Understanding the Nigerian Way of National Security
Towards a theoretical Framework for National Security Strategic Personality

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ABSTRACT

This thesis develops an explanatory typology, called the "National Security Strategic Personality theory (NSSP)". This theory is aimed at revealing how the operationalisation of national security, against threats with agency, is different from state to state. In developing this theory, the author focuses on identifying Nigerian state behaviour towards its perceived malicious threats, from 1960 through 2014. The NSSP theory is the result of an informed development of existing theoretical frameworks namely; Strategic Culture, and National Strategic Personality, into a coherent analytical tool.

This framework utilises a constructivist ontology, to carefully extract viable elements (such as the state, security and referent objects) of the strategic culture and national strategic personality theoretical frameworks respectively. The NSSP framework then proceeds to reapply the extracted concepts, into an explanatory typology, so as to maximise their explanatory and predictive efficiency.

The National Security Strategic Personality framework proposes that national security strategies of states, indeed share discernible similarities, but also possess distinct differences in character. This proposition is based on a systemic investigation into state behaviour against malicious threats, which identifies where state behaviour occurs, why such behaviour occurs, and how it occurs. The framework then proposes that the similarities and differences which one observes amounts to unique strategic personalities that can be documented. The hypotheses put forward in this thesis ascertain that:

Every State possesses a unique National Security Strategic Personality which guides state actions against its perceived malicious threats to its referent objects.

The unique National Security Strategic Personalities of states can be identified and adequately characterised by utilising the three elements of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework

The three elements proposed to be of fundamental importance to understanding the personality of national security strategies, are:

Orientation, the physical location which a state considers as being within its theatre of operations, within which one can observe state behaviour.
Inflationary Containment, active and passive coercive means enacted by a state, which enables one to identify what referent objects the state prioritises.

Compression, the strategic means which a state chooses to control or exterminate its perceived malicious threats.

Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression are treated as independent variables which enable us to characterise the individual dimensions of a National Security Strategic Personality. Together, the characterised independent variables provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the characteristics of the National Security Strategic Personality as a whole, which is identified as a dependent variable.

The development of an explanatory typological theory and the case study method of evaluation go hand-in-hand. The typological nature of the NSSP theory enables researchers to identify the NSSP of a state at any given time, while the implementation of case study analysis enables the researcher to comparatively analyse and distinguish between NSSPs of a state which may change over time.

The researcher views the case study method of analysis, as the most appropriate tool to superimpose the NSSP theory on the selected case studies to evaluate its validity. The employment of the case study method in this thesis, facilitates comparative analysis of four phases of governance in Nigeria. These comparative observations highlight the creation and normalisation of essential aspects of Nigeria's national security strategy, which have a significant impact on the nature of Nigeria's response to national security threats today. This method also increases the probability of identifying developmental patterns, by ascertaining the aspects of Nigeria's National Security Strategic Personality which have persisted over the period under review, and also detects the aspects of the NSSPs which have been relatively flexible.

The author believes that analysing state behaviour against threats with agency, enables one to understand the nature of state strategic behaviour against them. This analysis enables crisp scholarly characterisation of the true nature of what, up until now, we have believed to be a fog of strategic culture that influences the delivery of national security. The identification and characterisation of National Security Strategic Behaviour is capable of empowering scholars with more accurate predictive capabilities when anticipating the future of the security strategy of an observed state. These predictive capabilities would be reliably based on the observed dynamics of state behaviour.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AG - Action Group
BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation
BH - Boko Haram
C4 - Composition-4 plastic explosive
CNN - Cable News Network
FGN - Federal Government of Nigeria
FMG - Federal Military Government
IED - Improvised Explosive Device
JTF - Joint Task Force
MEND - Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNSA - Malicious Non-State Actor
MOSOP - Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NA - Native Authority
NCNC - The National Council of Nigerian Citizens
NDPVF - Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NNA - Nigerian National Alliance
NP - Native Police
NPC - Northern People's Congress
NSSP - National Security Strategic Personality
NYSC - Nigerian Youth Service Corps
SIOP - Single Integrated Operations Plan
SMC - Supreme Military Council of Nigeria
UMBC - United Middle Belt Congress
UPGA - United Progressive Grand Alliance
WAI - War Against Indiscipline
1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Drawing on a historically and theoretically contextualised understanding of the aims of the strategic culture theory as well as the national strategic personality theory, this research develops an explanatory typology, aimed at revealing distinctions in the operationalisation of National Security, in Nigeria. At a casual glance, it is apparent to an observer that similarities and differences exist in the way threats are handled among different states. The author believes that these similarities and differences are as a result of distinct approaches to national security amongst states, and, should be identified in the resultant actions of states operationalising national security, positing that it is their actions, which could reasonably serve as indicators to identify and characterise a National Security Strategic Personality of a state. This thesis, therefore, investigates the existence and character of a National Security Strategic Personality, taking a case study approach to identify if indeed, the Nigerian state possesses such an NSSP.

By keeping track of the coercive moves carried out by states against malicious non-state actors over time, specific patterns of strategy, which include the habitual behaviours of states, and conditioned responses to threats, emerge. These patterns of strategy, help to expose deeply rooted assumptions about the efficiency of their means and even enable us to identify attempts at innovation and change -when the favoured strategic means have proven to be less effective than anticipated. Furthermore, these patterns of strategy, could either be attributed to the material context within which the operating system of the state functions, the social context, or both. The author believes that if these patterns of strategy are collated, such a collation of information can serve as the basis for much more accurate examinations and interpretations of state strategy, surpassing both cultural interpretations and realist interpretations, with regards to the nature, the degree of flexibility and ideological limits of its operationalisation of national security strategies.

This research is unique because it identifies the point of theoretical intersection between material and ideational variables, as state behaviour. By asking the simple questions, where, why, and how, in observed instances of state behaviour against non-state actors, the researcher has made it possible to subject state behaviour to systematic investigation. This means that now, state behaviour of this kind, can be dissected, compared and aggregated in a theoretically meaningful fashion. Identifying the where, why, and how, dimensions of state behaviour as
variables serves a crucial function. This approach enables us to understand the actions of the state in question, utilising rationalist epistemology in addition to utilising constructivist ontology as a lens to approach the subject. This new approach focuses primarily on the **observed strategic behaviour** of states utilising coercive means and the use of force against non-state actors, that have been construed to be malicious threats. As an ‘explanan’, this focus on state strategic coercive behaviour is limited to focusing on strategic behaviour aimed primarily at malicious non-state actors which are perceived to be at odds with the state's interests, thus enabling observation and analysis of state behaviour against non-conventional threats such as terrorism, insurgencies and organised crime. This in itself grants this thesis an aura of novelty.

Rosenau lamented a lack of comprehensive systems of testable generalisations, the near absence of general theory, and pointed scholars in the direction of creating such theories through careful observation and comparison.¹ The National Security Strategic Personality theoretical framework follows the direction of Rosenau's intuition, existing as an explanatory and predictive power on models of state interaction with non-state actors within the context of national security provision. Another reason this thesis is unique, lies in its focus on observing and documenting numerous instances of state strategic behaviour, in a manner that enables an accurate characterisation of state strategic personality. Therefore, the NSSP theory, is one born out of aggregate exploration and confirmation, proposing a national security strategic personality which, firstly, is not limited to the time-frame of instances observed. Instead, it documents perennial patterns of repeated behaviour, perennial enough to be reasonably characterised as a strategic personality. Secondly, the national security strategic personality framework is not only resistant to variances in observed strategic behaviours of the Nigerian state over the case study periods. Instead, it includes these variances in behaviour over the documentation periods, as it appreciates the insights which stem from these variances. These variances are valuable because they could indicate critical revisions of national security strategy, such as an attempt at rapid innovation, a process of gradual change, or a rapid response to overwhelming stimuli, amongst other things. The national security strategic personality theory, therefore, seeks to serve as an analytical, conventional constructivist theory within international security studies, which is primarily focused on explaining the operationalisation

of national security, as a socially constructed reality. It is expected that this theory, would be subjected to rigorous, empirical testing.

Strategic culture as a theoretical framework, aims to serve similar purposes to the proposed purposes of the national security strategic personality framework. Certain shared preconceived assumptions –for example, assumptions about states possessing unique approaches to the use of force, which vary from state to state, or the potential power of anticipation which both theoretical frameworks offer concerning state strategy, place both theoretical frameworks in competition for the same spatial allocation. It is for this reason, that the author deems it necessary to subject strategic culture to utmost scrutiny, assessing the theoretical rigor with which strategic culture was developed, and exposing key shortcomings observable in the strategic culture theoretical framework, which have rendered it problematic and inefficient as an analytical tool capable of interpreting state behaviour with respect to national security strategy against its perceived malicious actors.

In addition, very limited attempts have focused on analysing the strategic culture, or strategic personality of Nigeria, with most theoretical lenses often producing perplexing results when they are applied in the Nigerian context. As a result, Nigeria is often absent in wider scholarly literature as a subject of intellectual investigation, both in strategic culture and national security discourse. This is in part due to understandable misconceptions of countries such as Nigeria, and numerous other countries in the global south, which are still stubbornly perceived, almost exclusively as post-colonies, notwithstanding the qualities of these states which qualify them as sovereign entities, worthy of analytical investigation on par with actual states. It is against this background that the author believes that an alternative theoretical framework is significantly required, which is accommodating enough to at least permit a more scientific analysis of the various national security styles which exist in such countries today.

1.2 Research Questions and Objectives

The research questions which foundationally necessitate this work, are:

- Is there a need for a National Security Strategic Personality (NSSP) approach to national security?
- Can an NSSP explanatory typology theory, surpass strategic culture interpretations of National Security?
- To propose the specific need for the NSSP theory in the wider academic literature
The core objectives of this research are:

- To propose the need for a constructivist approach to national security
- To propose an explanatory typology theory, which will surpass strategic culture interpretations of National Security
- To propose the specific need for the NSSP theory in the wider academic literature
- To Elaborate on the structure and design of the NSSP theory
- To empirically validate the NSSP theory
- To exhaustively understand the NSSP of Nigeria

1.3 METHODOLOGY

This research is primarily guided by constructivist ontology, utilising a qualitative research strategy to identify the NSSP of Nigeria. In doing so, the researcher combines historical analysis, and qualitative case study to interpret gathered data.

Analysis of Nigeria’s NSSP from its inception in 1960, through 2014, is no simple task. Firstly, it involves the linkage of strategic culture, as well as national security as concepts, in order to propose that various national security strategic types, exist. Furthermore, it reconceptualises and adapts the national strategic personality typology, as a means through which one can characterise such variances in national security strategy. This task then applies the NSSP theory to case studies spanning most of Nigeria’s history, in order to identify the existence and character of its NSSP. Nigeria as a country is an especially difficult state to analyse in this manner, due to the complexity of its history. Nigeria’s history has been characterised by colonial, military and civilian rule in its relatively short period of time. Therefore, such a tedious task of combing through Nigeria’s history is expected to yield highly insightful results, which in the authors opinion, justifies the immense efforts required to achieve this task.

1.3.1 Explanatory Typology

This thesis therefore, is largely qualitative in its methodological approach. More specifically, it introduces an explanatory typological theory which is characterised by the informed development of existing theoretical frameworks namely; Strategic Culture, and National Strategic Personality, into a coherent analytical tool. As Elman proposed, an
explanatory typology is a kind of typological theory which makes predictions based on combinations of different values of the theory’s variables. Explanatory typologies then place collected data in relevant cells for either congruence testing, or in the case of this thesis, empirical validation, in order to determine whether data collected is consistent with the proposed hypotheses. If the theory is valid, one should reasonably expect collected data to correspond with the proposed hypotheses, and insightful information should be derivable from the empirical validation process.²

Bennett and Elman, identify the utility of explanatory typologies in efficiently achieving such a task, as it is a methodology well suited for capturing temporal effects, or indeed enhancing fields within academic literature which are “empty, theoretically unlikely, unsurprising, or overdetermined.”³ The NSSP theory, as an explanatory typology should enhance research into the identification of various national security types, which, in academic literature, can be considered to be theoretically unlikely. This is because, national security is based on the concept of security which has been characterised by many within the discipline an essentially contested subject.⁴ This notion that the concept of security is essentially contested, has, in many ways, hindered academic progress towards the contemplation of national security types, rendering such contemplation as theoretically unlikely, as shall be explained in the next chapter.

Ragin, also explains that explanatory typologies enable researchers to specify configurations of variables in a manner in which the researcher can capture configurative causation.⁵ This thesis separates the three principal elements of National Security Strategic Personality, which are useful in capturing the configuration of national security strategy over a specific period of time. These proposed variables are; Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression, which are treated as independent variables which cause the characteristics of a state’s NSSP. These elements are explained in detail, with specific attention given to their origins, nature, relevance to understanding the NSSP, and their causation of the character of the NSSP of a state in question.

³ Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ‘Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods’ (2006) 9 Annual Review of Political Science. 455-476
⁵ Ragin C, Fuzzy Set Social Science (Chicago Press 2000)
1.3.2 The Case-Study Method

Within this thesis, the development of an explanatory typological theory and the case study method of evaluation go hand-in-hand. As highlighted by George and Bennett, typological theories and case study analysis are very compatible methodologically, as such a combination enables the researcher to identify not only types of phenomena, but also links between successive types. So while the typological nature of the NSSP theory should enable a researcher to identify the NSSP of a state at any given time, the implementation of case study analysis enables the researcher to comparatively analyse and distinguish between NSSPs of a state which may change over time. It is for this reason that this method of analysis has been applied utilising the guidelines proposed by George and Bennett in the Development of the Social Sciences.

The researcher views the case study method of analysis, as the most appropriate tool to superimpose the NSSP theory on the selected case studies to evaluate its validity. This method also permits the researcher to adequately evaluate if the National Security Strategic Personalities unearthed, reasonably correspond in the context of real-world examples, when superimposed on the actual strategic behaviour of observed states.

The employment of the case study method in the 5th to 8th chapters, facilitates comparative analysis of four phases of governance in Nigeria. These comparative observations highlight the creation and normalisation of essential aspects of Nigeria's national security strategy, which have a significant impact on the nature of Nigeria's response to national security threats today. This method also increases the probability of identifying developmental patterns, by ascertaining the aspects of Nigeria's National Security Strategic Personality which have persisted over the period under review, and also detects the aspects of the NSSPs which have been relatively flexible.

1.3.3 Fuzzy-Set

Ragin, proposed the fuzzy-set methodology in his work ‘The Comparative Method’ within which the applicability of mathematical sets in case analysis was highlighted. Essentially, fuzzy-set analysis incorporates the inclusion of measurement scales in case study

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6 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences (MIT Press 2005).
7 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences (MIT Press 2005).
8 Ragin C, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (University of California Press 1987)
analysis in a novel way. Fuzzy set analysis, qualitatively analyses cases according to their conformity with a particular category, and characterises cases based on the degree of similarity to, or variance from such a category. For example, rather than categorise a state as developed or developing, the fuzzy scale measurement would consider descriptive factors such as the state’s GDP, GDP per capita, and its human development index. These considerations would then enable a researcher to determine the extent to which that state can be categorised as either developed or developing.

This method of qualitative analysis is central to this thesis because, this method primarily enables the researcher to quantify the proposed NSSP independent variables. The orientation, inflationary containment and compression variables are the independent variables as shall be seen in the third chapter. Fuzzy set is unique because of its utility in minimising the risks of errors that stem from inference, while providing the researcher with the necessary control of the value of independent variables, and adequate variation required by the research problem. The control of the independent variables is necessary because, all three independent variables have to be specific enough to enable their surgical application, in a manner which permits the researcher to identify and isolate specific state actions, and adequately categorise state actions into their accurate categories.

1.4 SELECTED CASE STUDIES

The cases chosen were required to be theoretically relevant, and encapsulated periods of time when the decision making processes of states are challenged by malicious national security issues pertinent to the immediate survival of a prioritised referent object. To enable the researcher to observe state strategic behaviour at points in time where the implications of making critical decisions, are costly, and when significant intellectual resources are dedicated to the decision making process. Therefore, the case studies that would be carried out, broadly encompass periods of Nigerian government, spanning from 1960, through 2014. More specifically, the case study periods would be compartmentalised into various case episodes

Based on aforementioned criteria, these specific cases have been identified which serve as adequate models for observation:

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1. 1960-1967, described as the *Formation Period*. In this case study, in-depth analysis is carried out with focus on identifying Nigeria's political origins, considerations and ultimate concerns within that period. It is essential to include the formation period as part and parcel of the case study analysis, as it is during this period, that one can identify specific developments and trends that would ultimately influence subsequent discourse and operationalisation of Nigerian National Security Strategic Personality, which enables us to understand the genesis of its orientation or physical scope of Nigeria's National Security Concerns. It is also from this period of formation that one can begin to identify a broad set of characteristics and organisational objectives that would be socially constructed as proximal threats to Nigerian National Security.

2. 1967-1970 described as the *Secession Period*: This period of analysis covers much of the subsequent events that led up to the Nigerian Civil war, as well as the personalities and their considerations that imminently resulted in the eruption of the war. This period of analysis is essential, more so, because it illustrated the experimental beginnings of the Inflationary Containment, (i.e. the interests of Nigeria's National Security Agenda) and Compression, (i.e. the modus operandi of Nigerian National Security) aspects of Nigerian NSSP, as it is recognised today.

3. 1970-1999: This period of analysis, covers the subsequent fall-out of the Nigerian Civil war, Nigeria's attempts at unification. This period of analysis also explores the various exchanges of power between Nigeria's military and civilian elite. During this period, the exponential increase of violent and non-violent power tussles between civilians and the Military laid the foundations of its current civil-military relations configuration.

4. 2009-2014 described as the *Explosion Period*: This period of analysis, investigates the re-emergence of multiple MNSAs, and an intensification of their interactions with referent objects, taking into consideration the precedents laid out by the Nigerian state in the Formation and Secession periods of analysis, in necessitating an unambiguous resurgence of MNSAs with readily identifiable aims, objectives and means. The importance of this period of analysis lies within the realisation that there seems to be an intensification of interactions not only between MNSAs and referent objects but between MNSAs and the State. This period also highlights the exponential intensification of MNSA activity within Nigerian territory as a result of the consolidation of domestic and alien MNSA efforts. During this period of
investigation, all elements of Nigerian NSSP are observed critically, to determine if their operationalisation is indeed in line with the previous NNSP trends as identified, or if perhaps, the elements of Nigerian NSSP are reset and realigned to account for contemporary MNSAs.

1.4.1 Rationale for selected case studies

The choice of Nigeria as a case study reflects the availability and accessibility of relevant and reliable data on the subject matter to the researcher. In addition, the level of familiarity of the researcher with the cultural landscape and the subject of observation can only be regarded as an additional advantage in understanding the various phenomena which could have discouraged previous researchers in the past from exploring the subject. The potential downsides of the researcher’s familiarity with the subject matter, might be evident in the criticism of Nigerian NSSP, where one might identify the researcher’s inclination towards the protection of people as prioritised referents of Nigerian NSSP. However, this bias is mitigated by the conscious evaluation of the interests, which Nigerian NSSP seeks to preserve. The choice of Nigeria as the subject of observation, also has academic and scientific value. This is because, the author believes that the diversity of literature within international security would be enhanced with the inclusion of non-western perspectives, or non-western subjects of observation. Chronological gaps, such as the period between 1999 and 2009, can be explained simply, as a result of consistent NSSP strategy implemented by the Nigerian state, in the period 2009 to 2014. This is because, the Nigerian state from 1999 to 2014, faced largely similar MNSAs, but more crucially, operated the same system of government (the presidential system), allowing enhanced continuity in the nature of its NSSP, as opposed to previous case studies, where Nigeria witnessed extensive reconfigurations of its systems of government, resulting in markedly different eras of government within the country. The case studies conclude in 2014, as this was the point in time when this research was initiated, and the researcher thought it important to analyse Nigerian NSSP ‘till date’. The inclusion of events occurring after that cut-off date, would have invariably compounded the analysis of Nigerian NSSP, possibly risking the inclusion of incomplete information, gathered from on-going events. In applying the NSSP theory in this thesis, it is utilised as a means to understand Nigeria's national security strategy specifically. However, this does not mean that the applicability of the NSSP theory is limited to the Nigerian context. Rather, the NSSP theory is expected to be a suitable explanatory typology in the wider context of analysing the national security strategy of states, by focusing on observable state behaviour.
1.5 DATA SOURCES

To exhaustively unearth and analyse the National Security Strategic Personality of Nigeria, in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Republics, this research draws on existing scholarly debates within the realm of national security studies, strategic culture and national strategic personality, analysing the hitherto explanations for phenomena akin to the National Security Strategic Personality. To achieve this, analysis resorted to a sample of authoritative literature on strategic culture, national strategic personality, strategic coercion, as well as historical literature on the National security configuration in Nigeria, in order to situate the NSSP theory within wider literature. The case studies are furnished with insight gained from collecting relevant, declassified official documents and archives from the Nigerian Police Force and the Nigerian Army. The case studies are also furnished with insight from archival and contemporary News media coverage and biographical sources which have also been consulted.

Primarily, data gathered in this research originated from archives which span the case study periods. Concerning the interviews, respondents were purposefully sampled, focusing on key individuals drawn from the military and civilian population. This sampling method has been adopted, because the focus of the NSSP framework does not necessarily require interaction with individual respondents except in cases where individual respondents involved are accessible, and where these individuals were critical stakeholders in the Nigerian political scene over the course of the case study period. Their insights served to reasonably furnish the research with original opinions and information.

1.6 STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION (DATA PRESENTATION)

For the researcher to fulfil the aforementioned research objectives, the following steps are taken in the second and third chapters. The first step in the second chapter involves the clarification of the ontological approach to this research, focusing on a conventional constructivist interpretation of security and national security as concepts. The second step taken in the second chapter focuses on the strategic culture theoretical framework. This step, tracks the development of the theoretical framework, identifying the issues which necessitated the strategic culture theoretical framework, to further understand how the strategic culture theory has evolved through its first three generations, citing the recurrent reconceptualisation of the theory. In tracking the rise and demise of the strategic culture framework, the researcher identifies the foundational intent of the strategic culture framework, and makes a case for the
revision of this approach. In this process, the author is mindful of the similarities of the strategic
culture theory, and a conventional constructivist approach to the seemingly distinct
operationalisation of national security across states, carefully extracting the positive
contributions of the strategic culture theory, and identifying how these contributions can be
adapted in order to generate the national security strategic personality theory. This chapter also
highlights the typology of the national strategic personality theory proposed by Ziemke and
revises this typological approach, which has been adapted to inform the epistemological
approach the NSSP theoretical framework.

The first step in the third chapter focuses on the epistemological approach of the NSSP
theory, through the identification of the sub-elements of the NSSP theory, which make up the
elements of the theory. It goes further, to explain how these sub-elements can be extracted from
case-studies. The second step involves the delineation of the three principal elements of
National Security Strategic Personality, explaining in detail, what these proposed elements are,
how these elements are relevant to understanding the NSSP, and how these elements should be
applied to case studies, to identify the character of the NSSP of the state within that case study.
These three proposed elements are: Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression.
These three elements are explained in detail and are treated as independent variables, which
make up the NSSP.

Because these elements are treated as independent variables, they are placed on
measurement scales, which characterise each element of the NSSP. These measured
independent variables, determine the nature of the NSSP which is the dependent variable. The
relationship between these three elements is also expanded upon, as the sum-total of these
characterised elements, determines the nature of the NSSP. The implication of this is that each
measured element of NSSP, is only in part, a determinant factor in the character of the NSSP
and serve as limited analytical tools in isolation of each other, as each element can only provide
an observable breakdown for measuring a specific dimension of a National Security Strategic
Personality.

In the fourth chapter, the researcher identifies the case studies which will be used to test
the empirical validity of the NSSP theoretical framework. The first case study, however,
contains a detailed guide to the application of the NSSP theory. Subsequent case studies are
examined in the 5th, 6th and 8th chapter, focused on the extraction and characterisation of the
NSSP dependent variable, and the associated findings.
In the fifth chapter, the author utilises the NSSP theory to qualitatively analyse Nigerian state behaviour against MNSAs from 1960 to 1967. Firstly, the author provides a central narrative of events of significance which occurred from 1960-1967. This is followed by the delineation between the Nigerian state an MNSAs. After this, the author recalls significant events from the central narrative, within which observable state behaviour is analysed in three ways. Firstly, significant events were recalled so as to identify the location of state behaviour. State behaviour was then placed on the Orientation measurement scale to identify if the Nigerian state was introverted, or extroverted in the period under review. Secondly events were recalled so as to characterise the focus of Nigerian state inflationary containment. State behaviour was then tabularised to show if Nigerian NSSP is people-centric or interest-centric in nature. Finally, events were recalled with specific focus on the severity of observable state behaviour, to characterise Nigerian state compression. Observable state behaviour was then tabularised to enable the researcher to identify if Nigerian NSSP was constraining, coercive or compressive in the 1960-1967 formation case study. The values of Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression in this case study, were then collated to identify the overall characteristics of Nigerian NSSP in the formation period. The author proceeded to document overall observations and insight which was gained from the formation case study. In the sixth chapter, the author also utilised the case study method to empirically validate the explanatory typology.

The sixth chapter begins with a brief historical account of Nigeria’s first military coup. This account is followed by the delineation between the Nigerian state an MNSAs, after which it is followed by a central narrative of events of significance which occurred from 1967-1970. After this, the author recalls significant events from the central narrative, within which observable state behaviour is analysed. Findings are then tabularised to enable the researcher to identify if Nigerian NSSP was constraining, coercive or compressive in this case study. The values of Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression in this case study, were then collated to identify the overall characteristics of Nigerian NSSP in the formation period. The author proceeds to document overall observations and insight which was gained from the secession case study.

In the 7th chapter, cross-case studies are carried out to track the evolution of Nigerian NSSP from across a case-study periods.
In the eighth chapter, the author utilises the NSSP theory to qualitatively analyse Nigerian state behaviour against MNSAs from 2009-2014. The author also utilises the case study method to empirically validate the NSSP explanatory typology. This chapter begins with the delineation between the Nigerian state an MNSAs, after which it is followed by a central chronology of events of significance from 2009 to 2014. However, data presentation is quite unique in comparison with the preceding chapters. Over the course of this chapter, the reader would notice the author’s reliance on tabular presentation of events. This was as a result of the copious amounts of data analyzed within this chapter. Instances of MNSA activity in 2013 and 2014, was characterised and represented chronologically in tabular forms. Furthermore, the representation of Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression, followed this trend. Within these tables, the author has separated the characteristics of Observed State behaviour, for ease of understanding. The 9th and concluding chapter highlights the influence of Nigerian NSSP on the evolution of the Nigerian State, and draws on the findings of the previous chapters, highlighting the relevance and challenges of applying the NSSP framework, in policy implementation and academic advancement within the field of international security studies.
2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter proposes the need for a conventional constructivist ontological approach to national security, and proposes the need for a relatively rationalist epistemological approach in the form of an explanatory typology theory, which will serve surpass strategic culture interpretations of national security provision. In achieving these research objectives, this chapter provides an in-depth review of literature suggesting that a nexus between the provision of national security, and perceptually subjective cultural understandings of national security exists. In reviewing this literature, the author first examines existing literature on the nature of security and national security, from a conventional constructivist’s perspective. This literature review goes further to elucidate upon the nature of national security provision, and how different it could be, from state to state. The author proposes that viewing national security provision, as a result of a state’s national strategic personality, would enable more adequate scholarly characterisation of national security as a whole. The author then proceeds to perform an in-depth analysis of the strategic culture theoretical framework and the national strategic personality theoretical frameworks, critically appraising their utility and validity hitherto.

2.1 CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

2.1.1 The Social Construction of National Security Agendas

A significant number of states in today's world are threatened by the expansion of terrorist networks, the activities of drug cartels, and the contagion of political instability present in other states. On the other hand, a proportionately significant number of states seem to be just as threatened by the spread of free speech, the rise of feminism, and the popularity of non-governmental organisations which champion human equality. For example, the United States of America is most notable for its conquests worldwide, engaged in various military battles against the rise of terrorism in any corner of the world that it might emerge. The United States maintains that it is fighting against terrorism and protecting citizens, such as those in Iraq, from being harmed by terrorists, even if it warrants the justification of US soldiers accidentally murdering members the civilian population during their assignments. The so-called collateral damage is viewed as an unavoidable eventuality in a war which must go on…after all,
"Sometimes civilians bear the brunt of military action, but we do all we can..."¹ The United States also maintains that it remains committed to crushing drug-smuggling cartels on the South-American continent. The US achieves its victories against cartels, by sending in its covert operatives, to sabotage and dismantle the cartels' influence on various governments in the region. The US vehemently engages in public condemnation of the use of drugs and substances peddled by drug cartels, which, from an objective standpoint, are just as dangerous to human health as the consumption of alcohol, which is legal in the US today. On the other hand, there is The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has been notably criticised for its policy which bans women from driving vehicles.² It is surprising to see that Saudi Arabia has even on occasion, deployed police officers to roadblocks to ensure that women are unable to drive in Saudi territory.³ The Kingdom of Sweden takes a much different approach from the US in ensuring that the Islamic State is defeated in Northern Iraq. This however has been characterised by its deployment of only 35 soldiers outside its territory to fight the war on terror. In contrast to the United States deployment of thousands of soldiers in the past, Sweden has sent an infinitesimal number of troops, even though we know that Sweden is very capable of sending hundreds of troops to the region if need be.⁴

Why is it, that some states actively pursue the war on terror in every corner of the world, while others do not even have legislation on terrorism in their constitutions? Why do some states try to defeat only the terrorist networks which exist within their territorial borders, when clearly, terrorism has proven to be a highly contagious threat which permeates borders seamlessly? Why do some states implement measures befitting of an anti-cartel operation, to stop women from driving? Positing these sort of questions enables one to realise that, states embark on all manner of operations against entities which they view as threats, utilising all kinds of subtle as well as conspicuous means to eliminate or neutralize these threats. It is also evident that many states embark on campaigns against their perceived threats, claiming to be protecting 'humanity', 'democracy', 'our way of life', or some other sort of revered ideal. In the

² It must be noted that prior to the publication of this work, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia lifted the ban on women drivers.
actual course of events, the actions of many states greatly contradict their proposed aims for engaging these threats in the first place. Within this confusing, even chaotic landscape, we are repeatedly reminded that all these campaigns, are said to be in the interests of 'national security'. one could easily be led to conclude that any issue, can potentially become a national security issue, depending on the perceptual subjectivity of value systems of the country in which it arises. If all these various activities, can be regarded as pursuing the same national security we frequently hear of, it is only reasonable to conclude that there are either very different types of national security or at the very least, very different perceptions of what it means. As we can see, these attitudes have substantial consequences for the actions of states that claim to be pursuing their national security interests. If there are different conceptions of national security, which could explain the observations made earlier, then theoretically, one can reasonably aspire to distinguish one style of national security from another. It is at this junction, that the author proposes a constructivist ontology, as the most comprehensive means through which one can understand why, and how states differ in their subjective approaches to national security provision.

2.1.2 A Constructivist Approach to Security and National Security

Before one can aspire to understand national security exhaustively, it is essential to, first of all, understand what security is. The complexity of security as a concept means that its clarification is a requirement for anyone attempting to discuss national security. Security has been defined as a state of feeling safe and the absence of fear, anxiety, danger, poverty and oppression and that that security is the preservation of core values and the absence of threats to these values. Security was also defined by Zabadi as a state within which people or things are not exposed to the danger of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or decline. Zabadi also viewed the state as the primary provider of security towards its citizens, utilising power and force to provide security if need be.

Constructivism is not a theory of international relations or security. It is more of a ‘broader social theory which then informs how we might approach the study of security’. The author believes that one could regard constructivism as an ontology; a set of assumptions

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5 Alli WO, 'The changing environment of Nigeria’s foreign policy', Beyond 50 Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and Prospects. (Nigeria Institute of International Affairs 2010)


regarding the world and human agency.\textsuperscript{8} Constructivists examine how the human world, and occurrences therein, are socially constructed:\textsuperscript{9} “Constructed by the very ideas that actors share with themselves and others about the world they live in, and (given these ‘things’) what they can and should do.”\textsuperscript{10} These ideas which the author refers to, do not consist entirely of ideas within people’s minds. Instead, these ideas refer to those identified by Durkheim, which exist tangibly in the social world, in the form of ethical norms, language and religious beliefs amongst others.\textsuperscript{11} Constructivism highlights the role of ideas and social structures which consist of identities and norms.\textsuperscript{12} The utility of a constructivist insight lies in its ability to provide meaning. Lantis, citing Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, reiterates the proposition that “Constructivism recognizes the importance of ‘inter-subjective structures which give the material world meaning’ identifying these inter-subjective structures as socially constructed concepts such as “norms, culture, identity and ideas”. These socially constructed concepts give meaning to the identities of humans, their roles in human organisation, the implication of organisational behaviour and by extension, their role in state behaviour as a whole.\textsuperscript{13} Much like other concepts in international relations, when it comes to the concept of security, the ability of constructivism to challenge the rationalist framework that undergirds security theory, as well as other theories in international relations, grants it great importance as an ontology.\textsuperscript{14}

As Wendt understands, when it comes to rationalist accounts of politics, the variables of interest to scholars such as military power, institutions and domestic preferences should not only be relevant to those interested in conceptualising security because of their utility as objective facts, instead, they should be considered as important because of the specific social meanings attached to them.\textsuperscript{15} Meanings which are attached to them are as a result of a complex and specific construction of history, unique to each state, which Slaughter believes scholars

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{15} Alexander Wendt, \textit{Social Theory Of International Politics} (Cambridge University Press 2014).
\end{thebibliography}
can utilise to explain states’ behaviour meaningfully. If one were to dig deeper into some of
the ideas proposed by Wendt in his classic piece on the *Social Construction of Power Politics*,
one would realize that various mechanisms of security provision observable in many societies
today, serve as prime examples in which we discover that the protection of societal interests
and value have been influenced by socially constructed, knowledgeable practice, over time.¹⁶
For example, without preconceived socially constructed *ideas* about security, one would be
unable to answer the following questions casually: Who should provide security? Who should
they provide it to? What can they do or not do for security to be provided? How should they
provide security? Therefore, a constructivist perspective enables us to understand the concept
of security within a broader social context, and more importantly, question the relative ideas
of security within the broader social context. This approach allows us to understand just how
subjective the *meaning* of concepts like security are within various human communities, and
how this subjectivity goes on to influence their manifestation across these various communities.
Instead of utilising the simplified methodology to analyse the concept of security, which
includes the identification and comparison of security definitions from academia, the author
uses the constructivist ontology, to explore the conditions under which phenomena resembling
security exists, within which we can reasonably identify the provision of security.

With these definitions in mind, let us consider security as a result of social construction,
constructed by the *idea* that humans are capable of protecting and preserving those values and
things which they revere. These values and objects could be the preservation of wealth, the
preservation of a sense of immunity to bodily harm, or even the ability of one to secure his
living premises from intrusion by other humans, to preserve a sense of privacy. Now, let us
consider these values being threatened by a burglar, whose sole aim is to acquire the wealth of
others through coercion and intimidation. In attempting to obtain wealth, the burglar
inadvertently invades the living premises of an individual, perhaps threatening physical bodily
harm in the process of coercing the individual to give up his/her acquired wealth, and eventually,
if the burglar is successful, would acquire the wealth of the individual which is within reach.
This is an example of a security matter, and in reading this, one would expect that there are
institutions and mechanisms in place, to prevent this type of interruption to an individual's
ability to preserve his/her values. Perhaps the institution that comes to mind is the Police Force
or private security guards. Alternatively, perhaps the mechanisms that come to mind include

*International Organisation*
the availability of burglar-proof doors and windows, an advanced electronic security system, or even a double-barrelled shotgun in the victim's possession. As different as these institutions and mechanisms may seem, they are easily identified as security measures which can be considered by an individual to protect his/her wealth, person and privacy. Indeed, the differences in security measures would depend upon the society within which the individual is embedded in, and socialised in. If this individual is in the United Kingdom, for example, the possession of a double-barrelled shotgun would not appear to be a viable consideration, as within the United Kingdom, it would be legally and normally unacceptable for an individual to possess a shotgun. However, if this individual was in the United States, the possession of a double-barrelled shotgun might be legally acceptable if the shotgun is licensed to the individual, and depending of the state within the United States, it might be culturally acceptable to possess a shotgun at home, if a sizeable chunk of the population within that state considers it normal to possess and utilize a shotgun for personal protection from intruders –take the state of Texas for example. Conversely, if an individual's ability to protect his/her wealth, person and privacy is threatened by a hurricane or earthquake, it is not usually considered as a security matter because of the magnitude of the threat to one's values, in relation to the perception of one's ability to deal with the threat. In Japan, for example, it might be an issue which could be mitigated by advances in architectural design, whereas in Zimbabwe it might be a matter which might be resolved by praying to God or relevant Gods.

So why is it, that the idea that humans are capable of protecting their revered values and objects, seems invalidated in the face of threats of such magnitude? Why is it that threats of this magnitude, are not primarily considered as security matters? Perhaps this is because, as suggested earlier, in viewing security as a social construction, it is based on an idea regarding humans and their perception of themselves and their capabilities to protect their revered values within the world they live in. Therefore, in examining security as an idea, perhaps one would require a theory or an ontology that accommodates and expands on the role ideas have to play in our conceptualisation of security. Understanding security from a social constructivist's perspective unearths the role of ideas about security, which can help us understand how and why national security varies from state to state. This perspective, therefore, places significance on proposing a refined, constructivist understanding of the concept of security as a priority concern, if one is to be able to understand how and why national security varies from state to state.
2.1.3 The social construction of Referent Objects

Observing security as a socially constructed phenomenon, one can assert that, for security to exist, there are necessary precursors. Firstly, one must understand that security is primarily hinged on the existence of personalities with agency, as it is a concept that is hinged on the existence of at least a group of personalities which interact with each other. A social community of rational personalities which interact must exist. Their interactions, usually are mediated by social norms, identities and ideas of social and functional stratification. Furthermore, this community must be intellectually sophisticated enough to the extent that there is a possibility of the creation and preservation of value. Security is mostly acknowledged as the result, a state of equilibrium, achieved if the conscious alleviation of threats to referent objects within a community is successful. As a social construction, security is something that can only manifest within a social context, in which personalities that can create and depend on value, are present. Williams proposes that: "Security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished values; especially those [threats] which, if left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future."\(^{17}\)

It is interesting to note at this point, that security is not an intersubjective reality that exists exclusively in human communities, as knowledge stemming from anthropology has revealed to us that even amongst primates, a primary importance of social organisation and social adaptation is to optimize the possibility of the existence of individual members of such society. Take African savannah baboons, for example. The adaptive strategies of social living are indicated in the defensive strategies these primates have developed. A typical ground dwelling baboon would rarely last more than a few days in the wild isolated from other animals of its kind because, an individual baboon's ability to defend itself from predators is significantly reduced in isolation. What is observable instead with animals of this kind, is the development of social organisation, based on hierarchy, specialisation of social functions and even prioritised referent objects. When African savannah baboons are roaming the African plains, one can identify a tightly held formation, in which the intelligent positioning of subordinate males serves as a formative external barrier, and the positioning of the youngest juveniles in the centre of the troop, surrounded by females and dominant males, clearly indicates a specialisation of social functions optimised for the protection of their prioritised referent objects, young juveniles.\(^{18}\)

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Human beings, being members of the same taxonomic order primata, categorised based on over 200 various homologous traits,\(^{19}\) are also observed to share some of this instinctive inclination to create referent objects and attach meanings and value to them. The primary difference is that Humans have always been concerned with experimentation when security is concerned, modifying and readjusting the configuration of a much more complicated society in ways which could potentially maximise security within their communities. Human beings are also capable of attaching and discarding value, in relation to their immediate and ultimate interests. This means that there is some degree of variance concerning what humans within a specific social community attach value to, and what other humans outside the construct of that social community attach value to. Within a particular society, a particular issue could be elevated to become a matter which concerns the security of that entire society, while another society might not even recognise such an issue as a threat. In many ways this subjectivity of threat perception has been addressed by scholars such as Waever, who first outlined the process of securitisation within societies.\(^{20}\) However, while Waever's securitisation theory appreciates the socially constructed nature of security agendas, securitisation theory is yet to expand on the implications of this social construction across societies with markedly different values.\(^{21}\) Much like distinct cultures being results of their isolated development over time, the author suggests that security too, could be a result of markedly different discursive constructions of threats, in distinct societies over time.

Furthermore, the state of complete security is a state of non-permanence. The security of valuables from perceived threats is dependent upon the conscious and continual provision of security by an entity or entities to a prioritised referent object, from routine and elevated threats. The possibility of ensuring the security of people, and objects of value, is a primary function of societal interaction and is what permits the longevity of society, and indeed the members of said society. Williams citing Booth, states that security can be equated to a more sophisticated form of survival, which encompasses the possibility of an entity to exist in circumstances that are unrestricted by life 'determining' factors, and so coined the term "survival plus".\(^{22}\) The preservation of property, territory, rights, states and institutions (all of

\(^{19}\) Traits which are similar and imply common ancestry.


\(^{21}\) However, new research concerning the existence of Macrosecuritisations at the system level, which influence securitisation processes at the state level, have been proposed by Buzan and Waever See: Barry Buzan & Ole Waever, 'Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory', Review of International Studies 35:2 (2009), 253-76.

which are social constructs), are implementable within societies where specific kinds of human interaction such as cooperation, organisation, division of labour and specialisation of social functions exist. These interactions, therefore, represent an extension of the inherent need of humans to at least preserve a status quo. A status quo, which at least permits us to be able to make calculated decisions on more sophisticated issues, within the context of familiar, relatively stable parameters. For example, one cannot reasonably ponder on the decision to go shopping at a supermarket, during a severe hurricane, when even the continued preservation of that supermarket is in jeopardy.\(^{23}\) As Baldwin noted, the primacy of the role of security lies in the fact that it is a "prerequisite for the enjoyment of other values such as prosperity, freedom, or whatever."\(^{24}\)

The ideological subjectivity evident within the concept of security also manifests itself in other ways. For example, human societies do not exist in isolation. Kingdoms, Nations, Colonies etc. have always existed within wider contexts, and in many instances, the provision of security within one society can unwittingly result in the gradual fragmentation of perceptions of security of an adversarial society. Without social construction, societies would be unable to attach \textit{meaning} to the material resources other societies acquire to enhance the provision of their Security. As Wendt states 'material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the shared knowledge in which they are embedded'\(^{25}\) An example of this is the United States' subjective perception of Nuclear weapons. The \textit{idea} that Nuclear weapons are a catastrophic threat stems from the understanding of the capabilities of nuclear weapons. In the same vein, the \textit{idea} that the United Kingdom is one of the United States’ closest allies, means that the material acquisition of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom is not perceived as a threat to United States’ interests. However, the \textit{idea} that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an enemy (due to DPRK’s repeated threats of nuclear warfare), means that its acquisition of nuclear weapons is perceived as a threat to the United States’ interests. Rivalry, friendship and enmity are all \textit{ideas} about the configuration of interacting entities.\(^{26}\) The primary difference between friendship and enmity lies in the compatibility or otherwise, of the socially constructed identities of entities which interact. This leads one to realize just how important

\(^{23}\) Concerning human personalities, security can be viewed as a more sophisticated form of survival. However, when dealing with entities that are not fundamentally human; for example, the security of the territorial sovereignty of a Nation, the concept of security and that of survival can be viewed as more or less similar and interchangeable.


subjectivity is, as a dynamic which fundamentally affects our understanding of security. This is why the author believes that an exhaustive definition of security could most likely hail primarily from constructivist approaches to the subject. But, Baldwin reminds us of the fundamental difference between specifying the conditions under which security can be attained and actually understanding and defining the concept of security, citing Lasswell and Kaplan who posit that, conceptual clarification logically precedes the search for the necessary conditions of security.

Security as a concept, is one of those multifaceted concepts which can be approached from various perspectives. Some scholars have even equated the term security, with beauty; stating that much like beauty, security is an elastic and subjective term, capable of meaning different things to different observers. However, unlike other multifaceted concepts in political science, definitional debates about the conceptualisation of security, seem to be absent. Rather, the debates within security studies seem to focus more on normative and empirical arguments such as, the range of issues which could be classified as security issues, the search for an ultimate referent object of security, and the level of analysis most suitable for security studies. Security has even been classified as an essentially contested concept, meaning that there can be no consensus with regards to its meaning. Within the realm of security studies and international relations, there appears to be no consensus on an exhaustive definition of security, notwithstanding effort made in this direction. Interestingly, this lack of conceptual rigour in itself demonstrates the relevance of the ontological approach of this thesis. One can assign this absence of conceptual definition of security to the subjective experiences, subjective interpretations, and subjective manifestations of the concept of security from society to society, which stems from the subjectivity of ideas regarding what is valuable. A lack of agreement as to what the ultimate referent object of security should be for example, is only an advanced manifestation of the subjectivity of value.

So, how does one go about the conceptualisation of security? The answer lies in the deconstruction of the elements of what we observe to be the shared concept of security.

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28 Harold D Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power And Society (Taylor and Francis 2013).
Baldwin for example, asks the following questions in his deconstruction of security: *Security for Whom? Security for which values? How much Security? From what threats? By what means? At what costs? In what period?* Taking Baldwin's first question into consideration, it is entirely accurate to propose that the concept of security is virtually meaningless if we fail to understand whose security we are referring to, as Williams so aptly recognises.\(^3^4\) So, "Whose security should we be talking about?"\(^3^5\) Literature for decades preceding and spanning the cold-war era proposed that priority be given to states as ultimate referent objects when security in international politics was discussed, and it seemed to be more important to scholars, to focus on how representatives of particular groups and organisations constructed their threat agendas. However, literature developed after the end of the cold-war (such as those emanating from the Copenhagen school) argue for priority to be given to human beings, as the threat agendas constructed by recognised representatives of states, for various reasons, were observed to not always accurately represent the equally legitimate threat agendas of specific minorities residing within the boundaries of that state.\(^3^6\) Literature within this period leaned towards the conviction that without humans as the ultimate referent objects of security, the concept of security itself makes little sense.\(^3^7\) This unsolved lack of consensus in the security debate is a foundational cause of considerable variance observable, when one seeks to identify central tenets of national security strategies of different states, with some states' national security strategies prioritising regime security over human life and vice-versa. This variance can be assigned to the fact that national security is a concept developed on the foundations of a concept of Security, a concept which can be understood in significantly different ways, depending on value systems that influence where the providers of security believe its ultimate concerns should be. As Christiansen *et al* have identified, constructivism contrasts between material and social realities, citing that social realities ‘exist only by human agreement’, making social realities much more malleable, contestable and confined to definite periods of time.\(^3^8\) This perspective, echoes my approach to the concept of security, and, as you will see, underlines the provision of national security from state to state, and through different periods of history.

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2.1.4 The social construction of National Security

Various definitions of National Security have been proposed, and some of these propositions are worth exploring for one to meaningfully understand how the subjectivity of value influences the provision of National Security. Sheenan, touches on the value-laden nature of security, explaining that, much like knowledge which is socially contingent, security ‘is not an objective or apolitical condition; it is a subjectively constructed concept’

David Omand for example, proposes that National Security should be defined as "a state of trust on the part of the citizen that the risks to everyday life, whether from man-made threats or impersonal hazards, are being adequately managed [by the state] to the extent that there is confidence that normal life can continue." Omand, therefore, cites the existence of an agreement, (state of trust) between the citizen and the state, whereby the citizen has thrust the responsibility of the mitigation and alleviation of risk, onto the state. He also states that the extent to which this responsibility is thrust is at least to the extent that normal life, (a status-quo within that society) can continue. Omand implicitly proposing that security at the national level, is something that is to be consciously provided, whilst reiterating his conviction that Security is something that must be provided by the state. He stated that "Government's primary duty in respect of national security [is] towards the protection of the individual and the daily life of the community."

Therefore, we can understand that Omand's perspective on National security, is one in which he believes that Governments are providers of security, and as such, they should prioritise individual humans as the ultimate referent objects of National Security. Interestingly, David Omand served as the Director of the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters from 1996 to 1997.

However, not all scholars seem to agree with Omand's theorising on national security. Sir Richard Dearlove for example, is of the opinion that a clear distinction needs to be made between what he calls a "register of civic anxieties" and "what really constitutes...core National Security concerns that could really threaten the viability of a State, as opposed to the quality and safety of life that it delivers to its citizens" Anyadike also proposes a definition of National Security, which is similar to Omand's aforementioned proposition. She views National security, as the responsibility of the state to "maintain the survival of the State through

41 David Omand, Securing The State (Hurst 2011). p.11.
the use of economic, diplomacy, power projection and political power." There is agreement between Anyadike and Omand’s perception of National Security with regards to the responsibility of the state to provide security, but Anyadike simply does not expand upon the social contract which Omand believes to exist between the citizen and the state. This perceptual subjectivity, can be assigned to the fact that Anyadike, hailing from eastern Nigeria, is perhaps conceptualising on a different social agreement which amounts to National security, which in Nigeria has been observed to prioritise the survival of the state as an entity (or Interests) as the ultimate referent object of its National Security Strategy, over the provision of security to individual citizens (People) as the referent objects. It is interesting to note that such varying differences in opinion can be shaped by subjective experiences of individuals who are citizens of different states with different value systems, attempting to characterize two different versions of what they consider to be the same manner of social reality. In a way, one can assign this variance in the definition of national security, to Kaiser’s observation that ‘scholars are deeply embedded in the environment in which they work and that, in turn, the somehow contribute to the creation of the object (in this case, social reality) they aim at exploring’

Another take on the concept of national security by Julian Richards offers perhaps the most insightful perspective on how we should approach national security. Firstly, Richards recognises the nature of security as a social construct, a construct which is not static, but more or less fluid, depending on the dictates of society, circumstance and indeed political actors within that state, which together initiate, prioritise and reinforce various processes of securitisation according to their threat agendas. In addition to highlighting the socially constructed nature of security, Richards provides a brief historical analysis of National security, separating the evolution of the "nation" as a concept and that of "security". Concluding that "National security" is defined as a particular articulation of security priorities and concerns put forward by the political leaders of a state, at a given time in history....these concerns [are] constructed around the interests of a particular set of people, identified as the citizens of the state." Like Ziemke, he also highlights the importance of identifying and understanding the National Interest of a state, because it is the defence of this ultimate referent object (Ultimate Concerns in Ziemke's wording), that a state's actions in the face of certain perceived threats are

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45 Julian Richards, a Guide to National Security (Oxford University Press 2012). p.16-17
determined.\textsuperscript{46} However, one can observe in Richards’ observations that he does not necessarily pinpoint where the ultimate referent object lies, whether it is the citizens of the state or the values of the State itself. Instead, he highlights a bigger picture, aiming to characterise a much broader concept of national security, identifying that various versions of national security exist in different states. In doing so, he examines the influence of internal political processes, bureaucratic configurations and considers the effects of the influence of time (as well as the differences in perspectives of analysts, constructivists, liberals etc.), as determinants of what the ultimate referent object for a particular state's National Security is, without necessarily airing a subjective opinion as to where he believes these ultimate concerns should lie.

From the author's understanding of the assessed perspectives, in addition to a plethora of proposed definitions of National Security, the author proposes working definitions of security and national security. The provision of security should be viewed herein as a social process, dependent on the existence of rational personalities which ensure the conscious and continual provision of stable parameters around referent objects in order to maintain a status quo, within the context of a society, and therefore defines National Security herein, as the expression of a consensus, a compilation of the expectations of citizens of a Nation, wherein the alleviation and mitigation of certain perceived threats to members of that society (Nation) and their values (referent objects), are exclusively delegated to the relevant institutions of the state, which are held primarily responsible for the identification, assessment and mitigation (or in some cases, extermination) of these threats.

Securing interests, such as territory, physical wellbeing and financial stability, requires the investment of conscious effort, and rational decision making on the part of the state. Because the rational capability of any entity (including a state) is finite, rationalisation of phenomena requires the conscious simplification of options for choices to be made. This simplification process requires an entity to prioritise its options. When the process of prioritisation is initiated, one can then observe the deliberate preferential treatment of certain options by an entity, while it gradually and unconsciously deprioritises other options. When the process of prioritisation is superimposed on a state's finite ability to ensure the provision of security to objects of value, an observer can reasonably identify which objects of value are

given priority, and the different preferential biases of states can be distilled. Therefore, observing a state's behaviour when it faces National Security issues pertinent to its ultimate survival as an entity, in comparison with observing a state's behaviour when making less critical decisions -such as the configuration of its national football team, enables us to observe states at points in time where the implications of making critical decisions, are much more severe. By observing state behaviour in scenarios where the implications of decisions are heightened in this way, it is more convenient for an observer to extract and distinguish between various strategic choices available to the state at points in time, when significant intellectual resources are dedicated to the decision making process, thereby enabling more precise observation of which strategic choices have been chosen, and how these choices have been made, and most importantly, where its ultimate concerns are.

2.1.5 Culture, Strategy and Strategic Culture

A casual glance at the regular activities of individuals within different social communities reveals striking differences. This is because, observable behaviour of humans in any given community tends to include ideas, norms, ethics and values, transmitted through generations thorough agents of socialisation, that are somewhat specific to the social community in which they are situated. These ideas, norms, ethics etc, influence the nature of social realities that are constructed within these societies. In my view, culture is an encapsulation of all the social realities that exist within a defined society. However, one must recognise, and scrutinise authoritative definitions of concepts. Theoretically, culture has been defined in various ways. Below are some of the most popular authoritative definitions of culture have been proposed, and cited repeatedly by scholars:

*I use the term culture to mean an organised body of rules concerning the ways in which individuals in a population should communicate with one another, think about themselves and their environments, and behave toward one another and towards objects in their environments.*

*Culture is a set of human-made objective and subjective elements that in the past have increased the probability of survival and resulted in satisfaction for the participants in an ecological niche, and thus became shared among those*

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49 This compilation was carried out by Valerie Hudson in her work on Foreign Policy Analysis, which led the author to investigate these propositions independently: Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: classic and contemporary theory, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007)
who could communicate with each other because they had a common language and...lived in the same time and place.\textsuperscript{51}

Culture consists of patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reaction, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values.\textsuperscript{52}

Culture has fascinated humans from time immemorial and continues to do so. The study of culture as a concept within political science has received perhaps the greatest attention in comparison with other concepts. Scholars ranging from anthropology, to even strategy, such as Mead, Tylor, Parsons, Snyder, Snyder, and Bilton, have all delved into the concept of culture, utilising various theoretical lens.\textsuperscript{53} Culture has been characterised as being one of the easiest concepts to understand, yet one of the most difficult concepts to define theoretically.\textsuperscript{54} These three aforementioned definitions of culture, highlight varying elements and characteristics of culture. However, a common denominator of all these definitions is the fact that they all try to define an encapsulation of social realities which are identifiable in repetitive behavior - developed over time within the enclosure of a society. The development of symbolic communication, between individuals possessing the same cultural heritage, is also another factor of culture that they highlight.

So, there are two sides to these definitions, firstly, the development of codified behaviour, from repeated behaviour, over time. Secondly, the development of symbolic meaning, and forms of communication that have been developed over time. With that in mind, let us take a look at other definitions of culture. One popular definition of culture as proposed by E B Tylor, views culture as:

\textit{Culture, or civilisation, taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.\textsuperscript{55} [Tylor: 1871]}

In this context, culture is referred to as a single entity which encompasses all of observable human behaviour, and that this sum-total is transferrable from one human to another through acquisition. Tylor implies that elements of culture can only be acquired by humans

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{52} Clyde Kluckhohn, 'The Study of Culture', \textit{The Policy Sciences}, (Stanford University Press 1951)  \\
\textsuperscript{54} Valerie Hudson, \textit{Foreign Policy Analysis} (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007)  \\
\textsuperscript{55} Edward Tylor, \textit{Primitive culture}, (Holt 1889)
\end{flushleft}
within the construct of a society. Tylor's view implies that certain innate human traits, for example, instinctive reactions to external stimuli, which are not acquired through learning within the construct of a society cannot be regarded as part of culture, and therefore reside outside the logical boundaries of Tylor's proposed understanding of culture.\textsuperscript{56} It must be stated that one must try not to confuse culture and instinct. The instinctive behaviour being any behaviour which is performed without being based upon prior experiences, such as a person's reaction to a pinch on the arm. Culture has also been defined in anthropological terms as "The acquired knowledge that people use to interpret experience and to generate behaviour".\textsuperscript{57} From this viewpoint, culture is viewed as "a set of tools" with which we utilize to understand the implications of certain past and present activities "to interpret experience".\textsuperscript{58} From our understanding of these implications, we either curtail or modify our instinctive responses to stimuli by superimposing our interpretation of experience, and acting appropriately by "generating behaviour". The simultaneous occurrence of both interpreting experience and generating behaviour is a phenomenon which is necessary for actual situations, utilising cultural knowledge.

Much like the constructivist distinction between material and social realities, a striking distinction is made between the tangible aspects of culture-such as art, law et cetera which are mentioned in various contemporary definitions of culture, and the intangible aspects of culture such as norms, myth, identity politics and so on. Therefore, cultural anthropologists as a whole, refer to culture exclusively as the "knowledge" that individuals use to interpret objects, events and actions, therefore including behaviour and excluding material tangible manifestations of culture.\textsuperscript{59} One of the most popular and relevant definitions of culture was proposed by Geertz in his 1973 anthropological work 'the Interpretation of Cultures' wherein he defined culture as:

\begin{quote}
An historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by a means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about attitudes towards life\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

Geertz as well as other prominent sociologists and anthropologists at the time (including Douglas and Levi-Strauss), firmly believed in the crucial role of culture in behaviour modification, with Geertz even suggesting ways in which patterns of meanings could lead to

\textsuperscript{56} Edward Tylor, \textit{Primitive culture}, (Holt 1889)
\textsuperscript{57} James Spradley and David McCurdy, \textit{Anthropology--the cultural perspective}, (Wiley 1975) p.2.
\textsuperscript{58} James Spradley and David McCurdy, \textit{Anthropology--the cultural perspective}, (Wiley 1975) p.2.
\textsuperscript{59} James Spradley and David McCurdy, \textit{Anthropology--the cultural perspective}, (Wiley 1975) p.3.
\textsuperscript{60} Clifford Geertz, \textit{The interpretation of Cultures}, (Basic Books 1973)
unique behaviours, and provided a model of culture to supplement his proposition.\textsuperscript{61} This cultural knowledge serves as a set of tools useful for ‘getting along’ in life.\textsuperscript{62} To interpret the experiences, we encounter and simultaneously generate what we deem fit as appropriate behaviour in response to these experiences as they occur. The author must reiterate that the utility of culture (interpreting experiences and generating behaviour) occurs simultaneously, and are only separated in theoretical analysis, for clarity. Furthermore, the utility of culture is not limited to behavioural modification of individuals. Rather, it encompasses the behavioural modification of collectives of individuals, groups, and indeed entire societies, when they operate within socially constructed realities.

Strategy, on the other hand, is commonly understood as deliberately maintaining a balance between ends, ways and means; the identification of objectives and the prioritisation of resources and methods at the disposal of the strategist, for meeting objectives.\textsuperscript{63} Thomas Schelling, described strategy as a series of moves initiated by an actor, aimed at influencing the choice of an adversarial actor, in a manner which is favourable to one's self.\textsuperscript{64} Schelling viewed the ultimate aim of strategy as one's manipulation of an adversary's mode of behaviour to the point that such an adversary is left with a simple maximisation problem, with an optimum solution, which is the optimum solution for one's self.\textsuperscript{65}

2.1.6 Culture and Strategy as Intervening Variables

Considering the aforementioned perspectives on culture and strategy, one can reasonably anticipate that there are underlying linkages between the concept of culture and that of strategy. But, most importantly, one recognises that neither culture nor strategy can be tolerably defined without explicit reference to behaviour. In observing the functionality of culture and strategy, one can understand that there are quite a lot of scenarios where the linkages between the two phenomena become even more apparent, as both culture and strategy are proposed to perform the same intermediary tasks of interpreting external stimuli, and the modification of instinctive responses to said external stimuli. Culture and strategy can be

\textsuperscript{62} James Spradley and David McCurdy, Anthropology--the cultural perspective, (Wiley 1975) p.2.
\textsuperscript{63} Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics, (1st edn, Johns Hopkins University Press 2007).
\textsuperscript{64} Michael Andrew Berger, How Resisting Democracies Can Defeat Substate Terrorism: Formulating A Theoretical Framework For Strategic Coercion Against Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organisations' (PhD, University of St Andrews 2010).
\textsuperscript{65} Thomas C Schelling, The Strategy Of Conflict (Harvard University Press 1960)
regarded as intervening variables between instinct and behaviour. Indeed, it is this relationship between culture and strategy that Hudson speaks of when she proposes that "what culture provides its members is a repertoire or palette of adaptive response from which members build off-the-shelf strategies of action."\footnote{Valerie Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis* (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007)}

However, two principal distinguishing factors between Culture and Strategy exist. Firstly, while culture is a form of interpretive mechanism which permits us to generate appropriate behaviour in unfolding situations, Strategy enables us to ponder upon actions in advance, in light of our goals and capacities.\footnote{Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy* (1st edn, Oxford University press 2013)} Secondly, unlike culture, strategy and indeed strategic behaviour, has an end. This means that strategy influences behaviour, in a way that is usually more apparent in actors with the aim of influencing anticipated events, attempting to guide these events in a manner that is favourable to ones' objectives at an anticipated end.\footnote{Thomas C Schelling, *The Strategy Of Conflict* (Harvard University Press 1960).}

Whilst these distinguishing factors are relevant; it does seem that neither culture nor strategy can be operationalised in isolation of each other. For example, it may require cultural knowledge about the significance of the colors of traffic lights at intersections on the motorways, the intentions of other motorists, the purpose of keeping to one lane, and a variety of other considerations to be deemed fit to drive a car in a particular society (ideational variable). However, all this knowledge would not get a motorist to his/her destination without an understanding the physical limits of his/her automobile, range of the fuel tank in that automobile (material variable), and most importantly a navigation strategy to get said motorist from an initial location to his or her destination (strategic agency).\footnote{It is interesting to note, stemming from personal experience, that on Nigerian motorways, a red light at a traffic intersection does not indicate a command to stop, it is viewed somewhat as a mere suggestion, which most motorists choose to ignore.}

The same can be said for states, wherein the internalised norms of warfare, the capability to engage in warfare, and the presence of an operating system, are all requirements for a state to engage in warfare.

Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that cultural and strategic knowledge manifest simultaneously, in congruence with each other, and influencing upon each other, as they modify instinctive responses to stimuli. Culture and strategy both modify behaviour, in different contexts; culture possessing a semi-permanent influence on behaviour over an extended period of time, and strategy influencing behaviour with a specified end. These behavioural modifications do not manifest in isolation of each other, and it is little wonder why
many believe that the long-term effect of cultural, behavioural modification, overlaps with short-term strategic plans, both in individuals and collectives. This understanding begs a new question. How can we identify the influence of cultural knowledge on the strategic behaviour of collectives such as states?

2.1.7 The Cultural approach to Strategic Studies

“the fog of culture has interfered with the theory and practice of strategy” - Booth

Perhaps owing to the overlapping nature of culture and strategy, cultural approaches to strategic studies have been in existence for many hundred years, in one form or the other. The proposition that cultural interpretations routinely influence strategy is in fact, a proposition that is grounded in classical strategic literature. Affirming this proposition are the writings of Thucydides, Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu. Clausewitz consistently recognised that war and war-fighting strategy were a "test of moral” (ideational) as well as “physical forces." Clausewitz believed that the ultimate goal of strategy transcended victory on the battlefield, stating that the ultimate goal of strategy was the elimination of the adversaries’ morale to continue waging war. Attempts to focus on cultural influences on the behaviour of entire societies such as states, have been driven by a need to proffer alternative explanations to the relatively simplified explanations proffered by the realist and neo-realist schools of thought. This is not to propose that cultural approaches to strategic studies necessarily reject rationality, rather, it implies that a pure realist approach to strategic matters can be furnished with insight from cultural interpretations of strategic choice. They believe that rationality, being one of the most common examples of strategic judgement, is influenced by the culture within which rationality receives approval. Poore argues that it is insufficient to utilise any theory which assumes that the strategic behaviours of various states can be solely determined by immutable external forces such as international anarchy and the distribution of power in the international system, without understanding the specific social context within which such a state operates.

70 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism (1st edn, Taylor and Francis 2014).
72 Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes, The Peloponnesian War (1st edn, University of Michigan Press 1959)
76 Jonghyun Choi, The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The Continuities And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948' (PhD, University of Reading 2009).
and the values which it grants priority.\textsuperscript{77} The realist and neo-realist frameworks according to Poore’s logic, are guilty of this; simplifying the influence of culture on collective rationality, discounting the accumulated knowledge and implications of the past, whilst favouring forward-looking calculations of expected utility, which have produced limited explanations regarding state behaviour.\textsuperscript{78}

In focusing on material variables alone, we are robbed of a comprehensive understanding of how and why certain threats are prioritised over others, by the operating system. Perhaps the reason certain states choose to elevate the threat of terrorism to one which requires significant urgency, is because they consider terrorism to be far more corrosive to the interests of the state, in comparison to the impact of motor accidents, even though statistically, the impact of motor accidents evidently causes significantly higher loss of life and property within the state. Perhaps this biased focus on terrorism may be assigned to the fact that terrorism as a threat, is usually elevated, because it is orchestrated and operationalised by malicious agency, against the state. In contrast, the threats posed by motor accidents or natural causes, do not enjoy this sort of prioritisation, because of the lack of malicious intent and agency in these threats. Therefore, in reacting to threats such as terrorism, the state is aware of a much higher degree of flexibility in the strategies employed by terrorist organisations. In return, the strategies employed by operating systems are formulated by rational beings, outside the purview of low-level politics, capable of exponentially increasing the aggressiveness of the response to the terrorist threat.

This is where the understanding of ideational variables, becomes more relevant. Surely, there must be an idea about the risks posed by terrorism, which facilitates the counterintuitive prioritisation of terrorism over a statistically, more dangerous threat, posed by road accidents. There surely is an influence of ideational considerations, which overrides statistical objectivity, and it should not be ignored. When we start to consider how states respond to threats which are orchestrated by humans, we must consider both the material capabilities of states, as well as the ideological considerations, which determine how these material capabilities are utilised. The fact that one can always identify the individuals or organisations which are required to coordinate the reactions of states to malicious threats makes it possible for the researcher to

\textsuperscript{77} Stuart Poore, ‘Strategic Culture And Non-Nuclear Weapon Outcome: The Cases Of Australia, South Africa And Sweden’ (PhD, University of Southampton 2000)

identify state behaviour, which one can observe to understand how, why and where states react to malicious threats.

Matters within the realm of strategy are infinite, and scholars have attempted to focus on specific strategic matters where they believe the influence of culture on strategy, is most apparent. Since the early 1930s, political scientists, historians and army personnel have sought to proffer theories that explain the various strategies employed, attitudes towards, and tolerance of, nation states with regards to the use of force. This specific problem which is inherently interdisciplinary has been present in literature spanning from military history to sociology and even anthropology. Notably, the most substantial contributions of a conceptual nature to this body of literature stemmed from political scientists studying international security. An initial contribution to this area of knowledge which is now generally referred to as ‘Strategic Culture', was suggested by Lieutenant Basil H Liddell Hart, who put forward the argument in his book “The British Way in Warfare” which was published in 1932, in which he claimed that a sanctioned British “way in warfare” existed. This was followed decades later by Russell Weigley’s “The American Way of Warfare” which was published in 1973.

2.1.8 Strategic Culture

It was not until the 1970s however that the phrase ‘Strategic Culture' became accepted as an appropriate label to identify this field of inquiry. The phrase was coined by an american political scientist, Jack Snyder, in a report examining Soviet nuclear deterrence policy. His report, “The Soviet Strategic Culture; Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations” was principally an examination of the factors which were thought to be significant enough to considerably influence Soviet reactions- if the United States of America, carried out limited nuclear operations against the Soviet Union. Snyder defined Strategic Culture as the "sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation". Contending that the uniqueness of Soviet strategic culture was crucial in shaping Soviet thought and behaviour regarding matters of strategy. Snyder further proposed that political elites seem to articulate a unique strategic culture with regards to security and military affairs, which in his

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81 Jounghyun Choi, ‘The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The Continuities And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948’ (PhD, University of Reading 2009).
belief, was a wider manifestation of the influence of culture on strategy. He went further to propose that

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a \text{set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of cultural rather than mere policy.} \quad 82
\]

It is evident that Snyder thought of culture, as the presence of beliefs and attitudes, which facilitated the perpetual repetition of a set of behaviours. One does get the idea that he believed at a certain point, that the mechanical repetition of certain behaviour, was not as a result of policy but had moved up to the realm of ‘cultural' behaviour. Snyder thought culture to be a much more influential modifier of behaviour, than policy.

So what was the context within which his research emerged? At the time of Snyder’s research, the then United States Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, sought to ‘increase the flexibility of its strategic targeting plans' and viewed the development of ‘pre-planned nuclear options' as a viable supplement, which was less ambiguous in comparison to a plethora of options which had been previously considered. At the time, concerns of uncontrolled nuclear escalation between the United States and the Soviet Union were viewed as an immediate and urgent threat to international stability. It was also believed that the credibility of an American response to Soviet attacks on its territories and that of its allies would be enhanced if the US possessed an unambiguous plan of action which would be perceived as being below the SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan) threshold. The conceptualisation of Strategic Culture by Snyder was in effect necessitated by a need for the United States government to understand the motives and ideational foundations of Soviet strategic thought. Unable to reconcile Soviet decision-making styles with rational choice theory, Snyder finally concluded that the Soviet’s unique historical experiences, political institutions, as well as its strategic situation "combined to produce a unique mix of strategic beliefs." 83 Lantis viewed Snyder’s work on strategic culture, as a crucial catalyst which redirected attention to a possible nexus between political culture, military culture and strategic choice. 84


Also in the 1970’s, Ken Booth began to raise similar concerns about the role of ethnocentrism in strategic thought. Booth went further to explore the ideational foundations of nuclear strategy and superpower relations. He believed that without accounting for the obscuring effects which culture could have on strategic thinking, analysts could arrive at grave misunderstandings of enemy intent and strategic position. He, therefore, called for a careful application of cultural relativism within the study and practice of strategy. Booth further appealed to strategists to be more aware of the manner in which their cultural contexts could influence their thinking. Professing that “an observer cannot completely eradicate his own cultural conditioning, and the structure of ideas and values which it passes on to him.” However, one problem remained unaddressed. No one proponent of strategic culture had explicitly defined what cultural behaviour was. It was still, essentially, a foggy concept that influenced strategy.

2.1.8.1 The Uncontrolled Development of a Theoretical Framework

In the 1980s, the study of Strategic Culture rapidly burst out of its initial subject of analysis and went on to examine a plethora of non-nuclear security issues. This was in part attributed to concerns about misunderstandings and misrepresentations which plagued superpower relations, especially in matters of nuclear strategy. It was believed that these misrepresentations could have also made their ways into non-nuclear security issues and that they needed to be identified. Another possible reason for strategic culture's increased popularity was, in part, as a result of Ann Swidler's proposal of a more complex model of culture which encapsulated various links between culture and state behaviour. She proposed that the nexus between culture and state behaviour was mediated by cultural “strategies of action”. Although, she proposed a rather typical definition of culture as consisting of “symbolic vehicles of
meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories and rituals of daily life”.

She did, however, innovatively reconceptualise culture as an explanatory variable which could grant capability advantages to action, stating that "Action is not to be determined by one's values. Rather, action and values are organised to take advantage of cultural competences”.

Again, Swidler’s argument, served as a potential link between culture and cultural behaviour, thereby enabling scholars to propose different means through which cultural behaviour could influence strategy.

Strategic Culture was soon categorised into three major schools of thought by Johnston, less than two decades after it was conceptualised. This categorisation, was an attempt by Johnston, to extinguish a great deal of confusion facing political scientists who found it problematic to wade through the concept of strategic culture. This confusion was not surprising, especially since half of the etymological structure of the concept remained loosely defined. These categories were called the "first generation", "second generation", and "third generation" of writers.

Each of the generations of research on strategic culture were differentiated by Johnston, based on either their unique conceptual or methodological approaches to the subject of strategic culture.

2.1.8.2 In Search of Synergistic Links between Culture and State Strategy

In Johnston's opinion, the first generation of authors were primarily interested in describing a synergistic link between strategic culture and policy regarding weapons of mass destruction.

Scholars such as David R. Jones, Jack Snyder, and Gray were identified as belonging to this category. These scholars viewed culture as possessing a semi-permanent influence on elite-proposed policy. For example, Gray was of the opinion that, as a result of America’s national historical experience, Americans had generated unique “modes of thought and action with respect to force”.

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96 David Jones, 'Soviet Strategic Culture' Strategic Power: USA/USSR, (Palgrave Macmillan 1990)
provide an enduring explanation of state’s behaviour concerning foreign policy. Booth also defined strategic culture as:

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\text{a nation’s traditions, values attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, customs, achievement and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force}\]

This generation of scholars focused intently on why Soviets and Americans thought rather differently about nuclear strategy. Scholars such as David R. Jones, Jack Snyder, and Colin Gray contended that these variances were as a result of unique macro-environmental variations which were deeply rooted in subjective historical experiences, unique political cultures and geographical constraints. In the same vein, strategic culture proponents suggest that scholars such as Ade Adefuye, inadvertently explored the influence of strategic culture on sub-Saharan, states in his 1992 work, *Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Example*.

### 2.1.8.3 Strategic Culture as a Tool

The Second Generation of scholars included individuals such as Klein, Klein and Luckham. These authors, highlighted the role of self-interest on the decision-makers’ part, as another crucial factor other than strategic culture, which could influence the strategic choices of states. Within the second generation school of thought, it was a widely accepted premise that leaders of strategic communities did not necessarily act in accordance with their expressed motives. In other words, it was observed that there was a vast difference between what leaders thought and said, and the deeper motives for their thoughts and actions.

Theoretical expansion of this premise resulted in the second generation proposing that one had to delink strategic culture explicitly, and observed behaviour, in order to separate strategic behaviour which stemmed from actual strategic culture, and strategic behaviour which

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99 Jounghyun Choi, *The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The Continuities And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948* (PhD, University of Reading 2009).
100 Ken Booth, ‘The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,’ *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, (St Martin’s Press) 121-128.
102 Ade Adefuye, *Culture and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Example* (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1992)
was a result of the influence of decision-makers seeking to achieve their self-interests. According to second generation scholars, this delinkage was necessitated by observations of strategic behaviour in which general strategic orientation seemed to follow a proposed strategic culture, but actual operational strategy, on the other hand, reflected the specific interests of decision makers. Put forward initially in the mid-1980s; these scholars viewed strategic culture as a possible tool of political elites. These authors tended to focus more on the issue of instrumentality of strategic culture, and proposed that Strategic Culture was primarily relevant as a socialising mechanism for both decision-makers, and members of a strategic community – ‘a tool of political hegemony’.

This proposition made it possible for second generation scholars to view strategic culture as a means through which interest-driven political elites could establish and influence approaches to violence, in a manner which the state could utilise violence against its adversaries and still appear to be acting within the parameters of what is legitimately acceptable in that society. In theorising about leaders seeking to legitimise violence, one does wonder if the second generation were conceptualising on strategic culture or some form of early precursor to securitisation theory. It was also unanimously accepted in this school of thought, that the utilisation of strategic culture as a tool of political hegemony, resulted in strategic cultures incrementally differing from state to state, over time.

2.1.8.4 Strategic Culture as a Falsifiable Theory

The Third Generation of scholars according to Johnston, emphasised that for strategic culture to be relevant and useful, it must be a theory which is falsifiable. This generation of scholars advocated for a revision of the strategic culture concept. Pushing for a more narrowly defined and specific theory, which excluded behaviour and self-interest as independent

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variables. Johnston classified himself in this generation of scholars along with Jeffrey Legro\textsuperscript{112} and Kier\textsuperscript{113}. In fact, Johnston attempted to proffer a much narrower definition of strategic culture. He understood strategic culture as an integrated system of ‘symbols’ which establish long-lasting preferences by conceptually determining the role of military force in interstate political affairs, which as a result granted these concepts “such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious”\textsuperscript{114}. In attempting to redefine the concept of strategic culture, his definition seemed to be remarkably similar to Snyder’s initial definition of strategic culture.\textsuperscript{115} In addition, his ‘narrow’ definition, still included loosely defined terms such as ‘symbols’ and ‘systems of symbols’, which in his opinion included “argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors”, all these terms and constructs which resulted in his inability to relate strategic culture, to behavioural choices.\textsuperscript{116}

2.1.9 The Unravelling of Strategic Culture

Strategic culture as we have seen, was developed following a specific need to understand state strategy with regards to the use of force, from an alternative cultural perspective, challenging the realist assumption that the strategic behaviours of states could be solely determined by immutable external forces. It was as a result of the gaping dissatisfaction with the realist approach that there was an additional need to understand the meaning of state reactions to the use of force. The specific social context within which a state operates, in light of its unique historical experiences, was perhaps the only way in which scholars could identify and theorise on the non-material considerations which could reasonably influence state strategy. As promising as the notion of strategic culture seemed, scholars were then burdened with the task of developing a theory which could exhaustively explain what these non-material considerations were, and how these non-material considerations influenced state behaviour. In analysing strategic culture, the following shortcomings became apparent to the author.

\textsuperscript{112} Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (1st edn, Cornell University Press 2013).
\textsuperscript{113} Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (1st edn, Princeton University Press 2017).
\textsuperscript{115} Snyder defined strategic culture as “a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of cultural rather than mere policy.” See: Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations' (www.rand.org, 1977) <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf> accessed 15 January 2015.
2.1.9.1 The Problem of Infinite Independent Variables

Although first-generation scholars of strategic culture did provide innovative insight on the possible nexus between culture and strategic behaviour of states, it was plagued with foundational problems with regards to the definition, scope of application and methodology of strategic culture.\(^\text{117}\) Firstly, the first generation defined culture in extensive terms, running the risk of making it ‘practically meaningless’.\(^\text{118}\) The lack of a unified definition of ‘culture’ by strategic culture proponents in this generation, meant that there was a lack of consensus on what this concept meant, thereby influencing researchers to view and approach culture differently.\(^\text{119}\) Furthermore, the definition of ‘Strategic Culture’ as a unified concept, was remarkably vague, and tautological at best. Johnston notes that various definitions of strategic culture from this generation, regarded “technology, geography, organisational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, political culture, national character, political psychology, ideology, and even international system culture”\(^\text{120}\) as legitimate variables within the scope of strategic culture. This problem, also manifests itself in the inclusion of scholars such as Adefuye, who never explicitly expressed any ontological or methodological alignment with strategic culture, but was in essence, claimed by other proponents of strategic culture. The proponents in this generation were also guilty of oversimplifying the influence of complicated domestic factors on national strategy and reducing these factors to mere variables within the strategic culture theoretical framework. Obviously, when proponents of strategic culture failed to specify the theory's level of analysis, there was always the risk that variables would be imported from every level of analysis, and the relative importance of some these variables would be oversimplified. The strategic culture theoretical framework was so far-reaching that

\(^{117}\) It is interesting to note that Jeremy Black, warned against the indiscriminate application of this theory, arguing that the concept of strategic culture required quite a degree of flexibility to operate. This warning, however, did not hinder scholars from attempting to develop this concept into an increasingly sophisticated theoretical framework, as it gained some degree of popularity amongst political scientists who considered Strategic Culture as an operable alternative to Rational Choice Theory. Perhaps, because of the inability of Rational Choice Theory to proffer a convincing explanation for Soviet strategic thought and behaviour. The specific and narrow definition of “rationality” employed by proponents of Rational Choice theory - which implied that an actor ‘acts as if it were balancing costs against benefits to arrive at action that maximizes personal advantage’ - was one which excluded many considerations, such as the influence of the early formative experiences of a state-amongst other omissions. Johnston argued that these experiences, ensure that ‘different states have [developed] different predominant strategic preferences’.


\(^{119}\) Jounghyun Choi, ‘The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The Continuities And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948’ (PhD, University of Reading 2009).

it encapsulated almost all possible explanatory variables which could influence strategic choice, to the extent that there was hardly any conceptual space for a non-strategic culture explanation of strategic choice.\textsuperscript{121}

In attempting to explain what the relevant non-material influencers of state strategy were, first-generation scholars set a precedent, of enumerating various concepts from cultural studies, such as ideas, emotional responses, behaviour, imitation et cetera and including them as variables within the strategic cultural framework. The implication of this haphazard inclusion was that, when this theory was subjected to academic scrutiny, it was discovered that every variable included, had to be exhaustively defined, identified in real terms, and its interactions with other variables, accounted for. Whilst strategic culture scholars proposed the merits of strategic culture, and highlighted the intuitive genius underscoring the cultural approach to strategic use of force, these scholars were soon to discover the demerits of proposing a theoretical framework with numerous non-material variables. The strategic culture theoretical framework, was not intended to be superimposed on the plethora of security issues that subsequent proponents of the theory had applied strategic culture to, and subsequent generations of the strategic culture school of thought, were hardly restrained by any mechanism within the strategic culture theoretical framework, with regards to the scope of non-material independent variables that were up for consideration.

In addition, each researcher attempted to encapsulate the strategic culture theoretical framework rather differently, proposing labels such as ‘political culture’, ‘security culture’, ‘military culture’, ‘military organisational culture’, ‘ways of warfare’, ‘national style’, ‘strategic personality’ and ‘defence culture’, to name a few.\textsuperscript{122} These numerous labels led to the subsequent description of strategic culture as ‘thick’ and ‘descriptive’, and as an “academically unfashionable subject of national character”.\textsuperscript{123} Lantis citing Klein, argued that only a “comparative, in-depth study of the formation, influence and process of change in the strategic cultures of the major powers of the modern era”\textsuperscript{124} could positively contribute to the study of war and peace.\textsuperscript{125} The efficiency of Strategic Culture in aiding policymakers’

\textsuperscript{122} Jounghyun Choi, The Evolution Of Strategic Cultures Of Divided Countries: A Case Study On The Continuities And Changes Of Korean Strategic Culture And Strategic Relations On The Peninsula Since 1948 (PhD, University of Reading 2009).
understanding of the perceptions of different actors in international relations, and its consequent ability to eventually reduce ambiguity and misinformation with regards to strategic choice, are also considerations which make the case for the introduction of the NSSP theory. In addition, the perpetual disagreement on the importance of culture in strategy, and the failing final attempts made by third generation scholars to somehow eliminate, or at best minimise the influence of Culture in an attempt to produce a falsifiable theory out of strategic culture, remains perhaps, the most enduring hindrance of strategic culture.

With such an observation by Kelin, the factors which should be considered in generating an NSSP theory becomes increasingly evident. The NSSP theory needs to be capable to perform in-depth investigations into the formation, processes of change and personality of national security strategy, against modern threats such as malicious non-state actors. Understandably, it is quite difficult to theorise on ideational milieus which influence state strategy, utilising only material variables. This is perhaps why strategic culture scholars imported numerous ideational variables as an avenue through which a state's ways of strategy could be understood. However, the NSSP theory approaches this issue from a unique standpoint, by focusing on state behaviour. Observable state behaviour, is a result of material as well as ideational milieus, which enables us to understand the operationalisation state strategy as a result of its material limits, and ideational limits. Arguably, the physical capabilities of states are easier to identify in comparison to ideational limits. However, the author proposes that ideational milieus can be identified by identifying the purpose of state behaviour, by analysing its end. Asking about whom or what the state is protecting from threats, as well as how the state eliminates threats and where the state identifies threats, enables scholars to distil the general purpose of state behaviour in instances where it can be identified. These observations are proposed to be adequately addressed by the NSSP theory, as shall be shown in the next chapter.

2.1.9.2 The Ambiguous Dependent Variable

Much like the first generation of strategic culture, the author observed a great deal of confusion with regards to second generation theorising about the nature of strategic culture. It remains unclear whether strategic culture was to be seen as a dependent variable, or as a tool. In referring to strategic culture as a tool utilised to create political hegemony within a strategic community, the second generation failed to propose a refined definition of strategic culture, before introducing additional variables or categorising strategic culture as a tool. The second

generation also struggled to identify if, in reality, there were certain decision makers who were capable of objectively utilising strategic culture as a tool to serve their varying self-interests. Johnston cited recent research on organisational culture at the time, published by Hollander, wherein it was proposed that “elites too are socialised in the strategic culture they produce and thus can be constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors created”. The proposition that strategic culture could be utilised as a tool to enhance political hegemony, whilst also acting as an agent of socialisation, was at best confusing. This is because there are not many strategic communities tight-knit enough to possess a unique strategic culture, where top-level decision makers can be immune to the socialising effects of strategic culture. Unless of course, if proponents assume that top-level decision makers either are not subjected to the same socialisation process at some formative point in their membership of a strategic community, or on the other hand, that these top-level decision makers are capable of relieving themselves of all relics of the socialisation process when they achieve a high-level status, to the point that they can rationally and objectively manipulate the very strategic cultures they too have been socialised in, without the constraining effects of the strategic culture in question. Both of these assumptions seem far-fetched, and it remains unclear whether we should expect the strategic culture to influence the behaviour of the political elites, or if these elites enjoy a level of immunity from their strategic culture, especially since these elites can be largely constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors have created. Second generation literature also remains wholly unclear about a fundamental argument within strategic culture; if cross-national differences in strategy are expected to exist as a result of strategic culture.

As we have seen in the Second-generation school of thought, the attempts at reinvigorating the strategic culture idea were overshadowed by an inadequate conceptualisation of strategic culture as a dependent variable. The second-generation school of thought, by implication, exposed the lack of rigidity within the strategic culture theoretical framework. By proposing that strategic culture could be conceptualised as a tool of utility to elite decision makers, these scholars exposed another problem which the inclusion of infinite independent variables in the theoretical framework had caused. Successfully proposing that strategic culture could be viewed as anything other than the encapsulating construct proposed by first-

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generation scholars, meant that scholars were also free to debate on the nature and functions of strategic culture as a dependent variable. Some viewed strategic culture as a context, others viewed strategic culture as a variable, others viewed strategic culture as an outcome -of millennia of repetitive action by decision-making elites. As a result, strategic culture was rendered vulnerable and perceived as a free-for-all theory. Besides, methodology applicable to strategic culture was only limited by the imaginations of scholars interested in the concept, who approached the subject (as explained in the next paragraph), utilising a cocktail of proposed independent variables, and loosely constructed dependent variables to creatively approach various subject matters of their specific interests without restraint. The NSSP theory inherently addresses both the problems of infinite independent variables and ambiguous dependent variables, by virtue of its nature as a carefully constructed explanatory typology, with defined independent and dependent variables.

2.1.9.3 Strategic Culture as Anyone’s Game

The author has taken the liberty to identify and label the fourth school of thought within strategic culture as the "Conciliatory School of thought". This school of thought encompasses all scholars who seek to utilise the concept of strategic culture in various security-related fields, drawing upon previously conceptualised notions of strategic culture within the three generations of scholars. These scholars in applying strategic culture to their specific areas of research interest, attempt to criticise the theoretical framework of strategic culture, while also simultaneously applying modified concepts of strategic culture to said particular line of inquiry. The constant denominator in this school of thought is that scholars approach strategic culture with biased predilections for a particular generation's school of thought, which usually, is most aligned with their subjective ontological inclinations, and as a result, these scholars promulgate their ideas based on these predilections. Scholars such as Basrur and Morgan fall under this category. Basrur laments the "lack of theoretical rigour in demonstrating the linkage between identified cultural traits and actual behaviour" proposing that a limited definition of strategic culture needs to be conceptualised to be efficient in the present age. In his publication, he identifies strategic culture as having three elements. The Structural, Ideational and Praxiological elements. According to Basrur, the ideational element of strategic culture includes a country's "basic assumptions and beliefs". In other words, its perception of the international environment, as well as its "operational level" doctrine. The praxiological element

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of strategic culture "consists of the repetitive patterns of action over time"130 (Reiterating Snyder's original concept of strategic Culture), and the structural element of strategic culture are understood in a 3-tier "structural frame" which measures a country's level of "tolerance for ambiguity", its "reactions towards arms limitation regimes", and its "level of restraint in times of crisis". Thus, Basrur initiated the notion that strategic culture could be viewed as a dynamic and intermediate factor which influences the actions and reactions of a state in response to internal and external stimuli. Basrur is quite interesting because he analyses as non-western subject of strategic culture. Another conciliatory scholar, Forrest Morgan, argued that strategic culture merely conditions the behaviour of decision-makers in a state, rather than determining behaviour. Morgan viewed strategic culture as an "intermediate structure" which influenced a state's reaction to internal and external stimuli and served as something similar to an interpretory mechanism.131

The strategic culture narrative resembles a chaotic landscape consisting of countless opinions, divergence and disagreement from a host of contributing scholars. The strategic culture field still remains in a poorly defined, hyper debated landscape, where inclusive variables (each in their own right, complicated terms) are grossly oversimplified.132 Revised versions of the strategic culture theoretical framework are routinely proposed; each attempt, a more sophisticated way of reconceptualising strategic culture.

From this chaotic landscape, however, generations of scholarship have emerged, each with their respective merits and demerits, all serving to proffer greater understanding of the underlying nexus between culture and the state's strategic behaviour. However, analysis of the strategic culture discourse exposes immense room for refinement of the strategic culture theoretical framework, and the need for a standard definition of strategic culture is ever more apparent. Lantis identifies the need to interrogate the universality of strategic culture, amongst a plethora of problems plaguing this theoretical framework,133 moreover, it is a wise proposition that careful deconstruction of the strategic culture theoretical framework could assist policymakers and academics alike, to establish more accurate and specific theoretical

frameworks which could be utilised to eliminate the uncertainty and ambiguity which persists within the realm of state strategy. The proposed NSSP framework, emerges from a careful deconstruction of the strategic culture theoretical framework, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the different generations of the strategic culture framework. The NSSP theoretical framework is also unique, because of its constructivist approach to the subject. By aiming to identify the impact of repetitive behaviour and norms, on the construction of the Nigerian National Security Strategic Personality, it follows the overarching contributions made by constructivist approaches which ‘include the impact of norms and ideas on the construction of identities and behaviour’.

2.1.10 Origins of the National Security Strategic Personality Typology

Caroline Ziemke first proposed the concept of Strategic Personality Types in her work titled ‘Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence’. She too proposed that the strategic personality type of a state could be identified by focusing on the state's ultimate concerns. These ultimate concerns are referred to as 'the set of material, moral, or ideological factors that have emerged over the state's history as the keys to its long-term survival, cohesion, and sense of national well-being.'

She went further to highlight the constantly evolving nature of a state's ultimate concerns, and additionally stated that states’ perceptions of the effects of events (external stimuli), their identification of threats and vulnerabilities in addition to their scale of preference for their strategic options, were all characteristic of their habitual perspective and decision-making styles. Ziemke went further to develop a strategic personality methodology, which sought to compartmentalise (in theory), the various types of strategic personalities which exist. Originally adopting typologies from personal psychology, her methodology focused on how states have been observed to behave in the pursuance of their Ultimate Concerns. As a result, she proposed that three aspects of state behaviour are of utmost relevance in her Strategic Personality methodology, with each aspect resembling human psychological traits. These are:

- A State's Orientation to the 'Outside World' (analysing whether a state seeks the pursuance of its Ultimate Concerns in an "introverted" or "extroverted" manner).

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A State's prioritisation preference (i.e. the kinds of information which attracts the attention of the state, and in which it invests the most resources into), "sensing or intuitive" and finally,

- How the state analyses the information it attends to, defines its interests and decides to act. "thinking or feeling"137

This typology, essentially categorised states' unique personalities, according to the observed behaviours individual states exhibit, in relation to the observer's identification of a state's ultimate concerns. She utilised this means of observation, to facilitate comparison and analysis of state personality. For clarification, a tabularised explanation of Ziemke's Strategic Personality typology shows that each state's strategic personality is made up of three qualities identified in each tier of her categorisation. This meant, that a state's strategic personality could be 'Extroverted, Intuitive and Feeling' or 'Introverted, Intuitive and Feeling' for example, but could not be 'Extroverted, Introverted and Feeling', as the extroverted and introverted characteristics of state behaviour, fall under the same category of external orientation. Therefore, she believed that a state could not possess the qualities of being extroverted and introverted, at the same time. The table shown below explains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type A</th>
<th>Type B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introverted</td>
<td>Extroverted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Orientation</td>
<td>Sensing</td>
<td>Intuitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention Preference</td>
<td>Thinking</td>
<td>Feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Behavior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Strategic Personality typology developed by Ziemke, was not particularly useful in understanding and grouping the behaviour of a wide range of states which she had placed under observation, although she was able to only loosely identify Strategic Personality Types of twenty states. For example, Ziemke proposes that the United States' strategic personality is Extroverted, Intuitive and Feeling, while China, for example, is Introverted, Sensing and Feeling, in contrast.138 Whilst these characteristics appear to be remarkably accurate, the behavioural criteria with which Ziemke categorised these states in her methodology, do not

appear to be consistent. It must be said that Ziemke, by virtue of her typology, was ultimately promulgating the long-standing beliefs of a distinct group of strategic culture proponents such as Jack Snyder, Ken Booth, Colin Gray and Gerald Segal who charismatically propose that different nations conceptualize about, and act upon strategic matters in different ways, based on their unique strategic cultures and habitual decision-making styles.

So, whilst the author deems it fit to utilise Ziemke's typology with regards to the incisive potential of the configuration of some of her independent variables, the author believes that there is an overwhelming need for the revision, adaptation and development of Ziemke's typology. This is because, the dependent variables of the typology, are much too broad to be utilised as a reasonable perspective with which scholars can reliably understand and anticipate the strategic preferences of states. For example, while she accurately identifies the existence of Extroverted and Introverted states, utilising cumulative information about states’ past behaviour with regards to the scope of operational theatres within which these states actively consider as being within the domain of their national interests (ultimate concerns), elements such as the state’s attention preference, categorised as Sensing or intuitive, come across as rather ambiguous, as these elements are so broad, that it leaves substantial room for interpretational bias, and various researchers utilising this theoretical framework can quickly come to different conclusions when applying this theoretical framework to the same case study. In addition, considering that this craving to understand state's strategic personalities is especially inspired by a much more specific need to understand state strategy within the context of self-preservation against actors directly seeking to compromise the perceived longevity of states in question, the author believes that it was an erroneous decision on Ziemke's part, to not specify which strategic behaviours her typology recorded, and which behaviours were outside the scope of her investigation.

2.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF NSSP IN WIDER ACADEMIC LITERATURE

Within this chapter, the author argued that different versions of national security exist, based on the information gathered about national security strategy. The subjectivity of value within distinct human societies was observed to influence the prioritised referent objects of security within these societies. It was also argued that a constructivist ontology was the most appropriate to accommodate the complexities of characterising such a broad range of possible national security types, and distinct social realities which enable such variance. The author surveyed the ability of the strategic culture and strategic personality theoretical frameworks to
characterise these varying types of national security and discovered that both theories were unable to characterise them, in isolation. Purely rationalist accounts of national and international security, have also struggled to explain the ‘subjective security demands’ of states, where scholars such as Jervis, struggled to grasp variances to the security dilemma in his 1978 publication. The identified inability of the aforementioned theories, necessitated the development of a proposed theoretical framework, which could (in theory) adequately merge the descriptive and interpretive qualities of both theoretical frameworks. The author's focus on observable state behaviour as the starting point for such a hybrid theoretical framework led to the development of the National Security Strategic Personality theoretical framework, which shall be introduced in the subsequent chapter.

In this thesis, the author aims to propose a new theoretical framework, reconfiguring the individual elements of the strategic personality typology, and introducing two new elements which make up the National Security Strategic Personality theoretical framework, namely Inflationary Containment, and Compression. This reconfiguration, is especially mindful of the fact that the National Security Strategic Personality theory, focuses much more specifically on state strategic behaviour aimed at coercing malicious non-state actors, in comparison to the strategic personality typology in which Ziemke searches for an overall strategic personality of a state, based on its ‘ultimate concerns'. It is the author's belief, that the NSSP framework provides a constructive route to understanding the marked similarities and differences in states' strategic personalities with regards to coercion, while it either sidesteps or modifies the major flaws inherent in the strategic culture theoretical framework, and strategic personality typology.

3 CHAPTER THREE: INTRODUCING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (NSSP)

This chapter proposes the NSSP theory as an explanatory typological theory, tracking how the NSSP theory was developed to address the shortcomings of existing theoretical frameworks namely; Strategic Culture, and National Strategic Personality. It proposes a coherent analytical tool, aimed at identifying and categorising the various national security types. The NSSP theory, as an explanatory typology should enhance research into the identification of various national security types. Explanatory typologies enable researchers to specify configurations of variables in a manner in which the researcher can capture configurative causation.1 This thesis separates the three principal elements of National Security Strategic Personality, which are useful in capturing the configuration of national security strategy over a specific period of time. These proposed variables are; Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression, which are treated as independent variables which cause the characteristics of a state’s NSSP. These elements are explained in detail, with specific attention given to their origins, nature, relevance to understanding the NSSP, and their causation of the character of the NSSP of a state, in this chapter. The author then goes forward to expand on the characterisation of the resultant dependent variable, as well as proposing standardised questions which will be utilised for case-study analysis, and cross-case study analysis. In seeking to introduce this new theory of National Security Strategic Personality, it is crucial to elaborate on the Objectives and the Elements of the theory. It is of equal importance to the author that the Elements and Sub-Elements of this theory be explicitly defined.

3.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE THEORY

An unambiguous explanation of the aims of the National Security Strategic Personality theory is necessary, to avoid a repetition of the mistakes which plagued strategic culture from the very beginning. As we have seen, proponents of strategic culture, were not too clear on the scope of application of their theoretical framework, and this led to the misapplication of the theory. Therefore, expanding on the aims and functions of this theory enables scholars to concretely understand what this theory seeks to investigate, how it seeks to investigate, and why. It is the author's hope that this clarification would enable accurate criticism of the validity

1 Ragin C, Fuzzy Set Social Science (Chicago Press 2000)
of the theory whenever it is applied to new, relevant case studies. Setting rigid boundaries to the scope of this theory ensures that the author can minimise the misapplication of this theory.

The proposed dependent variable of National Security Strategic Personality theory, is characterised as a strategic personality which guides a state's strategic conduct with regards to how it operationalises its national security policy. It is proposed to vary from state to state, and can also vary within a state, through successive periods of time. This strategic personality constantly influences the manner in which states attempt to exterminate various malicious threats to the referent objects of its national security. The NSSP theoretical framework, therefore, aims to exhaustively understand the characteristic differences in how different states' security operationalise their national security policies towards malicious non-state actors. The NSSP theory should also be capable of enabling scholars to make in-depth observations of state behaviour and permit them to identify the contextual justifications which states attach to their actions. By analysing summaries of the state's resultant behaviour when confronted with threats to their referent objects from malicious non-state actors, this approach should expose the habitual, as well as variant strategic behaviours of states, which are cumulated to describe its National Security Strategic Personality. This information should shed light on the underlying strategic guidelines and ideational milieus that influence and limit the strategic behaviour of States within the context of National Security provision.

3.2 Functions of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework

In developing a theory which could be subject to empirical testing, it is important to accurately conceptualize the dimensions and ramifications of events in a clear, concise manner. Analogues which enable us to represent real-world events on a theoretical platform must be proposed. Within the fields of Comparative Foreign Policy, these analogues are usually called foreign policy "events", and in the 1970s the analysis of identified events resulted in conceptual breakthroughs for political science as a whole. In focusing on behaviour as something which could be dissected, aggregated and measured within the NSSP theoretical framework, the researcher hopes to essentially conceptualise about National Security Personalities as an aggregate of "who does what to whom, how". Therefore, the conceptualisation of sub-elements within the NSSP thesis enables us to utilise an adequate level of abstraction, so that

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2 See; WEIS (World Event/Interaction Survey), or CREON (comparative Research on the Events of Nations) these were well funded projects wherein the collection and aggregation of events data was the primary focus of the projects.
3 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007)
we may understand the "who" and "whom". In the same vein, events could be collated, but they must be adequately conceptualised and governed by the general rules of interaction which have been observed in the real world, so that we may understand the "what" and "how".

The working definition of national security within this research, views it as “the expression of a consensus, a compilation of the expectations of citizens of a Nation, wherein the alleviation and mitigation of certain perceived threats to members of that society (Nation) and their values (referent objects), are exclusively delegated to the relevant institutions of the state, which are held primarily responsible for the identification, assessment and mitigation (or in some cases, extermination) of these threats”. In understanding how national security works, a constructivist ontology, advocates for a better understanding of the social process which typifies national security provision. Focusing on the working definition of national security, the author extracts the sub-elements of the NSSP framework, which enables us to reconstruct the process of national security provision. The sub-elements of the NSSP theory, are merely a representation of real-world occurrences as analogues. The first sub-element, are the Referent Objects, referring to the citizens of a nation, and their collective expectations or values. The second sub-element we can deduct from the definition is the presence of the State institutions charged with the mitigation of threats. The third sub-element we can see in the working definition, comprise of those threats to the referent objects, which the NSSP framework primarily considers to be the Malicious Non-State Actors. The fourth element is State behaviour, which comprises of the identification, assessment, mitigation and extermination of threats. Therefore, a simple reconstruction of the process of National Security provision, involves the State, exerting State behaviour, against MNSAs to secure Referent Objects.

3.3 THE SUB-ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Sub-Elements are the fundamental Actors and Factors which are the building blocks of this theory. These Sub-Elements are: (a) The State, (who) (b) Malicious Non-State Actors, (whom) (c) Observable State Strategic Behaviour, (what) and (d) Prioritised Referent Object(s) (how). These fundamental pieces are the Sub-Elements of this theory which, when combined to interact with each other in various ways, create the Elements of this theory.
3.3.1 The State (Active, Exertive)

Etymological origins of the state, comes from 'lo Stato’, in the Italian language. This term was originally coined by Machiavelli to explain a social order which rules over society or singular political entity. Weber depicts the state as "a permanent specialised organisation of men armed with rules and means of coercion for maintaining order over a population in a defined territory over which this organisation exercises power". The State within the National Security Strategic Personality theoretical framework is a categorised as a Sub-Element. The State is viewed as the only initiator of another sub-element - Observable State Behaviour. To enable practical operationalisation of the NSSP theoretical framework, the author has decided to black-box the State. This means that within the NSSP theoretical framework, the State is viewed as a Unitary, Rational Actor, for the following reasons:

3.3.1.1 Mutual dependency of Agency and Structure

The decision to view the state a metaphysical abstraction might come across as one which should be utilised by realist scholars. But, viewing the state as a unitary, rational actor within the NSSP theoretical framework, stems from constructivist insight regarding the mutual dependency of agency and structure within the state. To illustrate, we routinely say that the United States captured Osama Bin-Laden; not Obama, who was acting within the powers granted to him as the President of the United States, to authorise the capture. We do not reference the unnamed individual who physically captured Osama, as he or she was only acting under orders which dictated their designated role in Osama's capture, and in the capacity of the office of the state which they occupied. Instead, we refer to the United States as a whole. To elucidate further, individuals such as those mentioned prior, carry out actions with far-reaching consequences, because of the socially constructed reality which grants them their respective powers and responsibilities. Notions of authority, office, rank and societal status, which underpin the ability and legitimacy of agency (in this case Obama), are all socially constructed realities, which have little or no meaning without the fabric of society, and its socially constructed realities. Therefore, behaviour of state actors depends on the existence of rational human actors, who, utilising the institutional structures of the state, carry out actions.

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6 It should be noted at this point, that a tendency to combine a realist position with an intersubjective ontology, is not entirely misplaced, and is in fact, quite common among social constructivists. See: Wendt 1992, Jepperson et al. 1996.
on behalf of the state. A constructivist considers this mutual dependence of agency and structure, as inseparable determinants of State behaviour as an outcome. State behaviour cannot be exerted exclusively by institutional structures without the influence of individual agents, and vice-versa. Instead, a focus on the state as a unitary actor, enables us to encapsulate, as a whole, the distinct identities shaped by ideational, as well as material circumstances. Therefore, it is less ambiguous, to view the state as a unitary actor within the NSSP framework.

3.3.1.2 Variance of Institutional Functions

Black-boxing the state, also enables us to view the state at an adequate level of abstraction where we can conceptualise about the agency of the state as an aggregation of the interaction of its institutions. It also helps an observer to avoid another problem - The variance of institutional functions within different states. The specification of functions of the internal institutions of States vary from state to state. For example, not every state utilises the same institution as its primary utilizer of force. The functions and capabilities of a police force in State A could vary significantly from that of State B, which may use its army to carry out the same functions as the police force of State A. Therefore, the decision to view the state as a unitary rational actor, means that Observable State Behaviour such as the use of physical force, which could be carried out by its police force, army, paramilitary institutions etc., are regarded as actions of the State as a whole. Therefore, viewing these institutions as part and parcel of the state eliminates the variance of institutional functions observable between different states. By simplifying the state to be viewed as a unitary actor, the author is potentially making it easier to link the State and Observable State Behaviour as sub-elements, as we shall see in the case-studies covering Nigeria. The actions of these institutions (and their representatives) are regarded as the actions of the state and categorised as Observable State Behaviour.

3.3.1.3 Adjectival Misconceptions

Black-boxing the state, also avoids erroneous expectations of state behaviour, based on preconceived ideas of how individual states should behave. Not all democratic states are true democracies, in the same vein, not all monarchies are autocracies. There is a great deal of complexity involved in identifying and categorizing states as having specific adjectival qualities, according to the institutional configurations which they utilize. "arguably materially dissimilar states can act similarly, and materially similar states can act dissimilarly"8 These

7 Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013).
8 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007)
complexities stem from the fact that many states theoretically recognised as belonging to a category of states based on their institutional configurations, do not behave in accordance to what we expect of states of similar internal configurations. For example, a state could be internally configured to have a democratically elected President, an independent judicial system, and legislative bodies which are proportionally representative of the political inclinations of the citizenry, (all of which are characteristic features of a democratic state) but in reality, such a state could be governed by a President who has grossly interfered with the suffrage process to ensure the longevity of his/her term in office, a judicial system which has been crippled by corruption, and legislative bodies which are unable to implement legislation for various reasons. Such a state by virtue of its functions cannot truly be referred to as a democracy and may operate in a manner which is akin to a totalitarian State (as is the case in Nigeria which is observed in this thesis).\(^9\) Observations of such a state as a democratic state could result in erroneous conclusions, because these observations would be primarily influenced by expectations of behaviour based on the state's institutional configuration, and is utterly unrealistic. In the same vein, it is arguable that additional adjectives, such as 'post-colony' or 'quasi-states', should bear little meaning in terms of the application of the NSSP theory, as I shall explain. Ascribing adjectival connotations of this kind as an additional description of a state’s sovereignty, does enable one to distinguish between the functional nature of the state in first and third-world contexts. However, one cannot but engage with conceptualisations of sovereignty as espoused in the wittgensteinian language game, which deviates from positivist empiricism, that proposes sovereignty as a constant fact. As a result, placing emphasis on the post-colony, or quasi-state, enables us to gainfully highlight the inter-subjective nature of sovereignty within these types of states (such as Nigeria), and enhances a more constructivist insight into the nature and function of the state in question.\(^10\) But, as scholars, we must be mindful of the context within which we theorise. Christiansen et al, highlight that ‘the respective political culture and the participants of a debate bear on the way theories, or for that matter research programmes, are shaped’\(^11\) accordingly, the author believes that it is the western narrative of state sovereignty, that perpetuates the continued need for a distinction in the description of post-colonies and quasi states, and actual states. As a

\(^9\) It is interesting to note that North Korea for example, is officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.


researcher from the third-world, one of the principal objectives driving the author towards formulating a theory of national security, which is immune to adjectival misconceptions, is to enable the scholarly characterisation of national security provision of both first and third-world states, in a manner which enables one to compare national security strategic personality across such conceptual divides, so as not to perpetuate the notion that some states are more deserving of sovereign status than others. Also, considerable variance exists between the institutional functions of post-colonies such as the United States of America, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and as one could imagine, it would be quite problematic to continually define the United States in terms of its history as a post-colony, in contrast to other states with similar history. Ultimately, it is arguable that every state could be defined in a plethora of terms, based on the uniqueness of its internal institutional compositions and functions, and one might reasonably suggest that the lowest divisional unit, within the NSSP theoretical framework, is the state itself. The merits of viewing every state as a unitary rational actor, in contrast, means that every state can be equally observed merely as the initiators of Observable State Behaviour within this theoretical framework, as opposed to the creation of multiple theoretical frameworks which independently critique national security strategy of first and third-world states. Therefore, characteristic differences amongst states national security strategic personalities are only viewed in terms of the degree of variance in Observable State Behaviour, and not on the degree of variance of the internal institutional configurations of states. This perspective still comprehensively identifies the subjective differences in the provision of national security, as a socially constructed reality. Therefore, a state only needs to meet the following criteria to be suitable for observation within the NSSP theoretical framework; a state must be a sovereign, recognised, nation state, with an existing government, and defined territory. Adjectival categorisations such as ‘democratic state', ‘monarchy', ‘totalitarian state', ‘post-colony' etc., bear little consequence within the NSSP theoretical framework, potentially enabling the theory’s application on a larger number of states in the future.

3.3.2 Prioritised Referent Object(s) (Passive, Reactionary)

Referent Objects refer to what a state considers valuable enough to warrant the prioritised, conscious and continuous provision of security, from threats posed by Malicious Non-State Actors. As we have seen in aforementioned perspectives on national security (in the Second Chapter of this Thesis), referent objects are categorised as such, based on the observed
state behaviour, aimed at protecting them. There are two categories of referent objects; referent objects are either **people** or **interests**, depending on the priorities of the state. Referent objects as people refers to a civilian population which the state isolates from interaction with Malicious Non-State Actors. In viewing people as the primary beneficiaries of security provision, a state's behaviour must reflect an orientation of security provision around individuals, "in line with internationally recognised standards of human rights and governance."13

However, people are not always the prioritised referent object of states' national security strategy. Interests other than people can also be identified as the prioritised referent objects of states. These interests are the tangible and intangible values, which a state can be observed to prioritise. These interests include; Tangible Values (e.g. territory, oil, and mineral resources), and Intangible Values (e.g. regime security, state sovereignty, and protected ideology). The prioritised referent objects are identified as such, based on the observable behaviours of states, regardless of the state's narrative as to what its prioritised referent objects are. This is because, in reality, the state's proclamation of its referent objects is not always aligned with its actions during inflationary containment, when state behaviour exposes what the referent objects are in reality. As mentioned earlier in second chapter of this thesis, this contradiction was identified by second generation scholars of the strategic culture school of thought, where it was a widely accepted premise that the leaders of strategic communities and states, did not necessarily act per their expressed motives.14 It was in this school of thought, that the identification of observable differences between what leaders expressed as their motives for action, and the possible motives for their eventual actions was initiated.15

The separation between people and interests as referent objects has been created because of the author's observations, that when interests are prioritised as referent objects, people are no longer the primary beneficiaries of the continuous, conscious provision of security by the state. The security of people becomes deprioritised as long as the provision of security is diverted to interests. This distinction, touches on a prominent debate within the emerging field of critical human security studies, as highlighted by Newman. Within critical

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12 Inflationary Containment refers to the Strategic means with which a State seeks to isolate Malicious Non-State Actors from Referent Objects of the State. It would be expanded on in the remainder of this chapter.
14 See: “Strategic Culture as a Tool” within this thesis.
human security studies, Newman points out that, ‘international security traditionally defined – territorial integrity – does not correlate with human security, and an over-emphasis upon state security can be to the detriment of human welfare needs.’\textsuperscript{16} The NSSP theory takes cognisance of this proposition, albeit elementarily, in the separation of people and interests as referent objects of national security provision. Although the NSSP framework only categorises a state as either people-centric or interest centric, a graphical representation of the hierarchy of referent objects is shown below, to serve as a guide to researchers further interested in identifying more specific interests of states:

![Hierarchy of Referent Objects](image)

Figure 1. The Hierarchy of Referent Objects.

How this prioritisation process can be observed, will be explained in detail, when the independent variables of the NSSP theory are introduced later in this chapter.

3.3.3 Malicious Non-State Actors (Active, Transfer)

Various threats to national security exist. These threats range from threats stemming from natural causes, such as earthquakes, flooding, epidemics and famine, to threats stemming from a states’ inability to immediately control circumstance, such as uncontrolled inflation, undocumented immigration, high motor accident rates etc. However, there are also threats to national security which exist, as a result of the deliberate actions of organisations, with perceived malicious aims. The intents of these threats are socially constructed, based on perceptions governed by social realities such as interests, friendship, enmity or rivalry.\textsuperscript{17} What the author has observed in preliminary surveys of the constitution of malicious threats, is that these threats are typified by organisations, which include organisations such as terrorist groups,

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\textsuperscript{17} See section: 2.13 within this thesis
organised criminal networks, secessionist movements, armed militias and other organisations which are perceived by the state to be at odds with its national interests. By extension however, organisations which might not necessarily consider themselves to be malicious, could in fact, be designated as such by the state. Therefore, one must be aware of the qualifying nature of the term MNSA, as it is merely nomenclature to identify actors which the state deems malicious. What sets malicious threats apart from natural threats to national security, is the existence of rationality at the helm of malicious threats. While, states need to have an outlined plan of action to respond to threats stemming from natural causes, the primary difference between malicious threats and natural threats is that, malicious threats are capable of intelligent manoeuvring, and resilience to state strategy. Malicious threats are not only capable of responding intelligently to state strategic behaviour, but they are also capable of understanding and interpreting state strategy as a form of communication, in ways that natural threats cannot. To reiterate, the term Malicious Non-State actors refer to organisations or individuals, whose existence, objectives and actions, are perceived as proximally threatening to the referent objects of a state. The perception of a malicious non-state actor as a threat is determined by the existence of a state that perceives the non-state actor as a threat to its interests. A malicious non-state actor, therefore, is only characterised as such, after it has been identified and categorised as a threat to a state's interests.

It may seem far-fetched to theoretically group terrorist organisations, organised criminal networks, secessionist movements, and armed militias together as the same category of threats. The reality is, these threats have far more characteristics in common than in contrast. These non-state actors have been observed by various scholars to utilise similar means of operation, communication, organisational structure, evasion and even transportation channels. These actors have also been observed to interact with referent objects of states in the same way, and in some cases, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish a terrorist organisation from an organised crime ring as they have been observed to synergise resources and means. What typically differentiates these malicious non-state actors from each other, are their different organisational aims and objectives. These malicious non-state actors, all pose proximal threats to the referent objects of the states that identify them as threats, and the interests they threaten require conscious, continuous security provision by the state.

Malicious non-state actors, as sub-elements of the NSSP theoretical framework, are viewed as actors, the ‘whom’. They react directly to another sub-element – observable state behaviour. Malicious non-state actors are proposed to have one function within the NSSP theoretical framework, which is to persistently attempt to interact with, and overcome the sub-element – prioritised referent objects. Therefore, malicious non-state actors within this theoretical construct, interact with two sub-elements directly. Observable state behaviour and prioritised referent objects.

3.3.3.1 Interaction between Malicious Non-State Actors and Referent Objects

As explained earlier, what differentiates Malicious Non-State Actors as threats within the NSSP theoretical framework, are their objectives. This is to imply that the primary difference between a terrorist group and an organised criminal gang, for example, can be found in their primary objectives; the former's primary objective usually premeditatedly utilises violence against targeted referent objects as a communicative means through which it can compel a political or ideological change, and the latter's objective usually being to amass profit from the illegal production, distribution, or resettlement of items or people whilst exploiting referent objects as suppliers or markets for their trade. These interactions include the utilisation of violence to interact with human referent objects through shooting, capturing, terrorising and bombing human referent objects, or destroying, capturing and occupying Interest Referent Objects. Because of the overwhelming similarities in their means of organisation, communication and sustenance, the nature of their interaction with Referent Objects is usually similar. Therefore, the author articulates all these instances of MNSAs utilising violence against Referent Objects, as instances of interaction between MNSAs and Referent Objects.

Requirements of Malicious Non-State Actors’ to Pursue Aims

Malicious Non-State Actors need to preserve access to the resources which they continually require to exist as a functioning entity. Without these interests, their reasons for continued existence is jeopardised. Malicious Non-State Actors, require Core and Peripheral Interests, to ensure their continued existence. The Core interests are Objectives and Personnel, while the peripheral interests are Mobility, Communication, and Supplies to enable the feasibility of their continued existence.
Core Interests

The proposed core interests of an MNSA, includes the material means, as well as the ideational reasons for their existence. The author proposes that without one of the core interests, an MNSA would either lack the intent, or the capability to continue its existence as a threat. These are:

- **Objectives** refer to the ideational motivations and goals which bring all the other vital resources together within the construct of the malicious non-state actor. These objectives could be the quest to amass profit through illegal means, or the promulgation and enforcement of an extremist or nationalist ideology among other things. These objectives, are the goals and motivations which guide the conduct of the malicious non-state actors and are constructed by the leaders of MNSAs. Ultimately, these objectives are operationalised and sustained by the actions of Personnel.

- **Personnel** refers to all human elements who subscribe to the Malicious Non-State Actor's objectives, spanning from individuals serving as operational and figurative leaders, to individuals serving as foot soldiers or providing peripheral functions such as drivers, guards and scouts. The Malicious Non-State Actor's requirement of possessing Personnel is perhaps the most important material requirement for its continued existence. The possession of Personnel is a necessary precondition for the MNSA to intelligently manoeuvre in ways that other threats do not. The MNSA's ability to identify its objectives, as well its ability to coordinate its other vital resources towards these objectives, is impossible without continued
access to existing and new personnel, who are willing and able to coordinate the MNSA’s resources to achieve its objectives.

Peripheral Interests

The proposed peripheral interests of an MNSA refer to the interests which are required for its Personnel to achieve its Objectives. It is possible, that without one or more of these peripheral interests an MNSA can continue to exist, with intent and capability. However, if all the peripheral interests are eliminated by a state, the MNSA loses most of its capability. These peripheral interests are: **Mobility, Communication** and **Supplies**

- Mobility refers to all means through which Personnel can physically transport themselves and other vital resources, for organisation, interaction with referent objects, or evasion from the State. The elimination of mobility means that the rational element of the MNSA is physically incapable of interacting with any other sub-elements in the NSSP theoretical framework.

- Communication in the same vein, refers to all means through which Personnel can transfer **Information**, for organisation, interaction with referent objects or evasion from the State. The elimination of MNSA communication means that the individuals who make up the MNSA are incapable of sending or receiving information which is vital to the coordination of the physical and ideological assets that would enable the MNSA to achieve its aims and objectives. Therefore, the elimination of mobility and communication would render the MNSA incapable of maintaining its organisational form and interacting with Referent Objects. This would eventually lead to the compression of the Malicious Non-State Actor.

- Supplies refer to all tangible assets which the MNSA requires to achieve their aims and objectives. Supplies refer to raw materials and finished goods, which the MNSAs consistently require to pursue their objectives. Supplies include ammunition, food supplies, access to healthcare, finances and source materials (e.g. opium for the production of drugs, or C4 for the production of bombs to incite terror). Eliminating the possibility of MNSA access to supplies limits MNSA scope of operations to a minimum, and eventually incapacitates MNSAs from achieving their aims of interacting with the referent objects of a state.

When states embark on eliminating MNSAs, they utilise various strategies, each with varying degrees of severity. Sometimes states move to directly eliminate all members of an MNSA by ordering a military campaign against them, other times we witness a softer approach
where states destabilise an MNSA by seizing its supplies. In some scenarios we observe states utilising an even softer approach of negotiation, in an attempt to weaken the objectives of an MNSA. The fragmentation of composite elements of MNSAs within the NSSP theoretical framework enables an observer to adequately characterise the severity of states’ actions, which are aimed at eliminating the MNSA, as shall be explained subsequently.

3.3.4 Observable State Strategic Behaviour (Passive, Exertive)

To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that affect external behaviour is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other...Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalisations.

Truthfully, the relative importance of a plethora of variables in influencing state behaviour can only be guessed (especially if some of these variables are intangible), and the influence of these variables cannot be easily measured. Therefore, an applicable methodology must seek to identify the point of theoretical intersection between material and ideational variables. The researcher believes that state behaviour itself lies at this intersection. Opinions concerning the possible reasons for state behaviour, such as the ones proposed by the realist and cultural schools cannot be studied in aggregate. However, state behaviour can. “behaviour as disparate as a war, a treaty, and a state visit [can] be compared and aggregated in a theoretically meaningful fashion”

In asking the how, why and where, questions that should be asked in every instance of observable state behaviour, we can document a reliable body of information that should enable us to understand the underlying patterns of state behaviour, and only then should we propose ‘foundational elements’.

Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual’s probable motivations and purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way people are likely on the average to behave in a given social context, the cognitive [behaviorist], be he narrative historian or systematic social scientist, undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond in particular contingencies.

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20 James Rosenau, 'Pre-theories and theories of Foreign Policy', in Approaches in Comparative and International Politics, (Northwestern University Press 1966)
21 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007)
22 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics (Princeton University Press 1965)
Observable State Behaviour within the NSSP theoretical framework refers to the deliberate strategic application of a state's resources to protect its referent objects. It is also the application of the state's resources to influence or control the politico-strategic choices of malicious non-state actors. The deliberate and purposive use of state power to influence another actor's strategic choices is a process which has been studied by various scholars such as Freedman, Schelling, Wijk, Byman and Waxman analysing Strategic Coercion. Whilst these scholars amongst others have been successful in identifying elements of strategic coercion, theorizing on its manifestation in various contexts, and even its utilisation against non-state actors and terrorist organisations, none of the proponents of this school have been able to explore the explanatory potential of dissecting and collating instances of strategic coercion as an element within other fields of scholarly inquiry such as strategic culture and strategic personality. The author recognises this unexplored explanatory potential of strategic coercion as an element within the NSSP theoretical framework, resulting in the inclusion of strategic coercion within this sub-element of the NSSP theory. By documenting a state's habitual preference for utilising strategy against a specific kind of threat, the author can identify the milieu which limits a state's habitual strategic preference; its strategic personality.

Observable State Behaviour is the nexus that enables observers to relate state behaviour to political purpose. It encompasses the coercive means with which a state chooses to reduce or exterminate interaction between malicious non-state actors and referent objects. It is perhaps the most vital sub-element within the NSSP theoretical framework because it serves as a means through which we can exhaustively understand the character of the national security strategic personality of a state in various ways. Firstly, the location where one can identify observable state behaviour enacted against malicious non-state actors serves a vital indicator of the physical scope of operations within which a state considers itself as a legitimate actor, aiming to ensure the protection of its referent objects. It also serves as an indicator of the type of

24 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (Cambridge University Press 1960)
malicious non-state actors which a state considers as a primary threat to its referent objects. Secondly, observable state behaviour enables us to analyse how a state chooses to interfere with the interaction between malicious non-state actors and its prioritised referent objects. By analysing how a state chooses to interfere with the interaction between malicious non-state actors, an observer can easily identify what strategic options a state deems practical, legitimate, applicable and proportional to protect its referent objects. Observing the strategic options operationalised by the state also exposes the state's perception of the severity of the threat posed by the malicious non-state actor, to referent objects. Furthermore, instances where one can observe state behaviour aimed at primarily separating malicious non-state actors from possible referent objects, enables an observer to identify what referent objects the state prioritises specifically.

Within the NSSP theoretical framework, malicious non-state actors are proposed to be perennially expanding entities, whose primary function is to interact with the referent objects of the state. Observable state behaviour aimed at inflationary containment is concerned with preventing these malicious non-state actors from achieving their objectives which require interaction with referent objects. For a state to interfere with the interaction between malicious non-state actors and referent objects, the state must engage in strategic activities of denial and isolation, primarily aimed at limiting and extinguishing the malicious non-state actor's capacity for successful interaction with referent objects by either target hardening, or damage mitigation. Observable state behaviour with regards to compression refers to the strategic means with which a state seeks to extinguish the very existence of malicious non-state actors and demonstrate the futility of the malicious non-state actor's continued existence as such. Therefore, within the NSSP theoretical framework, Observable State Behaviour aimed at compression, is concerned with preventing these malicious non-state actors from maintaining their organisational form, and the elimination of the motives and capabilities which enable their continued existence.

Finally, documenting sufficient instances of observable state behaviour aimed at securing referent objects and exterminating malicious non-state actors, provides us with sufficient data with which we can identify instances of repetition, habitual behaviour, the range of strategic options which a state considers, instances of variance from observed norms, as well

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as instances of innovation and incremental or sudden change in state behaviour. Data obtainable from meticulously documenting observable state behaviour against malicious non-state actors is sufficient for a researcher to characterize the national security strategic personality of a state, over the period of documentation, and serves as the most reasonable basis on which the anticipation of future state behaviour should be attempted.

3.4 ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY FRAMEWORK

3.4.1 Inflationary Containment

Inflationary Containment as an element of the National Security Strategic Personality theoretical framework refers to the strategic means with which a state seeks to isolate malicious non-state actors from referent objects of the state. Inflationary containment is concerned with preventing these malicious non-state actors from achieving their objectives which require interaction with referent objects. For a state to interfere with the interaction between malicious non-state actors and referent objects, the state must engage in strategic activities of denial and isolation, primarily aimed at limiting and extinguishing the malicious non-state actor's capacity for successful interaction with referent objects by Target Hardening (Preventative Strategy) or Damage Mitigation.30

- Target Hardening (Preventative Strategy). Target hardening refers to strategic actions taken by a state to increase the resilience of its referent objects within the range of malicious non-state actors’ inflation. In hardening targets, the state aims to convince malicious non-state actors that their attempts at interacting with specific referent objects may be too costly to be considered beneficial, by actually raising the costs of attempting to interact with said referent objects. Target hardening includes the fortification of territories and assets of importance to the state, increasing security provision to civilian populations within reach of the malicious non-state actor, and increasing surveillance and security provision to transportation channels and hubs, amongst other things. Therefore, target hardening interferes with the malicious non-state actor’s cost-benefit estimation of interacting with any referent objects within its range, by raising the costs of attempting to interact with these referent objects.

• Damage Mitigation. Damage mitigation refers to strategic actions taken by a state, to limit, reduce or reverse ongoing interaction between malicious non-state actors and referent objects. Damage mitigation is the implementation of target hardening strategies on referent objects which are already subject to interaction with malicious non-state actors. Therefore, damage mitigation includes the reclamation of territories and assets of importance to the state from the malicious non-state actor, the identification and separation of members of malicious non-state actors from protected civilian populations, and the increased presence of security provision and surveillance to compromised transportation channels and hubs. Therefore, damage mitigation limits, reduces, or reverses any ongoing interactions between malicious non-state actors and referent objects, by increasing the resilience of these referent objects in a manner which incapacitates or dissuades the malicious non-state actors' continued interaction with referent objects.

As a configuration of sub-Elements, Inflationary Containment comprises the state exerting Observable State Behaviour to separate Malicious Non-State Actors from Referent Objects.

3.4.2 Compression

Compression refers to the strategic means with which a state seeks to extinguish the very existence of malicious non-state actors and demonstrate the futility of the malicious non-state actor's continued existence as such. Compression is concerned with preventing these malicious non-state actors from maintaining their organisational form, and the elimination of the motives and capabilities which enable their continued existence. For a state to compress malicious non-state actors, the state must also engage in strategic activities of denial and isolation, primarily aimed at limiting and extinguishing the malicious non-state actor’s capacity for organisation and operation by dismantling its core and peripheral interests.

3.4.3 Orientation

The location where one can identify observable state behaviour enacted against malicious non-state actors, by a state, serves as a vital indicator of the physical scope of operations within which a state considers itself as a legitimate actor, aiming to ensure the protection of its referent objects. This element was adapted from Ziemke’s typology. Therefore, orientation refers to the physical location within which a state has been observed to

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operationalize **inflationary containment** and **compression** against malicious non-state actors **habitually**. States are usually considered to be **extroverted or introverted**, depending on **where** observable state behaviour has been observed. The determining factor in categorizing a state as extroverted or introverted, lies in whether a state habitually engages with malicious non-state actors within or outside its territorial jurisdiction. A state is considered introverted, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, shows that the state only identifies and tackles malicious non-state actors that operate within and along its territorial borders, and proceeds to protect referent objects within its borders. A state is considered as extroverted, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, reveals that the state continually identifies and tackles malicious non-state actors operating significantly outside its territorial borders, and proceeds to protect its referent objects outside of its borders. As a configuration of sub-elements, orientation comprises of the state, observable state behaviour, malicious non-state actors and prioritised referent objects.

*Orientation, Inflationary Containment* and *Compression* are treated as **Independent Variables** which make up a **National Security Strategic Personality**, which in this thesis is identified as a **Dependent variable**. National security policies are **outcomes** which depend largely on the configuration of the national security strategic personality. National security strategic personality is treated as a semi-permanent entity, which morphs and changes gradually over time but occasionally morphs relatively quickly, to accommodate unusually intensified threats to national security, such as violent extremist terrorism or a rapidly intensifying secessionist movement for example. As an analytical tool for scholarly understanding, national security strategic personality serves to characterise a state's interaction with its perceived malicious threats to national security.

### 3.5 Elements of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework as Independent Variables

In attempting to identify the ideational limits of state strategic behaviour, the independent variables selected within the NSSP theoretical framework, are variables which are made up of a stable configuration of the four aforementioned sub-elements, which revolve around state behaviour.
3.5.1 Orientation as an Independent Variable

Orientation as an independent variable determines whether the national security strategic personality dependent variable can be characterised as *introverted* or *extroverted*, depending on where state behaviour enacted against malicious non-state actors has been consistently observed. The physical scope of operations within which a state operationalises inflationary containment and compression can extend well beyond the territorial borders of said state, as long as the state can express that it has referent objects at risk of interacting with malicious non-state actors.

The definitive factor in determining the nature of a state's orientation is where one can identify inflationary containment and compression. Whether it is within the state's territorial borders or outside of it. Therefore, the national security strategic personality of a state is considered introverted, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, shows that the state only identifies and tackles malicious non-state actors that operate within and along its territorial borders, and proceeds to protect referent objects within the immediate reach of MNSAs. The NSSP of a State is considered as extroverted, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, reveals that the state constantly identifies and tackles malicious non-state actors operating significantly outside its territorial borders, and proceeds to protect its referent objects outside of these borders.

*Table 1. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation*

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<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>State Territory</td>
<td>Neighbouring State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Occurrence</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3.5.2 Inflationary Containment as an Independent Variable

Inflationary Containment enacted against malicious non-state actors by a state, serves a key indicator of the referent objects which a state considers as its priorities. This is because, when a state initiates strategic action against malicious non-state actors aimed at ensuring the protection of its referent objects, the state inadvertently coerces malicious non-state actors to steer clear of its most important referent objects first, before initiating compression to
incapacitate malicious non-state actors altogether. Therefore, inflationary containment as an independent variable of the national security strategic personality theoretical framework characterizes which referent objects the national security strategic personality of a state habitually prioritises.

Inflationary containment as an independent variable, determines whether the national security strategic personality dependent variable can be characterised as people-centric or interest centric, depending on which referent objects have been consistently observed to be the prioritised when analysing state behaviour enacted against malicious non-state actors within the state's scope of operations. The identification of prioritised referent objects is a deductive process, following the hierarchy of referent objects. This means, if inflationary containment enacted against MNSAs is observed to prioritise people as its referent objects, the state engages in actively protecting its citizens to the minimal extent that they can enjoy the freedom from premature and preventable death.\(^\text{32}\) One can deduce that interests and all its sub-categories are, for example, not considered as prioritised referent objects. In the same vein, if inflationary containment enacted against MNSAs is observed to prioritise territory as its referent object, for example, then one can deduce that interests, not people, are considered as the prioritised referent objects of the state. So, how do we separate which Referent Objects have been prioritised from those which have not?

As mentioned previously, there are two ways which a state can implement inflationary containment. These are; target hardening and damage mitigation. Target hardening refers to strategic actions taken by a state to increase the resilience of its referent objects within the range of malicious non-state actors’ inflation. In hardening targets, the state aims to convince malicious non-state actors that their attempts at interacting with specific referent objects may be too costly to be considered beneficial, by raising the costs of attempting to interact with said referent objects.

### 3.5.2.1 People as Referent Objects

When referent objects are people, target hardening that can be observed includes increased security provision to civilian populations within reach of the malicious non-state actor, negating the threatening influence of the MNSA, “to the extent that there is confidence

that normal life can continue."33 Target hardening people as referent objects also includes increased surveillance and security provision to civilian transportation channels and hubs and an increased presence of security forces amongst civilian populations, for the purpose of alleviating threats to civilians so that normal life can continue. Therefore, target hardening people as referent objects interferes with the malicious non-state actor's cost-benefit estimation of interacting with any people within its range, by raising the costs of attempting to interact with these people to the extent that interaction34 is unfeasible. Essentially, target hardening, when people are the primary referent objects of a state, is configured in such a way that people are the vital core of a state's inflationary containment activities.35

Damage mitigation can be observed as strategic actions taken by a state, to immediately limit, reduce or reverse ongoing interaction between malicious non-state actors and people. Damage mitigation is the implementation of target hardening strategies, on people who are already subject to interaction with malicious non-state actors. Therefore, damage mitigation includes the identification and separation of members of malicious non-state actors from protected civilian populations, the swift response of emergency services to people who have been subjected to interaction with MNSAs, and the increased presence of security provision and surveillance to compromised civilian transportation channels and hubs. Therefore, damage mitigation limits reduces or reverses any ongoing interactions between malicious non-state actors and people, by increasing the resilience of these people to the influence of MNSAs in a manner which incapacitates or dissuades the malicious non-state actors' continued interaction with people within range.

3.5.2.2 Interests as Referent Objects

When referent objects are interests, target hardening that can be observed includes strategic actions taken by a state to increase the resilience of its interests within the range of malicious non-state actors' inflation. Target hardening includes the fortification of territories and assets of importance to the state or increased the promulgation of state rhetoric which counteracts the ideological rhetoric promulgated by the MNSA. Security provision to civilian populations within reach of the malicious non-state actor is not usually present, or at least

34 Interactions as described earlier, include the MNSAs utilisation of violence to interact with Human Referent Objects through shooting, capturing, terrorizing and bombing them. In the case of Interest Referent Objects, interaction involves destroying, capturing and occupying them.
considered as a priority of secondary importance. Target hardening interests interferes with the malicious non-state actor’s cost-benefit estimation of interacting with any interests within its range, by raising the costs of attempting to interact with these interests. Damage mitigation can be observed as strategic actions taken by a state, to limit, reduce or reverse ongoing interaction between malicious non-state actors and its interests. Damage mitigation is the implementation of target hardening strategies, on interests which are already subject to interaction with malicious non-state actors. Therefore, damage mitigation includes the reclamation of territories and assets of importance to the state from the malicious non-state actor, and the increased presence of security provision and surveillance to compromised assets and territories.

Therefore, the National Security Strategic Personality of a State is considered *People-Centric*, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, shows that the state prioritises and protects humans subjected to threats stemming from interactions with malicious non-state actors, before the protection of interests is considered. Conversely, the NSSP of a state is considered as *interest centric*, when most or all of the case studies regarding the state under observation, shows that the state prioritises and protects interests subjected to threats stemming from interactions with Malicious Non-State Actors, before the protection of People is considered.

Table 2. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inflationary Containment</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centred On</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

3.5.3 Compression as an Independent Variable

Within the NSSP theoretical framework, compression is concerned with how a state prevents malicious non-state actors from maintaining their continued access to *vital interests*. In cutting off an MNSA from its vital interests, the state essentially incapacitates the MNSA. Compression as an independent variable, characterizes the NSSP dependent variable based on the nature of the strategic means with which a state seeks to end continued access to their *vital interests*, eventually demonstrating the futility of the malicious non-state actor’s continued
existence as such. Therefore, the nature of a state’s application of compression of MNSAs characterizes the NSSP dependent variable as either constraining, coercive or compelling. An NSSP is determined as either constraining, coercive or compelling, depending on the severity of the strategic means which the state employs to neutralize MNSA access to its vital interests. Therefore, strategic means are characterised on a spectrum of compressive severity, with brute physical force, and compelling communication, on opposite ends of the spectrum.

3.5.3.1 The Spectrum of Compressive Severity

As was explained earlier, an MNSA has core and peripheral interests, which it requires to continue existing. The core interests are its objectives and personnel. Without one of these core interests, an MNSA would either lack the intent or the capability to exist. The peripheral interests include those interests which enable the core interests to exist. Communication, mobility and supply, are required for MNSA personnel to pursue their objectives. Without some of these peripheral interests, an MNSA would still exist, though would be greatly incapacitated. The constraining and compelling communication extremities on the spectrum of compressive severity, focus on the core interests of the MNSA; with the constraining extremity focusing on personnel and the compelling extremity focusing on objectives respectively. In this configuration, one can distinguish compression strategy, as focused on the ideational or physical dimensions of the MNSA. Coercive severity is located in the middle ground of the spectrum, as it focuses on state strategy that seeks to target the peripheral interests of the MNSA, such as communication, mobility and supply. The components of the spectrum of compressive severity are explained in detail below:

3.5.3.1.1 Constraining Severity

On this end of the spectrum, state behaviour is comprised of Strategic means, with which the State aims to eliminate Personnel of an MNSA, physically, without any room for symbolic communication of any sort between the MNSA and the State. It is usually characterised by the utilisation of Brute Physical Force by the state, to eliminate Personnel of an MNSA physically. This severity of strategy leaves no room for any alternative options for the MNSA. For example, a Military action such as bombing is a definitive physical action taken by a state to instantaneously and physically eliminate the Personnel and other associated peripheral interests of an MNSA. There is no room for compelling communication of any sort

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between the MNSA and the state after a bomb has been dropped and personnel killed, there is no room for the MNSA even to consider surrendering to the State. Therefore, a State bombing MNSA personnel has utilised strategic means, which falls on the Constraining extremity of the spectrum. The deployment of a state's Armed Forces to shoot and kill all MNSA personnel on sight also falls on the same extremity of the Spectrum. All instances where strategic means utilised by a state to compress an MNSA are characterised by the physical extermination of the Personnel of an MNSA are documented as *Constraining*.

3.5.3.1.2 Coercive Severity

Strategic means on this portion of the spectrum, are characterised by the State, targeting the Peripheral interests of the MNSA (Communication, Mobility and Supply), to incapacitate an MNSA. This portion of the spectrum is characterised by the state, capturing and detaining MNSA personnel, in order to restrict their communication and mobility. Coercive severity could also be characterised by the restriction of MNSA supply, through the interception of their weapons, seizure of assets etc. This portion of the spectrum of compressive severity includes all strategies employed by the State, which fall short of physically eliminating (killing) MNSA personnel.

3.5.3.1.3 Compelling Communication

Strategic means on the Compelling Communication end of the spectrum is comprised of the means, with which the State aims to eliminate the Objectives of an MNSA. It is characterised by diplomatic communication, between the MNSA and the State. Compelling Communication strategies implemented by the state, are expected to compress the ideology of the MNSA. For example, Negotiations between the State and the MNSA, is on the Compelling Communication end of the spectrum, as is the threat of military action, and the promulgation of counter-narratives by the state. By convincing personnel to end their ideological ties with an MNSA, the state aims to incapacitate an MNSA's intent (objectives).

The Spectrum of Compressive Severity therefore, is a guide with which we can identify and characterise the strategic means utilised by a State, to Compress an MNSA. By aggregating and characterising the Strategic means utilised by States within observed case studies, we can characterise the NSSP dependent variable. If instances of Brute Physical Force during Compression are observed to outnumber those of Compelling Communication significantly, one can conclude that the NSSP dependent variable is Constraining. Likewise, if instances of Compelling Communication during Compression are observed to outnumber those of Brute
Physical Force significantly, one can conclude that the NSSP dependent variable is Compelling. When instances, where Strategic means appear to be a combination of Brute Physical Force and Compelling Communication, the characteristics of the instances of Compression within the case study, would be collated, and the strategies with higher frequency would characterise the NSSP dependent variable.

![Figure 3. The Spectrum of Compressive Severity.](image-url)

![Figure 4. The spectrum of Compressive Severity (Adapted to include some examples of strategic means).](image-url)

Table 3. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MNSA Vital Interests</th>
<th>Constraining</th>
<th>Coercive</th>
<th>Compelling</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characterised As</td>
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</table>
3.6 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The National Security Strategic Personality Theory postulates the following. That every State possesses a National Security Strategic Personality, and that the NSSP of every State has unique characteristics, which guides State actions against its perceived malicious threats. Furthermore, these unique characteristics can be identified by observing different dimensions of State behaviour against malicious threats to its Referent Objects. Three Key elements are required to understand the characteristics of the NSSP of a State exhaustively. They are Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression. The function of each element is of equal importance, as each element plays a unique role in contributing to understanding a specific dimension of State behaviour. The Characteristics of the National Security Strategic Personality of a state can be identified by utilising these key elements to observe their relevant dimensions of State behaviour against MNSAs.

Accordingly, the assertions of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework can be broken down into the following hypotheses:

- Every state possesses a unique National Security Strategic Personality which guides state actions against its perceived Malicious threats to its Referent Objects
- The unique National Security Strategic Personalities of States can be identified and adequately characterised by utilising the three Elements of the National Security Strategic Personality Theoretical Framework

Recalling Elman’s proposition, an explanatory typology is a kind of typological theory which makes predictions based on combinations of different values of the theory’s variables. In accordance, the National Security Strategic Personality is a theory which can be categorised as such. Since the proposed NSSP theory is an explanatory typology, then the author should be able to place collected data into relevant cells for empirical validation, in order to determine whether data collected is consistent with the proposed hypotheses above. This thesis separates and values the Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression variables of the National Security Strategic Personality, in order to capture the configuration of Nigerian national security strategy over a specific period of time. NSSP as a Dependent Variable possesses the valued characteristics, of Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression. This means that the National Security Strategic Personality as a Dependent Variable, can be an Extroverted, People-Centric and Constraining NSSP for example.
Typological theories and case study analysis are very compatible methodologically, as such a combination enables a researcher to identify not only types of phenomena, but also links between successive types.\textsuperscript{37} This is because, while the typological nature of the NSSP theory should enable a researcher to identify the NSSP of the Nigerian state at any given time, the implementation of case study analysis enables the researcher to comparatively analyse and distinguish between NSSPs of Nigeria, tracking its continuity or change over time.

To empirically test the validity of the National Security Strategic Personality theory, an observer must employ a structured and focused investigation into case studies, to enable an observer to identify the National Security Strategic Personality of a state, for the duration of the case study period. In addition to the case study method of analysis, the observer can employ cross-case study comparison, to compare the NSSP of a State with other States, or even identify if and how the NSSP of a State has changed over a period of time. Using Nigerian state behaviour against MNSAs, the aforementioned hypotheses would be subject to empirical validation, by focusing on the Nigerian State against Tribal MNSAs (1960-1967), as well as against Secessionist MNSAs (1967-1970), and against Terrorist MNSAs (2009-2014). In the course of the investigations, three independent variables be examined in order for the researcher to characterise the NSSP dependent variable.

The author in applying the measurement scales of the independent variables to investigate a case study, will be guided by the following standardised questions and tasks which would enhance a structured, systematic and focused investigation. These are:

A. Identify the State and its Proposed MNSAs
B. Where can one observe the presence of Inflationary Containment and Compression by the State?
C. What Referent Objects within reach of the MNSA have been observed to be granted priority by the State?
D. What Strategic Means have repeatedly been utilised by the State to eliminate the vital interests of the MNSA?
E. What are the characteristics of the National Security Strategic Personality of the State?

\textsuperscript{37} Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences} (MIT Press 2005).
Therefore, if the NSSP theory is valid, one should reasonably expect collected data to correspond with the proposed hypotheses, and insightful information should be derivable from the empirical validation process. The author stresses that the characteristics of an NSSP as a dependent variable does not aim to place the NSSPs of different states on hierarchic scales, claiming one country is better than another. Instead, it aims to accurately identify the characteristics of the NSSP of a state, in a manner which enables a researcher to understand and anticipate future state behaviour against MNSAs, in a more reliable manner than existing theories.

3.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter introduced the NSSP theory as an explanatory typological theory, and subsequently tracked the author’s considerations that guided the development of the NSSP theory. It proposed an explanatory typology aimed at enhancing research into the identification of various national security types. This chapter then introduced the proposed variables of the National Security Strategic Personality theory, which should become useful in capturing the configuration of Nigerian national security strategy over selected case study periods. The author then proceeded to expand on the characterisation of the resultant dependent variable, and well as proposed standardised questions and tasks which will be utilised for Case-Study analysis, and Cross-Case study analysis in the next chapter.

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4 CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF THE NSSP THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the preceding Chapter, the author elaborated on the key objectives and elements which make up the proposed NSSP theoretical framework. The author then proceeded to provide an operational breakdown of the process of identifying a National Security Strategic Personality, by utilising these elements. The measurement scales of the independent variables and the dependent variable, were also introduced, as well as an expansion on the characterisation of the resultant dependent variable. In order to carry out an empirical validation of the NSSP theoretical framework, standardised questions for Case-Study analysis, and Cross-Case study analysis, were also introduced.

In seeking to carry out this empirical validation exercise, the author began by testing the validity of the NSSP framework, through case study analysis. The case studies that were carried out in subsequent chapters, broadly encompassed periods of Nigerian government, spanning from 1960, through 2014. More specifically, the case study periods were compartmentalised into various within case episodes in the following manner:

1. 1960-1967, described as the *Formation Period*. This case study was selected because it covers Nigeria’s independence, up until the beginning of the Nigerian Civil War. This case study identified Nigeria's political origins, considerations and ultimate concerns within that period. The author sought to include this period, as it was during this time, that one could identify specific developments and trends that would eventually influence the origins of Nigerian National Security Strategic Personality. It is also from this period of formation that one could begin to identify a broad set of characteristics and organisational objectives that have been socially constructed as proximal threats to Nigerian National Security.

2. 1967-1970 described as the *Secession Period*: This period of analysis was selected because it covered a crucial part of Nigeria’s history - the Nigerian Civil War, as well as the personalities and their considerations that imminently resulted in the eruption of the War. This period of analysis was essential, more so, because it illustrated the experimental beginnings of the Inflationary Containment, (i.e. the interests of Nigeria's National Security Agenda) and Compression, (i.e. the modus operandi of Nigerian National Security) aspects of Nigerian NSSP.
3. 1970-1999: This period of analysis, was selected so as to enable the researcher to understand if the NSSP of the Formation and Secession periods had lasting effect on Nigerian NSSP. It covered the subsequent fall out of the Nigerian Civil war, Nigeria's attempts at unification, but most importantly, it explored the various exchanges of power between Nigeria's military and civilian elite. During this period, the exponential increase of violent and non-violent power tussles between civilians and the Nigerian military laid the foundations of its current civil-military relations configuration.

4. 2009-2014 described as the Explosion Period: This period of analysis, investigated the re-emergence of multiple MNSAs, and an intensification of their interactions with Referent objects, taking into consideration the precedents laid out by the Nigerian State in the Formation and Secession periods of analysis. During this period of investigation, all elements of Nigerian NSSP were observed critically, to determine if their operationalisation was indeed in line with the previous NNSP trends as identified, or if perhaps, if there was visible change.

All four periods of case study analysis are intimately interlinked, but, the demarcation of the case study periods into the periods as mentioned earlier, enabled the researcher to suitably carry out informed, systematic and empirical inquiry into the existence and nature of Nigerian National Security Strategic Personality. It is essential for one to vividly understand the nature, material and ideational contexts within which the Nigerian state was immersed, as it is with such contextual familiarity that the strategic actions of the Nigerian government may be accurately understood in light of its ultimate concerns.

4.1 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIA

In order to fully appreciate the complexities that are associated with understanding Nigeria as a whole, one needs to understand its origins as an entity. In the 1870s, the trade of oil palm was the main export product of the Niger Delta region; an area which was previously referred to as the Slave Coast. The lucrative trade in oil palm was commonplace in this region of Western Africa, and competition was rife within European markets, vying for preferential access to the oil palm trade. The Second Industrial Revolution in Britain had necessitated a massive demand for the Oil Palm produce, to power industrial machines. Hence, the Niger region was one of paramount importance to British interests. 1879 saw the emergence of the United African Company, and by 1884, the United African Company was the most influential
company in the region. The UAC possessed about 25-35 trading posts along the Lower Niger River, and this company was controlled by a British knight namely, Sir George Taubman Goldie.\(^1\) His company’s near monopoly on the Oil Palm market, granted the British leverage against German and French interests in the region, subsequently legitimizing British claims over the lower Niger region at the famed 1884 Berlin conference. British interests and those of the UAC were eventually consolidated and incorporated into the British sphere of influence, against other European interests in proximal regions. Therefore, in 1886, the company was granted a Royal Charter, and soon authorised to ‘administer’ the Niger Delta, and all lands around the banks of the Niger and Benue rivers.\(^2\) The company was renamed as the Royal Niger Company. On the 29\(^{th}\) of January 1895, the company's headquarters were attacked by some local kings, and their armies, with about 60 Europeans (mostly British) taken as hostages and about 40 of them killed as a result of failed negotiations between the African kings and the British. In February 1895, the British Royal Navy attacked locals inhabiting the Niger region, in what is referred to as the Brass Oil War today.\(^3\) The aftermath of this war turned public opinion within Britain against the Royal Niger Company, and it subsequently sold its holdings to the British Government for £865,000.00. This transaction effectively represented the sale of Nigeria to Britain in 1899. Two years later, Nigeria became a British protectorate and part of the British Empire on January 1\(^{st}\), 1901.

4.1.1 The Imposition of Unity

Indeed, the name “Nigeria” was merely a combination of the words ‘Niger’ -referring to the river Niger in West-Africa, and ‘Area’. This name was coined by a British journalist, Flora Shaw, who was the mistress of Nigeria’s administrator –who at the time was Governor Frederick Lugard. Nigeria was merely an encapsulation of British colonies around the Niger River; a country created by the United Kingdom, which encapsulated different peoples under a singular administrative umbrella for the primary purpose of resource exploitation. The formal amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 was an administrative decision on the part of the British, primarily influenced by the proximity of the protectorates which were thought to be more efficiently administrable as a singular colony of

\(^1\) Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa* (Public Affairs 2011)
the British Empire. In practice, however, Nigeria remained divided by administrative lines into the Northern and Southern Provinces, with the addition of the Lagos Colony.

Of the hundreds of ethnic groups within Nigeria, there were three identifiable dominant ethnic groups which at the time, comprised of about 70 percent of the Nigerian population in total. These three tribes were the Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo tribes respectively. Due to the stark differences in the nature of the well-established political systems of these dominant tribes, it made sense that the British colonial administrators further divided the amalgamated territory of Nigeria into three parts namely; The Northern Region which encapsulated the Hausa peoples, the Eastern Region, which encapsulated the Igbo peoples and the Western Region, which encapsulated the Yoruba peoples. It must be noted, however, that these three regions were also populated by hundreds of minority tribes which made up on average about 30 percent of the population at the time.

This artificial creation of the Nigerian state was achieved without the direct consent of Nigerian citizens, but somewhat indirectly through local chiefs and kings. As Siollun noted, ‘over 250 ethnic groups were arbitrarily herded together into an unwieldy and non-consensual union by the UK’. Nonetheless, in the mid-1950s, there was general agitation for self-governance across Africa, and this was reflected by the reclassification of Nigeria as an autonomous federation of Nigeria in 1954. It was eventually decided in late 1958 that Nigeria would be granted full independent status by 1960. One must be unambiguous in articulating the origins of Nigeria. It is not justifiable to view Nigeria as a country necessarily created by the consensual will of its inhabitants, or the fulfilment of a shared identity, but as merely a financial transaction between the British Government, and the Royal Niger Company in the early 1900s.

4.1.2 The Foundations of Elitism in Nigeria

Arguably, the push for self-governance championed by Nigeria's ‘founding fathers' in the 1950s, could be viewed in a different light. Members of Nigeria's legislative council in 1947 emerged as delegates of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in London. They were: Jaja Wachucku, an Igbo Lawyer, Funminlayo Ransome-Kuti, a female Yoruba activist, and Prince Adedoyin, a Yoruba monarch, among others. Excerpts of Jaja Wachuku's address in London stated that:

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5 *Ibid. p.12*
We have come to the United Kingdom, as delegates of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, chosen by our people, in order to demand for a more democratic constitution, to modify our [inaudible] laws affecting our lands, minerals and chiefs and to request the British government to grant us more political responsibility, to enable us to take an active part, in the management of our affairs within the framework of the British Empire-[Adedoyin]6

These representatives promulgated the impression that their push for more inclusive governance, was legitimised by the Nigerian people as a whole. However, the noticeable absence of a democratic political system in Nigeria at the time would have made it unfeasible, even nearly impossible for such legitimacy to have been granted to these individuals in the first place. These were the foundations of an elitist political system in Nigeria, which would eventually shape its NSSP. Another relevant consideration, is the realisation that even if such legitimacy was indeed granted to these representatives, it was much more likely that such unified representation was necessitated by a yearning for independence from British rule, rather than by a unified National identity forged by Nigeria's inhabitants, which would be necessary to bond them together in the future. Indeed, analysing Prince Adedoyin's speech, wherein he was quoted as specifying the extent to which he and his co-delegates hoped to manage their affairs ‘within the framework of the British Empire' was revealing of the origins of the unified front, in that, it was temporary and necessary only for the alleviation of Nigerians from direct British rule, whilst maintaining a unified Nigeria within the British Empire. The utility of this Unity would subsequently be challenged at various periods throughout Nigeria's history.

So, by the 1950s it was increasingly clear to British colonial masters that Africans were becoming more aware of the inequalities that existed against them in their homelands. However, there was an absence of an emerging unified identity capable of birthing a Nation. Perhaps the only identifiable drivers of a Pan-African identify were to be seen amongst the children of the African elite, especially amongst those that were studying in foreign institutions in London and Europe as a whole. These offspring of the elite were driven by the realisation of the existence of racism and the frequent racist treatment they received in diaspora, and not necessarily by the identification of any such common political and social ideologies of a unified people. The emergence of conferences such as the Manchester Pan African Conference of 1945 and subsequent conferences, are a testament to the unification of Africans in diaspora against

racism and subjugation, but not one of true Pan-Africanism. The main resolution of the 1954 conference for example, was that:

*We shall complain, appeal and arraign. We will make the world listen to the facts of our condition. We will fight in every way we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment – Main Resolution of the 5th pan-African Congress*\(^7\)

Judging by the personalities who were present at the Congress such as; Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Hastings Banda of Malawi, Peter Abrahams of South Africa, Jaja Nwachuku and Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria amongst others, it is evident that their joint resolve did not result in the creation of a Pan-African state, but rather, the existing territorial borders drawn up by the colonial masters of the time, were preserved. One can induce that, were Obafemi Awolowo and Jaja Nwachuku from different colonial territories, their respective (hypothetical) territories would have ended up being separate sovereign entities, and not the Federation of Nigeria. Notwithstanding, The Federation of Nigeria was granted full independence on the First of October, 1960, by an act of the British parliament.

### 4.1.3 Nigeria’s Role and Identity in the World

Nigeria in the 1960s was a vibrant, newly independent nation, having gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. With about 60 million citizens at the time, consisting of over 250 distinct ethnic groups, Nigeria boasted of the most educated workforce in the African continent.\(^8\) Nigeria was immediately saddled with the responsibility of fulfilling African expectations of becoming the world’s first African superpower, or as one BBC broadcaster narrated: “Many expect it to become the foremost negro state of the continent.”\(^9\) These expectations largely influenced the strategic outlook of the Nigerian state, and routinely served as justification for the administrative unity of Nigeria at the time. Excerpts from the Contact Magazine in London, on 10 October 1958, duly represented Nigeria as the embodiment of these hopes for a new African superpower:

*A Gigantic new independent African State whose influence on the development of the rest of the continent must be incalculable is taking shape at the Nigerian Constitutional Conference here.*\(^10\)


\(^8\) Max Siollun, *Oil, Politics and Violence* (Algora Pub 2009) p. 11


\(^10\) Collin Legum, ‘Huge New African State is Taking Shape at Nigeria Talks’ *Contact Magazine* (1958)
The newly independent Nigerian government was structurally configured as a parliamentary government, as provided for in the 1960 Nigerian constitution. In this regard, its domestic politics attempted to reproduce a Westminster style parliamentary democracy. Although the Queen of England was still Nigeria’s constitutional monarch, essential functions including those of foreign relations, Defence and Fiscal Policy were vested in the Nigerian parliament. Influential Nigerian political leaders at the time were; Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, and the leader of the Official Opposition, Sir Tafawa Balewa, a Hausa and the first elected Prime Minister, Sir Ahmadu Bello, a Hausa and the Premier of the Northern Region, and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo and the first Governor General and President. Three main political parties were in existence at the time. These were namely; the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, which was headed by Dr Azikiwe, and controlled the Eastern Region, The Northern People's Congress, which was led by Sir. Bello and commanded the Northern Region in addition to being the Ruling party at the time, and the Action Group, which was headed by Chief Awolowo, controlled the Western region and was the official opposition party. Evidently, these parties failed to represent refined debate about political ideologies. Instead, tribal interests of the three aforementioned majority ethnic groups, the Yorubas, Hausas and Igbos were vividly represented. Although this political configuration would be sure to elicit negative scrutiny by an observer in hindsight, it does highlight the relevance of the author’s aforementioned argument, with regards to the lack of political and ideational harmony that are believed to be necessary preconditions for the creation of a nation.

To a social constructivist, in Nigeria's case, the relegation of ideational harmony in favour of tribal politics does highlight the ideational context within which politics in Nigeria operated at the time. Externally, Nigeria was viewed as a singular political entity, the newest and most promising African Superpower and a progressive economic state. Internally, however, Nigerians considered the country to be a much looser political association of indigenous nations, within a very workable political and economic union, merely retaining the boundaries of its past colonial administrators. Regional and tribal identity were viewed as much more relevant identifiers of political status and determinants of the nature of each individual's political participation. Indeed, this rhetoric was espoused by the man who would eventually become its first Prime Minister, Sir Balewa, stating:

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12 Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa* (Public Affairs 2011)
Nigeria is not a Nation; it is a mere geographic expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are English or Welsh or French. The word ‘Nigeria’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not – Sir Tafawa Balewa

Externally, hopes were high that Nigeria would be well on the way to achieving a stable, unified and productive nation. The ultimate concern that seemed to gather significant narrative in international media was that of ‘Unity in Diversity.’ To the insiders in Nigerian government, however, unity was practically useless if they did not immediately benefit from their perceived proximity to the centre of political power, which they had recently struggled to obtain from the British. The struggle to maintain a unified government, therefore, was not as important to the Nigerian state, as the even distribution of the dividends of independence to the constitutive regions that made up Nigeria.

No doubt, we in Nigeria are very anxious of fostering a good relationship with all the countries in Africa and we hope that after October 1960, we shall go all out in order to make friends of our African neighbours. We are really interested in the other African states, but not in the sense of having a federated African state, but a union of African States, because we feel, though the thing might come about sometime in the future, it is most important for our countries in Africa especially those in west Africa, to do their utmost to develop the resources in their individual countries- Sir Tafawa Balewa 1959

Taking a look at the political rhetoric promulgated by the then Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, he aimed to set the stage for a politically extroverted Nigerian state, cautious of the reality that such extroversion would not necessarily be pursued in the immediate future, but would only succeed after significant efforts had been exerted by Nigeria, as well as other African states to develop their countries. Therefore, Nigeria’s proposed strategic outlook, was for it to eventually become regionally Extroverted, pending such a time that the conditions would have been suitable for such strategic outlook to be attained.

4.2 CONCLUSION

This chapter provided as a brief history of Nigeria as the subject of analysis. It also introduced the case study periods which shall be observed in the subsequent chapters. The next chapter will initiate an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory, and this would be carried out by utilising the case-study methods of analysis. The next chapter would

14 Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom (Faber 1967)
15 Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Mr. Prime Minister: A Selection of Speeches Made by Alhaji the Right Honourable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, K.B.E., M.P., Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigerian National Press Ltd 1964)
focus on investigating the interactions between the Nigerian state, and its declared or otherwise implied Malicious Non-State Actors, to ultimately identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian State from 1960 to 1967.
5 CHAPTER FIVE: A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE NSSP THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK - THE FORMATION CASE-STUDY

Having postulated the National Security Strategic Personality theory and its constitutive elements, as well as a brief history of Nigeria as the subject of analysis, this chapter initiated an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory. This was carried out by utilising the case-study methods of analysis, investigating the interactions between the Nigerian state, and its declared or otherwise implied Malicious Non-State Actors, to ultimately identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian State.

5.1 THE FIRST WITHIN CASE EPISODE 1960 – 1967 (FORMATION)

This first case study, is unique in comparison with subsequent case studies, as it is a case study period that analyses Nigeria's formative years as an independent state. The NSSP theory, would be applied with emphasis placed on the following considerations; Firstly, the author takes care to identify the proposed ultimate concerns of newly independent Nigeria, as this furnishes an observer with extensive insight regarding the strategic outlook of Nigeria's NSSP and, in a way, enables us to understand the underlying justifications for Nigeria's strategic means, aimed at achieving its strategic goals. The author also takes care in delineating the sub-elements of the NSSP theoretical framework, (The State, Prioritised Referent Objects, Malicious Non-State Actors and Observable State Behaviour), as well as the Elements of the NSSP framework (Orientation, Inflationary Containment and Compression). The author believes, that by explaining how the various sub-elements of the NSSP framework have been extracted from the case study, and how they can be used to identify the Elements of the NSSP theory the reader would be furnished with step-by-step insight into the application process of superimposing the NSSP theoretical framework on case-studies. The author then proceeds to analyse the elements of the NSSP theory as the independent variables of the NSSP framework; as it enables an observer to accurately determine the nature of the NSSP as a dependent variable of the case study period.

The Formation (1960-1967) Period of Nigeria's NSSP has been chosen for this proprietary application of the NSSP theory because, this period serves to characterise the specific developments and general trends that would ultimately influence subsequent discourse and operationalisation of Nigerian NSSP, thus enabling us to understand the genesis of its
Orientation. It is also from this period of formation that one can begin to identify a broad set of characteristics of MNSAs that would be socially constructed as proximal threats to Nigerian National Security. So, the first step that needs to be taken when applying the NSSP theoretical framework to analyse the proposed 1960-1967 case-study period is to identify the Sub-Elements as suggested in the NSSP theoretical framework.

5.2 **Assessment Question 1 - Delineating between the State and its Proposed MNSAs**

5.2.1 **The State**

The Nigerian State was structurally configured as a parliamentary government, as provided for in the 1960 Nigerian constitution. There were three major political parties headed by influential Nigerian political leaders at the time. These were namely, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, which was headed by Dr Azikiwe, and controlled the Eastern Region, The Northern People's Congress, which was headed by Sir Bello and controlled the Northern Region, and the Action Group, which was headed by Chief Awolowo, controlled the Western region.\(^1\) The federal legislative house in Nigeria was made up of 312 seats. The three political parties in existence that constituted this parliament were the Northern People's Congress (NPC) with 134 seats, The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) with 89 seats, and the Action Group (AG) with 73 seats. As represented graphically below, the NPC captured a significantly higher proportion of seats than the remaining parties.

\(^1\) Max Siollun, *Oil, Politics and Violence* (Algora Pub 2009) p. 11
The configuration of the Nigerian parliament seemed to overwhelmingly favour the NPC party of the North, which was by far more significant geographically and by population, in comparison to the remaining two parties. Therefore, the very first majority government post-independence was a strategic alliance of the Northern NPC and the Eastern NCNC, with the official opposition party being the Western AG. As a result, no significant parliamentary decision could be made without the full involvement of the NPC. This meant that, by implication, the entirety of Nigeria, was governed by Northern tribal interests. One can reasonably deduce, that due to the tribal nature of parliamentary politics in Nigeria, any future development of the country would be hinged on the level-headedness and cooperation of the influential individuals within the three major parties. This cooperation was expected to transcend ethnic lines, and instead, focus on the simultaneous development of all regions of Nigeria. Indeed, this cooperation of the political elite would also have to transcend differences accentuated by religion, mutual suspicion and hostility for political stability to be achieved. But, the unambiguous nature of tribalism in Nigeria at the time, with one of the political party’s motto, even being: “one north, one people”, meant that ethnic conflict and rivalry was an impending eventuality that could only be delayed, but not averted altogether. In an uncovered memo written by Robert Komer of the United States National Security Council Staff, Komer

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2 Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa* (Public Affairs 2011)
4 Ibid pp. 34
expressed his concerns about Northern dominance in the Nigerian Federal Government. He highlighted the ebbing resentment of northerners by their southern counterparts owing to the North's dominance in central government.\(^5\)

Delineating the real core of the Nigerian State requires the identification of the conglomerate of institutions that act as part and parcel of the State. Recalling Max Weber's definition of the State, wherein the State is defined as the specialised organisation of men armed with the rules and means of coercion to maintain order over a population, in an assigned territory, the NPC appears synonymous with the Nigerian State.\(^6\) The NPC was the ruling party, and within its ranks, the first Prime Minister, Sir Balewa, was selected. Sir Balewa, being the Prime Minister was viewed by citizens and foreigners as being its legitimate leader. More importantly, Sir Balewa wielded the sole authority over the institutions that served as the primary utilizers of coercive force. The Nigerian Army, headed by Major-General Welby-Everard, the Nigerian Navy, headed by Commodore Joseph Wey, and the Nigerian Police Force, headed by Louis Edet, were all constitutionally bound to obey his orders if he commanded them (at least in theory). So, therefore, any instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression would only occur, in line with the strategic goals of the NPC party to which he belonged, and on Sir. Balewa's explicit command. Opposition and Minority leaders, though being part of the government, did not enjoy the same authority which Sir. Balewa possessed, and even though the actions of these peripheral leaders would, in one way or another, influence Sir. Balewa's actions, they cannot be construed as being representative of the State, in the same way which Balewa can.

5.2.2 Malicious Non-State Actors

Taking into account the leadership structure of the Nigerian State, in which the NPC wielded absolute power, it was only a matter of time before pre-colonial tribal tensions and sentiments resurfaced in newly independent Nigeria. Nigeria was a newly independent nation which, for the first time since 1914, was responsible for its own survival as a unified entity. It is understandable that any actors which were viewed as a direct threat to Nigeria’s unity, would attract the attention of the Nigerian state.

The first instances of such tribal tensions would emerge in the Middle-Belt zones of the Northern Region in August of 1960. When members of the Tiv tribe and the Yoruba tribe of

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the Western Region, were simultaneously engaged in popular uprisings against the NPC-led government. These revolutions were characterised by the Nigerian State as threats to the fragile unity and stability of the State.\(^7\) While civilians belonging to the Tiv tribe, engaged in riots and protests against what they viewed as an inconsiderate and repressive government, widespread incidents of civil unrest were also documented in the Western Region. The underlying grievances which led to civil unrest in both regions were attributed to the nature of governance, which was characterised as unrepresentative of the people, and repressive, as espoused by Mr. Tarka who was the leader of the United Middle Belt Congress.

In the Middle-Belt zones of the Northern region, the members of the Tiv tribe and their supporters primarily questioned the credibility of the NPC government, and by extension, the legitimacy of the so-called Native Authority, which directly oversaw their affairs. An overwhelming majority of Tivmen supported a political party called the United Middle Belt Congress UMBC; a political party that has hardly been mentioned in general narratives of Nigerian history, probably because of its lack of representation in the Federal Parliament.\(^8\) In the Western Region, the development of tensions between two influential individuals within the western AG party namely; Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola, were increasingly evident. These tensions were the initial catalysts that could potentially destabilise the fragile political arrangement of the day.\(^9\) The development of tensions between the AG party leader, and his deputy were based on the objectives of their party in the National parliament. While party leader Awolowo preferred maintaining the AG party as an active opposition, deputy party leader Akintola was in favour of strategically allying with the NPC led government, to form a ruling coalition. This rift escalated to the point of splitting the AG party into two factions, with either faction supporting the Leader and Deputy respectively. We must be reminded that Sir Bello, the NPC leader himself was still unconvinced of a Nigerian identity, stating in one interview, that he would prefer to be addressed as the Sultan of Sokoto than the President of Nigeria.\(^10\) This highlights the fact that, although Sir Bello harboured the same anti-Nigerian sentiments as his counterparts in the West and Middle-Belt zones, his


\(^{9}\) Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (Public Affairs 2011)

proximity to legitimate power meant that he was able to control the narrative that identified threats to national values.

The utilisation of political violence by the AG in the Western Region, and the UMBC in the Middle-Belt zones pitted them against the Nigerian State, and unwittingly increased the powers of the Northern region, which controlled the apparatus of the Nigerian State. The AG and UMBC parties, were viewed by NPC leaders as acting against the interests of the Nigerian State and were essentially dealt with, as MNSAs. As their Western and Middle-Belt counterparts appeared to be divided, Northern leaders such as Sir Bello, for the time being, were relieved, as they had feared that "a sudden grouping of the eastern and western parties...might take power and endanger...the north" which would be ‘utterly disastrous.' The development of civil unrest, served as justification for the NPC government to clamp down on manifestations of instability which were purportedly against Nigeria's national interests. It was, therefore, convenient for those in control of the Nigerian State apparatus, to identify specific individuals and groups as Malicious threats to Nigerian values of national unity and peaceful development. So, in applying the NSSP theoretical framework on this case study, these individuals and groups that were seen as the instigators of political violence, and subsequently clamped down upon by the State, would be represented as the Malicious Non-State Actors.

With the delineation of the Nigerian State from potential MNSAs, it is now possible to introduce the first Independent Variable of the NSSP theoretical framework, by postulating the Second Assessment Question, which enables us to characterise the Orientation of the NSSP. As mentioned in the Third Chapter, the Orientation of an NSSP is determined by the location where one can identify Observable State Behaviour enacted against Malicious Non-State Actors, by the Nigerian State. It serves a key indicator of the physical scope of operations within which the Nigerian State considered itself as a legitimate actor, aiming to ensure the protection of its Referent Objects. Therefore, in identifying the nature of Nigeria's Orientation in this case study, one has to recognise the Physical Location within which the State has been observed to operationalise Inflationary Containment and Compression against Malicious Non-State Actors habitually. The Nigerian State would then be considered to be Extroverted or Introverted, depending on where Observable State Behaviour has been observed in the case-study.

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11 Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (Praeger 1969)p.152
5.3 **ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2 ORIENTATION: WHERE CAN ONE OBSERVE THE PRESENCE OF INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT AND COMPRESSION BY THE STATE?**

Middle Belt Zone, Northern region 1960-1963

Riots and widespread civil unrest began in the Yandev village in the Middle-Belt zones of the Northern Region in 1960. Violent clashes between members of the Tiv tribe and Government forces were as a result of popular discontent with the NPC leadership in the Middle-Belt zones. Government narrative, cast the blame on the UMBC party and its political ties with the AG party in the Western region. The Nigerian government singled out one UMBC politician, Mr Tarka, claiming that he was going against the national interests, in his campaigning for the creation of the Middle Belt Region to be carved out of the Northern region. The Nigerian State was quick to allege that Mr Tarka's campaign was not in the national interests, but rather a part of conspiracies by 'external forces' to destabilise the unity of the Nigerian State. One publication in the newspapers of the day, aggressively reiterated the government's allegations:

*some selfish politicians in the area (Middle Belt Zone) who hope to achieve their pet ambition...it has been the vowed desire of the disgruntled politicians that by so doing, they will make an inroad into the North and cause a setback to the present peaceful and steady march towards political solidarity and economic emancipation of the Northern Regional Government*

Mr. Tarka, was quick to respond to the government’s allegations, stating that he and his tribesmen had exhausted all legitimate avenues towards the creation of a Middle Belt government that represented his tribesmen at the federal level. Tarka compared the NPC’s governance of his people, to the colonial system of indirect rule. Tarka proposed that violence was perhaps the only other option left to him and his tribesmen, but also claimed that the nonresponsive nature of the Nigerian State, had necessitated the violence. "The high-handedness of the local authority, the clan and kindred heads, arbitrary police raids, mass arrests and imprisonment of the innocent by the police, the NP, and in particular, the Ahmadu Bello Youth Brigade for framed offences..." were given as reasons why the Tivmen had turned towards violence in order to achieve their emancipation from NPC rule. The Nigerian Government responded by deploying a limited number of Military officers to assist the

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14 Oradi, ‘UMBC Pushes For The Creation Of The Middle Belt State’ *Daily Times* (1964)
Nigerian police force in quelling the violence, and subsequently withdrew the Military officers. On further investigation of Mr. Tarka’s claims, one would be inclined to agree with his position, as he did have some legitimate concerns. Firstly, in the build up towards the first parliamentary elections in 1959, it was reported that the UMBC had won an overwhelming majority of Tiv votes in the region. Adding up to about 85% of the popular vote. However, their votes had little effect on the nature of government which they were subjected to. As the NPC had won a majority of the votes in the Northern Region as a whole, 85% of Tiv votes were infinitesimal in comparison to the NPC mandate. The NPC subsequently decided to instead, appoint their favourite local chiefs from the Tiv tribe to administer the TIV people, circumventing the popular mandate which the UMBC received. This was how the ‘Native Authority' was fabricated. Needless to say, the Tiv tribesmen who supported the UMBC were cut out from the political process altogether through this political arrangement by the NPC. The repressive nature of the NPC figureheads in the Middle Belt Region, was conspicuous, to say the least. The victimisation and arbitrary arrest of UMBC supporters was a common occurrence, as was the frequent occurrence of arbitrary taxation, arrest and detention of even passive supporters of the UMBC party. Without legitimate avenues for Tivmen to voice out their concerns, it was only a matter of time before violent, aggressive means were utilised for the emancipation of the Tiv from NPC dominance.

In September of 1960, UMBC supporters ambushed an NPC delegation headed for a meeting in Wukari, a town in the Middle Belt zone. In a bid to intimidate NPC supporters in Tivland, UMBC supporters forced the NPC delegation to retreat to their town of origin. However, a second attempt at ambushing the NPC delegation, ended in bloodshed, as police escorts opened fire on the Tivmen and killed one of their members. This killing sparked widespread violence in the area. Any villages, businesses or individuals that were perceived as supporting the NPC government were subject to intimidation and violence from the UMBC. Entire villages were razed to the ground by UMBC supporters, and government infrastructure in the area were set alight in retaliation to the killing of one of the UMBC supporters. It is documented that the arsonists from the UMBC frequently shouted ‘Tarka' (The Name of their leader) and ‘Awo' (short for Awolowo, the name of the AG leader at the time), as battle cries

before embarking on their chaotic assignments. As civil unrest would continue to render many areas of the Middle Belt zone ungovernable by the Nigerian State, the UMBC supporters seemed to be making their point known, that they were supported by a popular mandate. A publication by the Government at the time showed that the UMBC supporters were effective at crippling the administration within the Middle Belt Zones. The Nigerian State's immediate reaction to the civil unrest in the Middle Belt Zones was to send in anti-riot squads to quell the riots which were widespread and increasingly destructive. The Nigerian police estimated that about 5000 people were arrested for their participation in the violence, and about 3,880 were convicted of various crimes related to the riots. The Nigerian Government also ordered the arrest and detention of UMBC leader, Mr Tarka. Following the arrests and detention of rioters, the Nigerian State sought to address the underlying political grievances of the Tivmen. This second phase of the response was characterised by the facilitating of dialogue between the Government and the UMBC party, which resulted in the dissolution of the unpopular Native Authority. With the apparent willingness of the Nigerian State to engage in negotiations with the Tivmen and UMBC, political and legal reforms which were a result of the dialogue between the Nigerian Government and the UMBC were effective, and Mr Tarka was released from detention. Civil unrest seemed to be reduced to acceptable minimums. However, the instigation of the "Fletcher Commission" to assess the damages caused by the riots and compensation of riot victims, sparked outrage for the following reasons. The Fletcher commission estimated that about £500,000.00 infrastructure and goods had been damaged by Tivmen. The Northern Premier, Sir. Bello, then directed that these costs should be borne by every adult male taxpayer in the Middle Belt Zone. The resurgence of violence was imminent when it was discovered that the special levy to be paid within the Middle Belt Zone, exempted virtually all pro-NPC vicinities, and only applied to pro-UMBC settlements. This biased application of the special levies unearthed recently buried grievances, and by 1964, riots would re-emerge.

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Western region 1960-1963

In the Western Region, the Nigerian government was facing similar challenges with the Yoruba tribe. As was mentioned earlier, tensions between two influential individuals within the western AG party namely; Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola, were becoming increasingly violent. The party leader Awolowo was bent on maintaining the AG party as an effective opposition to NPC dominance, whereas his deputy, Akintola was in favour of an alliance with the NPC led government, to form a ruling coalition. This rift escalated to the point of splitting the AG party into two factions, with either faction supporting the Leader and Deputy respectively. In the Western house of Parliament, violence quickly escalated after parliament met in May of 1962 to debate a motion of no confidence in Akintola. Akintola supporters who would eventually become members of the NNDP party started a riot in the chambers of parliament. It was recorded that chairs were flung by members of the house, the speaker’s mace was converted into a weapon by one of the speakers, and tables were broken as violence ensued within the house. Riot police were deployed in the western region, and it is reported that canisters of teargas were thrown in the Parliament chambers. The meeting was subsequently adjourned as proceedings could not continue in such a violent manner. Subsequent attempts to reconvene the house of parliament resulted in similar outbreaks of violence and thus granted the western region its lasting reputation as a region prone to political violence.

Internal Division cripples Nigeria’s Proposed Orientation

This plunge into violent intra-party politics, against the backdrop of tribal inter-party politics, was not in line with Balewa's proposed strategic plans of positioning Nigeria as an extroverted and dominant state in the sub-region. Instead, Nigeria was beginning to implode following the breakdown of law and order within the western Nigerian house of parliament. It was becoming increasingly evident that the manifestation of pre-colonial tribal sentiments, was perhaps the most dangerous phenomenon with the capability of wreaking havoc on the delicate and newly established political order in Nigeria. Any individuals among the political elite, which were identified as willing and able to utilize and weaponize tribal sentiments for personal political gain, were viewed as potential MNSAs proximal to the interests of the state.

25 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (Public Affairs 2011)
26 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p.15
27 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (Public Affairs 2011) p.196
28 John De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (Hodder and Stoughton 1973) p.30
29 It is important to note that simultaneously, the NPC-led government was involved in supressing religious fanaticism in the Northern region, where an individual known as Marwa, was arrested and deported for spreading
Following the eruption of riots in the western region, as initiated in the western parliament, a western Senator, Chief O. A. Fagbenro-Beyioku appealed to the Prime Minister to intervene. Thus, what could be argued to be one of the very first manifestation of Inflationary Containment in Nigerian history was operationalised.

Judging by the actions of the Prime Minister, in which he promptly imposed martial law via a state of emergency declaration, manifestation of Inflationary Containment was arguably targeted at members of the Western parliament, but specifically at the AG party. The Prime Minister then proceeded to install Dr. Moses Majekodunmi as the interim Administrator of the Western region. Many Nigerians viewed the prompt declaration of martial law in the western region as premature. Also, it was hardly a secret that Dr. Majekodunmi had close personal ties with the Prime Minister (as his personal physician and friend) which influenced the appointment of the Western Administrator. Dr. Majekodunmi's first act, was to place several Western leaders under house-arrest and to launch an investigation into Chief Awolowo. A special commission led by Justice G. B. Coker, uncovered that Chief Awolowo had syphoned public funds for the enrichment of his party. It was also uncovered, that Awolowo may have been part of a plan to unconstitutionally overthrow the Federal Government. Awolowo and others including Anthony Enahoro and Lateef Jakande were eventually convicted and imprisoned for treason. These men vehemently denied these allegations at the time, but decades later it was revealed by one of the accused, that such plans actually existed. Samuel Ikoku, speaking at a workshop on Nigerian history, actually confessed to being part of the plot:

> we were fed up with the way the Nigerian System, the Nigerian state and the Nigerian government were operating, we were deeply committed to a change of government and we saw that waiting for elections would not produce any solution to the problem. This is what we did. We started preparations for it and the preparations had gone very far and I believe we would have pulled it off. But unfortunately for us our leader was so kind to the Nigerian police that he had a police informant among his planners and so the police knew every move we were making. And so it was easy to trip us up. Well, after the act, people have been saying, there was no coup because we went to court, there was no plan to overthrow the government. Naturally, if you catch me over a coup plot and take me to court, I have to enter a plea of not guilty, I did not do it. This is normal...Our leader even became the number two citizen in the country. I felt it was time to tell the country the truth so that our history would be correct. So, all I am saying is that, yes there was an attempt to overthrow the government.


31 John De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (Hodder and Stoughton 1973) p.31
Yes, I took part in the attempt. Yes, it failed, thanks to people like M.D. Yusuf and Co. – Samuel Ikoku

Elitist Tribalism as the bane of National Unity

The conviction of Awolowo among other southern politicians for treason, established the fact that it was conceivable for some, to plan to overthrow the constitutional government through physical force. These chain of events, in hindsight, appear to be the proprietary template under which subsequent attempts at overthrowing the Nigerian government would follow.

Following the federal clampdown on Western politicians that saw most of the politicians behind bars, there was a conspicuous vacuum in the political sphere of the western region. Arguably, public confidence in the political and judicial system was also significantly weakened by Awolowo’s pleas of innocence. The deep and mutual mistrust harboured by different tribes against their counterparts, was beginning to emerge, and it seemed as though the Federal Government’s intervention in the western region had been the catalyst for these happenings.

A new democratically created region emerged in early 1963; The mid-Western region. This region was carved out of the Western region, and although it served positively to highlight a new phase of political inclusion of minor tribes, it essentially weakened the western region’s position as an effective opposition to the northern-eastern alliance. 1963 also saw the creation of a new western-based political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). This political party was led by the AG’s former deputy leader, Chief Akintola, and although the party was widely unpopular, this party led the Western region, supposedly because of support from senior NPC leaders Bello and Balewa.

Middle Belt Zone, Northern Region 1964-1966

In the Middle Belt Zones, violence had re-emerged following the unsolved grievances of the 1960 riots. The Nigerian Government had increased its Police presence in the Middle Belt Zone as a result of the bitter lessons it had learnt from the 1960s riots. However, the Nigerian Government's increment of police forces in the Middle Belt Zone did not envisage the resurgence of violence that would greatly supersede that which occurred in 1960. It must be noted that since the dissolution of the Native Authority in 1960, no elections were held in

the Middle Belt Zone to elect any representatives from the zone into parliament. This essentially meant that the UMBC party, and the Tiv people by extension, were effectively ostracised from the government. With the Majority of Tivmen denied adequate representation, they once again turned to brutal violence against any entity which they believed were in support of the NPC led government. There was also the presence of the brutal Native Authority Police, an element of the Native Authority which was strategically preserved by the Nigerian Government. Reportedly, the Native Authority police engaged in repressive and abusive activity which could not be carried out by the conventional Police Force. The brutality of the Native Authority Police led the UMBC to call out for either a dissolution of the Native Authority Police or at the very least, a merger between the Native Authority police and the Nigerian Police Force, for increased supervision and accountability. The Nigerian government responded to Mr Tarka's demands, by reorganizing the Tiv Native Authority Police, under the administrative control of the Nigeria Police Force. This reorganisation however, had no strategic value in quelling UMBC grievances which stemmed from their lack of formal representation in government. Numerous riots broke out in the Middle Belt Zones in February 1964, in which several Police officers were murdered as a reprisal to the murder of a Tiv traditional ruler and clan head, earlier that year.

The Nigerian Police Force in the Middle Belt Zone appeared to be ill-equipped and understaffed to handle the unfolding crises. Reinforcements from the Northern city of Kaduna were routinely sent to assist in crises management. Tivmen were increasingly organised in their mobilisation of personnel, organisation of attacks, and solicitation of popular sympathy and support. A significant portion of the Tiv rioters were recently decommissioned military servicemen who served in the Second World War, fighting on behalf of the British Empire. The experience of these ex-servicemen, in addition to overwhelming popular support from members of the Tiv tribe, emboldened the rioters to carry out direct attacks on the police. The increasing intensity of the attacks on the Nigerian police, most likely necessitated a brutal military suppression of riots by the Nigerian government. On the 18th of November 1964, an

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35 *Ibid*
entire Battalion of the Nigerian Army, as well as the Reece Squadron of the Nigerian Army, was mobilised for a counter insurgency operation against the Tiv uprising. The Army battalion was explicitly ordered by the Prime Minister, Sir Balewa to neutralize the Tiv uprising by any means necessary. The Army battalion and Reece Squadron were never recalled up until the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967.

**Nigeria 1964-1966**

These political happenings highlighted the relegated role of popular legitimacy in Nigeria. The declaration of emergency rule in the western region, the leadership of the western region by a grossly unpopular party, the NNDP, coupled with the installation of Dr Majekodunmi in 1962, the leadership of the Middle Belt Zones by an unpopular native Authority, the deployment of the Nigerian army to crush dissent, and the ostracizing of all opposition parties, set the stage for the happenings in the 1964 elections. However, these political happenings are much more significant, when their effects are superimposed on the remainder of Nigerian history. Firstly, it was clear that the opinion of the common man in Nigeria was of little consequence in political proceedings. The wishes of the political elite overshadowed any of the concerns of the common man, and this arguably exacerbated the perception of the common man's distance from and subjugation to the government. Secondly, the power of political rhetoric such as those espoused by Awolowo over his conviction and incarceration, by far outweighed the popular legitimacy granted to courts of law. Until Ikoku's admission about their involvement in the coup plot decades later, Awolowo's political rhetoric proclaiming his innocence was viewed as truth, and the courts of law were viewed with deep suspicion by many. Thirdly, the swift imposition of martial law, and numerous house arrests by the Federal Government appeared authoritarian and further reminded the people, of the Federal Government's authoritative tendencies in its application of Inflationary Containment.

### 5.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF ORIENTATION

Although the Prime Minister had called for an extroverted orientation in principle, this was never achieved. Instead, Nigeria had become so engulfed in domestic political issues, that in practice, its orientation had been “Introverted”. All instances of Inflationary Containment

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40 Remi Anifowose, *Violence And Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience* (Nok Publishers 1979)
and Compression against possible MNSAs by the Nigerian state occurred within the territorial boundaries of Nigeria during the period of formation. It was also clear that, even though no self-proclaimed MNSA was active within Nigeria's borders, the determining factor of MNSA classification was at the discretion of those within the upper echelons of the Federal Government. All individuals within the Nigerian political elite were guilty of promulgating tribalist sentiments. However, the difference between those that were socially construed as threats to Nigerian unity and those that were not was the possession of political power, backed up by the State. The Nigerian government was capable of identifying its political rivals and labelling them as threats to National unity. The Nigerian government also effectively detected even loosely organised political dissidents and dismantled them through incarceration, house arrests and installation of replacements.

Owing to increasing political instability within Nigeria, there were no recorded instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression outside of Nigerian territory, during the formation period. Therefore, utilising Orientation as an independent variable within the NSSP theoretical framework, Nigeria was essentially an Introverted State. Below, is a measurement scale of Nigeria's orientation during the formation period. This measurement scale is the first representation of an element of Nigerian NSSP. Within this measurement scale, recorded events are tabularised, according to their location. Events represented in this measurement scale occurred within Nigerian territory, and are input in the ‘State Territory’ column. Notable instances wherein the Nigerian government operationalised Inflationary Containment, and Compression are as follows:

Table 5. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introverted</th>
<th>Extroverted</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Territory</td>
<td>Neighbouring State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Arrest and Detention of Tiv rioters</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

To compile the data within the assessment tables, I consulted archival material obtained from the National Library, Abuja, and the Libraries of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Zaria, National Defence College, Abuja, as well as documents obtained from British Library Archives. Documents (in the form of newspaper and magazine cuttings as well as audio and video messages) were invaluable. A large chunk of data were obtained from interviews, books, journals and official reports. These were collated, analysed and presented in the mentioned tables and figures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Negotiations with UMBC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>UMBC leader, Mr Tarka is arbitrarily Arrested and Detained</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Military Deployment against UMBC supporters</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Arrest and Detention of Tiv Rioters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Fortification of Residential Dwellings of Government Officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5 Assessment Question 3 (Inflationary Containment): What Referent Objects within Reach of the MNSA have been observed to be granted priority by the State?

In seeking to identify the Prioritised Referent Objects of Nigeria's NNSP within the NSSP theoretical framework, a deductive process wherein the hierarchy of Referent Objects is introduced as a guide to identifying Prioritised Referent Objects, is encouraged. Referent Objects within this case study refer to what the Nigerian government considered valuable enough to warrant the prioritised, conscious and continuous provision of Security, from threats posed by perceived Malicious Non-State Actors. As has been established in the course of the first assessment question, the Nigerian government considered the political instability in the Western Region and Middle Belt Zone as a source of concern. Also, the Nigerian government took decisive steps in identifying key influential individuals within the AG and the UMBC parties as responsible for the perpetuation of political violence. Therefore, the superimposition of the hierarchy of referent objects serves as an aid in deciphering what exactly the Nigerian government had interests in protecting, above other considerations.

As at 1964, when the National elections were to be held, the situation in Nigeria had deteriorated significantly. Endemic corruption among the political elite was conspicuous and had become clear that politicians were diverting national funds for personal enrichment.

_The ostentatious lifestyle of prominent ministers such as Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh raised eyebrows...Ministers were accused of taking 'kickbacks' for large government contracts. As many civil servants lacked experience and training in governmental, constitutional and parliamentary practice and affairs, they could easily be manipulated...in ministers’ corrupt practices –Max Siollun⁴³_ 

Smith, a former British Colonial officer also expressed his views about the finance minister at the time:

_Okotie-Eboh was a gross squalid crook who dragged Nigeria down to his own level...He had dragged Nigeria into the sewer, but because of his corruption,_

⁴³ Siollun M, _Oil, Politics and Violence_ (Algora Pub 2009) p.17
Nigeria has no sewers. The money to pay for them is still in Swiss banks – Harold Smith⁴⁴

It could be argued that most constituents saw little benefits of civil participation in Nigeria's democracy, as political violence had become a regular occurrence. Uniform provision of security to Nigerian citizens seemed to be absent. Instead, records show that on occasion, members of the pro-government NPC party were afforded preferential treatment by the Nigerian State.⁴⁵

The scale of Okotie-Eboh's corruption was hardly unique to him, as corruption amongst most government officials was rife and evident. The elections, therefore, were held against this backdrop of corruption and civil unrest.⁴⁶ In parliament the AG was significantly weakened entering the elections as a result of the Awolowo scandal, and the UMBC had no official constituency to contest for. The existing coalition between the Northern People's Congress and the NCNC was unravelling due to tribal tensions and instances of violence. However, the NCNC had strengthened its position as it now controlled large swathes of the Mid-western region formerly belonging to the AG. New coalitions were emerging, such as the NNDP under Akintola, aligning with the NPC to form what they called the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The weakened AG party, on the other hand, had allied itself with the encroaching NCNC to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). This consolidation of parties meant that entering the elections, there were two main parties pitted against each other; the NNA protecting Northern interests with supportive elements from the Western region, and the UPGA promoting Southern interests against Northern domination. The Northern Premier in an Interview with the BBC, just before the 1964 elections stated that:

Well this is not a very serious matter, it is a matter that happens in every country, you get odd controversies taking place here and there. I think all the leaders at once see that the unity of the country is maintained. Therefore, you get the tail of every parties trying to drag the parties here or there – Sir Ahmadu Bello⁴⁷

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⁴⁴ Harold Smith, *A Squalid End to Empire: British retreat from Africa* (New African 2005)
⁴⁶ Daily Times, *Riots in Middle Belt* (1960)
Considering the fact that hundreds of civilians caught up in political clashes had already lost their lives to the undeterred ambitions of the political elite, Sir Ahmadu Bello's utterances were insensitive to the plights of the Nigerian people at best. One can arguably perceive his deeply rooted elitist ontology. His views were not unique, however, as the actions of the political elite within the government were manifestations of similar views. It was becoming increasingly clear that Nigerian NSSP was hardly people-centric, in actions or in rhetoric.

As the two political alliances prepared for the general elections, Northern interests were to propagate their time in power; Southern interests were to taste power finally. The eventual fate of Awolowo and his colleagues still in prison from 1962 echoed the conviction that, it was dangerous to remain as the government's official opposition. The timely incarceration of Mr Tarka of the UMBC, suspiciously close to regional elections in 1961 suggested that the aforementioned conviction was true. The stakes of the election were higher because, to those on the opposition, it was a make or break affair. "The supremacy that could be enjoyed by a victorious party in government"48 dictated the desperation of opposition politicians. As a result, election malpractices were rampant, with the inclusion of ballot box stuffing, election rigging, voter intimidation, and physical blockades of election polling stations. The electoral processes were dictated by the scale of physical abuse, intimidation, tribal rhetoric and xenophobia, rather than by policy or refined ideology.

African politics, in which tribes, religions and economics all play a part, are involved in the situation. The northern premier is at odds with the eastern premier in whose regions large oil deposits have been discovered. In the heat of the election campaign, there have been threats of secession by the east; threats of violence “that would make Congo look like child’s play”49

The UPGA even resolved to boycott the elections altogether, levelling allegations against the northern region, claiming that they had devised plans to rig the elections. Fighting ensued in the Western region with approximately 2000 people losing their lives in the violence incentivised by the political elite.50

The deployment of the Army to police elections was just one of their numerous mobilisation tasks since Nigeria gained independence. Amidst the violence between civilians at the grassroots level, military deployment ordered around securing ballot boxes, was

48 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p.17
49 Memorandum from Samuel E Belk of National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Washington, December 30, 1964.
suggestive of the Nigerian government's increasingly Interest Centric nature. Many Army officers witnessed the gross electoral misconduct and were called by many Nigerians to intervene.\textsuperscript{51} At the central level of government, President Azikiwe and Prime Minister Balewa were competing for Army and Police loyalty in the case of any eventualities. In one of the several instances of their tussle, President Azikiwe reminded the heads of the Navy, Army and Police forces 'of their loyalty' to him as the Commander in Chief of the Armed forces. It was widely believed that President Azikiwe, sought to utilize the armed forces as leverage in the eventuality of a political stalemate. In response, the Prime Minister Balewa ordered a highly controversial show of force. Balewa ordered the Nigerian Army to embark on a tour of the country. The reasons for his order being to "give the people an opportunity to see their army" and "show the people of Lagos that the army is ready in case of trouble."\textsuperscript{52} Sir. Balewa also ordered the deployment of the Army to the Middle Belt Zone in the Northern Region to "take immediate steps to ensure a return to normal life" in the crisis-torn Tiv division.\textsuperscript{53} It is widely believed that the utilisation of such intimidation by the most powerful men in the country for the sake of elections, against the advice of people like Sir Vahe Bairamian (who urged for the political neutrality of the armed forces), essentially set the country on the path towards military rule, and eventually, civil war.\textsuperscript{54}

5.6 \textbf{Research Findings: Assessment of Inflationary Containment}

In assessing the nature of Inflationary Containment, the identification of \textit{Target Hardening} strategies as well as \textit{Damage Mitigation} strategies on Referent Objects should enable us to identify where the state’s Inflationary Containment is centred upon. As explained in the third chapter of this thesis, target hardening refers to strategic actions taken by a State to increase the resilience of its Referent Objects within the range of Malicious Non-State Actors’ inflation, and in this case study, MNSA’s inflation refers to organisations blamed for inciting tribalist political violence. In hardening targets, the Nigeria State aimed to convince its perceived Malicious Non-State Actors that their attempts at interacting with specific Referent Objects would be too costly to be considered beneficial, by raising the costs of attempting to interact with said Referent Objects. For example, the deployment of soldiers to police election,

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{51} James Ojiako, \textit{Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and?} (Africana Educational Publishers 1981)
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{52} James Ojiako, \textit{Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and?} (Africana Educational Publishers 1981)
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{54} Martin Meredith, \textit{The Fate of Africa} (Public Affairs 2011) p.198
\end{footnotesize}
suggests that any MNSA attempting to interact with ballot boxes would be met with lethal force.

Implementation of The Hierarchy of Referent Objects within the NSSP framework

It should be recalled that there are two proposed categories of Referent Objects; Referent Objects are either People or Interests, depending on the prioritisation by the State during Inflationary Containment. Within the framework of the National Security Strategic Personality Thesis, Prioritised Referent Objects are identified as such, based on the Observed State Behaviour, aimed at preventing or terminating Malicious Non-State Actors’ interaction with a specific group of people or interests. Therefore, identifying processes of inflationary containment where they may exist, enables an observer to understand the State’s Prioritised Referent Objects, amongst other Referent Objects.55

When identifying Referent Objects as People, one should normally be able to identify a civilian population which the State strives to isolate from interaction with Malicious Non-State Actors. But, as suggested earlier, safeguarding the Nigerian People did not seem to be the focus of the Nigerian State’s National Security Strategic Personality. Instead, Interests other than People could arguably be identified as the Prioritised Referent Objects of States. These interests are the tangible and intangible Values, which Nigerian NSSP could be Observed to Prioritise. Inclusive of Tangible Values like:

- Territory – The swift imposition of Martial law in the Western region
- Assets -The Fortification of Private Residences of Government Officials,

and Intangible Values, such as:

- Regime Security – The arbitrary Incarceration of Opposition leaders at strategic times around elections or important votes in parliament
- State Sovereignty – The military suppression of politically active indigenous Tiv tribesmen
- Political Ideology – the criminalisation and ostracizing of political organisations which were vehemently opposed to a National Union wherein the perpetual Northern dominance of the Nigerian State apparatus existed.

Again, the separation between People and Interests as Referent Objects has been created because of the author's observations, that a trade-off occurs when Interests are prioritised as

55 Inflationary Containment, refers to the Strategic means with which a State seeks to isolate Malicious Non-State Actors from Referent Objects of the State. It would be expanded on in the remainder of this chapter.
Referent Objects, as People automatically become deprioritised, and the continuous, conscious provision of security to People is jeopardised as long as the provision of security is diverted to Interests.

If Nigeria’s Referent Objects were People, Target Hardening that would have been observed would include increased security provision and counter-rhetoric aimed at capturing the hearts of civilian populations within reach of the Malicious Non-State Actors. In this way, the Nigerian state would have been able to negate the threatening influence of the MNSA, “to the extent that there is confidence that normal life can continue.”\textsuperscript{56} Target hardening People would have also included increased surveillance and security provision to civilian transportation channels and hubs, and increased presence of security forces amongst civilian populations to quell violence. Damage mitigation would have also been observed to be implemented by the State, to immediately limit, reduce or reverse ongoing interaction between Malicious Non-State Actors and People. However, it was observed that target hardening and damage mitigation efforts by the Nigerian government were hardly centred on the civilian population within the reach of MNSAs. For example, when the Prime Minister decided to declare a State of Emergency and subsequent martial law in the Western Region, this was a manifestation of Inflationary containment by the state. However, that only supporters of Chief Awolowo that were convicted and incarcerated, showed that an uneven application of State strategy was underway, suggesting that the martial law strategy was interest-centric in nature. It was Awolowo and his supporters, who wanted to maintain their official opposition stance against the government, as well as Tarka and his supporters who wanted to secure some degree of political autonomy for their zone, that were subjected to Nigerian Inflationary Containment. This biased application of state strategy could be viewed as the first indication of an interest centric Inflationary Containment strategy.

The eventual installation of Dr Moses Majekodunmi as the interim Administrator of the Western region was unconstitutional, and one could argue that it served as confirmation of many Nigerians’ suspicions that the government was acting in favour of preserving its longevity in power, or at the very least, enforcing a national unity without regards to minority opinion.\textsuperscript{57} Dr Majekodunmi’s first act of placing several western leaders under house-arrest (all of whom were Awolowo supporters and not Akintola supporters), and the commencement of investigations into Chief Awolowo and his supporters, suggested that Dr Majekodunmi was

\textsuperscript{57} Max Siollun, \textit{Oil, Politics and Violence} (Algora Pub 2009) p.15
acting under specific orders to prosecute the state’s perceived enemy. The special commission led by Justice G. B. Coker, which uncovered that Chief Awolowo had siphoned public funds for the enrichment of his party, would undoubtedly have also uncovered the misappropriation of public funds by a majority of other public office holders, other than AG politicians such as the infamous Okotie-Eboh. However, only Awolowo of the AG (and his supporters) were indicted.\textsuperscript{58} One could also argue that, had Tarka held an official position in the Middle Belt, it would have been very likely that he would have been indicted for misappropriation of public funds in a manner very similar to Awolowo's indictment. This seemingly targeted, biased campaign by the State, at least ensured that Awolowo and his elite supporters were efficiently isolated the civilian population, but more importantly, that Awolowo and his supporters were distanced from tools of political autonomy. That State-sponsored perpetrators of violence did not face the same fate, from an observer's standpoint, indicated that this isolation of the AG from civilians was deliberate, and largely interest centric. Referent Objects that were protected included the fortification of residential dwellings of the elite and assets of importance to the state, such as the targeted military deployment to secure ballot boxes and polling stations, without any specific orders to protect civilians subjected to political violence.\textsuperscript{59} Security provision to civilian populations within reach of the Malicious Non-State Actor was not usually present, suggestive of people being considered as a priority of secondary importance. Target hardening interests such as ballot boxes and polling stations did in fact interfere with the Malicious Non-State Actor's cost-benefit estimation of seizing such assets within its range, but simultaneously, civilians were denied the right to access these ballot boxes to cast their vote.

As it has been established that Nigeria's Referent Objects were Interests, efforts can then be made by an observer to identify what these interests were. Target Hardening that was observed by the Nigerian State included strategic actions taken by a state to increase the resilience of its ideals such as National Unity, and its longevity in power; both of which were threatened by the political uprisings spurred by its designated Malicious Non-State Actors' inflation. The deployment of the Army to police elections, at specific polling stations where the AG was popular, pointed to State interests in the electoral processes of these areas. However, that military deployment amidst the violence between civilians at the grassroots level in the West and Middle Belt was not to quell such violence that did not directly affect the well-being

\textsuperscript{58} James De St. Jorre, \textit{The Nigerian Civil War} (Hodder and Stoughton 1973) p.31
\textsuperscript{59} Tesemchi Makar, \textit{The History Of Political Change Among The Tiv in the 19\textsuperscript{th} And 20\textsuperscript{th} Centuries} (Fourth Dimension Publishing 2002)
of the ballot boxes, one can reasonably deduce that the fate of these civilians was of little consequence. Interests of the State, therefore, had much to do with the results of electoral processes in these areas, rather than the physical well-being of the civilians inhabiting these areas. The pleas of civilians, urging those Army officers that witnessed the gross electoral misconduct, represented the dire situation many civilians found themselves in.

In light of the information gathered from the Formation case study, the measurement scale, which characterizes the nature of Inflationary Containment within Nigeria’s NSSP is represented in tabular form. This measurement scale is the representation of the Inflationary Containment element of Nigerian NSSP. Within this measurement scale, recorded events are tabularised, according to the interests they were centred upon. Events represented in this measurement scale which are suggestive of interest-centric inflationary containment, are input in the ‘Interests’ column. Likewise events suggestive of people-centric inflationary containment are input in the ‘People’ column, as follows:

*Table 6. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inflationary Containment</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Awolowo and Others, estranged from the political process (Accused and Convicted on Treason Charges 1962)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attachment of Armed Personnel to Government official’s convoys and residences</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UMBC leader, Mr. Tarka is arbitrarily Arrested and Detained 1961</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Martial law is Imposed in the Western Region 1962</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biased Arrest and Detention of Tiv rioters 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Deployment against UMBC supporters 1964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Chief Awolowo and Others Imprisoned for Treason 1962</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Members of the Western Parliament Placed Under House Arrest 1962</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent suppression of Tiv Rioters 1964</td>
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In applying the measurement scale for Inflationary Containment, Nigerian NSSP during the Formation case study is inclined towards the protection of Interests. As a result, NSSP during this case study period would be characterised as **Interest Centric**.

5.7 **Assessment Question 4 (Compression): What Strategic Means have been Observed to be Repeatedly Utilised by the State to Eliminate the Vital Interests of the MNSA?**

In postulating this assessment question, an observer aims to identify the strategic means with which the Nigerian state sought to extinguish the existence of its designated Malicious Non-State Actors. It must be recalled at this point, that the compression of an MNSA is best achieved through the separation, isolation or elimination of the vital interests of an MNSA. These vital interests are the Core and Peripheral interests of an MNSA that, in a functional model, ensures the continued existence of an MNSA as such. As mentioned earlier in the third chapter, the proposed Core interests of an MNSA under the NSSP model are; Objectives and Personnel, whilst the peripheral interests of an MNSA are; Mobility, Communication and Supplies. Eliminating the Core interests of an MNSA, is a strategic move which offers definitive results in the compression of an MNSA. However, the elimination of peripheral
MNSA interests, serves to limit the capability and willingness of an MNSA to continue its existence.

This postulated assessment question when asked within the context of the Formation case study, focuses on the strategic means which were operationalised against eliminating the organisational form, ideological motives and operational capability of Nigeria’s designated MNSAs. The strategic means of interest to an observer applying the MSSP theoretical framework, are those which are perceived to have been geared directly towards the incapacitation or elimination of vital interests of the MNSA. The strategic means, are what an observer should characterize as manifestations of Compression. In addition, characterizing the nature of Compression geared towards an NSSP, means that an observer would be engaged in characterizing the compressive severity of strategy against the vital interests of an MNSA. This procedure is an essential first step towards enabling an observer to determine whether the NSSP dependent variable is either; Constraining, (meaning that case studies observed expose a continued reliance by the State on brute military force to physically eliminate MNSA personnel) Coercive, (meaning that case studies highlight a reliance of the state on eliminating MNSA peripheral interests; communication, mobility and supply) or Compelling, (meaning that case studies observed expose a continued reliance on strategy aimed at eliminating MNSA Objectives, through the utilisation of compelling communication). This characterisation of severity is guided by the spectrum of compressive severity as proposed in the third chapter of this work.

Constraining NSSPs are typically characterised by the identification of reliance on strategic means during the case study period, wherein one can deduce that the state aims to eliminate personnel of an MNSA, physically, without any room for symbolic communication of any sort, between the MNSA and the state. This means, Constraining NSSPs utilise strategies are definitive, and leave no room for any alternative options for the MNSA. For example, the deployment of an entire battalion of Nigeria's Armed Forces to ‘crush' the Tiv riots in 1964, falls on this extremity of the Spectrum, as it symbolised the end of direct dialogue between the Nigerian government and the Tiv.

On the other hand, strategic means on the Compelling end of the spectrum is characterised by a softer approach, wherein the state aims to eliminate the core ideology of an MNSA, such as its objectives or grievances. This severity of strategy, at least leaves MNSAs with reasonable room for symbolic communication with the state. Such strategies implemented
by the state, are focused on picking apart the grievances of an MNSA, or delegitimising such an MNSA’s ideological aims, eventually leaving it without reasons to continue its existence as such. An example for illustrative purposes would be the negotiations which occurred between the Nigerian government and the Tiv tribesmen in 1961. These negotiations were on the Compelling Communication end of the Spectrum, and they left significant options for the Tivmen to consider. Such a strategy, if effectively utilised could be productive in eliminating other vital interests of MNSAs such as Personnel and Communications, in the event that MNSA personnel are convinced that their strategic interests are not at odds with those of the State, and hostilities cease.

Using the Spectrum of Compressive Severity as a guide, we can identify and characterize the strategic means utilised by the Nigerian state, to compress the UMBC and AG MNSAs. By combing through occurrences, the researcher can effectively aggregate and characterize the severity of the strategic means utilised by the Nigerian State within the Formation case study. If instances of brute physical force during compression are observed to significantly outnumber those of compelling communication, one can suggest that the NSSP dependent variable is Constraining. Likewise, if instances of Compelling Communication during Compression are observed to significantly outnumber those of Brute Physical Force, one can conclude that the NSSP dependent variable is Compelling.

5.8 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF COMPRESSION

January –August 1960 Middle Belt Zone, Northern region

The Nigerian State employed the strategy of counter-narrating the UMBC, in order to quell the violent confrontations between UMBC supporters and government officials in Yandev, Middle Belt zones.\(^{60}\) It cast blame on the UMBC party and its political ties with the AG party in the Western region, ultimately holding them responsible for any unfortunate occurrences in the Middle-Belt Zones. The Nigerian State’s counter-narrative was aimed at discrediting the legitimacy of the UMBC objectives and criminalising its leadership's interests. In particular, the leadership of the UMBC party under Mr Tarka, was accused of being at odds with Nigeria's national interests. It was argued that Mr Tarka, in his campaigning for the creation of the Middle Belt Region to be carved out of the Northern region,\(^{61}\) was, in fact, part

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\(^{60}\) Remi Anifowose, *Violence And Politics in Nigeria* (First Academic Publishers 2006) p.103

of conspiracies by external forces utilising Mr Tarka's ambitions to destabilize the unity of the Nigerian State. In this instance, one could readily decipher that the Nigerian State sought to utilize the power of counter-narratives to immediately consider the objectives of the UMBC party to be at odds with the national interests and wellbeing of the State. This strategy also sought to incapacitate Mr. Tarka’s influence over Nigerian citizens, thereby attempting to reduce the possibility of the UMBCs Objectives, gathering popular support. Overall, this instance of compression by the Nigerian State against the UMBCMNSA was characterised by negotiations aimed at reducing the potency and credibility of UMBC objectives. These methods of compression, therefore, are assessed to be Compelling.

The Nigerian State was perhaps unprepared for a rebuttal by Mr. Tarka, who was prompt in responding to the Nigerian State's compression strategy. As Mr. Tarka stated that he and his tribesmen had exhausted all legitimate avenues towards the creation of a Middle Belt government which would represent his tribesmen at the federal level, Tarka neutralised the influence of the Nigerian State's compression strategy of counter-narratives –at least in part. Tarka had been successful in legitimizing his stance, as well as that of the UMBC party to the local population within the Tiv occupied Middle Belt Zone. In doing so, he was increasing his chances of recruiting additional personnel who would subscribe to UMBC objectives. He was also successful in strategically allying with the AG party in the Western region. This was seen as a consolidation of similar organisations, with similar objectives. In addition to minimizing the influence of the Nigerian State's counter-narrative, he was successful in highlighting the flaws of the negotiations between the UMBC and the Nigerian State. The flaws of the negotiation process were made apparent by the fact that, the UMBC party were still ousted from legitimate avenues to participate in the political leadership of the Middle Belt Zone. Tarka's comparison of the NPC's governance of Tivmen, to the colonial system of indirect rule, was very efficient in spurring a popular perception of the Nigerian State as facilitators of neocolonial subjugation. By the time Tarka proposed that violence was the only other option left to him and his tribesmen, he was quick to lay the blame on the Nigerian State by claiming that the nonresponsive nature of the Nigerian State, had necessitated the violence.62 The reasons Mr. Tarka and the UMBC had given in order to legitimize the use of violence for Tiv emancipation from NPC rule, had rendered the Nigerian State’s hitherto compression strategy worthless.

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August - December 1960, Middle Belt Zone, Northern Region

A pro-Government supporter along with two Nigerian police officers, were assaulted by UMBC personnel while they were performing their routine tax collection activities in a market owned by a Mr. Akpai, an active UMBC supporter. The Nigerian State deployed additional police officers to potentially aid the tax collectors, and possibly arrest the assailants. These policemen were met with further attacks by UMBC personnel. Violence escalated quickly when the Nigerian State decided to shut down the market forcibly. Native Authority police officers who were to enforce the closure order were hindered by UMBC personnel, and on the 25th of August, a riot squad was deployed to the area. This deployment was met with armed UMBC personnel wielding machetes and arrows, and about three policemen were injured by the UMBC personnel. This led to their subsequent withdrawal. In a timely fashion, the Nigerian Government responded by utilising a constraining strategy of military deployment; this would become its most recurring means of compression. By the time the Nigerian state deployed the first military officers to the Middle Belt Zone, it was a reinforcement tactic for the Nigerian police force stationed in the vicinities overseeing UMBC activity. This deployment was limited, and the primary assignment of the deployed Military officers was to assist the Nigerian police force in quelling UMBC violence. By December, UMBC personnel were actively involved in the looting and burning of property which they believed belonged to NPC supporters. Younger males supporting the UMBC soon formed themselves into militias, who spread violence.

The Military deployment strategy was efficient and short-lived as the Nigerian Government subsequently withdrew the military officers as soon as they believed the Middle Belt situation had been stabilised to acceptable levels. In characterizing the nature of compression applied by the Nigerian State, it is visible that following the backfire of compelling compression, the Nigerian State escalated the severity of its strategic means to include limited military action against the UMBC. The military action suggested that the Nigerian government was intent on controlling movement and communications in the area, to quell the violence. In light of Mr taka's neutralisation of compelling compression against UMBC objectives, and the introduction of military action to curtail UMBC peripheral interests, it is the observer's assessment that the compression strategy of the Nigerian State was Coercive.

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63 Abaagu, ‘Complaint to Minister of Internal Affairs’ NAK/MARKPROF APL/34 Vol. IV
1961, Middle Belt Zone, Northern Region

Following the inclusion of limited military deployment in compression strategy applied by the Nigerian State, the Tiv tribesmen remained effectively out from the political process altogether, with the enhancement of the supervisory powers of the Native Authority to rule the Tivmen indirectly. The escalation of the severity of compression strategy by the Nigerian state, suggests that the NPC led government was indeed repressive, and enhanced the UMBCs popularity. The native authority police, were essentially able-bodied men who were appointed by local chiefs to serve as personal security guards. However, on occasion their functions included those of maintaining law and order, and enforcing the will of local chiefs. These native authority policemen, differed from conventional police officers in the sense that, their functions were in the service of chiefs who appointed them and were only accountable to these chiefs. The unpopularity of the Native Authority in the Middle Belt was also exacerbated by what was essentially the unwarranted victimisation and arbitrary arrest of UMBC supporters. Coupled with the frequent occurrence of arbitrary taxation, arrest and detention of even passive supporters of the UMBC party, it was only a matter of time before violent, aggressive means were utilised by the UMBC to counter the Nigerian state's strategy. The enhancement of the powers of the native authority, coupled with the arbitrary arrests and detention of UMBC supporters by the Nigerian state, pointed towards an increasingly constraining compression strategy pursued by the Nigerian state. In light of the utilisation of arrest and detention tactics by the Nigerian State, as well as intimidation of UMBC supporters, it is the observer’s assessment that the compression strategy of the Nigerian State was bordering on the Constraining end of the spectrum. However, because the compression strategy of the Nigerian State was limited to targeting only peripheral interests of the UMBC such as Mobility, the observer assesses that the compression strategy was still in fact Coercive.

The Nigerian State's compression strategy became increasingly constraining in nature, the frequency of civil unrest was intensifying. The UMBC as an MNSA was not necessarily responding to compression strategy in a manner that was acceptable to the State. Hence, the intensification of compression strategy continued. In light of the intensification of UMBC activity, the immediate reaction of the Nigerian State to the civil unrest in the Middle Belt

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66 Ibid
Zones was to send in additional anti-riot squads from the North to quell the riots which were widespread and increasingly destructive. The Nigerian police estimated that about 5000 people were arrested and temporarily detained for their participation in the violence, and about 3,880 were convicted of various crimes related to the riots. The Nigerian State also ordered the arrest and detention of UMBC leader, Mr Tarka. Following the arrests and detention of rioters, the Nigerian State sought to address the underlying political grievances of the Tivmen. This second phase of the response was characterised by the facilitating of dialogue between the Government and the UMBC party, which resulted in the dissolution of the unpopular Native Authority. With the apparent willingness of the Nigerian State to engage in negotiations with the Tivmen and UMBC, political and legal reforms which were a result of the dialogue between the Nigerian Government and the UMBC were effective, and Mr. Tarka was released from detention. Civil unrest seemed to be reduced to acceptable minimums. The compression strategy of the Nigerian State was temporarily intensified to cope with the outbreak of violence by UMBC personnel, the deployment of additional physical force in the form of anti-riot squads from the North, was effective in quelling the violence. The Nigerian state also pursued a policy of mass arrests and detention in order to separate the personnel of the UMBC, thereby reducing its capacity for violence. The Nigerian state also directly targeted UMBC leader, Tarka, and placed him in detention. This strategic move significantly weakened the organisational buoyancy of the UMBC. It would seem to an observer that the Nigerian State's compression strategy had indeed become constraining. However, what was unique to this period of the case study, was the swift reintroduction of a compelling compression strategy by the Nigerian State. The reintroduction of negotiations between the Nigerian State and a temporarily leaderless UMBC was a hybrid application of constraining and compelling compression strategy. But, the fact that a major concession was made by the Nigerian State (with the dismantling of the Native Authority) violence was significantly reduced to minimum levels. The prompt release of Mr. Tarka from detention, also portrayed a symbolic gesture of goodwill from the Nigerian State. It is therefore the assessment of the observer that compression strategy pursued by the Nigerian State was Coercive as the strategy during this period was a simultaneous application of compelling and briefly, constraining compression.

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Observing the events which occurred in the Western Region in 1962, it is clear that the Nigerian state was engaged with a similar designated MNSA within the Yoruba tribe namely, The Action Group. As tensions between two leaders of the western AG party namely; Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola escalated, their clashes were becoming increasingly violent. The Nigerian state initiated subtle, but compelling compression against the AG party, by negotiating with its leaders in order to weaken its ideational stance. Following the Nigerian state’s proposition that the NPC and AG could form a ruling coalition, Awolowo was bent on maintaining the AG party as an effective opposition to NPC dominance. On the other hand, his deputy Akintola was in favour of agreeing to an alliance with the NPC led government, to form a ruling coalition. This split in ideational stance between Akintola and Awolowo, escalated to the point of splitting the AG party into two factions, with either faction supporting the leader and deputy respectively. The NPC led Nigerian state seemed to be well aware of the influence of the AG party over the Western Region and viewed its increasing dominance as a threat to its longevity in government. Therefore, in offering to absorb the AG party into the upper echelons of government, the Nigerian state perhaps sought to utilize the AG’s influence to its advantage, thereby neutralising an opposition and effectively gaining an ally.

As a result of this offer, violence quickly escalated in the Western Chambers of Parliament after the House met in May of 1962 to debate a motion of no confidence in Akintola. Akintola supporters in the AG party started a riot in the chambers of parliament as a response to the vote put forward. As chairs were flung by members of the house, the speaker's mace was converted into a weapon by one of the speakers, and furniture within the house were damaged as violence ensued. In a swift move, the Nigerian State ordered the deployment of Riot police in the western region. These riot-police were instructed to utilize non-lethal force in quelling the violence, and it is reported that canisters of teargas were thrown in the Parliament chambers. The meeting was subsequently adjourned as proceedings could not continue in such a violent manner. Subsequent attempts to reconvene the house of parliament resulted in similar outbreaks of violence and thus granted the western region its lasting reputation as a region prone to political violence. Following the initial negotiations between

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72 Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa* (Public Affairs 2011)
73 Max Siollun, *Oil, Politics and Violence* (Algora Pub 2009) p.15
74 Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa* (Public Affairs 2011) p.196
the NPC led Nigerian State and the AG, the Nigerian State was effective in weakening the AG’s core ideational interests through the use of compelling coercion. The violence that swiftly erupted after the AG had been weakened ideologically, made it necessary for the Nigerian State to employ a more *Coercive* means of compressing the AG party.

Judging by the actions of the Prime Minister, in which he promptly imposed martial law via a state of emergency declaration, it is suggestive that coercive compression was broadly targeted at members of western parliament, but more specifically, at the AG party. The Prime Minister’s installation of Dr Moses Majekodunmi as the interim Administrator of the Western region, was effective at delegitimizing the ideological interests of the AG party, and ostracised them from government altogether.\(^{76}\) The Nigerian government then proceeded to place several western leaders under house-arrest and to launch an investigation into Chief Awolowo. Thus, an observer can begin to understand that it was becoming routine practice for the Nigerian State to compress MNSAs by operationalising a compelling compression strategy followed swiftly by a *Coercive* compression strategy.

The Nigerian state initiated hasty judicial proceedings against the Awolowo faction of the AG party, and convicted Awolowo among other AG politicians for treason. The Nigerian state, through these proceedings established that plans to overthrow the constitutional government through physical force, were a foreseeable threat and these threats had to be dealt with significantly. Thus, the AG party were identified and designated as MNSAs, through the Nigerian State's promulgation of condemnation of the AG's ideological interests. From these chain of events, an observer can deduce that the Nigerian State initiated an effective compression campaign against the AG party, which damaged the core ideational interests as well as the physical capability of AG personnel to continue their existence as such. The overall characteristics of the Nigerian State's compression against the AG at this time was *Coercive*.

*Western Region 1963*

A new democratically created region emerged in early 1963. The mid-Western region. This region was carved out of the Western region, with popular hopes that it would highlight a new phase of political inclusion of minor tribes. However, the creation of the Mid-Western Region essentially weakened the Western region's position as an effective opposition to the Nigerian State. The State-sponsored creation of a new western-based political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), led by the AG's former deputy leader, Chief

\(^{76}\) Max Siollun, *Oil, Politics and Violence* (Algora Pub 2009) p.15
Akintola, was the Nigerian State's means of quickly replacing the vacuum that had been created by the incarceration of a majority of AG leaders. Even though the party was widely unpopular, this party was installed to lead the Western region. By securing the Western region, the Nigerian State was efficient at utilising compression to bolster its influence within the country.

Middle Belt Zone, Northern Region 1964

Meanwhile, in the Middle Belt Zones, UMBC violence had re-emerged following the unsolved grievances of the 1960 riots.UMBC supporters were increasingly irritated by the presence of the brutal Native Authority Police, which was an element of the Native Authority, strategically preserved by the Nigerian Government, to engage in inflationary containment and compression which could not be carried out by the conventional Police Force. The brutality of the Native Authority Police led the UMBC to call out for either a dissolution of the Native Authority Police or at the very least, a merger between the Native Authority police and the Nigerian Police Force, in order for increased supervision and accountability. The Nigerian government responded to Mr. Tarka's demands, by reorganising the Tiv Native Authority Police, under the administrative control of the Nigeria Police Force. The Nigerian State, had again been involved in coercive compression in the Middle Belt-Zones, and this strategy was proving to be backfiring. The Nigerian State's renegotiation with Mr. Tarka over the Native Authority Police Force's presence in the region appeared to be a strategic shift from coercive compression towards Compelling compression. As the Nigerian State's shift in compression strategy, had no significant value in quelling UMBC grievances which stemmed from their lack of formal representation in government, it was only a matter of time before numerous riots broke out in the Middle Belt Zones in February 1964. Police officers had been involved in the murder of a Tiv traditional clan head, and as a result, several Police officers were murdered as a reprisal to the murder of the Tiv traditional ruler. The murder of a Tiv ruler, whether targeted or by chance, marked a significant change in the character of Nigerian State compression strategy, as it appeared increasingly Constraining.

The Police Force in the Middle Belt Zone appeared to be ill-equipped and understaffed to handle the unfolding crises. The deployment reinforcement forces from the Northern city of Kaduna on numerous occasions to assist in crises management, characterised by constraining

77 Remi Anifowose, Violence And Politics in Nigeria (First Academic Publishers 2006) p.143
compression, signified a crucial shift in the nature of Nigeria’s compressive severity. It must be noted however, that Tivmen were increasingly organised in their mobilisation of personnel, organisation of attacks, and solicitation of popular sympathy and support, as a significant portion of the Tiv rioters were recently decommissioned military servicemen who served in the Second World War, fighting on behalf of the British Empire, the wealth of experience of these ex-servicemen proved a difficulty for the Nigerian State.\textsuperscript{80} The UMBC also enjoyed popular support from members of the Tiv tribe, and the deployment of additional Nigerian forces did little to discourage the emboldened rioters who, instead, carried out direct attacks on the Police Force. The UMBC uprising was fast becoming an internal insurgency, following the failure of the State’s constraining compression strategies. The increasing intensity of the attacks on the Nigerian Police force, moved the Nigerian State to instigate a brutal military suppression of riots. On the 18th of November 1964, an entire Battalion of the Nigerian Army, as well as the Reece Squadron, was mobilised for a counter insurgency operation against the Tiv uprising.\textsuperscript{81} The Army battalion was explicitly ordered by the Prime Minister, Sir. Balewa to neutralize the Tiv uprising by any means necessary. Following the events of 1964, an observer can decipher the constraining nature of Nigerian State compression, and this period of compression would be documented as Constraining.

From the Formation case study, the author has produced a measurement scale, which characterizes the nature of Compression of Nigeria’s NSSP. This too, is represented in tabular form. Within this measurement scale, recorded events are tabularised, according to the severity of the compressive strategy implemented by the Nigerian state. Events represented in this measurement scale which are suggestive of constraining compression, are input in the ‘Constraining’ column. In the same vein, events suggestive of coercive compression are placed in the ‘Coercive’ column. Finally, events which are assessed to be compelling communication, are entered into the ‘Compelling’ column, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Constraining</th>
<th>Coercive</th>
<th>Compelling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counter narratives - UMBC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Judging by instances of compression observed within the Formation case study, one can deduce that the Nigerian State, remained largely *Coercive* in its compression strategy against MNSAs. Another significant finding from the data collected is that the observer witnessed the gradual intensification of compression strategy through the years. Initially, the Nigerian State sought to utilise more diplomatic means at delegitimising the positions of MNSA leaders, both in the western region, and in the middle belt zone. The compelling compressive strategy yielded limited success in its application. However, the limited successes achieved by the compelling strategy, in addition to the intensification of civil unrest spurred by MNSA's could argued to be the rationale behind the escalating the severity of compression efforts, ultimately resulting in the mobilisation of military campaigns against MNSAs, especially in the Northern Region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Riot Squads - UMBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Mass Arrests / Detention - UMBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Arrests / Detention - AG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>State of Emergency declared - AG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Assassination of Key Personnel - UMBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Military Campaign against Personnel - UMBC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.9 The National Security Strategic Personality of Nigeria during the “Formative Period”

At this point, the data extracted by the measured independent variables from the formation case study period is collated to give an observer an accurate description of Nigeria’s NSSP.

Assessment Question 4: What are the cumulative observed characteristics of the National Security Strategic Personality of the State?

Based on state behaviour observed during this case study, it is reasonable to characterise Nigeria’s National Security Strategic Personality, as Introverted in its outlook, Interest-Centric in its provision, and Coercive in its severity.

Table 8. Dependent Variable Measurement: NSSP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Inflationary Containment</th>
<th>Compression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introverted</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extroverted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People-Centric</td>
<td>Constraining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest-Centric</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.10 Lessons Learnt from Formation Case Study

At the beginning of this chapter, the author set out to perform an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory. This was achieved through the utilisation of the case-study methods of analysis, which investigated the interactions between the Nigerian state, and Malicious Non-State Actors, which were present from 1960-1966. The author was able to reasonably identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian State. In addition, the author was made aware of the following considerations;

From a research point of view, this analysis of the formation case study was largely satisfactory. However, the author did come across some challenges with regards to identifying all instances of observable state behaviour during this period. This was as a result of the lack of first-hand data sources which encompass this period, as the author discovered that many records of events were simply inaccessible, due to damage and loss of official documents in government archives. On occasion, the author visited the Nigerian police force headquarters and the National Library in Abuja, only to discover that archives available only dated as far
back as 1969. The author was made aware of the fact that, many documents and archives were destroyed or misplaced during the Nigerian civil war. This necessitated the author’s reliance on secondary data sources, in addition to archival data, to paint of comprehensive picture of events that occurred. However, due to the typological nature of the NSSP theory, the author realised that the available data sources were comprehensive enough to provide a reasonable account of events during the formation period.

The formation case study, set the very first foundations for Nigerian NSSP. The ramifications of State behaviour, as well as MNSA activities, laid down precedents which both the Nigerian State and its perceived MNSAs followed. One of such precedents was the gradual intensification of Nigeria's compressive strategy. The compressive nature of Nigerian NSSP would carry on to influence its NSSP from 1966 onwards, signifying the reliance of the Nigerian State on constraining compression, and a limitation on the range of acceptable strategies which would be employed by the State onwards. This intensification of compressive strategy, also signified the nature of the mutually constitutive interactions between the Nigerian State and its perceived MNSAs, as one which was characterised by physical coercion, the superiority of the Nigerian state’s agendas, and the construction of MNSA identities by the Nigerian state. Another lesson learnt from this case study was the incursion of the military into politics in the Nigerian state. This was in part aided by their increasing importance in Nigeria's compressive strategy, which, over time, recognised the Nigerian military as the primary enforcers of coercion. Undoubtedly, this intensification of strategy, familiarised Nigerians with the presence of the military in political matters. The Nigerian military, was playing an increasingly important role in the delivery of national security, identifying itself as a key player in the formation and safeguarding of national interests, to the extent that the military possessed the discretion and independence necessary to identify even members of the ruling elite, as threats to national security. Equally, (as shall be explained in the next chapter), popular perception of the Nigerian military as a legitimate political institution (actor), reinforced the social identity of the Nigerian Military as such, saddling it with a responsibility to interfere in national politics, independently. Therefore, it came as no surprise when the first Military coup occurred in January of 1966, signifying the incursion of a different organisation of men armed with rules and particularly brutal means of coercion, maintaining control over Nigeria's population.

Another precedent set during this case study was, the interest-centric nature of Nigeria's NSSP during this period. Johnston posited that an ideational milieu existed, which limited state
behaviour and strategic choice, going further to state that such a milieu was the product of shared assumptions by the elite which impose a degree of order on the relationship between entities and their political environment. The interest centric nature of Nigerian NSSP as observed in this case study, was as a by-product of these dominant elitist politicians preserving the status-quo. Considering that these elitist politicians, by virtue of their speeches and actions, identified their interests, as being equivalent to the interests of the state, it is no surprise that entire political parties, and ethnic groups could be constructed by these politicians, as being malicious non-state actors. After all, it was these elite politicians in Nigeria, who facilitated its independence from foreign colonial powers in the first place, and that their immediate interests would have more influence over Nigerian NSSP. Elitist politics would remain a lasting feature of Nigerian politics, imposing the idea of ‘unity’, over the population residing within Nigerian territory – regardless of ethno-religious disparities. This elitist ontology within Nigerian politics is something Nigerians would become familiar with, and still, plays a crucial role in Nigerian NSSP till this day.

The author began this chapter in order to initiate an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory. In doing so, the author utilised the case-study methods of analysis, which investigated the interactions between the Nigerian state, and its declared or otherwise implied Malicious Non-State Actors. Relying on archival data, the author was able to reasonably identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian State during the Formation period. The next chapter will also initiate empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory utilising the case-study methods of analysis, this time, on the Secession period of 1967 to 1970. The next chapter would employ a similar methodology to this chapter, in terms of qualitatively analysing Nigerian NSSP through the case study method.

A snapshot of Nigeria as at 1967, portrayed a much different picture of the country. At the time, Nigeria was a federal nation governed by a Supreme Military Council, headed by Yakubu Gowon. Nigeria's NSSP during the formation period enabled the researcher to fully comprehend how this newly independent democratic Nation had now become an authoritarian state on the verge of a Civil War. As mentioned previously, Nigeria's NSSP during the formation period, was Introverted, Interest-Centric and Coercive, with designated MNSAs that were essentially ethnocentric organisations opposing the central government. This NSSP configuration highlighted the fact that, the role of popular legitimacy in governance was relegated, and Nigeria's NSSP was centred on interests, interests which were protected in an increasingly militarised manner by the end of the formation case study. The situation in the Western Region had deteriorated to the extent that emergency rule was imposed, and the Middle Belt Zones of the Northern region had become accustomed to military deployment as part and parcel of State compressive strategy. Nationwide, the duty of safeguarding the remnants of political processes of suffrage was devolved to the Nigerian Military, and power struggles between the President and the Prime Minister were made evident by their competition over military loyalty.

**Military Incursion into Nigerian Politics**

With the state of affairs within the Nigerian state during the formation period, individuals within the Nigerian military had become increasingly convinced of their salient importance in Nigerian politics. One of such individuals at the time, was Second lieutenant Azubuogu who narrated what was arguably the collective experience of military personnel at the time:

*Any army officer was being harangued by civilians because of the state of the nation. People felt that the army should do something, that the country should be salvaged...Most army officers at that time had the same problem of people coming to us, saying, what are you doing? The country is on fire. Why don’t you do something about it?*

Civilians were observed to aggressively transfer their frustration with the civilian government, on members of the armed forces. The general rationale behind this transfer of aggression was spurred by the conclusion that the armed forces could utilise their strategic

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positioning at major governmental establishments, to overthrow the corrupt government. This transfer of aggression, can be said to be as a result of expectations, within and outside the military establishment, that the social behaviour of the military should reflect their increasingly important, and independent role in political affairs. The Nigerian military, was gradually ceasing to be merely an executor of the political will of the elite, to an instigator of its own version of a preferred social order. Civilian aggression was characterised by passive-aggressive means of frustrating members of the armed forces, such as the purposeful increment of food prices in areas where military barracks had been established. In many cases, soldiers were harassed by civilians, many of whom were involved in spitting on soldiers which they found in markets shopping for foodstuff.2

With the extinction of the importance of popular legitimacy within Nigerian politics at the time, many individuals within and outside the Nigerian military disregarded the importance of elections and the political process altogether, thereby making the proposition of a military takeover of government more tolerable and even perhaps, desirable. Eventually, a group of military officers within the Nigerian Army decided to act upon what they perceived as a moral duty to restore accountability within government. In January of 1966 the group of Army officers comprising of Major Nzeogwu, Major Ifeajuna, Major Anuforo, Major Ademoyega and Major Okafor, enacted a coup plot against the Nigerian State. Their primary objectives were to arrest or otherwise kill all leading political and military figures in the country, and eventually form a new military government. Major Nzeogwu claimed that the rationale behind the coup was that:

Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds.3

They utilised the Commonwealth conference of January 15 1966, which was held in Lagos, Nigeria as a distraction to organise their attack.4 These officers carried out simultaneous attacks in the three regions, starting on the 15th of January and concluding on the 16th. In the Northern region, the officers assassinated Sir Ahmadu Bello (the Northern Premier), after

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2 Hilary M Njoku, A Tragedy Without Heroes (Fourth Dimension 1987).p.4
3 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p.55
4 Daily Times, ‘Crucial Premiers’ Summit Begins’ (1966)
which they ransacked his residence before setting it ablaze. In the Western region, the officers assassinated the Western Premier Chief Akintola, who initially resisted arrest by fighting back with a machine gun. They also assassinated the prime minister, Sir Balewa, The Finance Minister, Chief Okotie-Eboh and several senior military officials. In the Eastern Region, the Eastern Premier, Chief Dennis Osadebay was also temporarily placed under house arrest. A newspaper article published on the 16th of January 1966 assumed that these leaders had been abducted:

In the early hours of this morning, January 15 1966, a dissident section of the Nigerian Army kidnapped the Prime minister and the Minister of Finance and took them to an unknown destination

After the assassinations occurred, the coup plotters fled Lagos. These coup plotters were hunted down by Maj Gen Aguyi-Ironsì, who did not approve of their actions. Notwithstanding the fact that the coup plotters were unsuccessful in taking over the government, they were remarkably effective at destabilising it. Incidentally, President Azikiwe was outside the country on an extended medical vacation. With the Prime Minister, Northern and Western Premiers dead, the Acting President and The Council of Ministers were forced to hand over power to the most senior officer in the Nigerian Army, Major-General Aguyi-Ironsì. This handover was spurred by fears that the coup plotters would attempt to take over the government in the near future forcefully, and that such a takeover would be better suppressed if the entire nation was under the control of the Army's most senior officer. At a brief meeting of the aforementioned personalities, a handover document was hastily written to confirm the transfer of the Nigerian Government, to its Armed Forces:

The Council of ministers, meeting on 16th January 1966, have asked us to convey to you their unanimous decision to transfer voluntarily the government to the armed forces of the republic and wish the armed forces success to bring about peace and stability in Nigeria, and that the welfare of our people shall be their paramount task.

This handover was subsequently confirmed in the Daily Times newspaper the following morning:

At 11.50 last night the acting President, Dr Nwafor Orizu, told the nation in a broadcast that he has been advised by the Council of Ministers that they have

5 Daily Times, ‘This is Where Sardauna Died’ (1966)
7 Ejoor D, Reminiscences (Malthouse Press 1990)
9 Mbadiwe K, Rebirth of a Nation (Fourth Dimension Publications 1991)
unanimously decided to hand over government of the Federation to the Armed Forces in view of the present situation\textsuperscript{10}.

Following the broadcast by the acting President, Major-General Aguyi-Ironsi held a press conference to address the Nation, in which he asserted his ascension to political power, stating that:

\textit{The federal Military Government of Nigeria has taken over the administration of the country. Functions of the Federal Military Government shall be exercised by the supreme military council...my main concern is to restore law and order, as soon as possible}\textsuperscript{11}.

He also went further to state that Nigeria's external relations would not be altered in any way by the new administration, but that press censorship was likely if he deemed it necessary. In this regard, he essentially hinted at the fact that Nigerian NSSP would continue to remain introverted in its outlook, focusing on neutralising domestic elements of destabilisation.

Popular opinion regarding the military takeover of government seemed to support this development. It was reported that there was hardly any resistance to military rule from the civilian population and that in fact, a majority of the population welcomed this development. One journalist in Lagos, Mr. Gabriel Fangbore, was of the opinion that "corruption, nepotism on the part of politicians of all parties, and the danger of internal strife in Nigeria, swept the army into power. Some of these soldiers, I believe, are much more intelligent, are much more patriotic than the politicians, who we all condemn..."\textsuperscript{12} His opinion reflected much of the popular belief that since the political process was inaccessible to the general populace under civilian rule, it was hardly different to military rule -except for the belief that Nigerians expected a higher degree of discipline from the military in government affairs as opposed to civilian politicians. Astonishingly, the NPC party also issued an official statement, proclaiming its unquestioned support for the military takeover:

\textit{The Party gives its unqualified support to the military regime and to the Major general in particular. We call on all our party members and supporters to cooperate with the military regime and to give the new administration unflinching support in its great task of bringing peace and stability to Nigeria}\textsuperscript{13}.

Considering the overall reaction to the coup, general opinion indicated that the new Federal Military Government possessed quite a degree of popular legitimacy, which arguably,

\textsuperscript{10} Daily Times, 'President Hands Over Govt to Armed Forces' (1966)
\textsuperscript{12} (2004), Video.
\textsuperscript{13} Adaji H, Daily Times (1966)
surpassed that which the NPC led government of the first republic possessed. More importantly, Nigeria had effectively entered into a new era of military government, within which supreme power was obtainable by those who had the means and interest in enacting a coup.

6.1 ASSESSMENT QUESTION 1 - DELINEATING BETWEEN THE STATE AND ITS PROPOSED MNSAs

As the events mentioned earlier show, the nature of the Nigerian State as a unitary rational actor, had changed in terms of its internal configuration. The Nigerian State which was primarily NPC and Northern led in a democratic arrangement had become a military dictatorship, orchestrated by mostly Eastern and Western Majors, and headed by an Eastern Major-General. For the sake of clarity, it must be noted that the occurrence of the first military coup, does not neutralise the effectiveness of NSSP analysis within the Secession case study period. All that is required by an observer to apply the NSSP theoretical framework on such a case study is the delineation of the new State structure, by identifying the organisation of men with the means of coercion to maintain order over the entirety of Nigeria's population. In this case study, the NPC was deposed and substituted by the Nigerian military.

6.1.1 The State

As at January 1966 following the First Military Coup, the Nigerian State was structurally configured as a military dictatorship, which suspended the 1960 Nigerian constitution. It was primarily governed by the Supreme Military Council, which was comprised of ten positions, all of which oversaw specific facets of governance. The Supreme Military Council reported directly to Major-General Aguyi-Irons. See diagram below:
Figure 6. The Nigerian State, Jan. 1966

The configuration of Nigerian Government, was essentially centralised, with the Regional Governors and heads of the Army, Navy and Air-force bearing the same military rank. However, the occupants of this configuration did not last for very long. Tribal sentiments which plagued the political scene of the first republic remained omnipresent in all spheres of politics. Various individuals of Northern origin within the Military were convinced that Aguyi-Ironsi could not be accepted as Supreme leader. It was widely believed that because of Aguyi-Ironsi’s ethnicity, he was most probably a facilitator of the military coup which he publicly condemned. These inter-tribal sentiments continued to plague the rank and file of the Nigerian Military establishment. Northern soldiers were increasingly suspicious of Eastern soldiers and embittered by the murder of two of the most senior Northern politicians in the country. The situation was worsened by the general lack of sympathy shown by most Westerners and Easterners, as the welcoming jubilations which surrounded the coup developments, were interpreted by Northerners as jubilation in the face of the murder of their beloved leaders. At a military conference in the Southern town of Abeokuta, these tensions were brought to light as Northern soldiers began to massacre Eastern soldiers on the 27th of July, 1966. This massacre marked the beginning of a Second Military Coup, characterised

today as the Northern Counter-Coup. This violence quickly spread across the country and resulted in a full-scale insurgency. In some way, this Northern Counter-Coup was inevitable for two reasons. Firstly, the incursion of the Military into politics neutralised the advantage given to the Northern region in the Houses of Parliament in the Formation period, by the now suspended constitution. Secondly, given that the Northern leaders suffered the most casualties in the January coup, and that the majority of coup planners were Easterners, inter-tribal tensions leading to a full-scale confrontation was considered imminent.

On the 29th of July, the Supreme Leader, Major-General Aguyi-Irons was turned on by his guards, brutalised by his head of personal security detail, and murdered. The Military Governor for the Western Region, Lt. Col. Fajuyi, was also murdered in Aguyi-Ironsi's company. The principal coup plotters were Majors Muritala Mohammed and Theophilus Danjuma, both Northern officers of the Nigerian Army. The intertribal insurgency was not only limited to the upper echelons of military government. A majority of Eastern Nigerians who resided in the Northern region were brutalised by both Northern military officers and civilians. It is estimated that between 200 and 250 non-commissioned officers lost their lives in the counter-coup. The Easterners eventually fled the Northern and Western regions, to the Eastern Region, where they were welcomed by their Military Governor, Lt. Col. Ojukwu. Ojukwu was explicit in his condemnation of Northern violence against his Eastern kinsmen, proclaiming that even though he had no intention to launch an attack against Northerners in Eastern territory: "We had sufficient cause to retaliate and could have done so with good effect". With the assassination of the Supreme Leader by the Muritala-led coup plotters, a senior Northern Military Officer, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon assumed leadership of the Country. Interestingly, Lt. Col. Gowon originated from the Middle-Belt Zone of the Northern Region.

By the 2nd of August 1966, after tense negotiations between the coup-plotters and members of the civil service, Nigeria was placed under Lt. Col. Gowon's military leadership. In the Eastern region, however, Ojukwu immediately rejected this development. Citing the critical fact that notwithstanding Lt. Col. Gowon's post as the most senior Northern Officer, a higher ranking officer, Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe from the Western region was still alive and in active service. In addition, Colonel Adebayo, also from the Western region was superior.
to Lt. Col. Gowon, along with five other serving military officers. Ojukwu's protests highlighted the fact that, tribal sentiments were observed to be a much more determinant factor in the enactment of the counter-coup, and the subsequent allocation of positions within the newly formed government. For example, several colonels served as subordinate to lieutenant colonels, regardless of standardised military hierarchy. Below is a diagram which is more illustrative of the governance structure of the Nigerian state following the counter-coup.

**Figure 7. The Nigerian State, Jul. 1966**

### 6.1.2 Malicious Non-State Actors

Following the multiple incidents of violence against Easterners which occurred before, and after Lt. Col. Gowon's ascension to power, it became increasingly clear that inter-tribal tensions would preoccupy Nigeria's NSSP and dictate the selection of MNSAs within this case study period. When one analyses the nature of Nigerian strategic outlook at the time, information points primarily toward the survival of the nation as a single entity, as the predominant concern. The Northern counter-coup was an explicit manifestation of the potency of underlying tribalist tensions between Northerners and Easterners, which threatened the survival of the Nigerian state. Therefore, such tensions were viewed as the primary source of political instability, and as a result, individuals or organisations who were identified as willing and capable of exacerbating inter-tribal tensions, to an extent whereby the continued existence of Nigeria was jeopardised, were designated as the principal MNSAs. As we shall see in this case study, Nigerian NSSP was to be predominantly dictated by ethnic rivalry which permeated both civilian and military institutions.
6.2 CHRONOLOGY OF THE 1967-1970 SECESSION CASE STUDY

1966: The Return of Northern Dominance

The 1966 counter-coup initiated Gowon's rise to power and the subsequent consolidation of Northern control over the entirety of the Nigerian state. Initially, Gowon was viewed as a "compromise" leader. This was as a result of his Northern origins, Southern religious beliefs and his reputation as an individual who favoured diplomatic solutions over violence. However, the perception of Gowon's neutrality was not shared by Eastern Nigerians, who were still effectively under persecution by Northern soldiers.\textsuperscript{20} In various incidents in Sabon Garis (foreigner's settlements) in the Northern region, it was estimated that riots by Northerners claimed Eastern lives in the tens of thousands. These riots led to the subsequent evacuation of over a million refugees to the Eastern region. From September to October 1966, violence against Easterners by Northerners intensified significantly. This violent episode saw the murder of between 80,000 and 100,000 Easterners, as the internal situation deteriorated further.\textsuperscript{21} To the Easterners, it was becoming increasingly clear that the government was either unwilling or unable to stop the violence against their kinsmen.

The period spanning from July to October 1966 also saw failed attempts at negotiations between delegates of the SMC and the Eastern region. For example, on the 9th of August 1966, a meeting between representatives of all regional military governors and Gowon, was held. In this meeting, vital issues concerning the immediate fate of the country were discussed. Of primary importance to the Eastern government, was that the repatriation of soldiers to their regions of origin. This measure was discussed to reduce occurrences of inter-tribal violence, which was primarily orchestrated by Northern soldiers against Easterners. Within the framework of this repatriation exercise, Gowon agreed to Ojukwu's demands that Eastern soldiers be granted access to weapons with which they could utilise for self-defence during their journeys home.\textsuperscript{22} The Easterners were perceived by other representatives at the meeting, as exaggerating the severity of their plight, but in a significant turn of events, it was reported that several Eastern Nigerians were massacred on the day of the meeting in the Northern region, and a few hundred Easterners had been killed by Northern soldiers in Lagos. Some of these murders were carried out only a few hundred yards from where the meeting was being held.

\textsuperscript{21} Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, \textit{The Biafra War} (The Edwin Mellen Press 1990) p.55-56
The Gowon-led government eventually appeared sympathetic to the Easterners' jeopardy, and embarking on negotiations with these delegates seemed like a positive development. However, relations between the Ojukwu and Gowon would significantly worsen after Gowon, without consultation with Eastern leaders, announced his dismissal of the resolutions of this conference, on the 30th of November 1966.

For the Gowon-led government, the implications of the persecution of Easterners led to irreconcilable rifts between the Supreme Commander, Gowon and the Military Governor of the Eastern region, Ojukwu, as the latter was infuriated by recent developments in the country. As a result, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), was unable to organise meetings with all its members present. This was because Ojukwu rightly feared for his safety at SMC proceedings. Ojukwu, hailing from the Eastern region, believed that his presence at any of the SMC meetings would jeopardise his safety as many Northern soldiers would be present, and he believed that he too might be murdered at one of such meetings. Ojukwu's absence from these SMC meetings served to further isolate the interests of Eastern Nigerians at the central level of Government. This practical absence of Eastern representation within the government was, in many ways, like the disenfranchisement of Western and Middle-Belt interests during the formation case-study. The SMC would eventually meet in a conference, the early months of 1967. But, in the months preceding the SMC conference, Ojukwu became increasingly explicit in his condemnation of the SMC and the violence which was meted out against Easterners. Ojukwu frequently reiterated his opinion that, as Military governor of the Eastern Region, any SMC meeting would have to be held on politically neutral grounds, where Northern soldiers were absent. Ojukwu's conviction practically eliminated the possibility of SMC proceedings anywhere within Nigerian territory. Simultaneously, the Western and Northern regions witnessed the mass emigration of Eastern military officers, who abandoned their postings for fears of their safety. It was widely suspected that Ojukwu's outward condemnation of the SMC would culminate in a proposal for the Eastern region to secede from Nigeria. By this time, thousands of civilians had become victims of violence, and the nation was descending into anarchy. A situation needed to be found. In a bid to prevent hostilities, both sides decided to negotiate a settlement on neutral territory, in neighbouring Ghana.

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24 Daily Times, ‘Gowon, Ojukwu in Ghana’ (1967)
guests of Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah, included all members of the SMC, and they embarked on peace talks. 25

**The Aburi Conference of 1967**

On the 4th and 5th of January 1967, the SMC met for the first time since its constitution in August 1966, in the town of Aburi, Ghana (a neighbouring West-African state). This meeting was orchestrated by the then Military Head of State of Ghana, Lt. Gen. Joseph Ankrah. Lt. Gen. Ankrah was interested in the survival of neighbouring Nigeria as a single entity, as political instability in the West-African region would be greatly accelerated if the largest State in the region disintegrated into chaos.

The Aburi conference was essentially a constitutional conference wherein the future of Nigeria's union would be discussed in detail, by the members of Nigeria's Supreme Military Council. The physical situation of this conference in Ghana, was instrumental in providing neutral territory, which was a necessary precondition for Ojukwu's presence at any SMC meeting. Fortunately, proceedings at the Aburi conference were documented in detail, via video and audio recordings facilitated by the Ghanaians, and detailed minutes of the meeting were documented by Ojukwu's aides. It is from these recordings that the researcher could gain further insight into the state of the Nigerian union at the time. In one of the audio recordings, Lt. Gen. Ankrah was recorded in his opening remarks, stating that: "The whole world is looking up to you as military men and if there is any failure to reunify or even bring perfect understanding to Nigeria as a whole, you will find that the blame will rest with us through the centuries"26

At this constitutional conference, Ojukwu once again challenged the legality of Gowon's leadership, citing the existence of Military officers who outranked him. He also advocated for a more decentralised government, wherein decisions could not be taken at the central level of government without the approval of the military Governors, especially in instances where a particular region was to be directly affected. The remaining members of the SMC however, advocated for a strong, centralised government, wherein the military governors of the regions were nothing more than an extension of central control. In this conference, Ojukwu maintained his defiance, repeatedly referring to Gowon as the Chief of Army Staff and not the Supreme Military Commander. The recordings of this conference captured Ojukwu as saying:

25 Daily Times, ‘The Best For Nigeria is a Confederation’ (1967)
26 ‘Aburi Meetings | Openmind Foundation’ (Openmindfoundation.com)
A break at this time from our normal line (referring to military hierarchy) would write in something into the Nigerian Army which is bigger than all of us and that thing is indiscipline...because you are the head of a group who have their fingers poised on the trigger? If you do it you remain forever a living example of that indiscipline which we want to get rid of because tomorrow a Corporal will think that, he could just take over the company from the Major commanding the company.\textsuperscript{27}

Eventually, Ojukwu was able to convince the SMC to adopt a less centralised system of government within which regional governors enjoyed more autonomy in the decision-making procedures of their respective regions. Ojukwu also put forward a resolution which denounced the use of further violence by the SMC as a means of resolving the Nigerian crisis.\textsuperscript{28} It was perhaps Ojukwu's hope that if the SMC were seen to denounce the use of military force publicly, then he might have a better chance at seceding from Nigeria without bloodshed. The issue of publicly declaring the demise of the previous Supreme Commander, Lt. Gen. Aguyi-Ironsi was also discussed. (It must be noted that the demise of Aguyi-Ironsi was still not public knowledge at the time, and many Nigerians still believed he was alive, but missing.) Lt. Col. Gowon was in favour of Ojukwu's proposition to announce the demise of Aguyi-Ironsi. Perhaps Gowon's agreement with Ojukwu's proposition was in the spirit of goodwill, but it is much more plausible that Gowon was acting in his self-interest. The speculation surrounding Aguyi-Ironsi's disappearance, in a way, delegitimised Gowon's authority as supreme commander. The conference also deliberated on the plights of internally displaced persons, and the status and recovery of their abandoned assets in the Northern and Western regions. Detailed minutes of the Aburi conference were also documented by Ojukwu's entourage, and have been included in this paper, in Appendix B.

\textbf{1967: Eastern Secession}

The outcomes of the Aburi conference, however, were never implemented upon the SMC's return to Nigeria. On the 14th and 15th of January 1967, a follow-up meeting was held in the Mid-Western region. In attendance were Solicitors-General of the regions, who were acting as representatives of the military governors. It was at this meeting that Ojukwu became aware of the SMC's plans to renege on the agreements reached at Aburi. In Ojukwu's absence in subsequent SMC meetings, some SMC members expressed their opposition to most of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{27} 'Aburi Meetings | Openmind Foundation' (Openmindfoundation.com) <http://www.openmindfoundation.com/index.php/national-issues/nigeria-today/aburi-minutes/> accessed 10 February 2017.} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{28} THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL Republic Of Biafra' (Africafederation.net, 2017) <http://africafederation.net/Biafra_Military_docs.htm> accessed 03 October 2016.}
Ojukwu's propositions at Aburi. Decisions were still made at the central levels of government, with little regard for the wishes of people in the Eastern region. It was revealed at the follow-up meeting that the SMC had refused to grant regional governors more autonomy within the regions and instead, repealed constitutional provisions which enabled the military governors to act with the hitherto existing degree of autonomy. It became apparent that not only was Gowon trying to restrict Ojukwu's powers, but Gowon would also rather see Ojukwu's powers significantly diminished. Gowon also pushed for the elimination of unanimous votes in the SMC and replaced it with a simple majority vote system, in which he had the veto vote. For Ojukwu this meant that significant decisions which directly affected his region could be taken in his continued absence from the SMC.

Another issue which complicated the fulfilment of the resolutions at Aburi was the discovery of massive deposits of Crude Oil in the Eastern region in 1956. Further exploration of these oil reserves, meant that it was becoming increasingly clear the amount of wealth that could be made from this valuable resource. Many within the SMC were aware of the economic benefits of maintaining the Eastern region within the Nigerian state and were vehemently opposed to increased regional autonomy as a result. Ojukwu was also well aware of the benefits of the resources within his region and perceived the failure of Gowon to implement the Aburi resolutions as a grave threat to the well-being of the already embittered Easterners. The Central government ensured that it assumed control of the exploitation of the Oil deposits within the Eastern region, and subsequently dispersed the proceeds of Oil exploration equitably amongst the Regions. This method of resource exploitation was perceived as wholly unfair by the Easterners, who believed that they should be receiving a significantly higher percentage of the proceeds, being that the oil deposits were extracted from their region with significant impact on the local environment.29

Another independent development which further compounded the Easterners feelings of marginalisation, was the release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo from prison, by Lt. Col. Gowon. Many had hoped that the release of Awolowo from prison would have ensured an amicable split of all the three regions into separate independent entities. As one would recall, Awolowo was one of the leaders of the AG party, and frequently called for the emancipation of the Western region from the Nigerian union. Awolowo was perceived as an MNSA leader during the Formation case-study. However, upon his release, Awolowo immediately took sides with

29 Daily Times, ‘The Best For Nigeria is a Confederation’ (1967)
his liberators from the North and declared his allegiance with Gowon, and by extension, Nigerian unity. This development essentially pitted the Western and Northern regions against the Eastern Region. With the North and South in an alliance against the East, coupled with the ongoing massacre of Easterners, Ojukwu was facing increasing pressures from Easterners to lead them out of the Nigerian union. However, Gowon was prompt to declare that any such secession led by Ojukwu would be unacceptable and would result in a police action for the crimes of treason.

On the 27th of May 1967, Gowon effectively divided Nigeria into twelve States. These States were a strategic sub-division of the existing regions, and for the Easterners, was an unacceptable development, as it further created an administrative split, which saw Ojukwu only in charge of a much smaller portion of the Eastern region than he had been, before the 27th of May. This sub-division of the regions was perhaps the final catalyst for Eastern secession from Nigeria. Gowon's proclamation divided the Eastern region into Rivers State, East Central State, and South Eastern States respectively. Three days after Gowon's announcement, Ojukwu announced the Republic of Biafra as a Sovereign independent state, on the 30th of May 1967. Ojukwu announced the rationale behind his decision as being a response to the genocidal killing of people of predominantly eastern origin. He stated that: "in our case, that thousands have been massacred is not in dispute, one then might be permitted to ask, at what stage does this massacre become genocide". Ojukwu essentially announced his readiness for war against the Nigerian government in a televised interview:

> if civil war comes, and I do think it is imminent, you're quite right: it will for us be the price of freedom. Our people here, have for a long time been prepared for this eventuality, and I am confident of their readiness. I think that when it does come, that the people on the other side would be surprised, as to what they're going to get, and I'm confident that it will not last long.

Gowon issued a countering statement to that of Ojukwu, claiming that the secession would be met with forceful resistance from the Nigerian government, and ordered a ‘police action’ against Ojukwu. Popular support for Ojukwu from the Easterners meant that this action was met with forceful resistance. Thus, Gowon announced the beginning of the war:

> We are fighting this war in order to avoid the disintegration of the country into several mini-states which would become the protectorates of foreign powers. Everyone knows what the consequence of such disintegration would be. The tiny

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31 Ibid
states would all recklessly acquire arms from their protectors. There would be continuous war, insecurity of life and property and much greater sufferings than we have yet experienced.\textsuperscript{32}

Gowon also enforced the creation of a Military Blockade, which effectively cut off Eastern air and sea ports, as well as most forms of telecommunications in the region.\textsuperscript{33} As the blockade materialised, it was clear that the FMG’s aim was to isolate the Eastern region from sources of revenue. The recently established oil extracting companies which were within the Eastern region, were also included in the blockade, so as to halt any economic advantages which were to be gained by the Biafrans from the sale of oil.\textsuperscript{34} The FMG’s actions in the very early stages of the military confrontation were focused on the capture of Bonny Island from Ojukwu’s control, specifically because of the presence of valuable shell-BP installations, and the island’s strategic importance as a shipping route for oil exportation.\textsuperscript{35}

The initial police action\textsuperscript{36} ordered by Gowon, was met with a sporadic offensive from Ojukwu, who renamed the Eastern region of Nigeria, as the Independent Republic of Biafra. The Biafrans (as they are subsequently identified), attempted to capture the Mid-Western Region of Nigeria. This invasion mostly caught the Nigerian government by surprise. The Biafrans’ offensive managed to frighten the Mid-Western Military Governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor, and he fled his region. More significantly however, the invasion of the Mid-Western region by the Biafrans indicated to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) that the Biafrans also favoured territorial expansion. The United States was sceptical of the FMG’s ability to decisively win the conflict against Biafra. As an excerpt from publications by the United States’ interdepartmental Group for Africa shows below:

\textit{General Gowon leads a fragile, relatively moderate and regionally balanced coalition, determined to preserve national unity and convinced that rebel success would tear apart the country. The military stalemate accentuates inner stresses and strains...but the common interest nevertheless continues to hold the coalition together}\textsuperscript{37}

The reprisal by the FMG was a sign of things to come in the ensuing civil war. Firstly, the FMG mobilised its 2\textsuperscript{nd} Division to recapture the Mid-Western region from the Biafrans on

\textsuperscript{34} Chibuike Ugochukwu Uche, \textit{Oil, British Interests And The Nigerian Civil War} (2008).
\textsuperscript{35} Chibuike Ugochukwu Uche, \textit{Oil, British Interests And The Nigerian Civil War} (2008).
\textsuperscript{36} A Police action being a partial military operation designed to eliminate what is viewed as an internal insurrection
\textsuperscript{37} NSCGIF/AF 69-1/Rev.A February 10 1969 NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa Background Paper on Nigeria/Biafra declassified Apr 21 2005
the 6th of July 1967. The counter-offensive orchestrated by the FMG was swift, decisive, and brutal. The ensuing massacre of hundreds of civilians in the Mid-West was as a result of their tribal origins or affiliations.38 The Mid-Western Region, was populated by a significant proportion of Igbo tribesmen who historically originated from the Eastern region, as well as the Benin tribesmen, many of which were fluent in Eastern and Western local languages. The indiscriminate massacre of Mid-Westerners was essentially a policy characterised by widespread killings of individuals on the basis of their cultural heritage. One could reasonably argue that these killings were remarkably characteristic of genocide. One of the Counter-coup plotters of July 1966, Major Muritala Mohammed, (later Colonel in April 1968) was the head of 2nd Division at the time, and personally oversaw this ethnic cleansing in the Mid-West.39 A portion of an American diplomatic cable shown below, highlights the perception of the international community towards the FMG policy:

If the FMG overruns Biafra, at least some excesses against the Ibos are inevitable. However, the reports of international observers have stated that there is no evidence that the FMG is pursuing a policy of genocide. But there are historical reasons... for Ibo fears.40

1968-1969: Repercussions of Strategy

Through the latter months of 1967 up until March of 1968, the FMG carried out sustained military attacks against the Biafrans, capturing significant Biafran towns on the 12th and 14th of July 1967. In the Northern region, the 1st Division of the Nigerian Army, utilised the pre-existing soldiers stationed in the Middle-Belt Zones, to enforce a military blockade against the Eastern region. Most of the soldiers in the 1st Division were already accustomed to domestic warfare, as they had been actively engaged with UMBC supporters prior to the civil war.41 In the Mid-Western region, 2nd Division of the Nigerian Army were able to put down several Biafran offences, and on three occasions, launched an amphibious assault towards the town of Onitsha. 2nd Division sustained significant losses during all of their unsuccessful amphibious assaults, and eventually captured Onitsha, via assistance from 1st division, by advancing through the military blockade from the North.

For a brief period in the beginning of 1968, both the Nigerian and Biafran sides were unable to make significant advances, and there was a state of deadlock. However, after 2nd

38 Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, The Biafra War (The Edwin Mellen Press 1990)  
39 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence (Algora Pub 2009) p.170  
41 Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, The Biafra War (The Edwin Mellen Press 1990)
Division's successful advances in April 1968, the FMG was able to surround Biafra effectively. However, this blockade around Biafra was responsible for widespread civilian casualties from starvation.\textsuperscript{42} Increasing international pressure was ramped up against Nigeria's starvation strategy, as propaganda images were carefully constructed and promulgated by the Biafrans in international media. It appeared as though, the FMG was actively in support of suffocating Biafran civilians at all costs, and in response, some French medical practitioners travelled to Biafra, in order to provide independent humanitarian aid to Biafrans. Independent and critical of the Red-Cross, these doctors (who would form the famed ‘Doctors Without Borders' organisation two years later), were subjected to military attacks from the FMG, which were supported by Soviet airstrikes. As at the 20\textsuperscript{th} of October 1968, the FMG had successfully captured a number of Biafran strongholds, including Port-Harcourt city, Enugu city and the towns of Calabar and Bonny. The FMG also strategically focused on controlling territories where foreign oil companies were in operation. When oil installations were captured by the FMG, swift repairs were commenced to ramp up production and sales of oil. These sales were crucial in enabling the FMG to procure newer arms and equipment to sustain the offensive against Biafra. This strategy significantly weakened the Biafran side of the conflict, as they were essentially cut off from their economic assets, and forced to rely on foreign aid, which was in the most part, provided by France and Sweden.

Seemingly emboldened by their various strategies of isolating Biafra, the FMG attempted to overrun Biafra at the end of 1968, but was surprisingly faced with resistance from increasingly weakened and starved Biafrans. FMG offensives were effectively resisted by the Biafrans, and occasionally between 1968 and 1969 the Biafrans launched surprise strategic offensives against the FMG. Another dimension to this conflict which has received little attention was the plight of ethnic minorities in the Mid-Western regions. Various accounts from survivors of the war stated that the FMG indiscriminately targeted civilians who were caught in the cross-fire between Biafra and the FMG. In towns like Port-Harcourt for example, Saro-Wiwa documented that a majority of the inhabitants did not actively support either of the warring sides and were "treated as saboteurs, and so cruelly treated\textsuperscript{43} In Biafran strongholds, Russian military jets serving alongside the FMG were accused of indiscriminately bombing civilian centres.\textsuperscript{44} On the ground, a majority of civilians were killed, "not by bullet wounds but

\textsuperscript{43}Craig W McLuckie and Aubrey McPhail, \textit{Ken Saro-Wiwa} (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2000).
by cruel handling” 45 Individuals belonging to ethnic minority tribes were often suspected by both the FMG and Biafran soldiers of harbouring divided loyalties. These minority members were often blamed for successes gained by both of the warring sides. For example, on the 2nd of April 1968 some men belonging to the Ikun tribe (residing in Biafran territory) were suspected by Biafran soldiers of colluding with FMG soldiers and leaking vital information which could lead to military advances by the FMG. As a result of these suspicions, Biafran soldiers arrested Ikun tribesmen, looted their properties and allegedly raped Ikun tribeswomen. 46 It was also reported that Ikpeme tribesmen were routinely carted into what they described as concentration camps and severely maltreated. Even to the point that they were offered urine to drink when they requested water. 47 Nigerian troops were also undeniably ruthless in their manhandling of members of ethnic minority tribes. Nigerian soldiers were involved in the summary execution of individuals whom they believed had even the slightest sympathy for Biafran ideals, and in Biafran towns that were captured by Nigerian soldiers, lootings, rapes and arbitrary executions were the norm. 48 One of such examples, was the reported summary execution of about 2000 Efik tribesmen by Nigerian troops in the town of Calabar.49

1970: End of Secession

Increasing support for the FMG over the course of 1969, enabled more frequent offensives into Biafra. From the 23rd of December 1969, till the 6th January 1970, Col. Obasanjo led a final, sustained push into the Biafran town of Owerri. This manoeuvre, essentially split Biafran territory into two, and marked the beginning of Biafra’s demise. On the 8th of January 1970, it was reported that Ojukwu had fled the war, less than a week after Col. Obasanjo’s incursion into Biafra. Gen. Ojukwu handed over surrender responsibilities to his second in command, Phillip Effiong.

At forty minutes past four pm today Nigerian time, Africa’s worst war came to an end, that’s between Nigeria and breakaway Biafra. Major general Phillip Effiong, left in charge of Biafra when gen Ojukwu fled Sunday, announced the end on radio Biafra…He appealed to the federal military leader General Gowon, for a cease fire to negotiate a settlement within the framework of a united Nigeria. The war has lasted two and a half years, around two million

47 Ibid.
48 Donald Musgrave, ‘Priest Tells Of War Atrocities’ The Irish Times (1968)
49 Suzanne Cronje, “Two Levels of Truth’ Nigeria/Biafra April 1969
people have died. The peril that remains now is starvation of 4 million Biafrans or slaughter by federal troops.\(^{50}\)

The official date of Biafra’s surrender was on the 16th of January 1970. Footage of Effiong’s surrender statement was obtained by the researcher. Excerpts from this statement are below:

_I would like to take this formal opportunity to say that I, major general Phillip Effiong, officer administering the government of the republic of Biafra, now wish to make the following declaration. That we affirm that we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the federal military government of Nigeria. That we accept the existing administrative and political structure of the federation of Nigeria. That any future constitutional arrangement would be worked out by representatives of the people of Nigeria. That the republic of Biafra hereby ceases to exist._\(^{51}\)

Effiong’s official surrender statement was received by Gen. Gowon, at Dodan Barracks in Lagos, Nigeria. Gen. Gowon proceeded to make a statement following Effiong’s surrender:

_We have fought a long bitter battle, and it has ended in a victory for common sense, a victory for the unity of this country. And we have got cause to thank all the people of this country for what they have done, to help to keep this country one. I thank above all, the gallant officers and men who have given their lives that this nation might live. And we have with us today col. Obasanjo and unfortunately the other field commanders are not able to be with us at this moment._\(^{52}\)

Gowon pursued a policy of "no Victor, No Vanquished" after the end of the war. Within the framework of his policy, he refused to award FMG troops any special recognition medals for their participation in the war. He also ordered the release of Biafran prisoners of war, and the unconditional pardon of Biafran soldiers.\(^{53}\) One notable exception to his policy, was the former Biafran leader, Ojukwu. Ojukwu would remain in exile for twelve years. Gowon was subsequently ousted from power by another military coup, which occurred on the 29th of January 1975.

\(^{50}\) ‘Nigeria - End Of Civil War’ (YouTube, 2015) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P3MTW76o4_Y> accessed 14 April 2017

\(^{51}\) Ibid

\(^{52}\) Ibid

6.3 **Assessment Question 2 Orientation: Where Can One Observe the Presence of Inflationary Containment and Compression by the State?**

The occurrence of the First and Counter-Coups, signified a shift in the organisation at the helms of governance within the Nigerian state. The primary MNSA in existence during this period, was the Biafran MNSA, which was led by Ojukwu, and the Nigerian FMG led by Gowon. The designation of Biafra as an MNSA is based on the Nigerian State’s repeated condemnation of secessionist ideology and organisations. Although most scholastic literature identified Biafra as a self-proclaimed independent nation which waged war against the Nigerian state, the NSSP theoretical framework focuses on the description of Biafrans which was promulgated by the Nigerian State. The Nigerian State never recognised Biafra as an independent or sovereign nation, instead, Biafra was seen as a political entity which sought to undermine the territorial sovereignty and unity of Nigeria. Easterners that resided within Biafran controlled territory were described by the Nigerian state as Nigerians in need of emancipation from Biafran suppression. Therefore, within the NSSP theoretical framework, actions taken by the FMG against Biafra, are categorised as State behaviour against a perceived MNSA. These actions would be analysed in this second assessment question, with specific focus on the location where they occurred, for an observer to gain further insight with regards to the Orientation of Nigerian NSSP during the secession case-study period.

The killing of an overwhelming number of Easterners in the latter half of 1966 was carried out by disgruntled Northern soldiers, as well as Northern civilians. It must be noted that, the riots in *Sabon Garis* in the Northern region, which initiated the subsequent evacuation of over a million refugees to the Eastern region, was not as a result of a directive issued by Gowon. However, it is very likely that such widespread violence was a result of complacency by the Nigerian state. Also, Nigerian military personnel involved in the violence against Easterners, carried out their actions without any fears of sanctions or reprisals from the Nigerian State. Although it was recorded that Gowon repeatedly called for cessation of violence against the Easterners, there is no evidence which proves that he took any tangible action to curb the ensuing violence. Instead, what followed Gowon’s announcements was the intensification of violence against the Easterners from September to October 1966. The lack of any form of actual intervention against the violence was perhaps directly responsible for the emergence of Biafra as an MNSA in the first place. With these considerations in mind, an

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observer must be aware of the fact that Northern soldiers engaged in violence against Easterners in 1966, were not acting under any specific orders from the Nigerian State, as was the case against the UMBC in the Middle-Belt zones in the formation case-study. Therefore, these episodes of violence should not be considered as the implementation of Nigerian NSSP.

6.4 Research Findings: Assessment of Orientation

Within the secession case-study, instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression were predominantly within Nigerian territory, with the exception of the Aburi conference in Ghana, which is a neighbouring State. Therefore, in utilising Orientation as an independent variable within the NSSP theoretical framework, it must be noted that Nigeria was essentially an Introverted State. Below, is a measurement scale of Nigeria's orientation during the Secession period. Notable instances wherein the Nigerian government operationalised Inflationary Containment, and Compression are cited56:

Table 9. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Occurrence</th>
<th>Introverted</th>
<th>Extroverted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Territory</td>
<td>Neighbouring State</td>
<td>Sub-Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instances of Occurrence</td>
<td>Negotiations between FMG and Eastern Region, Lagos. Jul-Oct 1966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Release of Chief Awolowo, Lagos.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiations between SMC and Ojukwu, Ghana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1967</td>
<td>Negotiations between Solicitors-General. Mid-Western Region,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56 See note 42 in Chapter 5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1967</td>
<td>FMG Division of Eastern Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1967</td>
<td>FMG threat of ‘Police Action’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1967</td>
<td>Military Offensive against Biafra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1967</td>
<td>FMG Military blockade of Biafra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1967</td>
<td>FMG Ethnic Cleansing of Mid-West region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>FMG Military Blockade of Biafra</td>
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<td>FMG Military Offensives against Biafra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>FMG Military Offensives against Biafra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1970</td>
<td>FMG Military Offensives against Biafra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The NSSP assessment of Nigerian Orientation therefore, begins with the Nigerian State’s attempts at negotiation with delegates from the Eastern region in the period spanning July to October of 1966. These negotiations are included in Nigerian NSSP strategy as they were a consequence of directives issued by the FMG to embark on a peaceful settlement to the crises. The meeting held on the 9th of August in Lagos between representatives of the FMG and Eastern delegates, is identified as behaviour which was representative of state interests and
therefore documented as state behaviour. All of the meetings between the FMG and the Eastern region occurred within Nigerian territory in 1966.\textsuperscript{57}

The deterioration of relations between the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and Ojukwu, in addition to the escalation of violence against Easterners within Nigeria, meant that the SMC was unable to organise meetings with all its members present. The SMC’s decision to meet in a conference in Aburi, was significant as it was the first time in Nigeria’s history that it would attempt strategy against an MNSA outside Nigerian territory.\textsuperscript{58} It also signified Ghana’s willingness to act as a facilitator for dialogue, to solve internal issues of its neighbour state. The subsequent meeting between Solicitors-General of the regions which occurred on the 14th and 15th of January 1967, is documented as state behaviour within Nigerian territory as it occurred in the Mid-Western region of Nigeria. All other documented instances of Inflationary Containment or Compression carried out by the Nigerian State against Biafra, occurred within Nigerian territory. Therefore, a culmination of observed state behaviour within the Secession case study, suggests that the Nigerian NSSP remained \textit{Introverted} in its Orientation.

6.5 \textbf{Assessment Question 3 (Inflationary Containment): What Referent Objects within reach of the MNSA have been observed to be granted priority by the State?}

As was carried out in the Formation case-study period, identifying the Prioritised Referent Objects of Nigeria’s NSSP within the NSSP theoretical framework, is achieved through the application of a deductive process wherein the hierarchy of Referent Objects is introduced as a guide to identifying Prioritised Referent Objects. Referent Objects within this case study, refers to what the Nigerian government considered valuable enough to warrant the prioritised, conscious and continuous provision of Security, from threats posed by Biafra as its perceived Malicious Non-State Actor. It was clear during the first assessment question that the Nigerian government considered the withdrawal of the Eastern region from the country as a source of concern. The Nigerian government, unlike in the Formation case study, however, did not seem to be in the position to immediately identify key influential individuals as responsible for the perpetuation of political violence. This was because, in the secession case-study, it is arguable that the Nigerian government was involved in the promulgation of political instability, as shall be revealed in this assessment. Biafra as an MNSA proximally interacted with Nigerian

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL Republic Of Biafra} (\textit{Africafederation.net}, 2017) \texttt{<http://africafederation.net/Biafra_Military_docs.htm>} accessed 03 October 2016.

\textsuperscript{58} Max Siollun, \textit{Oil, Politics and Violence} (Algora Pub 2009) p.150
Citizens as well as Nigerian Interests such as Territory, Sovereignty, Economic Assets and the SMC. Once again, the superimposition of the hierarchy of referent objects serves as an aid in deciphering which of the aforementioned interests the Nigerian government had prioritised, above other considerations.

Any satisfactory inquiry into the focus of Nigeria's Inflationary Containment in this case-study period must take the nature of governance into consideration. Therefore, analysing the circumstances which enabled the emergence of a military dictatorship in the first place, enables an observer to fully comprehend the full spectrum of considerations which the FMG utilised to justify its actions. Considering that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) emerged as a consequence of the inadequacies which plagued the NPC led government of 1960-65, the relegation of the role of popular legitimacy in Nigerian governance during the period, was the most conspicuous ideological shift. Nigerian NSSP was already Interest-Centric in the Formation case-study, and these interests were protected by the NPC-led government, in an increasingly militarised fashion. With various regions of the country already accustomed to emergency rule (even under a democratic government), the transition into a military dictatorship from the Formation period through the Secession period, was hardly surprising. Arguably, neither was the occurrence of a counter-coup, which was spurred by underlying tribal tensions.

MNSA designation by the FMG government in the Secession case-study was remarkably similar to MNSA designation by the NPC-led government in the Formation case-study. MNSAs in both case studies were; A political movement, hoping for emancipation from central rule, spurred by feelings of marginalisation of an ethnic group or region, championed by an organisation willing to utilise violence in response to military suppression. Another similarity between both case studies, was that leaders of MNSAs were individuals who embodied the aspirations of a particular ethnic group or geo-political region, to be more included in governance. These MNSA leaders believed that they had exhausted all legitimate avenues to achieve their aspirations, and resorted to unconventional means of challenging the government in question. Tarka championing the emancipation of the Middle-Belt Zones (Tiv tribesmen), Awolowo championing the emancipation of the Western region (Yoruba tribesmen), and Ojukwu championing the emancipation of the Eastern Region (Igbo tribesmen). The power struggles over control of the military between Gowon and Ojukwu, were reminiscent of power struggles which occurred between the President Azikiwe and Prime-Minister Balewa in the Formation case-study. But, as the focus of the NSSP theoretical framework is on observed state
behaviour, this assessment focuses on the considerations of the State apparatus, and the strategic means which were utilised.

At the tail-end of the Formation case-study period, individuals within the Nigerian military had become increasingly allergic to the nature of NPC-led governance. In addition, the proximity of military personnel to strategic governmental establishments created a sort of familiarity between the military and these establishments. The Army was ever-present at polling booths, as Aides de Camps of various senior politicians, as security providers within governmental buildings, as enforcers of the NPC’s political will in areas of political violence, and as recipients of aggression from the civilian population which believed that military intervention was necessary to cleanse Nigerian government of corruption. The rationale promoted by the plotters of the eventual military coup of January 1966, shed light on the fact that these coup plotters, believed that they could annihilate the perpetrators of corruption within government, simply by killing individuals who held important positions within government and assuming their responsibilities. These coup plotters believed that their intervention, was in the interest of the general populace. However, the argument that these initial coup plotters represented a shift in Nigerian NSSP from Interest-centric to People-centric, is flawed. These coup plotters were not acting under the directives of the existing government, therefore, their actions cannot be categorised as representative of State behaviour or its NSSP.

Although the actions of the coup plotters enabled a military takeover of government by Aguyi-Ironsí, they failed to envisage the repercussions of the targeted assassinations of predominantly Northern and Western leaders, on the tribal balance of power which underscored Nigerian government at the time. Their actions catalysed the overt expression of tribal animosity, and Aguyi-Ironsí's life, and leadership of the country would be cut short as a result. In hindsight, these coup-plotters only facilitated the promulgation of an NSSP which was similar to that of the Formation case-study. By setting the precedent that the control of the Nigerian State was within reach of individuals, with the military capabilities to obtain it, it could be argued that these coup plotters inadvertently maintained the nature of Nigeria's Interest-Centric, Introverted and Constraining NSSP. Aguyi-Ironsí's short-lived government was preoccupied with putting down a military insurrection in the barracks, maintaining the perception of Aguyi-Ironsí's non-involvement with the coup plotters, and quelling widespread

59 Hilary M Njoku, A Tragedy Without Heroes (Fourth Dimension 1987) p.4
political violence from grieving supporters of the NPC-led government. All of which required the NSSP of the Formation case-study.

The Northern Counter-Coup of July 1966, facilitated Gowon’s ascension to power, but this coup was much more significant in many ways. This counter-coup represented Northern determination to retain their control of the country, and that this determination was (from their perspective) more important than the norms of military hierarchy in an authoritarian regime, and the continued existence of Easterners in Nigeria. Gowon’s ascension to power overtly dismissed the norms of seniority within the military, and as Ojukwu pointed out, confirmed the crucial role which tribal sentiments played in Nigerian governance. Therefore, like Aguyi-Ironsi, Gowon too inherited a country wherein the quelling of political violence, regime security and preservation of Nigeria as a single political entity, were priority concerns— even if it meant the slaughter of an uncountable number of Nigerian citizens.

Interest Centric Inflationary Containment

As it became increasingly clear that the prioritisation of the aforementioned interests over human life would become the norm during Gowon’s regime, the observer focused on identifying the specific interests which Nigerian NSSP prioritised.

The early days of Gowon’s regime in 1966, were characterised by wide scale violence against Easterners in the Northern and Western regions. The failure of Gowon to halt the continued persecution of the Easterners was regarded by many to be due to his lack of concern for the plights of the Easterners. From an observer's perspective, Gowon's failure to isolate FMG soldiers from Easterners in order to protect Eastern Nigerian's from violence, signified the de-prioritisation of humans within Nigeria's NSSP. Ojukwu’s relevance to Easterners was significantly increasing at this time, as he became increasingly explicit in his condemnation of the violence against his kinsmen. Ojukwu's overt criticism of Northern soldiers in general, and Gowon in particular, soon ignited the belief that he was one day going to attempt secession from Nigeria, or plot a coup. Ojukwu occupied an important position within the Nigerian State after Gowon became the Supreme Leader, as he (Ojukwu) remained the Military governor of the Eastern region, and was still a member of the Supreme Military Council. When Ojukwu proclaimed in mainstream media, that he had no intention to attack Northerners in Eastern territory even though he had “sufficient cause to retaliate” His statement was interpreted by Gowon and his supporters, that perhaps in the near future, he might be facing retaliation from
the East, and a possible ‘counter-counter-coup’. In addition, Ojukwu publicly challenged the legitimacy of Gowon’s government according to military hierarchy. Gradually, Ojukwu’s opinion alienated him from Gowon, and the persistent persecution of Easterners which Gowon failed to control, meant that Ojukwu might one day consider other strategies with which he could safeguard Easterners. These developments were interpreted by the SMC as precursors to the possibility of another military takeover enacted by dissidents within the military. As a result, regime security was a priority concern for the members of the SMC.

Gowon’s focus on attempting to facilitate dialogue between the SMC and Ojukwu, serves to illustrate that the Nigerian State viewed the cooperation of Ojukwu and the Eastern region at large, as important to the well-being of the country. However, it is more illustrative to note that all these attempts at negotiation by Gowon, were not followed up with tangible measures to stop the killings of Nigerian citizens. The negotiations were largely pursued by the FMG with the ultimate aim of stabilising the SMC. But, when it became clear that stabilisation of the ruling regime would not be possible until Ojukwu’s demands were met, interests in implementing the recommendations of negotiations waned. The subsequent failure of the Gowon regime to implement the recommendations of the Aburi conference, makes more logical sense, if an observer views the preservation of the SMC as the primary interest of the 1966 and 1967 negotiations. Therefore, it can be assessed that the preservation of the SMC’s regime was prioritised over the well-being of Nigerian, specifically Eastern citizens.

In addition, the discovery of oil in the Eastern region, played a crucial role in the nature of Nigerian NSSP in the secession period. The Nigerian State which was non-responsive to the plight of the Easterners, initiated strategic moves to secure the oil deposits which were in the Eastern Region. Gowon's demarcation of the Eastern Region into 3 States on the 27th of May 1967, set out to accomplish two things. Firstly, by demarcating the Regions into States, Gowon essentially abolished Ojukwu's formal role as the Governor of the Eastern region. Secondly, if Ojukwu was to remain as a Governor of one of the Four States, he would have lost effective control over most of the Eastern region, and would have had no jurisdiction over the oil producing states. This strategic move, could not have been interpreted as prioritising the lives of the Easterners, as they were still effectively being persecuted, and now, in addition to Eastern persecution, their claims over oil deposits had been nullified by Gowon.

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61 Daily Times, "East Won't Plan Attack" (1966)
Ojukwu's proclamation of Biafra's independence, three days after Gowon had demarcated the Region, was in direct opposition with the SMC's agenda for Nigeria. Ojukwu's proclamation, effectively meant that the FMG was able to then view Ojukwu and Easterners as an MNSA. Ojukwu's subsequent televised interview wherein he declared his readiness for war against the FMG, only helped to facilitate the FMG's categorisation of Easterners loyal to Ojukwu, as part and parcel of an MNSA. Gowon's reprisal statement created a clear demarcation of the Nigerian State from its prioritised MNSA, Biafra, and thus marked the beginning of the Nigerian Civil War.

The operationalisation of Gowon's 'Police Action' was brutal, and illustrative of the prioritisation of interests over human life, by the FMG. In Gowon's address, he narrated his rationale behind authorising a police action, stating that he was trying to stop the further fragmentation of Nigeria into 'mini-states' which would be nothing more than protectorates of foreign powers. He cited the promulgation of arms and ammunitions from these foreign powers as a development which would be detrimental to the well-being of Nigeria. During the operationalisation of Gowon's police action, one of the first strategic offensives initiated by the FMG was the establishment of a military blockade, which would effectively isolate Easterners from the rest of Nigeria. This blockade was extended to cordon off Airports, sea-ports as well as any forms of telecommunications within the region. The FMG was indiscriminate in its application of the blockade to include all of the Eastern territory, as there were no attempts to isolate its Nigerian citizens from Biafran control. Of course, this isolation would have been impossible, as most Easterners were better off allying with the Biafran MNSA, as the violence against Easterners, before the war, was carried out by FMG soldiers. Thus further illustrating that the Citizens of the country were not the FMG's prioritised concern.

The development of the military blockade, was optimised towards isolating the Biafran MNSA from sources of revenue, and from external contact. Oil companies which were established in the Eastern region, were the first to be isolated from Biafran influence. Focusing primarily on the recapture of Bonny Island from Ojukwu's control, as the presence of valuable shell-BP installations, and the island's strategic importance as a shipping route for oil exportation were prioritised concerns for the FMG. When the Biafran MNSA reacted to Gowon's police action with a military offensive to capture the Mid-Western region, the stability of FMG control over the remainder of Nigerian territory was in question. The FMG's swift

offensive to take back the Mid-Western region with brutal military force, on the 6th of July 1967, saw the indiscriminate massacre of Nigerian citizens in the Mid-Western Region by FMG troops, led by Murtala Mohammed. These widespread killings of Nigerian citizens, served to show the FMGs prioritisation of Territorial sovereignty over the lives of Nigerian citizens.  

As the FMG continued its conquests of Biafran-held territory in 1967 and 1968, this policy of ethnic cleansing was hardly discouraged. Nigerian soldiers were involved in looting, indiscriminate killing and rapes on a wide-scale. The military blockade was intensified at the beginning of 1968, wherein millions of Biafrans were subjected to a lack of food, water and basic supplies, as these goods were not permitted through the FMG's blockade. As the civilian death-toll rose, independent humanitarian organisations began establishing themselves in the Biafran-held territory with the purpose of alleviating as many civilians as possible. These organisations soon became aware of the harsh realities of FMG policy. On several occasions, the FMG carried out Russian facilitated airstrikes, which indiscriminately targeted civilian dwellings, and jeopardised the operations of humanitarian organisations in Biafran-held territory. Summary executions of captured civilians as well as even passive supporters of Biafra were the norm. These indiscriminate attacks by the FMG, continued until the end of the civil war, when Biafra as an MNSA was forced into submission.

6.6  **RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT**

In assessing the nature of Inflationary Containment, the identification of *Target Hardening* strategies as well as *Damage Mitigation* strategies on Referent Objects enable us to identify where the State’s Inflationary Containment is centred upon. In the secession case study, one can easily identify target hardening and damage mitigation strategies employed by the FMG, as optimised to protect Interest Referent Objects. As the Biafra MNSA developed and expanded, Nigeria's police action, its prioritised recapture of territory with significant assets, the indiscriminate killing of civilians, and its dismissal of recommendations devised during negotiations, vividly illustrate to an observer, that; Regime Security, Territorial Sovereignty, Valuable Assets and the Preservation of Nigeria as a single political entity, were the Prioritised Referent Objects.

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In light of the information gathered from the Secession case study, the measurement scale, which characterizes the focus of Inflationary Containment within Nigeria’s NSSP is represented below:\(^\text{67}\).

*Table 10. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inflationary Containment</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Release of Chief Awolowo, Lagos. 1966 -Regime Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiations between Solicitors-General. Mid-Western Region, Jan 1967 -Regime Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FMG Division of Eastern Region, May 1967 -Regime Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FMG threat of ‘Police Action’ May 1967-Territorial Sovereignty/Regime Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Offensive against Biafra, Jun 1967 -Territorial Sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FMG Military blockade of Biafra Jul 1967 -Territorial Sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{67}\) Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sovereignty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1967</td>
<td>FMG Ethnic Cleansing of Mid-West region</td>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>FMG Military Offensives against Biafra</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>FMG Military Blockade of Biafra</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>FMG Military Offensives against Biafra</td>
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<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>FMG Military Offensives against Biafra</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>FMG Military Offensives against Biafra</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In applying the measurement scale for Inflationary Containment, Nigerian NSSP during the Secession case study was greatly inclined towards the protection of Interests, with the dismissal of people as the core focus of Nigerian NSSP. As a result, NSSP during this case study period would be characterised as **Interest Centric**.

### 6.7 Assessment Question 4 (Compression): What Strategic Means have been Observed to be Repeatedly Utilised by the State to Eliminate the Vital Interests of the MNSA?

As was carried out in the Formation case-study, postulating this assessment question, serves as a means through which the observer can identify and document the strategic means with which the Nigerian state sought to extinguish the existence of its designated Malicious Non-State Actors. Compression of an MNSA is best achieved through the separation, isolation or elimination of the vital interests of an MNSA. These vital interests are the Core and Peripheral interests of an MNSA that, in a functional arrangement, ensures the continued existence of an MNSA as such. The Core interests of an MNSA are; Objectives and Personnel, whilst the peripheral interests of an MNSA are; Mobility, Communication and Supplies. Eliminating the Core interests of an MNSA, is a strategic move which offers definitive results.
in the compression of an MNSA. However, the elimination of peripheral MNSA interests, serves to limit the capability and willingness of an MNSA to continue its existence.

This postulated assessment question when asked within the context of the Secession case study, focuses on the strategic means which was operationalised against eliminating the organisational form, ideological motives and operational capability of Nigeria’s designated MNSA, Biafra. The step by step characterisation of the compressive severity of strategy against the vital interests of an MNSA, enables one to understand and characterise this facet of the NSSP dependent variable. This procedure is an essential step towards enabling an observer to determine whether the NSSP dependent variable is either; Constraining, meaning that case studies observed expose a continued reliance by the State on brute military force to physically eliminate MNSA personnel, Coercive, meaning that case studies highlight a reliance of the State on eliminating MNSA peripheral interests (Communication, mobility and supply) or Compelling, meaning that case studies observed expose a continued reliance on strategy aimed at eliminating MNSA Objectives, through the utilisation of compelling communication. This characterisation of severity is guided by the spectrum of compressive severity as proposed in the third chapter of this work.

*Figure 8. spectrum of Compressive Severity (Adapted).*
6.8 RESEARCH FINDINGS: ASSESSMENT OF COMPRESSION

August 1966 - May 1967

Before Ojukwu's declaration of Biafra as an independent state, 1966 saw the simultaneous occurrence of mass persecution and slaughter of Easterners at the hands of FMG soldiers at the grass-roots level, and numerous attempts at negotiation and reconciliation of Gowon and Ojukwu at the upper echelons of government. Earlier, the author made specific remarks with regards to the inclusion of negotiations attempted by the FMG, and the exclusion of the persecution of Easterners, in the application of the NSSP framework within August 1966 and May 1967. To reiterate, the author specifically noted that the various attempts at negotiation between Ojukwu and Gowon, were orchestrated and sanctioned by the FMG. Thus, the deliberate utilisation of negotiation by the FMG was an extension of Nigerian NSSP during this period, by virtue of its origins within the FMG. The persecution of Easterners at this time however, was openly condemned by the FMG, up until the beginning of the civil war. The observer believes that the FMG does bear responsibility for the behaviour of its foot-soldiers at the grassroots level during this period, but the inclusion of these sporadic orchestrated acts of violence within the NSSP assessment would be erroneous, as it did not represent an extension of any official FMG policy at the time. Even though the FMG could have been expected to ramp up its efforts in discouraging violence perpetrated by its foot-soldiers, we must be mindful of the fact that the most senior officials of FMG had only just assumed office due to the repercussions of the chaotic Northern Counter-coup, and a majority of FMG foot-soldiers were still actively acting as though the internal insurgency which started in July 1966, was still in effect.

Various negotiations between representatives of the FMG and the Eastern region were held between July and October 1966 in Lagos, Western Region. These meetings deliberated extensively upon means with which the FMG could quell the violence perpetrated by Northern soldiers against Eastern soldiers and civilians. For example, the numerous calls for the repatriation of all Nigerian soldiers to their regions of origin, were formally discussed within these meetings. These negotiations served as avenues through which the FMG could effectively maintain contact with Ojukwu who was still officially a member of the SMC. As one can recall, Ojukwu had refused to personally attend any SMC meetings for fears about his safety. Due to Ojukwu's concerns, the SMC agreed to meet on the 4th and 5th of January 1967 in Aburi, Ghana, where in-depth negotiations occurred. For the first time since the persecution of Easterners in
Nigeria, an SMC meeting with all members present, was held. These negotiations were essentially aimed at reconciling the interests of the regional military governors. In other words, Gowon and other members of the SMC attempted to pacify Ojukwu, and agree to terms upon which the future of Nigeria as a single entity would be based on. At this time, Ojukwu had not yet formally declared any interest to secede from Nigeria and Biafra as an MNSA was nonexistent per-se. However, it was apparent that a solution to the fragmentation of Nigeria had to be found, and urgently. Ojukwu's explicit condemnation of the FMG, had already made it clear that such an MNSA was a real possibility. These negotiations, were a pre-emptive means of extinguishing political Objectives which were needed to create the Biafra MNSA. Therefore, the Observer assesses that the Nigerian State, utilised negotiations as a means of neutralising the Objectives of Biafra MNSA during this period, and this strategy should be categorised as **Compelling Communication**.

Another notable strategy employed by the FMG occurred on the 27th of May 1967. Gowon announced the demarcation of Nigeria into States, which were carved out of the existing regions in an administrative overhaul. This demarcation of Nigeria was most interesting in the Eastern region, which was divided into 3 states. As pointed out in the previous assessment question, these states firstly abolished Ojukwu's formal position within the SMC, as Regional Military Governors would be replaced with State governors under Gowon's directive. Secondly, the geographic details of this demarcation showed that even if Ojukwu were to remain as governor of one of the states, he would have lost administrative control over a majority of the oil producing assets within the Eastern Region as a whole. This strategic move employed by the FMG, was meant to isolate Ojukwu from a variety of MNSA vital interests. Firstly, Ojukwu under this directive would have lost legitimate control over a majority of Nigerian civilians in the Eastern region, equating to a loss of MNSA Personnel. Secondly, Ojukwu would have lost access to oil deposits and valuable oil extracting installations, signifying a loss of Supply. Thirdly, Ojukwu would have possibly lost all administrative control, if he were not appointed Governor of any of the four states at all, equating to a loss of Personnel. Finally, new Military Governors who would have been appointed, would most likely have been from an infinitesimal portion of senior Eastern Officers, who were allies of Gowon, equating to a loss of Objective. This pre-emptive means of compression, was never operationalised. However, it did prove a credible strategic threat, which could have annihilated the Biafra MNSA. This is assessed by the observer as **Compelling Communication**.
Following Ojukwu’s declaration of Biafra as an independent state, Gowon issued threats of Police Actions, if any individuals or organisations were seen to be actively promoting the secession of any portion of Nigeria. Gowon’s threats were promptly ignored. Less than a week after the threats were issued, Biafra MNSA launched an offensive into the Mid-Western region. Although the threat of police action fell on deaf ears, it signified the end of Compelling Communication compression, and the beginning of the Nigerian civil war.

June 1967 - June 1968

Following Ojukwu’s declaration on the 30th of June 1967, the FMG moved to restrict all shipping to and from the Eastern region, which Biafra now claimed. This blockade, utilised soldiers already deployed in various regions of Nigeria, and was remarkably swift. The blockade essentially halted all traffic to and from Air-ports, sea-ports, postage and telecommunications. As Biafra moved to demonstrate control over Shell-BP installations, by demanding royalties from their establishments in the Eastern region, the FMG immediately increased the severity of the blockade to include the halting of oil tankers as well. The strategic importance of these installations was well understood by both the FMG and Biafra, hence, the decision on the FMG’s part to immediately reassert control over them. The observer assesses the initial implementation of this blockade, as a strategic means of isolating Core interests of Biafra, Personnel from Peripheral interests, Supply. As these strategic means were implemented directly against Biafra's supply, it is reasonable to categorise this form of compression as Coercive.

The FMG then proceeded to implement the aforementioned police action in order to recapture territories claimed by Biafra. On the 6th of July 1967, the FMG mobilised its 2nd division, beginning two years of sustained offensives by the FMG. This offensive saw the beginning of an unimaginably brutal, militarised strategy employed by the FMG. This sustained offensive initially led to the FMG’s recapture of Bonny island, in the River’s province. “This not only tightens the grip on the blockade and gives the Federal Government first footing in the Rivers province; it places in their hands the most valuable part of the Shell-BP installations, for the storage tanks, the pumping station and the tanker terminal are all at Bonny”68 Through the latter end of 1967, till July 1968 the FMG would soon be internationally identified as brutal and unforgiving in its strategy. The observer assesses that the FMG employed strategy primarily aimed at eliminating all MNSA personnel from Biafra-held

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68 Chibuike Ugochukwu Uche, Oil, British Interests And The Nigerian Civil War (2008)
territory. In the state of active warfare, all combatant MNSA personnel were to be shot on sight, and in many cases non-combatant MNSA faced the same fate. This strategy, falls explicitly on the Constraining end of the spectrum.

In the beginning of 1968, repercussions of the FMG’s blockade had filtered through international media. This blockade was responsible for the deaths and starvation of an overwhelming number of civilians in Biafran-held territory. This blockade was not only affecting peripheral interests of Biafra, but the direct elimination of MNSA personnel, at an overwhelming cost to civilians as well. As a result of these repercussions, the Observer assesses that FMG blockade strategy was on the Constraining end of compressive strategy.

July 1968 - August 1969

Biafra was virtually blocked off by the FMG by June 1969. The Compressive strategy of the FMG was successful in recapturing important Biafran strongholds, and by the 20th of October 1968, the FMG had managed to capture the towns of Port-Harcourt, Enugu, Calabar and Bonny, along with other numerous other villages. It was reported that by January of 1969, an estimated 1,000 children living in the Biafran-held territory were starving to death as a direct consequence of the FMG’s blockade. Representatives of the FMG were unambiguous in stating that they viewed starvation as a result of the blockade, as an acceptable weapon of warfare, and that the FMG was expected to continue utilising the blockade to its advantage – irrespective of collateral damage.69

The FMG’s strategy was criticised by a plethora of organisations, in light of the humanitarian crisis which its strategy was responsible for. Non-Governmental Organisations and religious organisations sympathised with victims of FMG strategy and subsequently intervened. These organisations intervened in the form of relief aid efforts to civilians in Biafran-held territory, and against the FMG's directives, began airlifting supplies to these territories. In an extension of FMG strategy, these airlifts were seen as allies helping of Biafra, and soon became legitimate targets for FMG soldiers. Numerous relief flights were shot down by the FMG, irrespective of the organisation they belonged to. A letter from the Joint Church Aid organisation to the U.S department of State, is illustrative of the frustration expressed by one of such relief organisations:

we are very aware of the fact that the FMG considers the Uli airstrip a military target. However, its nightly bombings have had little or no effect on the delivery of munitions. Instead, our pilots tell us...that the bombs carried by the Nigerian 'intruder' are deliberately directed toward the destruction of the relief aircraft. Within the past fortnight five of the church planes have been damaged by antipersonnel bombs dropped by the Nigerian bomber while they were being unloaded at Uli. Moreover, as I am sure you know or will be informed, the harassment is particularly directed toward the American crews and has been the principal reason for the resignation of three American pilots who considered the risks too great concerning their family responsibilities at home. It is estimated that more than 30 pilots and crew members were killed by FMG attacks on about ten different occasions. The FMG was unwilling to suspend its blockade because of the presence of humanitarian organisations, many of which the FMG considered to be clandestinely supplying arms and ammunition to Biafra, under the auspices of humanitarian aid. For the remainder of this period, the FMG continued its explicit, Constraining compression strategies.

September 1969 - January 1970

From September 1969 to January 1970, the FMG sustained all its strategic approaches, increasing the severity of the blockade and the frequency of offensives. Col. Olusegun Obasanjo eventually led a final sustained incursion into Biafran territory on the 6th of January 1970, when FMG troops were able to overrun the entirety of Biafran strongholds.

Table 11. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Constraining</th>
<th>Coercive</th>
<th>Compelling</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1966 –</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1967</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SMC and Ojukwu, Ghana. Jan 196771</td>
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<td>August 1966 –</td>
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<td>May 1967</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FMG and Eastern Region, Lagos. Jul-Oct 196672</td>
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71 Held on the 4th and 5th of January 1967 in Aburi, Ghana.
72 Referring to negotiations including that of the 9th of August 1966, which occurred on the same day as the massacre of Easterners in Lagos.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1966 – May 1967</td>
<td>Negotiations between Solicitors-General, Mid-Western Region, Jan 1967&lt;sup&gt;73&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1966 – May 1967</td>
<td>FMG Division of Eastern Region, May 1967&lt;sup&gt;74&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1966 – May 1967</td>
<td>FMG threat of ‘Police Action’ May 1967&lt;sup&gt;75&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1966 – May 1967</td>
<td>FMG Military Offensives against Biafra Jan -May 1967&lt;sup&gt;76&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 1967-June 1968</td>
<td>Military Offensive against Biafra, Jun 1967&lt;sup&gt;77&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 1967-June 1968</td>
<td>FMG Ethnic Cleansing of Mid-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>73</sup> A Follow-Up meeting wherein the finer points of the Aburi conference were discussed in detail by the solicitors general of the Regions.

<sup>74</sup> The FMG divided the entire country into twelve states. In the Eastern region, this division was interpreted by Ojukwu to be designed to forestall secession. The three states of the Eastern region 'mischievously' emphasised underlying tribal tensions between minority tribes in the Region. Especially the long-standing Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers animosity.

<sup>75</sup> The delay between the issue of the threat of police action and the action itself, suggests that this threat served an independent purpose to the operationalisation of police action. It was a further means through which Gowon could dissuade secessionists from operationalising their agendas. As one would recall, one of the resolutions of the Aburi conference, was that the FMG would not attempt to solve its 'problems' with force. Ojukwu perhaps thought that by persuading the FMG to denounce the use of force at the conference, subsequent secessionist movements would be exempt from the wrath of the FMG military.

<sup>76</sup> The operationalisation of the police action, was characterised by military offensives by the FMG, to regain territories held by the Biafra MNSA.

<sup>77</sup> The intensification of the brutality of the FMG military, signified the willingness of the FMG to utilise any strategy which it believed to be efficient in achieving its objectives, regardless of public perceptions about these means.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1968-August 1969</td>
<td>FMG Military Offensives against Humanitarian Organisations in Biafra 1968^79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1968-August 1969</td>
<td>FMG Military Blockade of Biafra 1968^80</td>
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</table>

Judging by instances of compression observed within the Secession case study, one can deduce that the Nigerian State, had evolved to become Constraining in its compression strategy against MNSAs. What is also evident from the data collected, is the more sudden intensification of compression strategy through the years. Initially, the Nigerian State sought to utilise more diplomatic, as well as tactical means (administrative reform), at delegitimising the positions of MNSA leaders, utilising strategy that could be viewed as equally affecting all regions of the country, to subliminally target Ojukwu's formal position of authority. However, the amount of popular support which Biafra MNSA received, especially from Easterners meant that the FMG viewed constraining compressive strategy as the most efficient means of neutralising Biafra MNSA. These successes of the Nigerian State, were characterised by significant blood-shed.

78 Murtala Mohammed, heading the 2 division, personally oversaw the ethnic cleansing of the Mid-Western region.  
80 Amid pressure from international NGOs the FMG remained resilient in its operationalisation of a total blockade to suffocate Biafra  
81 From September 1969 to January 1970, the FMG sustained all its strategic approaches, increasing the severity of the blockade and the frequency of offensives. Col. Olusegun Obasanjo eventually led a final sustained incursion into Biafran territory on the 6th of January 1970, when FMG troops were able to overrun the entirety of Biafran strongholds.
and violent repression of citizens within Nigerian territory. The implications of this episode in Nigeria's history, continues to influence Nigerian politics and governance today.

6.9 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY OF NIGERIA DURING THE “SECESSION PERIOD”

Based on State behaviour observed during this case study, it is reasonable for an observer to characterise Nigeria’s National Security Strategic Personality, as Introverted in its outlook, Interest-Centric in its provision, and Constraining in its severity.

Table 12. Dependent Variable Measurement: Compression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Inflationary Containment</th>
<th>Compression</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introverted</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Constraining*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extroverted</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
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</tbody>
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6.10 CONCLUSION

Much like the previous chapter, the author set out to perform an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory, through the utilisation of the case-study methods of analysis, which investigated the interactions between the Nigerian state, and its perceived Malicious Non-State Actors, which were present from 1967-1970. The author was able to reasonably identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian State, as Introverted, Interest-Centric and Constraining. Drawing from this conclusion, the following dynamics were granted deeper insight. At the start of the secession case study, the Nigerian military had already been increasingly identified by the civilian populace and political elite, as an independent political actor, capable of influencing the formation and execution of Nigeria’s national interests. As a result of this new social identity, the Nigerian military acted in accordance with accompanying expectations of such an actor. However, upon attaining complete control over the Nigerian State, the tribal, hierarchical and ethical dynamics within Military as an institution, had direct ramifications upon the events that occurred in the Nigerian state. The perceptions (prior to the military takeover of government) that the Nigerian military was somehow distanced from the tribal and hierarchical dynamics of the Nigerian state, were erroneous. What was observed instead, was that the tribal and hierarchical dynamics within the
Nigerian military, were almost identical to those dynamics within the civilian government. The military was not truly independent of tribalism, nepotism and corruption, and these were to be exposed during the recurrent conflicts of interests within the upper echelons the military, the resulted in repeated coups. Perhaps, these aforementioned dynamics would have only influenced the leadership of the military, had the military not been in control of the Nigerian state. The consequent marginalisation of Easterners, and their designation as an MNSA by the Military-run government, were merely symptoms of pre-existing tensions in the military. The consequent direction, and operationalisation of Nigerian NSSP was principally determined by these interests. In addition, the essentially brutal campaigns by the Military-run Nigerian state, against Easterners, signified a crystallisation of brute physical force, as an acceptable form of social behaviour, by the Nigerian military. It suffices to assume, that such a brutal campaign against Easterners might not have been carried out by other ruling institutions such as the NPC, who had not been explicitly associated with brute military force as an acceptable form of social behaviour. In the next chapter, the author would highlight the lasting effects of identities and norms constructed during the formation and secession periods, on the Nigerian state from 1970 to 1999.

In addition to the aforementioned insights, the following methodological observations were also made;

Recalling the challenges which the author faced with regards to data collection in the Formation case study, the same could be said about the Secession case study. In attempting to observe all instances of observable state behaviour during this period, the author realised that secondary sources of data would be required to augment the scarcity of primary data. However, unlike the Formation case study, the author was able to access much more information, as a result of international media coverage and independent accounts of the civil war. This enabled the author to offer a comprehensive account of events that occurred during the secession period. The availability of data spanning this period, also enabled the author to observe if the NSSP theory, would remain effective even with the inclusion of significantly larger instances of observable state behaviour. The next chapter surveys the influence of Nigerian NSSP from the Formation and Secession periods, on Nigeria from 1970-1999. Within this survey, the author tracks the evolution of the Nigerian state, with specific focus on its leadership structure, as well as its NSSP.
7 CHAPTER SEVEN: LASTING EFFECTS OF FORMATION AND SECESSION ON THE NIGERIAN STATE, FROM 1970 TO 1999

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Insights gained from the Formation and Secession case studies played a crucial role in the author's analysis of the Nigerian State from 1970-1999 in this chapter. This chapter highlights the evolution of the Nigerian State's leadership structure, the social construction of the Nigerian military as a central actor in Nigerian politics, the normalisation of compressive strategy, and the influence of popular legitimacy on the State, from 1970 to 1999. In light of Nigeria’s NSSP as understood from the preceding case studies within this period, this chapter, then surveys Nigerian NSSP from the end of the Nigerian civil war, through to the fourth republic, citing notable incidents throughout Nigeria's history which indicate periods of constancy and change in Nigerian NSSP.

7.2 NIGERIA FROM 1970-1979

7.2.1.1.1 Yakubu Gowon

With the Biafran MNSA compressed in 1970, Nigeria was able to refocus on the development of the country in other respects. Under Gowon's leadership, it was believed that Nigeria finally had the chance to achieve its potential as an African super-power. Gowon's victory over the Biafrans, ushered in a period wherein National unity was at unprecedented levels, and popular opinion concerning Nigeria's strategic outlook was optimistic.\(^1\) This new phase, enabled the promulgation of a centralised power structure, which was acceptable to a majority of Nigerians. By this time Gowon who had been in power for four years, was enjoying unprecedented support from the people. The Supreme Military Council "was...in fact, little more than a ratificatory organ"\(^2\) His magnanimous no-victor, no-vanquished policy was instrumental in regaining the support of the Easterners, whom he had brutalised during the war.\(^3\) This policy was of phenomenal utility to Gowon, who needed to be perceived as an acceptable and sympathetic leader, embodying the identity of the Nigerian military as a legitimate and capable determinant of Nigeria’s national interests, in order to preserve such a

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\(^1\) Sunday Times, ‘UK Papers Eat Their Words’ (1970)
\(^3\) Daily Times, ‘Let’s Put The Past Crisis Behind Us’ (1970)
centralised government. Nigeria genuinely had a chance to reverse the mistakes of its immediate past and pursue a new course.

Gowon’s new image also depended on his ability to remain quite pro-active over the next few years of his regime. He actively ensured that there was no retaliation against Easterners for their participation in the war. He also provided funds for Eastern rehabilitation, which were entrusted to Chief Obafemi Awolowo (a previous MNSA leader, whom he had released from prison before the war). In the same vein, He went further to announce that Nigeria would soon be returned to civilian rule in 1976. Another important development credited to Gowon, was the creation of the Nigerian National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). An institution which was created to facilitate the ideology of National unity in the younger generation.⁴ The NYSC scheme, was targeted at recent graduates of Nigerian universities, whom were subjected to a year-long compulsory service in the country. This scheme was designed in a way that, young university graduates had to undertake their national service in a region other than that of their origin, to facilitate the integration of Nigerians from various tribes. This is an institution which still exists today.

Gowon facilitated Nigeria's timely membership of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971, in order to acclimatise the country with the global oil markets.⁵ In a way, this was to ensure that Nigeria's oil production would be guaranteed a share in the world's oil markets. In his string of unprecedented moves, he also created the very first indigenous Nigerian currency, called the Naira. This was in an attempt to ensure that the Nigerian economy had developed its own identity and independence, whilst severing all remaining dependent ties with the British economy in particular, and colonial powers in general. Following the indigenisation of the Nigerian currency, the prompt indigenisation of the economy at large was his next step. He declared the Enterprises Decree of 1972, which saw the country reduce the shares of foreign companies in the economy to acceptable minimums. It must be noted that the Nigerian economy was predominantly occupied by foreign companies at the time, with British companies owning a lion’s-share of the oil economy. In addition, several American, Syrian, Lebanese and Indian companies dominated Nigeria's markets and manufacturing industry, with about 65% of the economy belonging to these foreign interests. Of course, this foreign dominance of the Nigerian economy was the subject of widespread

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resentment of Foreign Direct Investment in the country. This Enterprise decree essentially forced foreign companies to sell a majority of their shares to Nigerians, and Section 12 of this decree, subsequently limited foreign equity participation to 60%.\textsuperscript{6}

Following Nigeria's membership of OPEC, the Yom Kippur war was started by Syria and Egypt. This war was influential in destabilising global oil markets, as Western support for Israel was met with negative reception from Arab countries. The Arab oil-producing states imposed an embargo on oil exports, subsequently causing global scarcity of oil. Seventy percent of oil exports had been removed from the global economy. Nigeria was quick to capitalise on this scarcity, promptly increasing productivity to meet world demands. This scarcity also increased the price of oil by almost 400%, resulting in incredible profits for Nigeria.\textsuperscript{7}

The impression that Nigeria was still essentially under a military dictatorship, became more apparent, as the unprecedented profits that Nigeria was amassing during the oil boom, did come with negative implications for the leadership structure. Gowon's government demonstrated that it was capable of just as much corruption as the civilian government which Aguyi-Ironsì deposed.\textsuperscript{8} The mismanagement of national income was made possible when the Nigerian State announced a massive N2,625b (that’s 2.6 Trillion Naira) annual budget. These expenditures facilitated the squander of oil revenues by senior military officials, and elite politicians. For the average Nigerian, the benefits of such a massive budget only had minimal effect, as the proportion squandered by the Nigerian elite, meant that national projects and schemes were left underfunded. In addition, the foreign companies that were nationalised, were promptly swept up my members of the political and military elite, who utilised the proceeds from the sale of oil to buy the majority of shares in foreign companies operating in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{9}

Interestingly, the wealth of several elite Nigerian families today can be traced back to the indigenisation decree of 1973, which benefitted them. The Easterners, specifically Igbo tribesmen, were unable to participate in this windfall of profits however. As one would recall, Chief Awolowo was the finance minister, and in charge of funds earmarked for Eastern rehabilitation. Awolowo utilised his position as finance minister for the enrichment of himself and his peers, to the disadvantage of Easterners. The Easterners after the civil war, were unable to reclaim their wealth which was left behind in Nigerian banks prior to their exit from Nigeria.

\textsuperscript{6} Sunday Times, ‘UK Papers Eat Their Words’ (1970)
\textsuperscript{7} Daily Times, ‘Boom Boom Boom’ (1973)
\textsuperscript{8} Daily Times, ‘Biggest Budget Ever’ (1974)
\textsuperscript{9} Daily Times, ‘Govt Buys 35 Per Cent Shell BP Assets’ (1974)
and Awolowo was instrumental in elongating investigations into the repatriation of Eastern wealth. These delays resulted in a majority of Easterners losing their wealth and forced them to start from scratch. Awolowo essentially forced Easterners to forfeit all this wealth, which was also redistributed to his Northern and Western comrades.\(^{10}\)

Also at this time, the Nigerian State was observed to have identified an Extremist MNSA, operating within Nigerian territory. Maitatsine. By 1973, a religious extremist popularly known as Marwa, had been the subject of low-level policing in the Northern region, owing to his leadership of a religious extremist group known as Maitatsine. Maitatsine was essentially an Islamic extremist group, which was most notable for its violent intimidation of Nigerian citizens in the Northern Nigerian city of Kano. During previous administrations, Marwa had repeatedly been arrested, detained and deported by the NPC-led regime.\(^{11}\) However, Marwa's activities were not observed to be prioritised in a manner which was anywhere as significant as AG and UMBC prioritisation. Marwa only served numerous, short prison sentences for his activities. Marwa and his followers were simply not viewed as a threat requiring significant attention, and this led to his recurrent release from police custody in 1962 and 1966.\(^{12}\) Gowon's regime, for the first time in 1973, pursued Maitatsine MNSA after it had been preoccupied with Biafra MNSA from 1967-1970, and Marwa was arrested and detained in 1973, re-released, and then detained in 1975. However, Maitatsine activities should have received far more attention from the FMG, as it gained popularity within the Northern region, and many civilians were aware of its notoriety.\(^{13}\) It is very probable, that Maitatsine activities between 1975 and 1980, were left unchecked, as the FMG was then preoccupied with the looming instability within the SMC, which led to the next military coup.

On the 1st of October 1974, Gowon announced in his Independence Day speech, that he had reneged on his promise to return Nigeria to civilian rule in 1976. He instead promised a return of Nigeria to civilian rule in 1979, thereby elongating his tenure as Supreme commander. This decision was met with negative reactions, as it was believed that most probably, Gowon would postpone the handover to civilian leadership again after 1979. It only took three months

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for Gowon's decision to negatively impact his regime. He was subsequently overthrown in a bloodless coup on the 29th of January 1975, by Murtala Mohammed, whilst he was attending an African Union meeting.

Like Aguyi-Ironsì, Gowon's overthrow was effected by his head of personal security, (who was also commander of the Brigade of Guards) Col. Joseph Garba. "A bloodless coup which overthrew the nine-year-old government of gen Yakubu Gowon took place yesterday" In a newspaper article published by the Daily Times on the 30th of January 1975, the details of the coup gradually sifted through to the Nigerian public: “in a dawn announcement over the network of radio Nigeria, the commander of the brigade of guards, col. Joseph Garba, announced that gen Yakubu Gowon had been removed as head of state and commander in chief of the Armed forces”\textsuperscript{14}. This coup signified the end of a 9-year military dictatorship by Gowon, and ushered in a new phase of military leadership under Murtala Mohammed. A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on the entire country by Murtala to ensure that there were no reprisal attacks by supporters of Gowon. Gowon, away at the African Union summit, declined to make any comments about the development and subsequently lived in exile in the United Kingdom.

7.2.1.1.2 Murtala Mohammed

This coup which ousted Gowon, was unique in the fact that it was an entirely bloodless coup, an unprecedented development in Nigeria's history of coups. The coup was carried out by the same man who was instrumental in the overthrow of Aguyi-Ironsì, and was the ruthless commander of 2nd division during the civil war -Murtala Mohammed.

Gowon's overthrow was also the first time in Nigeria's history, whereby the military government was overthrown by another senior officer. Murtala by virtue of this, set a precedent which would be repeated by other senior military officers. In order to ensure that there was not a self-perpetuating military government in power, Murtala was obliged to share power with another Northerner, and Westerner. These two officers were Brigadiers Olusegun Obasanjo (the commander who led the final push into Biafran-held territories in the civil war), and Theophilus Danjuma (another individual who was influential in the first military coup). This coup was instrumental in perpetuating the Northern-Western domination of the country, with the Northerners wielding the most political power, and the Westerners acting as their subordinates. In a statement wherein Murtala addressed the nation after his takeover, he said:

\textsuperscript{14} Daily Times, ‘Coup No.3 In Nigeria’ (1975)
Fellow Nigerians, events of the past few years have indicated that despite our great human and material resources, the government has not been able to fulfil the legitimate expectations of our people. Nigeria has been left to drift. This situation if not arrested, would inevitably have resulted in chaos and even bloodshed. In the endeavour to build a strong united and virile nation, Nigerians have shed much blood. The thought of further bloodshed for whatever reasons, must I’m sure be revolting to our people.\textsuperscript{15}

Murtala subsequently enforced the forceful retirement of all senior military officials, and elite politicians from political power. Forceful retirement and a purge of all senior politicians, was also unprecedented. Because of this cleansing, his coup was viewed by Nigerians as a revolution of the masses, opposed to the power structure which Nigeria had become accustomed to from 1960-1975. There was only one individual from Gowon's supreme military council who was allowed to continue in this capacity, and that was Brigadier I.D. Bissala. Bissala who was the Commander of the Nigerian Defence Academy, would subsequently demonstrate why this was a fatal mistake on Murtala's part. Murtala also enforced investigations into all senior politicians he had deposed; perusing through their financial transactions and ethical conduct while they were serving under Gowon. He aimed to halt the mismanagement of the proceeds from Nigeria's oil-boom, and redirect these profits to the average citizen. In addition, he declared that the military abstain from all forms of ostentatious behaviour, and civilian suppression. As a result of all Murtala's declarations, he enjoyed the popular support of an overwhelming number of Nigerians. It is interesting to note that Nigerians viewed him so positively, considering how instrumental he was to the ethnic cleansing of Easterners during the civil war. Murtala frequently professed that all actions taken by his government were guided by a determination to alleviate the sufferings of average Nigerians:

\begin{quote}
...By the timely intervention of the armed forces, the people of Nigeria, have another opportunity to start again in the task of rebuilding the nation...\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

In a recently declassified memo of the United States, State department, Murtala was viewed by the American government as follows:

\begin{quote}
The leader of the coup against General Yakubu Gowon is an erratic, vainglorious, impetuous, corrupt, vindictive, intelligent, articulate, daring Hausa. Brigadier Murtala Mohammed was a prime force in the Nigerian coup of July 1966, which brought Gowon to power, and is one of the two principal plotters against Gowon for the past two years. He commanded a division during the Nigerian civil war, and was involved in the only documented cases of
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ifeoha Azikiwe, Nigeria, Echoes Of A Century (AuthorHouse 2013).}
\footnote{Ifeoha Azikiwe, Nigeria, Echoes Of A Century (AuthorHouse 2013).}
\end{footnotes}
genocide, won one important battle, and thereafter coasted upwards of two years until Gowon finally removed him from command and placed him in charge of Army signals, a position which he held until last month, though he combined his military role with the civilian position of commissioner (minister) of communications from July 1973, until the coup. 17

7.2.1.1.3 Olusegun Obasanjo

Whether Murtala’s declarations of overwhelming reform were truth, or mere fiction designed at garnering popular support, would remain unknown, because Murtala’s leadership of the country was cut short by an abortive coup, which occurred on the 13th of February 1976 -barely a year after he took over from Gowon. This day marked the fourth military coup in Nigeria. Murtala was assassinated on his way to work by shooters, who riddled his car with bullets whilst he was in traffic, without his security detail. The plotters also had plans to assassinate Obasanjo and Danjuma, but were unsuccessful. Obasanjo and Danjuma, promptly organised reprisal attacks led by Col. Babangida, to ensure that the coup plotters were tracked down.

In the meantime, a replacement was required after Murtala’s death. Northern politicians and officers insisted that he be replaced by a Northerner, to maintain Northern dominance. Murtala’s position was offered to Danjuma, but for some reason, he refused this offer and instead recommended that Obasanjo be appointed as a replacement. Obasanjo was installed as Supreme commander. To ensure Northern consolidation of power, another Northerner was required to share power with Obasanjo and Danjuma. As a result, Lt. Col. Yar’adua was promoted to become the third member of the trio. The coup plotters were tracked down by Col. Babangida, and the FMG published information confirming the events which led to the coup.

The daily Times reported that: “The Federal Government has launched full-scale probes into last Friday’s abortive coup. An official statement last night said a six-man military board of inquiry had been set up and had begun work.” 18 The main assailant, who led the abortive coup, was identified as Lt. Col Dimka, a Northerner. “Lieutenant colonel B.S Dimka the army officer who led last Friday’s abortive coup in which general Murtala Mohammed was killed, is now on the run” 19 Subsequent statements released by the press narrated how Dimka was able to assassinate Murtala: “The fugitive B.S Dimka is related to General Gowon by

19 Daily Times, ‘Dimka Wanted’ (1976)
The Federal Government said yesterday that Kwara state police commissioner S.K. Dimka and Lt. Col. B.S Dimka are related and that General Gowon's elder sister is the wife of the police commissioner...the government said that for all practical purposes, the intention of Lt. Col. Dimka was to restore General Gowon and he ousted state governors to power...it however, gave the assurance that the futile coup had neither religious nor ethnic motivation”

These news reports insinuated that General Gowon who was living in exile in the United Kingdom, was instrumental in orchestrating the coup, calling on loyal members of his deposed government to eliminate the new government. The press statements suggested that Gowon had given direct orders to Lt. Col. Dimka, whilst Dimka was on a foreign assignment:

The leader of the abortive coup, Lt. Col Dimka had been in touch with Gen. Gowon for some time before last Friday’s attempted coup, the Federal Government said in Lagos yesterday

Yar'adua also narrated the coup plots which they had uncovered from their investigation, suggesting that there was more than one group of coup plotters, with the aim of assassinating Murtala and others:

The coup was originally conceived as a major's plot in Kaduna, during a conversion exercise which brought a number of these plotters together. An inner circle of three, started these discussions. Their main grievances at the time centred around the conversion exercise itself...this group headed by Major...was extended to include other similar disgruntled elements. Simultaneously, Bissala on his own started a similar group also mainly composed of disgruntled elements of the ranks of Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels. The two groups soon got to know of their mutual existence. It was around this time that Dimka travelled to Madrid on official duties, he was then invited to spend a few days in London on his way back... for further discussions. While there Dimka met and held discussions with General Gowon who told him that everything was ready and he Dimka would be fully briefed by Bissala on his return to Nigeria

Although Yar’Adua had narrated the FMG’s version of events which led to the abortive coup, the authenticity of Yar’Adua’s claims are questionable. Nevertheless, Nigerian citizens were shocked at Gowon's involvement in the bloody coup. In the same vein Brig. Bisalla had been the only person allowed to stay in Murtala's government, from Gowon's government. The only link to Gowon's government turned out to be all that was needed for Murtala's downfall. Bisalla however, cited the perceived neglect of his office as Defence Minister, which created

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20 Daily Times, ‘Dimka Gowon Related By Marriage’ (1976)
21 Daily Times, ‘Demon In Touch With Gen Gowon’ (1976)
the impression that there was no need for his appointment in the SMC, thus his reason for involvement in the failed coup.\textsuperscript{23}

The new SMC leaders were intent on making a ruthless example of the coup plotters, to discourage any further attempts by others to emulate their actions. As an example, the coup plotters were subsequently executed by firing squad in public view. Obasanjo, then went on to ensure that Murtala's leadership agenda was fulfilled, with the inclusion of handing over government to civilian leadership in 1979.

\textbf{7.2.1.2 1979-1989}

7.2.1.2.1 Shehu Shagari

On the 1\textsuperscript{st} of October 1979, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was sworn in as Nigeria's president, and Obasanjo returned the military to the barracks. In line with Nigeria's existing power structure, Shagari was a Northerner. This handover by Obasanjo to Shagari, marked the beginning of what we consider to be the Second Nigerian Republic. As usual, the overwhelming majority of Nigerians welcomed this development and the mood was optimistic once again, as was evidenced by the numerous festivities which were held to mark Shagari's victory. Shagari's government however, proved to be as corrupt as its predecessors, and political violence, protests and allegations of government corruption was the norm during this period. One notable development in Nigeria's power structure, was the fact that Arc. Alex Ekwueme, an Easterner was elected as Vice-President. This signified the very first time in more than a decade, that an Easterner occupied such an executive post in the country, and represented what seemed to be a Northern-Eastern partnership.

However, in addition to government corruption and the mismanagement of national income, this civilian government was just as brutal and repressive as the military dictatorships prior to it. Individuals who were critical of the government, were promptly silenced by the Nigerian police force, on the orders of the President. This suppression went as far as censoring musicians who were critical of the government in song.\textsuperscript{24} One of such notable musicians who were critical of the government was Fela Anikulapo Kuti. Nigerians were already accustomed to this suppression, however, Fela was remarkably resilient to government persecution. In one

\textsuperscript{24} Evening Times, ‘Fela’s Son Beaten Up At Net Office’ (1979)
of his interviews, Fela brought attention to the physical nature of government brutality, after
he was released from police detention. Fela was quoted as saying:

One thing I want to assure them, if they think I'm gonna change or compromise
in my attitude in my way of life or in my expression or in my goal towards
politics, they're making me stronger...I'm surprised I'm so well after the beating
I got...you want to see the beating, I must show you...they can't kill me

Fela's plight was not unique to him, however, because of his considerable popularity, Nigerians
soon became aware of the repercussions of speaking against the Nigerian State.

At the same time, global oil prices were drastically sliding as a result of an oil glut.
Nigeria suffered as a result of this slump in oil prices, and soon entered an economic recession.
This economic recession was a driver for political violence as daily life became more difficult
for the already struggling average Nigerian. Notwithstanding, Nigerian political and military
elite continued to live lives of unimaginable luxury, in the face of recession. The distribution
of wealth between rich and poor within the country was widening significantly, and many
Nigerians were aware of this inequality.

Meanwhile, in the Northern Region, religious fundamentalism went unchecked. The
Maitatsine MNSA had enjoyed 5 years of virtually uninterrupted operation. This MNSA was
able to expand from a core followership of under 2,000 personnel in 1975, to almost 12,000 in
1980. Such an alarming expansion of an MNSA went mostly undetected, as the FMG was
preoccupied with house-keeping, coup foiling and dissent within the SMC. Maitastine
personnel were blatantly in control of swaths of territory within the city of Kano, and residents
of that city were routinely subjected to violent acts carried out by the MNSA.

By the time Shagari's government would enforce an order to ban all public processions by Maitastine on
the 18th of December 1980, it was perhaps too little, too late. Policemen who were sent to
enforce the order were significantly outmanned and outgunned. A few of the Police officers
lost their lives in the confrontation, and Maitatsine MNSA subsequently utilised police
equipment and weapons to wreak havoc in Kano. The siege of Fagge mosque in Kano which
lasted from the 18th of December, to the 30th of December 1980, served as an example of just

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25 The Punch, ‘Fela Charged With Robbery’ 1979)
26 Ibid
27 Paul Lubeck, "Islamic Protest Under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: Yan-Tatsine explained" (1985) 55 Journal of
the International African Institute
Affairs.
29 Toyin Falola p.155
how ruthless and violent this sect was.\textsuperscript{30} Only after this episode of violence, was the Nigerian Army called upon by the government to compress Maitatsine. The Army subsequently moved in quell the violence, with brute military force. Marwa, during this episode, was fatally injured from gunshot wounds which he sustained from the confrontation with the Army.

In 1983, a development quite similar to the persecution of Easterners in 1966, began to filter through international media. Nigerians were quick to blame the influx of foreign migrant labour as the reason for the persistent economic recession. During the oil boom, Nigeria witnessed the influx of millions of Africans, specifically from its neighbouring country of Ghana. These Ghanaians like other Africans, were attracted to the significant wealth created by Nigeria during the boom. What was unimaginable, was the violent backlash these immigrants would soon face during the recession. Nigerians became infuriated by the presence of Ghanaians living within the country, and blamed them for 'taking all our jobs'. This rhetoric was also supported by the Nigerian government, which promptly ordered the deportation of about 900,000 undocumented Ghanaians within the country.\textsuperscript{31}

In what can only be described as a flawed political move by Shagari's government, almost a thousand Maitatsine prisoners were released along with other political prisoners on Nigeria's Independence Day celebrations of 1982. It remains unclear why these prisoners were released. Almost immediately, Maitatsine MNSA resumed its attacks on civilians, in the city of Maiduguri and Kaduna, with a total death-toll ranging from at least 3,700 people to 4,000.\textsuperscript{32} However, the expulsion of Ghanaians seemed to be granted priority, and soon took a xenophobic turn. In addition to illegal migrants in Nigeria, even legal migrants were subject to harassment and abuse by members of the public. Some of these Ghanaians were beaten up by civilians as well as officers of the Nigerian Police Force, if they could not present their immigration documents upon request. In total an overwhelming 1.7 million Africans fled from Nigeria so as to avoid brutality at the hands of Nigerians.

The internal situation in Nigeria was rapidly deteriorating, due to the economy showing little signs of recovering from the recession. To the Northerners, Maitatsine attacks were left uncontrolled by the government, which only intervened with periodic reprisal attacks against


\textsuperscript{32} Toyin Falola, \textit{Violence In Nigeria} (University of Rochester Press 2009).
the sect. In 1983, another presidential election was held following the expiration of Shagari’s tenure. Shagari had become a very unpopular leader, and the prospects of him winning the 1983 elections were thin. However, when the results were announced that Shagari had won the elections with an overwhelming victory, it was difficult to ignore the political violence, voter intimidation and ballot-box stuffing that influenced the election results. Nigerians who refused to accept the election results, promptly turned to violence and numerous riots engulfed the country. Despite the opposition to his government, Shagari chose to stay in power. On the 1st of October 1983, Shagari was sworn in for his second term in office.

This tenure did not last very long. On the 31st of December 1983, Nigeria witnessed its fifth military coup. The leader of this coup, was Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, a military officer who had been involved in all military coups since 1966 with the exception of the 4th abortive coup. Buhari was also a Northerner. In his first address to the Nation, Buhari had this to say:

*Indiscipline, corruption, squandermania, misuse and abuse of public offices for self or group aggrandisement, which had assumed debilitating proportions in the last few years will be dealt with ruthlessly no matter who ever may have been involved*[^33]

He further went on to state that:

*The private sector has also its share of crimes against the Nigerian economy. Especially in the area of distribution of basic commodities. Reports reaching us confirm large-scale hoarding of commodities. I have already warned that hoarding will not be tolerated. Gentlemen, I must point out that your assignment as military governors is a service posting. You are therefore subject to redeployment at any time...*[^34]

7.2.1.2.2 Muhammadu Buhari

Buhari’s coup, was similar to Murtala’s coup in two respects. Firstly, Buhari forced the resignation of Shagari, as Murtala did to Gowon. Secondly, Buhari and Murtala both orchestrated and directly benefitted from the coup, as opposed to the Jan 1966 and Jul 1966 coups, where middle-ranking officers orchestrated coups which subsequently benefitted higher ranking officers; thereby fuelling the belief that, firstly, if one aspired to overthrow government

in Nigeria, one had to be part of the Military elite. Secondly, it became obvious that the leader who was being deposed did not necessarily have to be killed - just forced to resign.

Buhari was regarded as an uncompromising and ruthless military officer, who had stayed on the side-lines in many of the coups prior to his takeover. He was the first Military leader of the country, to declare a war against an idea. He called it 'the War Against Indiscipline'. Buhari was seconded by his deputy leader, Major-General Tunde Idiagbon (a Westerner), who was also notoriously popular for his heavy handed approach to issues. Idiagbon, formally declared a war against indiscipline, and outlined the government's plan of action in this war:

_I want you to bear in mind, the need to emphasise self-discipline, and leadership by good example. Begin my drawing public attention, to little but important...manifestations of indiscipline, such as rushing into buses, driving on the wrong side of the road...littering...cheating, taking undue advantage of scarcity to inflate prices for quick monetary gains, constituting ourselves into public nuisances, working without commitment and devoting little or no time to the upbringing of our children. Up till this time there has been no formal declaration of war against indiscipline. It is my pleasure therefore to declare today, the launching day for the war against indiscipline._

Buhari's Implementation of this campaign was brutal. Considering the numerous issues which the government considered to be within its jurisdiction, such as the use of militarised means to fight an economic crisis and intrude on personal affairs of Nigerians, this was a bizarre development - even for a country where the bizarre had become the norm. One could argue that this turn of events, echo Mbembe’s ideas regarding the banality of power in post-colonies._

Government was very unpopular amongst Nigerians who had become accustomed to everyday manifestations of corruption and disorder. Numerous individuals were arrested without trial, and critics were brutalised. In many instances politicians were detained without trial, and the prospects of them having their day in court, simply did not exist.

In March 1984, Maitatsine MNSA still proved to be a lethal organisation, involved in the massacre of upwards of 600 people, in the town of Yola. Buhari's government sent in the Nigerian Army to quell the violence, and eliminate any Maitatsine MNSA on sight. Buhari’s

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36 See: Achille Mbembe, ‘Provisional Notes on the Postcolony’ (1992) 1 Africa
37 Evening Times, “We Must Fight Indiscipline” (1983)
38 Toyin Falola, Violence In Nigeria (University of Rochester Press 2009).
39 Toyin Falola, Violence In Nigeria (University of Rochester Press 2009).
hard-handed military response, was eventually effective at permanently dismantling Maitatsine MNSA subsequently in 1985.

On the 17th of April 1984, Buhari passed decree no. 4, which was the ‘public officer’s protection against false accusation decree’.

This decree made it virtually impossible to be openly critical of the government's policies. In many cases, anyone who spoke negatively about the government, was arrested and detained by virtue of this decree. The Buhari government went as far as attempting to kidnap an individual from the United Kingdom, to bring him back to Nigeria to face corruption charges. Umaru Dikko was allegedly wanted for the theft of over 1 billion dollars from the Nigerian government. For a government that claimed to be fighting corruption, Umaru Dikko’s kidnap attempt, signified a blatant disrespect for international laws and conventions. The kidnap attempt was outsourced to Israeli mercenaries, who were paid to snatch Dikko, inject him with sedatives, haul him to London Stanstead airport, and stuff him into diplomatic cargo on a Nigerian Airways flight bound for Lagos.

This kidnap attempt was discovered by UK officials, who claimed that they heard noises from inside the diplomatic cargo which was not adequately labelled as such. Cmdr. William Hucklesby, then Head of Scotland yard spoke on the issue in an interview to British press. After only 20 months in power, the Buhari government was toppled in a palace coup.

7.2.1.2.3 Ibrahim Babangida

This was Nigeria's 6th military coup. Members of the SMC were concerned about the nature of the repressive government, and admittedly, Buhari was not admired for his unsophisticated style of leadership. The main coup plotter was General Ibrahim Babangida (the Colonel who was in charge of investigating the perpetrators of the abortive coup). In August of 1985, Babangida (a Northerner) had managed to force Buhari and Idiagbon to resign, following the new style of coups which Nigeria had become accustomed to. Babangida became the Head of State. He renamed the Supreme Military Council, to the Armed Forces Ruling Council of Nigeria. This change of name was required as Babangida broke all existing protocol in his configuration of the council. He essentially created a cartel-style government, wherein he was only surrounded by loyalists, in an attempt to ensure that he was not ousted by another coup, as Gowon and Buhari had been ousted by insiders within the SMC.

41 Alex Last, ‘The Foiled Kidnap Plot (BBC News 2012)’ <www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20211380>
In his opening statement to the country, Babangida announced his agenda, which was in no way unique to all agendas announced by his predecessors, except for the fact that he promised to ensure the freedom of the press; a promise which, in hindsight, was never kept:

*I am pleased to take this opportunity, to declare once again therefore, that this administration attaches the greatest importance to constructive and helpful criticisms as well as the freedom of the press. And to declare further that the admin also attaches the greatest importance of fundamental human rights*\(^{42}\)

### 7.2.1.3 1989-1999

#### 7.2.1.3.1 Ibrahim Babangida

This string of successive coups, had become the norm in the Nigerian State. Ever since the first military coup, Nigerian officers were well aware of the requirements to obtain the title of Supreme Commander or Head of State. All that was required was for one to be a member of the Nigerian Military, specifically the Army, and orchestrate the assassination of, or force the resignation of the current military leader - usually at gunpoint. The idea of discipline within the country was merely the rationale to explain the brutalisation of Nigerians by the Nigerian Military and Police Force. Larry Diamond of Stanford University, commented on the repercussions of the successive coups, and the lack of discipline within Nigeria, on its youth.

> The most successful people in the country, tend to be those who have accumulated their fortunes in corrupt means. And therefore young people, students and other immigrants take their cue, from that sort of social structure"\(^{43}\)

For most of Babangida's leadership, he was concerned with personal enrichment and the longevity of his regime. There were hardly any noticeable developments, except for his introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986, which was very poorly received by the general public, as it was a measure designed by the International Monetary Fund, as an austerity programme, which saw the earnings of a majority of Nigerians lose significant value.\(^{44}\) It appeared that his maintenance of the status-quo in Nigeria, was a strategic means of staying in power.

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In 1992 however, Babangida announced the return to civilian rule by 1993. He was instrumental in the creation of two political parties, namely the Social Democratic Party and the National Republican Convention - Two parties that were almost indistinguishable in terms of their ideology or ethnic makeup. On the 12th of June 1993, both parties contested in a presidential election. Subsequently, it was presumed that an individual named Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola (a Westerner), was the winner of the presidential elections. To Nigerians' surprise, Babangida stepped in and annulled the election results, and held on to Nigerian leadership. This unprecedented move sparked public outrage (which had become the norm), and there were violent demonstrations all over the country. The intensity of public outrage was not easy to ignore. Abiola had been very active in openly criticising Babangida, and criss-crossed the country, proclaiming himself as the President of Nigeria. Abiola was quoted as proclaiming in an interview: "I challenge General Babangida, to walk on any street in Nigeria with me without security, and see how long it will take... [Stammering] before people actually lynch him. That is the type of leader Babangida is..."\(^45\)

Babangida actively orchestrated the elimination of influential Nigerians, either by threatening these individuals with treason charges, or forcing them to flee overseas for fears of their personal safety. Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka was one of such notable personalities.\(^46\) Babangida's downfall was not necessarily as a result of him losing popular support. He in no way required that to stay in power. Rather, it was the amount of popular support which Abiola received, that made Babangida's position as Head of State untenable. As a result of Abiola's reprisals and speeches, the Armed Forces Ruling Council forced Babangida to resign from office.

7.2.1.3.2 Earnest Shonekan

In Babangida's resignation, he installed an individual, Chief Earnest Shonekan (a Westerner) as Interim President, on the 26th of August 1993, to lead the Interim National Government. As Shonekan's Minister of Defence, an individual named General Sani Abacha (a Northerner), occupied perhaps the most powerful position in cabinet. Abiola remained very active in his campaign against the government, and refused to recognise Shonekan's presidency, referring to it as a sham. Abiola's supporters were vehemently against this

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installation as well. In the meantime, Gen. Abacha was making plans of his own to take over power from the civilian government.

7.2.1.3.3 Sani Abacha

These plans materialised on the 17th of November 1993, when Abacha forced Shonekan's resignation (following the new style of coups) and took over power for himself, after only three months of civilian rule. Abacha established the Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria, and in an administrative overhaul, also created a cartel-style government, populated with only loyalists. Abacha's opening statements, were a sign of the brutality that would follow. Without caring for elaborate speeches and promises, he proclaimed:

*This regime will be firm, humane and decisive. We will not condone any acts of indiscipline. Any attempt to test our will, will be decisively dealt with*\(^{47}\)

And so, Nigeria entered another five years of a brutal military dictatorship, which was unrivalled in its history. Arbitrary arrests and detention were the norm, and there were persistent rumours of torture and inhumane treatment in Abacha's detention camps. Abacha, in December of 1993 created Decree 107, a decree which essentially made him sovereign, with the powers to create and abolish laws without any other individual's approval. Abacha was also swift in detaining Abiola, who was still actively proclaiming himself the president of Nigeria. In June of 1994, Abiola was arrested, while on the phone to a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) journalist. Excerpts from the phone call are represented below:

*I am being arrested... I'm just going out now with the police...there is a large crowd here...I am being escorted out to detention , by singing the national anthem... they are arresting me on the allegation of namely treason or something like that..."*\(^{48}\)

When asked by the journalist why he was still allowed to be on the phone with the BBC, Abiola replied: "*they have come to arrest me, not to arrest my mouth. It is all part of democracy here...I am not in any way disturbed by it...any sacrifice is in order, if it would bring democracy, peace and prosperity to Nigeria..."* The journalist then proceeded to ask Abiola how he felt about the arrest. Abiola replied: "*well, Mandela was in jail for 27 years, Kenyatta was in jail, I suppose that is one of the qualifications you need in this part of the world, don’t*


worry yourself my friend”⁴⁹ Abiola would subsequently die in detention, four years later. Other notable personalities who were arrested and detained by Abacha were, Gen. Obasanjo, on the 15th of March 1995, along with Gen Yar'adua, who died in detention. Human rights activist and author, Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was hanged on the 10th of November 1995, with eight other activists.

Abacha's government was also allegedly involved in the targeted assassination of political critics, utilising explosives, with 18 such incidents taking place between May of 1995 and April of 1998.⁵⁰ Abacha was undeterred by public opinion within and outside Nigeria, and remained in power until his death on the 8th of June 1998. Abacha died of a heart-attack. A Northerner, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, was selected as chairman of the Provisional Ruling Council.

7.2.1.3.4 Abdulsalami Abubakar

Following Abacha's demise, Nigerian Nobel Laureate Prof Wole Soyinka was quick to charge the interim government, specifically Gen. Abubakar, to return Nigeria to civilian rule. Speaking to the Cable News Network (CNN):

*The struggle on the democratic front against Abacha has not been against him personally, but against military dictatorship... there is only one course for the military to follow. That is to understand that they now have a graceful, very fortunate way of retreating to the barracks. And allowing the will of the Nigerian people to go forward*”⁵¹

Abdulsalami Abubakar, promptly responded to calls for him to return Nigeria to civilian leadership, and on the 15th of June 1998, Abubakar released all political prisoners from detention. One notable personality released, was Obasanjo (a former military Head of State), who subsequently won the presidential elections of February 1999. On the 29th of May 1999, Obasanjo was sworn in as Nigeria's civilian president.

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⁵⁰ Frank Osanugor argued that at least 18 bombing incidents were attributable to Abacha's government between May 1995 and April 1998. See; Frank Sochukwu Osanugor, *Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience (1995-1998)* (Advent Communications ltd. 2004)

7.3 INSIGHTS FROM 1970-1999

Following Nigeria's independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, the newly formed government operated a parliamentary system of government. As mentioned in the fifth chapter, there were three major political parties headed by influential Nigerian political leaders at the time - The three political parties in existence, which constituted this parliament, were the Northern People's Congress (NPC) with 134 seats, The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) with 89 seats, and the Action Group (AG) with 73 seats. However, Nigeria's parliamentary system would have seemed somewhat alien, as the configuration of parliament reflected an underlying tribal system which was still very influential at the time. The overwhelming majority of seats were taken up by the NPC, which was mostly a pro-Northern party. NPC dominance was significant to the observer because it aided the delineation of the core state apparatus from MNSAs. This delineation required an in-depth understanding of the division of political power within the country, which could be gained by a scholastic investigation into archives, newspapers and other sources. Within the NPC party, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and Sir Tafawa Balewa were identified as the most influential personalities and wielded the most political power. The broader implications of this power dynamic became apparent when NPC dominance in the political scene was taken into account. Sir Balewa and Sir Bello were the most influential individuals in Nigeria during the Formation case-study, because of the power they possessed within the most powerful political party in Nigeria. Accordingly, Sir Bello was the Northern Premier, and Sir Balewa was the Prime-Minister -both Northerners.

For the most part, Nigeria's system of government only represented an avenue through which its former colonial masters could maintain formal contact and trade with its previously established assets in the country. Therefore, when tribal sentiments began to play an overt role in Nigerian governance, attention was focused on the manifestation of tribalism in the highest echelons of government, where these tensions were perceived as possible threats to the continuous link between former colonial powers and their assets in Nigeria. The manifestations of tribal tensions at the grassroots level however, were considered to be of little consequence if they did not jeopardise the existing post-colonial dynamic.

The interests of power structures identified both within and outside of Nigeria pointed towards the expectation of Nigeria to remain as a single political entity, maintaining the borders created by colonial masters in its sub-region. In addition, if the post-colonial dynamic was to be preserved and developed predictably, individuals who were already familiar faces, serving in various governmental posts during colonial rule, were to remain within Nigerian
government, in a way guiding the newly independent country during its formative years. Unsurprisingly, the champions of Nigerian independence (whom most Nigerians today refer to as the founding fathers of Nigeria) either served in one capacity or another during colonial rule, or were involved in negotiating the terms of Nigeria's independence from the United Kingdom. The noticeable absence of an inclusive democratic political system in Nigeria before independence, would have made it unfeasible, even nearly impossible for popular legitimacy to have been granted to these founding fathers to represent Nigeria's interests in the first place. Thus the foundations of elitist politics in Nigeria had been established, and this influenced the Nature of Nigerian leadership from the period spanning 1970-1999.

The Nigerian State through 1970-1999, was characterised by the centralised nature of Nigeria's power structure, which enabled the personalisation of state power by successive rulers. These rulers ultimately determined the political entities that were treated as MNSAs during this period. This centralised style of leadership, largely remained unchanged in the periods following the Nigerian civil war, and explains why certain MNSAs such as Maitatsine were able to operate and expand undetected, in comparison to those such as Biafra, AG or UMBC.

One factor, which was very evident through surveying Nigeria's leadership structure, was the deliberate preservation of Northern domination. Although Gowon's attempts at enhancing tribal integration with his introduction of the NYSC program seemed laudable, equal participation of individuals from different regions, was absent in Nigeria's leadership. Cohesion barely transcended tribal lines. Notably, none of the military coups were actually carried out by Easterners of Westerners. Westerners' participation in military regimes, were determined by the Northern beneficiaries of the coups. One exception to Northern dominance during military leadership, was Obasanjo, who was only made Head of State after the demise of Murtala, and Danjuma's rejection of the position. The balance of Northern and Western interests at the centre, conspicuously excluded the East -with the exception of Arc. Ekwueme's tenure as Vice-President (and subordinate to Shagari). The table below shows the distribution of leadership, from 1960-1999.52

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52 This table only includes Nigerian leaders, who were also Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Hence Dr. Azikiwe's absence.
As the table shows, the leadership structure remained to the disadvantage of the Easterners, who lacked adequate representation of their interests throughout this period. In many ways, this alienation of Easterners from central political power, represented the preservation of social realities, which met the Easterners with suspicion, and as distinctly outside the interests of preserving Nigeria as a unified political entity. The persistence of Northern domination during this period, was representative of the lack of interest in diversifying political norms which would result in a balanced sharing of political power, in the absence of an inclusive political system. Riots and political violence in various regions of the country, had little or no effect in facilitating any political change, and it appeared that such change remained impossible from outside the upper echelons of government. The Nigerian State essentially remained a coalition of the most powerful individuals within the political elite, with the authority to enforce their will through the utilisation of coercion vis-à-vis the Nigerian Military and the Police Force.

The execution of military coups by middle ranking officials, remained a persistent feature from 1966-1976. These coups served to merely facilitate the transfer of state power, from the civilian political elite, to the military elite, or from one Senior Military official to another. None of the coups, facilitated a transfer of power from a senior military official to a lower-ranking
official, or from the military elite, to civilians. From 1976 however, military coups were executed by their benefactors, thereby enabling the personalisation of state power by the benefactors of coups:

Table 14. Coup Executors versus Benefactors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Coup</th>
<th>Executed By</th>
<th>Benefactor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These dynamics created by elitist politics, meant that the role of citizenry in Nigeria's political process was already relegated before Nigeria gained independence. It was only a matter of time before the average Nigerian understood that their administration had merely been transferred from foreign colonial masters to Nigerian elites who harboured similar interests to those of colonial masters. During the formation period, the observer witnessed the gradual unravelling of this post-colonial arrangement, on two fronts. Firstly, the tribal divide inherent in Nigerian politics meant that there was little or no hope for any form of political cohesion that transcended tribal lines - bar the occasional political alliances of parties to win a majority of seats in Nigerian parliament. Secondly, a class divide meant that only the political elite could afford to influence the political processes in Nigeria, as they had most likely served within the colonial government which granted them means and considerable influence in comparison to the average Nigerian. These divides were to the disadvantage of the average Nigerian, as the riots in the Western Region and the Middle-Belt Zones highlighted. It seemed that no matter how much the average Nigerian campaigned, change was simply impossible from outside the upper echelons of government.
The Nigerian State, therefore, was identified as the coalition of the most powerful individuals within the political elite, with authority to enforce their will through the utilisation of coercion vis-à-vis the Nigerian Military and the Police Force. As a result, less influential individuals resorted to the organisation of Nigerian citizens as Personnel of MNSAs. These MNSAs were headed by disenfranchised members of the political elite, articulating the concerns of their tribal kinsmen, utilising extrajudicial means. These MNSAs were made possible, because of the existence of individuals such as Awolowo and Tarka accentuating the tribal divides, and exploiting class divisions. Awolowo, Tarka and other MNSA leaders were viewed by average Nigerians as being one of the few individuals capable of influencing governance to the advantage of the average Nigerian, as a result of their familiarity with Nigerian elites. The subsequent suppression of these MNSAs by the Nigerian state, however, further destabilised Nigeria as a whole, and crushed the belief that average Nigerians could achieve their political objectives if they were to rally around influential individuals and remain persistent. As a by-product of the militarised suppression of MNSAs by the Nigerian State during the formation period, the Nigerian military was ever-present at polling booths, as Aides de Camps of various senior politicians, as security providers within governmental buildings, as enforcers of the Nigerian State’s will in areas of political violence.

7.3.1 Military Preservation of Civilian Elitism

It came as no surprise that the military became aware of its importance in determining the strategic interests of the government, and subsequently capitalised on this. The fact that middle-ranking officers of the Nigerian military sought to eliminate all individuals which they believed to be part of the political elite, represented another dimension of the class struggle. Notably, whilst most senior politicians in Nigeria during the Formation and Secession period were part and parcel of the elite, progression within the Nigerian army, up until the first military coup, was based on merit and military hierarchy. This realisation serves as a reasonable explanation for the reception of the first military coup, as average Nigerians believed that the coup was a revolution, representing the extermination of the political elite, which were seen as remnants of colonial powers. The downside of this dimension of the class struggle, was the failure on the part of these middle-ranking officers to fully appreciate the roles of senior military officials within the Nigerian power structure. Being in a senior military position, required frequent contact with the political elite, at formal meetings as well as social gatherings. This frequent contact with the political elite blurred the class stratification (if it were to be called so) Individuals who occupied these senior military positions, such as Aguyi-Irons, were
an example of this. Prior to his assumption of leadership of the county, Aguyi-Ironsi was ever present at state functions, private gatherings and informal meetings. He was also a close friend of Sir. Ahmadu Bello, and was opposed to the coup as it unfolded. The introduction of military coups by middle-ranking officials, served to merely facilitate the transfer of state power, from the civilian political elite, to the military elite, whom politicians were familiar with. A transfer which in reality, did little to eliminate the elitist dimension of Nigerian politics. This transfer of political power within the elitist echelons of Nigerian politics, was only neutralised by the counter-coup. Therefore, as at August 1966, the Nigerian State was structurally configured as a Military Dictatorship, which suspended the 1960 Nigerian constitution. It was primarily governed by the Supreme Military Council, which was comprised of ten positions, all of which oversaw specific facets of governance. This structure of leadership was devised by Aguyi-Ironsi. The Supreme Military Council, reported directly to Lt. Col. Gowon. By virtue of this leadership structure, Gowon’s occupation immediately assimilated him with elitist politics, and politicians, and the interests of the SMC remained quite similar to those of the NPC-led government. As a result, the Nigerian NSSP was observed to remain constant, as the SMC remained pre-occupied with ensuring national unity, and watching over its shoulder to discourage dissent within the military, which could lead to another coup. With the exception of compression strategy, the NSSP of the Formation and Secession Case studies remained largely the same, as the actual power structure which was facilitated by tribal considerations and elitism, remained unchanged. Gowon, like Balewa, was an individual wielding enormous power within his Northern party, (considering that the military was acutely divided along ethnic lines) who then transposed this influence to lead the entirety of Nigeria.

The incursion of the Nigerian military into politics, hardly changed the social realities of the average citizen. All that was accomplished by the initial coup plotters, was the facilitation of a transfer of political power from the civilian to the military elites. The initial coup plotters failed to envisage the repercussions of the targeted assassinations of influential individuals from specific tribes, as they inadvertently interfered with the fragile tribal balance of power which underscored Nigerian government in both case studies. Through this period, a new precedent was established. This precedent, demonstrated that the assumption of Nigerian leadership, was possible through violence and blood-shed. In addition to the implications of the class divide in Nigeria, the underlying tribal tensions in Nigerian politics, and the possibility of assuming territorial control within the country through blood-shed, Nigerian NSSP through
this period could be reasonably described as conforming to the Introverted, Interest-centric, Constraining model, in line with Nigerian NSSP during the Formation and Secession periods
8 Chapter Eight: The Explosion Case Study 2009-2014

This period of analysis, investigated the nature of Nigerian NSSP in the face of the emergence of various perceived MNSAs within its borders. Nigerian NSSP in this period was analysed in light of the observations made concerning Nigerian NSSP prior to this chapter. This case study was unique in the sense that it witnessed the simultaneous explosion of tribal tensions which plagued the Formation and Secession periods, religious extremism which was resurgent through the formation period to 1999 and militant agitations for resource control, which were highlighted during the Nigerian Civil War.

8.1 Assessment Question 1 - Delineating between the State and its Proposed MNSAs

The State

As at January 2009, The Federal Government of Nigeria operated a federal system of government. Nigeria made up of 36 states headed by Governors. These states were carved out of its regions, and share sovereignty with the Federal Government. In addition to the 36 States, Nigeria also possesses a Federal Capital Territory which is administered by the Federal Government, through a Minister for the Federal Capital Territory. Nigeria's President and Commander in Chief at the time, was Alhaji. Umaru Yar'Adua, a Northerner, who was democratically elected in 2007. Yar'Adua exercised executive powers, and was head of government. Following Yar'Adua's death in 2010, he was replaced by his deputy, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who led the country as the Acting-President until his election April 2011, after which he led the country as President until May 2015.

Malicious Non-State Actors

2009 was a unique year in Nigeria's history. This year, saw the full-blown emergence of Islamist Jihadism in the country. This year was explicitly selected by the author to begin this case-study period, as it witnessed the simultaneous mitigation of an already identified MNSA (MEND), and the identification of a new, and even more violent MNSA (Boko-Haram). The Nigerian government was essentially fighting two wars within its territorial borders. Both of which, were very different manifestations of similar underlying socio-economic and political inadequacies, which have plagued Nigeria from as far back as the Formation case-study.
From the Period spanning 2009-2014, Nigeria identified MNSA actors, which were predominantly located in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria, and the Niger-Delta Region. Most prominent was, the Jama`at ahl al-Sunna li-da`wa wa-l-qital terrorist group popularly known as Boko-Haram. The other principal MNSAs identified during this period, were mainly militant groups agitating for more inclusion in the distribution of oil revenues, which were extracted from the Niger Delta region. These were:

- The Niger Delta Liberation Front (2005-2014)
- Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta led by Henry Okah (2004-2014)

The Nigerian State was actively involved in the mitigation and elimination of all these MNSAs, (sometimes simultaneously) during the observed period. Because of the numerous activities of the MNSAs, which sometimes occurred simultaneously, this case study analysis produces a chronology of events spanning 2009-2014, wherein the activities of all MNSAs are documented chronologically, as well as government responses and critical developments within the Nigerian State which have direct bearing on Nigerian NSSP during the period. The author has represented the activities of MNSAs from 2009-2012 below:

### 8.2 Chronology of the Explosion Case Study

#### 8.2.1 2009

The beginning of 2009, saw the reemergence of hostilities between the Federal Government of Nigeria, and MEND. On the 30th of January 2009, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), resumed its hostilities against the Nigerian government and foreign companies involved in the exploitation of oil reserves in the Niger Delta region. The MEND MNSA, claimed that the rationale behind its resumption of activities, was due to an attack by FGN soldiers on one of its camps, run by the Niger Delta Vigilantes. This resumption of activities marked the end of a four month cease-fire brokered between MEND and the FGN in September of 2008. \(^1\) The FGN, in line with already established Nigerian NSSP, had already established Joint Task Force. This Task force, sought to suppress civil unrest and militancy in the Niger Delta region, through the utilisation of brute military force. On the 15th of May 2009, another military operation by the FGN was undertaken

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by a Joint Task Force (JTF). This task force launched military offensives against MEND as a reprisal aimed at stemming the kidnapping of Nigerian soldiers as well as foreign employees of multinational corporations in the Niger Delta. It was reported that thousands of Nigerian citizens evacuated their villages in the wake of these offensives, which saw hundreds of civilians killed. MEND MNSA emerged in 2006, as a direct repercussion of the exploitation of oil resources in the Niger Delta region. The proceeds of oil exploitation have repeatedly been siphoned by multinational corporations, and the FGN since the discovery of oil deposits in 1956. The obvious marginalisation of the local population, coupled with the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta, were factors instrumental to the emergence of MEND and other militant groups in the region. It is arguable that the heavy handed military suppression of all civilian agitations for resource control in the Niger Delta, legitimised the militant approach of MEND and similar organisations. For example, the execution of human rights and environmental activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People) leaders in 1995, demonstrated the futility of non-violent activism in the region. A subsequent movement, the Ijaw Youth Council, issued a vacation ultimatum to the FMG in 1998, which was brutally suppressed by the Abacha led government.

Subsequent activist groups which emerged in the Niger Delta, have been characterised by an increasingly militant stance and violent expression. Simultaneously in the Northern Region of Nigeria, the emergence of Boko-Haram as a violent terrorist organisation had become undeniably obvious. A group which was initially conceived as a locally active, radical Islamic sect, became more recognised as a violent extremist group with the means and capability to orchestrate major terrorist attacks on the Nigerian State and neighboring countries. Some have even suggested that Boko-Haram was the resurgence of the Maitatsine Islamic sect, which was prominent in Nigeria, in the 1980s. Although conflicting accounts exist on the early characteristics and activities of the group, scholars appear to agree on the fact that Boko-Haram morphed into the terrorist organisation as we recognise it, in June of 2009. On the 11th of June 2009, Boko-Haram members were interrupted by the Nigerian Police Force, during a funeral procession. The police were allegedly barring members of the sect who were riding motorbikes without helmets, from continuing in

4 A. Adesoji, Africa today july 2012
the procession. The situation took a violent turn, which resulted in the injury of about 20 members of the sect, some of whom survived gunshot wounds.

From the 11th to the 12th of June 2009, Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf threatened the FGN with attacks, as a result of the killing of 14 Boko Haram members by FGN security operatives. The threats were published via video, and was addressed to the President. An armed reprisal attack was carried out by Boko Haram in the Northern State of Bauchi, wherein Boko Haram members attacked a police station and freed hundreds of their incarcerated colleagues. The violent situation escalated, lasting days, and resulted in an armed military response by the FGN, which saw many Boko Haram members killed. Boko Haram MNSA launched sporadic offensives in various towns in 6 Northern states. This lasted from the 26th to the 31st of July, 2009. The violence left at least 800 people dead, mainly civilians and some Boko Haram members.\(^5\) The FGN stopped the uprising with military offensives which led to the capture of hundreds of Boko Haram members and its leader, Yusuf. Initially, Yusuf was arrested by the Nigerian Police Force, which handed him over to the Nigerian Military for interrogation. On the 30th of July 2009, Yusuf was extrajudicially executed by the Nigerian Army while he was still in custody. Another individual, Alhaji Foi, was arrested and executed in the same manner - this time at the Police Headquarters in Maiduguri. However, the

killing of Boko-Haram's leader, did little to quell the looming insurgency. In time, Boko-Haram regrouped under Shekau (Yusuf's deputy) and took on a more aggressive posture towards the FGN and Nigerian citizens alike. The constraining compression instantly operationalised by the FGN in the wake of Boko-Haram violence, was perhaps a crucial determinant in enabling the sect to enjoy sympathy from some of the local population, and eventually, more recruits. In total, MNSA activity in Nigeria claimed at least a thousand lives in 2009.

8.2.2 2010

In 2010, Boko-Haram resurfaced under Shekau's leadership. Shekau was identified as the MNSAs operational and ideational leader, who structured Boko Haram into a loosely connected, splinter-celled organisation. This change in organisational configuration, enabled Boko-Haram to be more resilient to Nigerian State compression in two ways. Firstly, Boko-Haram's decentralised organisation, made it incredibly difficult for FGN security operatives to detect. Secondly, a splinter-celled organisation, made it difficult for FGN security services to infiltrate. The FGNs militarised responses to such a fluid and undetectable group, were becoming increasingly outmanoeuvered.

In the Niger Delta Region, the FGN was also tasked with suppressing the rise of militant activities. Although it was Boko-Haram that attracted considerable attention due to their use of IED (Improvised Explosive Device), it was MEND MNSA which utilised explosives in warfare in 2010. On the 15th of March 2010, MEND attacked a government building, interrupting an on-going 'post-amnesty dialogue'. MEND claimed responsibility for the attack, which was characterised by the detonation of two bombs, which killed three people and injured others. The FGN responded by increasing JTF presence in the Niger delta. However, these JTF deployments were focused on infrastructure and instalments belonging to multinational corporations operating in the Niger Delta. The JTF also began launching attacks on the anti-Amnesty faction of MEND, to repel further vandalism of assets in the region.

On the 7th of September 2010, Boko Haram infiltrated a prison in Bauchi, North-East Nigeria. This prison break freed over 700 individuals, with about 100 of them being members

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of the MNSA. 7 people were killed as a result of this attack, and this proprietary break-in, signified the beginning of a series of prison breaks which freed up hundreds more in Northern Nigeria.

The severity of the insurgency the FGN was suppressing, became apparent on the 1st of October 2010, when two bombs were reported to have exploded in Abuja (the capital). These explosions were meant to coincide with the Independence Day celebration, at Eagle's square. This attack left 12 dead, and about 20 people injured. It was reported that these explosions were in relative proximity to President Jonathan at the time. Subsequently, MEND claimed responsibility for this attack.

On the 24th of December 2010, Boko-Haram killed about a hundred civilians in the Northern towns of Jos and Maiduguri. The attacks were characterised by a spate of explosions which targeted predominantly Christian dwellings. There were also recorded shootings in at churches in Jos. These attacks led to civil unrests, especially in Jos where inter-religious conflict was rife. The FGN responded to these attacks, with military offensives against Boko-Haram and MEND respectively. In the case of Boko-Haram, these offensives by the FGN were conspicuously late, only coming months after Boko-Haram had initiated a series of attacks on various prisons where they freed their colleagues and significantly increased in numbers. 2010, would end on a violent note, when in what was later characterised as the new-year bombings, explosives were detonated outside military barracks in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. The bombings which occurred on the 30th and the 31st of December 2010, killed at least four people. In total, around 149 deaths were recorded as a result of MNSA activity. Most of these deaths were attributed to Boko-Haram activity.

Below is a graphical representation of MNSA activity in 2010

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In January 2011, the FGN appeared more proactive in its stance. The FGN created the Counter Terrorism Center at the Office of the National Security Adviser.\textsuperscript{10} Also, the FGN appointed its first Presidential Adviser on Terrorism, in a bid to ramp up its counterterrorism efforts. A month later in February, the Terrorism Prevention Bill was passed into legislature, thereby creating a legislative framework which would guide counterterrorism implementation in the country. As the FGN was ramping up counterterrorism efforts, MEND continued their operations in the Niger Delta. On the 16th of March 2011, MEND detonated a bomb on an Agip platform in the Niger Delta. It was not clear if there were any casualties. In the meantime, Boko-Haram was ramping up its activities in the Northern region. The 6th of June 2011, marked the beginning of targeted assassinations of Muslim preachers who were critical of Boko-Haram's ideology. The assassination of Ibrahim Birkuti, marked the beginning of this modus operandi. These targeted assassinations were followed up by the first recorded suicide bombing in Nigeria. This occurred on the 16th of June 2011, when a Boko-Haram member detonated a car bomb in the Police Headquarters, Abuja. At least two people were killed, and several others (including the author) sustained injuries. This attack on the police Headquarters, signified the expansion of Boko-Haram's targets, from attacking unprotected civilians, to launching daring attacks on government buildings, including that of the Police Force which

\textsuperscript{10} Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and others, \textit{The Palgrave Handbook Of Global Counterterrorism Policy} (Springer 2017).
was meant to be suppressing them. In May 2011, President Jonathan alleged that political opposition was involved in the sponsoring of Boko Haram and terrorism in general. In May of 2011, FGN authorised airstrikes against MEND in the Niger Delta region.

In July of 2011, the FGN created a Joint Task Force in Borno State, to tackle the menace of Boko-Haram. In the same month, the FGN created a special panel, tasked with exploring the possibility of negotiations with Boko-Haram, but a month later, dismissed the possibility of negotiations.\textsuperscript{11} In the Niger Delta region, MEND activity continued despite JTF presence and airstrikes. On the 14th of September 2011, 23 foreign sailors were kidnapped by MEND from an oil tanker. They were subsequently released on the 26th of September.

On the 17th of September 2011, a close relative of Mohammed Yusuf, one Mr. Fugu, was killed near his Maiduguri home. It has remained unclear who the murderers were. Mr. Fugu, was an intermediary between Boko-Haram and representatives of the FGN. Boko-Haram denied involvement in this attack.

In the Niger Delta, the FGN increased JTF offensives against the anti-Amnesty faction of MEND in October. But, on the 19th, MEND personnel hijacked an ExxonMobil tanker, stealing large amounts of oil. It seemed as though both MNSA were simultaneously intensifying their activities in October of 2011. Boko-Haram continued its targeted assassinations in the Northern region, and attacks on civilians despite JTF presence in Borno. For example, on the 22nd of October 2011, a cameraman working for the Nigerian Television Authority was killed by Boko-Haram members, for allegedly spying on the activities of the sect. On the 4th of November 2011, in what is not categorised as the Damaturu attacks, Boko-Haram launched coordinated offensives all over Yobe state northern Nigeria. The attacks left at least 100 people dead. On the 17th of December 2011, Boko-Haram engaged in a prolonged shoot-out against Kano state police officers. This shootout was intended to resist an FGN raid of a Boko-Haram hideout. Seven people were reportedly killed, including police officers. On the 22nd of December 2011, Boko-Haram carried out a spate of bombings in Maiduguri, whilst simultaneously, the sect launched gun and bomb attacks in Yobe state. As a result, about 130 people were reported to have been killed. On the 25th of December, as Christmas and New Year festivities were approaching, the FGN ordered the visible deployment of Police and State security forces around public places of worship, to deter Boko-Haram attacks in Abuja. But, on the same day in what is now known as the Christmas day bombings, Boko-Haram carried

out bomb and shooting attacks. Killing about 41 people in Christmas day celebrations in churches, in Niger State. Another attack was planned in Jos; however one policeman lost his life whilst thwarting Boko-Haram's plans.

On the 31st of December, the FGN declared a State of emergency in the northern region, specifically Yobe, Plateau, Niger and Borno States. The State of Emergency was to last six months. The FGN also announced that all Northern borders to neighbouring states be closed.

Below is a graphical representation of MNSA activity in 2011

![Graph showing MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2011](image)

**Figure 11. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2011**

### 8.2.4 2012

2012, started off on a particularly poor note. First of all, on the 9th of January 2012, a secret police operative was assassinated by Boko-Haram. In response, President Jonathan announced that Boko-Haram had infiltrated all spheres of government and were able to identify secret police officers working for the FGN. Four days later, on the 12th of January 2012, MEND operatives bombed a hotel in Warri. There were no reported civilian casualties. On the same day, 6 suspected Boko-Haram dissidents were assassinated by the sect in Maiduguri. Boko-Haram spokesman announced that any sect dissidents would be hunted and assassinated.

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in the same manner.\textsuperscript{13} As MNSA activity was intensifying so early on in the year, the FGN made a crucial error. On the 18\textsuperscript{th} of January, the suspected plotter of the 2011 Christmas day bombings, managed to escape from Police custody. So embarrassing was this event, that as a result, the then Inspector General of Police was forced to resign.

In Kano, on the 24\textsuperscript{th} of January, FGN security operatives killed two suspected Boko-Haram members, following suspicions of their involvement in assaults, two days earlier. MEND MNSA on the other hand, showed no signs of relenting in their attacks on the oil industry. On the 13th of February 2012, MEND operatives killed the captain and another crew member of a cargo vessel off the coast of Nigeria.

The 9\textsuperscript{th} of March, saw the arrest of a suspected Al-Qaeda member, Abu Mohammed. Abu Mohamed was suspected as being a leader of an Al-Qaeda affiliated group operating in Nigeria. Muhammad was suspected of kidnapping two engineers, one British and one Italian, in May of 2011.\textsuperscript{14} Muhammad was interrogated until he gave up the location of the hostages. However, the hostages were killed when FGN attempted to raid the hideout where they were being held. Boko-Haram never suggested that it was affiliated with Muhammad, or involved in the abduction. Not long after the discovery of Al-Qaeda cells in Nigeria, Boko-Haram attacked news media outlets in Abuja and Kaduna, on the 26\textsuperscript{th} of April 2012. In this attack, Boko-Haram detonated bombs at complexes belonging to "This Day" newspaper in Abuja, killing four, and bombed another media outlet in Kaduna, killing three.

On the 10\textsuperscript{th} of May 2012, an Islamic sect leader is assassinated by suspected Boko-Haram operatives. The FGN expressed concern over this development, citing that such an incident could instigate armed conflicts between various extremist sects in the country as a result. From the 17\textsuperscript{th} to the 19\textsuperscript{th} of June 2012, an estimated 100 civilians are killed by Boko-Haram's attacks on churches in Kaduna and Zaria. These spate of attacks also left more than 300 people injured. This incident sparked confrontations between Christians and Muslims, with the Christians killing over twenty civilians suspected to be of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic tribe, in revenge.


These confrontations did little to dissuade the sect, which, on the 6th of August 2012, launched a suicide bombing attack, which left 7 police officers dead, in Sokoto. This bombing, occurred near Alhaji Shehu Shagari’s residence. Following the suicide bombing attack, Boko-Haram murdered a Muslim cleric and one of his followers. This occurred in a mosque in Maiduguri, on the 21st of August 2012. From the 5th to 6th of September 2012, Boko-Haram then turned its attention to vandalism. In a spate of attacks, the sect destroyed about 26 telecommunications towers, in protest of telecommunications companies' information sharing with the FGN intelligence agencies. On the 26th of August, a Boko Haram suicide bomber detonated a car bomb at the United Nations office in Abuja. This attack killed about 21 people and injured more than a hundred. This attack, attracted considerable international attention, as it signified the first time that Boko-Haram targeted an international organisation.

Following weeks of a lack of observed activity from FGN security operatives, the FGN JTF announced that it had killed more than 35 Boko-Haram operatives, and arrested about 60 more in Yobe State, on the 23rd of September. The next day, FGN Army announced that it had killed one Abubakar Yola, believed to be a regional commander for Boko-Haram. It was also announced that they had arrested 156 other Boko-Haram operatives in Adamawa State, following a coordinated action.

Meanwhile, in the Niger Delta region, MEND MNSA were observed to resume spates of attacks in October. On the 6th of October 2012, it was reported that militants closely affiliated to MEND seised an oil tanker off the coast of Ivory-Coast. The militants kept the crew of over 25 men captive for three days, then subsequently stole large quantities of oil from the ship. The next day, FGN announced that they had once again killed 30 Boko-Haram operatives, in Yobe State. The FGN also announced that Boko-Haram’s leader, Shekau, had also been killed in Kandahar.

On the 8th of October 2012, an FGN JTF soldier was killed by a IED, planted by Boko-Haram in Maiduguri. This IED was clearly intended to destroy the JTF convoy, as it patrolled Maiduguri. JTF soldiers subsequently attacked and killed civilians whom they believed were sympathetic to Boko-Haram, and then set over 50 houses alight. This incident claimed over 30 civilian lives. Following this attack on civilians by the JTF along with other extrajudicial killings, Amnesty international published a report on the 1st of November, wherein they alleged that FGN security operatives were involved in committing grave human rights violations in their quest to crush Boko-Haram.
In the Niger Delta, on the 15th of October 2012, MEND operatives abducted 7 sailors, whom they subsequently released on the 1st of November 2012 for an undisclosed ransom. Boko-Haram continued its relentless attacks on civilians, and on the 28th of October 2012, launched an attack on a church in Kaduna, killing 8 and injuring about 150 people. As was the case in the last Boko-Haram attack in a Kaduna church, Christian youth launched sporadic attacks on Muslims in the vicinity, in revenge. For the third year in succession, Boko-Haram launched Christmas day attacks, and killed 27 Christians in Maiduguri. Following these attacks, on the 28th of December 2012, unidentified assailants killed 15 Christians in Musari.

Below is a graphical representation of MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2012:

![Graph of MNSA Activity in Nigeria, 2012]

Figure 12. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2012

8.2.5 2013

Due to the copious amounts of MNSA activity identified in 2013 and 2014, the author has represented MNSA activity in tabular form, for ease of reference\(^{15}\).

\(^{15}\) Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5
Table 15. MNSA Activity in Nigeria 2013

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PERPETRATOR</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>BOMBING</th>
<th>SHOOTING</th>
<th>ABDUCTION</th>
<th>VANDALISM</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>WESTERN REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 INMATES FREED</td>
<td>JAN4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>WESTERN REGION</td>
<td>50 KILLED(^{16})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OIL PIPELINE</td>
<td>JAN9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td>3+ KILLED(^{17})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JAN19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 KILLED</td>
<td>1 KIDNAPPED</td>
<td>VESSEL HIJACKED</td>
<td>FEB4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td>VESSEL HIJACKED</td>
<td>FEB5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 KIDNAPPED</td>
<td>VESSEL HIJACKED, LOOTED</td>
<td>FEB7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td></td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>OIL CARRIER HIJACKED</td>
<td>FEB7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 KILLED(^{18})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FEB8-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td></td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>OIL CARRIER</td>
<td>FEB10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{16}\) The pipeline exploded killing 7 operatives, 3 Nigerian Soldiers and 40 people in the village.

\(^{17}\) The Emir of Kano gets attacked by gunmen. The Emir survives, however, his driver and guards are killed.

\(^{18}\) : Nine female polio vaccinators are killed in two separate shootings in health centers of Kano. Three days later, three North Korean doctors are hacked to death in Potiskum. Boko Haram is suspected of both attacks.
Olamide Samuel - 1401236 - University of Buckingham

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BH (Ansaru)</th>
<th>NORTHERN REGION</th>
<th>7 FOREIGNERS</th>
<th>FEB 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td>6 FOREIGNERS</td>
<td>FEB 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN CAMEROUN</td>
<td>7 FOREIGNERS</td>
<td>FEB 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td>2 FOREIGNERS</td>
<td>FEB 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>FISHING VESSEL ATTACKED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>SHELL OIL PIPELINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>OIL CARRIER LOOTED, DAMAGED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>NIGER DELTA</td>
<td>3 FOREIGNERS</td>
<td>MAR 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH (ANSARU)</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>7 FOREIGNERS</td>
<td>MAR 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram, kidnaps seven foreign expatriates from a Lebanese construction company, Setraco, at Jama’are in Bauchi. It is the largest kidnapping in northern Nigeria in recent times.

20 Six Russian sailors were kidnapped aboard the Armada Tuah 101 cargo ship. All 6 men were released on February 26 for 200 million Naira ($1.3 million) ransom.

21 Four children and three adult members of the French Moulin Fournier family are kidnapped by gunmen in northern Cameroon while visiting the Waza National Park, near the border with Nigeria.

22 Three Malaysian sailors were kidnapped aboard the Armada Tuah 22. The 3 men were freed on March 22 after the Joint Task Force raided a MEND camp while also capturing 4 militants.

MEND spokesman Jomo Gbomo sent an e-mail to Bloomberg News threatening to "bomb mosques, hajj camps, and other Islamic institutions." Gbomo calls this "Operation Save Christianity" and says this is in response to the bombings of churches in northern Nigeria.

9 oil workers were kidnapped by MEND gunmen off an oil installation operated by Royal Dutch Shell. The kidnappers are thought to be responsible for the murder of 12 police officers 3 weeks earlier.

8 ex-militants were killed by MEND gunmen in Yenagoa after they were found out to be collaborating with the Joint Task Force. A gunfight erupted when the MEND gunmen were spotted by Nigerian Police.

MEND gunmen kidnapped the daughter of Nigerian supreme court judge Bode Rhodes-Vivour. A ransom was paid 2 hours after her abduction and the militants released her soon after.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 28</td>
<td>Niger Delta</td>
<td>17 kidnapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 13</td>
<td>Togo Coast</td>
<td>One hostage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 15</td>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>2 tankers bombed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 19</td>
<td>Niger Delta</td>
<td>4 foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 30</td>
<td>Western Region</td>
<td>2 killed, 121 inmates freed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 6</td>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>42+ killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 14</td>
<td>Niger Delta</td>
<td>4 foreigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 16</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>24 hostage, oil carrier hijacked and looted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>56 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 15</td>
<td>Niger Delta</td>
<td>Oil vessel hijacked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

28 9 children are killed in Maiduguri and 13 students and teachers are killed in Damaturu by Boko Haram.
29 Pirates affiliated to MEND hijacked the French oil tanker Adour 48 km (30 mi) off the coast of Togo. The pirates took one sailor hostage before fleeing from the Nigerian Navy. The sailor was eventually freed on June 18 when the Joint Task Force seized the pirates' camp.
30 Yobe State school shooting, more than 42 are killed by Boko Haram gunmen in a Yobe State school.
31 Pirates hijacked the Saint Kitts and Nevis flagged oil vessel MT Notre. The pirates were able to keep the entire crew hostage for 4 days until a Nigerian Navy vessel intercepted the ship and killed 12 pirates while 4 surrendered peacefully.
In 2013 alone, MNSA activity claimed over 800 lives in Nigeria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BH</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN</td>
<td>SEP 12</td>
<td>40 SOLDIERS KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH (suspected)</td>
<td>NORTHERN</td>
<td>SEP 19</td>
<td>161 KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>SEP 20</td>
<td>9 KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>NORTHERN</td>
<td>OCT 10</td>
<td>20+ KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN</td>
<td>OCT 29</td>
<td>128 KILLED(^{34}) (95 BH OPERATIVES)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{32}\) An attack on the College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe by suspected Boko Haram members kills forty students.

\(^{33}\) An attack at Damboa leaves at least 20 killed (15 suspected militants and 5 civilians).

\(^{34}\) Boko Haram raids Damaturu. At least 128 people are killed (95 militants, 23 soldiers, 8 policemen, and 2 civilians)
Figure 13 MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2013.
### 8.2.6 2014

*Table 16. MNSA Activity in Nigeria 2014*[^35]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERPETRATOR</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>BOMBING</th>
<th>SHOOTING</th>
<th>ABDUCTION</th>
<th>VANDALISM</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>35 KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>138 KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>11 KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>121 KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FEB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>106 KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FEB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>99 KILLED (9 SOLDIERS)[^36]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FEB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>24+ KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FEB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>59+ KILLED[^37]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FEB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH[^38]</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
<td>PRISON BREAK</td>
<td>MAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>88 KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^35]: Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5.

[^36]: 90 Christians and 9 Nigerian soldiers are killed in Gwosa by Boko Haram.

[^37]: Federal Government College attack, 59 male students killed in a school massacre in Yobe State.

[^38]: Boko Haram attacks the heavily fortified Giwa military barracks in Maiduguri, freeing comrades from a detention facility. The military then executes about 600 unarmed recaptured detainees, according to Amnesty International.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APR 15</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>276 SCHOOLGIRLS KIDNAPPED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 1</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>19 KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 5</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>300+ KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 20</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>118+ KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 21</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>27 KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 27</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>58 KILLED (49 SECURITY PERSONNEL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 30</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>1 ASSASSINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 1</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>40 KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 2</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>200+ KILLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 20-23</td>
<td>NORTHERN REGION</td>
<td>70 KILLED 91 WOMEN KIDNAPPED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39 May 2014 Abuja bombing, 19 killed in Abuja by a car bomb.
40 Gamboru Ngala attack, at least 300 people are killed in the twin towns of Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State by Boko Haram militants.
41 The third emir of Gwoza, Idrissa Timta, is assassinated during a Boko Haram ambush.
42 Gwoza massacre, at least 200, mostly Christians, are killed in several villages in Borno State by Boko Haram.
In 2014, MNSA activity in Nigeria claimed over 3000 lives:

![Figure 14. MNSA activity in Nigeria, 2014](image)

### 8.3 Assessment of Orientation

Within the Explosion case-study, instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression were observed to be primarily within Nigerian territory, reflecting the overwhelming occurrence of MNSA activity within Nigeria, specifically in the Northern region and the Niger-Delta. One notable exception, was President Jonathan's meeting with the French president at the time, Francois Hollande, to discuss possible joint military efforts to compress Boko-Haram MNSA. Therefore, in utilising Orientation as an independent variable within the NSSP theoretical framework, it must be noted that Nigeria was essentially an Introverted State, as out of the observed instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression, only one was outside Nigeria's territorial boundaries. Below, is a measurement scale of Nigeria’s orientation during the Explosion period⁴³:

---

⁴³ Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5
Table 17. Independent Variable Measurement: Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State Territory</th>
<th>Neighbouring State</th>
<th>Sub-Region</th>
<th>Other Continent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DIVISION OF NIGERIAN ARMY CREATED IN BORNO STATE⁴⁴</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGN REPELS BH ATTACK, REPRISAL KILLS OVER 50 BH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGN REACHES OUT TO LOCAL LEADERS FOR SUPPORT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>FGN MAINTAINS JTF PRESENCE IN NIGER DELTA, FOCUSED ON OIL INSTALLATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>JTF LAUNCH ATTACKS ON KNOWN MEND BASES AND AFFILIATES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGN JTF DISTRIBUTE COUNTERNARRATIVES TO BH⁴⁵</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


⁴⁵ FGN operatives within the Joint Task Force (JTF) begin to distribute video-tape recordings which promulgate counter-Boko-Haram narratives to locals in Maiduguri.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2009</td>
<td>FGN EXPANDED JTF OPERATION RESTORE HOPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 2009</td>
<td>FGN ANNOUNCES AMNESTY PROGRAM IN A BID TO QUELL MEND VIOLENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG 2009</td>
<td>AMNESTY PROGRAM OPERATIONALISED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC 2010</td>
<td>MILITARY OFFENSIVES AGAINST BOKO-HARAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2011</td>
<td>PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON TERRORISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2011</td>
<td>COUNTER TERRORISM CENTER AT THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 2011</td>
<td>TERRORISM PREVENTION BILL PASSED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2011</td>
<td>PRESIDENT ALLEGED THAT POLITICAL OPPOSITION SPONSORING TERRORISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2011</td>
<td>FGN carries out airstrikes against MEND[^46]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 2011</td>
<td>Creation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) in Borno State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 2011</td>
<td>Panel created to negotiate with BH[^47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 AUG 2011</td>
<td>Reneges on plans to negotiate[^48]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 2011</td>
<td>JTF attack MEND members not participating in Amnesty Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 DEC 2011</td>
<td>Visible presence of State security at Place of Worship in affected areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^46]: On the 19th of May 2011, the FGN carried out airstrikes in the Niger Delta. These airstrikes killed John Togo, who was an influential member of MEND MNSA.

[^47]: In July 2011, the FGN announced proposed negotiations with Boko-Haram. In an unprecedented move, the FGN also ensured that five police officers were held responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf.

[^48]: The FGN however, reneged on its attempt to initiate negotiations with Boko-Haram, on the 3rd of August 2011, with the FGN explicitly rejecting negotiations with a terrorist group.

[^49]: Following the intensification of attacks in the North, on the 31st of December 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in Borno state, Niger state, Plateau state, and Yobe state. He also announced that all northern borders were to be closed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN 18 2012</td>
<td>BH PLOTTER OF 2011 XMAS DAY BOMBINGS ESCAPES FROM POLICE CUSTODY 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 24 2012</td>
<td>FGN OPS KILL 2 BH MEMBERS 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR 9 2012</td>
<td>9 MAR 2012 FGN ARREST ALQAEDA SUSPECT 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 23 2012</td>
<td>FGN KILL 35 BH ARREST 60 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 24 2012</td>
<td>FGN KILL BH REGIONAL COMMANDER 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 24 2012</td>
<td>FGN ARREST 156 BH PERSONNEL 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50 On the 18th of January 2012, a suspected plotter of the 2011 Christmas day bombings, escaped from police custody.
51 On the 24th of January 2012, FGN security operatives killed two suspected Boko-Haram members for their suspected involvement in the assaults in Kano, four days prior.
52 On the 9th of March 2012, FGN Army arrests one Abu Muhammad, suspected as being a leader of an Al-Qaeda affiliated group operating in Nigeria. Muhammad was suspected of kidnapping two engineers, one British and one Italian, in May of 2011. Muhammad was interrogated until he gave up the location of the hostages. However, the hostages were killed when FGN attempted to raid the hideout where they were being held. Boko-Haram never suggested that it was affiliated with Muhammad, or involved in the abduction.
53 On the 23rd of September 2012, The FGN JTF announced that it had killed 35 Boko-Haram operatives in Yobe state, and arrested about 60 more.
54 On the 24th of September 2012, The FGN Army announced that they had killed Abubakar Yola, believed to be a regional commander for Boko-Haram.
55 Furthermore, they announce the arrest of 156 other Boko-Haram operatives in Adamawa State, in a coordinated action.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 7 2012</td>
<td>7 OCT 2012 JTF KILL 30 BH AND ARREST 10&lt;sup&gt;56&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 8 2012</td>
<td>JTF KILL OVER 30 CIVILIANS&lt;sup&gt;57&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1 2012</td>
<td>FGN ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES&lt;sup&gt;58&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1 2013</td>
<td>JTF KILL 13 MEND COMBATANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 11 2013</td>
<td>FGN PRESIDENT VISITS PRESIDENT OF FRANCE TO DISCUSS JOINT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 31 2013</td>
<td>JTF CAPTURES 13 MEND OPERATIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 4 2013</td>
<td>SPECIAL DUTIES MINISTER TASKED WITH EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY OF DIALOGUE WITH BH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>56</sup> On the 7th of October 2012, JTF operatives announced that they had killed 30 Boko-Haram operatives, in Yobe state. They also declared that they had killed Boko-Haram leader, Shekau, and arrested 10 more in Kandahar.

<sup>57</sup> On the 8th of October 2012, an FGN JTF soldier was killed by a IED, planted by Boko-Haram in Maiduguri. This IED was set for the JTF convoy. JTF soldiers subsequently attacked and killed civilians whom they believed were sympathetic to Boko-Haram, and then set over 50 houses alight. This incident claimed over 30 civilian lives.

<sup>58</sup> On the 1st of November 2012, Amnesty International published a report which alleged that Boko-Haram and the FGN ` security operatives were involved in committing grave human rights violations, in Northern Nigeria. On the same day, Boko-haram declared willingness to negotiate with the FGN.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APR 11 2013</td>
<td>JTF ARRESTS 3 MEND OPERATIVES FOR MURDER OF 12 POLICE OFFICERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 22 2013</td>
<td>JTF CONFRONTATION WITH BH LEAVES OVER 180 PEOPLE DEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 22 2013</td>
<td>JTF CAPTURE MEND MILITANTS AND RECOVER 400M3 OF LOOTED OIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 27 2013</td>
<td>JTF RAID MEND CAMP. SET IT ABLAZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 28 2013</td>
<td>JTF CAPTURE 76 MEND OPERATIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 MAY 2013</td>
<td>STATE OF EMERGENCY DECLARED IN ADAMAWA BORNO AND YOBE STATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 2013</td>
<td>TERRORISM PREVENTION BILL REVIEWED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN - OCT 2013</td>
<td>MULTIPLE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN JTF AND BH LEAVE HUNDREDS DEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 12-18</td>
<td>NA OFFENSIVE LEAVES 150 BH OPERATIVES DEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2014</td>
<td>INTENSIFICATION OF MILITARY PRESENCE IN NORTHERN REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR 14 2014</td>
<td>JTF KILL OVER 600 RECAPTURED BH OPERATIVES ACCORDING TO AMNESTY INTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 1 2014</td>
<td>INTERAGENCY COOPERATION TO TACKLE TERRORISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2014</td>
<td>MORE TROOPS DEPLOYED TO NORTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 15 2014</td>
<td>VIGILANTE CIVILIAN JTF KILL 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 2014</td>
<td>ARMY KILL OVER 50 BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 2014</td>
<td>FGN LAUNCHES AIRSTRIKES AGAINST BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 26 2014</td>
<td>JTF RAID KILLS OVER 100 BH OPERATIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 2014</td>
<td>AIRSTRIKE KILLS CIVILIANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 2014</td>
<td>CEASEFIRE BROKERED WITH BH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.4 ASSESSMENT OF INFLATIONARY CONTAINMENT

In light of the information gathered from the Explosion case study, the measurement scale, which characterizes the nature of Inflationary Containment within Nigeria’s NSSP is represented below\textsuperscript{59}:

\textit{Table 18. Independent Variable Measurement: Inflationary Containment}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 DIVISION of Nigerian Army Created in Borno State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGN REPELS BH ATTACK, REPRISAL KILLS OVER 50 BH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGN REACHES OUT TO LOCAL LEADERS FOR SUPPORT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>FGN MAINTIANS JTF PRESENCE IN NIGER DELTA, FOCUSED ON OIL INSTALLATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>JTF LAUNCH ATTACKS ON KNOWN MEND BASES AND AFFILIATES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGN JTF DISTRIBUTE COUNTERNARRATIVES TO BH\textsuperscript{60}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2009</td>
<td>FGN EXPANDED JTF OPERATION RESTORE HOPE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 2009</td>
<td>FGN ANNOUNCES AMNESTY PROGRAM IN A BID TO QUELL MEND VIOLENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG 2009</td>
<td>AMNESTY PROGRAM OPERATIONALISED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{59} Author’s compilation. See note 42 in Chapter 5
\textsuperscript{60} FGN operatives within the Joint Task Force (JTF) begin to distribute video-tape recordings which promulgate counter-Boko-Haram narratives to locals in Maiduguri.
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEC 2010</td>
<td>MILITARY OFFENSIVES AGAINST BOKO-HARAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2011</td>
<td>PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON TERRORISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2011</td>
<td>COUNTER TERRORISM CENTER AT THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 2011</td>
<td>TERRORISM PREVENTION BILL PASSED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2011</td>
<td>PRESIDENT ALLEGED THAT POLITICAL OPPOSITION SPONSORING TERRORISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2011</td>
<td>FGN CARRIES OUT AIRSTRIKES AGAINST MEND⁶¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 2011</td>
<td>CREATION OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) IN BORNO STATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 2011</td>
<td>PANEL CREATED TO NEGOTIATE WITH BH⁶²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 AUG 2011</td>
<td>RENEGES ON PLANS TO NEGOTIATE⁶³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 2011</td>
<td>JTF ATTACK MEND MEMBERS NOT PARTICIPATING IN AMNESTY PROGRAMME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 DEC 2011</td>
<td>VISIBLE PRESENCE OF STATE SECURITY AT PLACE OF WORSHIP IN AFFECTED AREAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁶¹ On the 19th of May 2011, the FGN carried out airstrikes in the Niger Delta. These airstrikes killed John Togo, who was an influential member of MEND MNSA.

⁶² In July 2011, the FGN announced proposed negotiations with Boko-Haram. In an unprecedented move, the FGN also ensured that five police officers were held responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf.

⁶³ The FGN however, reneged on its attempt to initiate negotiations with Boko-Haram, on the 3rd of August 2011, with the FGN explicitly rejecting negotiations with a terrorist group.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 DEC 2011</td>
<td>STATE OF EMERGENCY DECLARED IN BORNO NIGER PLATEAU AND YOBE(^{64})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 18 2012</td>
<td>BH PLOTTER OF 2011 XMAS DAY BOMBINGS ESCAPES FROM POLICE CUSTODY(^{65})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 24 2012</td>
<td>FGN OPS KILL 2 BH MEMBERS(^{66})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR 9 2012</td>
<td>9 MAR 2012 FGN ARREST ALQAEDA SUSPECT(^{67})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 23 2012</td>
<td>FGN KILL 35 BH ARREST 60(^{68})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 24 2012</td>
<td>FGN KILL BH REGIONAL COMMANDER(^{69})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 24 2012</td>
<td>FGN ARREST 156 BH PERSONNEL(^{70})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 7 2012</td>
<td>7 OCT 2012 JTF KILL 30 BH AND ARREST 10(^{71})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{64}\) Following the intensification of attacks in the North, on the 31st of December 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in Borno state, Niger state, Plateau state, and Yobe state. He also announced that all northern borders were to be closed.

\(^{65}\) On the 18th of January 2012, a suspected plotter of the 2011 Christmas day bombings, escaped from police custody.

\(^{66}\) On the 24th of January 2012, FGN security operatives killed two suspected Boko-Haram members for their suspected involvement in the assaults in Kano, four days prior.

\(^{67}\) On the 9th of March 2012, FGN Army arrests one Abu Muhammad, suspected as being a leader of an Al-Qaeda affiliated group operating in Nigeria. Muhammad was suspected of kidnapping two engineers, one British and one Italian, in May of 2011. Muhammad was interrogated until he gave up the location of the hostages. However, the hostages were killed when FGN attempted to raid the hideout where they were being held. Boko-Haram never suggested that it was affiliated with Muhammad, or involved in the abduction.

\(^{68}\) On the 23rd of September 2012, The FGN JTF announced that it had killed 35 Boko-Haram operatives in Yobe state, and arrested about 60 more.

\(^{69}\) on the 24th of September 2012, The FGN Army announced that they had killed Abubakar Yola, believed to be a regional commander for Boko-Haram.

\(^{70}\) Furthermore, they announce the arrest of 156 other Boko-Haram operatives in Adamawa State, in a coordinated action.

\(^{71}\) On the 7th of October 2012, JTF operatives announced that they had killed 30 Boko-Haram operatives, in Yobe state. They also declared that they had killed Boko-Haram leader, Shekau, and arrested 10 more in Kandahar.
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCT 8 2012</td>
<td>JTF KILL OVER 30 CIVILIANS(^{72})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV 1 2012</td>
<td>FGN ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES(^{73})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 1 2013</td>
<td>JTF KILL 13 MEND COMBATANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 11 2013</td>
<td>FGN PRESIDENT VISITS PRESIDENT OF FRANCE TO DISCUSS JOINT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR 31 2013</td>
<td>JTF CAPTURES 13 MEND OPERATIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 4 2013</td>
<td>SPECIAL DUTIES MINISTER TASKED WITH EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY OF DIALOGUE WITH BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 11 2013</td>
<td>JTF ARRESTS 3 MEND OPERATIVES FOR MURDER OF 12 POLICE OFFICERS</td>
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<td>JTF CAPTURE MEND MILITANTS AND RECOVER 400M3 OF LOOTED OIL</td>
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<td>APR 27 2013</td>
<td>JTF RAID MEND CAMP, SET IT ABLAZE</td>
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\(^{72}\) On the 8th of October 2012, an FGN JTF soldier was killed by a IED, planted by Boko-Haram in Maiduguri. This IED was set for the JTF convoy. JTF soldiers subsequently attacked and killed civilians whom they believed were sympathetic to Boko-Haram, and then set over 50 houses alight. This incident claimed over 30 civilian lives.

\(^{73}\) On the 1st of November 2012, Amnesty International published a report which alleged that Boko-Haram and the FGN security operatives were involved in committing grave human rights violations, in Northern Nigeria. On the same day, Boko-haram declared willingness to negotiate with the FGN.
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APR 28 2013</td>
<td>JTF CAPTURE 76 MEND OPERATIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 MAY 2013</td>
<td>STATE OF EMERGENCY Declared in Adamawa Borno and Yobe States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 2013</td>
<td>TERRORISM PREVENTION BILL REVIEWED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN - OCT 2013</td>
<td>MULTIPLE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN JTF AND BH LEAVE HUNDREDS DEAD</td>
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<td>SEP 12-18 2013</td>
<td>NA OFFENSIVE LEAVES 150 BH OPERATIVES DEAD</td>
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<td>MAR 14 2014</td>
<td>JTF KILL OVER 600 RECAPTURED BH OPERATIVES ACCORDING TO AMNESTY INTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 2014</td>
<td>NACTEST STRATEGY APPROVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 1 2014</td>
<td>INTERAGENCY COOPERATION TO TACKLE TERRORISM</td>
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<td>JTF RAID KILLS OVER 100 BH OPERATIVES</td>
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</table>
In light of the information gathered during the Explosion case study, the FGN was observed to be overwhelmingly interest-centric in its inflationary containment. An underlying characteristic of most of the inflationary containment incidents identified, was its reactionary nature. The FGN response to militancy and terrorism during this period, appeared to be sporadic, reactionary and ad-hoc. FGN responses usually coincided with periods where an MNSA was able to attract considerable international attention after an attack, or significant economic assets were within reach of an MNSAs expansion. This period, exposed a conspicuous absence of pre-emptive strategy, with the exception of NACTEST, which was only produced in April 2014. As evident in the first chronology, Boko-Haram and MEND MNSAs were responsible for thousands of civilian deaths during this period, and the author failed to identify inflationary containment primarily aimed at eliminating the interaction between MNSAs and people as referent objects. As a matter of fact, in some instances, the opposite occurred. Worthy of note, was also the JTF’s involvement in the deliberate massacre of civilians in 2012 and 2013, in addition to the high loss of civilian lives as a consequence of JTF airstrikes in 2014. At the same time, the FGN was not observed to carry out any actions, which deliberately isolated MNSAs from civilian populations, indicating that people, were not the primary referents of Nigerian NSSP. Instead, civilian assistance and sympathy was observed especially in MEND MNSA activity in the Niger Delta.

In earlier chapters, the author identified one of the necessary preconditions to achieve a state of security, as the evidence of a conscious and continuous provision of security towards referent objects. Judging by the information gathered, Nigerian citizens were not prioritised as the referent objects of Nigeria’s NSSP during this period.

### 8.5 Assessment of Compression against MNSAs 2009-2014

From the period spanning 2009 to 2014, instances of FGN compression against MNSAs were observed 47 times. Out of these instances, the FGN was observed to employ Compelling Compression, 18 times, as opposed to Coercive compression which occurred 7 times and

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Constraining compression which was observed in 22 instances. However, many instances of constraining compression were observed to have been in effect for periods spanning several months, as the FGN was essentially engaged in an all-out war against MNSAs. Coupled with the severity of constraining compression, which was characterized by an overwhelming number of civilian deaths from both MNSAs and the FGN, the author assesses that Nigerian NSSP was constraining during the case study period. One must be aware that, these observed instances of compression, cannot merely be reduced to quantitative margins of measurement, such as simply counting and tabularizing incidents. Considering the assessment of Inflationary Containment, in conjunction with Compression strategy, enables us to understand the severity of compressive strategy in a different light. Had it been that analysis of Inflationary containment strategy, resulted in the conclusion that the Nigerian NSSP was people-centric in nature, it would be more readily confirmed in its compressive strategy, which would be more cognizant of collateral damage, civilian casualties and the exclusion of civilians who might be mildly sympathetic to perceived MNSA objectives. The reality however, is that compression strategy was constraining, characterized by brute physical force, intended to protect the prioritized referent objects (interests) of the Nigerian state.

Table 19. Independent Variable Measurement: Compression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Constraining</th>
<th>Coercive</th>
<th>Compelling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 DIVISION of Nigerian Army Created in Borno State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>FGN REPELS BH ATTACK, REPRISAL KILLS OVER 50 BH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>FGN MAINTAINS JTF PRESENCE IN NIGER DELTA, FOCUSED ON OIL INSTALLATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>JTF LAUNCH ATTACKS ON KNOWN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2009</td>
<td>FGN EXPANDED JTF OPERATION RESTORE HOPE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>AMNESTY PROGRAM OPERATIONALISED</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC 2010</td>
<td>MILITARY OFFENSIVES AGAINST BOKO-HARAM</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 FGN operatives within the Joint Task Force (JTF) begin to distribute video-tape recordings which promulgate counter-Boko-Haram narratives to locals in Maiduguri.

76 On the 25th of October 2009, MEND announced the cessation of hostilities against the FGN, and accepted the FGN’s peace settlement, showing a willingness to negotiate terms with the FGN. See; ‘BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Nigeria Militants Reinstate Truce’ (News.bbc.co.uk, 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8324638.stm> accessed 16 February 2017.

77 On the 19th of May 2011, the FGN carried out airstrikes in the Niger Delta. These airstrikes killed John Togo, who was an influential member of MEND MNSA.
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<td>CREATION OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) IN BORNO STATE</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PANEL CREATED TO NEGOTIATE WITH BH</td>
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<td>SEP 23 2012</td>
<td>FGN KILL 35 BH ARREST 60</td>
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78 In July 2011, the FGN announced proposed negotiations with Boko-Haram. In an unprecedented move, the FGN also ensured that five police officers were held responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf.

79 Following the intensification of attacks in the North, on the 31st of December 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in Borno state, Niger state, Plateau state, and Yobe state. He also announced that all northern borders were to be closed.

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<tr>
<td>APR 22 2013</td>
<td>JTF CAPTURE MEND MILITANTS AND RECOVER 400M3 OF LOOTED OIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 27 2013</td>
<td>JTF RAID MEND CAMP. SET IT ABLAZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 28 2013</td>
<td>JTF CAPTURE 76 MEND OPERATIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 MAY 2013</td>
<td>STATE OF EMERGENCY DECLARED IN ADAMAWA BORNO AND YOBE STATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 2013</td>
<td>TERRORISM PREVENTION BILL REVIEWED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN - OCT 2013</td>
<td>MULTIPLE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN JTF AND BH LEAVE HUNDREDS DEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 12-18 2013</td>
<td>NA OFFENSIVE LEAVES 150 BH OPERATIVES DEAD</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAN 2014</td>
<td>INTENSIFICATION OF MILITARY PRESENCE IN NORTHERN REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR 14 2014</td>
<td>JTF KILL OVER 600 RECAPPED BH OPERATIVES ACCORDING TO AMNESTY INTL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 1 2014</td>
<td>INTERAGENCY COOPERATION TO TACKLE TERRORISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 2014</td>
<td>MORE TROOPS DEPLOYED TO NORTH</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE 2014</td>
<td>ARMY KILL OVER 50 BH</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE 2014</td>
<td>FGN LAUNCHES AIRSTRIKES AGAINST BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 26 2014</td>
<td>JTF RAID KILLS OVER 100 BH OPERATIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 2014</td>
<td>AIRSTRIKE KILLS CIVILIANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 2014</td>
<td>CEASEFIRE BROKERED WITH BH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.6 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PERSONALITY OF NIGERIA DURING THE “EXPLOSION PERIOD”

Based on State behaviour observed during this case study, it is reasonable for an observer to characterise Nigeria’s National Security Strategic Personality, as Introverted in its outlook, Interest-Centric in its provision, and Constraining in its severity.

Table 20. Dependent Variable Measurement: NSSP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Inflationary Containment</th>
<th>Compression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introverted</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Constraining*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extroverted</td>
<td>Interest-Centric *</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter performed an in-depth empirical validation exercise of the NSSP theory, through the utilisation of the case-study methods of analysis, which investigated the interactions between the Nigerian state, and Malicious Non-State Actors, from 2009 to 2014. The author was able to reasonably identify and characterise the National Security Strategic Personality of the Nigerian State. Also, the author was made aware of the following methodological considerations;

Unlike the challenges which the author faced with regards to data collection in the Formation and Secession case study, the author was able to access copious amounts of data regarding Nigerian state behaviour, thus enabling the author to offer a comprehensive account of events that occurred during the Explosion period. The availability of data spanning this period, also enabled the author to test the effectiveness of the NSSP theory, when copious instances of observable state behaviour were input. Nigerian NSSP identified in the Explosion case study, appears consistent with NSSP identified from previous case studies, suggesting that Nigerian NSSP proves to be lasting constant through Nigerian history, regardless of the nature of governance in place.

The next chapter is an overview of this research. Within the next chapter, the author collates the highlights of this study, as well as a summary of major findings. This conclusion
draws from the entire body of research, and highlights key findings. The author proposes recommendations for policy and further academic research at the end of the chapter.
9 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

9.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an overview of this research which is centred primarily on the development of the National Security Strategic Personality theory, and the empirical validation of the NSSP theory, which simultaneously sought to identify and characterise Nigerian NSSP from 1960 to 2014. This conclusion was drawn from the entire body of research, and highlights key findings. The author proposes recommendations for policy and further academic research at the end of this chapter.

9.2 HIGHLIGHTS OF THE STUDY

This research, set out with the initial aims of developing an explanatory typology, to reveal the underlying reasons for variances observed in the operationalisation of National Security. In achieving this task, the author carried out a systematic investigation of the existence and character of a National Security Strategic Personality, utilising various case study periods, extracted from Nigerian history. The author’s quest to proffer a potentially novel means through which one could understand the ways of national security was initially driven by the insight gained from generations of scholarship which emerged within strategic culture, aided by constructivist ontology, empirically tested through case study analysis, and findings presented as an explanatory typology.

The author surveyed the ability of the Strategic Culture theoretical framework to characterise these varying types of National Security. However, while each of the generations of strategic culture offered novel ways in which one could identify different types of national security, the lack of an exhaustive definition of strategic culture, coupled with grave methodological disparities, hindered the strategic culture theory from enabling a better understanding of national security types. Focusing on a constructivist interpretation of Security and National Security as concepts. The author went further, to analyse the utility of the Strategic Culture theoretical framework, tracking the development of the theoretical framework, identifying the questions which necessitated the strategic culture theoretical framework, and critically appraising its evolution through three generations of scholarship. The author argued that different versions of National Security exist, based on the information gathered about National Security strategy. The subjectivity of value within distinct human
societies was observed to influence the prioritised referent objects of security within these societies. It was also argued that a constructivist ontology was the most appropriate to accommodate the complexities of characterising such a broad range of possible National Security types.

The identified inability of the aforementioned theories, necessitated the development of a proposed theoretical framework that could (in theory) adequately merge the descriptive and interpretive qualities of both the strategic culture and the national strategic personality theoretical frameworks. Utilising the careful deconstruction of strategic culture as a starting point, as well as the constructivist approach to national security, the author was able to propose a working definition of national security, which guided the development of an explanatory typology that could potentially capture the essence of national security in various states.

The author's focus on observable state behaviour as the starting point for such a hybrid theoretical framework led to the development of the National Security Strategic Personality theoretical framework. The development of the explanatory typology, was guided by the national strategic personality typology, which sought to identify a state's ultimate concerns, and categorise different states according to this. Ziemke’s typology was adapted in a manner which enabled the researcher to dissect observable state behaviour along the lines of identifying: Security for Whom? From what threats? By what means? and Where? The author developed elements of the NSSP theoretical framework, based on these questions. The Inflationary Containment element focused on answering the question: Security for Whom? The Orientation element focused on answering: From what threats? and Where? Finally, the Compression element focused on answering: By what means?

The author then proceeded to construct the National Security Strategic Personality NSSP framework in a manner applicable to case studies. In achieving this research objective, the author explained how a National Security Strategic Personality could be identified, and expanded on the key elements which constitute such. The author also expanded on the qualities and modes of interaction among the elements within the NSSP framework. Notably, the identification of the sub-elements of the NSSP theoretical framework, and their subsequent utility in creating the independent variables of the framework was explained in the third chapter. The three independent variables were consequently placed on measurement scales, to enable the characterisation of the three dimensions of observable state behaviour within an NSSP.
The author then proceeded to apply the NSSP theory on the Nigerian case study, wherein it was observed that the Nigerian way of national security, was, in fact, attributable to its NSSP, which had been forged and modified to suit both the material and ideational context within which the Nigerian State was situated. The collation of Nigerian strategy, served as the basis for proffered interpretations of Nigerian National Security Strategy within this research. Instances of observed State behaviour against MNSAs, were utilised as the primary sources of information, which the author dissected by utilising the three proposed independent variables of the NSSP theoretical framework.

The author was reasonably successful in tracking and characterising the coercive moves carried out by the Nigerian State against its perceived Malicious Non-State Actors over time, and identified specific patterns of strategy, which revealed the habitual behaviours of the Nigerian State, and its conditioned responses to MNSA. These patterns of strategy, not only exposed deeply rooted assumptions about the efficiency of Nigeria's preferred strategic means, but they also enabled the author to identify periods wherein the Nigerian state made attempts to innovate and evolve.

The second principal objective of this dissertation was also achieved. It involved the empirical validation of the NSSP theoretical framework, and an assessment of the NSSP dependent variables identified. Detailed steps were taken in the fourth chapter, to introduce the reader to the Nigerian environment. This chapter also identified the case studies which were subjected to the NSSP empirical validation exercise in the fifth to eighth chapters.

**9.3 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS**

**9.3.1 The State**

The behaviour of Nigeria as a State actor, depended primarily on the wishes of the rational human actors (such as Sir Bello, Lt. Col Gowon or Gen. Abacha), who, utilising the institutional structures of the state, carried out actions on behalf of the State, and legitimised their actions by rationalising them as necessary in the pursuit of National Ideals, National Interests, National Unity, and National Security. The most powerful Nigerians who occupied the highest positions of power, were regarded as expressions of agency within the state, who utilised the structure of the state to operationalise strategy.

Utilising a constructivist ontology, the author considered this personalisation of National interests, as a result of the mutual dependence of agency and structure, being
inseparable determinants of State behaviour as an outcome. Nigerian State behaviour could not have been exerted exclusively by institutional structures without the influence of individual agents, and vice-versa. Therefore, viewing the State as a unitary actor within the case-studies, enabled the observer to track the development not only of State strategy, but the interdependent relationship between powerful Nigerians and the strategic inclination of Nigeria, through its history as an independent State.

The methodology used in this research was highly beneficial to the observer, as it enabled the adequate characterisation of Observable State Behaviour. In the same vein, it also enabled the observer to adequately identify and characterise Nigeria’s perceived MNSAs, specifically in those periods of the case studies, where certain individuals simultaneously occupied formal positions within government and championed the causes of an MNSA (such as when Gen Ojukwu was the Military Governor of the Eastern Region and Biafra MNSA leader, or when Chief Awolowo was the head of official opposition and the AG MNSA leader). This methodology was also very valuable, in enabling the observer to delineate the State from other actors during times of rapid, and often violent changes of government (such as during the First and Counter coups).

9.3.2 MNSAs

The term Malicious Non-State actors, was coined by the author to refer to organisations or individuals, whose existence, objectives and actions, are perceived as proximally threatening to the Referent Objects of a State. The author argued that the perception of a Malicious Non-State Actor as a threat, is determined by the existence of a State that perceives the Non-State Actor as a threat to its interests. While it might have seemed unreasonable to theoretically categorise Terrorist Organisations, Organised Criminal Networks, Secessionist Movements, and Armed Militias under a unifying term, this research revealed that these threats had enough characteristics in common, to justify their joint classification.

The case studies observed by the author, witnessed the emergence of MNSAs with similar objectives and configuration. MNSAs within this research were a retaliation of numerous disenfranchised citizens to the prevailing power structures of the Nigerian State. These MNSAs were readily identifiable for two reasons. Firstly, MNSAs identified themselves as opposed to the National interests of the State which identified them as threats. Leaders of these MNSAs were often vocal in their criticism of the State. In the same vein, they were defensive of their modus operandi which capitalised on the use of political violence, riots and
violent dissidence, which they claimed was necessary as there were no means with which they could demonstrate their grievances in compatibility with the existence of the State. Secondly, MNSAs were readily identifiable because, the professed concerns of the Nigerian state, implied that the existence and functions of MNSAs were primary obstacles to National ideals. MNSAs were also identifiable because, Governments in observed case-studies, tended to concentrate their resources towards any organisations which they believed to be embodiments of underlying socio-political and economic grievances. Thus, following government responses to areas within which these tensions were expressed through political violence, aided the researcher to identify MNSAs that were the focus of government strategy.

9.3.2.1 Evolution of MNSAs

Another consideration worthy of note, was the homogenous nature of MNSAs in the beginning of the Formation period. The AG and the UMBC were entirely made up of individuals belonging to the same ethnic tribes, with the Yorubas and Tivmen populating both MNSAs respectively. However, after 1962, the observer witnessed cooperation between both AG and UMBC MNSAs. This cooperation signified the relegation of tribal differences by MNSAs, which was replaced with an understanding of the similar objectives, and modus operandi of both MNSAs. This trend, was much more identifiable in the Secession case study, as Biafra MNSA was not an ethnically homogenous MNSA. Instead, the Biafra MNSA was a coalition of numerous minority tribes within the Eastern region, who believed that they were subjected to Northern oppression. Admittedly the Biafra MNSA was mostly populated by Igbo tribesmen from the Eastern region. But, this Igbo dominance within Biafra MNSA was merely a representation of the ethnic demographics of the Eastern region, and not because of an Igbo-centric ideology. However, in subsequent case-studies, there were no instances of observed cooperation between MNSAs, as MNSAs in the Niger Delta and those in the North, were observed to have completely different objectives and were increasingly dissimilar in that regard. However, the author did observe the utilisation of similar types of violence by MNSAs in the Explosion period. With exception to the utilisation of suicide bombing by MEND and Boko Haram, repeatedly detonated explosives around government buildings, and even abducted civilians and foreigners alike.

By the end of the Formation case study, and through the Secession case study, MNSAs in were; A political movement, which sought emancipation from central rule, spurred by feelings of marginalisation of an ethnic group or region, championed by an organisation willing to utilise violence in response to militaristic suppression. From the 1970s onwards, however,
MNSAs were increasingly violent, largely homogenous, and dissimilar in their objectives. One similarity within the first two case studies were the leaders of MNSAs. These leaders were mostly individuals who embodied the aspirations of a particular ethnic group or geo-political region, to be either more included in governance, or exempt from central suppression by way of secession from the Nigerian union. These individuals believed that they had exhausted all legitimate avenues to achieve their aspirations, and resorted to unconventional means of challenging the government in question. Mr Tarka championing the emancipation of the Middle-Belt Zones (Tiv tribesmen), Awolowo championing the emancipation of the Western region (Yoruba tribesmen), and Gen Ojukwu championing the emancipation of the Eastern Region (Igbo and other minority tribesmen). However, in the Explosion case study, leaders of MNSAs were more exploitative of local grievances towards the government, and relied on the continuation of Constraining Compression by the FGN, to legitimise their means of violence, and recruit more followers. This shift in the characteristics of MNSA leaders, was reflective of the crystallisation of Nigerian NSSP, to the extent where MNSA leaders could even anticipate a militarised suppressive response from the FGN, if such an MNSA was observed to interact significantly with FGN referent objects.

9.3.3 Nigerian NSSP as a Dependent Variable

9.3.3.1 Orientation

Taking into account the proposition of an extroverted Nigerian strategic outlook by Sir. Balewa at the beginning of the Formation case study, it is ironic that Nigeria never achieved this, as a result of political instability and in-fighting within Nigeria. Various manifestations of political instability within the Formation and Secession case studies made it impossible for such a new country, with limited means, to pursue such an extroverted strategy. Nigeria's immediate goals of development and leadership within the West-African geopolitical sphere, would be met with timely resistance from within the Nigerian State. The fragile nature of Nigeria's union during the Formation and Secession periods, limited the focus of Nigerian NSSP to MNSAs, which were viewed as a direct threat to Nigeria's unity.

In the Formation case study, Nigeria had become so engulfed in domestic political issues, that in practice, its Orientation was “Introverted”. The same could be said during the secession case-study, as instances of Inflationary Containment and Compression were predominantly within Nigerian territory, except the Aburi conference in Ghana, which is a neighbouring State. In the period spanning 1970-1999, the Nigerian government was also
predominantly introverted in its outlook, with the exception of periodic deployments of FGN soldiers on peacekeeping missions in the sub-region. However, these peacekeeping deployments were short-lived, and the occasional withdrawal of FGN troops to mitigate domestic political violence, was a recurring feature.

In the case studies, the internal configuration of governmental institutions could not have been more different, with Nigeria operating a parliamentary system of government during the Formation case-study, and a Military dictatorship during the Secession case study, several periods of Military dictatorship and brief democratic intermissions were observed in 1970-1999, and the FGN was typified by an American Style Presidential system in the Explosion period. However, these differences did not reflect on Nigeria’s Orientation, and the nature of threats which it perceived as MNSAs that had to be tackled. Therefore, the preservation of an Introverted Orientation was evident throughout the case studies.

9.3.3.2 Inflationary Containment

In all case studies, it was established that Nigeria’s prioritised Referent Objects were Interests. Whilst the specific interests which Nigerian NSSP prioritised were marginally different, People were not observed to be the core focus of Nigerian NSSP for various reasons. The Nigerian State was primarily observed to operationalise strategy with the aim of protecting interests such as National Unity, and its longevity in power, or Regime security. In the Formation case study, the deployment of the Army to police elections, at specific polling stations where MNSAs were active, indicated the manifestation of State interests in the electoral processes of these specific areas. The nature of military deployment amidst the violence between civilians at the grassroots level during the Formation case study, indicated that the Nigerian State was explicitly interested in the security of ballot boxes, as opposed to the well-being of civilians resident in those areas. In the Secession case study, the nature of Inflationary Containment represented similar interests of the Nigerian State. These interests were observed to have been prioritised over the security of people. As the Biafra MNSA developed and expanded, Nigeria's police action, its prioritised recapture of territory with significant assets, the indiscriminate killing of civilians, and its dismissal of recommendations devised during negotiations, vividly illustrate to an observer, that; Regime Security, Territorial Sovereignty, Valuable Assets and the Preservation of Nigeria as a single political entity, were the Prioritised Referent Objects. This interest-centric nature of Nigerian NSSP was further typified by the reactive nature of FGN National Security efforts in the Explosion period. In the chronology of events, the observer vividly identified lengthy periods of MNSA activity and
interaction with people, followed by brief and brutal compressive responses by the FGN. Coupled with the grave human rights violations, and the occasional slaughter of civilians by FGN security operatives, and it becomes increasingly clear that people were not the core focus of Nigerian NSSP strategy in the Explosion period. Therefore, Nigerian NSSP remained Interest Centric in all case studies observed.

9.3.3.3 Compression

The dimension of Nigerian NSSP which, at first glance, seemed to vary considerably from the Formation to Secession case study, was the compression of MNSAs. It is apparent that the Nigerian State in both case studies were constraining in their extermination of MNSAs. However, it could be said that the brutality of compression in the secession case study greatly outweighed that of the Formation case study. In the Formation case study, the observer noted that the Nigerian State targeted peripheral interests of MNSAs with higher frequency when compared with the core interests of MNSAs. Arrests and Detention of UMBC and AG personnel was the most frequently recorded compression strategy during the Formation Case study. However, there was a specific trend of intensification during the Formation case study, and this was gradual. In the earlier periods of the Formation case study, the Nigerian State did attempt to negotiate with UMBC leaders. The Nigerian State also actively participated in the promulgation of counter-narratives to those expressed by MNSA leaders. The unrelenting momentum of MNSAs during this period, necessitated the arrests and detention of MNSA personnel. At the tail end of the Formation period, the mobilisation of the Nigerian Army and Police force on some occasions, signified the beginning of the State’s reliance on constraining strategy to eliminate MNSAs.

Surprisingly, this reliance on constraining compression was seemingly reversed by the FMG led Nigerian State at the beginning of the Secession case study. The FMG led Nigerian State facilitated, and actively participated in negotiations with Biafra MNSA at the beginning of the Secession case study. Initially, the Nigerian State sought to utilise more diplomatic, as well as tactical means (administrative reform), at delegitimising the positions of MNSA leaders, utilising strategy that could be viewed as equally affecting all regions of the country, to target Ojukwu's formal position of authority subliminally. The constraining compressive strategy was very efficient in terms of neutralising Biafra MNSA. However, these successes were marred because of collateral damage, and the fallout of this episode in Nigeria's history, continues to influence Nigerian politics and governance today. It can be argued that the reliance on constraining compression by the FGN in the Explosion case study, was as a consequence of
the inability of compelling communication to immediately compress the objectives of MNSAs in the preceding case studies. Thus, the heavy-handed implementation of constraining compression by the FGN was expected in the Explosion case study, as this style of strategy was viewed as the most effective means of exterminating MNSAs, as learned from the earlier periods.

### 9.3.3.4 Collation of Nigerian State NSSP from 1960-2014

The NSSP dependent variable of all case studies are intimately connected. Analysis of the Formation period, revealed that the Nigerian State in its initial experience of MNSA elimination, set a precedent for NSSP strategy in subsequent case studies. The ramifications of Nigeria's first NSSP, meant that the gradual crystallisation of Nigeria's NSSP, would result in an observer identifying a similar NSSP strategy today.

#### Table 21. Nigerian NSSP in Formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Inflationary Containment</th>
<th>Compression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introverted</td>
<td>* People-Centric</td>
<td>Constraining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extroverted</td>
<td>Interest-Centric</td>
<td>* Coercive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 22. Nigerian NSSP in Secession

<table>
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<th>Compression</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introverted</td>
<td>* People-Centric</td>
<td>Constraining*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extroverted</td>
<td>Interest-Centric</td>
<td>* Coercive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 23. Nigerian NSSP in Explosion

<table>
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<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Inflationary Containment</th>
<th>Compression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introverted</td>
<td>* People-Centric</td>
<td>Constraining*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Nigeria is plagued with various security issues, which have deeply rooted origins in Nigeria’s history. Boko Haram, Mend and other MNSAs all appear to be reincarnations of earlier MNSAs such as Maitatsine and Biafra. Nigerian NSSP has remained mostly introverted, interest-centric and constraining throughout its history, and it is arguable that current MNSAs in Nigeria are, in part, a repercussion of Nigerian NSSP. MNSAs in Nigeria have repeatedly blamed the government, citing mismanagement of national income and the marginalisation of the masses as grievances which necessitates their existence. The author suggests, that the Nigerian government takes informed decisions towards perhaps a revision of state strategy. It is arguable, that dire conditions of poverty and illiteracy especially at the grassroots level, enable the emergence of MNSAs. It is also arguable, that militaristic responses to MNSAs by the Nigerian government have only served to exacerbate tensions, and increase the resilience of MNSAs. While it is true that MNSAs from 1960 through 2014 have been repeatedly eliminated through brute physical force, it is also true that these MNSAs have dispersed, and regrouped severally, under new leaderships and identities, and are becoming increasingly resilient to militaristic suppression. The NSSP theory has shown that there has been little or no change in Nigerian NSSP, and perhaps the time has come for some strategic revision of Nigeria NSSP, if Nigeria is to expect different results. Two considerations of significance, relate to the increased prioritisation of People as referent objects of Nigerian national security. Till date, as evidenced in this study, the Nigerian State has focused primarily on interests as the prioritised referent objects of its NSSP. This disposition, has had far reaching consequences on the nature of its compressive strategy, which has been identified to be overwhelmingly militarised and brutal. With people prioritised as Nigeria’s referents, perhaps such a change might usher in a new era of political stability within the country, where its citizens can seek for change within the political system, using appropriate avenues of suffrage, negotiation and political participation. Another recommended change to Nigerian NSSP, would be the implementation of negotiation strategies with perceived MNSAs, as opposed to the implementation of brute physical force. As the Secession case study showed, the potentials of negotiated settlements between the Nigerian State and its perceived MNSAs have had superior influence on the strategic choice of MNSAs, when compared to brute physical force, which in
many cases has only served to strengthen the resilience of MNSAs who utilise the brutality of the Nigerian state, as a rationale to reciprocate with further violence. In prioritising negotiation as the primary compressive strategy of Nigerian NSSP, compromise, inclusion and truly representative interests of Nigerians as whole, would be permitted to flourish, thereby setting the conditions where ethnic, religious and class rivalry would become primitive and uninfluential factors in Nigerian governance.

9.5 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Looking to the future, the author believes that further research into national security strategy, would only benefit from an incorporation of the realist, strategic culture and constructivist ontological approaches. This incorporation of ontology serves to enable a more comprehensive approach to security challenges in today’s security climate. The emergence of malicious non-state actors, operate rather differently from the entities which the traditional realist theories of security studies were designed to understand. However, the emergence of malicious non-state actors does not in any way diminish the importance of realist understandings of conventional threats, which are still very much in existence today.

The NSSP theory is one of many possible explanatory typologies, which could be created through the careful deconstruction and modification of existing theories, and the author believes there is still a great amount of insight which could be gained from the generation and application of such theories, especially within security studies. The author also believes that the applicability of the NSSP theory is not limited to the Nigerian context. Rather, the NSSP theory is expected to be a suitable explanatory typology in the wider context of analysing the national security strategy of states, by focusing on observable state behaviour. Therefore, the author encourages researchers, to utilise this theory on case studies beyond Nigeria.

There is still room for refinement with regards to the NSSP theory, which could possibly be attempted in the near future. Firstly, the NSSP theory offers no hierarchical classification of state national security strategy according to its development. While it is common knowledge that every state possesses different capabilities, states national security strategies have not been classified as being developed, semi-developed or underdeveloped with the NSSP theory as is. Secondly, the author believes that while the qualitative nature of the NSSP theory seems adequate, the independent variables of the NSSP theory could be improved on in a manner which could enhance its predictive capabilities, and in time, quantitative methodology can be developed which would enable the analysis of significantly more instances of observable state
behaviour. As our awareness of events around the world continues to increase exponentially, due to globalisation and technological means through which events are recorded, the NSSP theory might become tedious if it is applied to case studies with infinitely more instances of observable state behaviour, in comparison to the earlier case studies which have been observed in this thesis. This is why the author believes that the quantification of NSSP variables, might enable researchers to create automated computer generated programs which could classify observable state behaviour, according to the basic tenets of the NSSP theory.
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