation of national states in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

The military cannot fight in a region where many of its leadership and personnel share identity and religion, which again shows that the seven levels approach discussed in chapter six of this work concerning the strategy of unconventional war were neglected or overlooked. Nigerian military, notwithstanding the complexities discussed above, is invited to end such a politically driven ethnic prone Boko Haram insurgency. Again, many of the military leaders and soldiers belong to the same sections and ethnic group of the centre of the insurgency (the Northern region) in Nigeria. See Chapter Three. How far can the military bring such a rebellion to an end in a complex Nigeria? Chapter Three further investigates the issue by providing insight into the military formation and her capacity. It examines the anatomy of the military structure and the Boko Haram insurgency. The chapter further

'Science always has its origin in the adaptation of thought
to some defined field of experience'
. Emst March.

Chapter 2 : The Field/Data Report

Overview

In the previous chapters, the study explained many issues that trigger the imperativeness of this present investigation. More important are the research questions identified in the general introduction chapter and the subsequent literature review and its limitations. A significant explanation is also made in chapter one on how Nigeria's historical trajectory, accounting for her political structure driven by ethnicity, creates challenges in the hand of the military in ending the Boko Haram insurgency. In this chapter, we approached the field of empirical epistemology evidence for primary data collection using survey methods to ask the respondents to judge their opinions on the many variables identified by previous scholars. The chapter presents the data collection results before we engage in the analysis as they relate to the study-specific research questions. Subsequently, we discuss the empirical evidence and scholars' work in the remaining chapters that specifically answered the research questions. The current chapter explained how data was collected and interpreted. Yes, all the independent variables are significant, calling for explanations but at different levels of impact. This chapter provided insight into the causality of the phenomenon. and exposed the research questions to empirical data

The Field/Data Report

The study explained in the general introduction how we went about research process management. This includes explanations of statistical tools engaged in data analysis because of the objective requirement of data results. Again, the ethnographer mindfully noted how the interviewer's behaviour can impact interview responses. An engaging

theoretic theoretical framework such as the data reflective analysis of David Kolb (1984)[114] to illustrate the rotation of think, plan, experience and reflect with the data and interview result guided the study and assisted the researcher in analysing interview content. Think about the process first; plan for the engagement and user experience to manage respondents' encounters (be an ethnographer! kindly, friendly, honest, precise, observant, unobtrusive, candid, chaste, fair, and literary)[115] And reflect on the whole excise before arriving at the findings. This is important since the result is to engage the military level of success/ failure in the Boko Haram insurgency. The answer centred around the independent variables of political, economic, social/culture, ethnicity, and military capacity. A careful analysis of the cause and effect is critical for appropriate data reflection and interpretation.

As the study explained previously in the general introduction section on the methodology of this thesis, statistical tools such as regression to mean, variable distributions and discriminant effectiveness will help analyse the data. For less critical factors, a combined effect titled another variable of a single combination can be conducted by factorial analysis (combining many veritable elements into a group of related factors). When one factor is not powerful enough to explain causality, many combined factors might do so. The chapter will help narrow down the most potent factors/independent variables that shape the dependent variable. It will be clear for us to say from the primary data that yes, with certainty, X (independent variable) causes Y (the dependable variable). Or X1, X2, X3, X4, when combined, causes Y.

Sample Results.

As the field work progressed and after over 80% of the survey was administered and filled out by the respondents, we took fifty copies of the administered survey at random. With the aid of SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences), we ran a regression to see how the variables were inter- acting. We saw at the earlier stage that the political independent variable explanation was gaining more ground than other variables and next to this is the

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[114] Kolb, D.A., Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984.
[115] Fine, Gary Alan. *Morel Tales: The Culture of Mushrooming*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1998.

military capability and the strength of counterinsurgency strategy. One surprise we got was the economic effects, which respondents did not score as high as the other variables from the sample result. See Table 2.1 (regression), 2.2, and 2.3, which suggested that perhaps the military is failing over the Boko Haram insurgents.

Regression

Table 2.1 Representation from the administered 50 randomly selected respondents' response from the primary data sample work

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					Durbin-Watson
					R Square Change	F Change	df 1	df 2	Sig. F Change	
1	.679[a]	.744	.708	.87892	.744	3.988	4	95	.005	1.920

a. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity, Political explanation, Economic Factor, Military Factors

b. Dependent Variable: Boko Haram

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	12.323	4	3.081	3.988	.005[b]
	Residual	73.387	95	.772		
	Total	85.710	99			

a. Dependent Variable: Challenges of military in the Boko Haram insurgency

b. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity, Political explanation, Economic Factor, Military

Factors

Table 2.2 Coefficients representation from the administered 50 randomly selected respondents' response from the primary data sample work on coefficient representation

Model	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant)	2.335	.647		3.611	.000
Ethnicity	.012	.117	.011	.103	.918
Political explanation	.602	.185	.330	3.248	.002
Economic Factor	.133	.113	.112	1.177	.242
Military Factors	.310	.132	.255	2.346	.021

(a) Dependent Variable: Challenges of military in the Boko Haram insurgency.

(b) Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity, Political explanation, Economic Factor, Military Factors

Figure 2.1 Representation from the administered 50 randomly selected respondents' response from the primary data

Figure 2.2 A graph table showing sample result of the independent variable

The empirical evidence suggests that we should be looking at two main factors: political and the capacity of the military. We tend to suggest that since the empirical evidence suggested political variables and the main challenges of the military in the Boko Haram insurgency, it remains for us to agree that dragging the military to confront political challenges is a mismanaged strategy and that makes some of the respondents even suggest that the military is the cause of Boko Haram insurgency. We do not want to advance this view except the overall data say so, because we are initially biased with the economic

variable as the shaping factor, at least in our literature construct. Although our literature review seems to suggest that ethnicity and clan identity are the main issues in such insurgency and that once an ethnicity or social identity factor influences the struggle, it will be difficult to contain such an insurgency. This is because their ethnicity saw national identity as superfluous to their ethnic identity. But the question to ask is, in such political preference for ethnic identity over national interest, should the military be deployed? See Chapter Five of this work. One fact that is empirically established by this work is that normative theory of identities, ideas, and values as the strategic explanation by the insurgents is the main issue in the dashboard of the conflicts and a challenge to the military because it is difficult for the military to find an explanation for the justification of Boko Haram normative ideology in the face of national interest.

The study could not conclude the present work based on a sample work of 50 respondents, and as such, we decided to complete our primary data collection and approach the final result. The sample work nevertheless triggers discussion on what to except and raises questions on some of the constructs picked from the literature that were tested in the field

Description of the Survey

The survey was made out in June of 2021 and with the supervisor's approval it came life in October of same year with supporting letter from the university introducing the ethnographer to the respondents and in addition is the supervisor supporting letter soliciting assistance from the respondents with the assurances that they will not be held responsible for the view expressed in the survey and is the assurances of confidentiality in respect of views expressed in the survey. The survey provided an opportunity for the respondents to make personal comments/suggestion in respect of the independent variables at the end of each section.

The survey was divided into four sections: ethnicity and cultural considerations, political explanations, economic factors, and military factors. In the general optional section, respondents were asked questions relating to their background specific to name, address, email, age, work category, gender, occupation, and telephone number. Even when the

general sections were made optional, many of the respondents offered to provide the information detailing their phone numbers, emails, and addresses in respect to the survey only. See the survey sample in Annex 1.

Reflections on Primary Data

Sufficient time was created to reflect on the data, thereby studying them in an unbiased way and reflecting the objective presentation of facts. The theoretical framework of David Kolb (1971) was adopted in reflecting on the data as previously noted in this work (see chapter one of this work). The framework assisted in resolving concerns that are naturally associated with issues of experimental data analysis and explained that a proper reflection is contingent on a circle of thinking through the data, drawing an appropriate plan from such reflection, generating and recalling field experience with the data collection and the interview process. Again, experience with data and its reflexivity is imperative for ethnographers with little or no experience with data collection. The approach resolved some of the concerns associated with a fairly large number of surveys and interviews collected, as raised by Kvale and Brinkmann (2008). 'How shall I find a method to analyse the 1,000-interview transcript'?'[116] The study took this measure to ensure the legitimacy of the result and the investigation. This is because with war studies, emotions can trigger uneasy thinking when reflecting on the number of people killed and property destroyed

Final Primary Data Results

The final presentation of data and results is done with the aid of statistics tools in a simple regression. The data is primary data. There are no secondary data on the influence of the variables (political, ethnicity, economic and military) on the military challenges of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The analysis of the data will be done in detail in the next chapter on how each of the independent variables shapes the dependent variable.

Regression

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[116] S. Kvale & S. Brinkmann. Changing psychologies in the transition from industrial society to consumer society,
  History of the Human Sciences, 21 (2008), p. 85-110 (doi:10.1177/0952695108091412

Table 2.3 Regression data results of the summary of predictors and dependable variables

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Sque	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	F Change	df 1	df 2	Sig. F Change	Durbin-Watson
1	.816[a]	.700	.063	.71995	.700	14.928	4	537	.000	1.717

(a) Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity, Political explanation, Economic factor, and Military factor

(b) Dependent Variable: Boko Haram demand
ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	30.951	4	7.738	14.928	.000[b]
	Residual	278.342	537	.518		
	Total	309.293	541			

a. Dependent Variable: Boko Haram

b. Predictors: Ethnicity, Political explanation, Economic factor and Military factor

Table 2.4 The coefficient relationship of variables
Coefficients

Model	Unstandard-ised Coefficients		Standard-ised Co-efficients	t	Sig.	Correlations			Colline-arity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	.675	.138		4.909	.000					
Ethnicity	.052	.039	.057	1.319	.188	.111	.057	.054	.893	1.120
Political explanation	.217	.044	.204	4.939	.000	.173	.208	.202	.982	1.018
Economic factor	.222	.040	.241	5.577	.000	.240	.234	.228	.895	1.118
Military factor	.008	.021	.016	.395	.693	.027	.017	.016	.997	1.003

a. Dependent Variable: Boko Haram insurgency

Figure 2.3 Histography representation of the independent variable standing

Figure 2.4 Graph reorientation of the independent variables

Figure 2.5 Pie chart representation of the performance of the independent variables of ethnicity, political consideration, economic and military factors.

Explanation of the Findings

The reliability test table is the degree to which a test is consistent and stable in measuring what it is intended to measure. Simply put, a test is reliable if it is consistent within itself and across time. Generally, you will see the reliability of a test as a decimal, the larger the reliability coefficient, the more repeatable or reliable the test scores and from the result of the reliability test table, our r =0.067. Reliability tells us how consistently the test scores measure the variable used in the studies. The results above show that 60% consistence of ethnicity, political explanation, and economic and military factors are the independent variables used in measuring the military challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency campaign within Nigeria.

The results show that the variable is consistent, and the normality table explains the assessment of the normality of data as a prerequisite for many statistical tests because normal data is an underlying assumption in parametric testing. There are various methods available to test the normality of the continuous data. The most popular methods are the Shapiro–Wilk

test and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. For continuous data, for example, testing of normality is very important because this explains the normality status of the data results, measures of central tendency, dispersion and from such exercise, the selection of parametric/non- parametric test are decided. From the results above, the data is normally distributed because Sig = 0.00, which is less than the p-value of 0.01, which concluded that inferential statistics can be used because the Shapiro–Wilk test is a more appropriate method for small sample sizes (>50 samples) although it can also handle larger sample sizes, while the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is used for n ≥ 50. For both above tests and since the data is normally distributed, regression analysis is used. From the regression analysis result, the model is the following:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ethnicity + \beta_2 political + \beta_3 economic + \beta_4 military + x_{ij} \quad\ldots\ldots\ldots(1)$$

$$Y = 0.675 + 0.052 Ethnicity\ (societal\ influence) + 0.217 Politcal + 0.222 Economic + 0.008\ Military + e_{ij}$$

R-Square= .700 =70%, DW= 1.7171, F-Calculated value= 14.928

The result presented above shows that the R2 is 70%, which implies that 70% of the systematic variation in military challenges in the Boko Haram as our dependent variable is explained by political factor, ethnicity or societal influence, economic, and military factor on internal security. This means that the model exhibits a high degree of goodness of fit. The F-stat of 14.928 shows that the explanatory variables (Ethnicity or societal influence, economic factor, political factor and military factor) are statistically significant in explaining the dependent variable (Boko Haram) at the 1% level of significance. The t-statistic of 0.052 implies that ethnicity is statistically significant at the 5% level in explaining the military challenges to the Boko Haram insurgency campaign within Nigeria. Multiple linear regression above, the size of the coefficient for each independent variable gives us the size of the effect that the independent variable is having on the dependent variable, and the sign on the coefficient (positive or negative) gives the direction of the effect. In the regression analysis above, for the multiple independent variables, the coefficient tells us how much the dependent variable is expected to increase when the independent variable increases by one, holding all the other independent variables constant.

Again, are the units which the variables are measured and from the result above coefficient for ethnicity or societal influence is 0.052, political factor is 0.217, economic factor is 0.222 and the military factor is 0.0008 and from the result show that all variables are important but not at the same level.

One explanation is that the result conforms with scholars' identified variables of political and eco- nomic factors as the significant challenges in the hands of the military in ending the Boko Haram insurgency. (See literature review in the introduction chapter). However, one thing that is new in this study from the empirical evidence is that the military is not the main challenge to itself in ending the Boko Haram insurgency. That explains that we may have a perfect military that is not appropriate as a solution to the Boko Haram insurgency meaning that whatever the effort the military put in place in ending the insurgency may not work since the military have no solution to main cause of Boko Haram, underscoring the imperativeness of the deployment of the military to resolve the conflict. The study suggests that domestic socialization is a more appropriate in an unconventional war, not military deployment.

P-values and coefficients in regression analysis work together to tell us which relationships in the model are statistically significant and the nature of those relationships. The coefficients describe the mathematical relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable (see Table 2.6). The p-values for the coefficients indicate whether these relationships are statistically significant. And from the result above coefficient are statistically significant, and for instance, the R-squared of the regression is the fraction of the variation in our dependent variable that is accounted for (or predicted by) independent variables. The R-squared is generally of secondary importance; our main concern is using the regression equation to make accurate predictions. From the results above, the R-square of all variables is 0.700=70%, which means that the identified in-dependent variables are 70% explaining the long-run relationship of impacts with the dependable variable. The Durbin Watson value is 1.717 after correcting for autocorrelation {AR (1)}. This im- plies that the residuals are not serially correlated. Therefore, the regression parameters were relevant and statistically significant.

All the independent variables account for causality explanations of the military challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, at about 70%. (Other factors we are not looking at still play high!). Again, it is not true that the military is seriously incompetent. It is also the case, as suggested by the data, that the military solution and the deployment of soldiers may not override the highly influencing political and ethnic factors. The failure to apply appropriate political strategy and establish communicating relationships to address ethnic or societal demand is accounting for the military loss in bringing the insurgency to an end—the responsibility of doing so centred around the leadership of the Nigerian government. The military deployment achieved little or no result, as we saw in the data result in Table 2.6. In Chapters three, four, five and six, we present a causality detail analysis of how each of the variables influences the continuous presence of Boko Haram insurgency.

Chapter 3 The Military answer to the Boko Haram problem /the Military Factor

Overview

Does the Nigeria military faces constraints in winning the Boko Haram War in Nigeria? This is the primary research questions the study is investigating as explained in the General introduction Chapter to which Chapter Three provided empirical evidence showcasing that among all the variables under investigation, the military is the least important factor in ending the Boko Haram conflict, yet the military account for over 90% of the federal government's budget spending in ending the conflict! Other variables that constitute a challenge in the hand of the military (political, economic, and societal factors) spend less than 10% of the government budget, notwithstanding that those factors are more statistically significant. The study established that the military spends the money, and the conflict advances with the government neglecting causal variables proving more statistically significant. Next, the chapter discusses the Nigerian military structure and anatomy, the centre dashboard, or the focus of the current investigation. It becomes imperative to know how Nigeria organised her military system. This will help us gain insight into the military organization's capacity, institutional setting, and the arrangement in the existence of the military development and tactical operations, particularly in response to one of its leading roles in defending the Nigerian nation's territorial sovereignty, specifically the Boko Haram Insurgency in the face of converging complexities of Nigeria's ethnohistorical background and generational grievances discussed in Chapters one and six of this thesis. Do the military constitute a challenge to itself in ending boko haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Introduction: The Nigerian Military

The term military usually, if not temptingly, sometimes erroneously refers to the army because the military is often seen in land warfare operations. Still, military operations cover

the land, sea, and air. For this thesis, the Nigeria military refers to the army, naval and air force combination[117] In the global military annual ranking conducted by the Global World Force (GFP)[118] the Nigeria military (army, navy, and air force) are ranked separately, indicating that the Nigeria military is not just the Army. In this study, these armed services are discussed individually before using the term military as one unit—Nigerian Armed Forces.

The Nigerian Army

Nigerian Armed Forces comprise the army, naval and air forces, of which the Nigeria Army (NA) is the most significant and visible component, which is responsible for land warfare operation. It bears the brunt of the nation's security challenges, notably in the contemporary age of Boko Haram insurgency. The Nigerian Army is ranked 56 globally out of 138 countries reviewing GFP's review in 2020.[119] The ranking of the NA shows her strength within the equipment's content, such as the Russian T-90 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), the German 'Leopard 2' and the Thailand light-class systems the 'Stingray' Light Tank. Other factors considered for the global military rating include finance, logistics, natural resources, and geography. The Army Act established the Army Act[120] (now and hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Act has since been first repealed, and the amended Act made provision for the inclusion of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the ranking/career structure of the army. The chief of army staff heads the NA.[121]

The British colonial masters were still in charge of the army five years post-independence. As a result, the leadership of the Nigerian Army was not fully indigenised until 1965. Major General Norman Foster was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) between 1960-1962, while Major General (Sir) Christopher Welby-Everard succeeded him. It was not until July 1966 that a Nigerian, Major General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi, was

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[117] See the Armed Forces Act Chapter A20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004
[118] 2000 Military Strength Ranking, *Global Fire Power* <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php.
[119] https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php.
[120] Nigerian Army Act (No. 26) (Chapter 294) Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960.
[121] Armed Forces Act Chapter A20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

appointed the army chief still with the GOC nomenclature. The following Nigerian soldiers, in turn, took over the leadership of the Army from 1965 to 2015.

Table 3.1. List of Leadership of the Army from 1965 to 2015.

No	Name	Description	Period
1.	Major General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi	GOC	February 1965 – January1966
2.	Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon	COAS	January – July 1966
3.	Lt. Col. Joseph Akaahan	COAS	August 1966 – July,1967
4.	Maj. Gen. Hassan Usman Katsina	COAS	Jan. 1968 - Jan. 1971
5.	Maj. Gen. David Ejoor	COAS	Jan. 1971 - Jul. 1975
6.	Lt. Gen. Theophilus Danjuma	COAS	Jul. 1975–Sept. 1979
7.	Lt. Gen. Alani Akinrinade	COAS	Oct. 1979 – Apr. 1980
8.	Lt. Gen. Gibson Jalo	COAS	Apr. 1980–Oct. 1981
9.	Lt. Gen. Mohammed Inuwa Wushishi	COAS	Oct. 1981–Dec. 1983
10.	Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida	COAS	Jan. 1984–Aug. 1985
11.	Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha	COAS	Aug 1985–Sept. 1990
12.	Lt. Gen. Salihu Ibrahim	COAS	Sept. 1990–Aug. 1993
13.	Lt. Gen. Aliyu Mohammed Gusau	COAS	Sept. 1993–Nov. 1993

14.	Maj. Gen. Chris Alli	COAS	Nov. 1993–Aug. 1994
15.	Maj. Gen. Alwali Kazir	COAS	Aug. 1994–Mar. 1996
16.	Maj. Gen. Ishaya Rizi Bamaiyi	COAS	Mar. 1996–May 1999
17.	Lt. Gen. Samuel Victor Leo Malu	COAS	May 1999–Apr 2001
18	Lt. Gen. Alexander Oderuduo Ogomudia	COAS	Apr. 2001–June 2003
19.	Lt. Gen. Martin Luther Agwai	COAS	June 2003–May 2006
20.	Lt. Gen. Owoye Andrew Azazi	COAS	June 2006–May 2007
21.	Lt. Gen. Luka Nyeh Yusuf	COAS	June 2007–Aug. 2008
22.	Lt. Gen. Abdulrahman Bello Dambazau	COAS	Aug. 2008–Sept. 2010
23.	Lt. Gen. Onyeabor Azubuike Ihejirika	COAS	Sept. 2010–July 2015

Source: Table 3.1 was computed by the current study.

The implication of table 3.1 above is that more than 65% of military leadership comes from North- ern Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency is taking place in northern Nigeria and, more specifically, in the Northeast. This raises the issue of bias in fighting the war. In addition, the moral burden is a challenge to the military since the military policy and strategy do not conform to the well-known practice of unconventional warfare. Nigerian Army has undergone tremendous trans- formation in post-colonial Nigeria, particularly after her republican status in 1963. Yet, there is no ruling out the Western fingerprints in the army's emerging culture, professionalism, and ethnic character. These

elements are closely related to what is known about the British Army. Indeed, in post-colonial Nigeria, the army has occupied many positions. Over time, it has played a notable role in maintaining municipal peace, guiding Nigeria's territorial integrity, and supporting regional and global peace initiatives through peacekeeping operations. Professionalism and neutrality were at the maximum during the colonial period. This is understandable because British functionaries of the colonial were not Nigerians the North or South protectorates. Could this mean that the army was influenced by their ethnicity (north or South) during the colonial period Put differently, did the realities of the colonial period neutralise the issues of ethnicity? These questions are pertinent because one of the issues under discussion in this work is the ethnicity or societal variable as a threat to the success of the operations and the success factor in the Boko Haram conflict. In chapter six, the ethnicity or societal issue is found to be a statistically significant influencing factor. Could the presence of such variable influence or explain why, despite Nigeria's independence, the Chief of Army Staff was still appointed from Britain in the first five years? The British colonial authorities saw the need to keep the military under her control even after independence in the interest of Nigeria's unity and prevent any risk of disruption of the fledgling democratic arrangement.

The British objective of building a professional and neutral army was short-lived. The Nigerian Army has also been entangled in the whirlpool of politics and class struggle shortly after the British entirely handed the Army over to indigenous Nigerian officers. The NA engaged in coup-plotting and countercoup to truncate the civil rule, thus culminating in the prosecution of the civil war and necessitating the need to suppress internal insurrections, as well as to confront insurgency. More- over, if the Army now dropped their professional duty and appointed themselves to political leadership positions, could Nigeria have produced a professional army that could fight a brutal war or conflicts like the Boko Haram? Therefore, this study identified the military as an independent variable for investigation. For instance, could it be said that the military's lack of professionalism accounts for the ineffectiveness of its tactical approach, thereby making the military not succeed in the Boko Haram conflict? Or is the military professionalism arising from their interest in poli- tics, as earlier noted in the main problem, thereby making the military fail in the Boko Haram insurgency? The Nigerian Army would seem

to have been thoroughly enmeshed, if not overwhelmed, in the challenge of over-politicising a noble profession's institutional administration and jeopardising its core calling.

In the early days, most of the NA officers were from the eastern part of Nigeria. (Again, the East was part of the southern protectorates by the amalgamation arrangement). This explains the ap appointment of the first indigenous Chief of Army Staff, Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. He was from the East and was appointed chief of army staff from February 1965 to January 1966. To occupy the Chief of Army Staff's position following the provision of the Army Act, the appointee must be a senior commissioned officer of the Nigerian Army. In the chain of command, the Chief of Army Staff reports to the Chief of Defence Staff in the Ministry of Defence, headed mainly by the civilian minister. The question to ask if those officers mentioned also go to war because, in Chapter One of this work, it is noted that the Nigerian government in 2020 (our investigation cutoff date) made a policy decision to relocate the military chiefs from their administrative office in Abuja to Sambisa Forest in Borno State. The Nigerian government felt that such an approach would boost the morale of the soldiers in the battle fronts and make the Army more efficient in fighting the war. This was because the chief of army staff does not usually go to the war front. It was felt that the process of formulating and implementing strategic policy decisions to carry out many operational activities (which require the approval of the Army High Command's approval from time to time), including logistics, will be better handled if they were close to Sambisa Forest, the main fortress and base of the Boko Haram insurgents. Unfortunately, this initiative has not proven to be more effective. See Chapter Seven of this work.

In January 1966. Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi assumed the position of the Head of State of Nigeria (position equivalent of the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria's office in democratic dispensation) through the first coup led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, a young soldier of Eastern Nigerian (Igbo) extraction. Major General Ironsi was in office for 194 days. The bloody coup d'état led to the death by assassination of Prince Ahmadu Bello and the ruling Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (two most

prominent leaders of northern Nigeria), while Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, the leader of the bloody coup d'état, was from Eastern origin. Moreover, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe (the most prominent and visible Igbo leader), who was the president and ceremonial Head of State in the parliamentary system, was out of the country during the coup, thus 'mysteriously' shielded from the coupists' bullets. Meanwhile, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (leader of the Yoruba/Western Nigeria) was inside the Prison, having been sentenced to a ten-year jail term in 1963 for treasonable felony. Across the broad spectrum of Nigerian society, this was taken as a clear demonstration that military officers from the Eastern Region used their military position in organising bloody coup d'état, killing themselves and, more importantly, prominent people of Northern Nigerian extraction. It was for this coagulation of reasons, among other elements of the unresolved national question, that ethnic identity was tagged on the coup now popularly known as the Igbo coup. It sowed the seeds for inter-ethnic tensions within the military and civil society. This culminated in the July 1966 coup, also known as countercoup, master-minded mainly by young soldiers of Hausa-Fulani ethnic persuasion, and young Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon became the new military head of state. It was in this second coup that Major General Ironsi was killed.[122]

The coup d'état and countercoup of 1966 were motivated by an account of the past. Curiously, the 1862 date of creating the first Army unit by Captain Glover strengthens the view that it was de- signed to protect British interest following Lagos' annexation as a British colony[123]. More explicitly, several studies have investigated the historical heritage of the Nigerian Army. For example, Dummar provided a guiding and comprehensive historical outline by adding that northerners' demographic recruitment in 1862 marked the beginning of the Nigerian Army's perpetuation until the 1950s. Furthermore, the use of Hausa (predominately the official language of the Northern protectorate) as the command

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[122] Falola T. The Military Factor in Nigeria, 1966-1985 New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995; G. Ajayi, The Military and the Nigerian State, 1966-1993: A Study of the Strategies of Political Power Control (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2007; Ojiako, J. O. Thirteen Years of Military Rule in Nigeria, Lagos: Daily Times 1979.
[123] Leadership (2013) 'Nigeria: History of the Nigerian Army', Abuja, 19 July. https://allafrica.com/stories/201307190130.html# text=The Nigerian army traces its, the British colony of Lagos. [accessed 7 July 2020].

language creates an imbalance in the Nigerian Army from then to this day. The praxis described above also established the narrative evidence of the generational grievances that characterised the historical past and newly converging again in the contemporary Nigeria.

In addition to Glover's Hausas, in 1888 the Royal Niger Company Constabulary was raised[124] and was recruited to play an internal security role in Nigeria from its creation up to about 1895. This constabulary formed the core of the more independent Northern Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF. On the other hand, the Oil Rivers Irregulars were created and filled with soldiers, predominantly of Igbo extraction in 1891. The two regiments became the Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF on January 1, 1914 and were later designated the Niger Coast Constabulary and formed the Southern Regiment of the WAFF of the Nigerian Protectorates' consolidation[125]. In a demonstration of the full-throttle operation of colonial rule all over Nigeria, and by extension, British West Africa, in 1920, the WAFF was renamed the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). During the 1930s, its operational strength increased from four to six battalions, served in two theatres: the Northern and Southern commands. The former had central installations at Sokoto, Kano, Zaira, Kaduna, Maiduguri, and Yola, while Enugu and Calabar were for the latter[126] The compelling need for more soldiers provoked by the Second World War pressure prompted the Army in colonial Nigeria to expand to 28 battalions that served outside Nigeria as part of the Allied forces. Many Nigerians who fought under these battalions later contributed to the tempo of agitation for decolonisation from 1945. The study demonstrates that ethnic challenges in the Army dated to her trajectory of events since 1895, as shown above that the Northern Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF took the lion's share of the Northern and Southern commands.

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[124] Dummar, F.C., 'The History of the Nigerian Army and the Implications for the Future of Nigeria' Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, University of Nevada, Reno, 1989, pp. 18-19.
[125] Dummar, p. 19.
[126] Dummar, p. 19.

The Nigerian Navy

The Navy Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria[127] establishes the Nigeria Navy and saddles it with the role of maintaining the security of water jurisdiction of Nigeria's sovereignty. Like it was with the Army, the British authorities were still in control of the Navy after Nigerian independence up to 1964. Rear Admiral A. Kennedy, a British officer, oversaw the Nigerian from 1958 to 1964, when handed over to the first indigenous Navy officer, Commodore (later Vice Admiral) Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey,[128] who became the Naval Staff Chief that year. The Navy's historical emergence in 1887 was a quasi-military institution called the colonial marine department of the British Royal Navy. Through stages of transformation, the Nigerian Navy (NN) was at the experimental stage until the late 1950s, when some of the Royal Navy's Reserves, who also served as officers of the Marine Department, pressed to establish a regular Navy. The most vocal among them was Captain Skutil, who incidentally became the first naval chief in Nigeria in 1956.

The first naval legislation, known as the NN Ordinance, was passed by the House of Representatives on 1st August 1956 and received the Governor General Sir James Robertson's assent in September 1956.[129]

The instrument provided that the NN would approach the territorial defence of Nigeria within its territorial waters. And to any extent, the Federal Government may demand her and within the Navy hydrographic survey content, maintaining Nigeria's customs laws, training in maritime, and other naval duties. The British passed the ordinance establishing the Nigerian Naval in 1956.[130]The NN Ordinance formed the origin of the Navy's role and force structure. The naval force was expected to limit its activities within the territorial

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[127] See the Royal Nigerian Navy Act (No. 9 of 1960). See also Olutunde Oladimeji, 'The Nigerian Navy - How it all Started', *The Sailor*, 1 July 1990, p. 8.

[128] Nigerian Navy, 'Treasured Articles from the Archive: Biography of Vice Admiral Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey'. *The Sailor*, July 1990, p. 6

[129] Nigerian Navy bulletin: A brief walk into their history and how they are ranked'. 1979. <https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/nigerian-navy-a-brief-walk-into-their- history-and-how-they-are- ranked/2lb52rt> [accessed 6 November 2020].

[130] Nigerian Navy bulletin p.7

waters of three nautical miles, with the understanding that the Royal Navy would handle the defence of Nigeria in the event of external aggression.

This was the situation with the NN for the remaining years of the colonial era. Up to 1964, when, in the euphoria of Nigeria's 1963 republican status, new legislation is known as the Navy Act of 1964[131] was passed by the House of Representatives to provide complete, home-grown naval de- fence, the NN, among other assigned duties. Therefore, the NN's narratives from independence in 1960 can be better understood in that context and from the events that shaped the Nigerian political system, as explained in Chapter One of this work. British colonial masters wanted the Navy to play a critical role in the territorial defence of Nigeria within water jurisdiction. However, North- east Nigeria, the primary area of the Boko Haram insurgency, is in the desert. Therefore, naval operations are not within such jurisdiction. But how much the Navy can support the other armed forces depends on their understanding of the desert's arid geography!

Indeed, from 1960, the NN started with the following Nigerian naval officers: Lieutenant Nelson Bossman Soroh was the only Nigerian officer on the executive branch. In addition, the Navy had Lt. Nathaniel A. Pearse, Lt. Edit Akinwale Wey, and Warrant Engineer Officer A. Coker in the engineering branch. In the supply branch was Lts. A. Akinloye, O. Z. Chiazor, S/Lts. S. Doyle, B. Martin, and A. Oni. The rest of the officers were retired (British) Royal Navy officers. However, the Indian Navy training team joined in 1962. As a result, the total number of expatriate officers serving with the Royal NN was twenty-four. Most foreign officers were now staff officers, and a few were assigned training duties. Gradually, the number reduced, and by the end of 1964, most ships came under Nigerians' command[132] The NN's indigenisation policy engaged in the force since 1957 had been involved in massive recruitment of Nigerian citizens into the service, but this did not bear fruit until 1960, when more Nigerians began to join the Navy

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[131] Dokubo, C., 'The Nigerian Air Force in a Changing Security Environment'. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/nigerian_air_force.pdf. [accessed 30 October 2020].
[132] William Abiodun Duyile, 'Historicising the Development and Intensification of the Nigerian Navy between 1956 and 1958', International Journal of History and Cultural Studies, 5 (3).2019, pp 1–18 .

In 1960, the NN began to be involved in national development and security matters. For example, on September 30, 1960 (at 11.59 pm), a naval rating Seaman Salawudeen Akano brought down the British Union Jack, symbolising Nigerian independence.[133] Second, Naval officer Lt. Onwura Zonyeuno Chiazor led the ceremonial parade to usher in Nigerian independence. He was also the first ADC to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe as Nigeria's governor general up to 1963. More significantly, the Navy was involved in the Nigerian-Cameroon diplomatic faceoff over Southern Cameroon. Eventually, the faceoff was settled through the 1961 plebiscite[134]In December 1960, Lt. Soroh took over the HMNS Kaduna command in a situational context. He took over the ship's command from Lt. Cdr. Nelson Walting, thereby making him (Lt. Soroh) the first Nigerian to take over a naval ship command. With little maritime warfare experience, the NN actively participated in the 1967-1970 civil war to keep Nigeria's corporate standing. After that, the NN became one of Africa's most powerful and the entire Third World with monumental transformations. Indeed, it has severally worked with the other arms of the Nigerian military to keep internal insurrections under check, particularly in Nigeria's oil-bearing coastal belt, otherwise called the Niger Delta. In addition, the NN has contributed to regional and global peace-making and peacekeeping efforts to Nigeria's strategic and status-enhancing advantage.[135]

The Nigeria Navy is strong in its operational base, primarily the marine, but does such capacity matter in the insurgency fight of the Boko Haram in the deserts. While the Navy could be supportive, it appears that the Northeast's geographical terrain (a desert terrain) is a challenge. This may create an opportunity in the insurgent's hand to embarrass the military operation, particularly when the Navy is drafted. As a result, they become victims of Boko Haram. At the war front, the NN began to manifest its truly Nigerian clout in 1964, when Commodore Edet Akinwale Wey became the first indigenous Nigerian

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[133] 'Nigerian Navy History Phase I, 1956-1970', <
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/navy-his- tory>

[130] Percival, J., *The 1961 Cameroons Plebiscite: Choice or Betrayal* Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2008).

[135] Sule, A. M. 'Nigeria's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations' Thesis, Certificate-of-Training, United Nations Peace Support Operations, 2013. See also S. Hamman, I. K. Mustapha, and Omojuwa, K. 'The Role of Nigeria in Peacekeeping Operations from 1960 to 2013', *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 21 2014, pp. 42–25.

officer to become the Naval Staff Chief. He was then the most senior Nigerian naval officer. He took over from Rear Admiral A. Kennedy, a British officer. The Nigerian Navy leadership record is encouraging, with enormous opportunities for improvement.

Table 3.2 List of the Leadership of the Nigeria Navy

No	Name	Description	Period
1.	Captain F. W. Skutil	CNS	1956 – 1958
2.	Commodore Alexander Kennedy	CNS	1958 – 1964
3.	Vice Commodore J. E. A. Wey	CNS	1964 – 1973
4.	Vice Admiral N. B. Soroh	CNS	1973 – 1975
5.	Vice Admiral M. A. Adelanwa	CNS	1975 – 1980
6.	Vice Admiral A. A. Aduwo	CNS	1980 – 1983
7.	Rear Admiral A. A. Aikhomu	CNS	1984 – 1986
8.	Vice Admiral Patrick Koshoni	CNS	1986 – 1990
9.	Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako	CNS	1990 – 1992
10.	Vice Admiral D. P. E. Omotsola	CNS	1992 – 1993
11.	Rear Admiral Suleiman Saidu	CNS	Sept. – Nov. 1993
12.	Rear Admiral A. A. Madueke	CNS	1993 – 1994
13.	Rear Admiral O. M. Akhigbe	CNS	1994 – 1998
14.	Vice Admiral J. Ayinla	CNS	1998 – 1999
15.	Vice Admiral V. K. Ombu	CNS	1999 – 2001
16.	Vice Admiral S. O. Afolayan	CNS	2001 – 2005
17.	Vice Admiral G. T. A. Adekeye	CNS	2005 – 2008
18.	Vice Admiral I. I. Ibrahim	CNS	2008 – 2010

19.	Vice Admiral O. S. Ibrahim	CNS	2010 - 2012
20.	Vice Admiral D. J. Ezeoba	CNS	2012 - 2013
21.	Vice Admiral U. O. Jibrin	CNS	2013 – 2015

Source: Table 3.2 was computed by the current study

The Air Force

The Nigerian Air Force (NAF)[136] has a unique history that differs from the two other arms of the military. The Air Force is one of the three components of the military system in Nigeria, as in any modern state. The NAF is a post-colonial military establishment. From inception, the NAF was created to safeguard Nigerian airspace and perform other duties as spelt out in the NAF Act. How- ever, in indirect ways, the country's colonial history and its dynamics impacted the underpinning factors that culminated in the emergence of NAF. While the Army and Navy were pre-independence establishments, the need for a NAF became compelling in 1961 following the nation's participation in Congo and Tanganyika (now Tanzania). During these peacekeeping operations, foreign air force aircrafts were the critical equipment used at the theatres to airlift the Nigerian Army Regiment to and from any operational positions.

At the time, the Nigerian government saw the imperativeness of establishing an Air Force equipped with modern facilities to actively support and provide the needed and full complement of forces to protect and secure the integrity of Nigeria's aerial territory and air space. The NAF was also established to enhance the nation's military posture, which was driven, among other things, by the desire to play a leading role in the stability of the newly independent African continent. As already indicated, the NAF was a child of pressing necessity. Consequently, the government agreed, in principle, in 1962 to establish the Nigerian Air Force by the instrument of law, which was later passed in April 1964 as the

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[136] See 'Nigerian Air Force – Our History'. Available from: https://airforce.mil.ng/history [accessed 18 June 2020].

Air Force Act[137]the NAF commenced the recruitment of cadets after the parliament officially established the Airforce under its statutory Act of April 1964. The basic objectives of the NFA are to serve four primary purposes, namely and by the Act.

(a)   To achieve a full complement of the Federal Republic of Nigeria's military defence system, 'both in the air and on the ground.

(b)   To ensure fast, versatile mobility of the armed Forces.

(c)   To provide close support for the ground-based and seaborne forces in all phases of operations and ensure a united Nigeria's territorial integrity.

(d)   To give the country the deserved prestige that is invaluable in international matters'[138]

With technical and logistics support sought and obtained from Ethiopia, Canada, India and ultimately Germany between 1962 and 1963, NAF took off on a sound footing and has grown over time to a formidable air force in Africa with proven track records in domestic, regional and global operational engagements. The NAF has been engaged in several internal, regional and international peacekeeping activities and counterinsurgency operations, with its well-established command structure. The air force is dragged into assisting in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. This could account for the lower number of air sticks since the Boko Haram insurgency began in 2008. Again, given the NAF''s success in outside peacekeeping operations. Is it also logical to investigate any impediment serving as a constraint to the Air Force in the fight against Boko Haram? Does the NAF evolve in an ethnic dilemma that undermines her capacity to bring the insurgency to an end using her professional air strike skills? Does the Air Force have the re- quired specific types of machinery to fight the insurgence that has proven unavailable? What incentives and motivations for the force to bring the insurgency to an end?

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[137] The Nigerian Air Force was established by a statutory Act of Parliament of 1964, the Air Force Act of 1964. See 'Brief History of the Nigerian Air Force', in https://www.defencehq.mil.ng/services/airforce
[138] See 'Nigerian Air Force – Our History' in https://airforce.mil.ng/history [accessed 18 June 2020].

The trajectory of NAF leadership is as impressive as the history of its creation. Colonel Gerhard Katz was the pioneer Chief of Air Staff (CAS) between May 1963 and November 1965, while Colonel Wolfgang Thimming succeeded him on November 24, 1965, and remained in the saddle until January 18, 1966. The first indigenous CAS was Lt. Colonel George T. Kurube, who held charge of NAF from January 19, 1966, to August 4, 1967. Then the civil war had started. One other thing is that the first five Chiefs of Air Staff were drawn from the army, while Air Vice Marshal John Nmadu Yisa-Doko was the first professional air force officer to become the CAS in 1975. See the table below.

Table 3.2. List of the leadership of the Nigeria Air-force.

S/No	Name	Description	Period
1.	Colonel Gerhard Kahtz	CAS	May 1963 – Nov 1965
2.	Colonel Wolfgang Thimming	CAS	Nov 24, 1965 –Jan 18, 1966
3.	Lt. Colonel George T. Kurube	CAS	Jan 19, 1966 – Aug 4, 1967
4.	Colonel Shittu Alao	CAS	Aug 5, 1967 –Oct 15, 1969
5.	Brig. Emmanuel E. Ikwue	CAS	Dec 18, 1969 – Jul 28, 1975
6.	Air Vice-Marshal John Nmadu Yisa-Doko	CAS	Jul 29, 1975 – Apr 14, 1980
7.	Air Vice Marshal Abdullahi Dominic Bello	CAS	Apr 14, 1980 – Dec 31, 1983
8.	Air Marshal Ibrahim Mahmud Alfa	CAS	Jan 1, 1984 – Jan 1, 1990
9.	Air Vice Marshal Nuraini Yussuff	CAS	Jan 2, 1990 – Jan 30, 1992
10.	Air Marshal Akin Dada	CAS	Feb 1, 1992 – Sep 16,1992
11.	Air Vice Marshal Femi John Femi	CAS	Sep 17, 1992 – Mar 26, 1996
12.	Air Marshal Nsikak-Abasi Essien Eduok	CAS	Mar 30, 1996 – May 29, 1999
13.	Air Marshal Isaac Alfa	CAS	May 29, 1999 – Apr 23, 2001
14.	Air Marshal Jonah Wuyep	CAS	Apr 24, 2001 – May 31, 2006

15. Air Marshal Paul Dike	CAS	Jun 1, 2006 – Aug 19, 2008
16. Air Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin	CAS	Aug 20, 2008 – Sep 18, 2010
17. Air Marshal Mohammed Diko Umar	CAS	Sep 19, 2010 – Oct 3, 2012
18. Air Marshal Alex Sabundu Badeh	CAS	Oct 4, 2012 – Jan 15, 2014
19. Air Marshal Adesola Nunayon Amosun	CAS	Jan 16, 2014 – Jul 12, 2015
20. Air Marshal Sadiq Abubakar	CAS	Since July 13, 2015

Source: Table 3.2 was computed by the current study.

The Nigerian Military (the Armed Forces)[139]

One concern here is asking: Is the Nigerian Military is structured appropriately to fight and end, and timely too, the Boko Haram insurgency? Given the explanations above, the question becomes necessary that the British government was still appointing chief of army staff and Navy five years after Nigeria's independence. What was the fear in the mind of the British colonial master for not granting full autonomy to the indigenous Nigerian military simultaneously with 1960 independence? Why should the chief of staff of both Army and Navy still be posted from Britain some years after Nigeria's independence? For instance, Britain continued to appoint the chief of staff Nigeria Navy up till 1964 and for the Nigerian Army up until 1965. This was not only antithetical to the early indigenisation of the two important arms of Nigerian armed forces architecture; it ran contrary to the sovereign status of Nigeria and the spirit and letters of its 1960 Independence constitution. Furthermore, it is curious that the indigenisation of the army and the navy's leadership would seem to have run to murky waters. For example, barely a year after his ascension to the position of head of the army and head of state shortly thereafter, General Ironsi of Eastern Nigerian extraction lost his life in a countercoup in July 1966.

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[139] Universally, the army, navy and air force are the three arms of any modern state's armed forces. Nigeria does not depart from that global tradition. The current study, therefore, recognizes the three arms of the Nigerian armed forces to the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, and the Nigerian Air Force.

The Nigerian civil war also broke out in 1967. We could also ask what the difficulties were in structuring a national army. Was that also a dilemma for the British or a challenge to the military. Did we wonder why the military has a structural problem worsened by ethnicity? Such a problem could affect the success of the military in any regional conflict within Nigeria, as ethnicity was a major counterforce against nationalism, and the infuriation of ethnicity may constitute a challenge to future operations, including succeeding in the Boko Haram conflict. In chapter one, this thesis considers the unusual challenges facing the composition of the Nigerian State and the proliferation of ethnicity as a syndrome. There is also the question of political challenges confronting the military in response to regional conflicts as politicians made an inroad into distorting the military. For instance, what was the intrigue behind the military coup d'état and the execution of Major General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi (from Eastern Nigeria) as the Head of the Military and Head of State of Nigeria in 1966? The assassination paved the way for Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (from northern Nigeria) to become Head of State of Nigeria even with the rank of a Lt. Colonel, which was (and still is) far low compared to Major General.

The Nigeria military is a collaborative force comprising the Army, Navy, and Air Force known as the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria established by parliament.[140] The three arms of the armed forces always operate in sync and robust reinforcement of ideas, strength, logistics and professional trainings as well as capacity building. The military has always been an important institution for the traditional purpose of protecting a given political unit's territorial integrity ranging from kingdoms, chiefdoms, dukedoms, cities, city-states, empires, states, nations, and nation- states. As Abdulrahman and Mang have argued, any nation's military institution 'is the bastion of its integrity. By integrity here, one implies the symbolism of a nation's defence system, beginning from within it to its boundaries. This means that a nation's sovereignty is strategically rested on its military integrity; therefore, the nation is in great peril where the military or its allied bodies are compromised. Thus, in its outlook, any nation's armed force should symbolise

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[140] See Armed Forces ACT Chapter A20. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

its unity, no matter the diversity[141] In carrying out this all-important duty, the military would select able-bodied men and women, who would proceed on strict and thorough training to attune their mindset to the realities of soldiering to the rather unenviable extent of indoctrinating them into readiness to die while defending the political unit, which would be regarded as the 'fatherland'.

The Nigerian Military is national in character, composition, duties, and outlook with drive, orientation, and philosophy woven around Nigerian nationhood's thought line and institutional culture as encapsulated in the Nigerian constitution. It is also a truism that the Nigerian Military has been a cardinal agency for promoting some of its foreign policy objectives and principles, particularly as applicable to regional (Afro-centric) security and global peace. In another vein, it is not out of place to aver that the Nigerian Military represents a primary elite class in Nigeria (particularly in the context of some senior soldiers) with its monumental influence traversing business, politics, agriculture, and education. Many retired Generals are on the list of 'A Class' business tycoons, politicians, prosperous farmers, and educational proprietors. With this complex but rich back- ground, the Nigerian Military is in a class in the emergent Nigeria national space. However, historical experiences and notable contradictions and challenges to the Nigerian Military had to grapple with the state's agency in its duty of municipal and international security. This is better under- stood in the context of Nigeria's mix-grill of new historical and social experiences.

Military in Politics

The Nigeria military has been engaging in politics by unethically overthrowing democratically elected presidents and, in most cases, launching a bloody coup d'état[142]. This is against the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Again, such praxis took the Nigerian military completely outside their professional engagement. And further

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[141] Abdulrahman S. O and H. G. Mang, 'The Nigerian Army as a Product of Its Colonial History: Problems of Re-building Cohesion for an Army in Transition', *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 53 2017, p. 22.
[142] An example is the January 15, 1966, bloody coup that claimed the lives of prominent Nigerians.

expose them to the risk of governance and professional incompetence. Once they stayed long in politics, they soon began launching a coup and countercoup d'état, increasing their interest in politics rather than the constitutional duties of protecting Nigeria's sovereignty. The practice over the years reduces their interest in professional military responsibilities. For instance, from 1960 -to 1999, the military ruled Nigeria for twenty-eight years and seven months[143]

Table 3.3 The Nigerian Military in Government 1960-1999

S/NO	NAME	PERIOD
1.	Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi	January 15 – July 29, 1966
2.	General Jack Yakubu Gowon	August 1, 1966 - July 29, 1975
3.	General Ramat Murtala Mohammed	July 29, 1975 – February 13, 1976
4.	General Olusegun Aremu Okikiola Mathew Obasanjo	February 13, 1976 – October 1, 1979
5.	Major General Muhammadu Buhari	December 31, 1983 – August 27, 1985
6.	General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida	August 27, 1985 – August 26, 1993
7.	General Sanni Abacha	November 17, 1993 – June 8, 1998
8.	General Abdusalam Abubakar	June 9, 1998 – May 29, 1999

Source: Table 3.3 was computed by the current study.

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[143] The January 15, 1966 – October 1, 1979, period is known as the first thirteen years of military rule in Nigeria. After a four-year civil rule (1979–1983), the military came back to power in the last day of 1983 and clung on to power until August 26, 1993. This second coming would add ten years to the aberrant record of military incursion into governance in Nigeria. The pretentious arrangement of Interim National Government that General Babangida installed as an ostensible face-saving strategy lasted for only eighty-two days between August 27 and November 16, 1993. This was not a democratic civil rule *per se*. The actual purpose of emplacing InterimNational Government, which was to pave way for the Abacha military government, came to fore through the Abacha Palace coup of November 17, 1993. This signaled the third military incursion, which indeed, was an extension of the second. It lasted between November 17, 1993, and May 28, 1999 – a period of five years and seven months.

The military is not socially structured nor professionally configured to be involved in politics or governance in political participation. Again, we see ethnicity posing a significant difficulty in the table above. For instance, of the eight Nigeria Heads of State from independence to the present day, six are from northern Nigeria, while only two are from southern Nigeria. The table above also confirmed many years of the military abandoning their core traditional responsibility and professionalism. Instead, they were immersed in taking over the business of governance, and commencing Nigeria's political re-arrangement, as well as writing and suspending the constitution, the only legitimate authority that defined Nigeria sovereignty, taking over as Head of State/ president, and ruling by draconian decrees, appointing military personnel as military administrators/governors for states, and some others as federal ministers![144] It is difficult to argue that such a military leadership that eyed their seat on the presidency can provide what is needed to fight against Boko Haram for many believe that the Nigerian Military is compromised and largely converged in the complexities of politics. Such traits and taxonomies of political dilemma constitute critical challenges to the military in the prospect of success of any internal regional conflicts and, more specifically, the Boko Haram Insurgency at least from the historical context.

Boko Haram insurgency and the Nigerian Military Counterinsurgency: Litmus Test While the Nigerian Federal Government (from now on known as FG) is recognised under municipal and inter- national laws as the *de facto* and *de jure* constituted authority with absolute jurisdictional power and control over the entire Nigerian landscape. The Boko Haram insurgents have included them- selves as a huge challenger to that recognition since 2009. Ordinarily, the FG has the exclusive, sole, and unshared monopoly of state instruments of violence with which it controls social behaviour and commands the allegiance of citizens. But, as Gilbert has argued,

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[144] For example, Generals Obasanjo and Buhari served as military Heads of State in 1976-1979 and 1983-1985 respectively, and they appointed ministers from among the middle-level officers. Again, Buhari served as Federal Commissioner for Petroleum Resources in 1976 under the General Olusegun Obasanjo regime.

Boko Haram insurgency has constituted a nagging predicament to the Nigerian state since its resurgence in 2010. The dexterity, sophistication, and fluidity of the terrorist group within the North-East geopolitical zone coupled with its prolonged confrontation with the Nigerian state as the sole legitimate monopolist of the instruments of force and violence has conferred the toga of invincibility on Boko Haram[145]

Adesoji[1146]contended that Boko Haram's activities also cut across the broad spectrum of the society, but a dominant number came from among the lowest social groups. Thus, beyond former university lecturers, students, bankers, commissioners, and other state officers, membership ex- tended to drug addicts, vagabonds, and lawless people. The common denominator binding the group members together was the desire to overthrow the secular government and propagate Islamic law. Still, Yusuf's (Boko Haram leader) oratory would seem to have been a contributory factor. Due to the kids-glove, and lethargic FG approach in handling the budding violent group, between 2002/2003 and 2009, it had grown in leaps and bounds such that quite a sizeable number of poverty-stricken non-Muslim youths in Northeastern Nigeria were, at least, showing sympathy and an open embrace to the Boko Haram ideology[147]. This slothful disposition of the FG boomeranged in 2009 when the Bauchi State government attempted to stem the tide of Boko Haram's expansion by banning their public gatherings, preaching, and other membership forms drive. Too little, too late! Predictably, the already buoyed and well-motivated Boko Haram members flagrantly disobeyed the directive. Consequently, in a desperate bid to stay the ferocious tide of the ensuing melee, which had spread from Bauchi to Borno, Kano, and Yobe States in the form of explosive reprisal attacks that lasted for five days, soldiers were called in to assist the police in enforcing the order. In his discussion of this crisis, Adesoji describes the Boko Haram rising as 'Old tunes, new players', and argues that the Boko Haram riots

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[145] Gilbert, p. 150

[146] Adesoji, p. 6. See also, Omipidan, p. 43-44; Michael and Bwala, 'End of the Road for Boko Haram Leader—How He Attracted Young Fanatics', *Saturday Tribune* (Ibadan) August 2009. p. 3.1
[147] Adesoji p. 9.

lasted from 26 to 30 July 2009 and spread across the states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Borno, where it was most extensive, perhaps because Borno was the base of the movement's leader. The riot's immediate cause was the sacking and arrest of nine prominent members of the group in Bauchi on July 26, 2009. The operation was carried out by the joint Security Council. Bomb-making material and weapon of mass destructions found on them were also confiscated[148].

In essence, the year 2009 marked a significant watershed in the evolutionary process of Boko Haram. What eventually became Boko Haram began in the 1990s as Shababul Islam, which means Islamic Youth Vanguard (a radical Salafist Islamic youth group) under its pioneer leader Abu Yusuf Mohammed Yusuf, popularly also known as Mohammed Yusuf. With his deep understanding and experience in Islamic fundamentalism, Mohammed Yusuf established Boko Haram as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, meaning 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'.[149] Members' propensity to attack what they considered the impurity and corruption of Western education earned them the new identity from the local folks, who chose 'Boko Haram,' which means 'Western education is sin' to describe them. This identity has endured over time. As Sergie and Johnson suggest, since western education 'Boko' has been a purveyor of corruption, spiritual filth, moral decadence and societal inequalities, it is a 'haram' that must be abhorred and forbidden by every true Muslim[150] Yet, in the extant literature, other names are suggested as phantom identities that the group might have used probably as a decoy in the past, including the Nigerian Taliban, the Yusufiyya and Ahlusunna wal' jamma hijra.[151]

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[148] Adesoji p.7.
[149] Mohammed Yusuf's main goal for establishing the body in 2002 was to support Islamic education and establish Islamic state, run on the basis of full application of the Shari'a in Nigeria. See Matfes, H 'Boko Haram: History and Context', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia: African History*, online publication October 27. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.119. See also United Nations Security Council Note, in
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/jama%27atu-ahlis-sunna- lidda%27awati-wal-jihad-%28boko .
[150] M. Sergie and T. Johnson, 'Boko Haram'. Available from:
<http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739>. [ac- cessed 28 October 2020].
[151] Omipidan, I., 'Revealed! How Yusuf's Father Began Boko Haram Ideology in the 1960s' *Saturday Sun* (Lagos), p. 48. 26 September 2009.See also Fafure S. 'A Loaded Season of Violence', *The Nation on Sunday* (Lagos), 2 August 2009.

Boko Haram, driven by its avowed ideology to establish an Islamic caliphate, governed through the Shari'a, with immediate jurisdiction and long-term spread over Northern Nigeria, and the entire country, respectively, started enlarging its agenda among young Muslims with a combination of persuasion, propaganda, religious sentiments, and financial assistance as carrots, and intense indoctrination into the body's ideals and philosophy. Membership in the group according, to Adesoji,[152] cut across the broad spectrum of the society, but a dominant number came from among the poorest social groups. Thus, beyond former university lecturers, students, bankers, commissioners, and other state officers, membership extended to drug addicts, vagabonds, and lawless people. The common denominator binding the group members together was the desire to over- throw the secular government and propagate Islamic law. Still, Yusuf's oratory would seem to have been a contributory factor. This study fingers the kid-glove approach of the Federal Government as the core of the ethnicity variable that it interrogates as being an impediment to the military's desire to end the war. See Chapters One and Six of the study's survey administered, the study specifically put this variable in its unique importance. See chapter six of this work., could the slothful action of the Bauchi State government to block the membership expansion drive of the Boko Haram? Or is appropriate strategy of domestic socialisation offensive to the constitutional provision of freedom of movement? Or, in other words, an unjust order not an invitation to anarchy? One reason accounting for the riot's immediate cause was the military attack on the group's hideout in the Dutsen Tenshin area of Bauchi on July 26, 2009.

The joint security team arrested nine prominent members of the group and confiscated many dangerous weapons, including materials used in producing bombs and other weapons were confiscated'[153]Still, would such a counterinsurgency approach have the capacity to end the war? Or has the military by itself, and using the wrong approach, constituted an unknown risk as a challenge in ending the war? This work investigates the military as a variable factor. See Chapters Five and Six. In chapter six, the respondents

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[152] Adesoji, p. 6. See also, Omipidan, pp. 43-44; Michael, I. and Bwala, J. 'End of the Road for Boko Haram Leader— How He Attracted Young Fanatics' 2009. p. 3. *Saturday Tribune* (Ibadan)
[153] Adesoji, pp. 104-105.

confirmed that the military might not be a statistically significant challenge, but itself is a recognised factor perhaps in her approach to the conflict. Soldiers overpowered and arrested Mohammed Yusuf and several hundreds of his followers. Eventually, Mohammed Yusuf died in police custody in Maiduguri, and quite several his supporters were also reported dead[154]. In contrast, several police stations, prisons, schools, churches, and other government office buildings were razed. This situation later determined the contours and nuances of the full-throttle insurgency in Nigeria as Boko Haram went under after that, not defeated. It resurged more violently later in 2010 under Abubakar Shekau, who swore to avenge Mohammed Yusuf's death on the Nigerian State.

From 2010 to the present, it is impossible to accurately estimate the level of carnage and destruction of public and private properties lost to the Boko Haram insurgency. However, the Global Conflict Tracker has estimated that, since 2011, more than 37,500 people have been killed by Boko Haram, 2.5 million people displaced, and 244 000 are refugees.[155] In all, Boko Haram has demonstrated its capacity to undermine the Nigerian state and its military's response to the insurgency by successfully carrying out several attacks. Therefore, the possibility is significant in explaining all the independent variables under investigation, and how they trigger an impacting effect on the dependable variable of military challenges in ending the war. Specifically, available records show the following deadly activities of the Boko Haram insurgents and some of the Nigerian government/military's counterinsurgency responses up to 2020:[156] Again, could this be a contributory challenge to the military as it further impoverished the economic living conditions of the people of the Northeast? This work further investigates economic factors, an independent variable contributing to significant challenges in the hand of the military. See Chapters 4 and 5 of this work. In chapter five, a respondent who administered the survey confirmed economic variables as an empirical factor that constitute a challenge in

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[154] P. Meehan and J. Spier 'Boko Haram: Emerging threat to the U.S. homeland'. 2011, Available from: https://www.google.com.ng/Boko+haram%3A+Emerging+threat+to+the+U.S.+homeland. [accessed 28 December 2020] but no longer available on 8th August 2022 when assessed for the second time
[155] See 'Boko Haram in Nigeria', Global Conflict Tracker in https://www.cfr.org. [accessed 11 November 2020].
[156] See Annex two of this work.

the hand of the military in ending the war. In Annex Two of this work, (table 3.4) explains the last ten years (the period of this investigation), the insurgents' various activities, and the military counterinsurgency's response. Regrettably, the study found that the counterinsurgency is at a very low ebb, and in most cases, they were unsuccessful.

Counter insurgency (COIN) and the challenges of the military.

Annex Two of this work, shows how well the military has reacted to the challenges created by the Boko Haram insurgency. From the table, there is evidence that the military is not doing as well as expected and must have faced some challenges that necessitate the current study. The work of Isaac Sampson[157] also suggests that a predominantly military approach to countering Boko Haram terrorists would continue to generate tensions between the government and the local people unless a more robust counter-terrorism strategy is designed and implemented. The Nigerian military strategy is failing because of a lack of support from the civil population, who are expected to know the gains and losses expected in supporting the military. Where it is not adequately explained, there is the likelihood of civil revolt against military action. The lack of legitimacy of military operation created challenges to the success of the conflict, undermining the military institutions as failure in ending the Boko Haram war. The military need to do a feasibility assessment of its operations specific to Boko Haram

Chapter one of the U.S. document on warfare explains seven stages expected as a strategy to be implemented in unconventional warfare: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organisation, build-up, employment, and transition.[158] The result of COIN does not indicate that the military has put that conventional practice into use; otherwise, one expected a more successful outcome. It is essential to emphasize that the military preparation is scheduled to distill information around the insurgent leaders and operating environment, including a proper understanding of psychological factors the COIN failed

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[157] Sampson, I. The dilemmas of *counter-bokoharamism*: Debating state responses to *Boko Haram* terrorism in north- ern Nigeria. *Secur J* **29**, 122–146 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2013.2

[158] US document TC 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare. Training circular No 18-01, Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 30 November 2010, pp. 1-2.

on 2nd April 2017. The Nigerian troops launched an offensive against Boko Haram from the reaction of Boko Haram insurgents from April 2017 after the military lunch to 27th February 2018. Several people were killed belong the expectation of the military COIN launched. On 5th May, military COIN was successful; as reported on the table, the Boko Haram reaction from 9th June 2020 to 2nd July 2020 is problematic as several civilian and military personnel were killed. What the military lacks here from a failing operation strategy is the challenges of infiltration; this includes synchronising the resistance command units and the initial failure to secure the support of the civil population. The management of the civil affairs of the unconventional war against Boko Haram is less populated. Again is the fact that military COIN has no human rights face, and the plight of children and young people, as we observed from the field report explained in International report[159] that more than 2000 women were raped and abducted by Boko Haram which promotes sexual and gender-based violence[160]Still, the military has also lunched some successful COIN as indicated in table 3.4 but the challenge in not in the number of people killed but winning.

Sun Tzu's posited the doctrine of military philosophy when he said in about 1000 B.C. 'The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. If you are far from the enemy, make him believe you are near. When you are weak make him believe you are strong. Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.' Additional sources report the lethal impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria.[161] For instance, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) affirmed in one of its reportages that Boko Haram killed more than 967 people in 2017 in a total of 150 attacks, marginally more than it did in 2016 when it launched 127 attacks and killed 910 people. There were 19 suicide attacks in 2016 and 38 in 2017, with Maiduguri being the epicentre or cradle of the insurgent group. The most brutally hit; military formations, police stations, mosques and fleeing internally displaced persons were the

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[159]Amnesty International, Nigeria 2016/2017, viewed 20 April 2020.
[160] Bouta, T, Frerks, G, and Bannon, I, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, 2005The World Bank, Washington DC.
[161] Gilbert, pp. 151- 152.

regular targets in the 2016-2017 period.[162]. Conversely, the Nigerian state has not recorded a significant victory against the Boko Haram insurgents beyond depleting their territorial hold in the Northeast in 2018. Lamentably, as of October 2018, over 2 million Nigerians were still displaced, and the number has increased ever since.[163] While the existing state of insecurity has delayed the return of displaced persons, there is yet no room for enduring community stabilisation initiatives. Despite the presidential remarks on the Northeast having entered the post-insurgency phase, realities on the ground point to the contrary. Therefore, there is a palpable blockade of any 'linear pathway from conflict to stabilisation'[164]

What is significantly discernible from the preceding is that, for the Nigerian military and FG, it is not yet Uhuru on the Boko Haram insurgency. The group is yet to be trounced by the military despite outlandish claims to the contrary. Instead, there have been repeated instances of 'attacks and suicide bombings', which 'have led the already thinly spread armed forces to prioritise securing urban centres, leaving rural communities and smaller towns with limited protection'[165] What the preceding portends for Nigeria are that, after eleven years of sustained violence by the Boko Haram insurgency, and with the synergised efforts of the multinational joint task force (MNJTF) and civilian (JTF), the military has fought the war, but the battle has not been won. Thus, the FG and its military may have to be challenged in designing their new architecture for anti-Boko Haram counterinsurgency, given Brechenmacher's view that 'The Nigerian case exemplifies the difficulties of implementing effective local-level stabilisation efforts while working with a host government that lacks political commitment, transparency and coordination'[166] In

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[162] Wilson Mark, '. Nigeriaan Boko Haram attacks in numbers – as lethal as ever', BBC News, 25 January 2018. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/world-africa> [accessed 11 November 2020].

[163] 'International Organization for Migration Nigeria – Displacement Report' 25 October 2018. Available from:<https://displacement.iom.int/reports/nigeria-%E2%80%94-displacement-report-25-october-2018?close=true> [ac cessed 4 November 2020].

[164] Brechenmacher, S. (2019), 'Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram', Carnegie Endowment for International. Peace Report Paper, 3 May 2019, p. 13. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042.> [accessed 11 November 2020].

[165] Ruth MacLean, 'Nigerians Forced Out by Boko Haram Return to Ruins and Continuing Risk,' *Guardian, 27* July 2018. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/global/development/2018/jul/27/nigerians-forced- out-by- boko-haram-return-to-ruins-and- continuing-risk> [accessed 4 November 2020].

[166] Brechenmacher, S. p.2.

chapter six of the thesis, the respondent confirmed that political factors challenged the military in winning the Boko Haram conflicts. The empirical evidence is discussed in Chapter Seven. This leads to our contribution to the knowledge discussed in Chapter Seven that the strategy of undermining domestic socialisation in conflict matters specific to the Boko Haram in Nigeria constitutes a challenge to the military in winning the war. This again explains why the deployment of the military to solve the political problem is a simplistic strategy to which the military has no solution. For instance, the more we move from political factors to ethnicity, the more we see the military as helpless in winning the war. Another outstanding challenge revolves around the poor living conditions of the people, which explains the significance of the economic variable in challenging the military effort and poor strategy that is ineffective in resolving conflicts, such as Boko Haram and such factors underscored the quality of capacity of the Nigerian leadership.

The Nigerian military response is problematic in the face of attack and brutalisation of human dignity carried out for over two decades by the Boko Haram group on Nigerian society, creating a high level of concern to the international community. The United Nations has not initiated any intervention similar to the case of Sudan. The reason has been that the matter is within the domestic jurisdiction of the Nigerian government. Currently, Boko Haram's activities have extended to the Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon, thus getting closer to what led to Rwanda and Syria's escalating crisis experience. Again, with the increasing military failure, it cannot be ruled out that UN intervention is a matter of time, as Boko Haram insurgency undermined the sovereignty networks of Nigeria as an independent country.

The Structure and Culture of the Nigerian Military

The Armed Forces Act cap. 20 of the Laws of Federation of Nigeria has twenty-one different provisions, including the establishment and composition of the armed forces, the

Armed Forces Council[167] the command units and operational use, the board of the army, navy and the air force, administration government and command, the definition of officers, enlistment and condition of service, discharge and transfer to reserve, misconduct in action mutiny, insubordination, malingering and drunkenness, offences, punishment, and court martials. The discussion is necessary, as we further argued in chapter seven and made a case for its amendments to make the military more efficient in handling its challenges in winning the Boko Haram war. The Armed Forces Act is a regulatory legislation regulating both the commissioned and non-com- missioned members of the military forces. Besides, it is still restricted to internal procedures ap- proved from time to time by the Council or the board of any of the armed forces' three members. The military derives her culture from her operational exigencies and praxis from the colonial master trajectory and conformity with the Act establishing her. As it were, culture defines the entire gamut of a people's or group's way of life in known social space. It is known with every human group, as well as with any national military, to be a 'pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel about those problems'[168] Arising from this, therefore, is that military culture emerges out of historical experience and extant military operations over time.

The cumulative accumulation of these and related incidentals constitutes military culture, which regularly undergoes fundamental changes over time and the emergence of new historical and environmental realities. More importantly, military culture is, to a great extent, cardinal to any chance of success a military hope to record in irregular or limited

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[167] The Armed Forces Act clearly stipulates in its Part I, Section 1 (1) that, 'There is hereby established for the Federation an Armed Forces which shall be maintained and administered as set out in this Act and comprise the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force (in this Act referred to as the 'Army', 'Navy' and 'Air Force') respectively'. Part II, Sections 4, 5, & 6 provide for establishment, functions, and powers of the Armed Forces Council, respectively.

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wars. As Komolafe argues, military culture is significant to their success or failure in irregular wars because it differs from conventional warfare. He further stresses the dynamism of military culture; thus, 'the group's basic assumptions must change for it to thrive in a new environment. Although the military is an ancient institution that dates far back to recorded history, the security environment is ever-changing as new threats emerge globally. Practically, all civilisations in history have engaged in armed struggles at some time. An analysis of these civilisations will reveal the unique cultures of their militaries'[169]This is within the track of Schein's suggestive view that its history and environment influence a group's culture[170] with its complex tenor of existential relationships of several elements, the larger society provides the social milieu within which military culture formation thrives. The importance of the environment cannot be overemphasised. It gives the space of survival for culture, which, in turn, creates extant trajectories of living, thoughts, assumptions, information processing, and decision making for the human components of society— at the same time, agreeing with Mills, who had argued in his book, *A System of Logic* that. 'Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance'[171] Carr offers a more balanced view that the fallacy is to suppose that these men existed in any sense other than biological or have only one kind of substance before being brought together. He asserts that society gets to work on them as soon as human beings are born and changes them from mere biological to social units[172]This reality justifies the assertion that culture promotes the archetype with which individuals within the group process information and establish deductions from the environment.[173]

Military culture should be understood within the context of the society, conventionally a state that owns the military and operates. Soldiers were the first social

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[169] Adedoyin A. Komolafe, 'Military Culture and Counterinsurgency in the Twenty-First Century: Defeating Boko Haram in Nigeria'(Research Report, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2013) p.5

[170] Schein, p. 17.

[171] Mill, J.S. *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1882).

[172] Edward H. Carr, *what is History*? (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1987).

[173] Komolafe, p. 5.

human components of society who must have been socialised by other humans and non-human forces as their socialisation agents. Their perception of, and contour of disposition towards, compatriots and foreigners are products of their society's psycho-social lens. In a more specific tone, Theodore Stroup (as Nagl quotes)[174] Again, 'The Army's culture is its personality. It reflects the Army's values, philosophy, norms and unwritten rules. Our culture has a powerful effect because our common underlying assumptions guide behaviour (sic) and the way the Army processes information as an organization'[175]

The formation of military culture is mostly a product of the actual social realities of any given society. The stark explanation of the picture of military culture formation in Nigeria, in its post-colonial trajectory, shows that the military had been involved in non-military undertakings, including incursion into civil rule and performance of civil police duties. All these have impacted the military's level of professional competence, the personnel perception index, their understanding of civil- military relations, and the military-industrial complex's dominant position in Nigeria's current social system and political economy. As shown above, these are dynamics of society that, as emphasised by Komolafe and Stroup[176] are essential to the military's success/failure. Hence, the central theme of this investigation is how the noted dynamics have impacted the Nigerian military's level of professional competence and success in handling terrorism–insurgency issues in Nigeria, mainly since the insurgency created by the Boko Haram dilemma since 2002 and more violently since 2009.

Between 1960 and 2009, the Nigerian military had grappled with maintaining the country's territorial integrity and policing duty of confronting violent internal insurrections, especially those directed against the Nigerian state. This fell within the remit of its core mandate, the mandate of the Nigeria military to defend the state from external belligerence and internal insurrection. Almost immediately after independence in 1960, a deluge of

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[174] John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 7.
[175] Nagl (supra). pp.7-8.
[176] Komolafe and Stroup. Military Culture and Counterinsurgency in the Twenty First Century: Defeating Boko Haram in Nigeria. Air Command and Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base United States unpublished https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1022985 2013.

crises blew across Nigeria as a litmus test to test and affirm the military's will and tenacity to deliver its mandate. As Gilbert captures the grim reality,

> Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed various forms of instability. From the Tiv riots in 1962 to the 1964-65 post-election violence; the 1966 first military coup d'état to the Isaac Adaka Boro up- rising in 1966; the countercoup d'état of 1966 to the Nigerian Civil war that commenced in 1966 (sic); the Agbekoya Parapo Revolt of 1968- 69 to the anti-SAP riots of 1989; the 12 June 1993 post-annulment riots to the Odua People's Congress saga of 1994-2003; the Niger Delta

He adds that,

> In fact, with the exception of the Biafran secessionist war that violently threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria, none of the aforementioned cases of instability has rattled and challenged the Nigerian state as the current Boko Haram insurgency. Hitherto, the Niger Delta militancy was considered the most virulent cause of instability since the Nigerian Civil war until the resurgence of Boko Haram in 2009.

The Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s also bore striking semblance with the Boko Haram insurgency, whereby, as Adesoji argues. 'Religious sentiments and explanations, beyond being seen as the lifeblood of the people's fundamental reality and daily experience, have been offered to justify even mundane or politically motivated situations.[177] Interestingly, the Nigerian military success- fully, even if exhaustively at times, quelled most of these violent crises, including the Biafran civil war, Tiv riots, Maitatsine uprising, and many more. It has also contributed significantly to several internal security operations,

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[177] Adesoji, A. O. 'Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State' in *Africa Today*, 57 2011 p. 99 (4). See also Iheanyi Enwerem. 'An Assessment of Government's Formal Responses to Ethnic/Religious Riots, 1980–1990s' in Ernest E. Uwazie, Isaac O. Albert, and Godfrey N. Uzoigwe, eds., *Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria* (1999), (Lanham, Md.: Lexington) p.123.

supporting the police and other civil authorities to restore peace, law, and public order[178] in addition to its awe-inspiring contributions to regional and global peace under the ECOWAS, AU and the UN's aegis[179] These commendable efforts are to the binary advantages of the country's corporate interest and peace, on the one hand, and its towering international status and prestige.[180] On the other hand, sadly, however, the Nigerian military could not sustain this record of achievement against the two most recent internal insurrections against the Nigerian State, namely, the Niger-Delta violent agitation and the Boko Haram insurgency. Its sheer inability to subdue the Niger-Delta agitators, which was evidence of its steep decline in recent years, led to the non-military option of amnesty designed and executed by the Yar'Adua administration and sustained by the succeeding Goodluck Jonathan and Buhari regimes, respectively. Moreover, this apparent failure may have had the grieving implication of encouraging other irredentist movements in other parts of the country, typified by the Boko Haram insurgency, which is now escalating to another part of Nigeria. This is exemplified by the recent IPOB demonstration promoting a new secession claim for Eastern Nigeria.

It could be persuasive to conclude that the Nigerian military (Army, Navy, and air force) were prominently emplaced and positioned to serve the critical purpose of securing Nigeria's territorial integrity from independence and now. However, the military has been chiefly distracted from her professional duties for a long time, even if she is well structured, with the bite of political engagement in bloody coup d'état constituting an impediment to

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[178] Amos G. A. and Istifanus, S. Z. *The Military and Management of Internal Conflicts in* Nigeria (Abuja, 2005). However, see R. O. Dode, R. O. 'Nigerian Security Forces and the Management of Internal Conflicts in the Niger Delta: Challenges of Human Security and Development', *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, 1 (3).2012, pp. 409-418.

[179] Nigerian military's track records in sub-regional and regional peacekeeping operations in Africa is second to none. This is common knowledge as witnessed particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone from 1990 with the formation of ECOMOG to end the Liberian civil war and (the ironical) restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone and including recent crisis in The Gambia and Mali. It was once viewed as a leading African force and potentially the pivot of peace operations on the continent. Between 1960 and 2012, it participated in 26 peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Africa, the Middle East and Europe. As of 31 March 2016, it was the twelfth largest contributor of military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. See International Crisis Group (2016), 'Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform', African Report No. 237, 6th June, footnote 3.

[180] For discussion on purposes/objectives of nations foreign policies, see Okajare, S. T. *Understanding Foreign Studies*, Akure: Pearls and Berry2008, pp. 25-49.

her professionalism. The Nigerian military praxis of engaging in politics through the bloody coup d'état is distilling into her anatomy and taxonomy. The identified constraints explained in Chapter One arise from ethnic rivalry and the unresolved issues of the amalgamation of 1914. See Chapter One of this work on opening the lid of constraints that constitute challenges to the Nigerian military leadership capacity to end the Boko Haram insurgency, and for other variables, see Chapter Five. Again, could the military leadership, who postulate between the ambition of professional military engagement and political interest dated to her post-colonial trajectory, be said to bring the Boko Haram insurgency to an end? Boko Haram is creating such inhuman security that affects Nigerian society. The Nigerian federal units are currently making a new fresh call to restructure the 'compelling federation' brought by the colonial masters. This is because if the military cannot end the Boko Haram war, it appears logical for another region to start to echo restructuring, or an outright demand for secession before Boko Haram announced their eventual victory and declaration of a fully Islamized independent country. These interrogations further explain the current investigation's imperativeness, given Boko Haram's threats and the military leadership's challenged capacity to respond. The Boko ha- ram insurgency's impact affects the desire for 'continuous' unity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria union. As we argued, the federating ethnic groups' desire for sustainable Nigeria is at a low ebb.

The Field Report on the Constraints of the Military to End Boko Haram

Is the military a challenge in ending the Boko Haram conflict? Or is the operation of the military to bring the insurgency to an end an added advantage to prolonging the war? Is the Nigeria military capable of solving the Boko Haram insurgency, or is the military infuriated with ethnic challenges in bringing the war to an end? In totality, how well is the military and her desire to bring the Boko Haram war to an end, thereby providing peace for the Nigerian people and defending her territorial integrity? The answers to the above question in our analysis of the Boko Haram insurgency are provided in our field report, as we see shortly. The study approach is to examine the military as a separate independent variable in our search for the challenges facing it in the fight against Boko Haram

insurgency and other challenges such as political consideration, ethnicity concern, economic factors, and the military or perhaps other factors.

In constructing the variable, we design research questions around the specifics of the military see the general introduction chapter. The data confirmed that the military is a factor, but in terms of statistical significance, not among the most important, having cumulatively less than a 0.0.008 effect on ending the conflicts. We say so because we find the p-value for Military Factor (0.693) to be more significant than the common alpha level of 0.01.

Military factor = (P-value = 0.693)

(0.0.008)

Specifically, the respondents were asked the following questions, to which they provided valid answers in the survey. In the end, the respondents were invited to make suggestions on the best possible changes that could be made in the military anatomy. We asked questions to the respondent relating to military capacity, training and benefits, insurance policy, commitment, leadership, and trust. The answers take us from the abstract concept and breed practical feelings of the stakeholders to our findings. Again, such empirical evidence helps in answering one of our research questions: that the military can bring war/conflict such as Boko Haram to an end. See Annex A.

Military Capacity

On the capacity of the military to end the Boko Haram insurgency. We asked the following questions:

(1)   The Nigeria military can cub the Boko Haram insurgency.

(2)   The military is skillful and knowledgeable about counterinsurgency matters and can create relative peace from the conflict.

(3)   The Nigerian military is good at conducting combined operations.

(4)   The dislocation of troops within the country impacts operations against Boko Haram.

The Boko Haram's concentration of the fight centred around the Northeast?

The Nigeria military can cub the Boko Haram insurgency.

Over 61% of the respondents confirmed that the military could bring Boko Haram to an end. See Table 3.4.

Table 3.4. The Nigerian military have capacity to cub the Boko Haram insurgency

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	116	21.4	21.4	21.4
	Neither agree nor dis-agree	93	17.2	17.2	38.6
	Strongly Agree	333	61.4	61.4	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

Recall our earlier discussions on the anatomy of the Nigeria military and its challenges. In this chapter Nigeria's military has been acknowledged to have participated with an impressive result. in many international peacekeeping operations.[181] The United Nations reported that between 2003 and 2018, the Nigerian military was 'helping to restore security throughout countries that had undergone brutal civil wars[182] Suppose the military

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[181] Lipede A. A. and Saliu, H. A. Nigeria's Participation in Peace-keeping Operations in Africa; An Analysis of the Cost and Benefits, *Defence Studies*, 8 1998, p. 63-78; Fawole, W.A Military Power and Third-Party Conflict Mediation in West Africa: The Liberia and Sierra Leone Case Studies. Obafemi Awolowo University Press. 2001.; Adebajo, A. ,Mad Dogs and Glory: Nigeria's Interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone'. In Adebajo, A. and Mustapha, A. (eds.), Gulliver's Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy After the Cold War, South Africa, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press 2008.
[182] Examples of such countries where Nigerian soldiers went on peacekeeping operations for restoration of peace and security are Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, DR Congo among others

could restore peace across the international community undergoing a brutal civil war; in that case, the question remains why is the Boko Haram insurgency still hanging out there for about two decades? Are there environmental factors that encourage military performance in an international environment lacking in Nigeria? Answering those questions requires further probing inside the Nigerian military. For instance, are questions related to soldiers' commitments, loyalty, insurance on the war front, payment of the allowance, and regular training in tactical operations. We sought from the empirical data an explanation of why the military is failing challenges within the military internal organisation. Is knowledge of the counterinsurgency strategy adequate to confront Boko Haram from the military perspective? Here is the interpretation of the data collected.

The military is skilful and knowledgeable of matters on counterinsurgency and capable of creating relative peace from the conflict.

The result of the data enquiry on the question relating to matters concerning counterinsurgency and capability of the military to return Northeast Nigeria to peaceful coexistence correlate with the empirical evidence of the capacity of the military to fight Boko Haram insurgency (see Figure 3.6). If knowledge is not in doubt, why is the operation failing? According to the Oxford Dictionary, counterinsurgency means military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries.[183] This could summarily mean the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces. An example of such can be the American operations against the Taliban/al Qaeda insurgency in Afghanistan, the Afghan uprising against the Soviet occupation, or the Nigerian military operations against Boko Haram insurgents. Some of the popular methods used by the Nigerian military include ambush, sabotage, and raids. The whole idea is to protect Nigeria's national identity and sovereignty. Unfortunately, this did not prevent Boko Haram from attacking the office of the United Nations in Abuja, Nigeria's federal capital city. There was also a successful

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[183]Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.

attack launched by the insurgent of the Nigeria Police headquarters in Abuja with a recorded death score.

Table 3.5 confirms that the military is not lacking in knowledge of what to do despite Boko Ha- ram's success in significant attacks

Table 3.5 The military is skillful and knowledgeable of matters on counter insurgency and capable of creating relative peace from the conflict

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	100	18.5	18.5	18.5
	Neither agree nor dis-agree	119	22.0	22.0	40.4
	Strongly Agree	323	59.6	59.6	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

The Nigeria Military Is Good at Conducting Combined Operations.

The p-value for Military Factor (0.693) is more significant than the standard alpha level of 0.01 and is further confirmed to make the military an independent variable that shapes the Boko Haram insurgency as a statistically not too significant variable. This is so when respondents further con- firmed that the military is good at combining joint operations with other armed forces, meaning that there is collective engagement to end the conflicts. In Figure 3.4 (Chapter Three of this work)**,** we said that many operations carried out by the military to dislodge Boko Haram were combined tactical operations of the military and paramilitary, including the Nigeria police force and military formation across the West African subregion. This is further confirmed in the survey (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 The Nigeria military is good at conducting combined operations

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	83	15.3	15.3	15.3
	Neither agree Nor dis-agree	139	25.6	25.6	41.0
	Strongly Agree	320	59.0	59.0	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

The Boko Haram Concentration of the Fight around the Northeast.

Northeastern Nigeria is at the centre of the Boko Haram insurgency operations, with the main operation at the Sambisa Forest. This position is confirmed by the respondent's answer that operations of the insurgents **are** limited to Northern Nigeria at most in the present time. The data also confirmed that the military base fighting the insurgent is basically in Northern Nigeria with directives from military headquarters located at Abuja, the federal capital in North-Central region. the federal government saw the distance between the location of the military commanding head office and the theatre of war as one challenge accounting for failing military against the insurgency and directed that the commanding head office be located to Maiduguri, within which jurisdiction is the Sambisa Forest, the headquarters of the Boko Haram. Again, little or no success is recorded by such a directive.

The idea is to make the operational policy decision making of the military close to the insurgency location. The military is failing not because of functional strategy failure, but more importantly because Boko Haram insurgency is largely explained more by political consideration and other variables beyond the military. It is not the case that counterinsurgency is not directed at the concerned location, but that its recorded failure is more on political shaping factors to which the military has no solution. Still, it may be of

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concern that the continuous failure of the military operation prolongs the conflict and trickles down to another part of Nigeria in no time. On several occasions, the military have launched propaganda strategies; see Figure 3.4 in chapter three of this work, some of which alluded to the information about the killing of the leader of Boko Haram, an allegation often denied by the Boko Haram information units. What is too clear is that the closeness of the military to the Boko Haram base has not prevented Boko Haram from successfully launching specific operations like the kidnapping of the 200 Chibok girls from their school. The military has fewer answers to those operations of the insurgents in their reactions. Yes, the military moved operational base close to the Northeastern region of Nigeria where Boko Haram insurgents operate. Boko Haram has restricted its operations to Northern Nigeria. However, nothing appears to support military success in the conflict.

Military Training

One of the most critical lessons in the military is to never repeat failure. Doing so requires consistent training to sustain and enhance the military implementation of strategy and mission. Training is the foundation of military success. Lieutenant General Ace Collins (1978) put the imperativeness of training in the military: 'It is astounding what well-trained and dedicated soldiers can accomplish in the face of death, fear, physical privation, and an enemy determined to kill them'[184] This question is related to the facilities and quality of training provided for the military in ending the conflicts, because we saw evidence of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations con- ducted exclusively against the targets on the ground. Every command unit of the military, for in- stance, Doctrine Command of the Army, Education and Training Command of the Marine Corps, Training Command and Air Education Command of the Air Force, each holding the military ser- vice responsible for developing, assessing the effectiveness of, designing, developing, and making provision for oversight functions. According to the US military, training is defined

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[184] Quoted J. Greer 'Training: The Foundation for Success in Combat', in <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/training-the-foundation-success-combat>.

as 'instruction and applied exercises for acquiring and retaining knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAs) necessary to complete specific tasks'[185]

General Martin Dempsey[186]explained the efficiency and effectiveness of training and its perfect practice to mean any Army in peace when he said, 'It's not practice that makes perfect; rather, it's perfect practice that makes perfect. It is, after all, the seemingly small disciplines and commitment to high standards that makes us who we are and binds us together as a force, an Army, in peace and war'[187]The efficiency and effectiveness of training in the military include the following:

- Adopting the ADDIE approach and many more designs.
- Assessing, developing.
- Implementing.
- Evaluating training procedures and processes.

The current investigation sought to determine if the military received adequate training from empirical evidence. The survey was designed to ask a hypothetical question: The military has received sufficient training over the years. The respondent confirmed. Yes, the military received adequate training over the years for combating an insurgency, such as the Boko Haram conflict. Fifty-three percent of the respondents said yes, and over 26% maintained neutrality of the question. It maybe that they are not too sure of the quality of training that the military received and the adequacy or otherwise. In any event, 20.3% of the respondents completely disagreed that the military had ever received adequate training to confront the Boko Haram insurgency. The aim of the exercise is to succeed in strategic, tactical, and operational objectives to win battles and engagements.

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[185] https://www.encyclopedia.com/education/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/military-training-doc- trine-philosophy-and-practice visited last on 8 August 2022
[183]https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography/Article/602694/general-martin-e-dempsey/visited last on last on 8 August 2021.

[187] Quoted J. Greer 'Training: The Foundation for Success in Combat', in <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/training-the-foundation-success-combat> visited last on 8 August 2022.

Military Remuneration

Is the military adequately rewarded in terms of remuneration? This is one of the most critical questions that we thought would be answered by the respondents in the survey. As shown in the data table in Figure 3.6, 34.1% of the respondents said no, the military was not well remunerated in the circumstances of the Boko Haram conflicts. Again, 34.7% of the respondents also say yes, the military is well remunerated, and 31.7% of the respondent-maintained neutrality to the question. The challenge is with the analysis; for instance, we could argue that the very lack of remuneration explained the military's failure in the battle. See the histogram in Table 3.7 and Figure 3.1.

Table 3.7 The military is well renumerated appropriately

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	185	34.1	34.1	34.1
	Neither agree nor dis-agree	169	31.2	31.2	65.3
	Strongly Agree	188	34.7	34.7	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

Figure 3.1 The military is well renumerated appropriately.

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The Army has said that the allowances and entitlements of military soldiers and officers serving in the Northeast combating the Boko Haram insurgency have been duly paid. According to the Army, 'As regards the payment of operations allowances, it is borne out of deliberate mischief and failure to comply with the new measures aimed at ensuring probity and accountability in the ser- vice. Accordingly, all officers and soldiers are now paid their operations allowance directly into their account'[188] The Army described the news-making round in Nigeria that the military has not paid those serving officers as coming from 'mischievous media house'. This perhaps explains why the respondents could not make up their minds in one specific way regarding the remuneration payment of the military concerning the operations in the Northeast. The Army spokesman further made clarifications about internal military administration concerning the payment of the military allowance of the soldiers when he said, 'For the avoidance of doubts, we wish to inform the public that the issue of non-payment of peacekeeping operations allowance is a minor internal military administrative matter, which was treated and resolved accordingly and has no bearing on the fight against terrorism and insurgency as they mischievously alleged'.

The internal administrative challenges, according to him, have nothing to do with the fight against terrorism and insurgency, meaning again that the soldiers are in a high spirit to fight the war despite the internal military challenges around their remuneration. The allowance of skilled soldiers as approved by the President and Commander in chief of the armed Forces was ₦100,000 or $200 per month. During the interview in this investigation, it was confirmed that the Army authorised in 2020 the payment of different categories of soldiers private to corporal ₦20,000 or $20, warrant officer, and master warrant officer ₦30,000 or $30 while Sergeant and Staff Sergeant – ₦25,000 or $25[189]However, in 2021, the National Assembly (House of Representatives) caused an investigation into the non-payment of allowances of the military. According to Hon. Abubakar Nalaraba, who moved the motion, 'Concerned that despite the increment in budgetary provision for the

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[188] Ogundipe, *Nigerian soldiers fighting Boko Haram not owed salaries – Army* (2016)*, Premium Times* <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/202629-nigerian-soldiers-fighting-boko-haram-not-owed-sal- aries-army.html>.
[189]Vanguard (Lagos: Vanguard Media Limited, 17 February 2020).

allowances from ₦283 billion in 2020 to about ₦380 billion in 2021, the welfare of Army personnel have not felt the corresponding effect. 'Personnel of Nigerian Army involved in internal security operations, training and performance of other military duties are still being owed various types of non-regular allowances'[190]

The allowance allegedly not paid includes duty tour allowance and first 28-day operation allowance. The payment, when made, was to assist in mitigating the effects of the poor economy on the affected soldiers and officers. The non-payment of allowance undoubtedly affected the military's performance in war-torn Northeast Nigeria, where Boko Haram insurgents successfully engaged the military. Again, this unclear account of the payment of the allowance results for the respondent's answer. See Figure 3.6. This study extends its search to this National Assembly's response in 2021, because the issue under investigation had allegedly taken place during the study period up to 2020.

Military Insurance Policy.

The survey results indicate that the military personnel life insurance policy is not active and challenging to assess when there is a risk of death. This is one of the internal challenges to the success of the military winning the war. The practice will discourage the soldiers, as their motivation is primarily reduced or at a very low ebb. One of the widows was reported by punch newspapers about the circumstance of their pains after the death of their husband in the Boko Haram conflict, she said. 'Some other widows and I wrote the defence ministry, which oversees the insurance, but there was no response. We have resorted to begging them. The sudden death of our husbands was a hard hit on us. We need help. The federal government should help us'[191] The above statement corelates with our data evidence

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[190] NAN, The Guardian, *Reps to investigate alleged non-payment of army personnel allowances. 30 June 2021*, The Guardian, Rutam House, Lagos Nigeria.

[191] Boko Haram: Widows of soldier's lament non-payment of life insurance claims, (n.d.) *Punch* <https://punchng.com/boko-haram-widows-of-soldiers-lament-non-payment-of-life-insurance-claims/>

Table 3.8 All military personal, including soldiers, have a life insurance policy that is active and can be assessed immediately in case of any risk.

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	203	37.5	37.5	37.5
	Neither agree nor disagree	190	35.1	35.1	72.5
	Strongly Agree	149	27.5	27.5	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

The causal effect of non-payment of insurance benefit to military can make the military failing in the war against the Boko Haram insurgents. Another report on the experience of a widow, which exemplifies many others, was captured in this work. 'But that sadness has been compounded by the silence of the defence ministry on my late husband's life insurance claim. It's quite traumatic. It has been difficult to survive with my children. My husband was killed by insurgents on August 7, 2014, in Borno State. I went to the Army Headquarters many times to know when the insurance would be paid, and they kept saying they were working towards it. It's frustrating'[192] The challenge is in what will motivate the serving soldiers to put in their best at the war front given the experience of the widows of their departed spouses in the hands of the military authorities. In February 2020, Gen. Abdullahi of the Nigeria military explained that the military presented 22 cheque leaflets to the families of soldiers who lost their lives to the war[193] The 22 families are a small proportion of thousands of soldiers whose allowances are still unpaid.

The group life insurance policy is an acceptable insurance policy in a military welfare scheme, and it is no longer the case that the death of military officers or soldiers in

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[192] Boko Haram, Widows of soldiers. https://area.com.ng/index.php/forum/thread/5232/widows-of-soldiers-killed-by- boko-haram-lament-husbands'-unpaid-life-insura/ assessed last 8th August 2022.
[193] NAN, *Reps to investigate alleged non-payment of army personnel allowances* (2021), *The Guardian*
 < https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/02/army-presents-life-assurance-cash-cheques-to- families-of-22-fallen heroes/>

war fronts is excluded from insurance policy. Insurance is set out to mitigate risks and it is defined as a pool of risks. When policies are taken, for example, the general welfare scheme, and a risk occurs in a few days, the policy beneficiary ought to be paid. The payment will assist the family in solving important family needs. Again, such regular payment is expected to encourage military officers and soldiers in the war front as incentives to get more encouragement and commitment to end the war. The experience of the windows as expressed above is discouraging and it is unnecessary distractions to the fight. Yes, war is generally excluded in the claim definition of insurance policy, damages related to war claims are excluded from insurance cover and the insurance exclusion and limiting clauses exclude liabilities caused by war. The reason for such a policy is largely due to the difficulties in calculating damages arising from war because such damages can be astronomical and could drag the insurance company to bankruptcy. An example is the experience of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack.

The military welfare scheme or group life insurance policy is put in place to help mitigate the risk arising from death in war front and this is a permissible insurance policy under the Nigeria insurance laws and the general regulations of the military. There are challenges with respect to non-payment of insurance premiums by the military. For instance, it is a general principle of practice under Nigerian insurance law that payment of premium activates insurance cover and if premium is not paid, there is generally no valid insurance cover. Again, the risk occurs before consideration for premium and this makes claim payment difficult. There is also no social security benefit system in Nigeria to which military personnel can lay claims. There are other challenges of the insurance of military equipment that are abandoned due to non-activation of payment of insurance premium, and this has the significant effects of denying the military the success of the fight. The cost of replacement of the equipment ordinarily should be paid by the insurance company only if a premium is paid and equipment properly insured.

The Influence of the Ethnicity of the Military

In its investigation of the military challenges, the study sought to ask how much ethnic consideration influences the military. The answer will help the study's analysis of the

critical role of ethnicity and will assist us in corroborating the drive of professionalism in the military. The result in Table 3.9 correlates with our earlier position.

Table 3.9 The military personnel are not always influenced by religion or ethnic considerations in fighting Boko Haram Insurgence

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	145	26.8	26.8	26.8
	Neither agree Nor disagree	202	37.3	37.3	64.0
	Strongly Agree	194	35.8	35.8	99.8
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

On the issue of ethnicity, empirical evidence as the study saw in the data suggest that ethnicity exists but cannot directly or majorly influence military operational decisions. Ethnicity exists to the extent that 26% of our respondents agree. Again, from the data presented above, over 37% of the respondents will consider the question technical and will neither agree nor disagree. Only 35% agreed that military personnel are not always influenced by such regional or ethnic considerations. The reason for such behaviour could further our analysis reasonably to conclude that the military is a command structure in which obedience to instruction is first carried out before complaints. It is always difficult not to obey teaching, even when it is not your desire, and our opinion is that such praxis holds the military in a collective bound.

Military's Commitment to Fighting against Boko Haram.

It is essential to know if the military, following their charge, is committed to bringing the conflict to an end. The empirical answer indicates that the military is dedicated to fighting. The implication is that the military keeps its oath of allegiance to the national government and will do all necessary to protect Nigeria from any form of internal and external aggression. Yes, 42% of the respondents said so. Still, there are issues with such a

commitment. For instance, 30.8 percent of the respondents that validly administered the survey say they will neither agree nor disagree with the statement that the military is committed to the fight against Boko Haram (see Table 3.10). In comparison, 26% said they do not think the military is dedicated to the battle. The fear is genuine, because if the presence of Boko Haram insurgency is still that high after close to two decades, military commitment is questionable. Yes. It may be challenging to say that the military is not committed to the fight. However, it is also not the case to close our eyes to the data. Still, concerns are raised given the challenges in the payment of the group life insurance policy of the soldiers and the military welfare scheme. In addition, the experience of the widows of the soldiers in accessing the benefits of the falling soldiers and military officers underscores the commitment indicated in the empirical data.

Table 3.10 The military are committed to the fight against Boko Haram

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	145	26.8	26.8	26.8
	Neither agree nor disagree	167	30.8	30.8	57.6
	Strongly Agree	230	42.4	42.4	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

Military Leadership Enjoys the Loyalty of their Subordinates

Military loyalty is a vital subject among its personnel. Are subordinates loyal to their offices following the ranking system? This is important to arrest conflicting decisions in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. In addition, loyalty may explain some level of success that the military was recording in the war. According to the U.S. Army, 'loyalty is bearing true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other

soldiers'[194] Cleon Raynor prefers to define loyalty as a commitment to a cause, a purpose, or a person[195]

The Army values loyalty as the most important because it is crucial to the success of each platoon, squad, team, and company. Loyalty is one of the seven Army values; others include respect, duty, selfless service, honour, integrity, and personal courage.

According to the U.S. Army, A soldier is 'one who supports the leadership and stands up for fellow soldiers.[196]In the specific instance of the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency, Table 3.11 shows that respondents answered Yes. Military leadership enjoys the loyalty of their subordinates. Such an assertion implies that loyalty will enable the military to succeed in the fight.48.7% or 264 out of 542 respondents that administered the survey confirmed that loyalty is not an issue. In comparison, 32.3% or 173 respondents will prefer to be neutral in leadership matters of the military loyalty of the subordinates. 19% do not agree that the leadership of the Army enjoys the loyalty of their subsidiaries. The answers may be influenced by the fact that the military has spent 20 years without ending the war, and one problem in the opinion of those who think the war is becoming prolonged is the issue of loyalty. Again, loyalty is reciprocity. The question did not ask if subordinates enjoy the loyalty of their leaders. Perhaps that is where the challenge is resting. Furthermore, does loyalty promote cohesion and combat effectiveness?

Table 3.11. Military leadership enjoy loyalty of their subordinates

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	103	19.0	19.0	19.0
	Neither agree nor disagree	175	32.3	32.3	51.3
	Strongly Agree	264	48.7	48.7	100.0

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[194] Sandra Gibson, 'Loyalty defines our allegiance' November 15, 2012. U.S. ARMY
  <https://www.army.mil/article/91270/loyalty_defines_our_allegiance>
[195] Cleon Raynor November 15, 2012. U.S. Army.
[196] Gibson, p.1.

Total	542	100.0	100.0	

This work has tested several variables to determine which independent variables (s) shaped the dependable variables. As we saw from the data collected, two major independent variables (political and economic factors) explain military challenges in the Boko Haram Insurgency because those variables are of statistical importance. As we explained above, that answers our research questions and hypothesis. Yes, political, and economic variables explain the challenges of the military in the Boko Haram insurgency. We presented the variables we saw above. Yes, to the other research questions and hypotheses relating to other challenges resulting from ethnicity and internal military considerations. Yes, they exist, and notwithstanding, and as we saw from the above, we also explained them, at least at the level of their impacts. Two other variables also account for the military's challenges, but they are not statistically significant. They are ethnicity and military factors. In any event, any variable whose p-value is $P < 0.01$ is less than the common alpha level of is statistically significant and calls for concern. This study explains the military challenges and offers rational analysis to end the war from all the variables and in accordance with their significance.

It is also not the case that those variables that are not statistically important in explaining the military challenges of the Boko Haram conflicts do not play some role that calls for serious concern. Still, it may also be that they do not explain the priority of our situation. It is not that the military is not significant to the idea of how to bring the conflicts to an end, as we saw. Yes, ethnicity may be an essential factor to address in bringing the war to an end, but it is not the primary cause. The study helps in prioritising and not misplacing it and assists in our re-computations of strategy and allocation of resources. If the two statistically significant factors (political considerations and eco- nomic factors) are addressed, we are likely on the right path to bringing the insurgency to an end. Such an approach may not require military deployment or wrongly accusing one ethnic group as the leading cause of the Boko Haram conflicts. Preventing such wrong accusations may create a more harmonious collective peace for national development. Domestic

socialisation may be more imperative than military deployment, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Critics of the Analysis

As with any other study, the legitimacy of the findings of the current study may come to open and can be challenged. One issue that can be raised around the legitimacy and validity of this study is the question: Can the research be a valid representation of the population of interest given the number of surveys administered? It should be noted that this study is important and significant for providing primary data sources from which other studies can take their foundation. The adequacy of representation of the population of interest is subjectively objective, but what is important is that stakeholders participated in the survey administration. They are from areas affected by insurgency. Respondents also included soldiers who were military participants on the battlefield. Is the data point sufficient for our analysis? Five hundred (500) survey questionnaires were administered as a primary data source, with various qualitative interviews among the stakeholders. The number is enough to run econometrics and perfect enough to make predictions. We also find our results on some of the issues, as we saw correlation with the extensive data separately collected and analysed by the IMF on similar cases of the economic living conditions in Northeastern Nigeria. Another issue that can also be raised is whether the unit of analysis adopted in the current work could prevent ecological fallacies? The answer is affirmative because of the various frameworks used in our reflection on the data. The study's robust research methodology and process management eliminate the ecological fallacy. Again, there is the question of whether one year of data collection and two years of analysis and writing of this investigation are sufficient for such a conflict that already counts two decades of engagement? The answer is 'Yes' because the investigation period is well utilised for the result, and the study of this nature cannot be open-ended.

'No matter what political reasons are given for war, the underlying reason is always economic'

A.J.P Taylor

Chapter 4 : The Economic Factor

Overview

The chapter provides insight into the research question that the economic factor of poor living conditions is the real challenge for the military winning the Boko Haram war. Yes, this is so, as the study considered the economic variables of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), basic standard of living, and provision of infrastructure facilities in the Northeast region of Nigeria, where Boko Haram dominates, before coming to such a conclusion. The primary data correlates with the study conducted by the IMF on the poverty level of the six regions of Nigeria in 2014, as discussed in the general introduction chapter. It is a known fact that poverty could trigger an unconventional war like Boko Haram. The chapter explained that the military is not created to solve poverty-associated problems and experiences challenges when the economic deficit presents the Boko Haram Conflict. Transparency International data on corruption ranked Nigeria 2020 number 149 out of 180 corrupt nations worldwide. Consequently, the international community fears that the money borrowed to bring the Boko Haram insurgency to an end may end in a private pocket, making it difficult to offer general support. The military is also part of Nigerian society, and corruption has been explained in the chapter as rooting into the military also affecting the economic condition of soldiers, with the allegation of delays in the payment of soldiers' allowances and surveillance benefits.

Introduction

One general explanation for war is economic conditions in which people protested unbearable living standards or outright resources control to which they have been put at disadvantages. See Chapter Two of this work. Living conditions are determined by the capacity of the government to translate the country's GDP into the practical economic life

of the people. Economic variables themselves are measured by economic indices such as unemployment and inflation, which generally include the consumer price index, balance of trade, housing and interest rate. Specific to the Northeast region, the ethnic region of Boko Haram insurgent, our survey was designed to capture some of those critical indices. This will help explain our hypothesis that economic factors cause Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and remain a challenge to the military in ending the war. We find 'Yes' as an answer to such a question in the research questions and hypothesis of this study. As such, we can empirically confirm that the economic living conditions of the people in the Northeast constitute challenges to the military in winning the Boko Haram insurgency. Or hypothetically put, the economic living conditions of the people in the Northeast explain why the military is not winning the Boko Haram insurgency.

The survey explains causality around economic conditions. This is important because the eco- nomic factor has prominently played out as the main reason Boko Haram trumps, and except that is resolved, the war cannot end. But unfortunately, the military is not expected to improve the economic condition of the people of the Northeast in practical terms and such is not part of the focus of the military objectives.

Our result for economic veritable confirmed a p-value of 0.01, which shows that the p-value for Economic factor (0.00) is less than the standard alpha level of 0.01, which indicates that it is statistically significant.

Variable

Economic Factor= =   (P-value = (0.000)

                          (0.222)

Once a veritable is statistically significant, it means its impact to a reasonable degree is dependable veritable and requires explanation.

It is also essential to confirm at least one crucial empirical study conducted by the IMF in a separate study (see the general introduction chapter). The study concludes that the living conditions of the people in Northeast Nigeria are appalling, and that the Northeast region is breeding in abject poverty that is unprecedented in Nigeria. It compares the various poverty levels in the six federating regions and finds the Northeast as incredibly

poor, with human lives at the dangerous condition of living. For instance, in comparison, the poverty level of Ekiti state in the southwest of Nigeria remains 16%; that of Borno State in the Northeast stands at over 52%. The study maintained that this disparity could naturally trigger war arising from economic crises.

Figure 4.1. Showing poverty disparity in the allocation of resources in Nigeria 2014

The IMF study provided two tables to explain the poverty rate concerning the population percent- age among the federating states compared to the financial allocation of resources from the Nigeria Federation account allocation committee in relation to state per capita income. See IMF Figure 1, in 4.2. The poverty rate in Borno State is 52% (Northeast) on Naira per capital of 7798, while that of Ekiti state (Southwest) 16 % on Naira per capital of 8692. Based on IMF data, the American government confirmed that the case of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast is primarily arising from the disparity in economic living conditions.

The present work seeks further clarification from the respondents in the survey on the role of economic factors accounting for the Boko Haram insurgency. In addition, several related questions were asked about the economic indices.

The data collected for this work showcase empirical studies, and the study's analysis approach is to report the respondent's position in each of those economic indices. It is significant to note that the results analysis is premised on a balanced view of the revenue and benefits. This explains, for instance, a question relating to tax payment from which the government derives the revenue expected to be used for the prosperity of the people.

Poverty

The respondents were asked to make a judgement if weather in their own opinion the Boko Haram region in Northeast Nigeria is the poorest among all the regions in Nigeria? This question is es s regions. It will also be necessary to see if the revenue allocation from the central government is justifiable based on tax or other factors such as state population, economic disasters, geographical areas, or ecology as determinants of the revenue-sharing formula.

Table 4.1 The Boko Haram region in Northeast Nigeria is the poorest among all the regions

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
	Strongly disagree	165	30.4	30.4	30.4
Valid	Neither agree nor disagree	131	24.2	24.2	54.6
	Strongly Agree	246	45.4	45.4	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

The respondent strongly agrees that the Northeast region is the poorest among all the federating regions in Nigeria. Two hundred forty-six of the respondents, representing 45%, confirmed the position. Such a result implies that the Northeast, relative to other regions, is unjustifiably treated in the Nigerian state's economic and financial matters. It may also

suggest that the Nigeria federation holds no equitable balance on economic issues among federating regions. Anan[197]

In specific to the general economic situation argued that 'Nothing is permanent here, except suffering. No job security, no safety clothing nor gadgets. Accidents are common. Every worker here would leave if they had a choice. 'The study field report data confirm that social and economic justice is the uncountable driver of the Nigerian economy. the respondent made self-assessment judgement on whether the federating region is making proportionately equal contributions to the Nigeria federation in economic and financial matters such that equality of sharing of revenue can be a prominent argument otherwise. Any argument without such consideration may amount to one side of the balance sheet. Or it is the case that the consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency create such untold hardship that renders economic contribution to the federation account almost impossible, thereby impoverishing the region itself. This question was asked because the data also confirmed that a large number of the respondents maintain a neutral position of neither agree non disagreed with the question. Still, over 24%of the respondent neither agree non disagree

Again, over 30% of the respondents will not agree that the Northeast is the poorest region in Nigeria. Suppose we add the percentage of neutrality with those who disagree. In that case, 54% is more than the number of those who agree that the Northeast is the poorest region in Nigeria, indicating that it is not as extensive as it has been said that the region is the poorest in Nigeria (but our analysis can be faulted if we add the neutrality figure to those that agree). Yes, we may not have a basis for adding the two but explaining the significance of not too correlated answers will explain. Yes, the Northeast is the poorest, but this is not heavily apparent from the empirical evidence.

For instance, in the IMF data (see Table 4.1), the disparity in poverty among federating states could be explained by the differences in the option and the valid result of

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[197] Amana, J. U Evaluation of the effect of rock types on aquifer vulnerability in Bolorunduro, Ondo State of Nigeria. 2019 unpublished dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of M.Sc. degree of the university of technology Azure. ://196.220.128.81:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1845.

the respondents in Figure 4.2. Yes, economic variables play a significant role in the conflict, such as the Boko Haram insurgency. For instance, the Sierra Leone civil crisis can be explained by poverty. Others include Indonesia Aceh Province, the Democratic Republic of Congo (the Congolese rebel movements), and the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which can also be explained by economic factors[198] Dolan explains that economic rationality and liberal individualism account for sociological reasons that promotes the growth of insurgency, and this again support the argument that the prevalent economic factor captured in the data is sufficient to trigger war partly explains the Boko Haram Insurgency. The deployment of the military is a challenge that explains why the military is not winning the war. For example, the military cannot improve the economic living conditions of the people of the Northeast since it is not the duty of the military to provide economic palliatives or infrastructural buildings that will improve the people's lives. Poverty and conflict are interconnected.[199] Countries with poverty or part of the country like the Northeast are more prone to wars. The presence of Boko Haram in such regions reduces economic performance, therefore putting governance at a very low ebb. Again, as we saw in chapter two of this work, the spread of financial crises of poverty and conflict resource governance,[200] excessive military spending[201] food crises and civil unrest[202] It is challenging for the military to succeed in counterinsurgency. These prove to be an unusual conflict where the military can launch operational strategy like a typical war given the large scale

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[198] Dolan, C. "Collapsing Masculinities and Weak States—A Case Study of Northern Uganda." In Masculinities Matter! Men, Gender, and Development, edited by Cleaver, F., 57–83. London, UK: Zed Books. 2002.

[199] Goodhand J. 'Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty' Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper No. 6 2001.

[200] Ross, M. L. 'How Does Natural Resources influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases', *International Organization*, 58 2004, pp. 35-67; Thies, C. G. 'Of Rulers, Rebels, and Revenue: State Capacity, Civil War Onset, and Primary Commodities', *Journal of Peace Research*, 47 (3)2010, pp. 321–332

[201] Taydas, Z. and Peksen, D. 'Can States Buy Peace? Social Welfare Spending and Civil Conflicts*', Journal of Peace Research,* 49 2012, 273-287 (2); Nielsen, R.A. et al. 'Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict', *American Journal of Political Science*, 55 (2); 2009, pp. 219-232; de Ree, J. and Nillesen, E. 'Aiding Violence or Peace? The Impact of Foreign Aids on the Risk of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Journal of Development Economics*, 2009 pp. 301-313; 88. B. Savun, and Tirone, D. C. 'Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?', *American Journal of Political Science* 55 2011, p. 233.

[202] Lagi M. et. al, 'The Food Crisis and Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle East', (unpublished manuscript, *arXiv:1108.2455*).

of smuggling and coercion Keen.[203] In their own right, those causality (cause and effect) arising from economic factors are sufficient to trigger war, and the military may find it difficult to end such insurgency even after the war[204]

The Boko Haram region in Northeastern Nigeria is disadvantaged in Nigeria's national income and wealth distribution.

This question is important in understanding the alleged level of inequities and injustice in the distribution of national resources and if the Northeast is put at a disadvantage. Resource allocation is important in federalism, and lack of it triggers civil protest leading to conflicts. Suppose the North- east is set at a disadvantage. In that case, it may be easy to conclude that the protest of Boko Haram insurgency based on such justifiable distribution of resources is valid, but is launching of insurgency a legitimate way of addressing the issue? Empirical evidence from the data says yes that national resources may be unjustly distributed in Nigeria state; it is true that the northeast of Nigeria was at a disadvantage in the distribution of national resources. See Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 The Boko Haram region in Northeast Nigeria is at a disadvantage in the national income and wealth distribution of Nigeria

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	97	17.9	17.9	17.9
	Neither agree nor disagree	151	27.9	27.9	45.8
	Strongly Agree	294	54.2	54.2	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

The data indicates 54% of the respondents agree that the Boko Haram region in Northeast Nigeria is at a disadvantage in the national income and wealth distribution of

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[203] David Keen, 'A Rational Kind of Madness', *Oxford Development Studies*, 25(1). 1997, pp.67–75.
[204] Justino, P. and Verwimp, P. 'Poverty Dynamics, Violent Conflicts and Convergence in Rwanda', The Review of Income and Wealth, 2013. 66-90 (1). P. 59.

Nigeria. The implication of such is that the government has a responsibility to act in the economic lives of the citizen. The military can hardly succeed in such a situation unless the government takes immediate steps in addressing the infrastructure and economic deficit of the people. The wide disparity between respondents who disagree and those who agree is shown in Figure 4. 2

Figure 4.2 Showing disparity in respondents' response to the hypothetical question. The Boko Haram region in the Northeast Nigeria is at disadvantages in National income and wealth distribution of Nigeria

The data can also be analysed to mean that the unequal distribution of resources is inconsistent with Nigeria's federalism. this position was affirmed by Chris Ikorukpo[205] when he explained that The cliche! Resource control 'is commonly associated with this school. The opposing school, made up mainly of the central government and the governments and people of the northern states, asserts that the current level of compensation is adequate. The establishment of environmental justice is impeded by several factors, chief of which is the commanding nature of federalism in the country.' the principle of equality in fiscal federalism is key to its success. One of the regions is grounded because Nigeria's federalism puts such a region at a disadvantage from its economic resources, and any form

of economic injustice could arrest the peace of a nation. It may also be argued that resources were distributed equally from the federal source. Still, it may be the case that the government of the state's concern in the Northeast has been weak in using the resources to create an advantage for the economic well-being of the citizen, as we shall see shortly. Again, the challenges are not what the military can fix since such an economic problem of deficit resource control is established. Therefore, it is not also the case that the military can help solve the problem and the challenge to the military is the continuation of the war on the ground of fighting against economic injustice. The rate of Unemployment counts highest in the Northeastern part of Nigeria than in any other aspect of Nigeria.

The study asked the respondent this question under discussion to test the effect of the lack of equal distribution of resources or the disadvantaged position of the Northeast, as explained in Figure 4.5. This will confirm whether the casual effect is manifesting in the real sense. One of the indices to look at to corroborate the results is unemployment. As such, the study further probes if the rate of unemployment counts highest in the Northeastern part of Nigeria than in any other Nigerian regions. Therefore, the effect of the Northeast region as the poorest region arising from the unequal distribution of federal resources must be corroborated by its effects such as unemployment, deficit infrastructure, and economic welfare. The seminar work of Akware Azalahu[206] confirmed 'In a nation where a large number of the people are unemployed, they would be poor; and poverty would lead to the insecurity of lives and property' the data also shows that the unemployment count is the highest in Northeast Nigeria (see Table 4.3).

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[206]Azalahu F, A., Et al Unemployment and Poverty: Implications for National Security and Good Governance in Nigeria. *International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research, 2*(1), 1-11(2021). Retrieved from http://journals.rcmss.com/index.php/ijpamr/article/view/109.

Table 4.3 Unemployment counts highest in the Northeast part of Nigeria than in any other part of Nigeria.

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	138	25.5	25.5	25.5
	Neither agree nor disagree	98	18.1	18.1	43.5
	Strongly Agree	305	56.3	56.3	99.8
	12.00	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

This position is confirmed by 56% of the respondents that administered the survey. The Nigerian government ought to first deploy the solution to the rising unemployment in the Northeast region and give it priority attention. In specific terms, Akware Azalahu explained the relationship between unemployment and human security and positioned that unemployment causes poverty and poverty causes insecurity. When people are unemployed, they chill their unorthodox methods to crimes of questionable adventures that further increases the cost of governance The unemployment profile of the Northeast will lead to organised crime, and the military is not created to fight unemployment. Boko Haram will take advantage of recruiting more insurgents to their camps to fight the war. The recruitment of such unemployed people requires no procedure comparable to joining the military. The youth recruited by Boko Haram have a clear understanding of the Northeastern topography, which again makes the military lose the fight against Boko Haram. Some scholars think that employment can be achieved by joining the military or government side or simply by entering the army group.[207] This can be more of an attractive option with no opportunity for gainful employment (see Chapter Four of this work).

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[207] Justino, P. 2010. 'War and Poverty,' HiCN Working Papers 81, Households in Conflict Network; D. Keen 1998, 'The economic Functions of Violence in Civil War', Adelphi Papers, 38 (320). 1-89; B.F. Walter 2004, 'Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (3), pp. 371-388.

Military employment is structured, making it less attractive to the Boko Haram unstructured employment process

Basic economic welfare such as infrastructures, hospitals and electricity are relatively in poor supply in Northeastern Nigeria and not comparable with other parts of Nigeria.

This question assists us in knowing the level of development and the state of provision of basic economic welfare and infrastructures. Again, this will further showcase the economic living conditions that Boko Haram at the latter stage relied upon to launch their insurgency as a justification for the conflicts. Data results correlate our earlier discussions with respect to the poor economic living conditions of the Northeast, which are a significant reason for the insurgency. Yes, and as indicated in Table 4.4, basic economic welfare such as infrastructures, hospitals, electricity is relatively in poor supply in Northeast Nigeria and not comparable with other parts of Nigeria

Table 4.4 Basic economic welfare, such as infrastructure and hospital electricity, is relatively in poor supply in the Northeast Nigeria and not comparable with other parts of Nigeria

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	138	25.5	25.5	25.5
	Neither agree nor disagree	155	28.6	28.6	54.1
	Strongly Agree	249	45.9	45.9	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

One of the consequences of poor economic living conditions is the unacceptable state of basic facilities, but can the military fight war be arising from demand for basic economic needs? Is the government not expected to deliver the dividends of democracy by providing facilities such as good roads, hospitals and schools to improve the living conditions of the people? Again, this explains why the military was not winning the war. The government's

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military response strategy cannot immediately solve the economic problem, but it will compound it. For instance, the mere announcement of a military presence in the region ordinarily reduces economic participation. As more businesses are closed, aggravating unemployment issues, this accelerates the conflict. The government's responsibility is to react to the poor state of basic facilities and resolve them rather than engaging the military to respond to the problem beyond their capacity. Military deployment usually leads to community violence and displacement of people. In some cases, the armed conflict also led to the destruction of infrastructure[208] The seminar work of Arong,[209] confirmed at least in the speck situation of military deployment in the Niger-Delta region for maintaining peace in Nigeria (the case study of the authors is similar to the northeast region) that the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria has a significant negative impact on the productivity of firms in Nigeria. Niger-Delta region. Again, it shows that the government of Nigeria is responsible for protecting good economic living and safeguarding human security, not only by military deployment. There is the need to review a deep inward government strategy of ensuring good living conditions for the population, providing employment, and reducing deficit infrastructure. Military deployment should be the last result of no other solution.

The states in the northeast collects' appropriate allocation of funds from Nigeria monthly revenue

The Federal Government of Nigeria shares revenue among the federating states monthly through the federation account allocation committee, relying on an extant agreed formula encapsulated in the fiscal policy. Therefore, the current question becomes necessary to know the appropriate revenue accruable to the Northeast and whether such revenue is distributed to the affected states monthly. If that is the case, the analyse will be

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[208] Dava, P., Et al. An Analysis of the Effects of Civil War and Prospects
for Development in Mozambique: The Case of Frelimo-Renamo in Chokwe District, *International Journal of* Humanities and Social Science Invention, (2013) pp. 66–75.
[209] Arong, F. E & Ikechukwu, E. M. The Effect of the Cost of Militancy and Unrest or Peace Accounting on the Productivity of Private Organisations in Nigeria. *International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research, 2*(1), 2021 pp. 87-100. Retrieved from
http://journals.rcmss.com/index.php/ijpamr/article/view/221.

more on managing the revenue allocated for development projects among the states in the region. The work of Adedotun[210] explains that the challenge is not on how much was distributed in revenue terms but, more critically, in the fact that a significant challenge is that political formula factors have driven 1970 revenue allocation. Such as 'jurisdictional' population and state equity, rather than factors associated with economic development. The above, as related to the phenomenon under investigation, shows that the military bearly has a solution to those purely economic challenges arising from political consideration. And for as long as these problems are there, the military finds critical societal challenges of economic and political consideration more difficult in containing the Boko Haram conflict.

Yes, 56% of the respondent agreed that the Federal Government of Nigeria share revenue appropriately and monthly with the states in Northeast Nigeria. Revenue accruable from fiscal federal- ism and mostly from proceeds of oil (Nigeria's major product in the international market) and the value-added tax are shared among the federating state, notwithstanding their contributions to the Federal Government's revenue base. For instance (and as we shall see soon), none of the Northeast states of Nigeria is producing oil, and significantly they are not also making a significant contribution to Value Added Tax (VAT). Still, they do share in the federation revenue allocation because of the principle of federalism, which shares appropriately from the revenue accruable from the federation account among the federating states. There has been an argument about the feasibility of such a revenue sharing arrangement and its implications for the continuous existence of Nigeria. Major oil-producing states question the rationality of taking resources from their region, selling them, and using the money to develop other states that do not produce oil. So also, the primary VAT generating states, such as Lagos and Rivers states, are now contesting those points in the Nigeria Supreme Court with the Federal Government of Nigeria on the sharing formula dilemma vis-a-vis the rationale for collecting VAT majorly from their states and using it to develop other states that generate little or nothing in VAT.

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[210]Adedotun, Philips. *Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues Journal of Federalism*, Volume 21, Issue 4, Fall 1991, pp. 103–111, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037962.

If Boko Haram's claim of poor economic conditions is the reason for the conflict, the underlying causes for the states' economic viability in the Northeast of Nigeria are also imperative. There is evidence from the data to show that it is not the case that the poor states in the Northeast are not paying taxes to the federation account on a zero basis, but the amount paid may be relatively low contingent on the business activities ongoing in the region. Again, the military is not winning the war because they have no solution to the region's economic challenges and issues relating to revenue formula and fiscal federalism deficit.

The government of various states in the northeast of Nigeria uses revenue collected for the development of the people.

The question is imperative given the scholar's belief that corruption is at the center of Nigeria's leadership and the significant belief that such a problem affects revenue allocation. And it subsequently distills the challenges facing the military in ending the Boko Haram conflict. For example, the work of Fagbadebo[211] explained that the imperativeness of legitimacy crisis arising from 'political intrigues in an ethnically - differentiated polity where ethnic competition for resources drove much of the pervasive corruption and profligacy.' he further posited that without support from civil society, the effective power of government was eroded. 'Patron-client relationships took a prime role over the formal aspects of politics, such as the rule of law, well-functioning political parties, and a credible electoral system. There is a need to break this cycle and ensure good governance, accountability, and transparency must be guaranteed'. Northeast of Nigeria are not poor because of a lack of appropriate revenue accruable from the federation account of the federal government, as we saw empirically in Table 4.5.

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[211] Omololu, Fagbadebo. Corruption, Governance and Political Instability in Nigeria of Political Science and Inter- national Relations. Economic and Policy Vol. 14 No. 1 (2008) Published 2008-08-27.

Table 4.5. The government of the various states in the northeast of Nigeria uses revenue collected for the development of the people

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	170	31.4	31.4	31.4
	Neither agree nor disagree	144	26.6	26.6	57.9
	Strongly Agree	228	42.1	42.1	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

The right question is asked to probe further. At the same time, the region is poor. As such, respondents were asked the hypothetical question to know if the government of the various states in the Northeast of Nigeria uses revenue collected to develop the people. They answered that the revenue collected is used for the state's development. 42% of the respondents said so. However, it is also essential to see that 31% of the respondents also disagree that the revenue is used for state development, meaning that political leaders used the revenue less for the state. It may be the case national Relations. Economic and Policy Vol. 14 No. 1 (2008) Published 2008-08-27 that they need Boko Haram as a political hand or tool to advance their self-interest. Again, the study's earlier discussion on political variables confirmed that Boko Hara came into existence to advance political desire. If revenue collected was not used for the development of the state to advance the economic conditions, it is logical to say that those revenues were diverted to corruption purposes or diverted to sponsor Boko Haram insurgency, again, for the sole purpose of advancing political self-interest as represented by 31% of the respondents. See Table 4.5.

The Nigerian economy needs external support to prevent crises like Boko Haram.

The cost of funding war is expensive and outrageous. For instance, the American government spent over $2 trillion or $300m per day in the Sierra Leonean civil war[212] Again, between 1991 and 2002, Sierra Leone spent $15 billion on civil conflicts[213] South Sudan recorded an estimated loss of $122 billion on conflict costs and US$28 billion every five years from the cash flow effects of conflicts[214]. Based on the cross-analysis, respondents were asked, given the economic size of Ni- geria, if the country would need external support in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents. Evidence from the data reiterates the need for external assistance in conflict matters, such as Boko Haram.

Table 4.6. The Nigeria Economy needs external support to prevent crises like Boko Haram

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	85	15.7	15.7	15.7
	Neither agree nor disagree	87	16.1	16.1	31.7
	Strongly Agree	370	68.3	68.3	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

Nigeria's economic size is estimated at US$514.076 billion, oscillating growth of 2% to 2.5%, the population of over 200 million people, nominal GDP per capita, ranking 162nd

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[212] Hank Tucker explained that the War in Afghanistan Cost America $300 Million Per Day For 20 Years, With Big Bills Yet To Come see Forbes <https://www.forbes.com/sites/hanktucker/2021/08/16/the-war-in-afghanistan-cost- america-300-million-per-day-for-20-years-with-big-bills-yet-to-come/?sh=1996fa7a7f8d>[210] Sierra Leone Civil War Cost US15 billion (2014), Concord Times <https://slconcordtimes.com/sierra-leone-civil- war-cost-us15-billion/>

[213] Sierra Leone Civil War Cost US15 billion (2014), Concord Times <https://slconcordtimes.com/sierra-leone-civil- war-cost-us15-billion/>

[214] Frontier Economics, South Sudan: The Cost of War (2015), <https://www.frontier-economics.com/me-dia/2487/south-sudan-cost-war.pdf>

position in the world. In another study, the present ethnographer summarised the Nigerian economy as follows:

Nigeria's foreign direct investment declined from $8.8B in 2011 to $3.3B in 2019. The current account balance deteriorated from $10.6B in 2011 to -17B in 2019 (related to falling oil prices). Inflation stayed at around 11% in both years, while unemployment deteriorated drastically from 4% to over 8% between 2015 and 2017. 80% of the 186 million citizens of Nigeria live on less than $2.00 a day, and the population grew by 2.6%, the economy only grew by 2.2% in 2019.[215]

On the prospect of Nigeria securing external debt to fund the conflicts, the economy position related to the foreign debt he further explained follows: 'Public debt increased from 17% of GDP in 2011 to 29% in 2019; foreign debt increased from $21B to $35B in the same period. While this level of indebtedness looks reasonable, the debts consume a large part of the Nigerian annual budget that is highly dependent on oil: the external loan serving ratio is already over 30% of the annual budget, which ran at 35.66 billion naira in 2011. Moreover, with recurrent expenditure consuming more than 50% of this budget, less than 20% of the budget remains for investments and capital expenditure'[216]

How much will Nigeria need to prosecute the Boko Haram insurgency? There appears to be no exert financial estimate to end the crises. What we know from the government financial estimate is that the sum of $1.2 trillion already spent (about twice the size of Nigeria's economy, estimated at US$514.076 billion!). The conflict has been ongoing in the last 19 years. Yes, the US and other countries have been offering different levels of assistance. However, there is no evidence **that** the international community is interested in further external loan assistance to Nigeria on Boko Haram. As confirmed by Nigeria's current financial estimate, about 50% of Nigeria's annual budget is now used to service external debt. It is not the case that the original debt is paid back.

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[215] Jimoh, I.F. How Megaprojects are Damaging Nigeria and how to fix it published by Palgrave/ Macmillan press. 2022.
[216] Jimoh, I.F p. 1.

The analysis implies that it is becoming challenging to finance the military in the fight against Boko Haram. This may be a challenge for the military in winning the war. However, yes, China has offered some form of loan assistance to Nigeria in infrastructure. The current ethnographer posited in another recent 'study, commissioned by the President of the Federal Government of Nigeria, identified that 11,886 large government projects of a total of 19,000 since Nigeria's independence in 1960 not only failed but were abandoned. This abandonment rate of 63% of all government projects implies a severe problem driving economic prosperity. With the global economic fragmentation, international help is quickly disappearing; further adding is the COVID 19 pandemic. Project failure in Nigeria contributes to declining government legitimacy'[217]Although it should be noted that we have evidence from the data that the economy is capable of financing the Boko Haram conflict when we asked the respondent 'Generally speaking, the Nigerian economy can fund Boko Haram crises', 67% strongly agreed. Still, this is qualified by the words 'generally speaking', which in our view means all things being equal, the economy can finance the insurgency and bring peace to the Nigerian community. This may not be so given that in the reports of Transparency International on corruption in the world. Nigeria ranks in 2020 as 149 out of 180 corrupt nations in the world. Consequently, the international community fears that the money borrowed to bring the Boko Haram insurgency to an end may end in a private pocket, thereby making it difficult to offer general support. The military is also part of Nigerian society. The conflict requires financial aid to come to an end. This includes modern military equipment, payment of soldiers' allowances, surveillance information management, and training

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[217] Jimoh, I.F p. 1.

Declaration of all bandits as terrorists may also encourage other countries to do same and help create a global consensus around dealing with transnational factors that feed the domestic activities of such proscribed organisations and individuals.'

<div align="right">Speaker, Nigeria Federal House of Representative.</div>

Chapter 5 : The Political Factor

Overview

The military success of the Boko Haram conflict is held back by political factors accounting for a P-value = (0.000) (0.217), indicating a higher statistically significant consideration that requires explanations again, this answers one of the research questions: Yes 'The Nigeria military's main challenges in winning the Boko Haram insurgency are political factors in nature?' Chapter five quarries the deployment of soldiers by the federal government to northeastern Nigeria in a matter infuriated by political reflection deeply rooted in the religion of ethnicity. The chapter agreed that the political structure reflects the national government. However, generational grievances still hold back the Northeast from reasonable political consideration. Of national interest Regrettably, the anatomy of the military is not providing balance consideration in the federal government deployment of the military to make a reasonable conclusion about the success of the conflicts as the military lost most of the counterinsurgency to the Boko Haram insurgent. Annex two to this work explains the insurgency's activities and the military response in the form of counterinsurgency. The Chapter concludes that Boko Haram is part of the political system, and the democratic arrangement does not exclude Boko Haram from participation in national politics or government. There is no evidence of the Nigerian government unfairness to the insurgents, and there seems to be no justification for the domestic insurgency (Boko Haram) beyond political consideration to which the military has no answer or solution.

Introduction

In chapter two, this study provides the data result and explanation around the variables responsible for the military challenges in the Boko Haram insurgency. We find

that all the variables constitute challenges at different levels. All variables are significant but not at the same level, and multiple levels of analysis trigger explanation and presentation. This chapter discusses the results, explaining how each of the independent variables stands. For example, at what level of value can the government hold the variables in offering solutions to the insurgency. We find from the data that the government and stakeholders are overplaying or underplaying some of the variables. This explanation is supported by the data based on a unit of analysis of the independent variables as distilled in the survey result. This chapter also assists in using the data report on the measure construct issues raised by scholars and how things have changed within the period covered in this investigation. Again, this shows the beauty of empirical evidence when analysing the literature construct. In addition, it provides scholars with the opportunity to receive feedback on their views on the independent variables covered by this work. The study's approach is to present individual variable data followed by a causal explanation of the military challenges in ending the Boko Haram insurgency. The variables are discussed following the ranking according to our data of the independent variables (impact of political consideration, economic living conditions, ethnicity or societal factor and military factors) on the dependent variables—the challenges of the military in the Boko Haram insurgency.

Political Considerations

The studies in the previous chapters answered the research question stating that yes, there are constraints facing the military in ending the Boko Haram conflicts. The answer triggers further research questions we are investigating whether such constrain is political in nature thus the re- search question:

(1) The Nigeria military's main challenges in winning the Boko Haram insurgency are political factors in nature?'

The political explanation of our data results shows that political factors are a statistically significant challenge to the military in ending the Boko Haram insurgency and that being so requires explanations.

Political Explanation= (P-value = (0.000) (0.217)

The result above (P < 0.01) shows that the p-value for Political Explanation as a variable is less than the common alpha level of 0.01, which indicates that the variable is statistically significant and requires we provide an explanation.

In the general introduction of this work, an explanation of several literatures on the political circumstances of Nigeria in history and the amalgamation of 1914 were reviewed. Northern Nigeria, as at that time, showed disapproval of the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates. The disapproval of the North clearly shows from our data that those political considerations are imperative. In the field, we asked several questions relating to and in reflection with political considerations and the trajectories of those questions and the opinion of scholars in their explanation of impacting factors to the challenge of the military in the conflicts. But, again, the fact that those scholars' submissions were distilled in the survey administered by the respondents under political considerations as influencing factor as measure construct is worthy of noting. For instance, the following questions were asked:

(1)   Politically, for instance, the issues relating to the national government of the Nigeria state is unfair to Boko Haram ethnicity

(2)   The Nigeria constitution is unfair to all regions, including the Boko Haram region

(3)   As an ethnic group, Boko Haram does not participate in election matters and does not rep- resent political parties.

(4)   The Nigeria democratic arrangement excludes ethnicity of the geographical area of the Boko Haram presence.

(5)   Boko Haram is always part of the political system.
.

(6)   Boko Haram's political interests are both in the constitution and morally protected like another regional interest in the federation of Nigeria.

The results are as follows.

On whether the national government or the Nigerian state is unfair to Boko Haram ethnicity.

When the amalgamation was announced in 1914, the northern region leaders. This reaction was in response to the famous Anthony Enahoro Independence in 1956 Motion, which he moved in 1953 at the House of Representatives in Lagos. The suggestion of 1956 as the year of Nigerian independence angered the Northern delegates, who described the motion as 'an invitation to commit suicide'. In the case of the amalgamation in 1914, most of the personalities that became prominent nationalists in colonial Nigeria were still children or at best teenagers, in 1914. For example, Sir Abubakar T. Balewa, born in 1912, was two years old; Ahmadu Bello, born in 1910, was four years old; Awolowo, born in 1909, was five years old; and Azikwe, born in 1904, was ten years old. Again, the British neither sought nor obtained any Nigerian's opinion. Amalgamation was on imposition. Nevertheless, the arrangement went on because the British colonial masters wanted it. Still, there are some concerns about political bias during the military and civilian government after the amalgamation. For instance, in chapter three of this work, we consider the anatomy of the military. The study explains how the northern region took the lion's share of the military positions, such as the chief of staff in the military formations and heads of state and presidents.[218] Therefore, in the civilian government, there is also the accusation of the North sharing key government appointments is in the circumstances of allegations, opportunities and challenges. Since the Northeast is the Boko Haram's base, this claim cannot be sustained except there is empirical proof that the Northeast has been short-changed like the other three regions of the South. This is so that the political structure is reflective of the national government. The data confirmed the results as follows.

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[218] Between 1966 and 1999, Nigeria had eight military heads of state. Two of them—Generals Aguiyi Ironsi (January- July 1966) and Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979)—were the only southerners. Six (Generals Yakubu Gowon, Ramat Murtala, Buhari, Babangida, Abacha and Abubakar) were/are Northerners. Moreover, Nigeria has had seven elected leaders (one prime minister and five presidents). Only two of them—Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and Dr. Goodluck Jonathan—are southerners, while Sir Tafawa Balewa, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Alhaji Umaru Yar'Adua, and Rt. Gen. Muhammadu Buhari were/are Northerners. The only additions for the South were Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe as ceremonial president in the First Republic and Chief Ernest Shonekan as head of the Interim National Government hurriedly put together by the military regime of General Babangida in 1993 as a face-saving deal following the crises provoked by the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election. See 'Chronologies of Past Presidents and Heads of State'. Available at: https://www.osgf.gov.ng/about-us/history/past-presidents-and-heads-state.

Table 5.1 Politically for instance is the issues relating to National government the Nigeria state is unfair to Boko Haram

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	377	69.6	69.6	69.6
	Neither agree nor disagree	95	17.5	17.5	87.1
	Strongly Agree	70	12.9	12.9	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

Figure 5.1 Politically for instance is the issues relating to National government the Nigeria state is unfair to Boko Haram

The respondents largely disagreed with the statement that, politically, for instance, in the issues relating to the national government, the Nigerian state is unfair to Boko Haram. The 'strongly disagree' answer shows that the Boko Haram ethnicity benefits from the Nigerian states and is constitutionally represented in the political structure. There has been an

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argument for political restructuring of the Nigerian state. See Chapter One of this work. Again, the data result explains why this argument for the autonomy of the regions is not very popular in the North despite requests. The northern ethnicity cannot claim that they are unfairly treated in the Nigerian state. There is a challenge to the military in winning the war in the face of an unreasonable demand; the Nigerian military needs to protect national territorial sovereignty. Yes, there could initially be issues. Tested data reported above indicate that 'strongly agree' with the 'unfair' treatment of the Boko Haram ethnicity. And there is no reason why domestic socialisation is not first deployed to open a national discussion of political demands rather than deploying the military.

The Nigerian Constitution is unfair to all Regions

We could not find evidence of unfair treatment of the ethnic base of Boko Haram, Northeast, by the Nigerian state or government. We then consider the question of constitutional fairness to all regions. We asked if the Nigerian constitution was fair to all regions. Again, 318 respondents, representing 58.7% of the data, strongly disagreed with the statement that the Nigerian constitution is unfair to all regions, including the Boko Haram region. Again, the data correlate with the first question discussed above, which reinstates that it is not the case that the Nigerian state is unfair to the Boko Haram region. Again, from the present result, see Figure 6.2, which confirms that the Nigerian constitution is fair to all the federation regions. This may also explain why the regional restructuring argument is not gaining ground in the eyes of the national government. Suppose that the constitution is fair to all regions, as the data confirmed. Could it be appropriate for Boko Haram to launch an insurgency? The disagreement among the Boko Haram region may be rooted in ethnic challenges and a collective interest in materialising a desire. We say so, given the constitutional fairness to all federation regions. We also observed that the insurgency is limited to the Northeast part of Nigeria.

The constitution represents the collective desire of all the people of Nigeria. For instance, the Nigerian constitution preamble says:

'Having firmly and solemnly resolve, to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God, dedicated to the promotion of inter-African solidarity, world peace, international cooperation and understanding and to provide for a constitution for the pur-pose of promoting the good government and welfare of all persons in our country, on the principles of freedom, equality, and justice, and for the purpose of consolidating the unity of our people. Do hereby make, enact, and give to ourselves the following constitution'[219]

The provisions and the desire of the constitution that the Nigerian government seeks to enforce brought about the deployment of the military in response to the challenges posed by the Boko Haram insurgency. Still, should this decision to deploy the military be made in a hurry without sufficient effort for domestic socialisation? Could the military be deployed to solve political problems? Is the conclusion logical, and what should ordinarily be done in the circumstances of such a situation presenting itself? The above analysis answers our second research and hypothesis questions as follows: yes, to the research question stating that the Nigeria military main challenges are political considerations, ethnicity factors, and yes, again to the hypothesis that political considerations explain why military counterinsurgency is failing in the context of the Nigeria Boko Haram war. This is also the case of ethnicity, as we shall see shortly in this work

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[219] The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 (Preambles).

Table 5.2. The Nigerian constitution is unfair to all regions, including the Boko Haram region

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	318	58.7	58.7	58.7
	Neither agree nor disagree	131	24.2	24.2	82.8
	Strongly Agree	93	17.2	17.2	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

The critical question is whether the constitution was unfair to the Boko Haram region. This is pertinent because, as we saw in the literature, scholars have explained deprivation theory as a reason for the exclusion of a particular clan. The explanations trigger protests. The study asked whether the constitution deprived all the regional ethnic identity of their right of the federation and the benefit derived from there. If that is so, the study can begin to address constitutional injustice or ethnic bias towards the Boko Haram region by the Nigerian government. Rotimi, Suberu [220] confirmed that the Nigeria constitution in display of fairness support the principle of federal character meaning the use of quota principle to correct imbalance in federal bureaucracy. the study already saw political explanations from the data results of $P < 0.01$. This shows that the p-value for political explanation (0.00) is less than the common alpha level of 0.01, which indicates that it is statistically significant. See Chapter One, where we discussed the historical trajectory of Boko Haram, which again alluded to the historical account that the insurgency was at first created as a different political guild to the former governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff. In any event, chapter one confirmed that the establishment of Boko Haram was during the administration of the former governor. Former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff was

[220]Rotimi, Timothy Suberu. Nigeria's Political Future: A Comment. Oxford Academics *African Affairs*, July 1988, Volume 87, Issue 348 pp. 431–439 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a098056.

interviewed, and he admitted that Boko Haram was established during his administration but not as part of the government. 57% of the respondents who administered the survey strongly disagreed that the constitution was unfair to any federating re region.

The issue of whether, as an ethnic group, the Northeast does not participate in election matters and has no political parties' representation.

About 28% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with this position. In contrast, 208, representing 38% of the respondents, strongly disagreed. Yes, this is because there are three sena- tors and six houses of representative members representing Borno State at the Nigeria National Assembly. Still, 34% or 177 respondents agreed that the Northeast (Boko Haram-dominated area) does not participate in election matters and has no political party representation. YES, it may be difficult to conduct elections in politically violent areas, such as the Boko Haram-dominated region, influencing the respondent's judgement. However, it is not the case that the election did not hold in the Boko Haram region. If elections can take place in the Boko Haram-dominated region, then it is tough to dissonance the domestic socialisation suggestion to the political problem because the military is not trained to solve some complex political issues. relating to voluntary participation in electoral matters. Again Frederick[221] contended that greater inequality increases the relative power of the wealthy to shape politics in their own favor against rival arguments that focus on the effects of inequality on citizens' there is the link with the economic variable earlier discussed in the previous chapter for example, Frederick also agreed that there is the compelling evidence that greater economic inequality yields greater political inequality. Doing so constitutes a challenge to the military who are not trained to balance political and economic power of the citizen. See Chapter two.

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[221] Frederick, S. Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement American Journal of Political Science Volume 52 Issue 1 January 2008 pp. 48-60.

Whether the Nigeria democratic arrangement excludes the ethnicity of the geographical area of the Boko Haram presence

The above question becomes relevant because Nigeria is a democratic country. Yes. Many respondents strongly disagree with the statement about 239, or 44.1% say it is not true that the democratic arrangement excludes the ethnicity of the geographical area of the Boko Haram presence. Again, this present arrangement and the result confirm the imperativeness of the practice of federalism which Okeke and Innocent[222] posited is characterised by 'extensive inter-governmental relations in which federal, state and local tier interact to seek policies and programmes that will cater for the welfare of the public. This can become a reality when there is financial insubordination from any levels of government. The concern here is that 38% or 167 respondents neither agreed nor disagreed on the political exclusion argument. This may explain why Boko Haram took over six local government areas, including Sambisa Forest, in Borno State and hoisted their flags this all negate the doctrine of federalism as explain the work of Okeke and Innocent.

It may also be the case that Boko Haram insurgents are creating their territory from Nigerian geographical jurisdiction. The entire region of Boko Haram is not excluded from the Nigerian state, and this makes it evident that insurgency is a product of political considerations. Politicians use Boko Ha- ram as a hand tool to increase or create new political power. Again, 25% of the respondents agreed that the Nigeria democratic arrangement excludes ethnicity of the geographical area of the Boko Haram presence. The fact that the election and electoral process may be difficult to conduct in crisis areas of the Boko Haram region may influence the exclusion conditions, as expressed by those who disagree.

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[222] Okeke, M. I., & Innocent, E. O. Issue of Fiscal Federalism and National Development in Nigeria during Obasanjo Administration. *Journal of Educational and Social Research*, *3*(10), 109 Volume 52 Issue 1 January 2008, 2013. Retrieved from https://www.richtmann.org/journal/index.php/jesr/article/view/2348

Whether Boko Haram is always part of the political system

This question became pertinent because Boko Haram is part of the political system since the Nigerian system provided ways of handling grievances through government legislature, executive and judiciary. See the results in Table 5.3. Again, if there is disagreement in any system, such as in the Nigerian state, there is government machinery to receive complaints and profound solutions. It can be argued that it is either the machinery is not there or sufficiently incapable of resolving the conflict or still that Boko Haram lost trust in them and decided to take the law into their hands.

Table 5.3 Boko Haram is always part of the political system

	Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly disagree	124	22.9	22.9	22.9
Neither agree nor disagree	171	31.5	31.5	54.4
Strongly Agree	246	45.4	45.4	99.8
11.00	1	.2	.2	100.0
Total	542	100.0	100.0	

Boko Haram's political interests are both in the constitution and morally protected, like another regional interest in the federation of Nigeria.

The question raises the issue of moral concerns regarding the protection of the interests of Boko Haram in Nigerian states. However, ethical issues go with issues of political consideration for the reason of identity protection and considerations. Again, 245 respondents strongly agreed that Boko Haram's political interests are both constitutionally and morally protected, like another regional interest in the federation of Nigeria. This may be because morality and law are Siamese twins. It may be challenging to separate

constitutional legal issues from moral issues. The answer correlates with the fairness of the constitution to Boko Haram ethnicity in the constitutional relationships of all regions. There is empirical evidence of the significance of political variables as a shaping factor in the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, constituting challenges to the military. The political class and the leadership of the Nigerian government did not adopt the option of domestic socialisation in resolving the crises before the deployment of the military. Again, it may be challenging to know which political interests the military will be protecting beyond the state's interest in a domestic conflict

There is no evidence to justify constitutional limitations in resolving crises, but it is a political infraction. However, Boko Haram is part of the political system, and the democratic arrangement does not exclude Boko Haram from participation. There is no evidence of the Nigerian government's unfairness to the insurgents, and there seems to be no justification for the domestic insurgency beyond political consideration. The logic behind the existence of the Boko Haram insurgency and its operations is political. It is unfair to the Nigerian state and a fundamental breach of the constitutional rights of the victims of the insurgency. The effect of the crisis has brought untold hardships and economic syndromes to the Nigerian state beyond the fact that it constitutes a challenge to the Nigerian military. Cornelius and Okorie suggest honesty and new value orientation for new confidence building for the much-needed peaceful coexistence in the Nigeria-state, which are achievable by domestic socialisation rather than military deployment in ending the conflict.

Theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the realm of moral values.'

Clausewitz on War.

Chapter 6 : Societal and Ethnic Factors

Overview

Introduction

The Chapter provides insight to the research questions on how Societal and Ethnic Factors constitute impediments to the Nigeria military in ending the Boko Haram conflict. The study saw that the Nigeria military capacity to manage information and misinformation about the Boko Haram insurgency is in doubt. For instance, is the challenge of military judgment of the key psychological factors in understanding Northeast Nigeria's environment. Information evaluation of the information provided by the insurgents, the lack of support of military deployment by the society, and the challenges of information accuracy and disinformation by the insurgency are key converging factors that have been prolonging the war. While society support is imperative for the success of ending any unconventional war, the military did not sufficiently contact interest groups such as the leaders of thoughts, prominent individuals, and religious leaders from the Northeast. The lack of contact and support fuelled the public revolt against the military, which created a dilemma in ending the war. The Nigeria military knowledge of adequate planning or tactical strategy operational deployment of unconventional war, reflective of the feasible assessment of the military operations primarily resulting in civil revolt of the military actions thereby lacking in the legitimacy of the military outing in the Boko Haram insurgency by the society. The current chapter benchmarked the framework of the roadmap of the US document TC 18-01 Special Forces Un- Conventional Warfare with the Nigeria

military planning strategy of winning the Boko Haram insurgency in the content of the societal approval and finds serious flops.

The Nigerian military needs modern training in areas of cooperation with insurgency leaders, particularly on information resistance. This is one aspect that the survey interrogates. It presented a field report of empirical evidence of how the alleged 'Western education' protest destroyed the ethnic-driven Islamic religion that tends to support Boko Haram operations to which the military had no response.

Societal and Ethical Factor Issues

Largely, society is the Centre of all discussions and issues relating to the challenges of Boko Haram insurgencies, as we saw in Chapters Three, Four and Five of this work, specifically on issues such as the political community and economic consideration. The insurgency has made considerable impacts on the destruction of lives and properties that creates limitations to human security[223]in Nigeria, as the study saw in the number of people that were killed demonstrated in Chapter Three (Table 3.4) relating to the activities of the insurgents and military counter insurgency. The peace of Nigerian society has been arrested by insurgent activities in the last twenty years, not only in the direct assault on human life in the Northeast and Northwest, but also the socio-psychological trauma it has inflicted on other regions of the country. Among other things, the insurgency has further destroyed the remnant cleavages of intergroup harmony across Nigeria, such that young compatriots who had to vacate their homes in the affected regions to where should naturally have been their haven have been seen and stigmatised as human embodiments of insurgency and violence who should be watched closely and avoided. Indeed,

what is left is to graduate the un- conventional civil conflict into a conventional war! The pains and the multiplier effects rub off on all sectors of the economy, and as previously cited in this work, spending on Boko Haram is twice Nigeria's economic size.

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[223] Jackson-Pearce, *Security in International Relations*, (Undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance, and the Social Sciences 2019 pp. 53–56. IR3140 University of London Press.

Amalu examines the effects of the insurgency on Nigerian society and submits persuasively that:

> Boko Haram insurgency has negative impact on the human security of the Nigerian citizens. It is therefore evident that as Boko Haram insurgency has claimed lots of lives, aggravated the food and nutrition insecurity, further damaged to health and education sector, and has caused general fear and anxiety; an urgent solution is needed.
>
> Boko Haram insurgency is therefore a threat to human security in Nigeria.[224]

It is the case that a conflict in one ethic group of Northeast Nigeria is redefining Nigeria's sovereignty, creating limitations to human conditions and distilling human insecurity. Dunn[2] explains the impact of the insurgency on childhood wasting; thus, 'Results suggest that if children exposed to the conflict had not been exposed, their mean weight-for-height z-score would be 0.49 standard deviations higher ($p < 0.001$) than it is, increasing from ‑0.74 to ‑0.25. Additionally, the likelihood of wasting would be 13 percentage points lower (mean z-statistic − 4.2), bringing the pro- portion down from 23% to 10%.[225]The implication is that the insurgency undermines the provision of basic social services, which creates development challenges in the health sector as it affects children. This is only one impact, for instance, as women and young persons are also affected by displacement and most of the affected persons travelled the borders of Nigeria to neighbouring countries, including Chad, Niger, Ghana, and other West African countries seeking asylum as internally dis- placed persons. The impact of religious fanaticism, which is widespread in the Northeast and fuelled by ethnicity, has created a lawless society that

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[224] Nneka Sophie Amalu, 'Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Human Security in Nigeria', *Global Journal of Social Sciences*, *pages* 35-42 2015 p.14
[225] Gillian Dunn, 'The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria on childhood wasting: a double- difference study', *Conflict and Health* volume 12, 2018, p. 6. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-018- 0136-2

makes the military fighting the nonconventional conflict almost impossible. John F. Kennedy's explication of nonconventional warfare is apt for our understanding of the Boko Haram insurgency and its impact. According to Kennedy, 'There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest'[226] He explained in specific reference to the US that 'the intent of the U.S. unconventional warfare effect is to exploit a hostile power's political, military, economic and psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish objectives[227]

In the Nigerian military, the challenges to reasonable military judgement of the key psychological factors in the understanding of the environment of the Northeast Nigeria, information evaluation of the information provided by the insurgents, the lack of support and under- standing of military deployment by the society, and the challenges of information accuracy and disinformation by the insurgency are key converging factors that have been prolonging war. The Nigerian military needs modern training in areas of cooperation with insurgency leaders, particularly on resistance information. This is one aspect that our survey interrogates, as we see shortly in this chapter.

The US document on nonconventional war discusses seven stages of the road map that the Nigerian military can borrow from see Figure 6:13 this includes preparation, initial contract, infiltration, organisation, build-up, employment, and transition. Each of the stages is important as strategic involvement in nonconventional wars, such as the Boko Haram conflicts. The military tactics in the Boko Haram conflict exemplify, in practice, a lack of proper understanding on the part of the military the vey distinction in approach to

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[226] US Document TC 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare November 2010 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-SF, 2175 Reilly Road, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.
[227] US Document TC 18-01 p.215

conventional and nonconventional war.[228] For example, the first stage of preparation as proposed by the US military document on unconventional war in the Nigerian context excluded the acceptance of the support of the society such that there was no input from the public in the military preparation for the resolution of the crises again, is the aggressive strategy of tactical attack without environmental survey and feasible assessment, which undermined the military success.[229]

The second stage requires initial contact and apart from government formation, the military did not contact interest groups such as the leaders of thoughts, prominent individuals, religious leaders from Northeast, and such lack of contact fuel the public revolt against the military, which creates a dilemma in ending the war. Infiltration by the military to the Northeast was done without consultation and with much aggressiveness, the approach provoked the population in the Northeast and that explains why the population withheld their support to the military in ending the war. The military build-up also excludes the civil population, who would have been helpful in providing information or limiting disinformation. Civilian employment by the military is limited in numbers as more military solders were deployed and such an approach also compromised success as Boko Haram insurgents took advantage of employing the civil population in advancing their mission. There were no transitions yet, as the conflict is still ongoing except that sapping the seven processes above in respect to the social engagement shows failure on the part of the military in ending the war. Statistic evidence collected from the field empirically shows (as we see later in this chapter) that the military is less significant for statistical explanation specific to the ending Boko Haram conflict in the Northeast, and regrettably many resources are deployed on the military than other factors. Society's collaboration is an important concern in ending nonconventional conflict, but it is the case in Nigeria that was compromised by the military approach to insurgency. Unfortunately, the military cannot act alone to bring the conflict to an end.

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[228] Thomas R. Mockaitis, Conventional and Unconventional War: A History of Conflict in the Modern World (Connecticut: Praeger Greenwood Pub, 2017).
[229] Chapter Seven of this work on how to end the war and ensure military success.

One challenge associated with others for the Nigerian military is the population resistance to military deployment in bringing the war to an end. For instance, there is a preponderance of opinions across the society that the military is oppressive, and that the military involvement is not likely promising for the good of the greater number, given that government in weak states like Nigeria is basically viewed as being oppressive and the population naturally withhold their cooperation and allegiance. Indeed, Jackson-Preece argues that 'in many of these states the military is more concerned with protecting the political leadership from the people than in protecting the people from external attack'[230]. Such praxis exposed the military to people's hatred, thus driving the military on collision to human value in an operational approach. Arising from that is the capacity for open conflict among individuals in their group approach to confrontation of the military, thereby prolonging the conflicts. What we saw in practice is the direct confrontation that brought the military into ridicule of civil society's desires: 'As the discontent grows, natural leaders, such as former military personnel, clergymen, local office holders, and neighbourhood representatives, emerge to channel this discontent into organised resistance that promotes its growth. The population must believe they have nothing to lose or more to gain. Key to transitioning from growing discontent to insurrection is the perception by a significant portion of the population that they have nothing to lose by revolting and the belief that they can succeed'[231].

Population resistance to the military approach in conflicts undermines military success and constitutes critical challenges to the military. For instance, there was no mobilisation plan of the society to support the military campaign for unconventional war. This exposed the suffering masses to the ridicule of military involvement, as there were no humanitarian assistance and other intervention centres to mitigate the challenges of the aggressive tactical involvement of the civil population. It was expected that civil military operation CMO[232] would be conducted with human face, where during resistance there are

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[230]Jackson-Preece, J. 'Security in International Relations', (Undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance, and the Social Sciences p. 49. IR3140 University of London Press, 2019)
[231]US Document TC 18-01 p.216
[232] Frankie Volker, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, (2006). 5-25 (2) p. 11

expected to be in existence significant humanitarian assistance to mitigate the painful effects. This was not the case with the Nigerian military with respect to the Boko Haram insurgency. The military hardly conducts a military operation impact assessment of the civil population. If they did, there was no direct evidence that the result was implemented in strategic formation on the indigenous population as the military is failing in the tactical approach[233]population resistance to the military approach to the Boko Haram conflict is a general protest of the imposed conditions of the military to human subjective values possess an obsessive hatred for the established authority.

The lack of support from society arising from the aggressive nature of military praxis constitutes challenges in the hands of the military in bringing the Boko Haram conflict to an end. For instance, the lack of feasibility assessment in planning on the part of the military implies that there is no plan presented by the military that needs the legitimacy support of the society in the intervention, no mission of engagement that the military discussed with the general public or specifically with the people of the Northeast, there was no mapping of the Boko Haram territory with respect to terrain, enemy location, climatology and troops by the tactical operation strategy and this resulted in the many killings of military personnel by the Boko Haram troops. The lack of planning under- scores the imperativeness of the accuracy of the means and resources required to achieve the military mission. Furthermore, beyond the hierarchy of the military, a specific analysis of leadership capability to end the war was lacking; so is the engagement of the understanding of the leadership engaged by the Boko Haram around tactical operation in the war front. For instance, in the question of respect, the tactics and battlefield conduct of the military are acceptable to society. The lack of legitimacy of the public of military tactical battlefield conduct undercuts the required success expected of the military. For instance, a considerable number of the public believe that the politically motivated risk is rather sustained than the military aggressiveness to the society, the lack of support and its potential risk worth the unknown risk in the opinion of the public.[234]

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[233] FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, issue 28 January 2014. P.7

[234] US document TC 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare November 2010. P.1-3

Other challenges facing the military, as triggered by societal factors, include the psychological preparation of the population for the introduction of conventional forces as milestones in the resolution of conflicts. The military owns it a duty to the public to prepare their psychological intent for the engagement of the plan and the road map to end the crisis if there was any feasible plan in place. This is important to unconventional war as a winning strategy rather than the aggressiveness displayed or paraded by the military. Such an approach undermined the desire for the military's success in the conflict. The impact of such a strategy is to dispel the information that suggests a guerilla operation. For example, the US used such a strategy in European and Pacific theatres (1942-1945), Iraq (2002-2003) and North Korea 1951-1945[235]. The Nigerian military could borrow from such strategic engagement in gaining the legitimacy of the society's support in ending the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast. The approach is empirically evidenced from limited war like Boko Haram in related cases such as The Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia– 1950s), Guatemala (1954), Albania (1949–1954), Tibet (1955–1965), Indonesia (1958), Cuba (1960s), North Vietnam (1961–1964), Afghanistan (1980s) and Nicaragua (1980s)[236]. The understanding here is that the military requires legitimacy (particularly the moral para-mental leg of legitimacy) in securing the success of unconventional or limited wars like Boko Haram.

The military thus remains on the negative side of the society's public opinion pendulum, and this can affect the efficiency and morale of the soldiers in the war front. More importantly, given that religion fuels ethnicity that is central to the Northeast, the military remains in dilemma, and this impacts its effective operation in bringing the insurgency to an end. The direct confrontation of the population is centrally revolt against the government policy choice of military deployment that is capable of paralysing military tactical operations, see Annex two of this work. It has been established that the military find it difficult in most cases to respond swiftly and appropriately to many of the insurgent attacks launched by Boko Haram. This is basically because of the dynamics of the society

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[235] US document TC 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare November 2010 P.1-7.
[236] Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Congress 'Exploring Three Strategies for Afghanistan', in <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55538/html/CHRG-111shrg55538.htm>

by which insurgent leaders take advantage of government policy and the constraints of the military in resistance or hesitation to use conventional tactics in such conflicts. Again, a significant number of the population believe they will succeed in their revolting against the government and its military policies because they have nothing to lose anymore, given that they are used to twenty years of sustained insurgency. The belief has been concretised in the minds of most people, even from day one of the military deployment, that there is hardly any change of option from the government's oppressive regime. One of the insurgents 'generals' popularly known as (General shoot -at -Sight) interviewed explained his experience; thus, 'we are out to kill the military because that is the only way to react to the government oppressive regime and the sudden deployment of the military to our situation and we are going to kill many of them we have nothing to lose since they have been killing our people. By the way, that explains my name, General Shoot-at-Sight'!

Government deployment strategy planning and feasibility assessment of the area of operation in the Northeast are poor and this challenge comes with very high unintended consequences. There is no adequate study of the topology of the Northeast, and it took so long for the military to understand the geomorphology of the dreaded Sambisa Forest, the place where the insurgents took the 200 kidnapped Chibok girls in April 2014.There was no evidence of adequate collaboration between the insurgent and the military. The strategy of engagement was weak because of the military's oppressive approach. That the military's failure to inform, collaborate with, and engage the population is critical to her failure to contain the insurgency. This is so because carefully mastered participation and involvement of all critical components of the society is significant to an accurate assessment of the challenges of the conflict, more importantly in minimising the unknown risk. The kidnapping of the Chibok girls is particularly instructive of the Nigerian military's failure to contain the insurgents. As the BBC reported,

> Originally, 276 were kidnapped, sparking one of the biggest global social media campaigns, with tweeters using the hashtag #Bring- Back Our Girls. Some managed to escape shortly after they were seized, while about 100 have been

freed in exchange for Boko Ha- ram militants, in negotiations brokered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)[237]

In essence, while it is heartening that some of the kidnapped girls eventually obtained their freedom, the agonies of those who were not released (and have not been released up until today) and their families are immeasurable. The trauma of possible eternal separation between the girls and their parents and siblings is unimaginable. Yet, this is the gory reality that Nigerian society has had to live with over time since 2014. What is more, the fact that those who were released got their freedom through a negotiated process leaves a great deal to be desired. The negotiations entailed mutual agreement with the Nigerian federal government having to release some insurgents in ex- change for the girls. Thus, it is a case of harmless and armless Nigerian girls becoming mere pawns and human shields of sort, as well as sex slaves for insurgents. According to the BBC, while the 'Nigerian military—with assistance from Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger—has pushed Boko Haram out of several provinces in Northeastern Nigeria, the group (still) retains control over some villages and pockets of territory and continues to launch deadly suicide attacks and abduct civilians, mostly women and children. In February 2018, more than one hundred students were kid- napped (in a fresh attack) by a faction of Boko Haram known as Islamic State (of) West African Province (ISWAP). They were released a little more than a month later[238]

Another important impact of the insurgency on Northern Nigeria is the problem of displacement and forced migration of human persons. This has become a social phenomenon with huge implications for the humanitarian conditions of victims and the quality of responses, if any, unveiled to ameliorate such conditions. Insurgency and

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[237]Centre for Preventive Action, 'Conflict with Boko Haram in Nigeria 2015). Available from: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria> [accessed 4 June 2022].
See also BBC News 'Nigerian Chibok Abductions: What We Know'. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 32299943 > (accessed 4 June 4, 2022).
[238]BBC News, 'Nigerian Chibok Abductions: What We Know'. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world- africa-32299943[accessed 4 June 2022].

displacement are composite and intrinsically linked phenomena that predictably help us understand the tenor and dynamics of conflicts in any given society. In terms of its nature, operational character, set objectives and effects, insurgency shows differential manifestations across societies. However, it has a common denominator to wrestle power and authority from and displace a legitimate government for the purpose of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources. Usually, this happens where there is a sheer lack of national cohesion, with a preponderance of marked divisions along racial, ethnic, religious and/or linguistic persuasions, within a seemingly composite society. This division fertilises the grounds for intergroup disharmony, distrust and tensions, which culminate in insurrection against established government[239]. O'Neil's argument in summary and as it relates to the insurgency consequently explains that insurgent activities/operations are terrorist acts that can, and do, lead to the displacement of persons. According to the United Nations Guiding Principles, displaced persons are:

> Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border[240].

Internally displaced persons are a category displaced within a geographical location. Because of the displacement, they suffer several consequences as the means of their

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[239] O'Neil, B., Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005

[240] United Nations (UN), 'UN Guiding Principles on Internal Population Displacement', in Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey, ed. by Janie Hampton (London: Earths can, 1998, pp. 205–213.

livelihood, such as agriculture and trade are dashed out because of violent conflicts or disaster, which could be as a result… of human or natural factor[241].

The IDP phenomenon is a double-pronged tragedy. On the one hand, the IDPs (particularly women and children) experience worsening situations of food insecurity, malnutrition, and poor hygiene. There is no adequate supply of much-needed resources to effectively cater to the basic needs of IDPs. Most of the most affected states struggled to provide a normal life for their citizens before the insurgency. Therefore, the compelling need to settle dis- placed persons came as a deadly blow to their fledgling economies. As Lenshi and Yenda warn,

> …it is important to state that many of these states the IDPs run to for safety also have serious challenges. For example, Taraba, Bauchi, and Gombe States and other parts of the central Nigeria, such as the Plateau State among others, are also affected by conflicts that have most of the time turned to be violent. The presence of IDPs also compounds the challenge of increased level of competition for resources, such as food, water and emergency shelter. The absence of these necessities leads to secondary displacement. This situation has serious consequences such as the risk and vulnerability of a continuous circle of displacement and further creates security concerns due to fears of Boko Haram.[242]

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[241] Lenshi, N.E. and H.B. Yenda, 'Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Responses in Northeast Nigeria', *International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies*, 2016.142 (8) Volume 4

[242] Lenshi and Yenda p. 147

While only about 13% to 18% of the entire IDP population live in the camps, 82% to 87% live among kith and kin in the host communities. More importantly, the table below shows the age and gender statistics of the IDPs in most of the affected states as of 2014.

Table 6.1 Age and Gender Statistics of IDPs in the affected Northern Nigerian States (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi and Taraba)

Children	Adults	Women	Men
56+%	42%	53%	47%

Source: N. E. Lenshi and H. B. Yenda[243]

Relying on available records, Lenshi and Yenda argue that,

> …these categories of people are more vulnerable to all kinds of challenges prevalent, particularly among women and children in the various camps. The challenges faced by the IDPs in the various camps have been mutually reinforcing, such that it amounts to human rights violation because the government is expected by the Kampala convention to provide better living conditions for the IDPs by supplying them with all the needed facilities required for a good life.[244]

The sustained operation of the Boko Haram insurgents in the Northeastern Nigeria remains the most potent factor in the prevalent insecurity situation and the consequent military, police, and civilian Joint Task Force counterinsurgency operations in the region.

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[243] Lenshi and H. B. Yenda, 'Boko Haram insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Responses in Northeast Nigeria', *Interna- tional Journal of Humanities and Social Studies* 4 (2016), 142 (8).
[244] Lenshi and Yenda, p .146.

As already noted, a greater percentage of the IDPs are in various host communities across the country, as the fewer population of about 18% are in the various camps. Those in the camps have suffered deteriorating conditions. In the same manner, IDPs living in various host communities do not fare better, as they experienced a deterioration of resources and their needs have increased drastically.

Table 6.2. Details of the average proportions of IDPs in the hardest hit three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa

Borno				Yobe				Adamawa			
LGA IDP	LGA Base	Case load	% Case load	LGA IDP	LGA Base	Case load	% Case load	LGA IDP	LGA Base	Case load	% Case load
Gwoza	288446	16117		Dama-turu	16281	16281		Mada-gali	135142	31316	
Mob-bar	116631	2350		Fune	4042	4042		Mubi North	151515	2152	
Dam-boa	249298	20540		Fika	3659	3659		Mubi South	129956	3586	
Konduga	190951	35810		Gujiba	15226	15226		Gombi	114761	9389	

MMC	4991	4991		Tarmuwa	3540	3540		Yola North	196197	5460	
Kaga	3496	2086		Gashua	10172	10172		Yola South	199675	5346	
Mafa	3496	3496		Geidam	11446	11446		Fufore	363	363	
Biu	7040	7040						Lamurde	2339	2330	
Jere	51720	1864									
Total	1199222	106098	11%	Total	771368	76354	-9%	Total	1085186	66,826	6%

Population caseloads of IDPs in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States
Source: National Emergency Management Agency, 2014.

If Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba States are added to the above details to show the six most affected states in Northern Nigeria, the depth and intensity of the ferocious Boko Haram insurgency would be much appreciated. It would underscore the fact that a more proactive architecture needs to be developed beyond raw military engagements to resolve the insurgency.

Table 6.3 below shows further details.

Current Location	IDP Individual	IDP Households	IDP Average HHs Size
Adamawa	220,159	25,807	8.5
Bauchi	60,555	9,881	6.1
Borno	672,714	76,842	8.8
Gombe	24,655	3,335	7.4
Taraba	74,125	11,599	6.4
Yobe	135,810	21,893	6.2
Total	**1188018**	**149357**	**8.0**

IDPs Population by States in Nigeria (2008-2014)[245]

From the above table, Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States, in that order, have higher cases of individual IDPs and affected IDP households than each of the other three, whereas Borno, Gombe, also in that order, has the highest average figures of IDP household sizes.

[245] IOM-OIM (2015) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), Round II Report, February 2015, http://nigeria.iom.int/dtm

The significant implication is that the prevalence and negative consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency are more in the first three states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe than elsewhere, thus showing that these states are the main theatres of the insurgents. However, the statistics in the comparatively less affected states are equally condemnable, requiring similar measures of intervention.

It is now clear that money that should have been spent on building public infrastructure for the collective public good is now being spent on caring, though justifiably, for displaced persons. Familusi and Oshomoh argue this more succinctly: 'Billions of naira has been spent on this project and many of IDPs who are supposed to be working and contribute to the economy are denied their right to work. Private agencies, Local, state and federal government have spent billions of naira to distribute relief materials to the IDPs'[246] Moreover, 'On 26 of November 2015, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) distributed 1,120 bags of rice, 2,240 bags of maize, 2,120 bags of millet, 280 bags of cement, roofing sheets, ceilings, mosquito nets, mattresses, tissues, detergent and lastly, over 800million has been spent by Yobe state government on the welfare of the Pompomari Camp, Damaturu'[247]. All of these have negative impacts on the economic development of the affected states and Nigeria as a whole. This is another double-edged impact of insurgency on the normal public life of the affected areas. On one hand, money is being dissipated on taking care of security matters and the daily welfare of displaced persons. From all indications, governments at all levels have to obey the supremacy doctrine of security by prioritising over and above any other welfarist considerations for the overall collective interests of society. Essentially, the situation has generally slowed down the commitment of all levels of government and other intervention agencies to the much-important drive of the provision of basic social amenities.

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[246] Familusi O.O and Oshomoh, T.O., The Socio-economic Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Ni- geria, Kampala International University of Social Science, KIU Journal of Social Sciences, July 2018. [S.l.], v. 4, n. 2, p. 213-223, ISSN 2519-0474.
[247] Daily Independence27 December 2015, p. 6.

Explaining this, Dauda opines that the insurgence of Boko Haram in the North has drastically reduced the present government's performance in the affected area[248]. It should be noted that security challenges in northern Nigeria have cost the economy of the country #1.3 trillion[249] Familusi and Oshomoh[250] view it that the sustained operations of the Boko Haram have led to the reduction of government derivation from the affected northern states because of restiveness in those areas as well as reducing investment and growth of business.

The insecurity challenge continues to make it impossible for the government to execute vital projects for the people. What the foregoing portends is that Nigerian society, especially in the Northeastern and North- western regions, is enmeshed in the whirlpool of insecurity or better put, security collapse. Without security, any society is unbelievable, and life therein is threatened. In underscoring the central importance of security to society, Hobbes declared that, without security, 'there is no place for industry… no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man (would become) solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'[251]. This makes the safety and security of any society the supreme law from which all others flow. William Bain further explains security; thus, 'it is an explicitly normative safety that is tied no less explicitly to the felicity or happiness of persons joined (willingly) in a relationship of civil association'[252] Bain, like many other international relations scholars, holds that such civil association, otherwise known as society, 'should be ordered to the benefit of citizens; those laws should attend to the welfare of the many; or that the safety of the majority should prevail over the interests of selfish or seditious factions'[253] Buttressing this, Jackson-Preece defines security as a 'core value of human life', because without it, human life is reduced to a basic struggle for survival[254]. Hedley Bull emphasised that 'Security …

[248] Dauda, M. 'The Effects of Boko Haram Crisis on Socio-Economic Activities in Yobe State', *The International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Invention*, (2014), 251–257 (4).
[249] The Sun Newspaper, p. 22. 14 July 2016.
[250] Familusi and Oshomoh, 220.
[251] Hobbes, T, *Leviathan*, ed. by M. Oakeshott. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946).
[252] W. Bain, The empire of security and the safety of the people), London: Routledge, 2006 p. 1.
[253] Bain, *The Empire of Security…*. See also T. Hobbes, (1998). *On the Citizen*. Eds. and trans., R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne. Cambridge University Press.
[254] Jackson-Preece, J. *Security in International Relations*) (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2019 p. 14.

means no more than safety: either objective safety, safety which actually exists, or subjective safety, that which is felt or experienced'[255]

Hence, such a society without security, as found in Nigeria, would depict lawlessness and drift to the Hobbesian state of nature, where life would be unenviably worthless, and living would be predictably on struggle. This would concur with the Hobbesian postulation of war of survival, or better put, war of all against all[256] Conceding that insecurity is a universal phenomenon, Familusi and Oshomoh argue that '……. What is strange in the country is the seeming inability of the government to find lasting solutions to the problem. The cliché of 'security threat' has almost trans-formed into security collapse'[257] This has not only culminated in the crippling of the local economies in the affected regions, as Falola and Hearton[258] have argued convincingly; it has also impeded foreign direct investments in Northern Nigeria and widened the North–South dichotomy in another dimension. Since the security problems associated with the Boko Haram insurgency began, a considerable number of operational and potential investors have deserted the affected areas.

It has become a common fad for some fifth columnists to sponsor fake news of food poisoning from the North to the South. As Familusi and Oshomoh note, 'the security challenge has also led to drastic reduction of people's patronage of agricultural produce from the North to southern communities because of the recent rumour that members of the sect are planning to send poisonous products to other parts of the country'[259] Often, some gullible residents of the South would momentarily believe and persuade their kin and kith to avoid food commodities from the North. This is part of the stigma already attached to Northern Nigeria as a hotbed of violence and a haven of all anti-human tendencies Furthermore, given that Northern Nigeria is largely an agrarian society, the core elements of the agrarian economy are steadily battered. Farmers no longer feel safe going to their farms for farming. Thus, the means of supplying basic household needs, particularly food,

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[255] Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* 1995(New York: Columbia University Press, p. 18.
[256] Jackson-Preece, J. p. 33.
[257] Familusi O.O. and Oshomoh, T.O. pp 213-223.
[258] Familusi and Oshomoh, pp.118–144.
[259] Familusi and Oshomoh, p. 219.

are cut off, while farmers' hitherto thriving export trade to Southern Nigeria and other parts of the West African subregion is collapsing. Consequently, in obedience to the forces of demand and supply, the prices of food items have shot up in recent times. According to Familusi and Oshomoh, 'The northern farmers find it difficult to carry out their legitimate right of farming and in some cases, goods are stockpiled wasting in the hands of farmers because the traders from the South are scared to travel to the North to buy goods'[260]

The Impact of Ethnicity

Our second hypothesis and research question suggest that ethnicity accounts for the Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria and this was tested in the field. The results show that ethnicity is one of the challenges facing the military. Still, and when combined with the societal factor, it is a statistically significant factor; nevertheless, we cannot undermine the ethic factor as one of the factors that underscore the military success of the Boko Haram Insurgency, particularly when we are looking for causality (cause and effect of military failure in the Boko Haram insurgency). A factorial analyse of society and ethnic independent variables triggers explanation.

Ethnicity = (P-value = (0.188)

$\qquad$ (0.052)

P >0.01, ethnicity variable show p-value of (0.188) is greater than the common alpha level of 0.01, which indicates that it is statistically significant. Chapters one and two of this work already established the significant presence of ethnicity in the Nigerian military setting, as the study saw in again is the establishment of ethnicity as driver of the political configuration of the Nigerian state. Even when our empirical data show that ethnicity does not stand alone as a statistical explanation, we combined societal variables as complementary to the statistical analysis, as we saw at the early stage of this chapter that the combined factorial analysis created a comfortable foundation for our discussion of

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[260] Familusi and Oshomoh supra p. 220.

ethnicity. It is also related to a political variable that stands alone in this work. Issues of ethnicity are correlative with political considerations, as we shall see shortly.

The survey asked questions relating to ethnicity considerations of the Boko Haram insurgency the respondents' provided answers to our questions satisfactorily. The questions asked are divided into two sections of the Boko Haram Identity: The issue relating to the amalgamation of South and North protectorates in 1914. This is a crucial interrogation to demonstrate the societal implications of withholding support for military counterinsurgency. In addition, it will offer a practical explanation of why military counterinsurgency fails in most cases, thereby exposing policy strategy weaknesses. In Chapter Three, we provide a comprehensive table of the number of insurgencies launched by Boko Haram. See Figure 3.4 in Chapter Three of this work. The military has tried to contain the insurgent through many counterinsurgency strategies. Still, there is no evidence that the military is winning the conflicts with the rising number of causalities and increasing age long of over two decades of the continuous operation of the insurgent in Nigeria. One implication is the deficit in government legitimacy, because the government is accused of pursuing self-interest. The survey asked the following questions, which are significant for investigating the casual effect of societal and ethical factors as challenges to the military in ending the Boko Haram conflict.

Ethnic Identity

(1) The Boko Haram is born out of ethnic considerations over national interest.
(2) Boko Haram, as the meaning of the name suggests, is genuinely against Western education.
(3) Boko Haram collaborates with other ethnic nations in Nigeria.
(4) Boko Haram's demand is reasonable within the context of the Nigerian state.
(5) Boko Haram is fostered within the culture of the ethnicities where it exists.
(b) The amalgamation of South and North Protectorates of 1914
(6) Boko Haram created the 1914 amalgamation of the South and North Protectorates.
(7) The event of 1914 created legitimacy to which Boko Haram took advantage.
(8) Boko Haram converged to protect its legitimate interests within the Nigerian

constitution.

Boko Haram Is Born Out of Ethnic Considerations Over National Interest.

The seminar works of Iro and Osumah[261] raise the question of the 'dysfunctional character of the Nigerian state' arising from the state's reliance on military deployment on repression and the issue of poor governance that makes the government unpopular and lacking in legitimacy. Such an approach over time also built or greed radicalisation of violet non-state actors like Boko Haram. The work identifies and com- pares two regions of the Northeast and Niger Delta, where insurgency breeds from poor governance and lack of legitimacy. The respondent's reaction clears the doubt arising from the discussion that the insurgent is protecting their regions, the military has more significant challenges at hand in ending the regional conflict Again, question is important, given that the Nigerian federation is a convergence of six geopolitical zones, one of which is the Northeast. Each of these zones has a number of ethnic and subethnic groupings within its geographical boundaries. As discussed in Chapter One of this work, ethnic groups are unrelated in praxis and traits of taxonomies of their convergence. The compelled federation of the major and minor ethic groups in Nigeria is often referred to as an 'act of necessity' for the British have been accused of converging the ethnic group by reason of administrative conveniences. In such circumstances, and given Nigeria's historical past particularly, the unresolved issues of the imposed merger of peoples of different cultural affinities culminated in the events that led to secession demand by the Biafra Republic of the Eastern Nigerians, barely six years after Nigeria's independence in 1960. This demand immediately led to civil war. The current question tends to probe into the circumstances that led to insurgency emerging from the Northeast region and wants to know if the major ethnic group (Hausa-Fulani) also disagreed with the federation arrangement, such that the insurgents emerged.

We stated earlier that the insurgents' most desired goal is to transfer legitimacy from the government to their self-desire. This also explains why the military is concerned about eliminating insurgents and preventing the escalation of acts of terrorism. This showcases

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[261] Iro Aghedo & Oarhe Osumah (2012) The Boko Haram Uprising: how should Nigeria respond? Third World Quarterly, 33:5,853-869, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.674701.

the significance of the question. The Boko Haram demand is borne out of ethnic considerations over national interests. A total of 542 or 50.1% of respondents, answered the question and strongly agreed that the Boko Haram demand is born out of ethnic considerations over national interest. While 75 or 13% of the respondents will not agree or disagree, 195 or 36% also disagree that it is not true that Boko Haram is ethnic demand. Figure 6.4 presents detailed statistics

Table 6.4 Respondents' responses to the question: The Boko Haram demand is borne out of ethnic considerations over national interests?

		Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Per-cent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	195	36.0	36.0	36.0
	Neither agree Nor disagree	75	13.8	13.8	49.8
	Strongly Agree	272	50.2	50.2	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

Figure 6.1. Respondents responds to the question: The Boko Haram demand is borne out of ethnic considerations over national interest?

The answer that Boko Haram is of ethical consideration shows why the insurgents took over six local government areas in Borno State of Nigeria and hoists Boko Haram flags in Nigeria territory and this also confirms empirically that they enjoy local support of their community. The Northeast region comprises six states out of thirty-six states of the Nigerian Federation. The activities of the insurgents currently extend to the entire Northern Nigeria, thereby covering additional regions with attacks launched in Abuja, including the office of the United Nations and the Nigeria Police headquarters. See Chapter Three of this work. Abuja, the Nigeria Federal capital, is situated in the North-central region. The attacks are characterised by violence and a considerable number of killings. David Galula[262] has suggested at least four methods of counter-insurgency strategy to contain the massive effect of the Boko Haram insurgent to include (1) reinforcement of the state political machine and (2) action against the conditions that precipitate insurgency. (3) Infiltration of the insurgent movement with the intent of rendering it ineffectual and (4) direct action against the insurgent leadership. The military has used those strategies with little or no result and one explanation for such an unsuccessful approach is that ethnicity-driven conflicts always defy critical military operational attacks, as we saw in chapter three of this work. A nonconventional conflict requires a different strategy than the conventional war operational tactical approach, as we saw in the early part of this chapter and the Nigerian military have a lesson to learn, as discussed above.

Boko Haram, as the meaning of the name suggests, genuinely opposes Western education.

The question of Boko Haram, as the meaning of the name suggests, is genuinely against Western education and became important because it is valid to suggest that the British government came to Nigeria with Western education and culture. It is also true that the British government contentiously influences policy decisions and the Nigerian legal system. For instance, at independence, all British statutes and law are of general application

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[262] Galula, D. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 1964).

in Nigeria up until 1960. Could it be the case that the Boko Haram ethnicity is at variance with such belief of the British culture and Western education as protected by the Boko Haram insurgents. The study asked this question. Abimbola Adesoji confirmed that 'Nigeria has a long history of religious conflicts, some of the most virulent being those of the Maitatsine (1980s) and Boko Haram (July 2009).' She explained that Boko Haram is enjoying material support as the insurgent pursues ideological commitment from the global jihadist movement. as a terrorist group. is because Boko Haram insurgents see Western education as repugnant to the doctrine of natural justice and good conscience. We found empirically from this work a yes answer.

In Table 6.5, for instance, 62% or 340 respondents strongly agree with the statement that Boko Haram, as the meaning of the name suggests, is genuinely against Western education. This explains the presence of the ethnicity element as a key factor in the Boko Haram insurgency. A disagreement was earlier expressed regarding the amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates See Chapter Two of this work. It may also be the case that Western education is destroying the established values in Islamic education populated in the Northeast.

Table 6.5. Respondents responded to the question: The Boko Haram demand is borne out of ethnic considerations over national interest?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	116	21.4	21.4	21.4
	Neither agree Nor disagree	86	15.9	15.9	37.3
	Strongly Agree	340	62.7	62.7	100.0
	Total	542	100.0	100.0	

Given the empirical evidence in the data above, the crisis of identity superiority of the regional/Ethnic configurations in Nigeria is increasingly becoming a concern in the Nigerian state. The increasing penetration explains the lack of success of the military in her counterinsurgency strategy of winning the war. 0ver 40% of the respondents confirmed some level of collaborations and the implication of the likelihood of expanding crises across the various regions to which the military cannot contain more so that the conflict is predicted to be unconventional war. Again, the issue of funding may also create concern for the economy. Due to the increasing state of insecurity, there have been strident calls from various state governments in Nigeria for the establishment of state- controlled security outfits different from federal establishments to handle state security matters, including granting the power of arrest and prosecution. That such demand is also prominent in the Northeast is evidence of state failure.

Boko Haram's demand is reasonable within the context of the Nigerian state

This question is crucial because it helps determine the legitimacy of the crises and the claim by Boko Haram that Western education is forbidden. Suppose that any event of the war itself is justifiable and necessary for developing the Nigerian state. We say so because it is not even in all situations that we can argue that war is not tenable. For instance, Charles Tilly says that war makes the state, and shape makes the war. If Boko Haram's demand is justifiable, why is the Nigerian state preventing such demand, and why is the demand not granted. Again, if the Boko Haram demand becomes unjustified, what option is left for the Nigerian leadership to support the military in ending the war? It is essential that the Boko Haram insurgency is unjustifiable. Empirical evidence shows that Boko Haram demand is inexcusable, as confirmed in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6. Data result on the question: Boko Haram's demand is reasonable within the context of the Nigerian state.

Frequency		Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	303	55.9	55.9	55.9
Neither agree nor disagree	149	27.5	27.5	83.4
Strongly Agree	90	16.6	16.6	100.0

Over 55% of the respondents agreed that the demand for Boko Haram is not reasonable. This confirms that both political considerations and ethnicity are challenges in the hands of the military at different levels. Therefore, it is not the case that it is a legitimate insurgency. Yes, the state must respond to such illegitimate demand in the face of federalism and sovereignty of the Nigerian state. This includes justification for the military counterinsurgency, but the challenge here is the question: Must Nigeria's response be military deployment, and if not, how much effort has the Nigerian government put in place to explore alternative strategies? As we shall see shortly, the military is not the cause of Boko Haram, but can the military end the war, and if not, what alternative is still possible in the context of addressing the right cause of the war, as we explain in Chapter seven.

Empirical evidence confirms that it is not the case that Western education is forbidden, as Boko Haram claimed. There is no truth in the claim, as indicated in Boko Haram's meaning. Boko Haram does not have any legitimacy in demanding another form of education and such demand is not supported. This again explains why Boko Haram has no visible external support of any country, confirming the recognition of support to Boko Haram in the last two decades that the war started. Unlike the Biafra Civil War, many countries announced recognition for the Biafra Republic a few months into the war. Some of these countries officially recognised Biafra as a legitimate country under international law. For example, Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Haiti, and Zambia recognised the Biafra Republic, while some other countries assisted the Biafra Republic without official recognition. Those countries included Vatican City, France, Rhodesia, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, and Norway. These countries held that Biafra demand was legitimate in the face of it. Our empirical evidence Figure 6.9 confirms that the Boko Haram claim is not legitimate.

In summary, yes, Boko Haram presents the unique identity of an ethnic group that demands a set of cultural and identity recognition. In the face of it, they believe, as explained above, that such identity is superfluous to the Nigerian identity, and they can do anything to sustain it. The fact remains that the demand for Boko Haram is not legitimate, as confirmed by the data, and no country has come in the open to support the insurgents. This explains why the Nigerian government is not prepared to support illegitimate demand and has deployed the military to suppress demand and ensure that the insurgency ends. This issue of political or ethnic identity is significant in the Nigerian context. See Chapter one of this work. Over 250 different meaningful identities made the Nigerian state. Again, such a voluntary union is still a challenge to maintain various ethnic identities in a federation for a long time. The issue of robust Boko Haram identity and unreasonable demand led us to discuss the trajectory of the 1914 amalgamation. We asked questions such as Boko Haram: Is the creation of the 1914 amalgamation of the South and North Protectorates? The event of 1914 created legitimacy to which Boko Haram took advantage? We discuss the empirical answers evidenced from the data as follows. There is also evidence from the data that Boko Haram is fostering within the culture of the ethnics where it exists. Such ethnic support accounts for the military's failure in fighting the war.

In countries where insurgency became pronounced after the Cold War, what has been in contention is access to resources and power. This led to the claim of identity being distinguished between nationalism and ethnic nationalism, which triggered regional insecurity, diffusion and spillover effects, terrorism, and internal displacement. Such conditions have been demonstrated in separatist movements in Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, and the Philippines. We saw in the data explaining the infuriation of ethnic nationalism in many war-torn countries. As described in the empirical studies, the Boko Haram insurgency enjoys significant support from the operation of force and the coercive- ness of the people of the Northeast region. The evidence in this study distances itself from any form of voluntary consent of the region to the Boko Haram insurgency. This again made it difficult for the military to launch the counterinsurgency fully in the region. Perhaps the only option left is to level the entire region, believing that Boko Haram will be wiped out entirely. This is not a reasonable option, as it will in no time trigger a civil war and question the legitimacy

of the military. It is also difficult to launch such an attack at present. For instance, an identity war comes with its delayed effect. The military was not winning the war because of the ethnic coronation of the Boko haram insurgency[263]

Figure 6.2. The 6-1 phases of unconventional warfare[264]

PHASE I Preparation	Resistance and external sponsors conduct psychological preparation to unify population against established government or occupying power and prepare population to accept U.S. support.
PHASE II Initial Contact	USG agencies coordinate with allied government-in-exile or resistance leadership for desired U.S. support.
PHASE III Infiltration	SF team infiltrates operational area, establishes communications with its base, and contacts resistance organization.
PHASE IV Organization	SF team organizes, trains, and equips resistance cadre. Emphasis is on developing infrastructure.
PHASE V Buildup	SF team assists cadre with expansion into an effective resistance organization. Limited combat operations may be conducted, but emphasis remains on development.
PHASE VI Employment	UW forces conduct combat operations until linkup with conventional forces or end of hostilities.
PHASE VII Transition	UW forces revert to national control, shifting to regular forces or demobilizing.

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[263] Klaus Schlichte, 'Is ethnicity a cause of war? *A Journal of Social Justice,* (1994) pp .59–65 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659408425775.

[264] US document TC 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare November (2010.) pp 1-9.

Chapter 7 : Conclusion.

Overview

The conclusion chapter reacted to the problem distilled by the primary data from the research questions, which are the focus of this investigation to which hypotheses are tested. Those problems are set to determine the level of impact of the independent variables on the dependable variable. For example, in the data seen in chapter two, the field reports that political and economic factors are the most significant challenges for the military in ending the Boko Haram insurgency, followed by the societal aspect of ethnicity. It is those specific problems that the conclusion chapter provides some insights into the identified research questions. The study quarried the deployment of the military in matters that ought to have been resolved by domestic socialisation. The chapter said the military is becoming helpless in ending the twenty-year conflict. It provided options in embracing solutions by way of internal mechanism, which includes the withdrawal of soldiers from the battlefield and the employment of a domestic socialisation strategy or the outright invitation to the UN for intervention to fortify the soldiers. The chapter further explained that failure to do so would result in international community intervention acting in the guess of responsibility to protect arising from unquantifiable genocide.

The Boko Haram crisis is now traveling across Nigeria's borders. The UN Security Council can trigger Article 51 to prevent a breach of international peace and security arising from the activities of Boko Haram. The study warned that as the Boko Haram insurgency is dragging, Nigeria cannot afford another civil war. Conflicts like the Boko Haram insurgency bring about an unquantifiable level of human insecurity[265] such that what may

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[265] For example, we have seen such nature of conflicts creating high level of human insecurity as it was in the case of regional conflicts in in the case of Iraq (1991) intervention for national security as it was the case in Bosnia

have begun as a security threat could end up as a full-fledged security collapse if not tamed early enough. As we saw in this work, the military is in a dilemma facing challenges arising from its internal structures, such as military factors relating to the loyalty of soldiers and the uncomfortable problems associated with the non-payment of soldiers' allowances, benefits of dead soldiers, and other allowances[266] These factors are sufficient to create such inefficiency in fighting the Boko Haram war, as the soldiers may not be in high spirit considering the challenges in the payment of allowances. The moral at a very low ebb. Again, ethnicity fuels political consideration, thereby creating critical challenges for the military in ending the conflict. As we saw in this study, the economic living condition is specific to the continued funding of the military and providing for the welfare of displaced persons in the Northeastern region of Nigeria. These problems are almost out of Nigeria's government hands, as the government appears extremely overwhelmed. This is due to failing economic resources[267] The military and the people cannot continue to be the victims of the Boko Haram insurgents, given the challenging circum- stances of Nigerian political leadership. Yes, these are the problems this study alluded to.

The challenges of the military are better appreciated when it prioritises its conditions in the arrangement of military challenges in the value stick of priority. For example, as we saw in this study, political and economic factors account for nearly 70% of challenges in the hands of the military, which requires funding. Spending in the order of value stick priority, as suggested above, is one way of preventing the misplacement of priority. For instance, as we saw in the independent variables, the military challenges in ending the conflicts are not of an equal proportion of impacts[268] Prioritising the critical challenges (political and economic) of the military requires that such variables maintain the first position in the values stick solution approach. The collective ex- planation is the

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Hezergovina (1995) or intervention for human security as it was in Afghanistan (2001) or intervention after R2P (responsibility to protect) the case of Kosovo (1995) and Darfur (2008) the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).

[266] In Chapter Three of this work, the study noted the conflicting account of the Military chief response to the argument of the family of soldiers who claimed that the entitlement of the allowance and the insurance of their late husband killed by Boko Haram remained unpaid.

[267] See Chapter Four of this work where we discussed the economic challenges of Nigeria and the failing living condition of the people of northeast as challenging to the military desire in ending the conflicts.

[268] See Chapter Two of this work.

political leadership's failure to embrace an alternative strategy of domestic socialisation before the deployment of the military, which accounts for the converging complexities arising from the conflicts, as seen in the data analysis[269]

The study must maintain a balance between returning to domestic socialisation to end disputes and the commencement of military disengagement. Again, the military cannot remain on the battlefield forever, and there must be peace in the Northeastern states of Nigeria. The question is how we do so, which explains the imperative of this chapter. Suppose we saw military challenges as confirmed by this study in the impacting variables of societal factors of political, economic, ethnicity and military variables. In this case, we must explain how those challenges can be reduced or eliminated. In doing so, we shall discuss the elimination of these challenges within the internal and external options. The suggestions and findings will also be in alignment in resolving the historical grievances, as we saw in Chapter One of this work. We must maintain a balance between returning to domestic socialisation to end disputes and the commencement of military disengagement. Again, the military cannot remain on the battlefield forever, and there must be peace in the Northeastern states of Nigeria. The question is how we do so, which explains the imperative of this chapter. Suppose we saw military challenges as confirmed by this study in the impacting variables of societal factors of political, economic, ethnicity and military variables. In this case, we must explain how those challenges can be reduced or eliminated. In doing so, we shall discuss the elimination of these challenges within the internal and external options. The suggestions and findings will also be in alignment in resolving the historical grievances, as we saw in Chapter One of this work.

The Internal Option

The expectation is usually that internal conflicts will be resolved internally using the strategy of diplomacy or the apparatus of government[270] However, it is not the case that the government has employed all available internal mechanisms before deploying the

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[269] See Chapter Two of this work.
[270] The converging complexities that made things difficult for the military are inherently loaded in the historical grievances we discussed in Chapter One of this work as we saw in the challenges created by the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914. See chapter one of this work.

military to the battlefield to re- solve conflicts. As noted in the general introduction to this work, the Nigerian police were initially in control of the crisis before the killing of Yusuf, the leader of Boko Haram. This occurred when the police invited and detained Yusuf and consequently killed him while in detention. That uncivilised method of crime prevention and prosecution brought the untold story of the initial cause of the crises that went uncontrollable, notwithstanding the deployment of the military.

There is no sufficient evidence that the government employed adequate domestic socialisation by approaching the problems with a desire for an amicable resolution of the issues at stake. The arrest of Yusuf was draconian in the opinion of this investigation; for instance, it was too unexpected and unimaginable that a police invitation honoured by Yusuf would lead to his killing in a democratic dispensation. Since Yusuf kept and honoured the police invitation or was arrested, the police should have started a criminal investigation to charge him to the law court if he committed any offence. Again, the government ought to use the information voluntarily given by Yusuf for further research to help distil further details. This would have assisted in explaining the knowledge of Boko Haram and their areas of complaints and demands. Could such demands be reasonably in a middle way, consensus building and give-and- take fashion? What could the government do to resolve the crises in the opinion of Yusuf?Again, why were the state security services not unaware of Yusuf's intention before actualisation. Was it real or true that the intelligent government system was unaware of the Boko Haram association before Yusuf's arrest and killing?

The political factor is identified and explained in Chapter Five of this work. Did the government convene stakeholder meetings and educate the people about the consequences of the conflict if we allowed it to mature and what the civil populate tend to gain or lose? Such collective engagement was not so. Rather, an aggressive military approach was employed by the government in resolving civil crises in a democratic system as an absurd and uncivilised strategy. Again, there is the question of why the government waited until such a situation, when the economic living conditions of the people remained unacceptably worsened with growing poverty. What is the government doing with the monthly revenue

collected from the federation account? We asked these questions to ex- pose the high level of non-engagement of domestic socialisation in internal crises. The answer also confirmed the highly discussed empirical debate classifying Nigeria as a failed state and this study evidently joins the debate.

Again, it is the consequences of the deployment of the military and its complex and unpredictable challenges, given the apparent politically driven ethnicity and religious fanaticism to which the government has no answer or deliberately acted in default. Still, outside of full-blown poverty and the growing decay in economic living conditions, the slightest provocation might trigger crises[271]Reducing the current challenges of the military requires that the political class and the government engage Boko Haram in the form of a summit that involves the traditional rulers, who were one time the hegemons of northern Nigeria. Doing so requires that the government eliminate the fear associated with the military, such that the selected participants from the Boko Haram side will be attending meetings with the stakeholder without any fear of being arrested or killed. The first area to start the proposed assurance of fear is the readiness for the initial withdrawal of the military and the release from detention of the Boko Haram people arrested during the crisis. Again, the government may discontinue all ongoing cases in various law courts relating to the Boko Haram conflict. These gestures are sufficient to bring the resolution of the crises to the table. All that is needed from the government is the free political will that is devoid of fear of arrest and that government machinery is sincere towards seeking sustainable solutions to the conflicts. These strategies are sufficient to bring Boko Haram to the table, and discussion commenced on the ceasefire agreement[272] The approach discussed above will reduce tension and process solutions internally. The challenge with the suggestion is the fear that Boko Haram will not agree to terms and that the government might have to put in so much in setting the table for the discussion.

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[271]The converging complexities that made things difficult for the military are inherently loaded in the historical grievances we discussed in Chapter One of this work as we saw in the challenges created by the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914. See chapter one of this work.
[272] See Chapter Four of this work.

The above fear of the government is also natural in internal conflicts. Again, there is the challenge of who will preside over the meeting. What are the assurances of his identity? And how are we sure that the Boko Haram people will accept his leadership and attend such a summit? The study is saying this because it is not usually the case with the current ethnicity infuriation conflict can be resolved without the engagement of internal mechanism. As noted in the general introduction chapter of this work, the challenge to the military is the growing and expanding jurisdiction of Boko Haram outside Nigeria. As we said, the activities are now growing in the West African subregion. In such a situation, it may appear that internal efforts from Nigeria alone are not sufficient to resolve the crisis. This also suggested an external solution strategy or, likeliest, a bridge or hybrid strategy (a combination of both). As noted in the general introduction chapter of this work, the challenge to the military is the growing and expanding jurisdiction of Boko Haram outside Nigeria. As we said, the activities are now growing in the West African subregion. In such a situation, it may appear that internal efforts from Nigeria alone are not sufficient to resolve the crisis. This also suggested an external solution strategy or, likeliest, a bridge or hybrid strategy (a combination of both).

The External Option

A solution can be found from the external engagement of the international community in resolving the crises, thereby reducing the challenges of the military associated with political, economic, ethnic, and military factors in the Boko Haram conflict. Perhaps those internal challenges are better viewed with an external lens, and appropriate solutions are deployed. This will involve a temporary suspension of Nigeria's sovereignty. This is a severe challenge and concern to geocentric power play, where political power, authority and influence are the key to unlocking international relations and politics.

The procedure for the engagement of external options is not straightforward. Still, it shall be explained in the specific context of the rules set out by the international community regarding intervention and the problem associated with such, particularly in the United Nations chapter. Specifically, according to general regulations, sovereign countries are not allowed to intervene by using force in the affairs of another country. This is the

expression of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, to which Nigeria is a signatory. Article 2 (7) prevents intervention based on another country's internal affairs or domestic issues[273]. The combined effects of the provisions of the articles imply that, while the massive killings arising from the Boko Haram insurgency are globally acknowledged, the international community maintains respect for Nigeria's internal affairs and sovereignty, hoping that the Nigerian government will resolve matters relating to Boko Haram.

In the general introduction chapter of this work, we noted the killing of President Idris Deby of the Republic of Chad by Boko Haram during his solidarity visit to the military in their barrack, com- mending them for their efforts at bringing an end to the Boko Haram insurgency in some parts of his country. While the meeting lasted, and in the presence of the military, the president was killed by the Boko Haram insurgents. In Chapter Five of this work, we noted the growing activities of the Boko Haram insurgency in the West African subregion. Evidence suggests that insurgent activities are now beyond Nigerian border[274]

The implications are that the international community will not wait to see the internal crisis of one country travelling to another country across the border, resulting in a more massive killing of people. Still, there are sustained international conventions of non-intervention. It is now the case that intervention is possible with the expansion rate of in-surgent activities beyond Nigerian borders. This is so within the context of interventions for inter- national peace and security as we saw in the case of Iraq (1991) intervention for national security as it was the case in Bosnia Hezergovina (1995) or intervention for human security as it was in Afghanistan (2001) or intervention after R2P (responsibility to protect) the case of Kosovo (1995) and Darfur (2008)[275] the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)[276]

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[273] Jackson, R. and Rosberg, C. 'Why Africa's weak states persist: the empirical and the juridical in statehood', *World Politics* 35 1982 pp. 1−24.

[274] Morgan, P. *International security: problems and solutions* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006).

[275] James Mayall, *The new interventionism 1991–94: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia* Cambridge University Press, 1996.

[276] Tom Ruys, *'Armed Attack' and Article 51 of the UN Charter* Cambridge University Press, 2010; T D Gill, 'When Does Self-Defence End?' in Marc Weller (ed), *The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law* Oford University Press, 2015) 737; Kimberly N Trapp, 'Can Non-State Actors Mount an

The case of Boko Haram confirms the need for human security, national security and a desire for international peace and security. Above all, the Boko Haram insurgency qualifies for an intervention that has transcended the borders of Nigeria. Such expansion should necessarily trigger the international community into a commitment for responsibility to protect.[277] It is no longer fashionable that the international community will not intervene appropriately and soon with respect to the conflict. Contemporary international relations prevent the collaborative activities of terrorists and the genocide of crime against humanity. How can this happen? And what can Nigeria do?

First Suggestion

The Nigerian government invitation of the United Nations Security Council for intervention[273] The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case confirms states' legitimacy of intervention based on the invitation. This means that intervention by invitation is legal and legitimate once the invitation comes from a legitimate government, not from the opposition[278]'Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition.'[279] Nolte defined 'military intervention by foreign troops in an internal armed conflict at the invitation of the government of the State concerned'[280]

Armed Attack?' in Marc Weller (ed), *The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law* Oxford University Press, 2015) 679; Dinstein (n 6) pp. 197–327; Gray (n 1) 134; Henderson (n 1) 207–26.

[277]Hafner (n 20) 371; Corten (n 6) 260–1; Max Byrne, 'Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of "Intervention by Invitation" as a Basis for US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen' (2016) 3 *Journal on the Use of Force and International Law* 97, 99–102; Malcolm N Shaw, *International Law* (Cambridge University Press, 8th edn 2017) 878–80; Dinstein (n 6) p.126; Gray (n 1) p.108.

[278] Georg Nolte, 'Intervention by Invitation' (Max Planck Encyclopedia for Public International Law, 2010) https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1702?rskey=JZexuR&result=1&prd=MPIL.

[279]Hafner (n 20) 371; Corten (n 6) 260–1; Max Byrne, 'Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of "Intervention by Invitation" as a Basis for US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen' (2016) 3 *Journal on the Use of Force and International Law* 97, 99–102; Malcolm N Shaw, *International Law* (Cambridge University Press, 8th edn 2017) 878–80; Dinstein (n 6) 126; Gray (n 1) p.108.

[280] Georg Nolte, 'Intervention by Invitation' (Max Planck Encyclopedia for Public International Law, 2010) https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1702?rskey=JZexuR&result=1&prd=MPIL.

One way legally possible to reduce the challenges of the military in the face of the failing internal solution to the Boko Haram conflicts is to invite the United Nations Security Council to intervene in resolving the internal crises. Such is a difficult thing to do in the face of the pride of the ruling political class arguing for Nigeria's independence and sovereignty. The Boko Haram insurgency is now twenty years old. This is what is needed in the circumstances of loyalty to the Nigerian state and genuine efforts to resolve crises. Such an approach shows a commitment to nation-building. It is not the case that Nigeria's sovereignty is eroded, depending on the steps taken. Still, it might call for an interim arrangement depending on how the Nigerian government proposes to handle the United Nations visitors and the international collaborative peacekeeping force. It may not be the case that the Nigerian government is waiting for the UN slogan for the use of 'all necessary means. The study says so because it is also the case that militaries in countries like Nigeria are usually more concerned with protecting the political leadership from the people than with protecting the people from external attacks relying upon the general prohibition against aggression and armed intervention underwritten by the UN Charter. Such a perverse situation primarily results from the universal guarantee of state security supported by the United Nations. The understanding of international practice is to prevent human insecurity as experienced before 1945, such as the Japanese occupation of Manchuria (1931), the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (1935) and the German and Hungarian partition of Czechoslovakia (1938/39)[281] The international principle of non-intervention exists to maintain the integrity and survival of not-too-powerful states that otherwise may have ceased to exist.

One of the major requirements for actionable intervention from the United Nations Security Council is consent from the country inviting the crucial UN organ. It is common knowledge with the benefit of hindsight and clear from practice that opposition, such as Boko Haram, cannot invite the UN, since it is not a state or non-state actor that enjoys diplomatic recognition. One advantage of such an invitation is that it helps resolve the challenges that internal solutions will pose to the resolution of the conflict when adopted.

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[281] Jackson, R. *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World* Cambridge University Press, 1990. pp. 50−109.

With such an invitation for intervention, at least the doc- trine of political neutrality will be maintained to a large extent. The country request is often called 'a request reflecting the free expression of will of the requesting State'[282]or 'demonstrable consent by the highest available governmental authority[283]The Nigeria military will be more active in collaboration with the UN security team if this option is actionable.

Second Suggestion

Intervention from the International Community

The Boko Haram conflicts continue to spread across the borders of other nations, coupled with the massive killings and destruction of properties recorded in the last twenty years, the expanding activities of the Boko Haram may trigger the United Nations' intervention. This is permissible under the UN Charter's provision on humanitarian intervention, as we saw in the case of Somalia and the Gulf War of 1990−91. If the UN intervenes in military action, it is not the case that Nigeria's independence or sovereignty will be kept in abeyance in absolute terms. Again, the existential fact that it is legally permissible for the UN Security Council to intervene, for instance, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, overrides Article 2 of the same Charter earlier cited in this chapter, which guarantees non-intervention. Once the Security Council identifies 'any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, article 39 empowers the United Nations to determine such threats. It enables the Council to take action to prevent such a threat, 'it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security' (Article 42). Article 51 adds that 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence'. Moreover, as we saw in the Gulf War of 1990−1999[284]the intervention was actionable and successful. However, in the case of Somalia, the intervention was not very successful. Still, the

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[282] See IDI resolution 2011 (n 15) Article 1(b).

[283] Article 51 of the United Nation Chapter empower the UN Security Council to act upon such invitation for intervention from member state. United Nations (1945), New York, United Nation Office of Public information.

[280] Article 51 of the United Nation Chapter empower the UN Security Council to act upon such invitation for intervention from member state. United Nations (1945), New York, United Nation Office of Public information.

[284] Morgan, p.71

establishment by the UN Security Council of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) assisted in the relief effort, which was hampered by continued fighting and insecurity. Human security entails that the UN Security Council intervenes in certain circumstances, including armed intervention for humanity. The UN also has the power to do so as contained in the UN Charter, which enshrined human rights protections and the responsibility of the Security Council for international peace and stability.

Again, the frequently cited Genocide Convention to which Nigeria is a signatory is a legally binding obligation to 'prevent and punish' the destruction of peoples even while they acknowledge that the exact meaning of this obligation remains unclear. It is not unusual for African leaders, such as President Buhari and Robert Mugabe, to put forward arguments revolving around national sovereignty. Such an unholy allegation that United Nations [285]intervention is a negation of the principle of sovereignty [286]is puerile with the massive killings and rising activities of the Boko Haram insurgents across borders. The international community has a responsibility to protect it. While the challenges created by the Boko Haram insurgency have lasted for two decades, the Nigerian military appears unable to solve the ethnicity-driven conflicts with political and economic considerations. Alternatively, the increasing poverty and economic living conditions of the Northeast people and other factors raised by societal exigencies create challenges for the military. However, the military, in the face of any of the options of external intervention, will reduce her challenges and will be more effective in ending the conflict. As explained in this investigation, more importantly to the Nigeria political leadership and stakeholders Nigeria cannot afford another civil war to which the Boko Haram insurgency is dragging her.

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[285] Spyros Economides and M. Berdal, (eds) *United Nations interventionism, 1991−2004*. (Cambridge University Press, 2007). John H. Herz, 'The security dilemma in international relations: background and present problems', *In- international Relations* (2003) pp. 411–416

[286] Krasner, S. *Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, especially Chapter 1, pp. 3–42.

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Annex One

At the end of each block, you will find a text box, which allows you to make comments more fully on the questions raised (or other points that you deem necessary). Any comments made here will be anonymous and will be treated with confidentiality. Again, the aim is to strengthen the study's analysis.

Section A.

ETHNICITY ANS CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS.

We are asking questions relating to the role of ethnicity and culture in creating and impacting Boko Haram. The questions are expected to score on a scale of 1-9 (strongly disagree-strongly agree)

Ethnicity and Cultural Considerations

Ethnic Identity

The Boko Haram demand is born out of ethnic considerations over national interest.

 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Boko Haram, as the meaning of the name suggests, is genuinely against western education.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
  Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Boko Haram is working in collaboration with other ethnic nations in Nigeria.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
  Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
  Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Boko Haram's demand is reasonable within the context of the Nigerian state.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
  Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
  Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Boko Haram is fostering within the culture of the ethnicities where it exists.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
  Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
  Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The Amalgamation of South and North Protectorates of 19 14

Boko Haram is the creation of the 1914 amalgamation of South and north protectorates.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
 Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
 Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The event of 1914 created legitimacy to which Boko Haram took advantage.
        1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
 Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
 Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Boko Haram converged to protect their legitimate interest within the Nigerian constitution.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
 Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
 Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Do you have any general comments on any issues raised in this session? (Optional)
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Section B

Political explanations

We are asking questions relating to the political explanation of Boko Haram in their share of fairness of the Nigerian state.

Political Explanation

Politically, for instance, the issues relating to the National government the Nigeria state is unfair to Boko Haram ethnicity
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The Nigeria constitution is unfair to all regions, including the Boko Haram region
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

As an ethnic group, Boko Haram does not participate in election matters and has no political parties' representation.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Democracy

The Nigeria democratic arrangement excludes ethnicity of the geographical area of the Boko Haram presence.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Boko Haram is always part of the political system.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly

The Nigeria constitution provided equal representation to all regions and ethnic groups, including Boko Haram.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Boko Haram's political interests are both in the constitution and morally protected like another regional interest in the federation of Nigeria.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

General comments on any issued raised in this session. (this session is optional)
....
....
....

Section C.
Economic factors
We ask questions relating to economic considerations such as Nigeria's general economic condition, capacity concerning national wealth, creation distribution of income, poverty level, unemployment, and the standard of living. About the welfare of the Nigerian people and the converging economic challenges of the regions.

BOX 3
Economic Factors

The Boko Haram region in Northeastern Nigeria is the poorest among all the regions in Nigeria.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The Boko Haram region in Northeastern Nigeria is at a disadvantage in Nigeria's national income and wealth distribution.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The rate of Unemployment counts highest in the Northeastern part of Nigeria than in any other part of Nigeria.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Basic economic welfare such as infrastructures, hospitals, electricity are relatively in poor supply in Northeastern Nigeria and not comparable with other parts of Nigeria.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Northeastern Nigeria collects appropriate allocation of funds from the Nigeria mouthily revenue mouthily.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The Federal Government of Nigeria allocates funds monthly from the federation accounts to every state. The government of the various states uses the funds in the Northeast for the development of the people.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The people of the Northeast regularly pay taxes relatively to parts of Nigeria.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Generally speaking, the Nigerian economy can prevent crises like Boko Haram.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The Nigeria economy needs external support to prevent crises like Boko Haram.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Is International assistance essential in the military fight against Boko Haram?

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Government leadership of the Northeast has used the economic resources to develop the people over the years.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

General comments on any issued raised in this session. (This session is optional)

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Section D
Military factors
We are asking questions relating to the military welfare, including the capacity to respond to the challenges of Boko Haram, assessment of counterinsurgency policies and the general condition of the soldiers, adequacy of salaries and other benefits, insurance welfares, payment of the allowance, and loyalty.

Military Capacity

The Nigeria Military can cub the Boko Haram insurgency.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The military is skillful and knowledgeable of counterinsurgency matters and can create relative peace from the conflict.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The Nigerian military is good at conducting combined operations.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The dislocation of troops within the country has an impact on the operations against Boko Haram.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The Boko Haram's concentration of the fight centred around the Northeast?

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Military Tanning

The military has received adequate training over the years on counterinsurgency strategy
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Benefits

The military is well renumerated and appropriately.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The military salaries are paid very regularly.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The military personnel and equipment are well insured, and premium and insurance are paid regularly

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Life Insurance Policy

All military personal, including soldiers, have a life insurance policy that is active and can be assessed immediately in case of any risk.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The military personnel are not always influenced by religion or ethnic consideration in fighting Boko Hara insurgents

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Military Commitment

The military is committed to the fight against Boko Haram.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Leadership loyalty

Military leadership enjoy the loyalty of their subordinates

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Military Trust of Leadership

Soldiers trust the leadership of the military in matters relating to the payment of their allowance on war fronts

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Can you suggest any changes to the military training that might be useful in the fight against BokoHaram?

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Section D

Military Factors

We are asking questions relating to the military welfare, including the capacity to respond to the challenges of Boko Haram, assessment of counterinsurgency policies and the general condition of the soldiers, adequacy of salaries and other benefits, insurance welfares, payment of the allowance, and loyalty.

Military Capacity
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The military is skillful and knowledgeable of counterinsurgency matters and can create relative peace from the conflict.
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Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

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1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The dislocation of troops within the country has an impact on the operations against Boko Haram.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The Boko Haram's concentration of the fight centred around the Northeast?
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Military tanning

The military has received adequate training over the years on counterinsurgency strategy
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

Benefits
The military is well renumerated and appropriately.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Strongly   Neither agree   Strongly
Disagree   nor disagree   Agree

The military salaries are paid very regularly.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

| Strongly | Neither agree | Strongly |
| Disagree | nor disagree | Agree |

The military personnel and equipment are well insured, and premium and insurance are paid regularly

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

| Strongly | Neither agree | Strongly |
| Disagree | nor disagree | Agree Life insurance policy |

All military personal, including soldiers, have a life insurance policy that is active and can be assessed immediately in case of any risk.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

| Strongly | Neither agree | Strongly |
| Disagree | nor disagree | Agree |

The military personnel are not always influenced by religion or ethnic consideration in fighting Boko Hara insurgents

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

| Strongly | Neither agree | Strongly |
| Disagree | nor disagree | Agree |

Military commitment

The military is committed to the fight against Boko Haram.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

| Strongly | Neither agree | Strongly |
| Disagree | nor disagree | Agree |

Leadership loyalty

Military leadership enjoy the loyalty of their subordinates

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

| Strongly | Neither agree | Strongly |
| Disagree | nor disagree | Agree |

Military trust of leadership

Soldiers trust the leadership of the military in matters relating to the payment of their allowance on war fronts

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

| Strongly | Neither agree | Strongly |
| Disagree | nor disagree | Agree |

Can you suggest any changes to the military training that might be useful in the fight against Boko Haram?

....

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Annex Two

Table 3.4. showing major activities of Boko Haram attacks and the Nigerian government/Military COIN responses from 2009 to 2020

S/No	Date of Events	Location	Boko Haram Activities	No. of Victims	Nigerian Military Counterinsurgency Efforts (COIN)
	July 27,2009	Potiskum Yobe State	Attack on Potiskun, divisional police headquarters	Three Policemen and One Fire Officer were killed	No COIN effort was made
	March 13, 2010	Jos, Plateau State	Violent attack on Northern Jos	Three hundred people were killed	'
	September 7, 2010	Maiduguri, Borno State	Killing of politicians	seven politicians; one of whom was a gubernato- rial aspirant of ANPP - Madu Fannami. were killed	'
4.	September 8, 2010	Bauchi, Bauchi State	Bauchi Central Prison set ablaze and about 750 Boko Haram members set free	Five Prison guards were killed	'
5.	October 1, 2010	FCT Abuja	Detonation of bombs near Eagle Square	Twelve people died; several oth- ers injured	
6.	December 24, 2010	Jos, Plateau State	Detonation of bomb at Barkin-Ladin	Eight people died; others injured	
7.	December 31, 2010	FCT Abuja	Detonation of bomb at Mogadishu Mammy Market	Ten people were killed	
8.	March 2, 2011,	Kaduna state	Attack of resi- dence of the Divi- sional Police Of- ficer, Mustapher Sandamu, at Rigasa area	Two policemen were killed	

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9.	March 30,2011	Damaturu, Yobe State	Planting of bomb, which exploded.	One police of- ficer was injured	
10.	April 8, 2011	Suleja, Ni- ger State	Bombing of INEC Headquarters	Eight corps members and a suicide bomber	
11.	April 9, 2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	Bombing at a polling unit in UnguwarDoki area	Only the suicide bomber	
12.	April 26, 2011	Bauchi, Bauchi State	Bomb attack in an open marketplace	Three people killed and sev- eral others se- verely injured	
13.	April 29, 2011	Bauchi, Bauchi State	Bombing of Army barracks	Several people injured	
14.	12th May, 2011	Bauchi, Bauchi State	Bombing of Shan-dawanka barracks in Bauchi State	Eighteen people were kidnapped	
15.	May 19, 2011	Bauchi, Bauchi State	Bombing attack	Three policemen were killed, while two soldiers were injured	
16	May 29, 2011	Bauchi, Bauchi State	Detonation of bomb at Mammy Market of Shan- dawanka barracks	Unconfirmed number of peo- ple was killed, while many oth- ers were wounded.	
17	May 30, 2011	Maiduguri, Bornu State	Detonation of bombs along Baga road	13 dead and 4 in- jured	

18	June 5, 2011				Nigeria Army 21 Armoured Brigade (21 Bde) in collaboration with Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order (JTF ORO 1) started cam- paign against Boko Haram alt- hough the Army was accused of being too kinetic. The campaign was a response to stakeholder's de- mand and was launched in phases for the rea- son of scale, capacity and component
19	June 7, 2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	Multiple Bomb blasts	Five people killed and sev- eral others in- jured	
20	June 16, 2011	FCT, Abuja	Bombing of the Nigerian Police Headquarter	Three people were killed, and several vehicles and other proper- ties were de- stroyed.	
21	June 16, 2011	Maiduguri, Borno	Bombing of Dam- boe Town near	Four children killed	
22	June 20, 2011	Niger State	Violent attack on Kankara Police Station	Seven Policemen and two private guards were killed	
23	July 9, 2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	Gun duel between Boko Haram in- surgents and sol- diers	31 people died	
24	July 9, 2011	Suleja, Ni- ger State	Bomb attack launched against a Church	Four people were killed and several others injured.	

25	July 11, 2011 .	Kaduna, Kaduna State	Tragic explosion at a relaxation joint in Fokados Street	Unconfirmed number of peo- ple were killed or injured	
26	July 12, 2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	Bombing of mov- ing military vehicle	Five people were killed	
27	July 15, 2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	Bomb explosion in the city centre	Five people were injured	
28	July 23, 2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	Bomb explosion near the Shehu el-Kanemi's Palace	Three soldiers were injured	
29	26, August 2011	FCT Abuja	Bombing of the UN Headquarters	Fifty persons died	
30	25 December 2011	Nasarawa State	Bombing of a church at Mag-dalla	Sixty people died	
31	20 January 2012,	Kano.	Coordinated bomb attacks	Two hundred and fifty people were killed	
32	08 March 2012	Sokoto, Sokoto State	Hostage taking	Italian Franco Lamolinara and Briton Chris McManus. They were killed sub-sequently	The Army at- tempted unsuc- cessfully rescuing them through a small Boat service
33	02 December 2013	Maiduguri, Borno State	Dressed in full military regalia, they launched at- tack on the Air Force Base	Unconfirmed numbers of sol- diers and civil- ians were killed while multi-mil- lion-naira prop- erties were burnt	
34	March 5, 2013	Yola, Ada-mawa	Two-hour siege on Yola Prison	Twenty-five peo- ple including the deputy chief of the Prison were killed; one hun- dred and twenty- seven inmates were released	

35	March18, 2013	Kano, Kano State	Violent attack on a passenger bus in a predominantly Christian commu-nity in Kano	Forty-one people were killed and dozens more were severely injured	
36	May 7, 2013	Bama, Yobe State	Coordinated at-tacks on Army barracks, Prison and Police Post	Fifty-five people were killed, and one hundred and five inmates were freed	
37	14th May 2013				The Nigeria Federal Government launched a state of emergency to cover the entire Northeastern states. It was largely unsuccessful as Boko Ha- ram insurgents regained their strength after a while
38	June 16, 2013	Damaturu, Yobe	A team of suspected Islamist militants attacked a school in Damaturu	Thirteen people made up of teachers and students	
39	June 2013	Yobe State	Boko Haram insurgents were alleged to have burnt 209 schools down	Unconfirmed number of civilians died	
40	July 13, 2013	Damaturu, Yobe	Attack against a secondary school	Forty-two mostly students were killed	
41	September 8, 2013	Ben-isheikh, Borno State	Coordinated arsons	One hundred and forty-two people were killed	
42	September 29 2013	Damaturu, Yobe	Attack against College of Agri-culture	Forty students were killed while one hundred and fifty others were injured	
43	20 December 2013	Bama, Yobe State	Vicious attack launched against military Barracks at Bama	Unconfirmed numbers of soldiers were killed	

44	27 January 2014	Bama Konduga, and Kawuri, Yobe State	Bama was under siege between 3.30 am and 12 noon unhindered; Konduga village was also attacked; and Kawuri village was also attacked	Ninety-eight people were killed, four hundred vehicles burnt and over four hundred people wounded. At Kawuri, several houses were razed and eighty-five people were killed	
45	11 February, 2014	Konduga, Borno State	Another attack on Konduga	Two thousand houses were burnt, while thiry nine people were killed	
46	15 February 2014	Gworza, Borno State	Izge village in Gworza was attacked	Nine soldiers and several civilians were killed	
47	25 February, 2014	Buni Yadi, Yobe State	Attack on Federal Government College	Several students at the College were killed	
48	14 April 2014,	FCT Abuja	Bombing of Nyanya Motor Park	Seventy-five people were killed, two hundred and fifteen were wounded and several vehicles were burnt.	

49	14-15, April 2014	Chibok, Borno State	Kidnapping of Chibok Girls School students	Over Two hundred students who were in the period of writing their final year examination were kidnapped without resistance	
50	April 30, 2014	FCT Abuja	Bus Station bombing	Seventy-five people were killed	
51	05 May 2014	Gamboru Ngala, Borno State	Invasion of Gamboru Ngala Local government	Three hundred people including sixteen police officers were killed	
52	May 15, 2014	Borno State	Attack on Market in Maiduguri	One hundred and fifty to three hundred people were killed in market attack.	
53	22 May 2014,	Jos, Plateau State	A twin bomb explosion at Jos Terminus market in Jos, Plateau State One hundred and twenty-two people were killed		
54	June 17 2014	Damaturu, Yobe State	Attack on a sports viewing center	Many youths and children were killed	
55	3 January, 2015	Borno State	Abduction	Over forty boys and men were abducted	
56	4 January, 2015	Baga	Capture of military Base	Unconfirmed numbers of soldiers were killed	
57	3-7 January 2015	Baga, Borno State	Attack against Baga Town	Over 2000 people were killed. This was about the worst attack by Boko Haram	

58	9 January, 2015	Maiduguri, Borno	Fleeing refugees trapped in Island of Kangala in Lake Chad	About one thousand refugees were trapped in the swamp	The Nig vowed t Baga. T and Nig withdre MNJTF
59	10 January 2015	Maiduguri, Borno State	Attack on a large market in Maiduguri by a young female suicide bomber	19 people were killed in a new strategy of suicide bombing introduced by Boko Haram	
60	11 January, 2015	Potiskum, Yobe State	Bombing of a market by two young female bombers	The two bombers and three civilians died	
61	23 January 2015				A coalit African ground fensive Haram
62	24 January, 2015	Maiduguri, Borno State	Attempted burning of Kambari village	Fifteen people were killed	
63	25 January, 2015	Maiduguri, Borno State	Launching of a large and well- coordinated attack against the Nigerian forces. Boko Haram later captured the town of Monguno that day after its unsuccessful operation in Maiduguri	Eight civilians, Fifty-three Boko Haram insurgents and unconfirmed number of soldiers died. What happened to the one thousand four hundred soldiers in Monguno was not known	

64	28 January, 2015	Adamawa	Rampaging attacks in different locations	Over forty people were killed	The Nigerian in collaboratio their Chadian terparts, swift and recapture Michika from surgents the f ing day (29 Ja 2015)
65	1 February, 2015	Maiduguri	Series of attacks against Maiduguri from four out of its five sides	Though unsuccessful, the attack caused many city dwellers to suffer panic and trauma	
66		Potiskum	Suicide bombing at a local politician's house	The bomber and eight other people died	
		Gombe	Suicide bombing outside a mosque	Five people were killed	
67	2 February, 2015	Gombe	A suicide bombing attack a few minutes after President Goodluck Jonathan left a political rally ground in the city	One person died, and eighteen others were injured	
68	12 February, 2015	Mbuta near Maiduguri	Raid on Mbuta community	Eight residents were killed	The West Afri alition forces Sambisa Fore main fortress Haram. They scores of the i gents
		Biu	Suicide bombing attack	One dozen of people were killed	
69	14 February 2015	Gombe	Attack on Gombe town	No causality was recorded as the attack was unsuccessful	The Nigerian successfully r the insurgents an operation back the Boko offensive in th Northeast

70	16 February 2015	Damaturu, Yobe State	Bombing attack at a Bus Station by a teen-age female suicide bomber	Sixteen people were killed and thirty others wounded	
71	20 February 2015	Borno	Series of attacks across the State	34 people were killed altogether	
		Chibok	Raids on Chibok	Twenty-one people died	
72	22 February 2015	Potiskum	Suicide bombing attack by a child female bomber	Five people were killed and some dozens wounded	
73	24 February 2015	Potiskum	Bombing attack by a male suicide bomber at a Bus station	Seventeen people were killed	
		Kano	Bombing attack by two male suicide bombers at a Bus station	Ten people were killed	
74	25 February 2015	Biu	Attacks directed to the town	In the two attacks, thirty-five people were killed	
		Jos	Attacks directed to the city		
75	28 February 2015	Damaturu	Bombing attack by two female suicide bombers	Four civilians were killed	
76	2 March 2015	Konduga	Insurgents dressed in disguise as herdsmen attacked the town	Sixty-three of them were eliminated in the famous Battle of Konduga. No record of civilian or military casualty	

77	7 March 2015	Maiduguri	Bombing attacks carried out in five blasts. After these attacks, Boko Haram formally declared allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant	Fifty-four were killed and one hundred and fifty-three fatally wounded.	
78	28 March 2015	Gombe	While general elections were going on across Nigeria, Boko Haram insurgents attacked Gombe	15 voters and an house of Assembly candidate were killed	
79	5 April 2015	Kwajafa Village, Borno	Dressed in disguise like preachers of Christian gospel, Boko Haram insurgents attacked the villagers	Twenty-four people were killed. But, some local sources put the casualty figure around fifty	
80	9 April 2015	Dile Village, Borno	Attack against the village	Twenty people were killed	
81	17 April 2015	Gworza	Gruesome attack of Gworza	Twelve people were killed by throat-slitting as soldiers were evacuating the town.	
82	21 April 2015	Baga	Attack against soldiers through landmine and rocket firing	Eight soldiers and one civilian were killed	
83	25 April 2015	Marte, Borno	Attack with a tank and over two thousand troops	Boko Haram re-occupied the town of Marte after killing some soldiers and civilians	
		Lake Chad	Attack an Island in the Lake Chad area	Forty-six Nigerian soldiers and twenty-eight civilians were killed	

84	12 June 2015	Northeast	Peak of several days of sustained nighttime raids and sporadic attacks across six remote villages in the Northeast	Thirty-seven villagers died	
85	15 June 2015	Monguno	A sack of bombs exploded at an abandoned Boko Haram site	No casualty figure is recorded	
86	22 June 2015	Maiduguri	Bomb attack by two young female suicide bombers on a mosque believed to be moderate in its Islamic teachings and practices	Thirty people were killed by one of the bombers. The second was believed to hev run away only to be blown up later by bombs already strapped on her	
87	30 June – 1 July, 2015	Maiduguri	A two-day attack on mosques referred to as the Borno massacres	Several scores of people were killed across villages and towns in the state	
88	July 1 -2, 2015	Kukawa and environs	Another series of two-day attacks on mosques believed to be too moderate in Islamic teachings and practices	Forty-eight men and boys were killed, and seventeen wounded, in the first attack at a mosque in Kukawa. Ninety-seven others mostly men were killed in the second attack. Some unnumbered women and girls were killed right in their homes, and several others wee wounded	
89	5 July 2015	Potiskum	A bombing attack against a Church	Five people were killed	

		Jos	Twin-bomb attacks	Forty-four people were killed	
90	16 June 2015	Gombe	A twin-bombing at-tack at a busy	Forty-nine people killed and	
			9marketplace during late afternoon	seventy-one others wounded	
91	19 July 2015	Konduga			The Acting C Army Staff M General Tuku tai launched C tion Lafiya D replaced Oper Zaman Lafiya
92	22 July 2015	Gombe	Two deadly bomb at-tacks targeted at two Bus stations	Twenty-nine people were killed	
93	11 August 2015	Borno	A bomb was detonated in a popular cattle market in Maiduguri	Forty-seven people died	
94	20 September 2015	Maiduguri and Monguno, Borno State	Series of bombings detonated in the even-ing	Majority of casualty, 117, were killed in Maiduguri while twenty-eight died in Monguno. Ninety-seven others were fa-tally injured	
95	17 November 2015	Yola, Ada-mawa State	Suicide bombing at-tack at a vegetable market	Thirty people were killed, and 80 others wounded	
96	28 December 2015	Madagali, Ad-amawa and Maiduguri, Borno	Bombing attacks on the two cities by fe-male suicide bombers	Over fifty-five people died altogether, and several others injured	
97	6 January 2016	Izageki Vil-lage	Raid on the village by Boko Haram gunmen, and suicide bombing attack	Two people were killed by the gunmen; and the suicide bomber killed five	

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98	27-28 January 2016	Dalori and its adjoining villages, the outskirts of Maiduguri	Weekend raids on the villages	Sixty-five people died and twice as much injured. Local sources put the casualty figure at about a hundred	
99	29 January 2016	Gombi, Adamawa	Bombing attack in a market by a twelve-year-old male suicide bomber	Eleven people were eliminated, and some others injured	
100	30 January 2016	Dalori Village, Maiduguri	Lethal attack by Boko Haram insurgents	Eighty-six were killed and several hundreds injured	
101	9 February 2016	Dikwa, Borno State	Attack by two female suicide bombers who sneaked to an IDP Camp and blew themselves up	Sixty people were decimated, while seventy-eight were injured	
102	12 February 2016	Kachifa Village	Attack on the village and it nearby settlements	Eight people were killed	
103	13 February 2016	Yashkari Village	Attack on the village and it nearby settlements	Twenty-two people died	
104	19 February 2016				A joint operat the Cameroon Nigerian Arm to elimination about 92 insur and freedom f about eight hu and fifty villa Kumshe villag the Nigerian-roon border
105	16 March 2016	Umarari Village, Maiduguri	Attack by three female suicide bombers	Twenty-two people were killed, and	238

				eighteen severely in-jured	
106	26 March 2016	Tumpun Vil-lage, Borno	Raid on the village	Four people killed	
107	5 April 2016	Izige, Borno	Attack on soldiers and local vigilante	Three soldiers and two members of local vigilante killed	
108	8 April 2016				Troops of the rian Army, in active operati killed fopur B Haram suicide ers before the attack Maidug
109	20 April 2016	Northeast	Attack on IDP near the Nigerian-Cameroon border by two female suicide bombers	Seven or eight people killed and several others injured	
110	24 April 2016	Alau Village, Borno	Raid on the village	Thirty people were killed	
111	12 May 2016	Maiduguri	Bombing by a suicide bomber who was pre-vented from entering a government facility	Six people were killed	
112	16 June 2016	Kuda, Ada-mawa	Attack at a funeral cer-emony	Twenty-four people were killed, and ten more injured	
113	20 June 2016	Wumbi, Borno	Attack on the village	Two people were killed	

119	21 August 2016	Kuburvwa Village, Yobe	Raid on the remote village located between Chibok and Damboa	Eleven people died. Women were also raped	
120	25 September 2016	Mianti and Dareljam, Borno	Ambush and landmine attacks against troops	Four soldiers and some civilian JTF died. One officer and three soldiers died in the landmine	
121	11 October 2016	Kwashebe Village, Maiduguri	Attack on the village described as quick but brief	Five people were killed	
122	12 October 2016	Gamboru Ngala, Maiduguri	Bombing of a Motor Garage	Eighteen people reported dead	
123	29 October 2016	Maiduguri	Bombing attack by two suicide bombers	Eight people were killed	
124	1 November 2016	Gubio, Borno	Car-bombing near a military checkpoint	Nine civilians were killed	
125	5 November 2016	Malam Fatori, Borno	Attack against troops	Seven people (one officer and six soldiers) were killed	
126	8 November 2016	Maiduguri	Bomb attack by two suicide bombers	Four people killed, and six others injured	
127	11 November 2016	Umulari, Maiduguri	Early morning bombing attack	Two persons (one officer and one soldier) died.	
128	16 November 2016	Bita-Piridang Road, Borno	Ambush attack against troops	Eight others were injured	240

129	18 November 2016	Maiduguri	Multiple bomb attacks	Six persons killed, and many more in-jured	
130	23 November 2016	Maiduguri	Suicide bomb attack	Two persons killed	
131	28 November 2016	Gworza	Attempted but failed ambush		The troops su fully eliminat insurgents
132	11 December 2016	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing at-tack	Three persons were killed	
133	13 December 2016	Kamuya Vil-lage, Borno	Assault on a military base	Scores were killed	
134	4 January 2017	Madagali	Attempted suicide bombing		The troops kil three female s bombers
135	7 January 2017	Buni Yadi, Yobe	Assault on military base	Five soldiers killed	The troops kil teen insurgent taliation
136	10 January 2017	Kalari, Maidu-guri	Attack by three female suicide bombers on private residences after disguising as visitors	Three persons were killed	
137	13 January	Kangawa Vil-lage	Assault on military po-sition	Three soldiers and ten insurgents died. Twenty-seven sol-diers were also in-jured	
		Madagali	Attack on civilians	Nine people were killed	
138	14 January 2017	Borno	Ambush and roadside bombing attack	Two soldiers were killed	

139	16 January 2017	Maiduguri	Bombing detonation at University of Maiduguri by two teenage female suicide bombers	Three people including a Professor were killed	
140	23 January 2017	Dzaku Village	Night invasion of the village	Eight killed; uncon-firmed number of women and children kidnapped	
141	25 January 2017	Kaleri, Maidu-guri	Suicide bombing at-tack on a mosque	Three people dead, and two others wounded	
		Maiduguri	Multiple bombing at-tacks in different locations	Four people were killed	
142	29 January 2017	Maiduguri-Biu Highway	Terror attack on a convoy of motorists	Seven people shot dead; several others injured	
143	30 January 2017	Maiduguri	Gun attack in parts of the city	Fifteen people were killed	
144	31 January 2017	Dalori, Maiduguri	Early morning lone at-tack by a suicide bomber	One man was killed	
145	1 February 2017	Nigeria-Came-roon Border	An insurgent attack	An independent UN contractor was killed	
146	7 February 2017				Officials of N foiled two atte suicide attack arrested the b
147	7 February 2017	Sasawa town, Yobe	Attack against a mili-tary base	Two people were killed	
148	11 February 2017	Ajiri-Dikwa Road, Borno	Ambush attack	Seven soldiers were shot dead, and nine-teen others injured	

		Mussa Village	Raid and arson	Several houses set ablaze rendering the owners homeless	
149	13 February 2017	Mifa, Chibok	Raid	A Muslim scholar was killed, and a young boy's hand was broken	
150	17 February 2017	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	Two civilians were killed	The police kil nine suicide b three of them female
151	13 March 2017	Maiduguri	Hounding and killing	Three men suspected to be Nigerian military spies were killed	
152	18 March 2017	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing attack	Six men were killed	
153	22 March 2017	Muna Garage, Maiduguri	Coordinated multiple bombings by about five suicide bombers	Five camp residents were killed, and twenty others injured	
154	30 March 2017	Pulka and Dumba villages	Abduction of women and girls	Twenty-two women and girls were abducted	
155	2 April 2017				The Nigerian launched an o against Boko
156	13 May 2017	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing of the University of Maiduguri	One man was killed, and another injured	
157	15 May 2017	Amawa, Maiduguri	Killing of civilian farmers	Eleven farmers were killed	
158	16 May 2017	Shuwari Buri vVillage	Suicide bombing attack by three female suicide bombers	Two people were killed and seven wounded	

159	19 May 2017	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing attacks of the University of Maiduguri by three female suicide bombers	Some soldiers and other security operatives were injured	
160	20 May 2017	Maiduguri	Sporadic shootings in newly liberated communities	Seven people were killed and over forty injured	
161	8 June 2017	Maiduguri	Coordinated military attacks targeted at mosques	Fourteen people were killed and twenty-four injured	
162	9 June 2017	Yola, Adamawa	Bombing	Two innocent teenage boys died, three others around them were severely wounded	
163	10 June 2017	Hambagba, near Gworza	Raid, kidnapping and killing	Six people were abducted, while four were killed	
164	14 June 2017	Komdi and Tumyan villages near Chibok	Raid and kidnapping	Six people were kidnapped while ten were killed	
165	18 June 2017	Borno	Multiple bombing attacks by five female suicide bombers	Twelve died, eleven injured	
166	20 June 2017	Maiduguri	Ambush attack laid for Police convoy	Two killed, six abducted	
167	26 June 2017	Maiduguri	Twin bombing attacks	Nine killed, thirteen wounded	
168	11 July 2017	Location unknown	Public execution of Muslims considered to be	Eight men executed	
			anti-Sharia		

169		Maiduguri	Bombing attacks by four suicide bombers	Nineteen killed, twenty-three wounded	
170	17 July 2017	Maiduguri	Bombing attacks by three female suicide bombers	Eight killed, fifteen fatally wounded	
171	23-24 July 2017	Maiduguri	Night bombing attacks at Dalori IDP Camp	Eight murdered, thirteen injured	
172	26 July 2017	Maiduguri	Ambush laid for some NNPC explorationists	Fifty persons murdered	
173	29 July 2017	Dikwa	Twin suicide bombing attacks	Fourteen killed, fifteen wounded	
174	4 August 2017	Simari, Maiduguri	Suicide bombing attacks by three female suicide bombers	Two civilian JTF members wounded	
175	7 August 2017	Island of Lake Chad	Twin gun attacks	Thirty-one fishermen killed	
176	13 August 2017	Amarwa Village, Maiduguri	Night raiding, arson and shooting	Four killed	
		Jere, Borno	Shooting	Two tractor drivers killed	
177	3 September 2017	Bank IDP Camp, Borno	Shooting, raiding and kidnapping	Eleven killed, four abducted, and three injured	
178	5-7 September 2017	Mallan, Kase Kura, Manjita villages	Three-day sporadic, drive-by shootings, arson and stealing of food and other items	Eight farmers killed, burnt three villages	
179	8 September 2017	Ngala IDP Camp	Gun attack	Seven displaced persons killed	

180	17 September 2017	Kurmiri Village	Slaughtering	Village Chief Imam and four others were killed.	
181	18 September 2017	Mashimari Village	Suicide bombing attacks	Fifteen people killed, forty-three injured	
182	26 September 2017	Maiduguri	Bombing attack by female suicide bomber in a mosque	Five people killed, several other worshippers wounded	
183	22 October 2017	Maiduguri	Bombing attack by a suicide bomber	Thirteen killed, five injured	
184	30 October 2017	Maiduguri	Bombing attack by a suicide bomber in a mosque	Five killed, several others wounded	
		Banki Village	Boko Haram car hit and blew up a landmine	Four (a man, a mother and her two children) killed; many others gravely hurt	
185	1 November 2017	Zamga Village, Maiduguri	Suicide bombing attack in a mosque	Six killed, two wounded	
186	15 November 2017	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing attack in a popular market	Ten killed, dozens severely hurt	
187	20 November 2017	Dinge Planta-tion, Mafa	Machete attack	Six farmers beheaded	
188	21 November 2017	Mubi, Adamawa	Bombing attack by a teenage suicide bomber in a mosque	Fifty worshippers were eliminated	
189	2 December 2017	Biu	Twin bomb attacks by a suicide bomber in a popular Biu market	Fifteen killed, fifty-three injured	
190	13 December 2017	Damboa	Gun attack	Five persons murdered	

191	25 December 2017	Maiduguri	Gun attack	Four persons were gunned down	
192	28 December 2017	Maiduguri	Bombing attack by suicide bombers	Six persons killed, thirteen heavily wounded	
193	30 December 2017	Villages around Maiduguri	Gun attack on a group of loggers	Twenty-five killed, three firewood laden vehicles set ablaze	
194	1 January 2018	Madagali	Gun attack	Three persons murdered	
195	3 January 2018	Gamboru	Suicide bombing at a mosque	Fourteen people killed, several others including the Meuzzin were injured	
196	8 January 2018	Kaje Village	Drive-on shooting at group of loggers	Twenty people were killed, and fifteen more presumed kid-napped by the gun-men	
197	15 January 2018	Jinene Woods	Shooting at loggers	Six persons killed; five girls abducted	
		Madagali	Gun attack	Five people including two insurgents killed; two others critically wounded	
198	17 January 2018	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing and gun attack	Twelve killed, sixty-five heavily wounded	
199	18 January 2018	Kaya Village, Adamawa	Midnight gun attack	Five killed	
200	26 January 2018	Hyambula Village, Adamawa	Gun attack on the village	Three killed, five injured	

201	30 January 2018	Dikwa, Borno State	Attack on loggers	Five loggers killed, and four others severely wounded	
202	31 January 2018	Konduga, and Dalori IDP Camp	Multiple bombing attacks	Four people killed, forty-four other sustained different grades of injury	
203	4 February 2018	Koffa Village, Borno State	Shooting and arson	Three killed, seven wounded	
		Kala Village, opposite Dalori IDP Camp	Shooting and arson	One person killed, one other injured	
204	16 February 2018	Konduga	Coordinated multiple bombings	Twenty-one killed, seventy injured	
205	19 February 2018	Dapchi	Kidnapping	One hundred and ten girls kidnapped from school	
206	27 February 2018	Lake Chad region of Nigeria	Suicide bombing attack on military patrol van	Two soldiers killed, two others wounded	
207	1 March 2018	Unknown location	Boko Haram threatened to		Presidency re the
			harm Leah Sharibu		threat; further demned attack Red Cross wo
		Madagali	Abduction	Three people abducted	
		Rann, Borno State	Attack on military barracks	Eleven people including three aid workers killed; three others wounded, and one kidnapped	

208	2 March 2018	Fulatari, Buni Yadi Yobe State	Bombing attack on a mosque by a female suicide bomber	Seven persons killed, twenty-eight injured	
209	5 March 2018	Gudda Village, Mafa, Borno State	Attack on farmers	Two farmers killed by throat-slitting	
		Dikwa	Attack on loggers	Three loggers killed, others fled and left behind a Pick-up van	
		Maiduguri	Bombing attack by a male suicide bomber on bicycle	Three people killed	
210	6 March 2018	Dikwa	Landmine attack	Four loggers killed	
		Gamboru	Gun attack	Three people killed	
211	30 March 2018	Muna Zawuya, Mafa, Borno State	Bombing attack by suicide bombers	Five people killed, thirteen injured	
212	1 April 2018	Jere, Maiduguri	Gun attack on a military base and adjoining villages	Twenty killed, eighty-four injured	
213	22 April 2018	Gamboru	Attack on forest workers	Eighteen killed	
		Wumbi Village	Landmine attack	Three killed, eleven wounded	
214	26 April 2018	Maiduguri	Gun attack and suicide bombing	Six killed, nine civilians, and two police- men injured	
215	1 May 2018	Mubi	Twin suicide bombing attacks on a mosque and market	Eighty-six killed, fifty-eight injured	
216	2 May 2018	Auno Village, Konduga	Attack and arson	No human casualty, but a vehicle was burnt	

217	3 May 2018	Mainari Shuwa and Mainari Kanuri, Konduga	Multiple suicide bombing attacks	Four killed, nine injured	
218	17 May 2018	Dikwa, Borno State	Twin suicide bombing attacks on open-air mosque for refugees	Four killed, fifteen injured	
219	27 May 2018	Mashimairi Village, Konduga	Suicide bombing at-tacks	Five killed, seven heavily wounded	
220	28 May 2018	Askira Uba	Attacks on herdsmen	One person killed, unconfirmed number of cattle stolen	
221	31 May 2018	Gworza	Ambush attack against the military	Five soldiers killed	
222	9 June 2018	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	One (the suicide bomber) killed	
223	11 June 2018	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	Two killed, four injured	
224	16 June 2018	Damboa, Borno State	Multiple bombing at-tacks by six female suicide bombers	Forty-three killed, eighty-four injured	
225	18 June 2018	Gajiram town, Borno State	Gun attack	Nine soldiers killed, two others wounded	
226	20 June 2018	Maiduguri	Bombing of military barracks by two suicide bombers	Fifteen heavily injured	
227	26 June 2018	Damboa	Attack on villagers	Seven killed by throat slitting, dozens wounded	

228	30 June 2018	Banki IDP Camp, Bama, Borno State	Gun attack on dis-placed persons	Four killed, four other civilians wounded, two soldiers wounded as their patrol van hit landmine planted by the insurgents	
229	20 July 2018	Jilli, near Geidam, Yobe State	Coordinated attacks on 81 Div. Task Force Brigade	Three officers and twenty-eight soldiers killed	
230	8 September 2018	Gudumbali, Borno State	ISWAP insurgents captured the town	Unconfirmed number of people including soldiers died	
231	31 October 2018	Kofa, Dalori and Bulabrin villages	Gun attacks on villagers	Fifteen people killed	
232	22 November 2018	Metele Vil-lage, Guza-mala, Borno State	Coordinated gun at-tacks on Nigerian Army Battalion head-quarters	Seventy soldiers killed	
233	16 December 2018	Gutamala	Early night attack by ISWAP insurgents on the Nigerian Army military base	Figures of casualty from various sources range from five, twelve to twenty-eight soldiers. All in-dependent sources agree that many other soldiers were injured	Nigerian Arm cial source cl: the attack wa: pelled throug reconnaissanc
234	17 June 2019	Konduga	Bombing attacks by suicide bombers who detonated near a group of people watching football match	Thirty people were killed, and forty other severely wounded	
235	4 July 2019	Damboa	Gun attack against soldiers	Five killed, fourteen soldiers and two civilians wounded	

236	18 July 2019	Jakana, Borno State	ISWAP ambush attack against military vehicle	All six soldiers in the vehicle were killed	
237	19 July 2019	Maiduguri	Attack on Action Against Hunger (NGO) vehicle	Six aid workers kidnapped and a driver killed	
238	27 July 2019	Nganzai Borno State	Street, open-air attack on passersby as reprisal against casualty suffered in a previous resistance attack by locals	Sixty-five persons killed	
239	5 August 2019	Monguno	ISWAP raid and gun attacks	Three civilians killed	
240	6 August 2019	Mafa, Borno State	Bombing attacks by two female suicide bombers against a group of women fetching firewood	Three persons killed, eight other wounded	
241	15 August 2019	Maiduguri	Gun battle with Nigerian Army	Three soldiers killed	
242	18 August 2019	Mogula, Borno State	Ambush open fire attack on military patrol vehicle	Four soldiers killed	
243	26 August 2019	A Borno village	Gun attack	Four civilians killed, twelve kidnapped	
244	27 August 2019	Wajirko Village, Borno	ISWAP gun attack	Eleven construction workers killed, several others wounded	
245	30 August 2019	Gasarawa, near Lake Chad	ISWAP gun attack against Nigerian Army	Eight soldiers killed	
246	31 August 2019	Balumri Village	Boko Haram invasion of the village	Four killed, six kidnapped. Four of the kidnapped six were later beheaded	

247	9 September 2019	Gudumbali	ISWAP ambushed attack against the Nigerian Army	Unconfirmed number of soldiers and civilians were eliminated	
248	25 September 2019	Location unknown	ISWAP execution of hostages	One of the aid workers kidnapped on July 19, 2019 was executed	
249	26 September 2019	Gubio	ISWAP ambush against the military	Seven soldiers killed	
250	27 September 2019	Gajiram	ISWAP gun duel against Nigerian and Chadian troops	One policeman, one hunter and six civilians were killed	An ISWAP Pi truck was dest and many of i gents were eli
251	28 September 2019	Banki	Gun attack against Nigerian Army	A soldier and eight civilians were killed; a vehicle of the Nigerian Army was also destroyed	
252	12 December 2019	Borno State	ISWAP gun attacks	Fourteen soldiers and one police man were killed	
253	13 December 2019	Location unknown	ISWAP execution of hostages	Four of the hostages held since July 19, 2019 were executed	
254	14 December 2019	Ngala	Gun attack against Fulani herdsmen	Nineteen Fulani herdsmen killed in reprisal against one in-surgent killed by the Fulani in an earlier attack	
255	22 December 2019	Maiduguri	ISWAP gun attack and mounting of fake checkpoints	Six persons killed, five others, including two aid workers, abducted	

256	24 December 2019	Chibok	Boko Haram insurgents Christmas Eve raid on Chibok com- munity	Seven killed; one teenage girl abducted	
257	26 December 2019	Location un- known	ISWAP insurgents kidnapping and execution	Eleven Christians, kidnapped earlier in Maiduguri and Damaturu, were killed as a response to the death Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: leader of the ISIS who died in a US Special Forces' Barisha raid in Syria on 27 October, 2019	
258	6 January 2020	Gamboru	Bombing attacks by suicide bombers	Thirty-two people killed; thirty-five others injured	
259	7 January 2020	Borno	ISWAP attack	Twenty soldiers and many civilians killed; over one thousand rendered homeless and displaced	
260	16 January 2020				Three aid wor and other civi who were kid on December 2019, by ISW Maiduguri we leased by an u fied militant g
	21 January 2020	Auno, Borno State	Bombing attacks by suicide bombers	Four soldiers killed, seven wounded	
261	9 February 2020	Auno, Borno State	Bombing attacks by suicide bombers	Thirty civilians killed, many others kidnapped	

262	4 March 2020	Damboa	Gun attack and raid on military base	Four police officers and two civilian JTF killed	
263	23 March 2020	Village in Yobe State	Boko Haram ambush	Between fifty and seventy-five soldiers were exterminated	
264	1 May, 2020				The Nigerian launched Ope *Kantan Jimla*
265	5 May 2020				The Nigerian recorded majo breakthrough COIN as the t killed one hun and thirty-fou gents made of eighty-eight I! and fifty-six F Haram memb This was in ac to arresting si informants of dreaded group seizure of lots caches of amn from them
266	9 June 2020	Gubio	ISWAP gun attack, arson and raids	Eighty-one persons died, seven persons and one thousand two hundred cattle abducted, while the village was razed	
267	13 June 2020	Monguno	ISWAP gun attack, arson and raids	Twenty soldiers killed, hundreds of civilians were wounded, and houses razed	

		Ngazai	ISWAP gun attack, arson and raids	Forty civilians killed, many others injured and some houses burnt	
268	27 June 2020	Borno Villages	Boko Haram ambush and gun attacks	Nine soldiers and two civilian JTF killed, many civilians kid-napped	
269	28 June 2020	Bosso and Mallam Fatori villages	Ambush, gun attacks and raids	Six soldiers killed, three vehicles set ablaze, and several weapons and caches of ammunition stolen	
270	29 June 2020	Damboa	Ambush, and gun at-tacks	Nine soldiers killed	
271	2 July 2020	Damasak, Borno State	Gun attack and raids	Two civilians killed and an aid helicopter destroyed	
272	7 July 2020	Bulabulin Vil-lage	ISWAP ambush	Thirty-five soldiers killed, eighteen injured and thirty missing (perhaps kid-napped)	Nigerian milit thorities claim seventeen insu were eliminat the encounter
273	10 July 2020	Baga	Deadly assault on the community	Twenty soldiers killed	
		Gada Biu	Open gun attack on military convoy	Fifteen soldiers killed	
274	13 July 2020	Kumula Vil-lage, Borno State	Open gun attack on military convoy	Eight soldiers killed	
		Kolore Vil-lage, Borno State	Deadly gun attack	Two soldiers killed	
275	18 July 2020	Village near Chibok	Gun attack	Three farmers killed	

276	22 July 2020	Location un-known	Execution of hostages by unknown terrorist gang	Five aid workers killed	
277	20 September 2020	Damboa	Boko Haram ambush attack	Seven soldiers killed	
278	25 September 2020	Baga	Open gun attack on Governor's convoy	Thirty people, including civilians and security personnel, were eliminated	
279	30 September 2020	Marte, Borno State	Open gun attack on military logistics convoy	Ten soldiers, including an officer, were killed; eight others seriously wounded. The insurgents looted the supplies and set two trucks ablaze before retreating into the bush. This is believed to be a reprisal for recent aerial bombings in the Marte region, which killed several members, including three commanders	
280	25 October 2020	Damboa			In a clearance tion, Nigerian killed twenty- Boko Haram i gents
281	28 October 2020	Koshebe, Borno State	Open gunfire on farmers	One hundred and ten civilians, mainly farm workers, killed	
282	11 December 2020	Kankara, Katsina State	Kidnapping of school children strongly suspected to be done by Boko Haram	Three hundred and forty-four students were kidnapped from the all-male government Science Secondary School	257

283	18 December 2020	Maiduguri-Damaturu Highway	Gunfire, Kidnapping	Thirty-five persons were kidnapped; one person eliminated; three vehicles razed and nine others abandoned on the road	
284	20 December 2020	Maiduguri	RPG attack against a convoy, kidnapping and stealing	Five soldiers killed; unconfirmed number of civilians abducted; three vehicles stolen	
285	24 December 2020	Pemi Village, near Chibok	Gun attack and raids	Eleven Christians killed; village church, hospital and houses razed; food looted and other people kidnapped	
		Gamboru	Gun attack, raids and abduction	Forty loggers abducted; four of them were later found dead	
286	27 December 2020	Shafa, Azare and Tashan Alade Villages	Gun attacks, arson and raids	Ten people including two police officers killed; churches, shops, homes, and a police station torched	
287	29 December 2020	Kayamla Village	Landmine attack	Eleven people, including four soldiers and seven pro-government hunters, were killed	